Consultation on Orbital Liabilities, Insurance, Charging and Space Sustainability

Q: 9. Annex A – Variable Liability Limit Approach Guidance

This additional guidance to the proposed variable liability limit approach is in draft pending the feedback from the consultation. This document will be updated to reflect the consultation feedback and the final scope of the variable liability limit adopted. The purpose of this guidance will be to provide some further context for the different elements of the approach, if this were to be adopted. It focuses on stage 2 of the proposed approach and will be further updated as the stage 1 mission categorisation and orbit sustainability risks are developed. Given the wide range of mission types and bespoke nature of individual missions, it is not intended that this guidance can cover each scenario that may arise; nor should it be construed that adopting any particular measures noted in this guidance would guarantee a positive score under the proposed approach. This would be determined on a case-by-case based on what is considered to be above and beyond what would be reasonably expected to apply in the specific application. The guidance, along with the proposed approach, would also be updated to reflect policy developments as they arise. This guidance therefore provides a set of guidelines as to the sort of actions which might result in a positive score under the relevant questions in the proposed approach.

Question 1

1. Ministerial Foreword

Accepted Answer

The space and satcomms sector is fundamental to all our day-to-day lives. Whether through our use of satcomms to support communications, weather services, banking, or our ability to use space for satcomms, space is a critical resource to support activity on Earth. But it is a resource that we need to nurture to ensure that future generations can also use and access the potential that space has to offer. We need to protect the near-earth and lunar environments from debris and junk pollution so that our world-class astronomers and scientists can continue to do important deep-space science and discovery to unlock the secrets of the universe and origins of life on Earth, as well as enable an increasingly diverse range of commercial activities to operate in a safe and sustainable manner. The responsible use of space is key to a sustainable future for space and the development of new sustainability insights and technologies we need on Earth. The UK is leading the way on setting the agenda for how this can be achieved.

Alongside the National Space Strategy, which sets out the high-level, long-term framework for the UK’s ambitions for the space sector, I have set out four key priorities for UK space policy: unlocking commercial investment and growth in the space sector; deeper collaboration internationally to enhance space sustainability and security; growing the UK as a science and technology superpower; and developing resilient space capabilities and services as a key part of the UK science and technology superpower mission.

Launching the UK’s Plan for Space Sustainability at the 4th Summit for Space Sustainability held in London in June last year, I said that a ‘Wild West’ space race without effective regulation risks a growing crisis of debris in space, which would undermine our ability to harness space as a planet and a nation. Our Plan referenced action that both the UK Government and industry are taking to introduce world-leading initiatives on space sustainability. It is vital that such action is not only driven by government-led regulation but working in partnership with the wider sector to develop a holistic plan of action to work towards a commonly agreed goal.

At the 5th Summit for Space Sustainability in June this year (which I am delighted was sponsored by the UK Space Agency and other leading UK space sector organisations), the UK set out further detail of the world-leading Space Sustainability Standard, being developed by the UK space sector and fully supported by the UK Government with growing international support from other space nations. Initiatives such as this help put the UK at the heart of international leadership on the sustainability agenda and I look forward to setting out further detail on the UK Government’s wider regulatory review of orbital regulation later this year.

This consultation sets out further detail on other government-led initiatives on space sustainability, in particular our proposal for a variable limit of liability for orbital operations, which includes a world-first approach to linking liability limits to sustainable operations.

One of the key aspects of such measures is that they have been designed to be flexible and evolve with both technology and commercial pressures and to accommodate future policy initiatives to support our sustainability objectives. With that in mind, it is important for the UK Government and the wider sector to have clarity on a pathway to a sustainable future for space. One of the key proposals in this consultation is to develop a roadmap to 2050 and potentially beyond to support sector planning and wider discussion needed at international level to enable that sustainable future to materialise. I therefore call on the sector to fully engage in the government’s development of its roadmap so that we have a shared ambition and understanding of what is needed.

This consultation will also help inform developing government policy on a range of other policy questions, including on-going work to establish a set of sustainability principles for UK activities.

I am also conscious that future investment and insurance in our space sector is intrinsically linked to the space sustainability agenda. This consultation therefore seeks your views on current and future issues and opportunities to create the best environment for all parts of our space sector to thrive.

As I said at this year’s Space Sustainability Symposium and Royal Society event, we need to look at space regulation not as a constraint on the sector, but as key to setting the foremost consumer and investor confidence which history shows us is key to unlocking investment and long-term viability. As we look to harness space as the new frontier of human endeavour, it is helpful to recall the lessons of other new frontiers. There are 8,000 active satellites in orbit and 3,000 redundant satellites, millions of pieces of debris and up to 90% of LEO satellites uninsured (except where third-party liability insurance is required, as for UK-licensed satellites) and without any global standards. Imagine a motor system with a redundant vehicle for every 2 in use, on deregulated roads with no insurance, police, or common standpoints. That is not a scenario conducive to investment confidence. Enlightened regulation of space to incentivise best practice is in all our interests.

This consultation sets out an ambitious agenda and asks fundamental questions about how the UK Government can support future space activities. Defining what a sustainable future looks like, and agreeing the steps to achieve such a future, is by no means an easy task but one we must do if we are to secure space as a resource for future generations. But if we invoke the spirit of leaders in the past, we can address those difficult questions and take the first small steps towards the sustainable space environment that it is our duty to create for generations to come.

Question 2

2. Executive Summary

Accepted Answer

2.1 Introduction

The UK Government committed in its response to the liabilities and insurance call for evidence in June 2022 to consult on a range of issues relating to orbital liabilities and insurance. This consultation delivers on this commitment. It includes a proposal for a variable liability limit approach to setting insurance requirements for satellite operations, which would implement a world-first approach whereby the liability limits for satellite operators’ missions would be determined by operators’ implementation of measures against a number of policy areas which the UK Government wishes to promote as part of its emerging sustainability agenda.

Space sustainability is a key pillar of the National Strategy. The variable liability limit approach proposed in this consultation delivers on the sustainability priorities of the National Space Strategy and the commitment in the Plan for Space Sustainability for the UK Government to consider ways to reduce insurance premia for satellite operations. The proposed variable liability limit approach has been devised to incentivise the adoption of more sustainable practices by operators. It addresses industry concerns that the UK approach to insurance for satellite operations is uncompetitive compared to some other nations, while reflecting UK Government priorities for space sustainability in setting an operator’s limit of liability.

The consultation also contains proposals for a range of other liabilities and insurance policies including options for alternative insurance models for satellite operators’ third-party liability (TPL) requirements, insurance for end-of-life and re-entry stages of missions, and a proposal for a variable approach to setting fees for orbital operator licences. Some of the policy positions the UK Government intends to implement, and others are policy proposals where the UK Government is seeking views from consultees.

The UK Space Agency (UK Space Agency) inspires and leads the UK in space to benefit our planet and its people and plays a major role in delivering the UK Government’s National Space Strategy.

UK Space Agency’s Value Proposition covers three main elements:

· catalyse investment to support projects that drive investment and generate contracts for the UK space sector

· deliver missions and capabilities that meet public needs and advance our understanding of the Universe

· champion the power of space to inspire people, offer greener, smarter solutions, and support a sustainable future

To achieve the greatest impact in these three areas, we focus most of our resource behind eight delivery Priorities. These are:

· launch: supporting satellite launch services from UK spaceports

· sustainability: taking a leading role in keeping space safe and accessible now and in the future

· discovery: supporting space science and exploration missions

· innovation: investing in bold new technologies

· levelling-up: boosting space investment and jobs across the country

· Earth observation: studying our planet to drive discovery and tackle climate change

· low-Earth orbit (LEO): delivering vital everyday satellite services

· inspiration: inspiring new space customers, investors and the next generation

Space Sustainability is becoming an issue of growing prominence. The UK Government firmly believes that the growing volume of debris in space is both environmentally and commercially unsustainable, requiring swift action to clean up the Earth’s orbit as well as to ensure future projects minimise their footprint through a variety of different approaches to debris prevention and mitigation.

The rapidly increasing number of launches and planned missions, especially into LEO which is forecast to continue and accelerate, and the expanding variety of missions means that space is becoming congested.

The importance of space sustainability to the UK Government was demonstrated at the 4th Space Summit in June 2022, when Minister Freeman announced that the UK Government would:

“undertake a regulatory review to incentivise sustainable practises, investment and growth, allowing today’s latest innovations in technologies such as Active Debris Removal (ADR), In-Orbit Servicing and Manufacturing (IOSM) and sustainable development to become tomorrow’s norms in space operation”.

In addition to proposals for orbital liabilities, insurance and charging, this consultation seeks views on the actions needed to address longer-term issues for space sustainability and where the UK can demonstrate leadership. This includes a proposal to develop a UK Space Sustainability Roadmap to 2050, which would define a UK space sustainability goal and actions to deliver this objective.

Implementation of the variable liability limit approach

In this year’s spring budget, the UK Government accepted all nine recommendations in Sir Patrick Vallance’s Pro-Innovation Regulation of Technologies Review: Digital Technologies. This included a recommendation for the UK Government to implement a variable liability limit approach for satellite operations. A change to a variable liability limit was also recommended by the Science and Technology Committee. The National Space Strategy also contained a commitment to review the UK’s approach to setting liability limits.

It is important to note that the consultation proposals on adopting the variable liability limit, charging and the other matters raised with regards to longer-term space sustainability contained in this consultation would be complementary with the Civil Aviation Authority’s (CAA) independent safety regime. The proposals would not replace this regime or otherwise influence the CAA’s independent assessments for licensing and/or regulatory oversight, in which safety considerations take primacy, as specified in the Space Industry Act 2018 (SIA 2018).

No decision has yet been made as to the detailed implementation of the UK Government’s variable liability limit proposal in this consultation (in particular which organisation or organisations would carry out the assessment if there was agreement to adopt the proposed approach), or how the information required for assessments will be sourced. To this end, the term ‘the assessors’ is used as a definition for the, to be determined, organisation or organisations which would administer the proposed variable liability limit approach.

Question 3

3. General information

Accepted Answer

3.1 Why we are consulting

The UK Government issued the Liabilities, Insurance and Charging consultation in October 2020 consultation covering the proposed approach to determining insurance requirements for launches licensed under the SIA 2018, the liabilities provisions contained in the draft Space Industry Regulations and associated guidance. In response to this, industry raised several policy matters regarding existing orbital liability and insurance policy, which the UK Government committed to reviewing.

The National Space Strategy, published in September 2021, stated the UK Government commitment to undertake a review of the key concerns and proposals raised by respondents to the consultation document entitled ‘Unlocking commercial spaceflight for the UK: consultation on draft insurance and liabilities requirements to implement the Space Industry Act’ (‘the Liability, Insurance and Charging consultation’). The UK Government issued a call for evidence in October 2021 to gather evidence, data and information to assist in policy development on these matters.

The UK Government published its response to the call for evidence in June 2022. The UK Government committed to work with the sector to develop formal proposals for consultation. This consultation includes proposals to implement a variable approach to setting liability limits for in-orbit operations, the UK Government’s latest thinking on alternative models for third-party liability insurance and a range of other issues arising from the liability and insurance review. A variable refund for orbital satellite licences to reflect sustainability aspects of a mission is also proposed.

This consultation provides an overview of policy areas which influence and could impact future adaptions to the proposed variable liability limit approach. There is a section which sets out longer-term actions that the UK could take to promote space sustainability and demonstrate leadership, including a proposal to develop a Space Sustainability Roadmap to 2050.

A supporting impact assessment has not been included with this consultation.

Whilst this consultation does not include an impact assessment, analysis has been undertaken to assess the business impacts of the proposed variable liability limit and variable refund approaches. Consultation feedback will also help inform further analysis of the benefits and costs of the proposals.

The UK Government has set a consultation period of 12 weeks to ensure that consultees have sufficient time to consider the range of issues and develop their responses.

3.2 Consultation details

Issued: 14 September 2023

Respond by:

· Section one responses are encouraged by 26 October 2023

· Sections two and three by 7 December 2023

Enquiries to:

Steve Plant Office of Regulation UK Space Agency Polaris House North Star Avenue Swindon Wiltshire SN2 1SZ

Email: spaceflightregulation@ukspaceagency.gov.uk

Consultation reference: Consultation on Orbital Liabilities, Insurance, Charging and Space Sustainability

Audiences:

This consultation is addressed primarily to orbital operators who either are licensed under the Outer Space Act 1986 (OSA) or are considering making applications under that Act or the SIA 2018 as well as providers of insurance services for the space sector. It may also be of interest to launch operators and those carrying out associated activities under either of these Acts. The UK Government would also welcome views from other stakeholders with an interest, either those associated with the space sector, or more generally, including academics and those who provide financial services other than insurance.

Territorial extent:

UK-wide as space policy is a reserved matter and responses are welcome from respondents in all parts of the UK.

3.3 How to respond

Email to: spaceflightregulation@ukspaceagency.gov.uk

Write to:

Steve Plant Office of Regulation UK Space Agency Polaris House North Star Avenue Swindon Wiltshire SN2 1SZ

A response form is available on the GOV.UK consultation page: www.gov.uk/government/consultations/XXX

When responding, please state whether you are responding as an individual or representing the views of an organisation.

Your response will be most useful if it is framed in direct response to the questions posed, though further comments and evidence are also welcome.

3.4 Confidentiality and data protection

Information you provide in response to this consultation may be disclosed in accordance with UK legislation (the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004). Please tell us in writing if you want any information you provide to be treated as confidential, but please be aware that we cannot guarantee confidentiality in all circumstances. Automatic confidentiality disclaimers generated by your IT systems will not be regarded as a confidentiality request.

Please see our privacy policy, any Personal Data provided will be dealt with in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018 and the UK GDPR. Where the legal basis for processing Personal Data provided in the course of this consultation is not that of the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority (Public Task), it is processed for a legitimate reason in connection with that task (Legitimate Interests).

We will summarise all responses and publish this summary on GOV.UK. The summary will include a list of names or organisations that responded, but not people’s personal names, addresses or other contact details.

3.5 Quality assurance

This consultation has been carried out in accordance with the UK Government’s consultation principles.

If you have any complaints about the way this consultation has been conducted, please email: bru@energysecurity.gov.uk.

Question 4

4. Context and Background Information

Accepted Answer

The 1972 UN Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (‘the Liability Convention’), which the UK has ratified, is the foundation for space liability regimes worldwide. Under the Liability Convention, the UK Government is ultimately liable for damage to the persons or property of other states caused by the space activities of its nationals or caused by such activities carried out from its facilities or territory. This means that another state suffering damage can bring a claim against the UK Government under this Treaty. The Liability Convention builds on Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty which makes a launching state internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty.

In relation to damage on the surface of the Earth and to aircraft in flight, the liability to pay compensation is absolute which means that the state bringing the claim would not need to prove fault. In relation to damage in space, the liability is fault-based. The Liability Convention therefore provides foreign nationals with the ability (via their own government) to seek compensation (possibly from the UK Government in cases where the UK is considered to be a ‘Launching State’) for damage or loss without having to prove fault.

Under the Liability Convention, a Launching State is liable for damage arising out of its space activities to property of States or of persons, or property of international intergovernmental organisations, or loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health.

A Launching State is defined in Art. I of the Liability Convention as:

· a State that launches or procures the launching of a space object

· a State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched.

There can be, and often is, more than one Launching State involved in a mission.

Damage caused on the surface of the Earth or to an aircraft in flight carries absolute liability. (Art. II)

For damage caused elsewhere to a space object, or to persons or property on board such a space object, the Launching State is liable “only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible” (Art. III).

The Liability Convention has significant implications for how states regulate space activities, and many states have sought to manage or offset some of their liability for non-governmental space activities. Typically, this is done by minimising the risk of a collision or third-party damage in the first place (through a state’s licensing and compliance procedures); by requiring an indemnity from licensed operators for claims presented to the state; and by requiring a minimum level of TPL insurance cover as a condition of the licence, to better protect both the operator and the government of that state from such claims.

4.1 The UK’s liability and indemnity regime for spaceflight activities

In the UK, the UN space treaties are currently implemented through the Outer Space Act 1986 for activities by UK nationals and entities overseas and the Space Industry Act 2018, which along with the Space Industry Regulations 2021 enables spaceflight and associated activities to take place from the UK.

Under section 10 of the OSA 1986, operators must indemnify the UK Government for claims brought against the latter other than in circumstances set out in that section.

All licences issued under the OSA 1986 must state a limit to the amount of the operator’s liability to indemnify the UK Government for claims made against the latter.

The SIA 2018 contains provisions on an operator’s indemnification requirements (section 34 and section 36). There are also powers in the Act under section 12(2) and through regulation making powers in section 34(5) to limit the amount of an operator’s liability.

The UK Government has confirmed that that all operator licences issued under the SIA 2018 will contain a limit on the amount of an operator’s liability with respect to claims made under both section 34 and section 36 of the Act. Operators will therefore not be facing unlimited liability for actions carried out in compliance with the SIA 2018 and licence conditions.

Regulations 218, 219, 220 and 221 of the Space Industry Regulations 2021 cover the following with regards to liabilities:

· persons who do not have a strict liability right of claim under section 34(2);

· that a limit on the amount of an operator’s liability to third parties under section 34(2) and any other third-party liability not covered by section 34(2) must be included in an operator’s licence;

· cases in which limits on the amount of an operator’s liability are disapplied.

Third-party liability insurance requirements and limits on the amount of an operator’s liability for activities licensed under the OSA 1986 and the SIA 2018.

This section sets out the third-party liability (TPL) insurance requirements and operators’ indemnification obligations for licences issued under each Act.

Insurance and limit of orbital operator liability requirements in the OSA 1986 and SIA 2018 are as follows:

· €60m insurance requirement / indemnity limit for standard missions

· This may be higher for higher-risk missions;

· The insurance requirement may be waived for low-risk missions (but the €60m indemnity obligation remains);

· An ‘any one occurrence’ approach and ‘aggregate’ amounts to be determined by the regulator as appropriate.

4.2 Scope of this consultation

This consultation primarily focuses on the sustainability of the space environment.

Where applicable, it should be noted that the questions and proposals included in this consultation relate to licences issued under the SIA 2018 and the OSA 1986. In addition to orbital operations, the issues raised may also be of interest to other parties involved in spaceflight activities and we would welcome comments from such parties.

References throughout this consultation to ‘liability limits’ and ‘limits of liability’ should be interpreted as limits on the amount of an operator’s liability, as per the SIA 2018.

Question 5

5. Section 1 - Matters to address in the shorter term

Accepted Answer

5.1 Setting liability limits for orbital operations, alternative insurance models and other policy proposals

This section sets out the UK Government’s proposals or latest thinking on the areas covered in the UK Government’s response to the liabilities and insurance call for evidence, which was published in June 2022. A range of matters are covered, including:

· Seeking views on the UK Government’s proposal to adopt a variable liability limit approach for orbital operations which considers the orbital sustainability aspects of the mission.

· Setting out the UK Government’s views on the viability of adopting alternative approaches for insuring third-party liability obligations for orbital operations;

· Referring to the development of the industry-led Space Sustainability Standard, which was announced in June 2022 as part of the UK Plan for Space Sustainability.

Given the synergies between these three separate measures, views are sought on the overall benefits of the proposed measures in combination to potentially reduce insurance premiums and deliver other potential benefits, rather than assessing the benefits for each proposed individual measure.

Setting out the UK Government’s intended policy on other areas covered by the liability and insurance review to take into account the variable liability limit approach. This includes insurance requirements for end-of-life and re-entry of satellites.

Seeking views on a possible move to a variable refund approach for orbital operations licences to align with the proposed approach to setting variable liability limits.

The UK Government believes that applying a sustainability focus to setting liability limits for orbital operations aligns with other objectives. The first of these is that sustainability is a key pillar of the National Strategy. This methodology can therefore be seen as a tool to incentivise the adoption of more sustainable practices. The UK Government is also aware that investors are increasingly considering an operator’s approach to sustainability as a key factor in their investment decisions.

The UK Government is aware that other nations are also accounting for sustainability considerations in developing their respective national policies. The UK Government will continue to work with other space-faring nations to promote the adoption of more sustainable measures such as those included in this consultation and will keep these measures under review as part of the wider regulatory work to demonstrate global leadership and drive discussions on space safety, security and sustainability.

Developing the proposed variable liability limit approach for setting liability limits for orbital operations

The UK Government established a working group consisting of satellite operators, insurers, academics and other sector experts with experience in orbital modelling, safety and sustainability, as well as policy officials and experts from the UK’s spaceflight regulator, the CAA, to help inform the UK Government’s thinking as it developed its proposal on the variable limit approach. Actuarial expertise has been provided by the Government Actuary’s Department. The UK Government would like to thank the members of the working group for their input as the UK Government developed its thinking on the approach.

The scope and high-level approach for the proposed variable liability limit proposals was discussed in a stakeholder plenary session on 31 March 2023. Attendees from 46 organisations participated. The main questions from industry stakeholders related to whether the proposed variable liability limit approach would be a mandatory requirement for a licence application. There were also comments about UK competitiveness compared to liability and insurance requirements in other nations.

Proposal and guidance on the variable liability limit approach

Rationale for this approach

Feedback received from previous consultations stated that the UK’s approach to setting liability limits for satellite operations is uncompetitive. The National Space Strategy, issued in September 2021, committed to launch a review of options to consider a lower limit of operator liability for in-orbit operations and alternative insurance models to support the needs of small satellite operators. A call for evidence was issued in October 2021 to inform this review.

That review covered a number of aspects but focused on views on amending the current approach to setting operator limits of liability for satellite operations as well as alternative insurance models. With regards to setting operator limits of liability, the review made the following recommendations:

· to move to a variable liability limit approach

· this approach will reflect an orbital sustainability focus

· the UK Government proposed a limited number of liability thresholds with a minimum value of zero and maximum recommended of £50m.

Sustainability is one of the key elements of the National Space Strategy. Goal 2 of the Strategy, ‘Promote the values of Global Britain.’ states the following:

“We will support an open and stable international order through our engagement on space. We will demonstrate global leadership and drive discussions on space safety, security and sustainability, and hold other nations to account for their actions in space. We will promote responsible behaviours and work to avoid miscalculation, escalation, and conflict. With the UK’s partners, we will modernise the guidelines governing the peaceful and responsible use of space to keep pace with new technologies and create opportunities for science and industry.”

Moving to a variable approach to make the liability limit proportionate to measures that operators adopt to reduce the potential for debris creation and minimising the impact on the orbital environment of the mission against the sustainability priorities identified under the new scheme, aligns squarely with this objective. Amending liability limits in this way could also reduce insurance premia. The proposed approach is designed to incentivise operators to consider adopting enhanced measures in a number of different mission aspects to reduce the overall impact of the proposed mission on the orbital environment. This would also enable operators to focus on UK Government and sector priorities on sustainable practices.

The proposed approach sets out a clear direction of travel with regards to space sustainability and provides a clear indication of current priority areas for operators to consider. These will be adapted over time as UK Government thinking develops, as well as that of the sector and other international organisations.

It is important to note that the proposed variable liability limit approach is completely separate and distinct to the mission safety assessment carried out by the CAA as part of a licence application as to whether the mission risks have been mitigated to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). It will therefore not be a consideration in the CAA’s determination as to whether a mission is licensable.

The questions on mission sustainability set out in stage 2 of the proposed approach reflect the UK Government’s current sustainability priorities and are not mandatory requirements for licensing purposes. It would be entirely at the discretion of the applicant as to whether they choose to adopt additional measures to score marks under stage 2 of the proposed variable liability limit approach. The purpose of the proposed approach is to reflect in the liability limit additional actions taken by operators to enhance the sustainability of their mission.

At this stage, no decisions have been taken as to who would carry out the assessment. The UK Government is holding discussions with the CAA on how the assessment for the proposed variable limit approach could be carried out in parallel with CAA’s licensing process approach to minimise burdens on both applicants and the assessors of the proposed approach. Further information will be set out in the UK Government response to this consultation and through engagement with the sector before any variable liability limit approach is implemented.

Irrespective of the organisation which would carry out the assessment to determine the liability limit under the proposed variable liability limit approach, if there is communication with the applicant setting out the proposed liability limit prior to a decision taken by CAA to issue a licence, this must not be construed that the mission will be licensed.

The proposed variable liability limit approach would not therefore indicate whether an application would be licensable. A higher baseline liability limit determined by the proposed process must also not be construed as meaning that a mission would be licensable or not. The proposed variable liability limit approach is designed to recognise additional sustainability actions taken by the applicant which are considered to be over and above baseline requirements from a licensing perspective.

5.2 Proposal for setting variable liability limits and insurance requirements for satellite operations

This section sets out the UK Government’s proposed approach to adopting a variable liability limit. The UK Government welcomes views on this approach or other alternative approaches that might be considered.

The UK Government’s current thinking is to propose a two-stage process to determine the liability limit for a satellite:

· Stage 1 would determine a baseline limit of liability using two parameters to be further developed, which if determined to be feasible, would be based on the activity being undertaken and the orbit in which the activity is to take place.

· Stage 2 would then assess the proposed mission against a series of sustainability aspects. The score for this stage would then determine whether the stage 1 baseline liability limit should be reduced, increased or remain the same.

Stage 1 - Determining the baseline liability limit

Further work is needed to develop this part of the proposed approach and the UK Government may commission a study to inform this stage 1 assessment.

The intention of stage 1 is to develop a methodology which determines a baseline liability limit focused on addressing two questions:

· Question 1 - What is the mission categorisation of the applicant’s proposed activity (see details of current categorisations below)?

· Question 2 - What is the highest indicative sustainability risk category of the intended orbit(s) of steady state operations? This may also consider sustainability risks post-operations.

Note – this is not intended to assess specific safety aspects of the proposed mission which form part of CAA’s licensing assessment. This looks to take into account the considered generic sustainability aspects.

The purpose of looking at these two aspects would be to assess these elements to generate a score which could then be plotted on a 9-box grid or similar approach. The final approach will be informed by the feedback received in this consultation and the results of the study which may be commissioned.

Possible scope of question 1

Question 1 (what is the mission categorisation of the applicant’s proposed activity) would consider the type of activity being proposed. Licensing and the setting of liability limits currently differs between ‘standard missions’ and ‘higher risk’ missions.

‘Standard missions’ as defined in guidance on CAA’s website represent very low and well-characterised third-party risks. For licensing purposes, the regulator defines a standard mission as a mission involving a single satellite employing an established launcher, a proven satellite platform, and recognised operational practices.

For higher risk missions, the regulator may set the liability limit and insurance amount at a higher level. It can do this where the mission is:

· novel in nature or scale, and / or

· uses techniques, technologies and / or systems which are unproven, and / or

· presents a higher risk of high-value third-party liability (TPL) claims and / or

· presents TPL risks that are not well-characterised.

The following diagram shows the current range of mission categories included in the technical question set as part of the application documentation for an orbital operations licence available on CAA’s website.

Figure 2 – Technical question set for an orbital operations licence

Further work is needed by the UK Government to adapt and refine these categories for the purpose of supporting this methodology and this will take place in tandem with the study to inform question 2.

However, the intention would be that any changes to the technical question set (figure 2) would be developed to reflect or could be adapted to take into consideration three sustainability risk categories for the purposes of determining the variable liability limit only. This would assist in the stage 1 assessment to inform the 9-box grid marking or other methodology adopted to generate the baseline liability limit.

These three sustainability risk categories would be either:

· lower risk

· medium risk

· higher risk

These three categories would be used for assessing the variable liability limit rather than as part of CAA’s safety assessment, which uses two categories of risk. If two categories of risk were used to inform the stage 1 assessment, the 9-box grid marking would be adapted to account for this.

Possible scope of question 2

The methodology for defining an indicative sustainability risk approach to different operational orbit environments will need to be determined. The UK Government will commission a study, subject to the outcome of this consultation, to inform the methodology for this question.

The intention would be for the study to generate a range of defined orbits, taking into account a number of orbital parameters including orbital altitude, eccentricity and inclination. These resulting defined orbits would then be incorporated into the proposed variable liability limit approach. As part of the orbit sustainability risk categorisation, the study would explore whether it is possible and how to define this risk in terms of orbital population, debris density and other risk factors such as characteristics of satellites within a particular orbit definition. The sustainability risk categorisation could be informed by collision risk or other parameters, for example financial risk, in situations where a particular orbit category contains a high value asset.

The study would also need to consider how to account for changes in orbit as part of the known planned CONOPs for the mission which are submitted as part of the application[1] and also whether it is possible to reflect changes in sustainability risk profile of the operating environment over time. For example, the orbital sustainability risk profile of an active debris removal (ADR) mission or in-orbit servicing (IOS) mission engaging in multiple assignments could change during the mission lifetime. This could lead to further recommendations on the assessors reviewing liability limits at regular intervals over the lifetime of a mission, but the intention for now is that the limit of liability would apply for the duration of the mission, unless there was a significant change in mission parameters.

This methodology would also consider how to account for anticipated variability of the intended orbit due to atmospheric drag and other events. The UK Government would also consider further whether long-term induced risk on the space environment would be covered as part of stage 1, or whether a question would be asked on this in criterion 3 of stage 2 of the methodology.

Further work is needed to develop the methodology for determining these categories of sustainability risk and a study will be commissioned to develop this. The study will take place in tandem with the work to inform question 1, if it is agreed to adopt the approach outlined above. The intention would be to develop a similar set of risk category descriptions as for question 1, which would need to be defined as either:

· lower risk

· medium risk

· higher risk

These three categories would then be part of the 9-box grid or similar approach.

Due to the complexity of the considerations involved in developing this methodology, it is possible that stage 1 will not be fully developed to be included as part of the initial implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach. A proposed interim approach has therefore been developed, which is set out later in this section.

Setting a score to determine the baseline liability limit

Once the methodology and risk categorisations are available in questions 1 and 2, assigning a risk level based on mission categorisation and orbit sustainability risk could then be translated into a baseline liability limit / insurance amount. The following example demonstrates a 9-box grid based on the use of 3 risk categories under each of questions 1 and 2.

The final approach will be determined by the commissioned study and responses to this consultation and be based upon the number of risk category definitions applied under each of the questions as a result.

In the figure 3 and 4 illustrations and in the final agreed approach, it should be noted, as mentioned earlier, that this assessment does not indicate whether a mission is licensable. It is designed only to determine the liability limit that the CAA will include in a granted licence.

Translating the score into a baseline liability limit

As noted in figure 3, the intention would be for the scoring mechanism (however that is subsequently determined) to align to three proposed thresholds of liability:

· Lower risk category (green) - £0 baseline requirement

· Medium risk activity (amber) - £20m baseline requirement

· Higher risk activity (red) - £50m baseline requirement[2]

The highest threshold of £50m equates roughly to the sterling equivalent of the current €60m requirement. It is not envisaged that this £50m threshold would be amended to reflect exchange rates at any particular time[3]. The £0 threshold is proposed to recognise those operators that have adopted a wider suite of additional measures to reduce their mission’s impact on the orbital environment. In such cases the limit of liability included in the licence (and also the insurance requirement) would be set at £0 and the operator would not be mandated to take out TPL insurance.

The £20m threshold is proposed to acknowledge the adoption of some additional measures by applicants to reduce their mission’s impact on the orbital environment. The rationale for proposing this level also reflects an insurance requirement below which it is not anticipated that material savings would arise for operators through reduced premium savings due to underwriting costs. For the current proposal it is assumed that this level is set at £20m.

A proposed liability limit threshold of £20m would also largely align with liability limits applied in some other nations.

If alternative insurance models were to be adopted, where an aggregated approach could reduce insurance premia, it may be feasible to adopt a fourth threshold between the £0 and £20m thresholds proposed. This could be considered as part of a first review of the proposed variable liability limit approach, once any alternative insurance models have been established.

The baseline liability limit would therefore provide an overall assessment of the mission parameters to enable operators to consider in their mission design the liability implications. For example, a higher sustainability risk activity may be shifted from a higher to a lower sustainability risk orbit as part of the mission design phase.

Stage 2 - Scored questions for sustainability aspects of the mission

Stage 2 would assess the mission plans against a number of policy areas which the UK Government wishes to promote as part of its emerging sustainability agenda. The proposed assessment and the determination of the final liability limit would recognise efforts by operators to engage in practices which are considered to be:

· early adoption of regulatory requirements which may be made mandatory from a particular future point in time[4]; or

· behaviours which the UK Government wishes to promote as part of its sustainability agenda, but which are not mandatory for licensing purposes.

The detail set out below provides the UK Government’s current thinking of the basic set of questions that could be applied in the stage 2 assessment. This proposed question set would be amended to account for feedback from this consultation. Certain amendments to these questions would also be necessary to reflect on-going policy development as well as what is feasible or relevant to a particular mission type. Further detail on the changes currently identified during the development of the proposed approach can be found in the guidance document in Annex A.

If this approach were to be adopted, current thinking sets out that most of the questions would be answered on a ‘yes/no’ basis by the assessors of the variable liability limit approach, based on the evidence provided to the assessor. Each answer would be scored as a single point where the response to a question is a ‘yes’ and zero where the response is ‘no’ (except in limited cases as set out below).

Not all of the stage 2 questions would apply to all mission types - further detail is provided later in this section and in the Annex A guidance as to which questions may apply to particular mission types, were this approach to be adopted. These would be set out for each mission type in the final guidance document. Where new mission types arise, the proposed question set to be applied to mission types would be set out in updated guidance. Some questions could therefore be removed for some applications.

In certain cases, the regulator as part of the licence application considerations may require the applicant to take different actions to those proposed by the applicant. In such cases, if it is considered appropriate by the assessors of the proposed variable liability limit approach, the applicant would not be penalised for this and the point for that question would be removed from the threshold scoring.

For example, there is a question about whether the satellite is manoeuvrable during the de-orbit. If the regulator based on its safety considerations has stated that as part of the post-mission disposal plan the satellite needs to be passivated and switched off once it has been positioned satisfactorily post-mission, a point could not be achieved under this criterion as a result of this decision. In such a circumstance, the assessor of the variable liability limit approach may determine that it would not be appropriate for this decision to adversely impact the scoring if the application had proposed to retain such manoeuvrability and it were considered to be a feasible option and sufficient evidence had been provided of the intention to do so. In such cases, the question would not be included in the overall scoring and the pass mark for the mission would be reduced by one for that particular case.

The proposed question set for this stage 2 assessment has been divided into four different criteria, each with a set of sub-questions. The first three criteria that would be applied to all mission types are:

Minimising risk through satellite and mission design
Minimising potential for debris during operations
Minimising risk post-operations

The fourth proposed criterion is ‘Use of third-party providers to reduce risk.’ It is recognised however that the development of ADR and IOS missions are in their infancy. In the early stages of the proposed variable liability limit approach this question would be regarded as an opportunity to score additional points, as it is not expected that operators would be routinely adopting such services due to cost[5]. As the proposed variable liability limit approach develops and ADR and IOS services become more prevalent, this criterion may be applied to certain mission types.

The proposed questions for each criterion are as follows:

Criterion 1 – Minimising risk through satellite and mission design

Manoeuvrability (general)	Does the satellite have the capability to avoid third-party objects in orbit[6]? [Note this question would not apply to satellites in GEO]Has the applicant demonstrated a higher reliability than accepted norms for its collision avoidance capability[7]? [Note – It is intended that this question would only apply to applications for licensing a constellation]
Trackability	Has the applicant adopted co-operative / uncooperative measures to enhance the trackability and identification of the satellite(s)[8]?
Conformation with recognised sustainability standards	Has the applicant provided evidence of achieving recognition under the Space Sustainability Standard[9]?
Dark and quiet skies	Does the applicant’s proposal meet best practice guidelines issued by the UK Government[10]?

Criterion 2 - Minimising potential for debris during operations

Data sharing and engagement with other operators

Has the applicant provided acceptable details of any data sharing or coordination arrangements with other operators and more than one third party provider involving [1 point for each ‘yes’ response]: - relevant tracking or ephemeris data? - collision avoidance procedures? - planned manoeuvres?If making use of an autonomous collision avoidance system, does the applicant have appropriate proposals in place to agree with operators in the same operating orbital environment the circumstances under which they would plan to manoeuvre or switch off the system? [If appropriate according to mission type – for example constellations]

Criterion 3 - Minimising risk post-operations

ADR / IOS facilitation

Does the design of the satellite facilitate servicing by third party IOS providers, or by third party ADR providers should the primary means of disposal fail[11]?

Active de-orbit impact

Does the use of the active de-orbit method reduce the de-orbit time from this altitude by [x]% or more as compared with natural decay?[Note 1 – the regulator will consider whether the method employed and the de-orbit timeline proposal is safe and reduces risk to as low as reasonably practicable[12]][Note 2 - The question above would not relate to GEO missions. Therefore a different question could be included for GEO only - Does the operator intend to use a method of disposal to the graveyard orbit which is considered to be sustainable?]Has the applicant demonstrated a reliability of greater than accepted norms[13] for its chosen active disposal method? [Note – this question would only apply to applications for licensing a constellation]

If applicable - Manoeuvrability / control during de-orbit

Will the applicant be able to control the satellite in an effective and timely manner to avoid collisions during the post-mission phase until no longer controllable during re-entry (or until some other pre-determined point as required in licence conditions – for example until the satellite is below crewed vehicles or high value assets for example the International Space Station)? If passivation is required by the regulator, this would be reflected in the scoring.

Criterion 4 - Use of third-party providers to reduce risk[14]

IOS contracts

Has the applicant demonstrated that they have discussed or put in place contractual arrangements with a third-party to extend the lifetime of the mission through use of IOS methods?- Yes, has contractual arrangements in place (3 points)- Has demonstrated discussions with providers and has an established plan in place as part of the application (1 point)- Does not intend to put such arrangements in place (0 points)

ADR contracts

Has the applicant demonstrated that they have discussed or put in place contractual arrangements with a third-party ADR services provider to remove the satellite(s) or other debris created during the mission, either at end-of-life or in event of failure of satellite systems[15]?- Yes, has contractual arrangements in place (3 points)- Has demonstrated discussions with providers and has an established plan in place as part of the application (1 point)- Does not intend to put such arrangements in place (0 points)

It should be noted that use of third-party providers to extend mission lifetimes or remove satellites from orbit may not be appropriate or applicable for certain operator types. For example, such an approach would not be expected for a CubeSat at very low altitudes but could be feasible for use in constellations. The guidance in Annex A provides further detail of where such services may be appropriate. As the development of third-party services is in its infancy, in the early stages of the proposed variable liability limit approach it would not be expected that operators would routinely make use of such services, so operators that would choose to do so would receive additional points.

Translating scores into liability limits

Further assessment using the questions in stage 2 could then determine whether the baseline liability limit threshold determined in stage 1 should be increased, reduced or remain the same.

Some mission types could have some questions which may not apply to the proposed mission. Therefore different scoring thresholds could apply to determine the liability thresholds for these mission types.

It is proposed that the thresholds in the following table would apply for a range of five different scenarios that have been assessed thus far. The guidance in Annex A provides further detail as to how these have been derived:

Mission type[16]	Liability threshold scores
£50m	£20m	£0
CubeSat	0-4	5-8	9-10
Constellation	0-6	7-9	10-13
ADR	0-4	5-7	8-9
Earth Observation mission	0-4	5-8	9-10
GEO mission	0-4	5-6	7-8

For example, if a CubeSat mission had been assessed at the £20m threshold from stage 1, a score between 5-8 would be needed to retain that level in the final determination. If the mission scored between 0-4, the liability limit would be increased to £50m. A score of 9-10 would result in a £0 liability limit for the mission.

These marks assume that ADR and IOS are not included in the scoring. Maximum potential scores could therefore increase (up to an additional 6 points) were contracts for such services put in place by operators, although the threshold scores would not be increased to reflect this.

The following conditions could also apply for the implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach:

· An operator could request that the £50m baseline is applied and no further assessment would be carried out, as per stage 2.

· For novel missions or by exception, a higher liability limit may be applied if considered appropriate.

Proposed interim approach whilst stage 1 is developed

Further work is needed to develop the proposed methodologies for the stage 1 assessment. If the proposed variable liability limit approach were to be implemented prior to this work being completed, the UK Government would recommend that the stage 2 scoring would be applied from a baseline of £50m. The resulting score from the stage 2 assessment as per the table above would then determine the liability limit applied (for example a score of between 5-8 for a CubeSat mission would reduce the liability limit to £20m, and 9-10 to a £0 liability limit).

Figure 5 – diagram of proposed interim approach

Application of the proposed variable liability limit approach to constellations[17]

The limit of liability arising from this assessment would be applied on a per satellite basis, which would be stipulated in the licence issued to each satellite, as per current arrangements.

The determination of the liability limit would be assessed however depending on the system proposed. For example a constellation would be assessed based on the whole constellation, rather than each satellite assessed separately within the constellation. This may lead to variations of the approach, which would be taken on a case-by-case basis to reflect the make-up of the constellation.

As per the current approach for constellations and for operators of multiple satellites, the assessors of the proposed variable liability limit approach would consider whether it would be appropriate to apply an aggregate insurance requirement to cover such missions. The level of the aggregate insurance amount and the point at which the application of the aggregate would be considered would be determined by the assessors on a case-by-case basis. The amount would not be set at a level which would exceed insurance market capacity.

Organisation that would carry out the proposed variable liability limit assessment

As previously mentioned, this is yet to be finalised. The proposed framework has been devised to make use of information provided to the CAA as part of the licence application, but decisions about who would carry out this assessment, and whether information provided with the application to CAA could be used for this purpose, have yet to be agreed. The UK Government would confirm the assessors of the proposed variable liability limit approach in its response to the consultation.

Timeline for implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach

The UK Government would look to implement the proposed approach as soon as possible following the publication of the UK Government response, subject to views expressed in response to this consultation, and any further action or consultation needed to implement the approach. The UK Government response will provide further detail on the date from which the proposed variable liability limit approach and associated policy decisions would apply, if a final decision were taken to adopt this approach. The Annex A guidance would also be updated for the UK Government response to reflect consultation feedback.

Questions

1: Do you have any comments on the proposed two-stage approach?

2: Do you have any comments on the four criteria proposed under stage 2?

3: Do you agree that a £20m middle threshold would be an appropriate insurance requirement to reflect a value at which a minimum premium could apply?

4: For the active de-orbit method question in criterion 3, minimising risk post operations, do you have views as to what an appropriate de-orbit timeline reduction could be compared to natural decay?

5: Do you have any alternative suggestions for applying a variable liability limit approach?

6: Do you believe that questions on Earth sustainability could be included in future within the scope of the proposed approach?

7: Do you have any suggestions as to other topics that could be included within scope in future, for example an operator’s use of life cycle assessments as part of their mission design process (see section 2 for further background on life cycle assessment work)?

5.3 Future adaptions of the proposed variable liability limit approach

The proposed variable liability limit approach would need to adapt over time to reflect UK Government and wider international developments on sustainability aspects of satellite operations. The current approach would not cover all relevant aspects of sustainability, as there is still much discussion required to define sustainability and longer-term goals.

In future, wider aspects of sustainability could be adopted in the proposed variable liability limit approach, for example reducing the environmental impacts of space activity on the Earth’s environment by expanding the approach to cover supply chains, launch activity and disposal of satellites in the Earth’s atmosphere. This would reflect the scope of topics covered by the industry-led Space Sustainability Standard and any future wider UK government and international policy developments on this agenda. At present, the proposed approach reflects a number of key UK Government key priorities to develop sustainability policy.

The proposed approach to setting liability limits for satellite operations however sets out a clear direction of travel which is designed to incentivise adoption of best practice with regards to sustainability. It can therefore be tailored to reflect future UK Government ambition, including any milestones adopted as part of the proposal to develop a UK Space Sustainability Roadmap in ‘section 3 – Longer-term UK leadership on Space Sustainability’.

Questions

8: Do you have any comments on possible adaptations of the proposed variable liability limit approach?

5.4 TPL insurance – latest thinking on new approaches to insuring risks for satellite operations

TPL insurance

Insurance is viewed as a key cost by operators when considering overall launch costs. The requirement to hold TPL insurance is mandatory in UK licences, although the costs of purchasing TPL are smaller than costs for insuring assets. The cost, availability and level of TPL insurance required are viewed by industry as key elements of the UK’s competitiveness.

There is currently capacity in the insurance market to cater for the UK Government’s orbital liability and insurance requirements. However, changes in the orbital risk profile have led to discussion about the insurance market’s desire to cover future risks. The risk profile is changing due to the number of satellites currently in orbit and future projections, and there are increasing concerns about the risks posed by space debris.

A further consideration for adopting an alternative approach to TPL insurance requirements is the impact that this would have on the insurance market generally. This includes the potential for sudden withdrawal of insurers from the market and whether a new scheme would apply to all operators. In deciding on any changes to the current approach the UK Government’s view is that addressing one issue should not cause any adverse impacts to the availability or cost of insurance for operators or create a market failure or economic shock.

Currently TPL insurance for each mission is provided by established insurers and parent guarantees may also be accepted in addition to TPL insurance. TPL requirements are specified in licensing conditions and currently determined by the CAA on a case-by-case basis depending on mission risk. This limit is determined per satellite, although depending on the number of satellites operated by an operator, a per occurrence aggregate basis may also be adopted.

Alternative insurance models

The liabilities and insurance call for evidence outlined a number of potential alternatives to the current approach to providing TPL cover on a per-operator basis. The options presented were as follows:

· Mutual model

· Decommissioning bonds

· Government ‘space’ bond

· Corporate bond

· Escrow account

· Options to increase space insurance market capacity

· Catastrophe bonds

· ATOL-type scheme

· Collective insurance policy (purchased either by a space sector body or the UK Government)

In response to the call for evidence there was overwhelming support from operators for a sector-proposed ‘Discretionary Mutual Insurance Scheme for Small Satellite Operators’ (‘Mutual’). Insurers preferred the option of a collective government-agreed insurance approach, doubting the viability or efficiency of a Mutual model.

Insurers expressed concerns that a change to TPL insurance requirements could affect London’s position as the major insurance centre for space insurance, although it’s worth noting that the TPL section of the market is small compared with other elements of the space insurance market.

The UK Government’s call for evidence response stated that the UK Government would further assess the viability of three of the options:

· The Mutual approach

· Collective insurance policy

· Government space bond

The call for evidence also set out that any new approach would need to satisfy insurance and indemnification requirements set out in operator licences, in particular to provide a guaranteed resource to enable operators to comply with their responsibilities set out in licence conditions and to comply with legislation. Other criteria assessed would be to:

· Reduce the cost for comparative levels of cover as compared with the traditional insurance market;

· Promote more competitive pricing for insurance;

· Provide suitable cover as currently provided for in the insurance market for UK licensed activities for the full range of satellite missions;

· Increase the availability of insurance for satellite operators;

· Ensure that it does not create an additional market failure or costs for operators not covered by a particular scheme;

· Assess the impact of the proposal on the level of the UK Government’s exposure to losses;

· Be sustainable in the longer term and adaptable to the evolving risks in the orbital environment;

· Be self-sustaining without any additional government underwrite; and

· Adapt to any proposed changes to liability limits, including if a more refined risk-based approach is adopted.

The UK Government has also considered additional factors when assessing these models. These are:

· Timelines for implementation

· Costs of implementation

· Regulatory or administrative burden for implementing and running such a model

· How such a model could support other strategic objectives for growth of the sector

· How such a model would affect competitiveness with other states

· These criteria have been considered in the UK Government’s assessment of the viability of the Mutual, collective insurance policy and government space bond options.

Discretionary Mutual Insurance Scheme for Small Satellite Operators

In response to the October 2020 consultation, the UK Government received a proposal to establish a not-for-profit operator owned and run Mutual to provide an insurance mechanism for operators of small satellites. The aim of a Mutual would be to increase the availability and reduce the cost of TPL insurance for operators of small satellites.

Rather than all operators purchasing TPL insurance individually from the commercial insurance market, members would pay a reduced premium to the Mutual. In the case of a third party claim the Mutual would pay the claim up to the amount of the liability limit out of an insurance backed managed fund.

The Mutual would be targeted at small satellite operators and constellations. The criteria for eligibility to join the Mutual would ultimately need to be determined by its members but the following potentially represents the initial criteria:

· Satellite mass below 500kg.

· Propulsive capability (which reduces the risk of collision as a satellite can perform collision avoidance manoeuvres).

· Members must support best practices for sustainability of the space environment; and

· Members must achieve new Space Sustainability Standard recognition within a prescribed period of joining.

Ineligible operators or those who would be eligible but choose not to join the Mutual would still be required to purchase TPL insurance from the commercial market.

Members of the Mutual would only be liable for claims up to an overall aggregate, based on a more limited number of insurance claims per year than catered for under the current TPL insurance approach. Any profits accrued in the Mutual would create a fund which would provide the first call for any claims that occur. Each year the Mutual would purchase reinsurance from the commercial insurance market to cover the difference between the fund value and the Mutual’s overall TPL requirement. Were there to be any liability claims exceeding the aggregate amount for which the Mutual would be held liable, the UK Government would be responsible for covering this additional sum.

At least in the early years, fund reinstatement cover would be purchased so that the fund could be protected from being exhausted by a claim, and restored to the value held at the point at which a claim arose. This would mean that initially the whole of the risk undertaken by the Mutual would be reinsured with the commercial insurance market. The intention would be that the fund would eventually reach a size large enough that reinsurance would not need to be purchased.

Further background on the proposed approach can be found at Alden Legal’s website.

Since the call for evidence the UK Government has engaged with the proposers of the Mutual to further understand the proposal. The Government Actuary’s Department has provided analytical support to assess the potential for reduced insurance premiums from implementation of this option.

The UK Government considers that a Mutual is a viable alternative to deliver the UK Government’s TPL regulatory requirements, and would be compatible with other benefits outlined in the call for evidence, including:

· Reducing the cost for comparative levels of cover as compared to the traditional insurance market;

· Promoting more competitive pricing for insurance;

· Is suitable in the longer term and adaptable to evolving risks in the orbital environment;

· Would increase the availability of insurance for small satellite operators;

· Would be compatible with the proposed variable liability limit approach to setting liability limits.

The UK Government will provide a final opinion on the viability of this approach in its response to this consultation. If agreed as an option to take forward, the UK Government would then work with the proposers to ensure that the approach met the TPL obligations in UK legislation and operator licence conditions.

Collective Insurance Policy

A collective insurance policy facilitated by an independent body to cover all UK licensees was an approach included in the call for evidence. A single policyholder would arrange a pool policy for applicable operators. The policyholder would pay an initial nominal fee to establish the policy and each operator eligible to be covered could then declare the satellites they would want to include on the policy. The fee for each satellite would be determined by the risk of each mission, but in practice would be less than for a policy agreed by individual operators.

A collective insurance policy would be agreed on an annual basis, and an aggregate could be applied to a policy. Were there to be any liability claims exceeding the aggregate amount for which the collective insurance policy would be held liable, the UK Government would be responsible for covering this additional sum.

A cross waiver would be applied to cover the additional insured parties on the policy. This would mean that if two operators under the policy suffered damages due to, for example, an in-orbit collision and took legal action against each other, the policy would not respond. Whilst conditions could be applied to specific operators, the insuring agreements would be the same.

The framework for the policy could cater for a range of possible variations, length of coverage, and variable limits of liability for different operators to reflect the proposed variable limit of liability approach through declarations on the policy. In such cases, the premiums paid by individual operators would be tailored to reflect these elements.

The criteria for eligibility to join the collective policy would need to be determined by the policyholder and the insurers involved. Once the eligibility criteria would be met for inclusion on the policy, it could perhaps be anticipated that premiums would be calculated based on mission risk.

Ineligible operators or those who would be eligible but choose not to be covered by the collective policy would still be required to purchase TPL from the commercial market.

As with the Mutual, having a single policy should result in cost savings for operators through reduced administrative costs, as compared with operators taking out their own individual policy. Having a single policy could also increase competition between insurers, which could have benefits in reducing the cost of the insurance. Applying an aggregate on the policy would reduce the capital required to be held by insurers to cover the risks assumed, which should lead to a reduction in premiums (although further work is needed to quantify the extent of potential savings). As this approach would not be seeking to establish a fund, the extent of savings could be greater in the shorter term as compared with the Mutual (although may not deliver the same level of benefit in the longer term) as the same level of insurance would be required, whereas with the Mutual the level of reinsurance to cover the shortfall to meet the fund’s obligations would decrease over time.

A collective policy could bring further benefits if future orbital policy mandates certain approaches to homogenise risk (such as if a policy mandating propulsion were implemented), in order to reduce the number of variables requiring consideration.

The potential savings which could be gained from a collective policy is uncertain, particularly regarding how the price of coverage would be influenced by higher risk missions and what the limit of coverage would be, or whether a risk-based pricing regime could be developed.

How information would be exchanged between the operator and the insurer is an important consideration, as it could be burdensome for certain parties (for example the policyholder). Further thinking would also be required to consider the flow of information between the policyholder, the insurer(s) and the insured(s). The process could follow general standard practice, where brokers support the information flow between policyholders and insurers, as well as transferring premiums. Under such a policy there would probably need to be a process whereby all brokers could declare for their own clients and assist with information transfer as required.

Whilst a collective policy could cater for variances in missions through applying conditions for individual operators, this could become complex given the many variables that would require consideration. This may to some degree be mitigated as UK Government policy for orbital operations evolves. For example if a decision were taken that all UK-licensed satellites would require propulsion and have to de-orbit within a certain timeframe, this may also have a positive benefit in reducing premiums, although as a general rule insurers would expect operators to meet the requirements set by the UK Government as standard. Other factors such as the reliability of a propulsion system would also be a consideration, so making measures mandatory may not drive or result in significant reductions in the premium. Other prevailing market conditions, including the level of capacity available in the market and the minimum insurance premiums insurers would charge irrespective of the evolution of orbital operations and environment, would also have a bearing on the level of premium charged. This would apply equally to any alternative insurance / reinsurance solution adopted.

Since the call for evidence the UK Government has engaged with the insurance sector to further understand how such a policy could work. The Government Actuary’s Department has provided analytical support to assess the potential for reduced insurance premiums from implementation of variable liability limits.

The UK Government considers that a collective policy is a viable alternative to deliver the UK Government’s TPL regulatory requirements, and would be compatible with other benefits outlined in the call for evidence, including:

· Reducing the cost for comparative levels of cover as compared to operators taking out an individual policy in the traditional insurance market;

· Promoting more competitive pricing for insurance;

· Is suitable in the longer term and adaptable to evolving risks in the orbital environment;

· Would increase the availability of insurance for small satellite operators;

· Would be compatible with the proposed variable limit of liability approach.

The UK Government will provide a final opinion on the viability of this approach in its response to this consultation. If agreed as an option to take forward, the UK Government would then work with the insurance sector and any proposed policyholder to ensure that the approach met the TPL obligations in UK legislation and operator licence conditions.

Questions

9: What would be the impact on premiums of adopting either of these approaches?

10: Do you have a preference for either approach and if so, why?

11: Do you consider that there is sufficient demand for both of these approaches to operate?

12: If you support a collective policy approach, do you think that a single policy could be put in place to cover all UK licensed operators or should multiple policies be put in place to cover specific mission types or orbits, for example?

13: For a collective policy approach, which industry body do you think could act as the policyholder?

14: If either or both of these approaches were to be implemented, what would be the impacts on premiums for UK operators not covered and market capacity for the residual TPL market?

15: Do you think that either of these approaches could offer greater benefits than those that could be achieved by reducing the liability limit only?

16: Do you have views on how the UK Government should consider the viability of these alternative insurance models and how they comply with legislative and license conditions?

17: Would the industry require any additional organisational support from UK Government to develop the alternative insurance model?

Government space bond for small satellite operators

A government space bond was an idea presented in the call for evidence. The premise would be that a bond similar to the green bond issued by National Savings and Investments would generate funding to provided loans to space companies, as well as provide a resource to meet TPL claims.

Operators would be required to invest in the bond as a condition of their licence, and the limit of liability would, as now, be included as a licence condition. The level of an operator’s investment in the bond would be commensurate with an insurance premium based on their limit of liability. Operators would also have the option to voluntarily invest a higher amount into a bond.

The level of investment could be based on a per satellite amount, multiplied by the duration of a mission. For example, an operator of a single satellite with an annual assessed investment requirement of £20,000 (based on liability limit of £20m) operating for five years, would be required to invest £100,000. For operators operating a larger number of satellites and to which an aggregate insurance value could be applied under current policy, the level of investment could be based on the aggregate value. Were a mission to be extended, an additional investment would be required for the period based on the same calculation methodology, although it would be anticipated that the original investment would be repaid.

Institutional investors would be able to invest in the bond, as would members of the public. The amounts invested by these parties could be subject to minimum and maximum investments, with larger sums set for institutional investors.

Investments by operators would be required for a fixed period. This would be for the duration of the mission for satellite operators, whereas for public and institutional investors it would be anticipated that they could choose between fixed periods, with the possibility of offering increased returns for investments held for longer periods. Operators’ contributions to a fund could either be a one-off investment covering the duration of a mission or paid annually, as per current insurance premiums. During the lifetime of the bond a regular coupon would be paid every 6 months.

Upon maturation of the bond, the full investment value made by the operator would be repaid once an operator’s licence had expired or after the fixed investment period for other types of investors. Funds could not be removed until the maturity of the bonds unless there were a legal requirement, for example in the event of operator insolvency.

Once a fund would be established, the capital available could be used to either provide grants or loans to space sector companies. In the case of a grant, the UK Government would provide the return back into the fund to pay the coupon to investors. If funds were loaned to space sector companies, the loan repayment interest would provide the revenue to meet the coupon requirements under the bond. Loan repayments could take place every 6 months to meet the coupon payment obligations. In either case, the UK Government payment and/or the loan interest rate would need to be sufficient to meet an obligation to pay the coupon.

In the event of a TPL claim made against either the UK Government or against an operator arising from licensed satellite activities, the value of the claim would be sourced from the fund up to the level of the operator’s limit of liability. Any remaining elements of a claim would be met by the UK Government. For example, a claim of £20m where an operator had a limit of liability of £50m would be paid for entirely from the fund, whereas for a claim of £100m against an operator with the same £50m limit of liability, £50m would be met from the fund and the UK Government would be liable for the remaining £50m.

In a scenario of a space sector company defaulting on a loan repayment and the money lent not being recoverable, the size of the fund would be reduced by the outstanding balance of the loan, and coupon payments could be affected. This would present a risk of investors not receiving a return of the full amount of their original capital. In this circumstance it would be anticipated that the reduction in the capital returned would be pro-rated to reflect the level of investment compared to the size of the fund at the time of occurrence of a liability claim or company default. This capital risk means it would be unlikely that financial rules would permit members of the public to be eligible to invest in a bond, as there is a lack of third-party liability claims data to be able to inform public investors about risk level and it would not be reasonable to expect public investors to understand the risk to their capital due to the complexity of the subject.

A significant difference between a space bond and other bonds, such as the green bond, would be that with a dual function to provide loans to companies and meet liability claims made against satellite operators, unless the UK Government were to provide a guaranteed return, the potential loss of capital may reduce the attractiveness of a bond, require a higher level of return or may be incompatible with financial regulation rules.

Diversifying risk over a wider client base (including possibly members of the public) could be beneficial by creating a larger resource to cover claims and provide loans. Any losses would be spread across a larger number of investors, thus reducing losses per investor on a pro-rated basis as compared with other models.

Whilst the risks of orbital liability claims are considered remote, even a remote risk might dissuade investors. Of potentially greater concern would be the possibility of loan defaults due to space companies becoming insolvent. This might mean that grants would be the preferred method to disburse funds, but this would require UK Government agreement to provide the yield.

The UK Government has decided that this option should be discounted as a viable alternative to traditional TPL insurance due administrative complexities, issues regarding risks and potential losses and how these factors would translate into the scope of investors that could invest in a bond and level of yield expected to cover such risks. There was also limited mention or support for this idea in the responses to the call for evidence.

While the UK Government deems that a space bond is not feasible as an alternative insurance model, it could be used to meet wider strategic objectives for growth in the sector by helping to leverage additional funding, particularly for a national ADR capability. Further detail on this is provided in section 3 - Longer-term UK Leadership on Space Sustainability.

Questions

18: Do you agree with the recommendation that a government space bond is not a viable option for this purpose?

19: If you consider that it is a viable option, would you propose any changes to the approach set out?

5.5 Analysis of implementing the proposed variable liability limit approach, possible alternative insurance models and links to the Space Sustainability Standard

The UK Government is considering the proposed variable liability approach and alternative insurance models on the basis that these measures could have positive benefits by reducing premiums for satellite operators. In addition, the industry-led Space Sustainability Standard is a third measure under development which could provide benefits in terms of reducing premiums.

The UK Government proposes to explore the benefits of combining these proposed approaches together, rather than on an individual basis. The UK Government is seeking further evidence and views of the potential benefits of adopting these measures before taking a final view on the adoption of the two main proposals of the proposed variable limit of liability and whether to support alternative models of insurance.

The combination of these three measures could lead to positive benefits in terms of premium reductions for satellite operators, although the exact extent of benefits is difficult to quantify. It is recognised that insurers will apply a minimum premium for cover provided and that prevailing market conditions will also be a determining factor on premium rates, in addition to mission specific risks.

The general assumption is however that the proposed variable limit of liability approach and alternative methods of insurance would in their own right create potential benefits in terms of premium reductions when compared with the current levels of insurance required and operators taking out their own individual insurance policy. Insurance sector support for the development of the Space Sustainability Standard would also indicate that this measure would also bring positive benefits with regards to insuring satellite operations.

Whilst it is not possible to quantify the exact benefits that may arise, the UK Government has undertaken analysis to estimate the potential insurance premium savings for satellite operators by implementing a variable liability limit approach. The analysis assumes that satellite operators would continue to take out individual TPL insurance to cover their liability limit; it does not include assumptions about alternative insurance models where an aggregated insurance amount would apply collectively to operators.

The assumptions for this analysis include forecasts of future satellite licence applications, insurance premia and the orbits (LEO, MEO, GEO) in which missions could occur. The outcomes should therefore be interpreted as providing an indication of the type of insurance premium savings that could be derived from implementing a variable liability limit approach and not definitive. Annex B further explains the assumptions used for this analysis.

The analysis suggests that insurance premium savings from implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach could range from £36,000 for five annual licences issued to £355,000 for fifty annual licences issued.

Further savings may be derived if alternative insurance models with aggregated cover were implemented alongside the proposed variable liability limit approach, although this would depend on the specific rules regarding the level of any aggregated cover and the criteria for operators to join.

To achieve a reduction in the liability limit and resulting insurance requirement, operators would need to adopt sustainable measures in addition to those required for licensing purposes. The UK Government has not attempted to quantify costs of operators adopting such measures. The UK Government is aware that many operators are already adopting sustainable measures which have been included in the proposed variable liability limit approach as part of their business-as-usual satellite design. Other initiatives, such as the industry-led Space Sustainability Standard, could further incentivise the adoption of additional measures to score points in the variable liability limit approach.

The extent of savings would also depend on the satellite operator’s individual circumstances. Operators with a fleet of satellites for example would need to assess the impact of these measures across the range of their licensed satellites. The fleet may have satellites at each of the liability limit thresholds and the highest threshold applied to the fleet may drive the insurance premium or the aggregate applied to a fleet policy.

Similarly, the benefits of adopting an alternative model or models of insurance would be driven by the eligibility requirements to enter the scheme as well as how premiums are determined for each individual operator. The relative benefits of each scheme would depend on the extent and the time to which the scheme relies on the existing market to insure or reinsure the risks held.

If more than one alternative model of insurance were to be established, then satellite operators would need to consider the eligibility requirements and potential benefits of each option.

Questions

20: Please provide any views on the extent of potential benefits that could arise from the adoption of these measures either individually or in combination. If you do not consider that there would be any benefits from adopting any or all of these measures, please state your reasons why.

5.6 Other TPL and insurance matters from the liability and insurance review

The call for evidence response set out the UK Government’s initial thinking for a range of liability and insurance issues and stated that a formal set of proposals would be developed for consultation.

The UK Government intends to implement some of the policy approaches which were outlined in the call for evidence. Further consideration of other policy positions is needed to reflect the potential adoption of the proposed variable liability limit approach and new models for insuring third-party liability risks, and accordingly the UK Government is seeking views from consultees on proposals for these policy areas.

Other liabilities and insurance policies - government implementation

Amending Section 12(2) of the SIA 2018

Section 12(2) of the SIA 2018 states that an operator licence ‘may’ specify a limit on the amount of the licensee’s liability in respect of the activities authorised by the licence. The UK Government recognises that changing ‘may’ to ‘must’ in section 12(2) is the highest regulatory priority identified by the sector.

As noted in the call for evidence response, the UK Government is currently exploring options for amending section 12(2) of the SIA 2018 to make clear in legislation that all operator licences must specify a limit on the amount of the licensee’s liability under section 36. As set out in the document ‘Guidance on insurance requirements and liabilities under the SIA 2018’ on the CAA’s website, the UK Government’s stated policy is that all licences issued under the SIA 2018 contain a limit on the amount of an operator’s liability with respect to claims made under both section 34 and section 36 of the Act. Therefore, no operator faces unlimited liability. The UK Government amending section 12(2) of the SIA 2018 would provide legislative certainty on this.

If no suitable opportunity arises within the current round of the UK Government’s legislative priorities, the UK Government will look to make this amendment as soon as parliamentary time allows.

Amending the currency of orbital operator liability limits from €s to £s

The call for evidence response explained that the UK Government intends to set orbital operator liability limits in pound sterling rather than the current euros value which is applied.

As part of the change of setting liability limits from euros to sterling, in cases where operators purchase insurance in a non-sterling currency to also cover insurance requirements in licences issued by other jurisdictions, an exchange rate will be applied to determine whether the insurance coverage in the policy meets the liability limit set out in the UK licence.

The Bank of England exchange rate on 1 April of the relevant year will be used for the assessment. For example a £50m value is used as a general benchmark for the current €60m insurance required for standard missions. However if the €60m policy taken out equates to a value of £48m when the exchange rate is applied, then a further Euro equivalent of £2m will be required for the policy.

The UK Government has decided to implement this change. The date of implementation will be set out in the UK Government’s response to the consultation.

Insurance requirements for operators procuring a launch from overseas

The current policy when procuring a launch overseas is for the satellite operator to take out or have access to €60m of insurance for the launch. Under usual practice, the satellite operator would be included as an additional insured on the launch insurance policy.

With increasing numbers of launch vehicles likely to require less than the current €60m UK requirement by their respective regulators, this means that some satellite operators are required to take out more insurance than is necessary for the launch, if they have to purchase their own policy to cover the difference between the launch operator’s insurance policy and the €60m requirement. The UK Government is proposing to change the approach so that the insurance required (and therefore the operator’s limit of liability) will be the same as that for the launch vehicle.

As now, this requirement could be satisfied by being named as an additional insured on the launch policy and the satellite operator will not be required to take out an additional insurance policy for this amount. If the satellite operator is not included on the launch policy, the operator will need to take out a policy for the value covered by the launch policy.

This approach would align with the approach taken for UK launches.

In cases where the level of insurance required by the foreign jurisdiction licensing the launch would exceed the current €60m requirement and the operator is not covered by the launch policy, the €60m requirement will still apply (or the £50m equivalent once the changeover is applied in licences), so that operators are not disadvantaged by this change.

The UK Government has decided to implement this change. The UK Government consultation response will set out the date from which this change will apply to future licences.

Other liabilities and insurance policies - government proposals

End-of-life insurance requirements

The current policy with regards to end-of-life insurance requirements is generally that, if agreed with the regulator, once the licensed activities have been completed and the satellite has been safely positioned to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State / Regulator, passivated and switched off, the licence will be terminated. Operators are not required to hold insurance following the termination of the licence.

There is no set definition of a satellite being placed to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State / Regulator as this will be mission specific. This could be for example when the parameters in an agreed end-of-life plan and / or relevant safety considerations (i.e. once the Regulator is satisfied that the safety risks from collision and/or debris generation are sufficiently low) have been met.

To clarify, the previous paragraph relates to the termination of a licence. The termination of insurance requirements is a separate decision that relates to risk mitigation regarding government contingent liabilities. In the past, the termination of insurance requirements has often coincided with the termination of a licence, although the former could occur earlier.

Even though insurance will no longer be required following the termination of a licence, the indemnification obligations as set out in the licence for any successful claims will remain, up to the operator’s limit of liability.

In general, it is proposed that the same approach is adopted with the implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach. However, on a case-by-case basis the UK Government could agree with the CAA as the regulator where flexibility could be applied to determine the point at which insurance is no longer required as well as the point at which the licence is to be terminated, depending on the specifics of a mission and having considered the principles of the proposed variable liability limit approach. The CAA will also have sought the views of the Secretary of State on these points.

Questions

21: Do you have any comments on the proposed approach to end-of-life insurance requirements?

Re-entry insurance policy

The response to the call for evidence set out that further policy development was underway to determine licensing requirements for missions where objects are designed with the intent to survive re-entry intact (for example during sample return missions). As part of this thinking the UK Government was considering whether insurance for re-entry activities would only be required where the object is designed to survive re-entry intact and that such activity would be licensed and risks modelled. In such cases, the UK Government was exploring whether it would be appropriate to apply the proposed variable limit approach of £20m and £50m, or whether a bespoke value would be required.

A study which was commissioned to look further into this issue has provided its findings. Current thinking on the proposed approach to insuring re-entry activity is that considering the current licensing approach, it is assumed that UK licensed satellites would burn up on re-entry, given the currently modelled characteristics of these satellites. The UK Government would generally not require insurance for re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere as a means of disposing of the satellite.

In a scenario where a satellite would intend to survive re-entry intact (for example in cases where in-orbit manufacturing missions return the space object to Earth for retrieval), a limit of operator liability would need to be included in a licence to cover such re-entry activity and an assessment of the potential extent of damage would be required.

It is proposed that an assessment of the potential damage from a re-entry mission would determine whether either of the limits of liability proposed for orbital operations of £20m or £50m should apply or whether a higher limit would be required. An adapted version of the Modelled Insurance Requirement (MIR), which calculates the insurance requirement for launch activities, would be used to calculate a higher liability limit. Further detail on how the MIR is used to determine the insurance requirement and liability limit for launch can be found on the CAA’s website.

Another consideration for determining re-entry policy is whether to adopt the internationally accepted norms for requiring a controlled rather than uncontrolled re-entry.

As noted by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination Committee (of which the UK Space Agency is a member agency), in their report of June 2021[18]:

“Typical parameters to assess re-entry safety are casualty area and the casualty expectation (Ec). A threshold Ec below 10−4 per re-entry event is recommended as part of the IADC Guidelines, as the threshold provides guidance to mitigate a consequence of removing space debris from orbit. It is noted that the NASA Standard 8719.14, the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, the European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation, ESA’s Re-entry Safety Requirements, and the JAXA Space Debris Mitigation Standard all limit the value of casualty expectancy (Ec) per re-entry event to less than or equal to 10−4.”

The UK Government proposes to consider an approach that in cases where an uncontrolled re-entry would result in an Ec of greater than 10-4, a controlled re-entry would be required, although such parameters would be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Questions

22: Do you have any comments on the proposed approach to re-entry insurance?

Insurance waivers

The liability and insurance review agreed to consider when it might be appropriate to waive the requirement to insure satellite operations.

Existing waiver for the lowest risk satellites

For the lowest-risk missions insurance requirements may be waived following a risk assessment. This may be applied to low-risk missions launched from the International Space Station (ISS) or launched to an operational altitude below that of the ISS. The review looked at whether this waiver should be amended to consider developments in the low-Earth orbital environment, for example with new space stations planned or in-orbit already, such as China’s Tiangong space station.

The call for evidence response recommended that the current waiver of insurance applied to the lowest risk missions launched from or operating below the ISS should be retained for operations licensed within two years of June 2022, but would be reviewed further as the orbital environment below the ISS changes.

The UK Government stated its intention to maintain the approach for two years in the call for evidence response in June 2022. The UK Government will review this policy in June 2024 or on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a lower altitude is required due to interaction with high value assets and space stations operating below the ISS.

Proposed new waivers of insurance

The call for evidence also stated that the UK Government is exploring further whether it is appropriate to use the waiver of insurance approach to support broader aims of the National Space Strategy around growth and innovation.

The UK government is considering whether the following circumstances may also be appropriate to apply a waiver of the insurance requirement and set an operator’s liability limit at £0. In such cases the UK Government would accept the risks associated with such missions:

Licences issued to first-of-a-kind technologies to recognise the significant development costs to enable their first operation. This is designed to support the innovation agenda. Examples could include cases where grant funding is provided by the UK Government under its various innovation programmes, or where the operator could demonstrate that the activity is a world-first in the application of novel technology or activity. Improvements and iterations of an existing technology would not be covered by the waiver.

To align with the proposed fee waiver for cases of not-for-profit organisations (see the charging for orbital operator licences proposal below).

The application of any of the waivers set out above would be determined on a case-by-case basis and be subject to a satisfactory risk assessment by the regulator. If a full waiver of insurance were not deemed appropriate due to the level of risk associated with the activity / technology, the regulator would be able to apply a lower insurance requirement than would otherwise be required under the proposed variable liability limit approach.

The UK Government would not intend to introduce regulations to implement new waivers of insurance. The UK Government’s response to the consultation would set out any decision to implement new insurance waivers by updating guidance, which would be published on the CAA’s website.

Questions

23: Do you have any comments on the proposed approach to existing waivers and circumstances where new waivers could be applied?

Forward look on insurance

Responses to the call for evidence referred to the space insurance market. There were comments about market competition and market susceptibility to increase in premiums, reduction of capacity or complete withdrawal of insurers in response to a large claim or series of claims.

With space debris increasing in risk and with its cost to commercial satellite operators, the UK Government announced last year that we will use our global regulatory and standards leadership to support the development of an industry-led Space Sustainability Standard to help drive commercial ESG for space sustainability.

Minister Freeman convened a Roundtable at Lloyd’s in January this year with leading space companies, insurers and space investors to agree a workplan and roadmap to launch the industry-led Space Sustainability Standard later this year.

As well as supporting developments such as this to increase the attractiveness of the UK for investment and innovation to demonstrate world-leading responsible behaviour in space, the UK Government is also exploring ways to expand the space insurance market in the UK to support the activities of UK space companies and increase insurance services provided for other markets, to reinforce London’s position as the world’s leading and most innovative space insurance market.

The UK Government also wishes to obtain a better-informed view of issues currently facing the insurance market and the prospects for the market over the course of the next 5-10 years, including the risk appetite of insurers moving forward given increased orbital congestion and how these issues can be mitigated. The UK Government is aware of concerns from the sector that activities in LEO may be uninsurable within 5-10 years and is therefore keen to work with the insurance sector to manage and mitigate risks as much as is feasible.

Questions

24: What opportunities are there to develop insurance products to cover other aspects of space activities (for example business interruption insurance)?

25: Which of these would you consider would fall to the insurance sector and which to government to progress, were they to be adopted?

26: How could uptake of TPL and other types of insurance be encouraged in other jurisdictions to provide opportunity for growth in the London insurance market (for example linking insurance provision to responsible behaviours or enabling access to markets if insurance is taken out)?

27: What issues are facing insurers in terms of risk arising from increasing orbital congestion now and in the next 5-10 years?

28: How do you think these issues could be mitigated?

29: How can insurer underwriting overheads be minimised to reduce insurance premiums and scrutiny by the CAA (for example standard policy wording to reduce administrative costs of developing policies, adoption of standard models to quantify risk)?

30: How can the limited space insurance capacity be better managed to meet the increasing demands for launch services and operations, for example an option for a single insurance requirement when multiple UK satellites are onboard the same launch vehicle?

31: With the advent of novel technology and activities, what do you see as the key challenges and how can these be overcome? For example, is there a need to move to a product liability basis as adoption of automated collision avoidance manoeuvre systems become more prevalent.

32: Are there any other issues that you think should be considered / addressed?

5.7 Other regulatory policy proposals and considerations

SIA 2018 and OSA 1986 satellite licensing - Charging for Orbital Operator Licences

Background on charging

The power to make charging schemes is necessary as licensing and the subsequent monitoring of spaceflight and associated activities outlined in the SIA 2018 and those activities licensed under the OSA 1986 incur a cost to the regulator.

The charging provisions in the SIA 2018 and the OSA 1986 are as follows:

· Section 62 of the SIA 2018 gives effect to Schedule 11 which makes provision for the Secretary of State or regulator (referred to in the SIA 2018 as the charging authority) to charge a fee for carrying out their functions.

· Section 4 A of the OSA 1986 allows the Secretary of State to make, by regulations, a scheme for determining the charges. The policy intent is that the same charging regime applies to licences for satellite operations and procuring a launch issued under either the OSA 1986 or the SIA 2018.

Individuals or companies intending to carry out activities from within the UK apply under the SIA 2018. UK nationals, Scottish firms or bodies incorporated under the law of any part of the UK intending to carry out activities from outside the UK apply under the OSA 1986 (as amended by the Deregulation Act 2015). In practice, all applications are made to the CAA which conducts licensing activities for licences issued under both the SIA 2018 and the OSA 1986, and joint procuring of a launch / operations licences where one element is issued under both Acts but for which only one licence fee is paid. The current fee for a single orbital licence application is £6,500.

The UK Government previously consulted on charging in 2020 in the Consultation on Draft Insurance and Liabilities Requirements to Implement the SIA 2018. As set out in the Summary of Views and Government’s Response, issued on 5 March 2021, it was concluded that there was broad support for a one-off charge of £6,500. This fee applied to applications for orbital licences issued under the OSA 1986 and SIA 2018. Concerns were raised by constellation operators about paying the fixed fee for applications where repeat licensing occurs and the UK Government has since introduced a refund scheme for these operators and published details in Guidance on Satellite Licence Fees for Constellation Operators.

Views were also raised in response to the consultation that charges should be set in line with fees in other jurisdictions to retain the UK’s competitiveness, and the UK Government therefore agreed to keep the charging proposals under review.

Although the UK Government does not intend to increase the fee at this time from £6,500, it should be noted that our charging proposals are subject to further approvals and dependent on future funding arrangements for the CAA. The current fee has not been updated since 1998 and it does not recover the full costs of the regulator for carrying out the licensing work. Therefore, it is necessary to keep this under regular review. Current arrangements for funding CAA for this work are in place until the end of this government spending period in March 2025.

Suggested changes to administration of fees for orbital licences

In the long-term it is the UK Government’s intention to delegate charging powers from the Secretary of State of the Department of Science, Innovation and Technology to the CAA for orbital licences issued under the OSA 1986 to align with the current approach for licences issued under the SIA 2018. The CAA would then use their annual Scheme of Charges to consult on fees. However, this is dependent on primary legislation to make the changes. The UK Government will continue to seek to make this change at the earliest opportunity.

Suggested change to introduce a variable refund structure for orbital operator licences

The UK Government is considering a proposal whereby it would apply a variable refund to the fixed fees currently charged by the CAA for orbital operations licences, as a means of reflecting the sustainability aspects of the proposed mission. The proposed variable refund structure would apply the same rationale as the proposed variable liability limit approach, were this to be adopted. The UK Government would recognise implementation of additional sustainable measures by operators by applying a refund on the cost of the licence fee for their missions.

The UK Government is seeking views on this option. The application fee payable to the CAA would still be £6,500 as per the current process although as noted above, decisions on the level of future fees may be taken in due course. The CAA would then consider the application and if it were to be progressed, and if after assessment the liability limit for the mission were to be set at £20m, the UK Government would refund 60% of the application fee (i.e. the UK Government would apply a refund of £3,900 to the original fee paid, resulting in an actual licence cost of £2,600). If the liability limit were to be assessed as zero, the UK Government would apply a refund of £6,500. If the liability limit was set at £50m then the fee would remain at £6,500 and no refund would be applied. If a limit of liability higher than £50m were to be included in a licence, the application fee would still be £6,500 as per current arrangements. The following table sets this out:

Variable Liability Limit	Current CAA Application Fee	Government Refund	Net Cost of Successful Application
£0	£6,500	£6,500 (100%)	£0
£20m	£6,500	£3,900 (60%)	£2,600
£50m	£6,500	£0 (0%)	£6,500
>£50m	£6,500	£0 (0%)	£6,500

Further work would be needed to determine how the refund would be administered.

The rationale for the proposed reduction from £6,500 to £2,600 is to mirror the % change of a liability limit from £50m to £20m i.e. a 60% reduction of £6,500 is £2,600. Were the UK Government to include additional liability limit thresholds in the proposed variable liability limit approach, then subsequent amendments could be made to the variable refund structure to add any new thresholds.

If adopted, this government refund approach would apply to all orbital operator licences to be issued by the CAA under both the OSA 1986 and SIA 2018. If the licence were to cover both procurement and operations in the same application from the same operator, then a single fee applies to cover both licences.

The refund proposal described is one put forward by the UK Government rather than the CAA. This is in keeping with the UK Government’s desire to see spaceflight as a key component of UK growth and to encourage sustainability of missions in the near-term. The proposal does not result in a change in the manner in which charges are calculated and levied by the regulator now or into the future, as charging decisions by the CAA are made independent of the UK Government. Should the UK Government choose not to pursue this proposal the CAA will hold no liability in upholding the refund scheme described.

Charges for constellation operators

The UK Government is seeking views on the option that the variable refund approach for standard orbital missions would also be applied to constellation operators. As constellation operators are covered by the existing refund scheme, the UK Government would look to align the existing refund scheme with the proposed variable refund approach, if this were to be adopted. For example, the scale of reductions applied to the current £6,500 fixed fee would be applied also in cases where a variable refund would be applied for the £20m liability threshold (which is £2,600 post refund). The following table provides an illustrative example of how the existing refund scheme could be applied to a post variable refund of £2,600.

Number of licence applications submitted	Licence fee (per licence, post variable refund)	Proposed constellation fee (per licence) after existing refund applied	Constellation scheme refund (per licence)
201+	£2,600	£2,160	£440
151-200	£2,600	£2,280	£320
100-150	£2,600	£2,480	£120
<100	£2,600	£2,600	£0

Charges for a Procurement-Only Licence

A Procurement-Only Operator Licence (POL) is a type of Orbital Operator Licence under the SIA 2018 (UK) or OSA 1986 (Overseas). The POL only authorises the ‘procurement of the launch of a space object’. It is granted where the launch of a satellite is procured and takes place from either the UK or overseas, but where the subsequent operation of the satellite is either carried out by a different party or carried out by the same party under a foreign jurisdiction. For example, it may apply where a foreign satellite operator, based overseas, intends to procure the launch of their satellite on-board a UK launch vehicle and operate the satellite in another jurisdiction.

The UK Government is interested in views on whether a POL should be treated differently to a standard orbital licence by introducing a specific POL fee, which would be exempt from the proposed variable fee approach, or a fee waiver. As part of the wider review of the SIA 2018, the UK Government is considering whether SIA 2018 POL licences will still be required in the future. Changes to legislation would be required before any decision on these SIA POL licences could be made (these changes would not affect OSA POL licences).

Fee waivers policy

The UK Government intends to revoke the current fee waiver under regulation 4 of the OSA 1986 (Fees) Regulations 1989 for educational institutions, as set out in the 5th March 2021 Government response. Both section 4A(5) of OSA 1986 and paragraph 7(2) of Schedule 11 to SIA 2018 contain general fee waiving powers. These powers can be applied on a case-by-case basis to waive fees for educational institutions.

The UK Government is proposing to waive fees, on a case-by-case basis, for licences issued to first-of-a-kind technologies to recognise the significant development costs to enable their first operation. This is designed to support the innovation agenda and aligns with the proposed approach for waivers of insurance requirements. Examples could include cases where grant funding is provided by the UK Government under its various innovation programmes, or where the operator could demonstrate that the activity is a world-first in the application of novel technology or activity. Improvements and iterations of an existing technology would not be covered by the waiver.

Analysis of benefits of applying variable refunds to fees

The proposed variable refund structure, aligned to the proposed variable liability limit approach, would help towards meeting key objectives and aims of the National Space Strategy around sustainability, growth and innovation. The UK Government believes that a variable refund depending on mission sustainability would be attractive to operators when considered in combination with the other initiatives on space sustainability. Introducing new criteria for fee waivers for not-for-profit operators, and some other operators, would help towards making the UK more competitive, when compared with licensing regimes in other countries.

The UK Government has carried out analysis of the potential benefits to satellite operators of applying a variable refund approach. For individual orbital licences, the estimated cost savings to operators collectively range from £14,300 to £130,000. Were a constellation to be licensed under a variable refund approach, the savings would be higher; analysis suggests that savings for a constellation with a liability limit of £20m could range from £970,000 to £1.6m with a liability limit of £0. As explained for the analysis of the proposed variable liability limit approach, these are illustrative figures based on forecasts of future satellite licence applications, liability limits (and by association, variable refunds) and the orbits in which missions could occur. Annex B further explains the assumptions which have been used for this analysis.

Implementation

If there is general support for the charging proposals the UK Government would look to implement the changes as quickly as possible thereafter. For changes to fees applied under Kthe OSA 1986, this would require secondary legislation and the UK Government would draft the legislation on the basis of the suggestions set out above. Normal timescales to implement secondary legislation means this could take 9-12 months. This indicative timeframe considers the scope of the proposals in this section. The UK Government would not intend to consult further on the proposed charging proposals or draft legislation unless there were further developments or significant changes to the suggestions set out above in response to feedback received from this consultation, in which case the UK Government would consult further as required.

Questions

33: Do you have any comments on the proposed approach to fees set out above? In particular:

i. The principle of aligning the fees structure with the approach to setting liability limits;

ii. The proposed changes to the constellation refunds policy to reflect the revised fee structure;

iii. The proposal on new fee waivers and whether there are any additional categories that could be included;

iv. The proposal on procurement of a launch only licences.

34: What are the potential additional benefits in adopting this approach to charging in addition to those identified?

35: Are there any disadvantages in adopting this approach to charging?

Question 6

6. Section 2 - policy overview of issues influencing the proposed variable liability limit approach

Accepted Answer

6.1 Introduction

This section outlines the UK Government’s current thinking on a number of policy areas relating to space sustainability. Some of the policies are included as suggested questions for the proposed variable liability limit approach for orbital operations. Policy developments for relevant topics will need to be considered for future adaptions to the proposed variable liability limit approach, as well as for the current set of suggested questions (for example dark and quiet skies).

6.2 Dark and quiet skies

The growing number of satellites has raised concern in the astronomy community that this could interfere with their scientific observations, and potentially cause environmental damage if unchecked. At the request of the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), in conjunction with the International Astronomical Union and Spain, organised a conference on ‘Dark and Quiet Skies for Science and Society’. This took place as an online workshop from 5-9th October 2020, and the findings from the workshop were published as a report: Dark and Quiet Skies for Science and Society: Report and Recommendations. This report presented the impacts on astronomy from a number of sources, including satellite constellations, and presented recommendations for the astronomical community, the space industry, and national and international regulators on how these impacts could be mitigated.

A second online workshop was held on 3-7th October 2021. This was split into three working groups focusing on specific areas, one of which looked at satellite constellations. The findings were presented to the 59th Session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) of COPUOS and published in detail as: Dark and Quiet Skies for Science and Society II: Working Group Reports

The UK Government is considering its policy with regards to dark and quiet skies and will set out its further thinking once completed.

The stage 2 questions of the proposed variable liability limit approach regarding compliance with the UK Government’s dark and quiet skies policy will be adapted to reflect the outcome of these considerations.

6.3 Manoeuvrability /Collision Avoidance

UK Space Agency commissioned a study from Aerospace UK to inform future policy on propulsion.

The purpose of the study was to assess safety and sustainability considerations of licensing satellites without collision avoidance capability. The work was structured into three stages. Stage one reviewed the approach to collision avoidance capability (such as propulsion or differential drag) for a variety of platform sizes. Stage two assessed a mandatory approach to collision avoidance capability for all UK satellites above a fixed altitude; key metrics for this stage were the sustainability of the space environment, UK Government financial liability and commercial considerations of platform design. Stage three drew conclusions from the previous two stages to provide policy recommendations.

The UK Space Agency is considering how the study’s recommendations could inform its future approach to collision avoidance capability and further information and discussion on the way forward will be discussed with the sector.

The questions in stage 2 of the proposed variable liability limit approach relating to manoeuvrability would be adapted to reflect the outcome of these considerations.

6.4 Post-mission disposal timelines

The Aerospace UK study also assessed post mission disposal (PMD) timelines. The work included a literature review of previous studies that assessed the impact of PMD on space environment sustainability, analysis of the impact on the space environment and UK financial liability of a hypothetical scenario of reducing PMD, and an assessment of the high-level impact on spacecraft design of reducing PMD timelines.

UK Space Agency is considering how the study’s recommendations could inform its future approach to PMD timelines and further information and discussion on the way forward will be discussed with the sector.

The questions in stage 2 of the proposed variable liability limit approach relating to PMD timelines would be adapted to reflect the outcome of these considerations.

6.5 Astra Carta Seal

At the 4th Summit for Space Sustainability in June 2022 held in London, His Majesty King Charles III proposed establishing an ‘Astra Carta’ which would build on the Artemis Accords and develop peaceful and sustainable space exploration.

The Astra Carta is a collective call to action that seeks to unite nations, organisations, the private sector and stakeholders in a shared commitment to the responsible and sustainable use of space.

The Astra Carta aims to serve as a roadmap for the global private sector to align their space-related activities with sustainability goals, approaches and standards in partnership with government, international organisations and other stakeholders.

His Majesty King Charles III announced The Astra Carta Seal on 28 June 2023. Further information about the Astra Carta Seal can be found on the Sustainable Markets Initiative website.

6.6 ADR - application to other activities / operational approaches e.g. launch and commissioning services

The National Space Strategy released in September 2021 highlights the areas of ADR and In Orbit Service Manufacturing (IOSM) as priorities for the UK:

“And we will work to establish early leadership in potential and emerging markets such as in-orbit servicing, space travel and habitation, and active debris removal.”

For ADR and IOSM missions that involve more than one State, there may need to be arrangements between the States as to how they will apportion liability for joint missions, provide relevant consents and recognise each other’s safety and security regimes.

The UK has been working with other national and multinational space agencies to develop our regulatory framework around in-orbit proximity missions, with a view to developing draft arrangements to enable joint missions with international partners.

As part of this engagement, UK Space Agency has developed a joint project with the New Zealand Space Agency to develop our regulatory framework around IOS and ADR missions with a view to developing standard draft arrangements to enable joint missions with international partners (IOSM requirements will be considered in the next phase of the project). This joint initiative has produced an adaptable template arrangement that could be used with other States to govern joint international ADR and IOS missions. The arrangement specifies:

· Roles and responsibilities of each State;

· Liabilities and insurance arrangements of each party;

· Resolution of any third-party claims arising from the joint activity;

· Information sharing practises and transparency; and

· Intellectual property

The template arrangement was presented by UK Space Agency and New Zealand Space Agency to UN COPUOS on 1 June. The presentation is published separately and a link to the presentation is included at Annex C.

The UK Space Agency and New Zealand Space Agency held a side event at the COPUOS plenary session entitled ‘Enabling multi-state active debris removal and in orbit servicing missions: Perspectives from New Zealand and the United Kingdom’. At this session, both parties showcased the thinking we’re developing on regulating joint missions of this type. Much of the arrangement between States revolves around liability issues, and the ways in which third-party and consequent state liability is attributed during different operations as part of a mission. The side event at COPUOS was well received, with positive feedback from international colleagues on the thought leadership the UK is showing on these issues, and eagerness to get involved in similar joint framework arrangement projects.

6.7 Monitor Your Satellites

Monitor your satellites is the UK Space Agency’s digital service that shares Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) collision warnings with commercial operators and government users if their asset is in danger of colliding with another. On top of presenting complex information from open-sources in a user-friendly format, UK Space Agency uploads UK-derived analysis from UK Space Agency orbital analysts. The service is available online and has a similar look and feel as other government websites.

Monitor your satellites is free to use for all UK registered satellite operators and UK Space Agency are working with operators to continue improving the service and adding capabilities. This ensures that the UK space industry has access to SST capabilities and actively contributes to improving the reliability, accuracy, and effectiveness of the service.

Monitor your satellites uses data from multiple observational sources – US Space Command, UK Sovereign sensors and Commercial sensor providers, ESA DISCOS object data and the UK Space Agency’s own UK SST information.

A dedicated Orbital analysis team then analyse and process all this information and produce their own UK analysis which gets published out to users of the service.

UK analysis is proprietary and has been through external validation and full transparency is maintained throughout to give users confidence in the alerts and data.

In the near future, Monitor your satellites will start to provide advice, as well as alerts, specifically in the form of Manoeuvre Trade-Space Plots. UK Space Agency are also planning on generating and sharing UK Conjunction Data Messages.

The service will also be expanded out to additional user groups with the aim of becoming a decision support tool for regulators as well as satellite operators.

Making use of the Monitor your satellites application is one of methods which could be used to demonstrate evidence to achieve a score in the variable liability limit approach for the data sharing question.

6.8 Space Traffic Management

The UK Government acknowledges the growing international concern on how congested space is becoming, whether that be through innovative constellations, debris, human spacecraft and missions, or traditional missions. The UK Government places high importance on the issue of sustainability of the space environment.

To continue to operate safely in space, the UK Government is committed to developing sustainable traffic management standards, and we have started international collaborations to achieve this objective. We recognise the importance that Space Traffic Management has on sustainability. In partnership with the US and Japan, the UK is leading the development of the ISO Space Traffic Coordination Standard with the aim of creating an internationally accepted method of operating in space. The UK is also currently chair of the ISO 24113 Debris Mitigation working group. As stated earlier in this consultation, the UK have announced, through Science Minister Freeman, a new, industry-led Space Sustainability Standard, which is currently in development.

The UK continues to welcome and encourage international collaboration on Space Traffic Management and recognises that unanimous agreement will be the key to securing success on this issue. We will continue to lead and champion the safe use of space for all humankind through international standards.

6.9 Safety and Sustainability Principles for Regulation of In-orbit Missions

UK Space Agency does not currently provide a published policy framework to guide the CAA’s consideration of either safety or sustainability as part of its licensing activity. The CAA uses the principle of assessing whether risk is ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ in relation to safety (which is a well-established concept in sectors with a high risk to public safety),

There are a number of published sets of guidelines and / or best practices in regard to sustainability, which include:

· The Long Term Sustainability Guidelines published by UN COPUOS in 2018;

· The Space Debris Guidelines published by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination Committee, latest version published in 2021;

· Best Practices for Sustainability of Space Operations produced by the Space Safety Coalition, latest version April 2023;

· ISO standard 24113; and

· Space Sustainability Rating, produced by e-Space EPFL Space Centre under the auspices of ESA, the World Economic Forum and others.

To date, the Space Debris guidelines have formed the basis for the UK Government’s view of how sustainability should be considered within licensing.

It is the UK Government’s view that the UK needs to develop its position on sustainability in space further, recognising, amongst other factors, the following:

· The rapidly increasing number of launches and planned missions, especially into LEO which is forecast to continue and accelerate, arising in particular from the deployment of large constellations;

· The increasing variety of missions, which are leading to requests from industry as to how planned and prospective missions might be regulated;

· Global compliance with the space debris mitigation guidelines is not yet at a level that is sufficient to induce substantial benefits or slowing of the population growth; and

· To reduce the impact on the environment, regulators such as the FCC mandating stricter behaviours on aspects such as post-mission disposal lifetimes.

The Principles will form a key part of the regulatory review announced by Minister Freeman at the 4th Summit for Space Sustainability in London in June 2022, alongside a planned review of the SIA 2018 by the UK Government. These principles and any subsequent amendments would also inform the proposed variable liability limit approach and insurance requirements for orbital operations.

6.10 Life cycle assessments

The Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) in UK Space Agency has been researching Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) methods for space activities. This research has been conducted in the context of the European Space Agency (ESA) CleanSpace EcoDesign work. The research project goal is to develop the OCE capability and knowledge in this area to better support the UK Space Agency on environmental sustainability efforts.

The research began with informally consulting UK based space companies of varying size to understand existing environmental tracking and regulatory conformance processes. Following this, LCA methodologies were investigated further with detailed research into best practice and processes for conducting an LCA. Research continued into the issues around space LCA activities, highlighting the unique areas such as the space segment, re-entry and particular manufacture techniques. The work now focuses on conducting an internal study via a small scale UK Space Agency project in order to develop expertise and determine capability requirements. The study could go on to inform developing policy and future funding of the UK.

Questions

36: Do you have any comments about how future policy changes to areas outlined in this section could be best reflected in future adaptions of the proposed variable liability limit approach, were it to be adopted?

37: Do you consider that evolving positions for any of the policy areas will be particularly important for future adaptions of the proposed variable liability limit approach?

38: The UK government would welcome views from respondents on their knowledge and use of LCAs. If you do not have such knowledge, what is your current level of environmental tracking (scope 1,2 and 3 or anything extra)?

Question 7

7. Section 3 - Longer-term UK Leadership on Space Sustainability

Accepted Answer

7.1 Introduction

The UK Government wants to demonstrate global leadership on space sustainability, both in terms of thought-leadership and taking forward concrete actions.

This section seeks views on what should be the UK Government’s priorities on space sustainability in the longer term, including actions to achieve these priorities to help inform longer-term planning and the development of a Space Sustainability Roadmap. Developing a UK approach to space sustainability could cover aspects such as reducing the impact of space activities on the Earth’s environment, orbital, Lunar, cis-lunar environments and other planets and solar system bodies, all of which are included in this section.

The UK Government is taking a multifaceted, holistic approach to achieve a sustainable space environment for the use of future generations.

Whilst there are various aspects to space sustainability, one key element is tackling debris creation. This needs to address debris mitigation, as well as existing debris to the extent that is possible, based on current and proposed future technologies.

The UK Government wants to develop a comprehensive approach to addressing debris associated with future UK-licensed missions but also consider further actions to address debris created by the UK through its space activities (such as removal of defunct satellites).

Sustainability of the space environment cannot be solely achieved by the UK alone. Whilst the UK could take unilateral action, it is likely that some measures needed to address longer-term space sustainability may only be achieved in partnership internationally. We must work with international partners in fora such as UN COPUOS, the European Space Agency (ESA), other international bodies and organisations, as well as bilaterally on specific topics.

Questions

39: What international partners do you recommend the UK should work with?

40: Do you find the UK’s partnership arrangements effective?

41: Could the UK do more, or perhaps less, in this area?

7.2 Developing a Space Sustainability Roadmap to 2050

The UK Government is proposing to develop a Space Sustainability Roadmap needed to reach an overarching space sustainability goal for 2050.

The aim of this consultation is to help determine this goal and start to set out a detailed list of actions and milestones to 2050 to achieve this. The roadmap could extend beyond 2050, depending on the scope of discussions and what is considered to be necessary in the longer term.

The rationale for setting out this level of detail is to capture the actions needed to achieve the overall goal and to develop plans to determine when action needs to start to achieve each objective. This approach would also enable synergies or potential consequences to be assessed as the various strands develop. The roadmap would need to make appropriate reference to other roadmaps under development, such as for IOSM.

Space Scotland have developed a roadmap on space sustainability which provides an example of aspects that could be covered by the UK Government’s roadmap.

Figure 6 – Image of the space sustainability roadmap included in the document ‘Space Sustainability - A Roadmap for Scotland’ (website and page 14 of that document)

The UK Government would welcome stakeholders’ thoughts on actions taken to address climate change or other sustainability initiatives which could be applied to improve the sustainability of the space environment and considered in the roadmap.

The UK Government is also seeking views on the appropriateness and viability of setting targets for removal of existing UK debris to demonstrate leadership on sustainability, assess the potential benefits for the space environment and to stimulate demand for ADR services. However, it is important to recognise that currently there are technical and legal limits to what can be achieved to remove debris. The roadmap will consider the size of debris that can be feasibly removed, based on current technologies.

The timescale for delivering a roadmap would need to be further scoped. The UK Government will carry out further work on a roadmap over the next 12 to 18 months and will establish a working group to engage with stakeholders. We would welcome expressions of interest in joining the working group.

Questions

42: Are there other examples of sustainability initiatives or other roadmaps which you feel could inform the development of the UK Space Sustainability Roadmap?

43: Do you think it is viable to include targets for the removal of debris relating to the UK’s space activities as part of the roadmap? If so:

i. Please provide your suggestions for feasible targets for 2030, 2040, 2050 and beyond.

ii. Please provide your thoughts on what would be a realistic size and / or type of debris that should be considered within the scope of any targets.

iii. What are the potential benefits of including such targets with regards to:

iv. Impact on the space environment?

v. Benefits to the UK space sector, in particular relating to the commercialisation of the UK’s ADR capability?

44: What should be the UK government’s priorities to address space sustainability?

45: What other actions could be included in the roadmap to address space sustainability?

7.3 Views on establishing a UK space sustainability concept

As with climate change policy, a key focus of a longer-term space sustainability strategy will be to adopt an overarching concept to shape current and future thinking.

There are many parallels with climate change policy and the adoption of Net Zero goals and targets to reduce carbon emissions, which could potentially be used to define a space sustainability strategy.

The UK Government is aware a number of organisations are proposing to define the objectives of their respective space sustainability agendas. A ‘Leave No Trace’ approach is one example, which has been proposed by OneWeb.

The UK Government supports initiatives being developed by other organisations, in particular ESA’s Zero Debris Approach[19], which aims to stop the generation of debris in valuable orbits by 2030.

Other fora such as the Paris Peace Forum have also considered initiatives of this type - https://parispeaceforum.org/en/initiatives/net-zero-space/

https://www.netzerospaceinitiative.org/supporters

The UK Government is considering whether these or other concepts could be used to help inform the UK’s future policy on space debris and spacecraft operation for UK registered spacecraft.

Questions

46: Do you have any views how these and other approaches and concepts could be used to inform the UK’s developing policy on space debris?

7.4 Defining sustainability with regards to space activities

Developing a definition of space sustainability to shape future UK space sustainability policy.

The UK Government is seeking views about developing a UK definition of space sustainability, which would reflect the current understanding of issues affecting space sustainability, and could build on the definition of space sustainability in the Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines’:

“The ability to maintain the conduct of space activities indefinitely into the future in a manner that realizes the objectives of equitable access to the benefits of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, in order to meet the needs of the present generations while preserving the outer space environment for future generations.”

An example of a proposed change to the current Long-term Sustainability Guidelines definition of space sustainability is from the Scottish Space Sustainability Roadmap, which suggests the following:

“The long-term sustainability of space activities (on-ground and in-orbit) is defined as the ability to maintain and improve the conduct of space activities indefinitely into the future in a manner that ensures continued access to the benefits of the exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes, in order to meet the needs of the present generations while preserving both the Earth and the outer space environment for future generations. Space sustainability also requires the promotion of the use and environmental benefits of space data and recognising the need for launch and in-orbit activities to be carried out in a responsible and sustainable manner.”

As well as improving the sustainability of the space environment, the UK Government is also considering whether further action should be taken to address sustainability of space activities affecting the Earth’s environment.

During development of the proposed variable liability limit approach, including Earth sustainability in the approach was considered. Due to a lack of data and policy formulation the decision was taken not to include such aspects but to give further consideration in future iterations of the proposed approach.

Whilst there is a particular focus to reducing and ultimately eliminating carbon emissions arising from the end-to-end process of space missions, the UK Government will also consider the broader aspects of space activities on the Earth’s environment. These considerations will include manufacture of space objects, through to launch and re-entry for the purposes of disposal of launch vehicles and satellites.

The UK Government’s policy on Earth sustainability for launch will consider the on-going development of the industry-led Space Sustainability Standard, which is considering the issue in terms of supply chains for satellite manufacture and launch. In future, an approach could be adopted in which satellites would no longer be disposed of in the Earth’s atmosphere as a general rule, which ties in with the concept of a circular economy, as outlined later in this section. The UK Government will also consider other on-going research and any other relevant initiatives to inform policy.

It is however important to acknowledge the steps that have already been taken to define sustainability in a number of areas of space activity. Environmental considerations are a key aspect for UK launch, with an Assessment of Environmental Effects required as part of a licence application for launch activities. The UK Government has also published a set of environmental objectives for the regulator to take into account when exercising its functions, including for launch activity.

Questions

47: Do you have any further suggestions as to how the long-term sustainability guidelines could be adapted for a UK space sustainability definition?

48: Do you think that sustainability of the Earth’s environment should also be included in the definition, and if so, how?

49: If you agree that aspects of Earth sustainability should be included in this definition, which aspects should be covered in the proposed roadmap?

7.5 International co-ordination on space sustainability

Co-ordination through the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and other international fora

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has been established for over 60 years, which along with its two Sub-committees (the Scientific and Technical Sub-committee and the Legal Sub-committee) is the primary source of multilateral engagement on space related issues.

The UK has and continues to remain a strong voice within UN COPUOS and has been particularly supportive and pro-active in advocating space sustainability and in assisting new space-faring nations to develop their national capabilities.

The UK recently has funded a number of measures through the UNOOSA to promote sustainability and responsible practices in space and has circulated conference room papers to further the Long-term sustainability (LTS) agenda at UN COPUOS sessions in recent years. The UK has also demonstrated its support for ongoing work for the implementation of UNOOSA guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space.

Phases 1 and 2 of the project delivered significant benefits in terms of understanding the implementation of the LTS Guidelines. Phase 3 is an important next step - it will build on the work completed in the first two phases, which is particularly timely as a second Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, established under the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has recently begun its work, under a five-year mandate.

In partnership with UNOOSA, the United Kingdom will also fund tranche 1 (of 4) of an initial three-year registration project (2022-2025). The objectives of the project will be to enhance international expertise related to the registration of objects launched into outer space, support member states and state parties to implement their international commitments related to registration, and to understand challenges on registration, which can be addressed through capacity-building or facilitating dialogues aimed at improving policy coherence among national entities or focal points.

The project aligns with the importance that member states, regulators, and industry attach to good registration practices in their respective national legislation, business models, and/or strategies, and the need to address current and future challenges regarding registration. Registration is a key transparency measure, which underpins future new and novel space missions and commercial space activity, such as mega constellations, IOS and ADR missions.

The UK Government supports the adoption of national regulatory frameworks with regards to space, as per UN Resolution A/RES/68/74. The UK Government will continue to work with other national governments and space agencies to facilitate the peaceful use and exploration of outer space.

The UK Space Agency is also a member of the Inter-Agency Debris Co-ordination Committee (IADC), another key forum to promote and further space sustainability.

The UK has implemented the LTS guidelines and the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines through a mixture of regulations and guidance.

The UK Government is seeking views as to whether there are further actions that could be taken to encourage the adoption of more sustainable practices at international level, working with other jurisdictions through the route of UN COPUOS and other international bodies. The UK Government is also interested in views as to whether there are any lessons from tackling other multilateral issues through international fora which could inform an approach to space sustainability.

Questions

50: Are there any additional actions with regards to space sustainability that could be taken forward through international fora such as UN COPUOS?

51: Are there any lessons or actions arising from other multilateral issues tackled through international fora that could be applied to space sustainability?

7.6 Bilateral arrangements

As set out in section 2, UK Space Agency has been working with the New Zealand Space Agency to develop an arrangement for managing ADR and IOS missions which involve more than one jurisdiction. The proposal presented at the UN COPUOS plenary in June could be used as a template by other jurisdictions to manage such missions. Such arrangements could be implemented to clarify the obligations on different parties and to effectively manage arrangements in cases where there is existing international or national law (such as the Liability Convention) which does not foresee the new types of activity arising in space.

The UK Government is seeking views on cases where similar arrangements could be useful to agree bilaterally and potentially be applied as a template for more general use.

Questions

52: Are there any other activities which you feel could benefit from an approach agreed bilaterally as a template for wider use?

7.7 Insurance / finance sector

There is increasing evidence that investors in space companies are assessing the sustainability of the proposed operations as a key consideration in investment decisions. The development of the industry-led Space Sustainability Standard underlines this. Insurers as well as investors are supportive of the Space Sustainability Standard. With this mind, the UK Government is seeking views as to whether there are any initiatives adopted to address other issues which could be applied to space sustainability.

As an example, for climate change there are various finance and insurance initiatives aiming to cease investments in fossil fuels and adopt targets towards Net Zero[20]. The UK Government is seeking views as to whether similar initiatives could feasibly be applied to space sustainability and the steps to develop such initiatives.

Questions

53: Do you have any views on adopting measures similar to climate finance and insurance initiatives to promote space sustainability? If yes, please provide suggestions on possible actions that could be taken.

7.8 Commercialisation of Active Debris Removal and In-Orbit Servicing Services

It was recognised in the G7 statement on space sustainability that ADR services delivered by commercial entities will form an important part in maintaining space sustainability moving forwards, both in terms of minimising the impacts of debris generated through future missions and addressing existing debris, as part of the wider action needed to address space sustainability.

The UK Government recognises that the development and utilisation of such services is in its infancy, although the UK is already playing a leading role globally in developing such services. The UK has previously licensed demonstration missions such as ELSA-d and Remove Debris and is actively engaged in developing this capability through its own national programme and participation as ESA programmes (Clear-Space 1and ENCORE).

There has been significant potential identified for IOSM missions, with an achievable UK share of the global market estimated to be a quarter by 2031, with a value of £2.7bn.

The initiatives outlined to remove debris at the end of missions, as well as target setting for the removal of historical debris (if adopted) would create a demand for such services in the medium to long-term, once short-term action has developed the UK capability in this area.

Funding will be a key element for developing and financing such services. There have been suggestions to create a global ADR fund[21], which could pay for the provision of ADR serviceouts. The UK Government will consider ways in which funding could be generated from public and private sources which could both fund the UK capability and provide capital for a UK contribution to a global ADR fund, were one to be established.

The UK Government would welcome further suggestions as to how private sources of finance or operator funding could be utilised to generate a fund for the provision of such services. One possible option could be the creation of a space bond to source funding from both institutional and public investors. Whilst a space bond with similar criteria as bonds issued by National Savings and Investments has been assessed as not viable for members of the public to invest in as a fund for third-party liability claims (see ‘Government space bond for small satellite operators’ in section 1), it could be more appropriately used to develop a national ADR capability and provide a UK contribution to any future global ADR fund.

To create a sustainable ADR sector, further regulatory action may also be needed to ensure that there is an appropriate framework to enable the range of activities which ADR services could support in future. This is explained further in the next section on establishing a circular economy in space.

Similar questions may also arise with regards to IOS missions and views are also sought as to whether there are any specific issues for such services.

Questions

54: Do you consider that applying targets for debris removal as part of the roadmap and taking action to remove debris created by future missions would create sufficient demand to ensure a sustainable ADR sector?

55: Is any other regulatory action needed to facilitate ADR and IOS services?

56: Do you have any suggestions or comments on how private finance could be secured to develop a UK ADR and IOS capability?

57: Do you have any views as to whether governments should have a role in debris removal?

58: Would you support the establishment of a global ADR fund, even if UK industry was not the primary beneficiary of such a fund?

7.9 Establishing a circular economy in space

There is increasing discussion on developing a circular economy in space[22]. This could bring a number of economic benefits through opportunities to collect, reuse and recycle materials from old satellites into new satellites or other products. Environmental benefits could be derived by not disposing of satellites into the Earth’s atmosphere, reducing demand for precious resources from the Earth’s environment and also reducing particulate matter caused by the re-entry of space objects and emissions and other environmental impacts created through launch and manufacture of space objects on Earth.

The development of such an approach could require the designation of an orbit which could be used to store debris for potential re-use. This would need to be agreed internationally. Further regulatory changes could also be required to maximise the potential for this sector regarding ownership of debris (linking back to the point raised in the commercialisation of ADR services section).

The UK Government is seeking views on feasible timescales for the development of a circular economy in space and views on regulatory action that would be needed to facilitate such an economy to develop, including the challenges and potential risks and how these could be mitigated.

59: What do you consider to be feasible timescales for the development of a circular economy in space?

60: What do you see as the key regulatory challenges and changes needed to establish a circular economy in space?

61: When do you think it will be feasible to stop satellites de-orbiting into the Earth’s atmosphere?

7.10 Sustainability of the Lunar environment

As well as considering the sustainability aspects of space activities on the Earth’s environment and that of orbits around the Earth, there is an increasing focus on ensuring that the sustainability of the Lunar and cis-lunar environment is also protected as there are many more missions planned over the coming years.

The UK is a signatory to the Artemis Accords[23], which sets out principles for cooperation in the civil exploration and use of the Moon, Mars, comets, and asteroids for peaceful purposes.

With more activities planned in the Lunar environment and beyond, the UK Government is seeking views on specific measures that need to be considered to protect the Lunar and other planetary and solar system body environments and any measures which could be adopted to protect such environments.

Questions

62: Do you have any thoughts on specific actions that can be taken to protect the Lunar environment and that of other planets and solar system bodies?

7.11 Priorities for action on space sustainability

This consultation covers a broad range of sustainability issues with regards to the Earth, orbital, Lunar, cis-lunar environments and other planets and solar system bodies.

With regards to the Earth’s and low-Earth orbital environments, the UK Government is seeking views as to what you consider to be the priority areas for action, which could help form the shorter-term priorities for the UK Government.

Questions

63: Based on the issues set out in this section, what do you consider to be the priority areas for action to protect the Earth’s and low Earth orbital environments?

Question 8

8. Next steps

Accepted Answer

The UK Government will hold two plenary sessions to summarise the content in the consultation and seek initial feedback from consultees. The first plenary will cover the liability and insurance and charging proposals, while the second plenary will cover the policy overview of the areas influencing the proposed variable liability limit approach and longer-term UK priorities for space sustainability.

The UK Government is requesting that respondents provide their responses to section 1 earlier in the consultation window to enable earlier consideration of these responses. However, comments may still be provided by the end of the consultation.

The UK Government would encourage consultees to provide their responses to relevant sections by the following deadlines:

Setting liability limits for orbital operations, alternative insurance models and other policy proposals – comments by 26 October.
Policy overview of areas influencing the proposed variable liability limit approach – comments by 7 December.
Longer-term UK priorities for space sustainability – comments by 7 December.

The rationale for this approach is to try and reach a view on the proposed approaches in section 1 and enable implementation of outcomes as soon as possible after issuance of the government response, particularly with regards to the proposed variable liability limit approach for satellite operations, which the UK Government hopes to implement at the earliest opportunity in 2024. However, where responses to sections 1 and 2 are received after their respective deadlines, they would not be excluded from being considered for the government response, on the condition that they are provided by the consultation deadline of 7 December.

The UK Government intends to issue its response to the consultation early in 2024. Subject to feedback during the consultation, a timeline for implementation of proposals will be outlined in the government response.

Question 9

9. Annex A – Variable Liability Limit Approach Guidance

Accepted Answer

This additional guidance to the proposed variable liability limit approach is in draft pending the feedback from the consultation. This document will be updated to reflect the consultation feedback and the final scope of the variable liability limit adopted.

The purpose of this guidance will be to provide some further context for the different elements of the approach, if this were to be adopted. It focuses on stage 2 of the proposed approach and will be further updated as the stage 1 mission categorisation and orbit sustainability risks are developed.

Given the wide range of mission types and bespoke nature of individual missions, it is not intended that this guidance can cover each scenario that may arise; nor should it be construed that adopting any particular measures noted in this guidance would guarantee a positive score under the proposed approach. This would be determined on a case-by-case based on what is considered to be above and beyond what would be reasonably expected to apply in the specific application.

The guidance, along with the proposed approach, would also be updated to reflect policy developments as they arise.

This guidance therefore provides a set of guidelines as to the sort of actions which might result in a positive score under the relevant questions in the proposed approach.

Question 10

10. Guidance on stage 2 questions

Accepted Answer

10.1 Criterion 1 – Minimising risk through satellite and mission design

Manoeuvrability (general)

Does the satellite have the capability to avoid third-party objects in orbit?

The intention behind this question as currently proposed is not to specify a particular manoeuvring type or to mandate propulsion but to ensure that the method employed can be deployed with sufficient speed to enable such manoeuvres to be carried out effectively at short notice (for example within hours) in response to conjunction warnings.

A more nuanced approach may need to be considered on the basis of mission specific detail in cases where a satellite has a manoeuvring capability. For example, the question may be updated to ask the following questions to gather more specific detail on the capability of the manoeuvring approach:

· the number of potential manoeuvres a satellite can make;

· whether the anticipated number of annual manoeuvres is feasible in the chosen orbit to stay within the planned maximum manoeuvres possible over the proposed lifetime of the mission; or

· whether that due to the activity taking place in a lower sustainability risk orbit, that this situation could offset lower manoeuvrability of the satellite as compared with the activity taking place in a higher sustainability risk orbit.

The assessors will determine for each mission whether the adoption of such a capability would be reasonably practicable for the proposed mission. A higher degree of manoeuvring capability may be required depending on the characteristics of the orbit in which the activity is due to take place.

There are no set rules from the regulator’s perspective as part of the current licensing process on the responsiveness of manoeuvring capability; this will in part be informed by the mission proposal and for example interactions with ground stations. Certain missions may have more limited access to ground stations which would extend the timescales to respond to conjunction warnings to days rather than hours.

It is therefore not possible to provide a definitive guideline on this question, however it is unlikely that manoeuvring capability would be deemed to be acceptable by the assessors to score a point if such manoeuvres took longer timescales to complete. As conjunction warnings provided by various agencies and companies provide details of conjunctions at a general maximum of [x] days in advance, it is unlikely that manoeuvres which take longer than this would be deemed to be acceptable (for example those that rely on atmospheric drag).

It should be noted that this question would not apply to satellites in GEO as it is assumed that all satellites in GEO would have a manoeuvring capability prior to having been disposed.

This question will be adapted on the basis of the policy decision arising from the study commissioned to inform the UK Government’s policy on propulsion and whether this should be made mandatory.

Has the applicant demonstrated a higher reliability than accepted norms for its collision avoidance capability?

It is intended that this question would only apply to applications for licensing a constellation.

The reason for this applying to constellations rather than to single satellites is that a lower reliability rate of a capability would have a greater impact for a constellation, where such capability could fail on 10s of satellites rather for a single satellite only.

There is not a UK or internationally accepted norm against which to assess this question, unlike in the case of the Space Debris Mitigation guidelines which suggest a reliability of 90% for post-mission disposal success.

The rate to be applied would be determined at an appropriate level to take into account the characteristics of the constellation. A general benchmark of 90% for reliability generally could be applied to align with the post-mission disposal success benchmark. An acceptable percentage for this question would be assessed as being above 90%.

It is not possible therefore to give a definitive figure on this. An indicative percentage for collision avoidance reliability would be for example 99%, but this may not be appropriate depending on the numbers of satellites in a constellation. Therefore a higher figure such as 99.9% may be applied for larger constellations (for example if an application were for a constellation of 1,000 satellites) but could be set at 90% for a constellation of 10 satellites.

The operator would also need to consider how to demonstrate this level of reliability. It may be possible to provide evidence of cases where the system has been successfully used on other missions. In the absence of such evidence, operators may wish to consider how modelling or other tools could be used to demonstrate evidence of reliability. This could also be provided for the safety assessment.

Future policy may determine a rate which should be applied to this criterion.

Trackability

Has the applicant adopted co-operative / uncooperative measures to enhance the trackability and identification of the satellite(s)?

Co-operative measures are considered to be those which enhance the trackability of an object during the operational phase of a mission. Uncooperative measures are considered to be those which are used to enable enhanced tracking of an object when it is considered to be debris.

The general assumption is that more than one measure should be adopted to score a point for this mark and must include measures that would not be considered to be standard requirements for such missions.

Conformation with recognised sustainability standards

Has the applicant provided evidence of achieving recognition under the Space Sustainability Standard?

There are a number of existing guidelines and standards which provide guidance or requirements on space debris mitigation and aspects of orbital sustainability. Examples include:

· Long-term sustainability guidelines - https://spacesustainability.unoosa.org/content/The_Guidelines

· Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines - https://www.iadc-home.org/documents_public/view/id/172#u

· ISO 24113 https://www.iso.org/standard/72383.html

The LTS and Space-Debris Mitigation guidelines are used as baseline requirements for UK licensing purposes.

There are a number of other initiatives that have been established to cover aspects of sustainability. These include the Space Safety Coalition and the Space Sustainability Rating. It is not intended at this stage to include such initiatives as part of the scoring mechanism, but they could be considered in future as they develop.

A new initiative being developed in the UK is the Space Sustainability Standard, part of the Earth & Space Sustainability Initiative. The Initiative will facilitate the establishment of an industry-led Space Sustainability Standard, a global transparent ESG space sustainability standard, recognised by the finance and insurance communities.

The industry-led Space Sustainability Standard is being developed and this guidance will be updated to reflect its scope at the time of implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach. As the Space Sustainability Standard evolves, this guidance will be amended accordingly.

Figure 7 - Intended scope of the Space Sustainability Standard

The range of themes covered by the Space Sustainability Standard currently extends beyond the scope of the proposed variable liability limit approach, although future developments of the proposed approach are likely to incorporate broader aspects of the Space Sustainability Standard strands. In the early stages of the proposed variable liability limit approach, it is not intended to require specific recognition of particular elements of the Space Sustainability Standard for most missions to gain a point under the scoring system, although this will change as it becomes clear which elements of the Space Sustainability Standard will be ready at implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach.

To score a point under this question recognition would need to be achieved under one or more of the following currently proposed strands[24] of the Space Sustainability Standard:

· Operations

· Debris

· Debris mitigation (constellations)

· Space debris remediation

· Re-entry

· Dark skies, astronomy

· Spectrum

· Space traffic co-ordination and management

Proposed constellations will need to achieve three or more of these strands in order to achieve a point and debris mitigation could be a compulsory element. Certain other mission types may also be required to achieve certain strands of the Space Sustainability Standard to achieve a point.

If one of the strands of the Space Sustainability Standard is used to evidence compliance for one of the questions included in stage 2 of this methodology, that strand cannot be used to achieve a point for this question. For example, if recognition under the dark skies, astronomy strand is used to secure a point under the ‘Dark and quiet skies’ question below, one of the other strands (for example ‘operations’) must be achieved to gain a point for this question.

Dark and quiet skies

Does the applicant’s proposal meet best practice guidelines issued by the UK Government?

This question may need to be rephrased if appropriate guidance has not been issued by the time of implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach. The question would then be revised once the UK Government has issued further guidance on its approach to dark and quiet skies. The trackability criterion may need to be reviewed against the measures included in the dark and quiet skies policy.

As further policy on dark and quiet skies is being developed both nationally and internationally, recognition will still be given to operators who can demonstrate that they have taken action on the following areas:

· For all operators generally to score a point, to provide evidence that they have adopted best practice satellite design principles to minimise the impact of their activity on dark and quiet skies. Such actions could include action taken to reduce reflectivity of surface materials and the overall brightness of space objects. It is not intended to specify a particular visual magnitude at this stage.

· For constellations, evidence will also be required that the applicant has engaged with the astronomical community to discuss how the applicant can reduce their impact. This could be demonstrated by engaging in national and international fora on this issue, as well as evidence of direct engagement with the astronomical community.

Applicants may also wish to consider how they have taken action to address recommendations of the Dark and Quiet Skies for Science and Society: https://www.iau.org/static/publications/dqskies-book-29-12-20.pdf as well as the Dark and Quiet Skies II for Science and Society: Working Group Reports - https://www.iau.org/static/science/scientific_bodies/working_groups/286/dark-quiet-skies-2-working-groups-reports.pdf

As the Space Sustainability Standard develops, recognition under the Dark Skies, astronomy strand would count as a point for this question. If that were the case, to achieve a mark under the ‘Conformation with recognised sustainability standards’ question would require the applicant to achieve recognition under another strand of the Space Sustainability Standard, to avoid double counting.

10.2 Criterion 2 - Minimising potential for debris during operations

Has the applicant provided acceptable details of any data sharing or coordination arrangements with other operators and more than one third party provider involving:

Relevant tracking or ephemeris data?

To score a point for this section, an applicant would need to demonstrate that they had access to more than one source of tracking or ephemeris data and made use of these sources to demonstrate that they had a better understanding of the orbital environment than by simply relying on one source alone. This could be demonstrated through membership, contractual arrangements or regular use of the services noted a couple of paragraphs below, which can be a mixture of free and paid for sources of information.

Whilst the regulator does not certify such sources of information, such sources should be considered to be reliable and accurate so as to provide assurance of data quality.

Suitable sources could include but not limited to:

· In-house capability

· Monitor your Satellites – https://www.monitor-your-satellites.service.gov.uk/ - Monitor Your Satellites is a pilot service from the UK Space Agency, providing Space Surveillance and Tracking information to UK-licenced satellite operators.

· space-track.org - https://www.space-track.org/auth/login

· Seradata - https://www.seradata.com/

· LeoLabs - https://leolabs.space/leotrack/

The use of premium paid-for services does not guarantee a point towards this score but can be used in combination with other sources and may carry greater weight if considered to be a trustworthy source. Similarly, use of the ‘Monitor Your Satellites’ is not a mandatory requirement but is strongly encouraged.

Collision avoidance procedures?

Given the increasing number of conjunction warnings between different objects, co-ordination between operators is increasingly important to help avoid collisions and manage such situations to minimise the potential for misunderstanding or unintended consequences of both operators attempting to manoeuvre in response to a conjunction warning.

To score a point under this section, applicants will need to be able to demonstrate that they have actively engaged with other operators using the same operational environment. Evidence of such engagement could be details of meetings set up between different operators and public statements setting out the applicant’s policy on collision avoidance (including any thresholds they are applying in cases when they would manoeuvre). It would also include evidence of informing relevant tracking services of the procedures.

Examples of such public facing statements include those of SpaceX (February 2022 statement with regards to Starlink) and OneWeb.

Where applicants have applied for a constellation, such co-operation will be particularly important both during the operations but also in the planning phase, so as to be able to establish the impact of the constellation on its operating environment. To score a point applicants for constellations would be expected to produce evidence of more extensive engagement than for operators of single satellites.

Applicants who do not intend to make use of propulsion may also score a point by being able to demonstrate liaison with other operators using the same operational environment to get an understanding of the other operators’ procedures for carrying out collision avoidance procedures for their respective satellites.

Planned manoeuvres?

Planned manoeuvres would cover manoeuvres which result in a significant change in orbital parameters. Such manoeuvres could include those such as orbit raising post-launch, active de-orbit or moving to a different orbital region in the case of an ADR or IOS mission. It would not include minor changes to counter the effects of atmospheric drag, for example.

To score a point, applicants will need to be able to demonstrate that they have actively engaged with other operators using the same operational environment. Evidence of engagement could be details of meetings set up between different operators, or public statements setting out the applicant’s policy on collision avoidance (including any thresholds they are applying in cases when they would manoeuvre). It would also include evidence of informing relevant tracking services of the intended procedures.

Where applicants have applied for a constellation, to score a point they would be expected to produce evidence of more extensive engagement than for operators of single satellites.

Applicants who do not intend to make use of propulsion and would therefore not engage in planned manoeuvres may also score a point by being able to demonstrate liaison with other operators using the same operational environment to get an understanding of the other operators’ planned manoeuvres.

If making use of an autonomous collision avoidance systems, does the applicant have appropriate proposals in place to agree with operators in the same operating orbital environment the circumstances under which they would plan to manoeuvre or switch off the system?

This question would only apply in cases where autonomous collision avoidance systems are used, for example for constellations.

This question would look at evidence of an applicant’s engagement with other operators as per the criteria under the ‘collision avoidance procedures’ question, with relevant information provided about the how the system would be used, including any thresholds applied. The additional aspect for this question is providing evidence that the applicant has procedures in place for switching off the autonomous collision avoidance system and that the applicant has informed other operators in the relevant operational environment about the circumstances in which such action would be taken.

It will be particularly important to demonstrate that engagement has taken place with operators in the same operational environment who use autonomous collision avoidance systems to ensure that protocols around manoeuvring are agreed between those operators.

10.3 Criterion 3 - Minimising risk post-operations

ADR / IOS facilitation

Does the design of the satellite facilitate servicing by third party IOS providers, or by third party ADR providers should the primary means of disposal fail?

The purpose of this question is to recognise cases where applicants have taken proactive measures in designing their satellites to facilitate IOS and ADR services.

This is an emerging area, so suggested appropriate mechanisms will be refined over time but examples of existing mechanisms include docking plates, grappling fixtures and magnetic tethers.

As different methodologies for ADR services are developing to account for cases where satellites are stable or tumbling for example, further explanation of how these methods could be facilitated by the design of the satellite could also score a point.

Active de-orbit impact

Does the use of the active de-orbit method reduce the de-orbit time from this altitude by [x]% or more as compared with natural decay?

As part of the licence application, the CAA will consider whether the method employed and the de-orbit timeline proposal is considered to be safe and reduces risk to as low as reasonably practicable.

This criterion is designed to incentivise reduction of de-orbit times. The question may be re-phrased in light of any policy decision taken following the recommendations of the post-mission disposal timelines study referred to in section 2.

The question above would not relate to GEO missions. Therefore a different question could be included for GEO only - Does the operator intend to use a method of disposal to the graveyard orbit which is considered to be sustainable?

Has the applicant demonstrated a reliability of greater than accepted norms for its chosen active disposal method?

This question would only apply to applications for licensing a constellation.

The reason for this applying to constellations rather than to single satellites is that a lower rate of reliability of the chosen active disposal method would have a greater impact for a constellation, where such capability could fail on 10s of satellites rather for a single satellite only.

The Space Debris Mitigation guidelines suggest a reliability of 90% for post-mission disposal success[25].

The rate to be applied would be determined at an appropriate level to take into account the characteristics of the constellation. A general benchmark of 90% for reliability generally could be applied to align with the post-mission disposal success benchmark. An acceptable percentage for this question would be above 90%.

It is not possible therefore to give a definitive figure on this. An indicative percentage would be for example 99% but such a figure may not be appropriate depending on for example the numbers of satellites in the constellation. Therefore a higher figure such as 99.9% may be applied for larger constellations (for example if an application were for a constellation of 1,000 satellites) but could be set at 90% for a constellation of 10 satellites.

The operator would also need to consider how to demonstrate this level of reliability. It may be possible to provide evidence of cases where the system has been successfully used on other missions. In the absence of such evidence, operators may wish to consider how modelling or other tools could be used to demonstrate evidence of reliability. This could also be provided for the safety assessment.

Future policy may determine a rate which should be applied to this criterion.

If applicable - Manoeuvrability / control during de-orbit

Will the applicant be able to control the satellite in an effective and timely manner to avoid collisions during the post-mission phase until no longer controllable during re-entry (or until some other pre-determined point as required in licence conditions – for example until the satellite is below crewed vehicles or high value assets for example the International Space Station)? If passivation is required by the regulator, this would be reflected in the scoring.

This question addresses similar issues to those included in the criterion 1 question ‘Does the satellite have the capability to avoid third-party objects in orbit?’ and will be assessed in a similar way.

10.4 Criterion 4 – Use of third-party providers to reduce risk (if applicable / appropriate for the mission type)

IOS contracts

Has the applicant demonstrated that they have discussed or put in place contractual arrangements with a third-party to extend the lifetime of the mission through use of IOS methods?

· Yes, has contractual arrangements in place (3 points)

· Has demonstrated discussions with providers and has an established plan in place as part of the application (1 point)

· Does not intend to put such arrangements in place (0 points)

ADR contracts

Has the applicant demonstrated that they have discussed or put in place contractual arrangements with a third-party ADR services provider to remove the satellite(s) or other debris created during the mission, either at end-of-life or in event of failure of satellite systems[26]?

· Yes, has contractual arrangements in place (3 points)

· Has demonstrated discussions with providers and has an established plan in place as part of the application (1 point)

· Does not intend to put such arrangements in place (0 points)

It should be noted that the intention is not that operators rely solely on ADR as a means of de-orbiting. Rather, the intention is to consider cases where planning for using ADR is utilised as a backup should the primary means fail, therefore pushing sustainability beyond the legal minimum requirement. ADR providers must also be able to demonstrate credibility to carry out the proposed activity or competence of having previously carried out such missions. They should also be appropriately licensed / regulated by their jurisdiction.

To score the maximum three points for either of these questions, the applicant must be able to demonstrate that there is a contract in place to meet this answer.

To score 1 point the applicant must be able to demonstrate that the use of services is envisaged as part of their mission planning / end-of-life plan and that meaningful conversations have taken place with the providers of such services.

If no such or insufficient evidence is provided, 0 points will be awarded.

10.5 Testing the approach

The methodology proposed has been tested against a number of scenarios of the generic licence applications that CAA receive and which it is assumed could be received in future. These were not based on any one particular application but on general scenarios that may occur based on current mission types.

The five scenarios that were tested were:

· A 3U cubesat without propulsion performing standard operations at 500km altitude, meeting the 25-year de-orbit guideline.

· A 100-satellite constellation proposed to operate at 1000km altitude. All satellites would have propulsion but autonomous collision avoidance would not be used. Active de-orbit planned would be planned as part of post-mission disposal and would meet the 25-year guideline. The operator also plans to receive recognition under the industry-led Space Sustainability Standard. The operator had taken measures to improve dark and quiet skies and engages with operators in a similar orbit. No ADR / IOS activities planned.

· ADR satellite with propulsion performing a single capture with conjoined re-entry post mission. The object to be removed is to be captured at 700km, with altitude actively reduced to 350km for disposal, therefore meeting the 25-year de-orbit guideline.

· Earth Observation satellite with propulsion performing standard operations. Operating at 500km altitude, meeting 25-year de-orbit guideline.

· Large telecomms satellite with propulsion in GEO, performing standard operations. Planned disposal to graveyard orbit.

Based on this testing, some adjustments were made as to which questions in stage 2 were applied to different scenarios (it was assumed that all ADR missions would have propulsion and the de-orbit timeline question was removed from the GEO example) or an additional question applied in the case of the GEO scenario (due to all satellites having propulsion in this area).

Therefore for future applications, some further adjustments may be made to the questions that are used in the assessment to reflect the nature of the mission. This will be explained to the applicant. This guidance may then be updated to reflect the particular scenario and will be applied to other similar applications in future.

Question 11

11. Annex B – Proposed Variable Liability Limit and Fees Analysis

Accepted Answer

11.1 Introduction

This annex explains analysis undertaken of the potential insurance premium savings to satellite operators through implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach, and a reduction in fees paid by operators through implementation of the proposed variable refund approach to licence fees.

11.2 Assumptions

Annual satellite operation licences issued

Three scenarios of annual individual licences granted for satellite operations have been used. These scenarios are based on current numbers of issued satellite licences and assumptions for future growth used to inform other areas of UK Space Agency policy. The future growth assumption reflects the additional actions the UK is taking on a range of policy areas, not just an assumption that the proposals in this consultation would result in an increase of issued satellite licences.

The analysis also applies a reasonable split of licences issued within the three thresholds of proposed liability limits (which will then determine the variable refund). This assumption predicts that the proposed variable liability limit approach would incentivise a greater proportion of applicants to adopt additional measures to attract a lower limit of their liability.

Annual licences issued	Assumed split of satellite licences per liability limit for each of the three annual licences scenarios
Baseline (min) = 5Predicted = 15Growth = 50	£0 = 10%£20m = 50%£50m = 40%

11.3 Mission orbits

The analysis assumes 70% of missions would occur in LEO and 30% in GEO.

11.4 Variable liability limit insurance premiums

The component parts of the insurance premiums have been used for the analysis of the variable liability limit approach, to illustrate what may happen to the total premiums payable if the liability limit and/or aggregate limits are varied. The split of premiums includes assumptions about capital loading, expense loading, brokerage and carrier fee.

The approach which has been applied is theoretical. Since any reduction in liability limit would reduce the amount of insurance purchased, insurers and brokers may seek to keep their premium income at a higher level by not passing on the full theoretical reductions to operators that the UK Government has calculated for this analysis.

The analysis also assumes that insurance companies currently charge premiums that reflect the actual risks of orbital missions.

11.5 Variable liability limits analysis

The analysis of implementing a variable liability limit approach suggests that operators could obtain the following insurance premium savings:

Number of satellites	5	15	50
Premiums @ £50m	£108,904	£326,711	£1,089,036
Premiums for proposed variable approach	£73,229	£219,688	£732,294
Premium saving	£35,674	£107,023	£356,742

11.6 Variable refunds analysis

The assumptions for variable refunds are based on the % splits of liability limits. A £0 liability limit would result in a net cost of £0, a £20m limit a net cost of £2,600 and a £50m limit would retain the current fee of £6,500.

Individual satellite licence applications

Number of satellites	5	15	50
Fee savings	£14,300	£40,300	£130,000

Constellation application

The variable refunds analysis includes an assumption of an application for a constellation of 300 satellites, where a liability limit of £20m would be applied to each licence, which would translate to a net cost per licence of £2,600.

The analysis of the variable refund for a 300 licence constellation applies the refunds methodology which is included at the following link -https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1018441/Guidance_on_Satellite_Licence_Fees__3_.pdf

Number of licence applications submitted	Licence fee (per licence, post variable refund)	Proposed constellation fee (per licence) after existing refund applied	Constellation scheme refund (per licence)
201+ licences	£6,500	£5,400	£1,100
151-200 licences	£6,500	£5,700	£800
100-150 licences	£6,500	£6,200	£300
< 100 licences	£6,500	£6,500	£0

The same percentage reduction to determine the refund for a fee of £6,500 has been applied to calculate a refund amount for a constellation where a net cost of £2,600 would be applied to each licence. The results of this calculation are as follows:

Number of licence applications submitted	Current fee (per licence)	Proposed constellation fee (per licence)	Refund (per licence)	% of refund of the current fee	Refund per licence if same % applied to £2,600 net cost licence fee
201+ licences	£6,500	£5,400	£1,100	16.9% approx.	£440
151-200 licences	£6,500	£5,700	£800	12.3% approx.	£320
100-150 licences	£6,500	£6,200	£300	4.6% approx.	£120
< 100 licences	£6,500	£6,500	£0	No change	£0

The current refund for a constellation of 300 satellites would be £330,000.

For the proposed variable refunds approach, a constellation of 300 satellites with a liability limit of £20m would have a net cost reduction of £3,900 for each licence, plus a refund of £440, resulting in a total reduction per satellite of £4,340. The overall savings benefit would be £1.3m minus the refund value of £333,000 for the current fee of £6,500, which would total £970,000.

If the liability limit for a constellation with 300 satellites were set at £0 the net cost reduction would be £6,500 per licence, resulting in an overall saving of £1.6m.

Question 12

12. Annex C – Presentation to UN COPUOS on enabling multi-state active debris removal and in-orbit servicing missions

Accepted Answer

Please see the separate document.

This consultation is available from: www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-science-innovation-and-technology

If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email correspondence@ukspaceagency.gov.uk

Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use.

[1] Initial thinking on implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach foresees that the assessment of the variable liability limit would take place only once CAA had agreed with the applicant that CAA had all necessary information to enable it to carry out its assessment for licensing purposes. This needs to be further considered once it is determined how and by whom the proposed variable liability limit approach would be implemented, but the intention is to avoid the proposed variable liability limit assessment being carried out multiple times throughout the licensing process on the basis of updated information.

[2] Note – it may be possible to have a limit below the £20m threshold were this proposed approach further combined with a change in third-party liability insurance model. That may be considered at a later date once any decisions are taken on which or any of the alternative insurance models are adopted.

[3] Further detail on how insurance policies in currencies other than £ sterling will be assessed as meeting the proposed liability limit thresholds is set out later in this section.

[4] It should be noted that none of the measures included in the current scope of the proposed stage 2 questions are to be made mandatory based on current policy thinking. This statement is included to demonstrate how the proposed approach could be used to incentivise early adoption of measures as and when any decision is taken to make a particular measure a mandatory requirement for licensing purposes.

[5] It should be noted that the regulator would not anticipate that operators rely on ADR as the sole means of de-orbiting. The intention behind this question would be to consider cases where planning for using ADR would be utilised as a backup should the primary means fail, therefore pushing sustainability beyond the legal minimum requirement. ADR providers would also need to demonstrate credibility to carry out the proposed activity or competence of having previously carried out such missions. They should also be appropriately licensed / regulated by their jurisdiction.

[6] This question would be adapted on the basis of the policy decision arising from the study commissioned to inform the UK Government’s policy on propulsion and whether this should be made mandatory - further detail is contained in section 2. A more nuanced approach may need to be considered based on mission specific detail. For example with regards to the number of potential manoeuvres a satellite can make, whether the anticipated number of annual manoeuvres is feasible in the chosen orbit to stay within the planned maximum manoeuvres possible over the proposed lifetime of the mission or whether that due to the activity taking place in a lower risk orbit could offset lower manoeuvrability of the satellite.

[7] This would be determined at an appropriate level to account for the characteristics of the constellation. An indicative percentage would be for example 99% but such a figure may not be appropriate depending on the numbers of satellites in the constellation. Therefore, this figure would be determined on a case-by-case basis.

[8] Co-operative measures are those which enhance the trackability of an object during the operational phase of a mission. Uncooperative measures are those which are used to enable enhanced tracking of an object when it is considered to be debris.

[9] The Space Sustainability Standard is still under development and this question would be adapted to reflect the state of play at the implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach. As the Space Sustainability Standard develops, this question and the associated guidance would be adapted accordingly. Further detail on additional recognised standards will be considered and set out in guidance.

[10] This question may need to be rephrased if dark and quiet skies guidance has not been issued by the time of implementation of the variable liability limit approach. The question would then be revised once the UK Government has issued further guidance on its approach to dark and quiet skies. The trackability criterion may need to be reviewed against the measures included in the dark and quiet skies policy.

[11] It should be noted that the regulator would not anticipate that operators rely on ADR as the sole means of de-orbiting. The intention behind this question would be to consider cases where planning for using ADR is utilised as a backup should the primary means fail, therefore pushing sustainability beyond the legal minimum requirement. ADR providers would also need to demonstrate credibility to carry out the proposed activity or competence of having previously carried out such missions. They should also be appropriately licensed / regulated by their jurisdiction.

[12] This criterion is designed to incentivise reduction of de-orbit times. The assumption is that all licensed missions would meet the current 25-year guideline in the Long-Term Sustainability guidelines. The question may be re-phrased in light of any policy decision taken following the recommendations of the post-mission disposal timelines study referred to in section 2.

[13] An indicative percentage would be for example 99% but this may not be appropriate depending on for example the numbers of satellites in the constellation. Therefore, this figure would consider the characteristics of the constellation and would be determined on a case-by-case basis.

[14] At the initial stage of implementation, this would be an additional opportunity to score a point but as such services develop, this criterion could be mandatory for certain mission types.

[15] As noted above, the regulator would expect that this is not the sole intended disposal method for functioning satellites.

[16] Other mission types which would be developed further are orbital transport vehicles and space tugs. Lunar missions could also be included.

[17] Work is underway to further develop the UK’s policy on satellite constellations. This may include further work on defining constellations. For the purposes of applying this methodology, the general assumption is that requirements would apply to constellations containing larger numbers of satellites, although this could be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

[18]

[19] https://blogs.esa.int/cleanspace/2023/01/12/short-introduction-to-esas-zero-debris-approach/#:~:text=The%20ESA%20Zero%20Debris%20Approach,the%20Low%2DEarth%20Orbit%20environment.

[20] Examples include the Net Zero Insurance Alliance and the Glasgow Finance Initiative for Net Zero.

[21] For example https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/files/iasl/sdc2011_2_pelton.pdf , https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c1/AC105_C1_2012_CRP16E.pdf and

https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-03952-7_70

[22] See for example articles by ESA, on research carried out by the University of Southampton, Paris Peace Forum,

[23] Further information can also be found on NASA’s website.

[24] This doesn’t include all the strands of the Space Sustainability Standard, but those which are currently deemed most relevant to the proposed variable liability limit approach.

[25] Section 5.3.2 on page 14 states that ‘The probability of success of the disposal should be at least 90%. For specific operations such as large constellations, a shorter residual orbital lifetime and/or a higher probability of success may be necessary.’

[26] As noted above, the regulator would expect that this is not the sole intended disposal method for functioning satellites.

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1. Ministerial Foreword

2. Executive Summary

2.1 Introduction

Implementation of the variable liability limit approach

3. General information

3.1 Why we are consulting

3.2 Consultation details

3.3 How to respond

3.4 Confidentiality and data protection

3.5 Quality assurance

4. Context and Background Information

4.1 The UK’s liability and indemnity regime for spaceflight activities

Third-party liability insurance requirements and limits on the amount of an operator’s liability for activities licensed under the OSA 1986 and the SIA 2018.

4.2 Scope of this consultation

5. Section 1 - Matters to address in the shorter term

5.1 Setting liability limits for orbital operations, alternative insurance models and other policy proposals

Developing the proposed variable liability limit approach for setting liability limits for orbital operations

Proposal and guidance on the variable liability limit approach

Rationale for this approach

5.2 Proposal for setting variable liability limits and insurance requirements for satellite operations

Stage 1 - Determining the baseline liability limit

Possible scope of question 1

Possible scope of question 2

Setting a score to determine the baseline liability limit

Translating the score into a baseline liability limit

Stage 2 - Scored questions for sustainability aspects of the mission

Translating scores into liability limits

Proposed interim approach whilst stage 1 is developed

Application of the proposed variable liability limit approach to constellations[17]

Organisation that would carry out the proposed variable liability limit assessment

Timeline for implementation of the proposed variable liability limit approach

5.3 Future adaptions of the proposed variable liability limit approach

5.4 TPL insurance – latest thinking on new approaches to insuring risks for satellite operations

TPL insurance

Alternative insurance models

Discretionary Mutual Insurance Scheme for Small Satellite Operators

Collective Insurance Policy

Government space bond for small satellite operators

A government space bond was an idea presented in the call for evidence. The premise would be that a bond similar to the green bond issued by National Savings and Investments would generate funding to provided loans to space companies, as well as provide a resource to meet TPL claims.

5.5 Analysis of implementing the proposed variable liability limit approach, possible alternative insurance models and links to the Space Sustainability Standard

5.6 Other TPL and insurance matters from the liability and insurance review

Other liabilities and insurance policies - government implementation

Amending Section 12(2) of the SIA 2018

Amending the currency of orbital operator liability limits from €s to £s

Insurance requirements for operators procuring a launch from overseas

Other liabilities and insurance policies - government proposals

End-of-life insurance requirements

Re-entry insurance policy

Insurance waivers

Existing waiver for the lowest risk satellites

Proposed new waivers of insurance

Forward look on insurance

5.7 Other regulatory policy proposals and considerations

SIA 2018 and OSA 1986 satellite licensing - Charging for Orbital Operator Licences

Background on charging

Suggested changes to administration of fees for orbital licences

Suggested change to introduce a variable refund structure for orbital operator licences

Charges for constellation operators

Charges for a Procurement-Only Licence

Fee waivers policy

Analysis of benefits of applying variable refunds to fees

Implementation

6. Section 2 - policy overview of issues influencing the proposed variable liability limit approach

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Dark and quiet skies

6.3 Manoeuvrability /Collision Avoidance

6.4 Post-mission disposal timelines

6.5 Astra Carta Seal

6.6 ADR - application to other activities / operational approaches e.g. launch and commissioning services

6.7 Monitor Your Satellites

6.8 Space Traffic Management

6.9 Safety and Sustainability Principles for Regulation of In-orbit Missions

6.10 Life cycle assessments

7. Section 3 - Longer-term UK Leadership on Space Sustainability

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Developing a Space Sustainability Roadmap to 2050

7.3 Views on establishing a UK space sustainability concept

7.4 Defining sustainability with regards to space activities

7.5 International co-ordination on space sustainability