T Inniss v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis: 6001499/2025

Employment Tribunal decision.

• From: HM Courts & Tribunals Service and Employment Tribunal
• Published: 2 March 2026
• Last updated: 11 March 2026
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  1. 11 March 2026

     Reference number 6001499-2025 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS London South Employment Tribunal Claimant: Tyrell Inniss Respondent: The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis Judgment with Reasons The Claimant’s application to amend his claim to include allegations concerning events in May 2025 is refused. The complaints relating to the conduct of the Police Appeal Tribunal proceedings are struck out on the ground that those proceedings attract judicial immunity and the Respondent’s conduct as a party to those proceedings is not justiciable before this Tribunal. The remaining claims concerning the Claimant’s dismissal on 09 July 2024 were presented out of time and it is not just and equitable to extend time. The Tribunal accordingly has no jurisdiction to hear the claim. The claim is dismissed in its entirety. BACKGROUND 1. The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as a Police Constable in the Metropolitan Police Service. His employment came to an end on 09 July 2024 when he was dismissed following a misconduct hearing at which allegations of domestic violence were found proven against him. 2. The Claimant exercised his statutory right to appeal against his dismissal to the Police Appeal Tribunal. That appeal was heard and dismissed. The Claimant was notified of the outcome on 05 November 2024. 3. The Claimant subsequently became aware of the possibility of bringing a claim before the Employment Tribunal. He contacted ACAS on 26 November 2024 and obtained an early conciliation certificate dated 02 December 2024. He presented his claim to the Employment Tribunal on 15 January 2025. 4. The relationship context which formed part of the Claimant's narrative at the hearing, the circumstances of the disciplinary proceedings, the Police Appeal Tribunal proceedings, and the Claimant's perception that the system operated one-sidedly against him form the background to this litigation. The Claimant plainly feels strongly that he has been treated unfairly. That perception, while sincerely held, does not of itself establish discrimination or victimisation. The Tribunal's task is to determine the preliminary issues before it by reference to the evidence and the law. COMPLAINTS MADE IN THE CLAIM 5. The claim form presented on 15 January 2025 alleged that the Claimant’s dismissal on 09 July 2024 was an act of direct discrimination on grounds of race and sex contrary to sections 13 and 39 Equality Act 2010. The Claimant contended that he was treated less Reference number 6001499-2025 favourably than another individual and relied upon comparison and asserted differential treatment as part of his case. 6. The Claimant further alleged that his dismissal was an act of victimisation contrary to section 27 Equality Act 2010. He contended that he had done protected acts, including raising concerns about the conduct of others, and that his dismissal was in whole or in part a response to those protected acts. 7. The claim also contained complaints relating to the conduct of the Police Appeal Tribunal proceedings. The Claimant alleged that the Respondent failed to present evidence that would have assisted his case, that material favourable to him was withheld or not properly ventilated, and that the Respondent’s conduct of those proceedings was discriminatory or otherwise improper. 8. On 21 October 2025, the Claimant applied to amend his claim to add a further allegation. He sought to allege that on 02 May 2025 he contacted the Respondent through the Metropolitan Police website to enquire whether a third party had been investigated for alleged criminal conduct, and that on 06 May 2025 the Respondent refused to provide the information sought and declined to log a complaint on his behalf. The Claimant contended that this refusal was an act of discrimination and victimisation connected to his previous employment. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 9. The following issues fell to be determined at this preliminary hearing: 10. Whether the Claimant’s application to amend the claim to add allegations concerning events in May 2025 should be granted 11. Whether the complaints relating to the conduct of the Police Appeal Tribunal proceedings are justiciable before this Tribunal or whether they should be struck out on grounds of judicial immunity 12. Whether the claim concerning the Claimant’s dismissal on 09 July 2024 was presented within the limitation period prescribed by section 123 Equality Act 2010 13. If the claim was presented out of time, whether it is just and equitable to extend time pursuant to section 123(1)(b) Equality Act 2010 THE HEARING 14. This hearing took place by video on 13 January 2026 before Employment Judge M Aspinall sitting alone. 15. The Claimant appeared in person. The Respondent was represented by Counsel. 16. The hearing was conducted as a preliminary hearing to determine the issues identified above. I heard oral evidence from the Claimant concerning the circumstances of his May 2025 contact with the Respondent and the reasons for delay in presenting his claim. I also heard submissions from both parties. 17. During the hearing, the Claimant confirmed matters relevant to the application to amend. He confirmed that he contacted the Respondent through a general public-facing website Reference number 6001499-2025 rather than through internal channels. He confirmed that the person who refused to log his complaint was unknown to him and was not, so far as he was aware, connected to his previous employment or disciplinary proceedings. He confirmed that the reason given to him at the time for the refusal was that he was a former police officer. He confirmed that the subject matter of his May 2025 enquiry was whether a third party had been investigated for alleged criminal conduct. 18. The Claimant also gave evidence about the reasons for delay. He explained that he had not been told about the Employment Tribunal at the time of his dismissal and that he focused on the Police Appeal Tribunal. He explained that after the Police Appeal Tribunal decision he delayed contacting ACAS while searching for legal representation, and that he further delayed presenting his claim after obtaining the ACAS certificate for the same reason. 19. The Respondent relied on a skeleton argument and made oral submissions on amendment, jurisdiction and time limits. THE LAW Amendment of claims 20. The power to amend a claim is found in Rule 29 Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013. The Tribunal may at any stage amend any claim or response. 21. The principles governing the exercise of that discretion were set out in Selkent Bus Co Ltd v Moore [1996] ICR 836. The Tribunal must balance the injustice and hardship of allowing the amendment against the injustice and hardship of refusing it. Relevant considerations include the nature of the amendment, time limits, the timing and manner of the application, and the relative prejudice to each party. A Tribunal is entitled to refuse an amendment where the proposed claim has no reasonable prospect of success. Post-termination discrimination 22. Section 108 Equality Act 2010 applies to post-termination conduct only where the conduct arises out of and is closely connected to the former employment relationship. Direct discrimination and victimisation 23. Direct discrimination under section 13 Equality Act 2010 requires proof that the alleged discriminator treated the claimant less favourably because of a protected characteristic. 24. Victimisation under section 27 Equality Act 2010 requires proof that the claimant was subjected to a detriment because he did a protected act or because the alleged discriminator believed he did or might do such an act. 25. In both cases causation is central. The decision-maker’s knowledge and reasons matter, because treatment cannot be “because of” a protected characteristic or protected act if the decision-maker is unaware of it. Time limits 26. Section 123 Equality Act 2010 provides (so far as relevant) that proceedings must be brought within three months starting with the date of the act complained of, subject to a Reference number 6001499-2025 discretion to extend time where it is just and equitable to do so. 27. There is no presumption that time should be extended. The exercise of the discretion is the exception rather than the rule: Robertson v Bexley Community Centre [2003] IRLR 434. 28. In Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 23, [2021] ICR 1107, the Court of Appeal held that the best approach is to assess all relevant factors in the particular case, including in particular the length of and the reasons for the delay. The Court emphasised that the just and equitable discretion requires an evaluative assessment of all relevant circumstances rather than a mechanistic exercise, and deprecated the application of a checklist approach that had developed following British Coal Corporation v Keeble. 29. The pursuit of other processes does not stop time running: Palmer and Saunders v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1984] ICR 372. Early conciliation 30. Section 18A Employment Tribunals Act 1996 requires a prospective claimant to contact ACAS before presenting a claim and to obtain a certificate in respect of the matter complained of. Judicial immunity 31. It is a fundamental principle of the law that those who exercise judicial functions are immune from suit in respect of acts done in the exercise of those functions. That immunity extends beyond the decision-maker to protect parties and participants in respect of what they say and do during judicial, or quasi-judicial proceedings: Heath v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2004] EWCA Civ 943. The rationale includes the integrity and finality of judicial proceedings and the avoidance of satellite litigation. FINDINGS OF FACT AND APPLICATION OF LAW The application to amend 32. The Claimant sought to add an allegation that on 02 May 2025 he contacted the Respondent via a public-facing website to enquire whether a third party had been investigated for alleged criminal conduct, and that on 06 May 2025 the Respondent refused to provide the information sought and declined to log a complaint on his behalf. 33. I accept the Claimant’s evidence as to the mechanics of this contact. The enquiry was made through a general public-facing website rather than internal channels. The individual who dealt with the enquiry was unknown to the Claimant. The reason given at the time for refusing to provide the information or log the complaint was the Claimant’s status as a former police officer. The subject matter of the enquiry was whether a third party had been investigated for alleged criminal conduct. 34. I refuse the application to amend for the following reasons. No reasonable prospect of success 35. The proposed allegation has no reasonable prospect of success on causation. Reference number 6001499-2025 36. The decision-maker was unknown to the Claimant and, on the evidence, was a person processing a routine enquiry through a public-facing mechanism. There is no proper basis upon which it could be inferred that this individual knew the Claimant's race, sex, or history of alleged protected acts, or that any such matter influenced the response given. While the decision-maker evidently knew that the Claimant was a former police officer—that being the reason given for the refusal—knowledge of former employment status is not the same as knowledge of protected characteristics or protected acts. The bare fact of previous employment does not support an inference that the unknown individual who processed this routine enquiry knew of, or was influenced by, the Claimant's race, sex, or any protected acts he may have done. 37. One cannot treat a person less favourably "because of" a protected characteristic or subject a person to a detriment "because of" a protected act, where the decision-maker is unaware of the characteristic or act in question. Discrimination and victimisation require a causal connection between the protected matter and the treatment complained of. The Claimant's proposed allegation invites the Tribunal to infer such a connection without any evidential foundation reasonably capable of supporting the inference. The allegation is, in that sense, speculative rather than reasonably arguable. 38. That is sufficient to refuse the amendment. Section 108 Equality Act 2010 39. Even if causation were arguable, I am not satisfied that the proposed allegation falls within section 108. 40. The May 2025 enquiry was made through a public-facing mechanism available to any member of the public. Its subject matter—whether a third party had been investigated for alleged criminal conduct—had no connection to the Claimant's former employment or to any matter arising from that employment. On the evidence before me, that is not conduct which arises out of and is closely connected to the former employment relationship within the meaning of section 108. The Claimant was acting, in substance, as a member of the public making a general enquiry, rather than as a former employee pursuing a continuing employment-related detriment. Time limits 41. The refusal complained of occurred on or about 06 May 2025. The primary limitation period expired on or about 05 August 2025. The application to amend was made on 21 October 2025, approximately 77 days after expiry. 42. No explanation was offered for that delay. Where no explanation is given, it will rarely be just and equitable to extend time. I see no proper basis for extending time for this proposed new allegation. Early conciliation 43. The early conciliation certificate relied upon by the Claimant is dated 02 December 2024, before the May 2025 events occurred. I treat that as a further factor weighing against permitting, by amendment, a freestanding allegation arising months later and of materially different character. Balance of hardship Reference number 6001499-2025 44. Counsel submitted, and I accept, that any hardship to the Claimant from refusing this amendment is limited, given the absence of merit in the proposed allegation. The Claimant is not being shut out from an arguable claim. He is being refused permission to add an allegation which, for the reasons I have given, is incapable of being properly advanced. In those circumstances, the balance of hardship favours refusal. 45. The application to amend is refused. The Police Appeal Tribunal proceedings and judicial immunity 46. I turn to the claim insofar as it relates to the Police Appeal Tribunal proceedings. 47. The Police Appeal Tribunal is a statutory body exercising judicial functions when determining appeals. The Claimant accepted at the hearing, properly and realistically, that he cannot challenge the decisions of that tribunal before the Employment Tribunal. If he wished to challenge the tribunal’s decision, the proper route would have been by judicial review, not an employment tribunal claim. 48. However, the pleaded case went further. It included complaints about the Respondent’s conduct during the Police Appeal Tribunal proceedings, including allegations that the Respondent failed to present evidence, withheld material, or otherwise conducted those proceedings unfairly or in a discriminatory manner. 49. Those allegations are not justiciable in this Tribunal for two related reasons. 50. First, the immunity attaching to judicial proceedings extends beyond the tribunal itself to protect all participants in respect of what they say and do in the course of those proceedings. As confirmed in Heath v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2004] EWCA Civ 943, the immunity applies to anything said or done by those participating in judicial proceedings in the course of those proceedings. The rationale is the protection of the administration of justice. Parties must be free to conduct litigation—making forensic choices about what evidence to call, what submissions to advance, and how to present their case—without fear that those choices will be second-guessed in subsequent proceedings brought by a disappointed opponent. Were it otherwise, judicial proceedings would lose their finality, and every contested hearing would risk generating satellite litigation of precisely the kind the law has long sought to prevent. 51. Second, and in any event, to permit such claims would be to sanction a collateral attack on the PAT's decision. The substance of the Claimant's complaint is that the PAT reached the wrong conclusion, and that it would have reached a different conclusion had the Respondent conducted the proceedings differently. To adjudicate upon those allegations would require this Tribunal to determine what outcome the PAT should have reached—an exercise that amounts to impermissible re-litigation of the appeal otherwise than by judicial review. I would refuse to entertain these complaints on this alternative basis, even were the immunity point not available to the Respondent. 52. Accordingly, insofar as the claim is founded upon, or would require adjudication upon, what occurred in the Police Appeal Tribunal proceedings or the Respondent's conduct within those proceedings, those complaints are struck out. Time limits: dismissal on 09 July 2024 53. Following refusal of the amendment and striking out of the Police Appeal Tribunal-conduct Reference number 6001499-2025 complaints, the remaining claim concerns the Claimant’s dismissal on 09 July 2024. 54. The primary limitation period expired on 08 October 2024. 55. The Claimant did not contact ACAS until 26 November 2024. An early conciliation certificate was issued on 02 December 2024. The claim form was presented on 15 January 2025. 56. Early conciliation was commenced on 26 November 2024, some seven weeks after expiry of the primary limitation period. The statutory extension of time consequent upon early conciliation operates only where a claimant contacts ACAS within the primary limitation period. Where, as here, early conciliation begins after time has already expired, the early conciliation provisions do not revive or extend a claim which is already out of time. The claim was therefore time-barred before ACAS was contacted. 57. The claim was therefore presented substantially out of time. The delay from expiry of the primary limitation period to presentation of the claim is approximately three months and one week. That is not a marginal delay; it is, broadly speaking, equivalent to the entire primary limitation period itself. 58. I considered carefully the Claimant’s explanations. Lack of awareness of the Employment Tribunal 59. The Claimant says he was advised about the Police Appeal Tribunal but not about the Employment Tribunal, and that he learned about the Employment Tribunal later. I accept that this is his account and that he genuinely relied on the appeal route. 60. However, any complaint about incomplete advice received at the time of dismissal is a matter between the Claimant and those who advised him. The Respondent bears no responsibility for advice given by others. More fundamentally, the question before me is whether it is just and equitable to extend time, not whether the Claimant was well-served by his advisers. Ignorance of rights can be relevant to that assessment, but the ignorance must be reasonable. The Claimant accepted in cross-examination that he did not conduct any research into his legal position—for example, by searching online—because his attention was focused on the appeal route. On his own evidence, therefore, he had the means and opportunity to take basic steps to ascertain his rights and the applicable time limits, but chose not to do so. Focus on the Police Appeal Tribunal 61. The Claimant says he focused on the appeal process and believed it was not reasonable or practical to pursue Tribunal proceedings simultaneously. That does not assist him. The law is clear that the pursuit of another process does not stop time running for employment tribunal purposes. A claimant who wishes to preserve tribunal rights must take steps to do so within time even if another process is ongoing. 62. Further, this explanation does not account for the delay after the appeal outcome was communicated on 05 November 2024. Even if focus on the appeal explains some earlier inaction, it does not explain why ACAS was not contacted until 26 November 2024. Searching for legal representation Reference number 6001499-2025 63. The Claimant relied on his efforts to secure legal representation as a reason for delay. That is the least satisfactory of the explanations advanced. The Employment Tribunal system is expressly designed to be accessible to litigants in person. There is no requirement to obtain representation before presenting a claim, and no procedural advantage flows from doing so. A claimant who is uncertain of his position but conscious that time may be running can, and should, present a claim to protect his position and continue seeking advice thereafter. The Claimant did not take that elementary precautionary step. The just and equitable discretion 64. In accordance with Adedeji, I considered all relevant circumstances, in particular the length of delay and reasons given. The delay is substantial. The reasons advanced do not satisfactorily justify it. There is no presumption of extension: Robertson. 65. I accept that the Claimant's sense of grievance is genuine and that he believes he has been treated unjustly. However, sympathy for a litigant's predicament is not the test. The statutory question is whether it is just and equitable to extend time. Applying that test to the facts before me, I am satisfied that it is not. 66. I have considered prejudice to the Respondent. While Counsel did not advance detailed submissions on evidential prejudice, that is not determinative. The just and equitable discretion does not operate such that absence of specific prejudice creates a presumption in favour of extension. The burden remains on the Claimant to show that extension is just and equitable, not on the Respondent to demonstrate prejudice from delay. Given the substantial length of the delay and the inadequacy of the explanations offered, it would not be just and equitable to extend time even were forensic prejudice limited. 67. Time is not extended. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS For the reasons given: 68. The application to amend dated 21 October 2025 is refused. 69. The complaints founded on, or requiring adjudication upon, the Police Appeal Tribunal proceedings and/or the Respondent’s conduct within those proceedings are struck out. 70. The remaining claims concerning dismissal on 09 July 2024 were presented out of time and time is not extended. 71. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear the claim. The claim is dismissed in its entirety. APPROVED Judge M Aspinall (sitting as an Employment Judge) 8th February 2026 Date sent to Parties 19 February 2026 Reference number 6001499-2025 For the Tribunal Office P Wing Publication and public access to judgments and decisions: Judgments, decisions and reasons of Employment Tribunals are published in full shortly after the judgment or decision has been sent to the parties. These can be found at www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions Recording and transcription: Where a Tribunal hearing has been recorded you may request a transcript of the recording, for which a charge may be payable. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, verified or approved by a Judge. More information can be found in the Joint Presidential Practice Direction on Recording and Transcription of hearings, and the accompanying guidance, at www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practicedirections

  2. 2 March 2026

     First published.

• Country: England and Wales
• Jurisdiction code: Breach of Contract, Race Discrimination, Sex Discrimination, Unfair Dismissal and Unlawful Deduction from Wages
• Decision date: 13 January 2026

Read the full decision in T Inniss v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis: 6001499/2025 - Judgment.

Read the full decision in T Inniss v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis: 6001499/2025 - Reasons.