Transparency data
Annual Report on Major Projects 2019 to 2020, consolidated data and narratives (csv)
Updated 9 July 2020
Download CSV 516 KB
| GMPP ID Number | BEIS_0004_1920-Q2 | DECC_0005_1112-Q1 | BEIS_0001_1617-Q2 | BIS_0015_1516-Q1 | DECC_0013_1213-Q1 | BIS_0014_1415-Q3 | DECC_0010_1112-Q1 | BEIS_0003_1819-Q2 | CO_0020_1718-Q4 | CO_0018_1617-Q3 | CO_0019_1617-Q4 | CO_0014_1516-Q2 | CO_0015_1516-Q2 | CO_0023_1920-Q1 | CO_0022_1819-Q4 | DCMS_0009_1516-Q4 | DCMS_0011_1718-Q3 | DCMS_0013_1819-Q3 | DCMS_0012_1819-Q2 | DCMS_0008_1516-Q4 | DCMS_0010_1718-Q3 | DCMS_0014_1920-Q2 | DEFRA_0006_1516-Q1 | DFE_0009_1617-Q2 | DFE_0006_1415-Q3 | DFE_0011_1819-Q2 | DFE_0010_1819-Q1 | DFE_0012_1920-Q1 | DFID_0001_1112-Q1 | DFT_0034_1920-Q2 | DFT_0020_1314-Q2 | DFT_0024_1516-Q4 | DFT_0031_1819-Q1 | DFT_0001_1112-Q1 | DFT_0033_1819-Q1 | DFT_0025_1617-Q1 | DFT_0026_1617-Q1 | DfT_0023_1516-Q3 | DFT_0004_1112-Q1 | DFT_0005_1112-Q1 | DfT_0022_1415-Q4 | DFT_0027_1617-Q1 | DFT_0028_1617-Q1 | DFT_0021_1314-Q3 | DFT_0029_1617-Q1 | DFT_0016_1112-Q1 | DH_0065_1819-Q4 | DH_0058_1516-Q4 | DH_0063_1819-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Name | Future Shared Services Programme | Geological Disposal Facility Programme (GDF) | Heat Networks Investment Project | Local Land Charges (LLC) Programme | Magnox & RSRL PBO Competition | New Polar Research Vessel | Smart Metering Implementation Programme | The Next Magnox Operating Model | Commercial Capability Expansion Programme | Common Technology Services | Government as a Platform | Government Hubs Programme | GOV UK Verify | Transforming CCS | Transforming Government Security | 700 MHz Clearance Programme | 5G Testbeds & Trials | 4th National Lottery Licence Competition | Birmingham 2022 Commonwealth Games | Blythe House Programme | Local Full Fibre Networks | Rural Gigabit Connectivity Programme | DEFRA Unity Programme | Apprenticeships Reform Programme | Priority School Building Programme 2 | Social Work England | T Level Programme | Test Operation Services Transition Programme (TOpS) | St Helena Airport | A12 Chelmsford to A120 Widening | A14 Cambridge to Huntingdon Improvement Scheme | A303 Amesbury to Berwick Down | A428 Black Cat to Caxton Gibbet | Crossrail Programme | East Coast Mainline Programme | East West Rail Programme (Western Section) | Great Western Route Modernisation (GWRM) including electrification | Heathrow Expansion Programme | High Speed Rail Programme (HS2) | Intercity Express Programme | Lower Thames Crossing | Midland Main Line Programme | North of England Programme | Rail Franchising Programme | South West Route Capacity | Thameslink Programme | Clinical Triage Platform (CTP) | Data Processing Services Programme | GP IT Futures Programme |
| Department | BEIS | BEIS | BEIS | BEIS | BEIS | BEIS | BEIS | BEIS | CO | CO | CO | CO | CO | CO | CO | DCMS | DCMS | DCMS | DCMS | DCMS | DCMS | DCMS | DEFRA | DFE | DFE | DFE | DfE | DFE | DFID | DfT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DHSC | DHSC | DHSC |
| Description / Aims | The Future Shared Services Programme was initiated in 2018, the programme is born out of a need to replace the existing Oracle and Workday platforms | To site and construct a Geological Disposal Facility for the disposal for higher activity radioactive waste. | Helping create a self-sustaining heat network market through £320m capital investment and short-term actions to address market barriers | The Programme will deliver a single Local Land Charges (LLC) Service for England. | The appointment of a Parent Body Organisation to manage the Magnox and RSRL SLCs to deliver all twelve sites into Care and Maintenance, with a 10% saving, over a 14 year period. The contract has subsequently been terminated and will now deliver a series of Milestones and Termination States over a five year period ending September 2019. | Royal Research Ship Sir David Attenborough will replace two existing polar research/supply vessels with one dual purpose ship which planned to save £102m over 30 years | To offer every home and small business a Smart Meter by 2020. | Changing the model for delivery of decommissioning of the Magnox Sites from the current Parent Body Organisation (PBO) model to an NDA Subsidiary Model. | Improve commercial capability across central government and the wider public bodies sector by expanding capability building interventions applied to commercial specialists (at Grade 6 and above) into new target populations. | Enabling Government to transform the way Civil Servants work by supporting departments during the adoption of modern, flexible and secure technology that will increase their efficiency and deliver value for money. | Development of common platforms for use by digital services across government to avoid duplication of effort. | The Government Hubs Programme will consolidate and modernise the government's office estate, creating an office network that supports smarter working and great places to work. | A new way to prove who you are online and for public service providers to be assured you are who you say you are | The Transforming CCS programme will encompass both digital delivery and organisational transformation to deliver the transformation vision that will transition CCS into a digitally enabled organisation that puts the customer at the heart of everything it does. | Improve security outcomes by raising minimum standards, provide clarity for security across HMG, provide governance and security leadership to enable a better understanding and management of the threats and risks to government and its assets. | Investing up to £600m to clear the 700MHz spectrum by mid-2020 for use for mobile broadband services in the future. | To foster, build and lead the development of the UK's 5G ecosystem. | The project aims to run a competition to award the next National Lottery licence (4th), that delivers statutory duties of due propriety and player protection, while incentivising responsible innovation and maximising returns to good causes. | Delivery of the Birmingham 2022 Commonwealth Games. | Ensure Blythe House is put to its most efficient and effective use in order to deliver maximum value for money and that its museums are able to care for their collections in the most efficient and effective way. | Designed to stimulate greater commercial investment in full fibre networks across the UK to deliver faster and more reliable connectivity. | The Rural Gigabit Connectivity Programme will pilot and test innovative approaches to deploying full fibre in the most difficult to reach areas where the market alone is unlikely to deliver. | The Defra UnITy Programme has been established to exploit the opportunity presented from the expiry of its two largest ICT contracts. The programme will now run until 04/2020 to develop a delivery mechanism leveraging good outcomes in a multi-vendor environment. | To create more high quality apprenticeships, meet the skills needs of employers and the country, to create progression for apprentices and to widen participation and social mobility in apprenticeships. | Meeting the needs of the school buildings in the very worst condition across the country. | Establishing a new specialist social work regulator, Social Work England, which will focus on public protection and practice improvement. | To manage the development and delivery of new T Level qualifications, closure and benefit realisation | Programme of work to move from a multi supplier model to a single supplier model | The project aims to establish sustainable air services to St Helena to promote economic development and increased financial self-sufficiency, leading eventually to graduation from UK Government support. This will be done through the construction of an airport and the introduction of scheduled air services. The project will put in place the necessary legal, regulatory and monitoring framework, and includes a series of reforms to be implemented by the St Helena Government to open up the island to inward investment and increased tourism. | A12 Chelmsford to A120 Widening - widening the A12 to three lanes between junction 19 (north of Chelmsford) and junction 25 (A120 interchange). | To improve the A14 which is a major national and inter-urban regional transport artery between Cambridge and Huntingdon to relieve congestion and support both national and regional economic growth. | Freeflowing dual carriageway replacing the current single lane on the A303 between Amesbury and Berwick down including a twin bored tunnel under the majority of the world heritage site and a northern by-pass of Winterbourne Stoke. | The scheme provides a new off-line two lane dual carriageway between Black Cat roundabout on the A1 in Bedfordshire and Caxton Gibbet roundabout on the A428 in Cambridgeshire. | A new high-frequency rail service which will increase rail-based capacity in London by up to 10% and cut journey times across London and the South East. | Improving capacity and frequency of the services on the East Coast Mainline, increasing passenger seat capacity to major stations along the route, reducing journey times and improving the customer experience through the introduction of new trains. | The programme will reconstruct and upgrade a partly disused railway between Bicester and Milton Keynes /Bedford allowing for the introduction of new passenger services improving connectivity and journey times along the corridor. | An extensive programme to modernise existing infrastructure on the Great Western mainline. It will create faster and more reliable services, better stations and increased freight capacity. | The Heathrow Expansion Programme covered the Government’s policy activities to enable delivery of a new Northwest runway at Heathrow Airport (subject to the granting of development consent). The funding and delivery of the programme is led by Heathrow Airport ltd. | HS2 will form the backbone of the UK's transport network, connecting eight out of ten of Britain's largest cities. By making it easier to move between the North, Midlands and South, cutting many journeys by half, HS2 will make it easier for people to live and work where they want. | Renewing the UK's high speed train fleet on the Great Western and East Coast. Through Train Operating Companies IEP is a key means to deliver the passenger benefits including more capacity, improved reliability, reduced journey times, and better environmental performance. | A new free-flowing road crossing of the Lower Thames east of Gravesend and Tilbury. It will improve network resilience and the performance of the existing crossings at Dartford enabling local regional and national economic growth. | Modernisation of the Midland Main Line Route to provide more passenger capacity and reduced journey times into London and between major Midland cities. | The enhancements provided by the North of England Programme will support economic growth, bring improved journey times, offer additional train services and enable modern trains to run across the North. | To secure the provision of passenger rail services as set out under the Railways Act 1993 (as amended) by letting Rail Franchises. | Programme of infrastructure upgrades and new rolling stock to increase passenger capacity including enhancements works at Waterloo station. | A significantly enhanced high-frequency rail service which will increase rail-based capacity in London and across the wider South East and provide new journey opportunities. | The programme's overall aim is to support first contact resolution, that is, to the greatest extent where we can, we should deal with the patients concern there and then, and ensure patients are treated by the most appropriate healthcare professionals in the most appropriate place for their needs. | To deliver a modern data platform (DSP) to improve how NHS Digital manages, analyses and provides access to data for healthcare planning and research. | The GP IT Futures programme will deliver a new procurement framework, to replace the General Practice Systems of Choice (GPSoC) procurement framework. In so doing, it will create an open, competitive and innovative market with an ultimate goal to creating a world leading health ecosystem which will underpin the requirements set out in the NHS Long Term Plan. |
| IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (A Delivery Confidence Assessment of the project at a fixed point in time, using a five-point scale, Red – Amber/Red – Amber – Amber/Green – Green; definitions in the IPA Annual Report on Major Projects) | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber/Green | Amber/Red | Amber/Green | Amber/Green | Amber | Red | Amber | Amber/Green | Amber/Green | Amber | Amber | Amber/Red | Amber/Green | Red | Red | Amber | Amber/Red | Amber | Amber | Amber/Red | Amber/Red | Amber/Green | Amber | Green | Amber | Amber/Green | Red | Amber | Red | Amber | Amber | Red | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber/Red | Amber/Red | Amber/Green | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber/Red |
| Departmental commentary on actions planned or taken on the IPA RAG rating. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - A complex programme involving several organisations managing complex dependencies, and involving considerable business change. The programme was required to resolve issues such as clarifying the scope and vision across all the organisations involved and improved planning and resources in post. - Clarity was required on the scope of the Outline Business Case costs and where these sat across the organisations involved. This raised a concern over affordability. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Procurement activity in Q3 1920 was paused following market feedback over the core terms of the DAS framework, the procurement route established by CCS for the purchasing of cloud based shared service platforms. - Due to this feedback and potential suppliers declining the opportunity to bid, the Programme took the decision to withdraw the procurement in December 2019. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Programme has since been revisiting the Outline Business Case and conducting further analysis on the options for achieving the Programme’s desired outcomes. - The position as of Q4 1920: The Programme is working through material changes to its scope following notification from one of the key customers of their intent to leave the Programme and focus on an independent solution as a result of prioritising aspects of their own wider transformation programme. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - This is a long term programme and uncertainties and risks still remain, including the ability to attract and secure a willing GDF host community reflecting the continued amber assessment. - As the programme progresses the uncertainties associated with the number of communities, GDF solutions, location(s), extent of the geological characterisation and the nature of the design solutions will be resolved, however this will take a number of years. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The siting process is in progress following launch in December 2018 and continues to be one of the main activities during this phase of the programme, relying on the approach from volunteer communities. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The programme has received approval to proceed with community engagement, disbursement of investment funding and site evaluation, a significant move to the next stage of the programme. - The programme and business transformation activities continue to move towards a delivery organisation in support of the move from policy development to siting and community engagement. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - Following the appointment of the Delivery Partner (DP) end Q2 2018 to lead on the HNIP delivery, the DP has now mobilised and is fully operational, and as at Q2 there has been one successful funding round. From that the project and the DP are making a number of changes to the processes and these will need to be properly embedded. - A key factor that has impacted the project status was the forecasted pipeline of fundable applications. Whilst the overall pipeline looked relatively healthy, the number of early fundable projects coming through in Q2 19/20 didn't align with projections. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The most significant factor that is affecting the project status at this point is certainty in the number of fundable projects due to Covid 19, and whilst albeit limited at this point, may result in delays due to supply chain disruption, resource availability impacting approvals, planning, monitoring and construction. - The number of fundable projects seeking non fiscal funding has been less than projected due to the availability of more attractive funding alternatives for projects and/or project applicants - for example companies' internal treasury rules may require the use of internal borrowing as the primary funding source. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - There have been a number of initiatives to improve the application and post funding approval processes, alongside the roll-out of the Delivery Partner's data application system - The governance of the project has moved from mobilisation and is now focused on ramping up delivery capability and making processes more efficient and delivery centric. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Programme has reached a pivotal point in its delivery as it moves towards the end of Phase 1. There are important tools in production including the register and migration readiness tools and a commercial agreement with a digitisation supplier. All augers well for delivery of the overall programme. - However, the Programme is still in the learning phase and it needs to guard against the desire to prioritise delivery of Local Authority (LA) migrations over future design and learning. - A change of focus on the outcomes from Phase 1, a concentration on the development of useful metrics and the time and space to examine alternate options will give greater confidence that the Programme will deliver its overall objectives and maximise the benefits to UK PLC. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The uncertainty around EU Exit timings and restricted activities in a pre-election period impacted local authority and potential supplier engagement activities and progress. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - As a result of learning to date, the Programme adapted its approach to focus on pre-migration activity, including early data analysis and engagement with LAs. This enabled a richer understanding of the migration challenges and timelines. - The Programme has developed and consulted on a new delivery model which forms the basis of the new business case. This better aligns with the desired outcomes for the Programme, to unlock the economic benefits quicker. - The benefits model has been substantially revised to identify and quantify the wider economic benefits of the investment. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - IPA review held in April 2019 highlighted potential cost liabilities as being a significant issue to resolve with only four month remaining. It was noted that the cost is unlikely to change, but uncertainty regarding scope and schedule changes to meet the cost envelope mean that the overall delivery was feasible rather than probable. - A key risk identified related to CFP's behaviour as a leaver remained constant during this review period. - Key risks identified regarding the outstanding milestones to be delivered by August. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - A commercial resolution was reached with Magnox/CFP (with HMG agreement) and transition to subsidiary operations completed successfully, with the first Board meeting held during quarter 3 by the new Chair. - 43 out of 49 key contract milestones are complete. Significant delivery of key decommissioning projects, critical path milestones and programmes of work. Of the 6 milestones above that were missed, the % complete ranges from 81% to 96% representing a high proportion of high hazard scope reduction delivered. (During the termination period Sept 17 to Aug 19). Overall Health, Safety and Environmental performance has significantly improved over the second half of the contract period. - An IPA Gateway 5 Review was held in February 2020 (DCA Amber/Green). | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - Programme remains on scheduled but no time or cost contingency remains - Good progress made with the 2018 Project Assurance Review recommendations and a Gateway 4 planned in for Summer 2020 to support interim acceptance. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - There are now c.17 million smart and advanced meters operating across Great Britain. - The Programme has worked with industry delivery partners to successfully implement complex technical solutions that will transform the customer experience. - The Programme has updated its Cost-Benefit Analysis. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Programme has consulted on a new regulatory framework for energy suppliers to drive market-wide completion of the smart meter rollout as soon as practicable. - The Programme continues to work with industry delivery partners to implement and drive market-wide completion, while also taking into account the impact of COVID-19. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - Changing the model for delivery of decommissioning of the Magnox Sites from the current Parent Body Organisation (PBO) model to an NDA Subsidiary Model. The Transition to the new Operating Model took place successfully on the 1st September 2019 as planned. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Transition to the new Operating Model took place successfully on the 1st September 2019 as planned, with the first Board meeting held during quarter 3 by the new Chair. - An IPA Gateway 5 Review was held in February 2020. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - Our programme reported Amber RAG status for the majority of 2018/19 - however, it went back down to Amber/Red in Q1 2019/20. This was mainly due to the stakeholder engagement challenges presented by Brexit - both within central government departments and Wider Government Bodies. Departments had limited ability to engage in capability building intervention due to having other Brexit pressing priorities - Uncertainty around long term funding within Contract Management space was another key risk which impacted our DCA during this period - Our DCA improved to Amber in Q3 19/20 - the G7 Commercial Leads project successfully closed on 30/11/19 with a Green RAG status and the programme was now working towards revised targets for Wider Government Bodies project, approved at the June 2019 Programme Board, in light of better customer insight. The programme's RAG status moved to Amber/Green as of March 2020 Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The main external factors impacting our programme DCA were Brexit and funding issues within Contract Management space, both of which were outside of programme's control Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The engagement strategy for the Wider Government Bodies project was refreshed to help improve engagement with Wider Government Bodies. This included issuing a letter from our Senior Responsible Owner to encourage support from Permanent Secretaries and the piloting of Contract Management Foundation training to Wider Government Bodies as an incentive to take up other commercial capability services. - A paper to revise some of our programme targets (particularly in relation to Wider Government Bodies), in light of a better understanding of organisational pressures and requirements, was tested with our key stakeholders through our governance and endorsed through our change control process. The revised targets were approved at June 2019 Programme Board - At a programme level we structured ourselves in a more customer focused manner by better utilising our account managers across the whole programme to improve engagement - with a particular focus within Contract Management space. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - Good progress was made on the key success criteria in this period. Particularly strong was the increased adoption and usage of GovWifi during this period. This resulted in an improvement of the RAG based on adoption progress and decreased risk Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Covid-19 had an impact from March 2020. Usage and adoption of GovWifi shrank markedly due to Civil Servants largely working from home - Covid-19 had an impact from March 2020. Some staff were off sick with Covid-19 and others had to care for others with Covid-19. By March 2020 end, it was too early to ascertain the impact of Covid-19 fully, so that the status is still Amber/Green Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Greater team efficiency and process improvements resulted in some increases in productivity - Building more effective pipelines of adopting services has resulted in increased adoption and programme benefits. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - GDS continued to make good progress against the objectives of the programme. Adoption of GDS GaaP services remained above target, and a solid pipeline of future services to onboard was fulfilled, and continues to be refreshed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Covid-19 had an impact from March 2020. Some staff were off sick with Covid-19 and others had to care for others with Covid-19. By March 2020 end, it was too early to ascertain the impact of Covid-19 fully, so that the status is still Amber/Green - EU Exit work has had some impact, with recruitment being slower (due to EU Exit priorities elsewhere) into the GaaP teams. EU Exit work in other departments may also have also been a factor in some GaaP service adoptions being delayed Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Greater team efficiency and process improvements resulted in some increases in productivity - Building more effective pipelines of adopting services has resulted in increased adoption and programme benefits. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Government Hubs Programme remains at the concept stage as there is no approved Programme Business Case (PBC). Due to Spending Review 2019 being cancelled by the newly formed Government, GPA were unable to present the PBC to HMT & CO for approval to secure the mandate and funding for the programme - The Gov Hubs programme has continued to develop the programme level artefacts including the PBC, draft mandate and in the meantime secured funding via a HMT Reserve Claim to progress three live projects Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The cancellation of SR19 has limited the freedom the Gov Hubs programme can operate within, however the submission and part approval of a HMT Reserve Claim has secured funding for FY 2021 on those critical time sensitive projects - Financially the programme, like Capital Projects as a Directorate, is yet to establish itself and how it is able to fund the full GPA support capability. This is having an impact on the smooth planning & resourcing of projects at this stage Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Since Q2 1920, progress on Birmingham 2 and Peterborough projects has been steady and roughly to schedule and budget. Croydon 2 secured HMT approval for an Agreement for Lease (AfL) in late March 20, providing the SRO with confidence that the programme is operating albeit at initial operating capability capacity - The Capital Projects PMO are gaining in capability and confidence and new or improved processes are being brought forward to support project & programme delivery. In the nascent period of establishing the Hubs programme, some new policy is being written as projects break new ground and this will be helpful for those projects that follow. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Red, due primarily to the following factors; - GDS has made significant progress against the programme's objectives: following the appointment of a new SRO in March 2019; by reinvigorating its Board; and through more detailed internal planning and cross-government cooperation - GDS has continued to run securely the Verify system, on which 22 online government services rely, and has increased substantially its number of user Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Quarter four witnessed a very significant increase in demand for Verify services, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic; for instance, around 300,000 new Verify identities were created in the second half of March 2020, compared to an average of about 35,000 per week pre-COVID Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - In quarter four, GDS worked rapidly with its identity providers and with government services to respond successfully to the unprecedented increase in demand for Verify; this included scaling up capacity, rolling out new functionality, and improving the user journey. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - There had been a period of mobilisation following the business case approval in April and the Programme was in the early stages of it's delivery lifecycle. - The programme would be delivering critical new infrastructure to support ambitious growth plans for CCS. Formalised governance was established but further planning was needed across the programme to improve delivery confidence Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The DCA currently remains AMBER due to the scope of transformation required for CCS - The COVID-19 risk may impact future DCA ratings. Whilst the Programme is still a priority for CCS, resource and time for engagement with CCS Staff will need to be prioritised onto the COVID-19 response which will result in some of the Transform strategy work being slowed or paused Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Additional project and digital delivery resources have been employed including contracting with a delivery partner to create a multidisciplinary team alongside business and digital stakeholders across all parts of CCS. - Key decisions have been made regarding the digital delivery approach for the critical components of the new digital solution which resulted in additional clarity about the complexity and schedule for delivery. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - No change to the Amber/Green delivery confidence rating given in Q2. The Programme was in a good place due to recent, positive action to reset the strategic direction and the Programme was on track to deliver. The IPA ratified this delivery confidence in September. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - There were no external factors (better or worse) to impact the delivery of the TGS Programme Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - There were no internal factors (better or worse) to impact the delivery of the TGS Programme | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Delivery Confidence Assessment at Q2 reflected the uncertainty of a general election and the impact this might have on the timeline. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The programme was deemed to have matured and moved to the point at which it was ready to oversee the launch of competitions. The challenge remaining is to maximise the opportunities for learning and innovation in use cases by initiating contracts/project starting swiftly. - Knowledge management and sharing underway, with industry support for the programme high. Innovative market intervention deemed by IPA as being appropriate and beneficial. The programme is delivering against its core objectives. Key factors driving Amber DCA included; pace of project initiation; uncertainty re. level of response to competitions to be launched; uncertainty re. provision of match funding. - Industrial 5G and Rural Connected Communities competitions now completed, with winners announced. 5G Create competition also agreed by Minister/SoS. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Impact of Purdah on the programme was significant; delays to project launches and competition launches experienced. Contract and commercial activity ceased for a number of weeks over November/December. - The impacts of COVID-19 on the programme and its projects timelines, scope of work, and budgets is being regularly assessed and mitigations being put in place. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Competitions successfully launched for both Rural Connected Communities (RCC) and Industrial (previously Sectors). Agreement received from Minister for Digital and Broadband to initiate 5G Create, encouraging projects across a range of sectors including the creative industry - announced by SOS in December 2019. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The arrival of Rothschild & Co (R&Co) as lead advisors and recruitment of experienced Commercial Director, on secondment from Government Commercial Organisation, provided confidence that senior leadership was in place to manage the programme. - A more detailed schedule of market engagement commenced in September with a broader range of organisations including technology firms and finance providers in addition to established lottery operators. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The requirement to follow the HMT-led Treasury Approval Point (TAP) process, and specifically its deferral until after the March 2020 Budget, introduced a 3-month delay to the start of the competition. This action consumed programme contingency but the end date is unaltered, and delivery confidence unaffected because the delay was used to mature competition documentation and engage further with market. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Draft Invitation to Apply (ITA) and draft Licence were published to market in December 2019 and feedback received in January 2020. This exercise flushed out a number of issues with the market and allowed us to address them in final versions of competition documentation, giving us greater confidence that our requirements would be understood and acceptable to potential applicants. - An extensive assurance and audit plan was delivered. Including: IPA Gateway 2 review; internal audit of Outline Business Case, Incentive Mechanism, and Evaluation Framework; engagement with Cabinet Office complex transactions team; shadow bid reviews to test how suppliers might 'game' competition; and testing of game assessment processes. These actions increased confidence in the quality of the competition documents and processes. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The tight delivery timetable for delivery of the Games, within four and a half years compared with the usual seven. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - HM Treasury approved Full Business Cases for all three museums' projects to create new storage facilities, and the release of all remaining funding for construction and the decant from Blythe House. - The scope and location of all new storage facilities was confirmed at Full Business Case stage, including contingency plans to de-risk the decant from Blythe House. - Agreement was reached with the museums for a lease for Blythe House. There has been good progress in preparing objects for the decant, and development of co-ordinated plans and logistical arrangements to enable the movement of objects to new storage. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The impact of the current Coronavirus outbreak will be assessed, and scenario planning undertaken. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Blythe House Asset Disposal Project Board has agreed terms of reference and scheduled monthly meetings. - Discussions with the local authority about a pre-application for Blythe House took place in early 2020 and an architect was appointed to support this process. - An adviser from the Office of Government Property has been appointed to support the project. Procurement is underway to appoint an agent for the sale of Blythe House. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Red, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - Delivery Confidence Assessment at Q2 reflected the pressure that without approval from HMT to extend the March 2021 deadline we could not deliver the current scope. Since Q2, the DCA has improved due to HMT approval. - Similarly we had significant concerns about whether Manchester and London could deliver in the March 2021 timeframe due to the progress in their procurements and the scale of these projects. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Red, due primarily to the following factors; - In order to deliver our strategic objective of increasing full fibre coverage across the UK, BDUK ran a market trial of the Gigabit Broadband Voucher Scheme. Gigabit broadband vouchers are a one-off contribution to SMEs wanting to buy ultrafast connections over gigabit-capable infrastructure. They can be used to aggregate demand in an area to encourage network operators to extend or build new fibre networks to reach these new customers. RAG for Q2 19/20 relates to run rate of vouchers, as there is no line of sight to spend £200m on hubs and vouchers by Mar 2021. Since Q2, the programme is rated Amber Red. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The programme remains at Amber status as it continues to manage existing risks resulting from the inherently complex nature of implementing into a multi supplier environment, compounded by other departmental change programmes and EU Exit considerations. - Transition and initial deployment activities continue as planned. Activities include replacement of whole print estate, transformation of local and wide area networks, end user migrations to 0365 tooling suite, Windows10 device rollout and Data Centre infrastructure migration. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Since 30.09.19 the programme has continued to engage with Defra EU Exit programme, monitoring any dependencies and supporting the programme itself. The programme prioritised providing new Windows10 devices for EU EXIT Programme new joiners. - Since 30.09.19, the programme has received immediate, medium and long term requirements in response to the Covid-19 outbreak Q4 19/20. This has led to elements of current deployments being reprioritised to support remote working arrangements across the Defra estate approx. 21k users. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The amber/red rating at Q2 has improved, and is now Amber. This is a reflection of the reduced delivery risk now that the apprenticeship service has been scaled up to enable access for non-levy paying employers. The move of non-levy employers onto the digital platform happened in January as scheduled, and it was hitch-free. - The severity of predicted funding uncertainty we reported in Q2 has now reduced. Whilst we are still concerned about the uncertainty in demand and the challenges this brings around forecasting, most recent data on apprenticeship starts suggests the funding overrun predicted in 2020/2021 will no longer be the case and the pressures for subsequent years have also reduced. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Covid 19 -The economic impact of the virus will have a lasting impact on apprenticeship delivery. Apprentices are being furloughed and laid off; and our delivery chain in respect of independent training providers, and providers of end point assessment is also likely to be put at risk. This work is fast paced and we have not yet got a full evaluation of final impact on forecasted future numbers. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - A bridging business case is now in place to cover the one year SR settlement for 2020/21, and we are working on a new full business case that focusses on longer term delivery. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - We maintained a strong performance in entering building contracts and completing building projects. During the 12-month period ending Q2 19-20 we signed 115 new contracts, in line with our forecast. We handed over 55 buildings in the period. - We made significant progress in completing the feasibility work on the most complex schemes, moving them through to procurement. - We have made changes to programme data and Quality Assurance to improve forecasting accuracy which is supporting the overall improving trajectory. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Covid-19 outbreak has re-directed priorities and in some cases, staff (but not delivery teams), to urgent Covid-19 related work. We have prioritised work as necessary and do not expect this to impact on project delivery. The construction industry has been impacted by Covid-19 and we are still reviewing the likely impact of this on project timescales with teams. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - During the June-August 2019 the planning assumption was that Social Work England would go live in April 2019 (this was subsequently revised to September 2019 and a confirmed go-live was announced in the same timeframe (June-August 2019). Risks during this period were around the successful recruitment of high calibre staff and ensuring a digital platform was in place. - In June-August 2019 Social Work England's go-live date of 2 December 2019 was announced. Although progress was good and on track, the risk for potential problems with the Customer Relationship Management systems development or data transfer could not be ruled out. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Assumptions around Social Work England's go live date was driven by confidence in the projects ability to switch on regulatory functions at the same time the previous regulator switched off and therefore avoid any risk of public protection being compromised. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The development of the Customer Relationship Management system and subsequent testing; and the quality of data being transferred from the previous regulator. - The completion of the recruitment of Social Work England's Board; and the Executive team all helped in strengthening and supporting an effective governance for the project allowing them to respond the challenges that had previously been noted. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - An assurance review by IPA in December 2019 also had an Amber/Red DCA. In this review, a major risk was identified to September 2020 roll-out that the Technical Qualification (TQ) would not be developed, agreed and available for first teaching in September. However, this has since been agreed and signed off in April 2020. - The long-term sustainability of the T Levels programme has major challenges, the most immediate of which is its position in the upcoming Spending Review. The T Levels unique value in the wider qualifications landscape needs to be clearly set out to address this. - The strategic landscape for T Levels is not considered to be stable. If T Levels are to be part of the journey from Level 2 to Level 4 and employment, there needs to be consistency of approach across the reform landscape. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Covid-19 outbreak has re-directed priorities and in some cases, staff, to urgent Covid-19 related work. However, we do not anticipate that this will impact the ability to deliver in September 2020 as staff continue to work at pace, re-prioritise work where necessary and seek appropriate steers from Ministers. - Cabinet Office/No 10 have restricted government comms during the Coronavirus outbreak, which has resulted in comms on T Levels being paused. This will impact our planned comms and engagement strategy, which is currently under review. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The delay to the approval of the Technical Qualifications originally posed a distinct threat to the September 2020 launch. These have since been approved by IfATE and Ofqual and are ahead of first teaching in September, eliminating what was one of the most significant risks to delivery. - An assurance review by IPA in December 2019 stated that "In short, the amber red confidence rating reflects the complexity and size of the challenges described above to the long term delivery. If the Review Team was assessing the confidence in the delivery of the September 2020 milestone, we would assess confidence as Amber. This reflects the good work the programme has undertaken in its contingency planning, stakeholder engagement and close working with the AOs – as well as significant progress shown with employer and providers." | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The Delivery Confidence Assessment rating was due to slippage in the readiness of the school-facing portal by the original delivery plan deadline of 31 August 2019. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The 2019/2020 test cycle was cancelled in March 2020 due to Covid-19 and school closures. Covid-19 may have impacts on operational delivery of the 2020/21 test cycle. Specific risk mitigations and contingencies caused by Covid-19 outbreak will need to be considered. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Additional resources were committed by the prime supplier which proved more effective at managing delivery. This was assisted by greater transparency of information and process, commitment to delivery deadlines and joint working sessions. The result was that operational deliverables were met as required until the point of cancellation of the 2020 test cycle. -Improvements made in our joint working led to increased delivery confidence and working relationships led to a Amber rating by the IPA in November 2019. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The airport is fully operational and working well. The scheduled commercial air service continues to provide regular access to and from the St Helena. Ticket sales remain strong and passenger numbers are up from the previous year. - Following the principle contractor’s financial difficulties and the subsequent termination of the contract, St Helena Airport Limited, an arm’s length body of St Helena Government, seamlessly took over responsibility for operations of the airport. This arrangement remains in place. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Given the resilience of the service to date, the St Helena Government and SA Airlink (the air service operator) agreed to expand the service to increase flight capacity during the high season December to February. This will also explore the potential for flights to St Helena departing from Cape Town. - The COVID 19 pandemic has affected access to St Helena as the lockdown in South Africa since late March prevents scheduled air service from operating. A chartered an alternative flight to transport medical supplies and medical staff to the island and to evacuate people requiring the most urgent medical attention. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The project does still face some challenges. The principal contractor was unable to complete all capital works, the department commissioned a review to advise on the most cost-effective way to bring this part of the project to completion. - The Department, along with St Helena Government continues to monitor access options in light of the COVID 19 pandemic. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - In September 2019, the project was preparing to announce a preferred route announcement for Junctions 19 to 23, as well as a non-statutory consultation for Junctions 23 to 25. The delivery confidence assessment was based on three key outstanding issues which were causing increased project uncertainty on how the scheme would progress. Firstly, there was uncertainty on the timing and outcome of the North Essex Authorities Local Plan, which included the Colchester Braintree Borders Garden Community. Whether the Garden Community was found viable or not in the Local Plan would inform the decision on a proposed route between Junction 23 and 25, as the route may have needed to divert southwards around the proposed Garden Community footprint. - Secondly, in order to divert the road southwards to accommodate the Garden Community, the project required additional funding. The additional funding was to come forward via a Housing Infrastructure Bid submitted by Essex County Council to MHCLG. At the time of the DCA, it was not known whether this would be approved. - Finally, there was a risk of delay to making the PRA for Junction 19-23, a critical milestone to maintain the delivery programme. Approval was subject to discussions with DfT around the interaction with potential RIS3 pipeline projects such as the A120 Braintree to A12. Failure to make the PRA for Junction 19 to 23 in October 2019 would have introduced a significant delay and additional costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The sources of uncertainty highlighted in the September 19/20 DCA assessment have been resolved. In May 2020, the Planning Inspector's report on the Local Plan determined that the Colchester Braintree Borders Garden Community was unviable. This is not expected to be challenged by the Local Authorities. While Housing and Infrastructure Funding was announced in March 2020, this was conditional on delivering the Garden Community housing. This funding is now expected to be withdrawn. - With no viable Garden Community, and without funding for the additional costs of realignment of the A12 further south, the project now has clarity on the recommended route alignment. This recommendation will be taken through governance with the intention of announcing a preferred route for the section between junction 23 to 25 in the autumn. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The project team announced the Preferred Route for Junctions 19-23 in October 2019. In the same month, the project launched a non-statutory consultation on four route options between Junctions 23-25 of the A12 to accommodate the Garden Community. In November 2019, the project mobilised a programme of investigative surveys, which were designed to de-risk the preliminary design stage by providing geotechnical and condition data. - HE has now completed its internal procedures and the recommendation is going to IPDC on 15 June. Alongside this request, DfT and HMT will consider the use of Highways England Regional Delivery Partnerships as the project's procurement route and development phase funding, which will allow the project to proceed into the development phase of the scheme and prepare its' development consent order. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - The completion of a number of substantial subcontract packages (e.g. earthworks, large sections of pavement) have provided additional certainty on programme and cost outturn. - The completion of additional project critical milestones including bulk earthworks and main carriageway activities enabled continuation of works through the winter period, which has de-risked project delivery. - The retention of key project personnel from within Highways England and the supply chain has maximised consistency in delivery and the continuation of established relationships leading to a high performing team. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Winter 2019 brought the project some bad weather, with yellow warnings for flooding and wind. The project was able to mitigate by planning activities effectively and moving non-critical works which could not be undertaken at that time. - Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The project has implemented a comprehensive handover strategy to ensure efficient handover of the main asset into Highways England Operations for operation and maintenance, and a number of local roads to the Local Authority. This includes over 38,000 asset records. The project successfully opened and handed over the operation of the Southern Bypass in December 2020, with the remainder of the scheme opening for traffic ahead of schedule in May 2020. - The use of data analytics on the project has allowed an improvement in the effectiveness of monitoring and decision making by the senior leadership team. This has ensured management interventions are focussed on key project activities, i.e. safety critical works and those driving completion dates and productivity. - The project has continued to effectively collaborate with the supply chain as set out in the procurement strategy. This has incentivised key contract packages to deliver in line with the schedule and the total project budget. It also supported a strong focus on realising opportunities to enable this outcome. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - At Q2 18/19, the scheme's potential value for money (VfM) was assessed as low. There was concern that the removal of Private Finance as an option would increase costs to a point where the VfM would be too low to sustain the project. This issue has since been resolved with Treasury approval of the OBC in Oct 2019. - One of the key risks to the project was Highways England's confidence in successfully passing Development Consent Order (DCO) given the high profile challenges to the scheme from 3rd parties, such as heritage and environmental lobbying groups. This risk was largely mitigated through a successful Examination Phase ending in Oct 19. A DCO decision was due from Secretary of State on 2nd April 2020. This has been delayed to 17 July 2020. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - HM Treasury approval received in October 2019 and funding certainty was provided in the March 2020 Budget statement demonstrating government support for the scheme. - The DCO decision has been delayed until 17 July 2020. This is the decision by the Secretary of State that give planning permission for the scheme. The delay in DCO decision is not confined to this project and decisions on a number of other road infrastructure projects have also been delayed Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Successful completion of DCO Examination Phase in Oct 19, with an expected Secretary of State Decision now planned for 17th July 2020. - The Invitation to Participate in Dialogue for the main works contract was published on 1 May 2020 | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - The Preferred Route Announcement was made on the 18 February 2019. The project milestones remain on track for delivery. - There continues to be strong stakeholder support and interest for this project demonstrated by the positive outcome from the Statutory Consultation - Funding for the delivery of this project has been included within the Roads Period 2 spending envelope announced in March 2020. The associated benefits case has been approved by Treasury. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Changes in the Design Manual for Road and Bridges resulted in some design rework but this is not anticipated to affect overall programme. Changes in the uncertainty log resulting from increased developments and employment areas within the local plans are being analysed and will be included within the project design. - East West Rail Company have announced their corridor route for the central section (Bedford to Cambridge) which is currently expected to be constructed after the A428. Areas of potential overlap are being discussed to maximise the opportunity for close collaboration. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Approval from HM Treasury in Feb 2020 followed by the announcement of funding of the project as part of RIS2 in the March 2020 Budget Statement. IPA recommendations from PAR in July and September 2019 have been actioned - Formal mobilisation of the Regional Delivery Partnership Framework (RDP) contract has begun for the project. This closed the IPA recommendation to engage with the RDP as soon as possible to finalise budget. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Red, due primarily to the following factors; - On 18 September 2019 TfL announced that projections were now £42m more than the £2.15bn funding announced in December 2018 as part of the financing package to fund the project’s completion. Modelling scenarios include a significantly higher level of risk contingency, up to £394m more than the committed funding. - In July 2019 a further WMS announced additional funding that has been made available to Network Rail (NR) for the On Network Works (ONW) – the forecast costs for the ONW were now around £2.8bn, though there was a risk of this increasing. - In April 2019, CRL announced a revised 6-month opening window for the central section (Paddington to Abbey Wood – excluding Bond Street) between October 2020 – March 2021. CRL continued to report that this was achievable but that a number of risks remained. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - It is too early to tell exactly how the impact of COVID-19 will be felt following the “safe stop” of work at project sites. CRL have initiated scenario planning work, developing assumptions to inform a range of possible safe start options and assess the impact of COVID 19. - Due to falling ridership numbers as a consequence of Covid-19, Tfl revenues have dramatically decreased and conversations are currently ongoing regarding TfL's continued ability to fund the project. Talks are ongoing with TfL to mitigate substantial drops in revenues due to falling ridership numbers. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - CRL's Delivery Control Schedule (DCS) began to be implemented, this showed early and consistent challenges to meeting milestones. Despite the challenges of delivering the DCS, CRL believe that the Stage 3 opening of the central section in Summer 2021 is still achievable - though acknowledge this would be tight and could have implications for delivery dates of full services. In an attempt to add greater focus on coordination and delivery of the project, CRL added an additional member to their executive team which means there is now a chief programme office and chief project officer in an attempt to increase productivity and delivery. - In November 2019, a revised AFCDC that was aligned to the DCS indicated that it would not be possible to deliver the project within the available funding and would require between £400 to £650m in additional funding. Based on analysis DfT, HMT, TfL and GLA have agreed a funding shortfall target. Discussions are ongoing regarding a revised funding agreement between HMT, TfL and DfT and a further waiver has been agreed until 22 July to further funding negotiations. - An Arcadis review highlighted a Network Rail On Network Works (ONW) funding gap of £140.6m. The February 2020 Network Rail portfolio board have approved an increase of £140m for Crossrail On Network Works. Funding is from existing CP6 budgets has been approved by DfT ministers and awaits HMT ministerial clearance. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - Realisation of the Programme's benefits is dependent upon the East Coast franchise's introduction of InterCity Express Programme trains and the delivery of those trains has been delayed. The final train deliveries are now expected in Summer 2020. - The IPA anticipated that the digital signalling project between London and Peterborough would be incorporated into the East Coast Mainline Programme in November 2019, increasing the complexity of the Programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - COVID-19 will delay the delivery of engineering works and is likely to mean the planned introduction of the new East Coast Mainline timetable in December 2021 is deferred. The prolongation and replanning of these activities will increase costs and delay the realisation of the Programme's benefits. - The digital signalling project will not be incorporated into the East Coast Main Line Programme but will be delivered as a separate scheme later in the 2020s. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - As a result of COVID-19, engineering works to remodel the track layout King's Cross Station have been delayed. The project needs to replan the works. There is a risk that the introduction of the new East Coast timetable will need to be deferred from December 2021. - The storms experienced in early 2020, combined with the impact of COVID-19, mean that critical works on the Werrington Grade Separation project have been delayed, putting the entry into service date of this enhancement at risk. The project team needs to replan the works. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Red, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - Project cost estimates and target price were significantly higher than the approved funding envelope available. Negotiations and cost challenge work took place to identify savings to bring within budgets in order to support the full business case investment before entry into target price contract award in 2020. - Other than the cost challenge, the other key risks to the project which may impact on meeting planned entry into service dates is the difficulty in establishing a working timetable that delivers the required train service specification. - A complex interface with the High Speed 2 project at Calvert is on the critical path with works potentially impacting on East West Rail project schedule and may incur additional infrastructure costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Covid-19 may have an impact on the project but it is too early to assess this. Enabling works are still ongoing with sites generally open. Main works are due to commence in the Autumn, pending all approvals, and any impact will only be known nearer the time. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - EWR Co have reviewed the way that they deliver the programme in order to maximise cost and schedule efficiencies. - Further EWR Co and Network Rail scrutiny, negotiations and assurance activities have been undertaken to reduce cost estimates. A benchmarking exercise has been undertaken to understand where further work is needed on costs to inform final target price for the full business case. - Work has progressed to identify and take forward opportunities on the HS2 project interface to de risk programme dependencies. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - In 18/19, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) was causing issues between the new Intercity Express Trains (IETs) and track infrastructure. In 19/20, the IETs were undergoing a programme of modifications to mitigate risks. - Also in 18/19, decisions were required due to the delay of Crossrail. By 19/20 the decision had been made that Crossrail would operate Paddington to Reading services from December 2019. - In December 2018, electrification to Bristol Parkway and Newbury was completed, enabling the extension of electric operations on 2 January 2019 from Swindon to Bristol Parkway, and to Newbury from Reading, building on the electric operation to Swindon via Reading already in place. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The enhanced GWR timetable with electric timings was successfully implemented in December 2019, substantially reducing the difference between the fastest and slowest journey times between London and the South West. - From 5 January 2020, electric services are operating on the Great Western Main Line from Paddington and Cardiff (excluding electric operation in the Severn Tunnel), due to completion of electrification between Newport and Cardiff. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Heathrow Airport Expansion Consultation (AEC) ended on 13 September 2019. Following consultation feedback Heathrow was expected to progress its final Masterplan through their formal Business Plan approval gateway (M5) - which was scheduled to complete in April 2020. DfT’s HEP continued to work with Heathrow to understand its evolving Masterplan. - Confidence reviews were completed to examine Heathrow’s construction delivery schedule and scheme financing; together with an internal qualitative review of how the draft Masterplan protects the benefits of expansion and mitigates disbenefits. Engagement continued between DfT, Heathrow and the CAA to review the Heathrow delivery date of 2026. - The IPA agreed that opening a third runway by 2026 was a challenging timescale however the IPA DCA was based upon the HALs ability to deliver new Airport Capacity by 2030. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - On 27th February 2020 the Court of Appeal ruled that when designating the Airports National Policy Statement (ANPS), the previous Government did not take account of the Paris Agreement, non-CO2 emissions and emissions post-2050. The ANPS therefore has no legal effect until reviewed by the Government under the Planning Act 2008. - All reporting on the programme was paused and has not changed since the Court of Appeal ruling on 27th February 2020. Expansion at Heathrow is a private sector project and it is for the scheme promoter to take it forward. Further, there has been a global pandemic and air travel has largely ceased. While we can be confident based on previous recessions, and the pent-up demand at Heathrow, that if any airport is to need additional capacity it would be Heathrow, the future is uncertain. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Following the publication of the CAA position on Cat C costs, HAL confirmed in January 2020 that their schedule for the opening of the runway had been delayed for 2 years to 2028-29. This reflected the need to phase the costs over a longer period. HEP were awaiting further clarification of Heathrow's detailed schedule and costs. Further, HAL confirmed after the Court of Appeal hearing that the Court's judgment would have an impact on its timescales. Lastly, HAL's CEO confirmed a new runway would still be needed but not for 10-15 years. - All reporting on the programme was paused and has not changed since the Court of Appeal's ruling of the ANPS on 27th February 2020. - The Airports and Infrastructure Directorate have been temporarily redeployed to work on the COVID-19 response. Due to the expectation there will be an extended period of time for the aviation industry to return to 'normal' operations, it is likely that any expansion will be delayed. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Red, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - Significant Cost and schedule pressures emerged on Phase One in late 2018, as HS2 Ltd updated its baseline, with inclusion of actual market prices, in readiness for Notice-to-Proceed (the formal start of construction). - Despite remedial activity to improve the cost (and schedule) position, it became clear that it would not be possible to deliver the existing Sponsor’s Requirements within the existing funding envelope and schedule targets. - In August 2019, following a change in Prime Minister, Secretary of State, and in response to publication of the HS2 Chairman’s Stocktake, the Government commissioned an independent review of the HS2 programme chaired by Doug Oakervee to consider whether, and how, to proceed with HS2. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - It is too early to assess the full impact Covid-19 will have on the programme’s cost, schedule and benefits. Enabling Works and initial mobilising of the Main Works Civils are ongoing with sites generally open but there are likely to be some site or contractor-specific challenges to work through. - There has been an increase in protestor action across the line of the route. This is a combination of long-standing action against the programme and a more recent uptick as a result of the emergence of environmental groups . This has created challenges to maintaining schedule. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - In February 2020, following the conclusions of the ‘Oakervee Review’ and having sought wider advice, the Government confirmed its commitment to delivering the HS2 programme. - Between February-April 2020, Government approved the Full Business Case for Phase One and agreed a revised funding regime and governance arrangements to take the programme forward. - In April 2020, Government authorised HS2 Ltd to issue Notice-to-Proceed to its Main Works Civils Contractors and to start construction activities along the line of route. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The final Great Western fleet train was successfully rolled out into service in December 2018 improving delivery confidence. - The ongoing roll out of the East Coast trains has improved delivery confidence. IEP East Coast trains were successfully launched on the London-Leeds route on 15th May 2019. The first Anglo-Scot service successfully launched on August 2019. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - COVID-19 and related social distancing measures have impacted the planned roll out of the remaining 9 trains. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The roll out of East Coast fleet trains has continued since early 2019, only 9 of the total 122 IEP trains are yet to be accepted into service. - An electromagnetic interference issue has been largely resolved with track and train resolutions identified and in the process of being implemented. - The significant December 19 timetable change was successfully implemented on the Great Western route. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The project schedule is extremely tight with multiple critical paths and constrained timescales to support a 2027 Open for Traffic (OfT) date. Further work is needed to validate elements of the schedule, particularly how schedule risk and opportunity is handled, and to ensure it is robust. - Further market engagement is required to validate some of the assumptions in the Commercial case, including the proposed commercial model. This engagement needs to target non-UK suppliers, verify the construction programme and validate the contracting strategy and procurement process - The concurrency of key dates for the procurement and DCO schedule are sensitive to one another. There is a risk around completing dialogue before close of DCO examination which is being considered as part of a review of the schedule Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - In March 2020 the Chancellor, as part of the Budget settlement, announced that the project would be fully publicly funded. It was previously announced in October 2018 that private funding would not be used to partly fund the project. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - A baseline (cost, schedule & risk) review of the project was undertaken in late 2019, which was approved by DfT in December 2019. - Further ground investigation have been undertaken to feed into the development of the projects schedule and cost assumptions | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - DCA is now Amber/Red due to effect of COVID-19 on operational readiness planning. - Recent IPA review of Key Output 1 readiness for service rated Key Output 1 as Amber/Red and recommended re-planning of benefit release to May 2021. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - COVID-19 has resulted in scarcity of planning personnel and inability to complete some readiness works on time. This has caused projected benefits release to be projected to be delayed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Pre COVID-19, industrial relations issues and impacts of extreme weather caused re-planning of some possessions required to complete infrastructure works. These were re-planned, but this used float within the project, reducing overall confidence in delivery. - Other activities remained projected to complete to tight schedule. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - At the time of reporting there was significant uncertainty around elements of programme scope relating to the Trans Pennine Route upgrade, caused by an exercise to re-evaluate costs and scope of the programme to align to the DfT funding envelope. This resulted in a decrease in delivery confidence for the whole programme, of which the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade was the next major element. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Since Q2 19/20 the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade has been separated from the North of England Programme and established as a standalone programme on the GMPP. The North of England Programme was closed from GMPP in December 2019, and therefore doesn't have a current DCA. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The key risks that justified the Amber/Red rating in Q2 1819 remained relevant in Q2 1920, including the risk of financial default on franchises; - Potential delays to the introduction of new rolling stock, with consequent impact on delivery of passenger benefits; - Potential legal challenge by bidder(s) and its impact on delivery of live projects. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Williams Rail Review. - The General Election purdah period impacting on ability to announce project outcomes. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Project teams have looked at options on potentially defaulting TOCs, considering whether a new shorter contract could be negotiated with operator(s) or whether the implementation of the Operator of Last Resort (OLR) should be enacted. On Northern, OLR was taken over operation of passenger services. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - All delivery milestones for the South West Route Capacity Programme, including then lengthening of platforms to accommodate 10-carriage train and the re-opening of the former Waterloo International Terminal (Platforms 20-24), have been completed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Department's response to the COVID-19 outbreak necessitated the temporary redeployment of staff. This has impacted the SWRC Programme in postponing its final assurance activity (the IPA Stage Gate 5 review). Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The completion of all delivery milestones has enabled the DCA rating of Amber/Green. - The continued engagement with Network Rail to support the quarterly reporting of financial data. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Network Rail infrastructure required to deliver the 22 trains per hour service has been delivered with the exception of relatively minor snagging works that do not impede an increase in timetabled operations and which are due to be completed by the end of 2020. - The Class 700 Thameslink train fleet has received updated software which will enable the operation of the Automatic Train Operation (ATO) system which will help offset the performance impacts of operating higher frequency services. - The timing of the 22tph Thameslink service increase has been delayed to enable resolution of the ATO software (now resolved) and the subsequent commencement of driver training. The impact of COVID-19 will delay driver training until a safe method can be developed and agreed by the industry. COVID-19 delays will be captured through a wider timetable strategy. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Due to COVID-19, timetable step- ups will have to be reviewed. Industry stakeholders are working collaboratively to plan the new timescales. - Due to COVID-19 and public health guidelines, a way forward needs to be agreed on how drivers can be trained and 2m distance cannot be kept while in the cab. This needs to be agreed with GTR and the unions. | Provision of narrative not possible due to prioritisation of Covid 19 response | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Amber DCA rating at Q2 1819 was in line with an external Gateway 3 review at FBC stage in May 2018. The DCA remained Amber at Q2 1920 to reflect the risks at the early stage of delivery of the Data Processing Services, following FBC approval in May 2019. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The time remaining in which to start, progress and / or, as applicable, complete: user engagement; to complete the contingency plans for the exit of one or more GPSoC Core suppliers from the market; to support an unknown number of new entrants to the framework; to implement the TOM, to get a robust baseline and approach for the benefits case; to hold the Red Lines on the framework; to keep to the current milestones for the FBC; to get funding for the affordability gap in the FBC. - The resource available to the programme with which to start, progress and / or, as applicable, complete: user engagement; to complete the contingency plans for the exit of one or more GPSoC Core suppliers from the market; to deal speedily with an unknown number of new entrants to the framework; to resource the Target Operating Model. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - There have been no non-project operating environment activities that have impacted the DCA. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - A greater than anticipated number of suppliers submitted a compliant bid to deliver services through the new framework. This resulted in a greater number of solutions needing to be assessed and assured by the programme. - The process of assessing and assuring suppliers' solutions as being compliant against the terms of the new framework was more complicated and time consuming than expected. This resulted in the end to end duration of each solutions' assessment and assurance journey taking longer than planned, impact the timescales in which Phase 1 transition activities could be completed. |
| Project - Start Date (Latest Approved Start Date) | 01/11/2018 | 30/06/2008 | 25/11/2015 | 01/03/2014 | 03/04/2012 | 01/05/2014 | 02/12/2009 | 01/09/2017 | 01/04/2017 | 01/04/2016 | 31/12/2015 | 01/05/2015 | 01/04/2012 | 01/04/2019 | 01/10/2016 | 13/01/2015 | 28/02/2017 | 16/11/2018 | 21/12/2017 | 01/04/2015 | 01/04/2017 | 01/05/2019 | 01/11/2014 | 08/05/2015 | 01/05/2014 | 09/05/2016 | 25/10/2016 | 01/09/2018 | 15/03/2005 | 01/04/2015 | 01/09/2012 | 01/12/2014 | 01/04/2015 | 22/07/2008 | 01/04/2014 | 30/11/2011 | 01/12/2011 | 01/07/2015 | 14/01/2009 | 01/06/2005 | 30/05/2014 | 01/01/2011 | 23/07/2009 | 15/01/2015 | 16/07/2012 | 01/07/2005 | 01/04/2016 | 23/02/2015 | 01/09/2016 |
| Project - End Date (Latest Approved End Date) | 31/05/2023 | 31/12/2040 | 31/03/2021 | 17/11/2023 | 31/08/2019 | 31/12/2022 | 31/12/2024 | 01/09/2019 | 31/03/2020 | 31/03/2020 | 31/03/2020 | 31/03/2036 | 31/03/2020 | 31/03/2022 | 01/04/2020 | 01/01/2022 | 31/03/2021 | 01/08/2023 | 31/03/2023 | 31/03/2023 | 01/12/2021 | 01/05/2021 | 30/04/2020 | 01/04/2021 | 25/02/2025 | 30/09/2019 | 30/09/2023 | 30/03/2020 | 31/08/2026 | 01/05/2028 | 30/09/2021 | 01/06/2028 | 01/04/2025 | Data Not Provided | 01/12/2023 | 30/06/2024 | 31/12/2024 | 31/12/2050 | 31/12/2033 | 04/06/2020 | 31/07/2028 | 31/12/2024 | 31/12/2022 | 14/09/2019 | 31/12/2019 | 31/12/2026 | 31/03/2021 | 31/03/2020 | 31/03/2023 |
| Departmental narrative on schedule, including any deviation from planned schedule (if necessary) | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/05/23, due primarily to the following factors; - End date is as per the previously approved Outline Business Case (OBC). - This will shift following the requirement to revisit the Programme scope and OBC. A revised end date is not known at point of submission. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/05/23, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Procurement activity in Q3 1920 was paused following the market feedback over the core terms of the DAS framework, the procurement route established by CCS for the purchasing of cloud based shared service platforms. - Due to this feedback and potential suppliers declining the opportunity to bid, the Programme took the decision to withdraw the procurement in December 2019 which has an impact on overall end date. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/05/23, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Procurement activity in Q3 1920 was paused following the decision to withdraw the procurement in December 2019. - The Programme has since been revisiting the Outline Business Case and conducting further analysis on the options for achieving the Programme’s desired outcomes. - The position as of Q4 1920: The Programme is working through material changes to its scope, following the departure of one of the original customers of the project, and consequently revising the schedule. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/40, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/40, due primarily to the following factors; - Schedule remains in line with the ambition to identify the location for, design and construct a geological disposal facility by the 2040's. - Delivery continues in line with the schedule, progressing as planned to secure approval to proceed with the current phase and development of the next phase, however progress is influenced by the levels of community engagement and pace of progress to form working groups. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/40, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The ambition remains, although there is ongoing uncertainty due to the volunteer approach and hence the location, geology and design for the facility. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/40, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Further engagement activity and pro-active stakeholder events are in progress to identify and encourage the next wave of interested communities in line with the project delivery ambitions. - Organisational transformation, strengthening of capability and capacity increase is in progress to meet the demands of the schedule. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/21, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/21, due primarily to the following factors; - This has now been updated in the Q4 GMPP to 31/03/2022 in line with the FBC. There have been no actions to change the end date of 31/03/2022. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/21, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The end date remains as set out in the approved FBC - 31/03/2022 Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/21, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - This has now been updated in the Q4 GMPP to 31/03/2022 in line with the FBC. There have been no actions to change the end date of 31/03/2022. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 17/11/23, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 17/11/23, due primarily to the following factors; - The current business case proposes extending Phase 1 for another year to put in place and test the delivery model. This will enable a more informed business case and delivery timeline to be developed. - The Programme is dependent on local authorities signing up for data analysis and migration. The refreshed pre-migration and early engagement strategies are designed to bring more LAs forward quicker. - Given the significant time to migrate an individual LA and the number of LAs, this Programme is likely to be a multi-year programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 17/11/23, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There is a reliance on local authorities (and/or their software suppliers) to be engaged and able to extract data from their current system, to feed into the early data analysis work. - This programme has a significant dependency on the LAs existing software suppliers to extract the data and transfer it to HMLR systems for analysis. As approval for the Programme is currently on an annual basis, suppliers are reluctant to investment in their systems to create more strategic and streamlined solutions. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 17/11/23, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Machine learning analytic tools, such as the Migration Helper, is already proving to reduce migration timelines, particularly for improving spatial data. - New delivery models have been designed to enable several local authorities to migrate concurrently and with more appropriate support. The engagement strategy, commercial strategy and internal team capabilities have been redesigned to align with this and speed up delivery. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/08/19, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/08/19, due primarily to the following factors; - The contract will terminate on the 31st August 2019 in line with the project plan and the 2017 Business case. - The Project End Date coincides with the end of the Contract with CFP. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/08/19, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - No actions have impacted the baseline project end date of 31/8/19. - The end date (31/8/19) aligns to the end of the contract with CFP. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/22, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/22, due primarily to the following factors; - Testing and trials period have been re-planned and prioritised to ensure the in service date remains as October 21. - The time between the ship going into service (October 21) and the project end date (December 22) the project team will work on closing down and undertaking a Gateway 5 before complete closure. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/24, has lengthened by 1461 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/20, due primarily to the following factors; - The Programme is on schedule to meet the commitment for every home and small business to be offered a Smart Meter by the end of 2020. - The updated 2019 Cost-Benefit Analysis includes an extended appraisal period so the Programme has consulted on the introduction of a new regulatory framework for energy suppliers that supports market-wide rollout of smart meters as soon as practicable. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - A thorough evaluation of the new regulatory framework consultation responses has been conducted. - The impact of COVID-19 is being considered with key stakeholders and assessed by the Programme. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/09/19, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/09/19, due primarily to the following factors; - No change | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/20 has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/20, due primarily to the following factors; - In March 2018 the Civil Service Board endorsed proposals to increase the scope of the Contract Management element of the programme from the top 500 contract managers (managing gold contracts) to all contract managers (managing gold, silver or bronze contracts). The end date was originally 31/3/2020 - but was revised to 31/03/2022 following this scope increase. - Following the Civil Service Board on 13/11/19, it has been agreed (subject to departments having the ability to require this, otherwise reliant on 'best practice / comply or explain') that Wider Government Bodies with over £100m annual 3rd party spend must ensure: - all new commercial appointees at Grade 7 and above to be accredited from April 2020; and - all their commercial staff at Grade 7 and above are accredited by March 2022 - The Wider Government Bodies project team are now working towards achieving these new targets within revised timelines. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/2020, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Departments experienced challenges in identifying their full target Contract Management populations and as a result, the progress made in the Contract Management space has been slower than originally anticipated. Brexit has impacted departments in their ability to put the identified individuals through learning and assessment - having to prioritise Brexit related work. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/2020, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Endorsement of new targets for Wider Government Bodies project: i) for all new commercial appointees at Grade 7 and above to be accredited from April 2020; and ii) all their commercial staff at Grade 7 and above are accredited by March 2022. - Endorsement of a recommendation that Accounting Officers should maintain a register of 'gold' and 'silver' contracts within their Department - including a named individual accredited contract owner. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/20, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/20, due primarily to the following factors; - At both FY Q2s, the project was largely on track to complete the programme's benefits, and be in a position to inform both GDS's strategic direction and future Business Cases for CTS and related services. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/20, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - See factors in the above response to 'Departmental Narrative 1 - Actions planned or taken on the IPA RAG rating'. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/20, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - As per the above responses, Covid-19 has directly and indirectly impacted the project. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/20, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/20, due primarily to the following factors; - At both FY Q2s, the project was largely on track to complete the programme's benefits, and be in a position to inform both GDS's strategic direction and future Business Cases for GaaP and related services Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/20, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Covid-19 has directly and indirectly impacted the project. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/36, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/36, due primarily to the following factors; - In the absence of an approved PBC and Mandate, work continues on the individual projects with no impact on the overall programme timeline. - The end date will not be reviewed until the latest iteration of the PBC is completed and approved. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/36, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - No change. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/20, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/20, due primarily to the following factors; - The end date has changed. Given the increase in COVID-driven demand and government services' short-term dependency on Verify, the Chief Secretary to HM Treasury agreed to extend Verify operations up to the end of September 2021. This was confirmed in a written ministerial statement on 29 April 2020 (see https://www.parliament. uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2020-04-29/HCWS217/). | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/22, due primarily to the following factors; - The end date is derived from the approved business case underpinned by a live delivery plan and the project end date remains the same. - The planning and recruitment for digital delivery had taken longer than planned but development was underway on the prioritised tactical solutions and design work had commenced on the new scalable digital solution. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/22, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The end date remains as stated in the approved business case, with investment funding being secured for FY20/21 Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/22, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The project end date remains the same. - On-going investment has been endorsed by the CCS Board for 20/21 to continue to enhance project delivery capability to support successful delivery - Release schedules for the 3 main components of the digital solution have now been defined and agreed, with the first release due Q3 2020. | The scheduled project end date at Q2 19-20 (30th September 2019) is 01/04/20, due primarily to the following factors; - A transition year (Phase 2) was agreed at the Government Security Steering Board, and the programme extended by a further year, with additional £8m funding from the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) assigned, which was confirmed in January 2020. Phase One of the Programme ended on 31 March 2020. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/04/20, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There were no external factors (better or worse) to impact the delivery of the TGS Programme Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/04/20, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There were no internal factors (better or worse) to impact the delivery of the TGS Programme | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/01/22, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/01/22, due primarily to the following factors; - The scheduled end date of the clearance events was May 2020, however the COVID-19 outbreak has impacted the final two events. Engineering work will continue as the programme approaches closure. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/22, has changed since last year’s Q2 1819 date of 31/03/2021, due primarily to the following factors; - The programme has been extended until 31 March 2022 - funding has been confirmed by HM Treasury and Business Case updated. This will allow for further trial time for the projects. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/2022, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Programme end date of 2022 allowing for further benefits realisation within the Programme life cycle. This can help to provide a more informed decision for any further Government involvement in 5G activity/development. - The impacts of COVID-19 on the programme and its projects timelines, scope of work, and budgets is being regularly assessed and mitigations being put in place. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/2022, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Programme extended to allow further time for project trials. Slower initiation than anticipated has been a trend across the majority of projects; in some cases, this is due to equipment availability/cost savings. | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/08/23, due primarily to the following factors; - The Third Licence expires in February 2023, followed by a 6-month project close down period. - Allows for up to 2 years transition period following the conclusion of the competition and award of Preferred Licensee. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/08/23, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The requirement to follow the HMT-led Treasury Approval Point (TAP) process, and specifically its deferral until after the March 2020 Budget, introduced a 3-month delay to the start of the competition. This action consumed programme contingency but the end date is unaltered. - The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the possibility of multiple lockdowns, increases the risk that competition processes have to be extended. Delaying the result of the competition will reduce the period for transition and increases the risk of having to extend the Third Licence. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/08/23, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Whilst waiting for TAP (Treasury Approval Point) to convene, we took opportunity to conduct further engagement with market and share more information to help potential applicants prepare their responses when competition started. - We have conducted an impact analysis on the programme schedule of various COVID-19 lockdown scenarios and have revised Business Continuity Plans to improve preparedness and resilience. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/23, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/23, due primarily to the following factors; - The dates of the Games are agreed with the Commonwealth Games Federation, Birmingham City Council, and other Games partners. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/23, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/23, due primarily to the following factors; - Following confirmation of the scope and location of the three new museum storage facilities, and Full Business Case approval for each construction project, key milestones for delivery to programme were identified, to deliver by the end date. - The three museums have prepared a co-ordinated plan for the decant of their collections from Blythe House to new storage facilities before the forecast programme end date. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/23, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The impact of the current Coronavirus outbreak will be assessed and scenario planning undertaken. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/23, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - A delay of 18 weeks to the Science Museum Group's construction programme was recorded in February 2020, with a consequent delay to the start of the decant from Blythe House, however, this could be accommodated within the programme end date. - The impact of the current Coronavirus outbreak will be assessed and scenario planning undertaken. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/12/21, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/12/21, due primarily to the following factors; - The scheduled programme end date is at 01/12/2021. - LFFN was set up as a pilot programme to stimulate the market . | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/05/21, due primarily to the following factors; - This is a pilot programme which is scheduled to end 01/05/2021. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/04/20, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 30/04/20, due primarily to the following factors; - Transition and initial deployment activities continued as planned. Activities include replacement of whole print estate, transformation of local and wide area networks, end user migrations to 0365 Tooling suite, Windows10 device rollout and data centre infrastructure migration. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/04/20, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Since 30.09.19, the programme has received immediate, medium and long term requirements in response to the COVID 19 outbreak Q4 19/20. This has led to elements of current deployments being reprioritised to support remote working arrangements across the Defra estate approx. 21k users. The impact of Covid-19 activates are being assessed and may impact the programme end date. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/04/21, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/04/21, due primarily to the following factors; - The Programme baseline end date remains 01/04/21. The programme remains on track to deliver the stated reforms within this timeframe. | At Q2 19-20 (30th September 2019) we forecasted the programme to be completed by Q1 24-25, with 90% of projects now scheduled to hand over by the end of 2021. 90% of projects are either complete, or construction is scheduled for completion in line with the baseline projection for the programme end date of December 2021 (allowing for a standard 12 months of defects liability period on the relevant construction works). The small percentage of cases (10%) which will be completed after December 2021 all have confirmed programmes for delivery, and just 5 projects are scheduled to complete after December 2022. | Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/09/19, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Internal readiness reviews resulted in the working assumption for Social Work England's go-live date being revised - primarily due to delays in the transfer of data from the existing regulator. Following a successful review in the period June-August 2019, and increased confidence in deliverability, a planned go-live date of 2/12/19, was made public. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/09/23, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 30/09/23, due primarily to the following factors; - We remain committed to the delivery of T Levels from September 2020 though the current Covid-19 circumstances bring additional challenges, particularly for providers and for employers who might offer industry placements. We will continue to provide all the support we can to our partners throughout this period. - We have spoken to a majority of the 50 2020 providers regarding T Level in September and will continue to monitor. Providers are positive overall, but it’s important to note that the full impact of the Covid 19 has yet to have full effect and this picture may shift in the coming weeks. - The delay to the approval of the Technical Qualifications originally posed a distinct threat to the September 2020 launch. These have since been approved by IfATE and Ofqual and are ahead of first teaching in September, eliminating what was one of the most significant risks to delivery | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/03/20, due primarily to the following factors; - The End Date for the Programme has been re-scheduled to 31 August 2020 to allow a review of operational service to be incorporated into the Gate 5 review. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/08/26, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/08/26, due primarily to the following factors; - The construction of the airport was completed on schedule with the airport receiving certification during May 2016. The St Helena air service has made a strong start since commencing on 14 October 2017. - The department hopes to close the project on completion of outstanding infrastructure works. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/08/26, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The COVID 19 pandemic has delayed the Department progressing the workstream that will find the most cost-effective way to bring outstanding capital works to completion. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/08/26, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The Department has focused its efforts to ensuring St Helena Government has the medical personnel and medical supplies it needs to respond to COVID 19. We return to this issue as soon as we have resources to do so. | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/05/28, due primarily to the following factors; - The schedule allows for design development and preparation of the submission to the Planning Inspector. This includes additional surveys, statutory consultation, and further design and assessment works. - After the design, under the planning act (2008), an application will be submitted to the Planning Inspector. The statutory timescales for a Development Consent Order are approximately 18 months - Once orders are received there will be a construction period starting in Summer 2023, scheduled for 4 years until Open for Traffic in Summer 2027. One year post opening assessment period is allowed for until Summer 2028. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/05/28, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The planning inspector letter on the Local plan was expected by March 31st 2020, however was published on May 19th 2020. This meant there was greater uncertainty for the project for this period while scoping surveys and making preparations for the start of preliminary design. - In addition, Covid-19 has impacted on the project schedule. Traffic counts were cancelled in March 2020 due to the reduced traffic as a result of Covid-19 mitigations. The project has put in place revised traffic modelling strategies to minimise the impact of this. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/05/28, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The project has implemented mitigations to respond to the impact of Covid-19, such as revised traffic modelling and a complete review of method statements to ensure activities being undertaken to progress the project are safe. - To ensure the project could progress as quickly as possible, two route proposals for Junctions 23 to 25 were progressed through Highways England governance processes (Normally this would be one route). This allowed the project additional time to wait for the Planning Inspector's letter whilst minimising the impact on schedule. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/09/21, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 30/09/21, due primarily to the following factors; - The completion date has not slipped due to the project being able to accurately re-sequence activities to mitigate delays, to drive improvements and to maximise productivity where opportunities have been presented. - Innovative ways of working to drive improvements have been actively promoted on the project including: locating site batching plants on-site; collaborative and production based work scheduling; and project dedicated resources to promote productivity and lean initiatives. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/09/21, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There has been no change to the baseline project end date; despite some weather events in 19/20 the project has been able to maintain its programme. This is due to the continuous reviews of programme and critical path analysis. The project has applied mitigation measures and the use of collaboration and lean methodology adding confidence to the achieve the projects forecasted end date. - The project successfully opened for traffic ahead of schedule in May 2020 with the works to Huntingdon town centre progressing well, adding confidence to the achieve the project's end date. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/06/28, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/06/28, due primarily to the following factors; - The key risk regarding the delivery of the project related to funding certainty which impacted the likelihood of the scheme going ahead rather than its completion date. This certainty was provided in March 2020 in the Budget. - The project schedule was fully assessed and rebaselined during the approval process to HM Treasury, notwithstanding any issues beyond the control of the project, the original project end date was seen to be viable at Q2 1920. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/06/28, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Despite Treasury approval of the project in Oct 19, BREXIT and the subsequent General Election delayed a statement of funding certainty being released until the March 20 Budget Statement. This has required a project rebaseline which has injected a delay of approx. 6 months to the project. - The Secretary of State DCO decision has now been confirmed as delayed until 17 July 2020 and a further re-plan is required to factor in this delay as the DCO decision is on the projects critical path. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/06/28, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Project rebaselining activity to accommodate slippage to the HMT Funding Announcement. - Further project rebaselining to accommodate current delay to Secretary of State DCO decision. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/04/25, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/04/25, due primarily to the following factors; - Formal mobilisation of RDP has commenced meaning that the production of the detailed design will run in parallel with the DCO allowing construction to begin early in 2022. The construction period remains unchanged. - The project schedule has been fully assessed and baselined. The project is currently undergoing budget setting with the contractor and once this work is completed a further review of the schedule can be undertaken. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/04/25, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The impact of Covid19 on the completion of environmental surveys and archaeological trial trenching may result in a delay to the DCO submission. The project team are assessing ways of mitigating this risk Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/04/25, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Additional targeted consultation will be carried out to seek stakeholder views on a number of areas highlighted in the review of "buildability". This is scheduled for summer 2020 and the results will be fed into the DCO submission. This consultation will be "virtual" given the Covid 19 pandemic. - Covid 19 has resulted in one instance when site operations where closed for a week due to a staff member testing positive. Schedule impacts are being mitigated and future impacts being considered as pandemic restrictions develop and/or change. | Data not Provided - At the November 2019 CRL Board CRL announced a slippage to the revised 6-month opening window for the central section (Stage 3: Paddington to Abbey Wood – excluding Bond Street) stating that the range of opening dates were now between February 2021 - November 2021 with a mid-point of Summer 2021. The CRL Chairman told the TfL Board in June 2020 that he still expects the central section to open in Summer 2021. Stage 5 completion, with services running from Shenfield and Abbey Wood out to Reading and Heathrow, is expected to be 12 months later. - Pre Covid-19: CRL stated that they believe that the Stage 3 opening of the central section in Summer 2021 is still achievable - though this is tight and could impact delivery dates of full services. CRL reported that their internal Trial Running target date 23 September 2020 is under pressure. In March 2020, CRL reported that the achievability of their Trial Running target date is at risk of slipping by between 1 to 3 months, Trial Running would, at the earliest, commence on 12 October 2020. Issues affecting the deadline include the quality, requirements and timeline of the assurance submissions. - In an attempt to add greater focus on coordination and delivery of the project, CRL added an additional member to their executive team which means there is now a chief programme office and chief project officer in an attempt to increase productivity and delivery. TfL have established an Elizabeth Line readiness Board to focus on bringing transforming Crossrail into a Operational Tube Line. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/12/23, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/12/23, due primarily to the following factors; - At Q2 19/20, all of the projects that enable the new East Coast timetable to be introduced were forecast to be completed at least six months before the timetable change date. - A planning group has been established to develop the new East Coast timetable and at Q2 19/20 its work was proceeding to schedule. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/12/23, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Although COVID-19 will delay engineering works and is likely to delay the introduction of the new East Coast timetable, the Programme's end date is defined by the completion of power supply upgrades. These upgrades could still be completed in 2023, meaning the Programme's end date remains achievable. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/12/23, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The project needs to be replan the delivery of the engineering works delayed as a result of COVID-19 and confirm when the new East Coast Main Line timetable will be implemented. - The project is liaising with power distribution companies to confirm the timescales for completion of the new connections that are needed to the National Grid. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/06/24, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 30/06/24, due primarily to the following factors; - While the end date has not formally changed the need to determine final target cost and impact on project scope, costs and schedule means this date is under pressure and is very likely to change. - There was also a need to establish the outcome of Transport Works Act Order consents and the potential impact this may have had on planned seasonal environmental work which have continued as scheduled. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/06/24, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The potential impact of COVID 19 on works and programme schedules is still being assessed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/06/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The impact of activities and changes to the delivery of the programme following review, cost challenge, negotiations and scrutiny to agree the final target price will require re-baselining of project delivery dates. - Engagement with High Speed 2 Ltd continue in order to work through project dependencies and to de risk the potential impact on project works to remain on planned schedules. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/24, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/24, due primarily to the following factors; - There has been no change to the forecast or baseline end date. - GWRM is a programme of works, and no scope changes have taken place that would affect the forecast or baseline end date. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There has been no change to the forecast or baseline end date. - GWRM is a programme of works, and no scope changes have taken place that would affect the forecast or baseline end date. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/50, has lengthened by 7670 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/29, due primarily to the following factors; - The Project End Date baseline was updated to reflect Heathrow’s decision to phase terminal capacity expansion and other development works over a longer time period (up to 2050) to manage costs and build terminal capacity in line with demand growth. - The ANPS stated there was a need for Heathrow to deliver new airport capacity (an operational runway) by 2030. The actual delivery date will be dependent on Heathrow's timescales (the target date as of Jan 2020 for an operational runway was 2028/29, although it was recognised that this was becoming increasingly challenging to deliver the runway to this timescale given the scale and complexity of the project. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/50, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - On 27th February 2020 the Court of Appeal ruled that when designating the Airports National Policy Statement (ANPS), the previous Government did not take account of the Paris Agreement, non-CO2 emissions and emissions post-2050. The ANPS has no legal effect until reviewed by the Government under the Planning Act 2008. - All reporting on the programme was paused and has not changed since the Court of Appeal's ruling of the ANPS on 27th February 2020. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/50, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There have been no further change to the rebaselined project end date. - Following the publication of the CAA position on Cat C costs, Heathrow confirmed in January 2020 that their schedule for the opening of the runway had been delayed for 2 years to 2028-29. This was to reflect the need to phase the costs over a longer period. HEP were awaiting further clarification of Heathrow's detailed schedule. - All reporting on the programme was paused and has not changed since the Court of Appeal's ruling of the ANPS on 27th February 2020. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/33, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/33, due primarily to the following factors; - Schedule pressures had emerged over the course of the year and the HS2 Chairman had published a stocktake report indicating that the Company no longer believed it could deliver the programme to the current schedule target. - However, a revised baseline had not been adopted while Government carried out the Oakervee Review and considered how to proceed with the programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/33, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - It is too early to determine the impact of COVID-19 on the schedule dates. There is some contingency in the current target dates for Phase 1, which may be able to absorb a certain level of delay. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/33, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - A revised funding regime and incentivisation framework has been agreed between Government and HS2 Ltd and this has revised the target date for delivery of Phase 1. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 04/06/20, has lengthened by 119 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 06/02/20, due primarily to the following factors; - The Department entered a new agreement with the Train Service Provider setting a new project end date of June 2020 to provide time to resolve electromagnetic interference issues and to facilitate later entry into service of the East Coast fleet. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 04/06/20, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - COVID-19 and related social distancing measures have impacted the planned roll out of the remaining 9 trains. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 04/06/20, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Lockdown and implementation of social distancing measures have impacted manufacturing productivity, the Department is working closely with stakeholders to mitigate the effects on the programme. Challenges remain around benefits realisation including the need to improve train performance and completing the full roll-out of the fleet on the East Coast expected in Autumn 2020. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/07/28, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/07/28, due primarily to the following factors; - Certainty of RIS 2 funding and confirmation of funding to replace that which was to be privately financed - Following the removal of the constraints imposed by being partly privately funded (including contract packaging) the project has updated, strengthened and externally assured our Commercial Procurement Strategy which de-risks the schedule. - The outcome of market engagement which will confirm if our assumptions regarding timescales and cost are realistic for the tunnelling work Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/07/28, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The corona virus pandemic is impacting on project delivery. We have implemented business continuity plans and our IT platforms allow office staff to effectively work at home. However Covid-19 prevention measures are impacting on ground investigation and other early works. There are also indirect consequences on the schedule as a result of the effect on the construction market which are likely to affect the procurement process. - The project have introduced a baseline schedule range of December 2027 to November 2028. The likely project end date is 7 months after this to accommodate project close down activities. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/07/28, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - A full review of the schedule is underway to validate the likely project timeline given a number of factors including the impact of Covid 19. The outcome of this work is expected in summer 2020. - As part of the review of the schedule we are considering the timing of the main works procurements as compared to the DCO examination and award dates. This is to derisk the procurement activity by providing sufficient certainty to bidders | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/24, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/24, due primarily to the following factors; - Key Output 1a of the MML programme is being replanned and examined, final completion date has not formally been changed but programme remains in replanning. - Due to COVID-19, Key Output 1 benefit release being replanned for May 2021 currently, dependent on COVID-19 impacts. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/24, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - COVID-19 has delayed the benefit release date for Key Output 1, replanning being undertaken to ascertain realistic new date for benefit realisation. This was planned for December 2020, currently working towards May 2021 timetable for benefit realisation. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Key Output 1a of the MML programme is being replanned and examined, final completion date has not formally been changed but programme remains in replanning. - Due to COVID-19, Key Output 1 benefit release being replanned for May 2021 currently, dependent on COVID-19 impacts. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/22, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/22, due primarily to the following factors; - At the time of reporting the programme had completed a number of significant milestones and was on track to complete delivery in line with its completion date. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/22, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Since Q2 19/20 the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade has been separated from the North of England Programme and established as a standalone programme on the GMPP. The North of England Programme was closed from GMPP in December 2019. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 14/09/19, has lengthened by 167 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/19, due primarily to the following factors; - Given the nature of the Rail Franchising Programme, Passenger Services and IPA agreed to use the most advanced project to report on delivery Milestones. In Q2 1819 Q2 this was South Eastern Project with end date of 31/03/2019. The reason for the 167 day increase is that in Q2 1920 the most advanced project was West Coast Partnership with an end date of 14/09/2019. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/19, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/19, due primarily to the following factors; - There has been no change in scope for the Programme and no new milestones . - All delivery milestones have been completed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/19, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The continual engagement between the Department for Transport and Network Rail has enabled the baseline project end date to be met (for Delivery milestones). - The revisiting of benefits management plans which align with the baseline project end date. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/26, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/26, due primarily to the following factors; - The assumptions about completion of the project did not change during this period. The Network Rail infrastructure required to deliver the end state Thameslink service has all been delivered, with the exception of some snagging works that are due to be completed by the end of 2020. These works will have no impact on operations or the wider programme. - Currently all Class 700 units have the up to date software required to enable automatic train operation which is needed for end state TLP delivery. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/26, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The project is currently reviewing requirements for a system to support high capacity services for the operation of the Thameslink end state timetable across 4 rail networks in the south east. Work is being undertaken to refine the scope and delivery plans to enable further step-ups in Thameslink services. The end date of December 2026 remains valid for delivery of the planned operational benefits. - All other infrastructure and rolling stock required have already been delivered or will be in place by this date. | Provision of narrative not possible due to prioritisation of Covid 19 response | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/20, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/20, due primarily to the following factors; - The baseline end date at Q2 1819 and Q2 1920 was 31/03/20, in line with the FBC. | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/23, due primarily to the following factors; - There are currently no factors which are impacting the programme end date |
| Financial Year Baseline (£m) (including Non-Government Costs) | £32.24 | £46.52 | £86.60 | £32.50 | £198.00 | £68.00 | £1,065.90 | £3.00 | £2.30 | £4.96 | £17.00 | £19.08 | £3.00 | £8.23 | £12.50 | £156.00 | £67.40 | £7.84 | £63.36 | £77.70 | £132.40 | £79.50 | £140.30 | £2,470.01 | £740.80 | £6.59 | £105.60 | £11.00 | £3.90 | £12.98 | £401.00 | £39.70 | £11.02 | £1,137.70 | £208.80 | £112.10 | £289.00 | £9.38 | £3,732.50 | £38.46 | £165.00 | £299.30 | £753.00 | £3.17 | £49.42 | £84.10 | £9.71 | £12.11 | £35.99 |
| Financial Year Forecast (£m) (including Non-Government Costs) | £32.24 | £46.52 | £66.90 | £7.00 | £192.00 | £64.50 | £1,065.90 | £3.00 | £3.13 | £1.30 | £12.00 | £19.08 | £17.90 | £7.85 | £12.50 | £94.20 | £37.70 | £13.21 | £34.97 | £95.69 | £82.02 | £41.06 | £142.70 | £2,183.00 | £716.22 | £11.00 | £123.60 | £11.14 | £4.54 | £12.98 | £323.20 | £39.70 | £19.30 | £1,131.20 | £166.70 | £100.00 | £324.00 | £9.38 | £2,784.70 | £38.11 | £165.00 | £288.34 | £251.00 | £2.12 | £34.16 | £169.20 | £8.48 | £12.84 | £50.95 |
| Financial Year Variance (%) | 0% | 0% | -23% | -78% | -3% | -5% | 0% | 0% | 36% | -74% | -29% | 0% | 497% | -5% | 0% | -40% | -44% | 68% | -45% | 23% | -38% | -48% | 2% | -12% | -3% | 67% | 17% | 1% | 16% | 0% | -19% | 0% | 75% | -1% | -20% | -11% | 12% | 0% | -25% | -1% | 0% | -4% | -67% | -33% | -31% | 101% | -13% | 6% | 42% |
| TOTAL Baseline Whole Life Costs (£m) (including Non-Government Costs) | £423.92 | £12,743.00 | £375.90 | £193.30 | £2,782.00 | £1,403.00 | £20,136.95 | £5.00 | £11.70 | £44.19 | £90.00 | £564.10 | £206.10 | £28.34 | £31.04 | £595.00 | £232.75 | £64.34 | £777.92 | £210.24 | £321.10 | £212.80 | £1,067.60 | £11,347.41 | £2,398.50 | £21.31 | £155.60 | £125.61 | £445.72 | £1,145.37 | £1,435.30 | £1,919.90 | £809.98 | £17,630.90 | £1,040.40 | £1,091.50 | £5,007.00 | £32,607.78 | £55,700.00 | £6,445.73 | £6,052.20 | £1,671.20 | £5,849.00 | £24.47 | £817.70 | £7,269.40 | £33.36 | £69.50 | £423.00 |
| Departmental narrative on budget/forecast variance for 2018/19 (if variance is more than 5%) | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -23%, is due primarily to the following factors; - A review of the initial takeup of the project's loan product resulted in an adjustment of the project's non-fiscal whole-life spend profile. - There was a requirement to adjust some notional income total charges to reflect an updated project term. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -23%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The primary challenge has been a lower than projected number of applications from projects seeking project loans (non-fiscal funding). A number of steps have been taken since to improve take-up, including a downward revision to the project loan rate. - As a nascent market the early growth in the number of applications hasn't been in line with the FBC projections for the first year of the scheme, however that is changing as we are starting to see increased interest in the latter part of the FY. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -23%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The recent 2020 budget confirmed the transfer of £36m of non-fiscal spend from 19/20 to 21/22, which also confirmed the full project funding to 21/22 - The transfer of £17m of fiscal budget from 19/20 to 20/21 was confirmed via the supplementary estimate process, and as a result allows the projects to retain its overall spend envelope. ? | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -78%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The baseline is based on the OBC approved in September 2015. The Programme has since submitted a full PBC, but due to general election delays, were advised in November 2017 to identify lower cost and more targeted solutions of migrating LAs. Since, funding has been on a phased basis. - The original approved Phase 1 spend was £15m to cover the 15 months to March 19 and at the end of this period HMLR was approved to extend the Phase 1 period to 19/20 to complete up to 16 Local Authorities. - Actual spend has been significantly below the OBC assumption which assumed the Programme would be in full flight with a significant number of suppliers on board and migrating c70 Local Authorities in 19/20. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -78%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - Despite good progress being made in 19/20, LA migration was much slower than expected and the cumulative number of live migrated LAs at the end of March 20 was 9 compared to the forecast at Q2 of 15. Consequently, this has led to some lower costs e.g. LA burdens payments. - Actual spend with suppliers in 19/20 has also been lower than forecast at Q2 due to issues with LA data quality, the need for some work to be completed in house and also delays in signing contracts with some incumbent suppliers. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -78%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Whilst unlikely to have a material impact in 19/20, the Programme has been working to design a new operating model, capable of increasing the pace of delivery while lowering costs i.e. industrialisation of the migration process. - The Programme has reflected on the learning from Phase 1 to date and has increased the amount of skilled and experience resource on the Programme specifically in the areas of pre-market engagement, plus additional Contract and Supplier Manager roles. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -5%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The project forecast remains on target. | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 36%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The 0.83m in year variance simply reflects the slight increase in this years budget. The original budget plan for the 19/20 excluded overheads such as estate costs but these were included as part of the actual 2019/20 budget bid. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 36%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - Increase of the Government Commercial Function Communications budget - enabling to bring together members of the function, sharing best practice and ability to build on the ethos of a cross-government function - The increased budget also included delivery of Government Commercial Function Blueprints within central government departments - allowing HM Treasury, Permanent Secretaries and the Government Commercial Organisation to have a visibility of departments 3 year commercial plans Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 36%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The Grade 7 Commercial Leads programme was delayed in 2018/19 and the green light for the project to go ahead was only given in 2019/20 by HM Treasury. This impacted the 2019/20 original forecast budget. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -74%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Fewer new CTS products and services have been developed over the life of the programme than were envisaged in the original baseline so whole life costs are lower Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -74%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - This variance has stayed largely unchanged Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -74%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The variance figure has stayed broadly static in this period. Recruitment times, attrition rates, and an active effort to replace contractors with permanent staff have provided minor variation | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -29%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Fewer new GaaP products have been developed over the life of the programme than were envisaged in the original baseline so whole life costs are lower Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -29%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - This variance has stayed largely unchanged Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -29%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The variance figure has stayed broadly the same in this period - Recruitment times, attrition rates, and an active effort to replace contractors with permanent staff have provided minor variation. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 47%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The in-year variance is largely due to: the cost of identity creation not becoming cost neutral to GDS; and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which led many more people than predicted to create and use Verify accounts to access government services online. | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -40%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The programme has identified whole life savings against the SR2015 Funding Profile of over £200m and forecast costs have been reprofiled to reflect the current requirements. - Budget savings have been made against all areas of delivery specifically the infrastructure clearance, viewer support and PMSE costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -40%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The COVID-19 virus has caused the infrastructure programme to be delayed, extending the viewer support programme and slipping some costs into 2020-21. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -44%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Delays experienced in initiating projects; Purdah delayed project initiation for Rural Connected Communities and Industrial 5G due to being unable to engage in any commercial activity. - WM5G - project has underspent (slippages in timescales). - Security - initiation of the Security project has been delayed significantly, and the project has not spent against forecast. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -44%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - Purdah - inability to progress announcements/commercial has moved timelines back, resulting in a spend that is lower than forecasted. - The impacts of COVID-19 on the programme and its projects timelines, scope of work, and budgets is being regularly assessed and mitigations being put in place Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -44%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - WM5G - project has underspent (slippages in timescales). - Security - initiation of the Security project has been delayed significantly, and the project has not spent against forecast. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 68%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Rescoped commercial strategy and approach in terms of the nature of the competition we were seeking to generate. Took opportunity to explore wider sources of investment capital and interest in the competition in the finance and technology sectors. - Appointment of Rothschild & Co (R&Co) as lead advisor to engage with the market, and changes to scope and timing of other contractors work. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 68%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Improved programme and financial controls have been implemented to ensure the programme stays within the uplifted budget. - Gambling Commission appointed a permanent Chief Financial Officer and internal auditors have reviewed in-year costs and future budget estimates (in Outline Business Case). | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -45%, is due primarily to the following factors; - A change in the timing of the expected spend on the Alexander Stadium, with less spend expected in 19/20 than originally forecast. The overall cost of the stadium project remains in line with original expectations. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -45%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The forecast was revised following a full review of the Alexander Stadium project which resulted a change to the timing of expected spend, with less spend expected in 19/20 than originally envisaged. - The overall cost of the Alexander Stadium project remains in line with original expectations. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 23%, is due primarily to the following factors; - This variance does not represent a change in overall programme spend, but reflects the management of grant in aid drawdown from year to year. The in-year forecast spend represents anticipated expenditure on the Blythe House project, while the baseline represents what is being drawn down in grant-in-aid funding. - There is an arrangement whereby the museums can draw down the grant-in-aid funding for non-Blythe House project expenditure, and 'repay' it to the project in future years, as has happened in Q2 1920. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 23%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The impact of the current Coronavirus outbreak will be assessed and scenario planning undertaken. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 23%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - There is an arrangement whereby the museums can draw down the grant-in-aid funding for non-Blythe House project expenditure, and 'repay' it to the project in future years. - The impact of the current Coronavirus outbreak will be assessed and scenario planning undertaken. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -38%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Slower than budgeted local authority procurement and readiness to pass BDUK project assurance which has delayed delivery. - Projects were delayed because of an overbuild issue which required ministerial approval before they could proceed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -38%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The December election and the purdah period meant no new contracts could be committed to which has delayed delivery. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -38%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - There has been a continuation of the issues from Q2 which have been mitigated through greater BDUK involvement with the local authorities and a greater focus on project readiness in the project selection process. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -48%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The RGC programme transition from setup to delivery has been slower than expected. - Hubs have received a high level of applications but most have proved to be ineligible sites slowing the approval process. - Rural Vouchers are demand led and the takeup has been lower than budgeted. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -48%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The December election and the Purdah period meant no new contracts could be committed to which has delayed delivery. - The Scottish R100 project has delayed BDUK projects in Scotland as Openreach has focused on those projects. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -12%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The budget itself of £2,470m was set in 2015, ahead of the apprenticeships reforms in 2017, and since then there have been a number of external factors that has impacted on the scale and demand for apprenticeships across the country that fall within a range that was expected when the original budget was set. Spending on the apprenticeship programme is demand led, and employers can choose which apprenticeships they offer, how many and when. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -12%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The lower spend reflects a number of different factors, including the demand for apprenticeships from employers resulting in lower levels of starts than originally anticipated. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -12%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The apprenticeships service being implemented as a minimum viable service (MVS) | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 67%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Baseline costs were taken from the final business case, which provided the expected costs of implementation at a point in time. Costs were subsequently recalculated up to the point at which SWE was expected to "go live" – the “go live” date was confirmed during Q2 19-20 as 2 December 2019. - Capital costs were above baseline due to additional digital requirements, as well as costs associated with premises outside the DfE estate. Additional DfE staff costs were not readily identifiable within the DfE system, so some modelling was implemented to arrive at an estimate for these costs. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 17%, is due primarily to the following factors; - In September 2019, an updated Strategic Overarching Business Case (SOBC) was drafted and submitted to the DFE Investment Committee. During this process we worked with all the different teams delivering the T Level elements and conducted a full review of the budgets required. During this process it was identified the budgets in the original SOBC and GMPP report had changed as the scope and delivery on the work had been agreed. The budgets were updated to reflect the latest figures. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 17%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The Cabinet Office advised our communication campaign colleagues to turn off the social media advertising in March 20, due to COVID-19. This led to an underspend in Financial Year 19-20. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 17%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The delay in agreeing the first TQ has meant some of the networking events were delayed into financial year 20-21. This has caused an underspend in Financial Year 19-20. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 16%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The Department commissioned a review of the outstanding infrastructure works and are considering options for the best value for money conclusion to this final part of the project following the principle contractor’s financial difficulties and the subsequent termination of the contract. - The project has continued to incur capital costs to complete key aspects of the associated infrastructure including the Bulk Fuel Installation. The project costs remain within the approved budget. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 16%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The COVID 19 pandemic has stopped the Department progressing the workstream that will find the most cost-effective way to bring outstanding capital works to completion. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 16%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The Department has focused its efforts to ensuring St Helena Government has the medical personnel and medical supplies it needs to respond to COVID 19. We return to this issue as soon as we have resources to do so. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -19%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The project spend was brought forward earlier in the year than originally planned to support for the road opening to traffic ahead of the publicly committed date of December 2020. This in year reduced cost does not affect the overall scheme cost. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -19%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The project did not spend the forecasted £323m in 19/20 financial year due to extreme wet weather which reduced productivity on activities, such as earthworks, pavements and landscaping. This resulted in some activities being postponed to 20/21 where they could be delivered efficiently without an adverse effect on the scheme opening for traffic. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -19%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Earthworks, pavements and landscaping were adversely affected by extreme wet weather. The project decided to focus on delivering assets required to enable open for traffic as soon in Spring 2020 as possible. - These works were assessed and postponed to 20/21 due to the exceptionally adverse weather. Assessments were made to ensure that these postponed works could be efficiently be delivered after open for traffic. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 75%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The 2019-20 forecast increased from £11.02m to £19.3m as a result of delays to the Preferred Route Announcement in the previous financial year and reprofiling of future funds to allow the project to progress archaeological and ground investigation works and derisk the project. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 75%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The delay to the Preferred Route Announcement further delayed activities which were undertaken in 19/20. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 75%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - To inform the Development Consent Order, early contractor involvement has been built into the forecast as this will reduce risk and provide increased confidence in the proposed solution. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -20%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Contracts for power supply upgrades were due to be awarded in August 2019 but this was delayed until 2020 because the tender prices received were higher than expected and further contract negotiations were needed. - The 19/20 in-year forecast underspend would have been greater than 20% but the Stevenage turnback project has been accelerated, bringing forward those costs from 20/21. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -20%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The variance has not been affected by non-project operating environment activities. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -20%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Since Q2, project team revisions to forecast costs have reduced the Programme-level variance for the year to an underspend of 17%. - Funding was approved in December 2019 to enable power supply upgrade enabling works to start ahead of full contract award and reduce the in-year underspend. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -11%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The estimated forecasts were amended to reflect 2019 spending review settlements approved at mid year. - Some activities did not take place due to the slippage in receiving planning consents resulting in some variance against forecasts Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -11%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The Transport Work Act Order was granted later than expected with consents being received in Q4, which pushed some 2019/20 activities into 2020/21 year, meaning there was some underspend in the 19/20 financial year. These activities will be picked up in the 20/21 financial year. - Further variances may occur due to the outcome of final target cost price negotiations and the need to rebaseline project costs. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 12%, is due primarily to the following factors; - £53.6m of the variance is due to GWEp cost escalation on account of prolongation of works in Severn Tunnel and Cardiff electrification. - Bristol East Junction costs have also increased as Network Rail have now completed the Single Option Development stage. - Offsetting these increases have been in-year cost decreases to a number of projects within the programme either been reduced in cost or reprofiled. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 12%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - A further reprofiling of Great Western electrification costs by Network Rail has resulted in in-year costs dropping below the original baseline, as contingency costs are now accounted for in later years due to not being spent in 19/20. - NR are now undertaking closure activities and concluding contractual arrangements with contractors. This is likely to have an impact on forecasted costs, however, it is too early yet to say what this impact will be. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -25%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The Baseline budget was set against Baseline 7.0 for Phase One. The programme assumptions at that time assumed a ramp up of Phase One programme activity to support Notice to Proceed. As this milestone was revised this resulted in a revised forecast spend in the financial year. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -25%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - With the Notice to Proceed decision for Phase One (originally scheduled for December 2019) under review, contractor mobilisation activities and procurements, such as ordering tunnel boring machines, were deferred, resulting in significant underspend throughout 2019/20. | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -67%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Delivery of programme scope relating to the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade was delayed as the programme underwent an exercise to re-evaluate costs and scope of the programme to align to the DfT funding envelope. Spend associated with that delivery was therefore also delayed, resulting in reduced spend in this reporting period. - Some smaller schemes within the programme were also delayed or descoped, resulting in a reduced spend. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -67%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Since Q2 1920 the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade has been established as a standalone programme on the GMPP, and now reports separately to the North of England Programme. As a result in year costs for the North of England Programme have decreased. The North of England Programme has been closed. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -33%, is due primarily to the following factors; - This data references a single project, West Coast Partnership competition, for which the baseline cost envisaged a piece of risk adjustment work that proved not to be necessary. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -31%, is due primarily to the following factors; - A review of costs was undertaken with Network Rail. It identified that the Programme was previously reporting unrelated costs. These were removed and the corrected costs displayed a variance of negative 31%. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -31%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The DfT Wessex Programme Client and Network Rail Sponsor held regular finance meetings reviewing reported costs. This enabled the removal of costs unrelated to the SWRC Programme from the GMPP reports supporting the variance of -31%. - Network Rail have implemented changes to their Finance Reporting System which has improved their ability to report accurate costs to the Department for Transport. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 101%, is due primarily to the following factors; - There has been an increase in infrastructure costs, which have required further funds to be allocated, this increase is mainly down to cable troughing at London Bridge and slippage to closing down the Network Rail Programme. - There has also been slippage in the close down of the Network Rail due to closing down the Network Rail Programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 101%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Additional London Bridge cable troughing works were required which required additional funds to be allocated for 2020/21 and 2021/22. The overall cost remained the same as a result of release of contingency. - Development of the planned Thameslink traffic management system has taken longer than anticipated and required a reallocation from 2019/20 to 2020/21 and 2021/22. | Provision of narrative not possible due to prioritisation of Covid 19 response | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 6%, is due primarily to the following factors; - At Q2 1920, there was an increase of £0.7m due to additional planned development work on the Data Processing Services. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 42%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Additional programme spend to complete procurement and deliver against the Secretary of State tech vision. Note that these were all reflected in the programme's Full Business Case which was approves by HMT and Cabinet Office in October 2019. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 42%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - There has been no non-project operating environment impact to the Q2 1920 baseline / forecast variance of 42%. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 42%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - There has been no further project operating environment impacts to the Q2 1920 baseline / forecast variance of 42%. |
| Departmental Narrative on Budgeted Whole Life Costs | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £423.92 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The Whole Life Cost is made up of the following: business transformation, change management, solution development, license, support & hardware, system transition licensing, application support, retained function costs, and shared services overheads. - Whole Life Costs for the Programme will be revised following the requirement to revisit the Programme scope and OBC. Revised costs are not known at point of submission. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £423.92 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - No non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £423.92 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The position as of Q4 1920: The Programme is working through material changes to its scope following notification from one of the key customers of their intent to leave the Programme and focus on an independent solution as a result of prioritising aspects of their own wider transformation programme. - Whole Life Costs for the Programme will be revised following the requirement to revisit the Programme scope and subsequent Outline Business Case. Revised costs are not known at point of submission. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £12,743.00 m, has increased by £399.04 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £12,343.96 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The increase in costs since last year are primarily down to inflation and revised assumptions during the siting and construction phases. All figures are provided in real rather than nominal values due to the long timescales associated with this programme. - It does not include any provision for waste disposal from a new nuclear build programme, as this will be funded by new nuclear operators. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £12,743.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The Whole Life Cost figure represents the estimated cost of designing, constructing and operating the GDF out to the 2130s. Note that the figure reported here only relates to a GDF for legacy waste and waste arising from the existing fleet of nuclear reactors. - In line with other Government programmes at an early stage of development, the estimate does not include any allowance for risk, uncertainty or optimism bias. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £12,743.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The Business Case to proceed with community engagement, disbursement and site evaluation has received approval and has commenced. - The next phase of the programme which will include geological characterisation, community engagement, solution development, technical design, delivery partner engagement and early procurements is in the early stages of development which will inform the Whole Life Cost. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £375.90 m, has increased by £4.10 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £371.80 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Whilst the project ends on the 30/03/2022 the Delivery Partner is contracted beyond this date to complete funding and carry out monitoring and reporting of successful projects. The costs for this (£3.6m) were included in the Q2 report Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £375.90 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The £375.9m baseline remains the same reflecting the rescheduling of funding mentioned above. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £375.90 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The £375.9m baseline remains the same reflecting the rescheduling of funding mentioned above. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £193.30 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £193.30 m, due primarily to the following factors; - As mentioned in section 3, the baseline represents the last approved business case being the OBC from September 2015. Since then the Programme has submitted a full PBC, but this was not approved and therefore the Programme full life baseline has not been able to be refreshed. - The Programme funding approvals have been on a phased basis demonstrating lessons learnt over a smaller number of LAs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £193.30 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The baselines at Q2 were unchanged for the reasons outlined above. - The full assessment of the impact of Covid-19 on the delivery of the Programme and associated costs has yet to be undertaken. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £193.30 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The Programme is looking to refine the time, costs and income estimates including delivery costs and potential sales volumes, based on a deeper understanding of the data in LAs and the steps required to improve it. - The work the Programme is undertaking now and into the next financial year will give greater clarity on the risks and opportunities to the costs, benefits and delivery approach in order to refresh the full PBC during late 2020. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £2,782.00 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £2,782.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The baseline cost totalling of £2,782M reflects the HMT / BEIS approved business case for the scope of the Termination Contract in 2017. - The cost outturn for the contract at £2,843M is £61M (2%) higher than the 2017 business case due to additional contract scope, mainly associated with additional nuclear waste and asbestos. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £2,782.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The total contract spend variance of £61M relates mainly to the 2018/19 financial year, where the annual variance is £63M. This includes additional funds provided to Magnox of £42M to meet the NDA's contractual obligations to fund all the scope agreed in August 2017, plus £21M for additional NDA approved contract scope associated with additional waste and asbestos. Agreed with HMG prior to funding release. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,403.00 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,403.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The whole life costs represents costs until 2043/44. These cost include the project costs until closure and recurring Antarctic Partition and Logistics infrastructure budget costs. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £20,136.95 m, has increased by £2921.18 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £17,215.78 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The updated 2019 Cost-Benefit Analysis includes an extended appraisal period. As a result, it captures both additional costs and additional benefits over the new appraisal period. - Overall, the benefits have increased by more than the costs resulting in an increase in the net benefits for the Programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £20,136.95 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - A lessons learned exercise around the new Cost-Benefit Analysis has been conducted. - Programme costs continue to be effectively managed, and addressed through appropriate governance groups. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £5.00 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £5.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - No change | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £11.70 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £11.70 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The baseline for the whole life cost remained the same. This is primarily due to: i) introduction of stronger internal controls and processes in 2018/19 to account for all projects accurately and manage budgets closely; ii) recruitment of finance team between January - May 2018, strengthening our finance structure to provide the necessary support to the Capability Programme; iii) effective management of financial risks in line with the principles outlined in Orange Book - 'Management of Risks, Principles and Concepts Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £11.70 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - There is no variance to the original baseline Whole Life Cost. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £11.70 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - There is no variance to the original baseline Whole Life Cost. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £44.19 m, has increased by £0.23 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £43.96 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The baseline should not have risen, but has no material impact given the size of the underspend (see above for underspend and baseline reasoning) Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £44.19 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The baseline should not have risen, but has no material impact given the size of the underspend (see above for underspend and baseline reasoning) Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £44.19 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The baseline should not have risen, but has no material impact given the size of the underspend (see above for underspend and baseline reasoning) | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £90.00 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £90.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The baseline is unchanged as no relevant factors (new Business Case etc.) have occurred in this time period. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £90.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The baseline is unchanged as no relevant factors (new Business Case etc.) have occurred in this time period (and the question is N/A) | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £564.10 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £564.10 m, due primarily to the following factors; - No new business case Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £564.10 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Further work on the impact of inflation will need to be modelled Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £564.10 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - No new business case | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £206.10 m, has decreased by £3.50 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £209.60 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The whole life cost is consistent with the previously-approved baseline and, understandably, is being reviewed following the Chief Secretary's decision to extend Verify operations up to September 2021. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £28.34 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Whole life costs show the 3 year programme costs. This is without optimism bias. The initial two year cost of the programme had been included within the CCS Business Plan and Budget 2019/20 to 2020/21 - Design and delivery approach decisions were being reviewed and further planning was underway to confirm the prioritisation for delivery in 20/21 Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £28.34 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - As a Trading Fund the CCS Board has approved the FY20/21 budget and validated that programme costs are within the boundaries of affordability - Investment prioritization at CCS Portfolio level is under review to mitigate any impacts of the COVID-19 risk on CCS growth objectives Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £28.34 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The forecasted costs were reduced in Q3 19/20 as delivery timescales within the year became clear and some elements of delivery were refined and re-prioritised for delivery in 20/21 - FY20/21 budget and business case have been reviewed and approved in Q4 19/20 in-line with latest delivery plans | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £31.04 m, due primarily to the following factors; - For 2019/20 the programme has recorded an overspend of 1%. This is this a direct consequence of the reallocation of funds from the Central Teams funding to support the CoE pilot delivery. We have also met regularly with the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP), our funding source, keeping them fully informed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £31.04 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - There were no external factors (better or worse) to impact the delivery of the TGS Programme Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £31.04 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - There were no internal factors (better or worse) to impact the delivery of the TGS Programme | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £595.00 m, has increased by £0.08 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £594.92 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The increase is due to rounding . | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £204.50m, has decreased by £12.55m since last year’s Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £217.05m, due primarily to the following factors; - The programme is spending less than anticipated this financial year for several reasons, including slower decision making due to the timing of elections and other political events has delayed the start of projects. - A number of projects are underspending against forecast, including WM5G and Security (which was slower to initiate that anticipated). Phase 1 project also underspent. Industrial 5G had a lower uptake than anticipated, but it is expected that the funds will be absorbed by 5G Create. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £204.50m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Slower initiation of projects and lower than anticipated spend (i.e. Security project has underspent and has been delayed in initiation; Industrial 5G did not have anticipated uptake). | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £64.34 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Approximately half of the whole-life costs are incurred in the design of the Licence, running the competition for the operator, and managing the transition period from Third to Fourth National Lottery Licensee. - The cost of regulating the Fourth Licence for 10 years is the remainder of the whole-life costs. For the purposes of estimating at this stage, we assume the cost of regulation is the same as that for the Third Licence, c£3.15m/year. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £64.34 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The requirement to follow the HMT-led Treasury Approval Point (TAP) process, and specifically its deferral until after the March 2020 Budget, introduced a 3-month delay to the start of the competition. Consequently, some programme costs have slipped into later years (FY21/22 and FY22/23). The impact will be confirmed in due course in the Full Business Case. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £64.34 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - In the course of developing the Outline Business Case, there was a re-appraisal of the resources required to run the competition effectively. Increasing the strength of the evaluation teams, both with Commission and external subject matter experts, will ensure a better quality process. - Decision to procure a Transition, Technology and Operations partner earlier than originally planned has increased whole-life costs, but will ensure the risks inherent in the transition period can be effectively managed. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £777.92 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The budget for the Games was announced in a written ministerial statement by Mims Davies on 25 June 2019: https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-06-25/debates/19062540000016/CommonwealthGames. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £210.24 m, has decreased by £127.76 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £338.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The three museum projects reached Full Business Case stage with confirmed scope and locations for new storage facilities, finalised construction costs, and revised targets for non-government funding. In particular, the focus of delivery for the British Museum's project changed from Bloomsbury to Reading, causing a significant reduction in costs. - The overall reduction of £127.8m comprises a reduction in non-government funding of £96m by the British Museum and £35m by the Victoria & Albert Museum. There was an increase in the target for non-government funding of £3.2m for the Science Museum Group's project. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £210.24 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The impact of the current Coronavirus outbreak will be assessed and scenario planning undertaken. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £210.24 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The baseline Whole Life Cost has increased by £4.9m, representing an approved increase in the capital cost of the Victoria & Albert Museum's project to be funded from non-government sources. - The impact of the current Coronavirus outbreak will be assessed and scenario planning undertaken. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £321.10 m, has increased by £2.40 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £318.70 m, due primarily to the following factors; - There has been a small correction to the allocation of the trans Pennine initiative budget from the National Productivity Investment Fund (NPIF) Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £321.10 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - £5.3m of budget relating to the reduction in scope of the Trans Pennine Initiative has been surrendered to HMT as part of the LFFN reprofile | Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £212.80 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - As RGC is acting as a pilot for the proposed UK Gigabit Programme the decision has been made to release the 2019-20 underspend at the budget supplementary and reduce the scope of the project. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,067.60 m, has increased by £19.20 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,048.40 m, due primarily to the following factors; - £1,067.6m is the PBC baseline run costs throughout the business case period. It is PBC run costs £982.4m plus Investment costs £85.2m as at baseline in 2016. The £1,048.4m included in Q2 18/19 was an error and should have been £1,067.6m. If the WLC really means how much over the PBC period did we expect the run costs and the investments costs to be; 819.3 plus 85.2 investment costs = 904.5m. 2016 estimation was to spend 904.5m by 22/23 compared to Q2 19/20 forecast of 791.2 run plus 120.4 Investment costs - 911.6m. Baseline to the programme means what were our costs annually at that time when we started the programme 2016. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £11,347.41 m, has decreased by £0.09 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £11,347.50 m, due primarily to the following factors; As costs are directly proportional to the number of starts, as starts fall cost does too – there has been a reduction in the total costs compared to the previous year’s return is explained by a fall in the number of apprenticeship starts projected for 2019-20 and 2020-21 | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £2,398.50 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £2,398.50 m, due primarily to the following factors; - There has been no revision to the baseline cost profile. Based on the maturity of the programme, the impact on changes to the remaining schools in the programme results in less fluctuations to the overall programme budget. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £2,398.50 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - There has been no revision to the baseline cost profile. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £2,398.50 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - There has been no revision to the baseline cost profile. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £21.31 m, has increased by £0.00 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £21.31 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Baseline costs were taken from the final business case, which provided the expected costs of the implementation at a point in time. The change in SWE’s planned go live date did not impact on baseline costs. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £155.60 m, has increased by £9.40 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £146.20 m, due primarily to the following factors; - In September 2019, an updated Strategic Overarching Business Case (SOBC) was drafted and submitted to the DFE Investment Committee. During this process we worked with all the different teams delivering the T Level elements and conducted a full review of the budgets required. During this process it was identified the budgets in the original SOBC and GMPP report had changed as the scope and delivery on the work had been agreed. The budgets were updated to reflect the latest figures. - In 20-21, the Strategic Business Case will be drafted and submitted to the Investment Committee (depending on COVID-19 work). The budgets will be reviewed, budgets may change further as additional work is scoped and delivered. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £155.60 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The Cabinet Office advised our communication campaign colleagues to turn off the social media advertising in March 20, due to COVID-19. This led to an underspend in Financial Year 19-20. This will continue into Financial Year 20-21. The way networking and awareness raising with providers will have to be reviewed as we can not hold face to face events as planned, this will cause underspends will emerge. - Due to COVID-19 we may not be able to engage the employers needed to deliver the industry placements and therefore will not be able to deliver the expected amount of T Levels in September 2020, leading to an underspend. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £155.60 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Through the SOBC, all the elements of T Levels have been reviewed and fully scoped. This has increased the WLC but we have a more robust T Level programme and delivery options to ensure the work is delivered effectively. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £125.61 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The whole life costs are based on internal staff costs alongside supplier costs for set up and delivery of 5 test cycles (from 2020 to 2024 inclusive). Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £125.61 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - As a result of Covid-19 the 2020 Test cycle has been cancelled which has resulted in a reduction of the costs payable with respect to this test cycle. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £125.61 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The cancellation of the 2020 Test cycle has resulted in a renegotiation of the contract with suppliers. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £285.40 m, has decreased by £159.70 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £445.10 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The whole life costs cover the 40 year design life of the airport. The costs are attributable to both the UK Government and St Helena Government. Areas of expenditure included when calculating the whole-life cost are: planning, design, construction, operations, maintenance, asset renewal and/or disposal. - The scheduled commercial air service commenced in October 2017. The service carried 15,744 passengers up to the end of December 2019. Forward sales have remained for this quarter. - Work has been commissioned to review tourism projections based on the real data from flight operations. The Department expect to receive the finding of this work during 1st Quarter of 2020/21. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £285.40 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The work that has been commissioned to review tourism projections based on the real data from flight will provide some information on how benefits are likely to be realised. However, the COVID 19 pandemic will affect traveller numbers to St Helena. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £285.40 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The Department will continue work to review tourism projections – however the focus will be to support efforts to ensuring St Helena Government has the medical personnel and medical supplies it needs to respond to COVID 19. We return to this issue as soon as we have resources to do so. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,145.37 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The WLC at Q2 remained unchanged from Q1. The WLC at Q2 aligned with the approved budget. - The WLC is based on the assured Commercial Estimate at the time, received in March 2019, of £1,145.37m Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,145.37 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - A revised inflation profile has been implemented, reducing the WLC Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,145.37 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Value engineering work has been undertaken, reducing the WLC. Value engineering outputs included a reduction in the volume of earthworks required, rationalisation of environmental mitigation measures and a shorter construction duration. - The project has also assessed the cost benefits of the proposed procurement route - Regional Delivery Partnerships - which is expected to achieve additional cost benefits. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,435.30 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,435.30 m, due primarily to the following factors; - There are no changes to the budgeted project costs. The project is on track to deliver to its agreed baseline and no future increase in cost is forecast due to significant effort being applied by the project to resolve any problems safely, cost efficiently and in the best interest of the project. - The contractual and commercial model introduced in Deed of Variation - 2 which was agreed in April 2018 has supported the collaborative working required to enable all parties to focus on safe and efficient delivery. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,435.30 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - There has not been any significant external factors that have impacted on the project's whole life cost. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,435.30 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - There have been no changes to the baseline Whole Life Cost, and therefore no project action required. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,919.90 m, has increased by £363.50 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,556.40 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Removal of the option of Private Finance in the 2018 Budget has led to an increase in the amount of non-recoverable VAT which needed to be included in the cost estimate - this accounts for the majority of the £363m difference. This is as a result of the difference between the treatment of non-recoverable VAT in privately or publicly financed projects. - The project was approved by Treasury in October 2019 after the Q2 1819 submission (30th September 2019) and thus this difference and the reasons for it have already been accepted by Treasury. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,919.90 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The Project has been rebaselined to accommodate the delay in announcement of Funding Assurance and further rebaselining will now be required following delay to the Secretary of State DCO announcement. - Any additional costs arising from any schedule delay are likely to be largely mitigated by the project being able to exploit new inflation rates to the funding model. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £809.98m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost, due primarily to the following factors; - The project baseline has remained constant at £810m throughout the period. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £809.98 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - There are no non-project operating environment activities that have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £809.98 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The project compiled a new baseline estimate . The paper was approved by Treasury in early 2020 and reflects the most recent commercial estimate whole life cost. - The formal budget setting process has commenced within the Regional Delivery Partnership Framework. It is anticipated that due to the improved ways of working that a reduction in the Whole Life Cost is achievable and this approach will be fully documented. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £17,630.90 m, has increased by £2156.29 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £15,474.61 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The delay to the CRL programme announced in August 2018 resulted in cost increases. In December 2018 a new funding and financing package was announced to fund the project's completion. This included a £1.3bn Loan to the GLA, £750m contingency Loan to TfL and £100m of GLA's own funding. The combined total of the financing arrangements outlined above means that the overall funding envelope for the project was forecast at £17.6. - Since the 18/19 Q2 GMPP CRL have indicated that they would require between £400 to £650m in additional funding. The total funding envelope project forecast for Crossrail is between £18.3bn to £18.8bn. This includes the costs for both the CRL and the NR works. The independent assurance of the revised Network Rail (NR) On Network Works (ONW) costs has concluded and a request for an allocation of a further £140m to fund Crossrail works was made at the NR Portfolio Board on 27 February. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £17,630.90 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - It is too early to tell exactly how the impact of COVID-19 will be felt following the “safe stop” of work at project sites. CRL have initiated scenario planning work, developing assumptions to inform a range of possible safe start options and assess the impact of COVID-19. The Project-Representative will be making their assessment of the Crossrail pre-COVID-19 benchmark position, against which the future potential disruptive long-term impacts can assessed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £17,630.90 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - In November 2019, the Crossrail Board announced that it would not be possible to deliver the project within the available funding and would require between £400 to £650m in additional funding. CRL undertook scenario analysis exercises and identified a shortfall target which has been agreed between DfT, HMT, Transport for London (TfL) and the Greater London Authority (GLA). Sponsors are in the process of negotiating the funding gap. However given COVID-19 demobilisation further analysis will be required to fully know the impact. - The independent assurance of the revised Network Rail (NR) On Network Works (ONW) costs has concluded and a request for an allocation of a further £140m to fund Crossrail works was made at the NR Portfolio Board on 27 February. It is proposed that the additional funding will be met from the reallocation of existing NR budgets using CP6 underspend. This was recently approved by Ministers. - Talks are ongoing with TfL to mitigate substantial drops in revenues due to falling ridership numbers. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,040.40 m, has increased by £0.03 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,040.37 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The baseline Whole Life Cost for the Programme has not changed but the figure reported at Q2 1920 was rounded to the nearest £100k. - The cost of the power supply upgrades between Doncaster and York has not been finalised due to ongoing contract negotiations with suppliers. When these costs have been confirmed, the baseline Whole Life Cost for the Programme will be updated. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,040.40 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - COVID-19 will delay the delivery of projects and introduction of new timetable. The prolongation and replanning of works is expected to increase costs and mean the benefits of the Programme are introduced later than planned. The Programme will need to be re-baselined when the implications of the virus have been fully assessed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,040.40 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Network Rail needs to quantify the cost implications of the COVID-19 delays on each project. - The total cost of the East Coast Main Line power supply upgrades is being finalised with the supply chain. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,091.50 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost, due primarily to the following factors; - The Whole Life Cost is based on GRIP 3 costs and the project is now at GRIP 4 stage which now includes HS2 integrated civils costs and additional infrastructure . This has exposed some pressure on WLC that is being considered. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,091.50 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The Whole Life Cost is based on GRIP 3 costs and the project is now at GRIP 4 stage which now includes HS2 integrated civils costs and additional infrastructure which will impact on the anticipated full cost of the programme . - There is an ongoing cost and scope challenge to come to an agreed revised cost price for the programme which is undergoing further scrutiny and challenge. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £5,007.00 m, has increased by £6.00 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £5,001.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Brickyard sidings, to the west of Cardiff was an agreed scope increase, to mitigate delay to Cardiff electrification. - Brickyard sidings enables stabling of Electric Multiple Units as well as the Intercity Express Trains, providing extra capacity to Cardiff Central station, especially during special events. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £5,007.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - No actions have increased the overall programme baseline costs. - Network Rail have reported that it would not be possible to complete the electrification element of the programme within available funding, but this has not increased the overall programme cost. A re-baselining exercise will be undertaken in due course across the programme. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £32,607.78 m, has increased by £9874.88 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £22,732.90 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The scheme cost profile was updated to reflect Heathrow’s decision to phase the expansion of terminal capacity and other development works over a longer time period than originally planned. Costs were provided as part of a review of Heathrow’s scheme financing. The preferred Masterplan forecast was £32.5bn [in 2014 prices] which included costs expected to be incurred from 2017 – 2051. - The Government made clear it expects Heathrow to work closely with airlines and its regulator (CAA) to refine the scheme design to target landing charges as close to today’s (2016) level as possible. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £32,607.78 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Following the publication of the CAA's position on Cat C costs, Heathrow confirmed their schedule for the opening of the runway has been delayed by 2 years to 2028-29. This reflects the need to phase the costs over a longer period. HEP were awaiting clarification of Heathrow's detailed schedule and costs. - Recent financeability checks concluded that expansion appeared, in principle, to be privately financeable without government support. Should agreement on Cat C costs not be reached, there could be further impact on Heathrow’s schedule and costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £32,607.78 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The government has been clear that expansion is a private sector project. Delivery of expansion at Heathrow will be funded by Heathrow. - Any investment by Government in related surface access would be subject to HMT’s business case process. Where surface access schemes benefit airport and non-airport users, Government would share the cost with the private sector in line with regulatory processes with related costs being managed by DfT road and rail teams. - All reporting on the programme was paused and has not changed since the Court of Appeal's ruling of the ANPS on 27th February 2020. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £55,700.00 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £55,700.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - £55.7bn (in 2015 prices) represented the then capital estimate for the HS2 project. Whereas ongoing pressures to the estimate and schedule were still being assessed by the Department at Q2 2019/20, there was further scrutiny placed on the project with the publication of the HS2 Chairman’s Stocktake report in September. In addition, the independent Oakervee Review was commissioned at the time of producing the Q2 report. It was therefore considered inappropriate for the baseline capital estimate for the project to be amended at that time and the budget remained at £55.7bn. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £55,700.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Schedule challenges were presented on the delivery of works at Old Oak Common, due to legal challenges to the award of the Construction Partner Contract, which has since been satisfactorily resolved. There were also some further delays to the clearance of ancient woodlands, with some sites paused during the Oakervee Review. However, the project continues to pick up pace and drive forward with delivery. The ongoing COVID-19 situation has resulted in revised working methodologies for the project and HS2 Ltd has risen to these challenges. The rapid development and the uncertain outcome of the outbreak means it has not yet been possible to precisely determine its impact on the project. HS2 Ltd is currently working with its suppliers to assess the implications on schedule and cost. The current schedule and cost estimates contain contingency to address the issues which have arisen due to the pandemic. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £55,700.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Since Q2 19-20 the project has been subject to increased scrutiny through the independent Oakervee Review. This review reassessed the deliverability of the project and undertook a further assessment on project cost and schedule. The recommendations were welcomed and adopted by government, with increased focus on savings and ministerial oversight on delivery. In accordance with IPA guidance, the project has re-established a capital estimated cost range for the project: £65-88bn (2015 prices) and £72-£98bn (2019 prices). The Whole Life cost for the HS2 project was included in the Full Business Case for Phase One, which was estimated at £108.9bn (2015 prices). | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £6,445.73 m, has decreased by £137.52 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £6,583.25 m, due primarily to the following factors; - A review of the baseline WLC was undertaken on Q1 19/20. The new forecast and baselines figures reflect more accurately the state of the programme. - Previous RDEL Baselines incorrectly included Bi-mode variation costs even after these were reallocated to CDEL Non-Gov costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £6,445.73 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - A variation on RDEL forecast has been made due to the extension of existing contracts and the procurement of new contract for technical advisors. - A Variation on CDEL forecast has been made due to the release of contingency for EMC and deferral of expenditure into next year. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £6,052.20 m, has increased on last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost, due primarily to the following factors; - The increase is due to the addition of portfolio risk to the previously approved cost (in line with HE policy) and an increase in non-recoverable VAT following the move from private to public finance for the link roads. Since Q2 1920 DfT has approved a further update to the Whole Life Cost and the latest approved position is £6,391m. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £6,052.20 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The delays caused by Covid19 will impact inflation Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £6,052.20 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - In line with Highways England Policy, portfolio risk has been added. This along with design changes (Removal of Tilbury Junction including Rest and Service Area including associated viaduct works) were submitted for approval to DfT in December 2019. - Since December 2019, we have made further design changes for safety and following consultation feedback. We have also updated the schedule to incorporate feedback from a number of independent reviews. These changes may increase the inflation included in the whole life cost. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,671.20 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,671.20 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Key Output 1 remains projected to complete within budget, however prolongation of works may cause increase in budget. - Key Output 1a re-examination under way, so final programme spend will be determined by outcome of re-examination. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,671.20 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Close management of costs continues. - Contingency management system remains in place and allows active management of contingency. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £5,849.00 m, has decreased by £203.00 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £6,052.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - A reduction in scope of the North of England Programme, as a result of some schemes within the programme being descoped. - Further certainty of WLC for the programme as estimates mature through the development, design and delivery phases. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £5,849.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Since Q2 19/20 the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade has been established as a standalone programme on the GMPP, and now reports its whole life cost separately to the North of England Programme. As a result whole life costs for the North of England Programme have decreased. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £24.47 m, has increased by £3.87 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £20.60 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Competition projects were required to add an additional stage in the project to deal with non-compliant bids, which resulted in additional and unforcasted cost. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £24.47 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - We do not have live competition projects. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £24.47 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - We do not have live competition projects. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £817.70 m, has decreased by £2.50 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £820.20 m, due primarily to the following factors; - A review of Programme Costs took place between the Department for Transport and Network Rail. It identified corrections, through the removal of unrelated costs, which were then reflected in the GMPP reports. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £817.70 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The Department for Transport and Network Rail have engaged on a periodic basis to review Programme Costs which has supported the data provided in GMPP reports. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £7,269.40 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £7,269.40 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The costs have not changed as there has not been overall costs increases and the programme has kept to budget. - This is mainly down to the fact that the vast majority of infrastructure has been delivered Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £7,269.40 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The costs have not changed as there has not been overall costs increases and the programme has kept to budget. - This is mainly down to the fact that the vast majority of Infrastructure has been delivered | Provision of narrative not possible due to prioritisation of Covid 19 response | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £69.50 m, has decreased by £5.75 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £75.25 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The Q2 1819 baseline cost is from the approved OBC, whereas the Q2 19/20 baseline cost is from the approved FBC and therefore reflects a later estimate of scope and costs. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £423.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - There are currently no factors which are impacting the programme whole life costs |
| Annual Report Category | ICT | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | ICT | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | ICT | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | ICT | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | ICT | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Infrastructure and Construction | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | ICT | ICT | ICT |
| The IPA Annual Report publishes the whole life cycle costs on projects, based on figures from their Business Cases, whilst the National Infrastructure and Construction Pipeline (NICP) focuses primarily on the upfront capital investment on a project. Where both documents refer to the same projects, this distinction will be the principal reason for any differences in the data sets published. Other government publications may use different methodologies to derive cost figures | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |