Wendy Eccles v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (UC): [2026] UKUT 395 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber decision of Judge Stout on 06 October 2026.
Read the full decision in .
Judicial Summary
The appellant is a Universal Credit claimant who manages her claim by telephone and has no access to her electronic journal. She appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against a decision of the Secretary of State of 22 May 2024 that she had limited capability for work-related activity (LCWRA). At the appeal hearing, it was identified that the Secretary of State had made a prior decision on her claim on 18 September 2023, which had been uploaded to her electronic journal. The claimant had been notified by text message that there was a letter for her on her electronic journal, but was not sent the decision in writing, or provided with written notice of the requirement for mandatory reconsideration or the right of appeal. It was argued for the appellant that the 18 September 2023 decision was accordingly a nullity or, if not a nullity, that it was not an appealable decision and the First-tier Tribunal should deal with the appeal as if the decision did not exist. The First-tier Tribunal did not deal with that argument, but proceeded on the basis that the 18 September 2023 decision was a final decision that had not been appealed and accordingly limited the scope of the appeal.
The Upper Tribunal held:
- The decision of 18 September 2023 was a decision that the appellant did not have LCWRA, made as required by regulation 43(3) of the UC Regulations in response to the appellant’s failure to provide fit notes when requested. It was a refusal to supersede her previous award, not merely a decision not to proceed with a work capability assessment;
- The failure to notify the decision did not make it a legal nullity. It was a final decision for the purposes of section 17 of the Social Security Act 1998 (SSA 1998) and appealable under section 12;
- However, the failure to notify meant that the time for seeking mandatory reconsideration of that decision had not yet started to run; nor had the time limit for appealing it;
- The First-tier Tribunal had nonetheless made a material error of law by failing to deal with the appellant’s nullity argument. That argument was properly raised in the appeal against the 22 May 2024 decision and the First-tier Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with it. The First-tier Tribunal’s error in not dealing with the argument was a material error because the First-tier Tribunal ought to have considered, and raised with the parties, the options of: (a) staying the proceedings to allow the appellant to seek mandatory reconsideration and, if necessary, appeal the 18 September 2023 decision; and/or (b) inviting the Secretary of State to consider revising the decision of his own motion.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal set aside and remade by disposing of the appeal by consent on a basis agreed between the parties.