United Kingdom Research & Innovation v 1) The Information Commissioner 2) Reuben Kirkham: [2026] UKUT 146 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber decision by Judge Church on 09 April 2026.
Read the full decision in .
Judicial Summary
These appeals concern two Freedom of Information requests made to the body now known as UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), which is a major funder of scientific research. The requests sought information arising from mid‑term reviews of university‑run Centres for Doctoral Training (CDTs) funded by UKRI, including scores, feedback, submissions and related correspondence.
The Upper Tribunal’s decision addresses three main issues
First, it considers whether the requests fall to be treated under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) or the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR). It upholds the FtT’s conclusion that, while CDTs work in areas connected to environmental priorities, the “measure” that the requested information is “on” is the assessment and performance management of the CDTs, and not the underlying research. That administrative evaluation is not a “measure” with the required environmental impact for EIR purposes. FOIA therefore applies.
Second, it considers whether the FtT’s decision making in relation to section 36 FOIA (prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs) was in error of law. It decides that the FtT was not required to accord “deference” to the opinion of the “qualified person”, but rather was required to give it “appropriate” consideration. In all the circumstances (including the opinion being very brief and short on reasoning) it was appropriate for the FtT to give it very limited weight and to conclude, after a proper public interest balancing exercise, that the public interest in transparency and accountability outweighed the public interest in maintaining the exemption.
Third, in relation to section 41 FOIA (information provided in confidence), it found that the FtT had erred materially in law in:
(a) failing properly to apply the tests set out in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415;
(b) deciding that the requested information was not confidential based on its assessment of whether UKRI regarded the information as confidential (when it should have focused instead on whether the information was imparted in expectation of confidence and whether the preservation of the information’s confidentiality was “of substantial concern” to the confiding party (see Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No. 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414 at 438); and
(c) treating section 41 FOIA as if it is a qualified exemption requiring a section 2(2(b) FOIA balancing exercise, when it is an absolute exemption subject only to there being a strong public interest (which must be “exceptional” (see London Regional Transport v Mayor of London [2003] EMLR 4)) sufficient to defeat an otherwise actionable breach of confidence.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed UKRI’s appeal concerning the first information request, but allowed its appeal concerning the second information request. The FtT’s decision in relation to the second information request was set aside and the case remitted to the First‑tier Tribunal for reconsideration using the correct legal tests.