RB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (UC): [2026] UKUT 136 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber decision by Judge Brewer on 25 March 2026.
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Judicial Summary
This appeal concerns the interaction between entitlement to Universal Credit and immigration status following deportation action. The supersession decision fixed 22 May 2020 as the date on which the appellant was treated as a person subject to immigration control under section 115 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.
By section 12(8) of the Social Security Act 1998, the First‑tier Tribunal was required to determine only whether the Secretary of State was entitled to reach that conclusion from that date. No earlier immigration history, not having been put in issue and not arising from the evidence, required determination.
The Secretary of State’s attempt to rely on new Home Office material before the Upper Tribunal failed. Under Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, as applied in the social security jurisdiction, that material could and should have been obtained with reasonable diligence; it was incomplete and did not identify the statutory basis of deportation, whether under s.3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 (conducive deportation) or ss.32–33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (automatic deportation). It could not establish any clear or uncontentious factual mistake for the purposes of E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044. It was therefore inadmissible.
In determining whether the appellant retained leave beyond 22 May 2020, the Tribunal applied section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971, which extends leave only while an appeal could be brought or is pending within section 104 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Section 104 provides an exhaustive definition of when an appeal remains pending and is confined to the domestic appellate system. On that basis, the appellant’s domestic appeal rights were exhausted on 22 May 2020, and his section 3C leave ended on that date.
The appellant’s application to the European Court of Human Rights could not extend or revive leave under section 3C. That is so for three reasons: (1) proceedings before the ECtHR do not form part of the appellate structure established by the 2002 Act; (2) an ECtHR complaint is an international supervisory mechanism, not a continuation of domestic appellate litigation; and (3) section 3C operates only by reference to the domestic appellate routes expressly defined in statute.
The later human‑rights submissions made after the expiry of leave were further submissions under paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules. Such submissions do not engage section 3C and cannot revive leave once it has expired.
Accordingly, the appellant’s leave ended on 22 May 2020, and from that date he was a person subject to immigration control without recourse to public funds for the purposes of section 115 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and the Universal Credit Regulations. The Secretary of State was entitled to supersede the Universal Credit award from that date.