MH v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP): [2016] UKUT 531 (AAC) ; [2018] AACR 12

Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber decision by Judge Rowland, Judge Rowley and Judge Hemingway on 28 November 2016.

Read the full decision in [2018] AACR 12ws

Judicial Summary

Reported as [2018] AACR 12

Personal Independence Payment – mobility activity 1 – ability to follow the route of a journey without another person – whether a need to be accompanied to avoid overwhelming psychological distress is relevant

The Upper Tribunal had before it three appeals concerning the mobility descriptors of personal independence payment. In the first case, the claimant had been found to be unable to undertake any journey because it would cause overwhelming distress to him (descriptor 1(e)) but appealed on the ground that the overwhelming distress he would suffer if he went out meant that he also could not follow the route of a familiar journey without another person (descriptor 1(f)) and that the retching he would experience would make him unable to move more than 50 metres (descriptor 2(c)). In the second case, the claimant suffered from severe anxiety and had been awarded 2 points in respect of daily living descriptor 9(b) on account of a need for prompting to enable her to engage with others but had not been awarded any points in respect of mobility descriptors. She appealed on the ground that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in not having regard to its finding that she satisfied daily living descriptor 9(b) when considering mobility activity 1 which, she argued, was relevant to her ability to seek directions when she was lost and so to the question whether she was able to follow the route of an unfamiliar route for the purposes of mobility descriptor 1(d). In the third case, the First-tier Tribunal found that the claimant had not been out of her house unaccompanied for four years and awarded her the enhanced rate of the mobility component on the ground that she could not follow the route of a familiar journey without another person and so satisfied descriptor 1(f). The Secretary of State appealed on the ground that the descriptor was concerned only with an ability to navigate rather than a broader need for supervision.

Held, dismissing the claimant’s appeal in the first case, allowing the claimant’s appeal in the second case dismissing the Secretary of State’s appeal in the third case, that: 1. the different terminology in descriptors 1(b) and (e) as opposed to descriptors 1(d) and (f) was not of itself significant and did not indicate that they were concerned with mutually exclusive issues making ‘overwhelming psychological distress’ relevant only to descriptors 1(b) and (e) and not also to descriptors 1(d) and (f). (paragraph 35); 2. the meaning of ‘follow the route of a journey’ in mobility descriptors 1(d) and 1(f), when given its natural or ordinary meaning, clearly included an ability to navigate but was not limited to that, although a claimant’s inability to engage in communication with people to find her way if lost was irrelevant (paragraphs 36 to 38); 3. descriptors 1(e) and 1(f) could not be read in isolation from each other and the legislation contemplated that, where descriptor 1(e) was satisfied because the claimant needed to avoid overwhelming psychological distress by not undertaking any journey, the claimant would not undertake journeys so that the need for consideration of descriptor 1(f) owing to such severe anxiety on a journey would not arise (paragraph 41); 4. where claimants suffered from severe anxiety, descriptors 1(d) and 1(f) had to be applied in the light of descriptors 1(b) and 1(e) with due regard being had to the term ‘overwhelming psychological distress’. Only if a claimant was suffering from ‘overwhelming psychological distress’ would anxiety be a cause of the claimant being unable to follow the route of a journey. The threshold was a very high one and a claimant being anxious or worried was not sufficient (paragraph 48); 5. similarly, the relationship between mobility activity 1 and mobility activity 2 was such that physical symptoms arising from overwhelming psychological distress and only affecting the claimant’s ability to move if he or she undertook journeys out of doors were not to be taken into account under activity 2 where descriptor 1(e) was satisfied (paragraph 52); 6. notwithstanding the fact that the terms ‘prompting’ and ‘overwhelming psychological distress’ were found in both daily living activity 9 and mobility activity 1, it did not follow that an award of points under one would necessarily indicate an award of points under the other (paragraph 54).

Published 20 December 2016
Last updated 15 January 2019 + show all updates
  1. Decision selected for reporting as [2018] AACR 12

  2. First published.