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His Majesty's Treasury v (1) Adrian Finch (2) Information Commissioner: [2026] UKUT 406 (AAC)

Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber decision of Judge Citron on 20 October 2026.

Read the full decision in UA-2025-001010-GIA.

Judicial Summary

This case is about certain information in a paper written for a meeting of a ‘loan charge steering group’, comprised of officials from HM Revenue & Customs and from HM Treasury, in 2019. The paper was considering “options for concessions” by the government in response to an independent review of the ‘loan charge’, a piece of tax policy (and legislation) targeting a certain kind of tax avoidance (‘disguised remuneration’). The “options” paper had been disclosed to Mr Finch, the First Respondent in these proceedings, by HM Treasury, in response to an information request. However, certain text in the paper, opposite the “Legal” and “Legislation” headings in the analysis of various options contained in the paper, had been withheld, relying on section 42 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the exemption for information covered by legal professional privilege.

The Information Commissioner, the Second Respondent in these proceedings, had issued a decision notice to the effect that HM Treasury was entitled to rely on section 42 to withhold the text in question; but on appeal by Mr Finch to the First-tier Tribunal, the First-tier Tribunal decided that this was wrong in law, as the text in the paper was not, itself, legal advice given by lawyer to client, and there was “insufficient evidence” that the text was covered by legal advice privilege.

On HM Treasury’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal holds that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law: the case law authorities are clear that legal advice can, without losing privilege, be disseminated within an organisation, or even externally to an organisation, to allow for its consideration by the client; and in doing so it can be summarised, as opposed to communicated verbatim; the fact that the withheld text in the “options” paper was not, itself, legal advice from lawyer to client, was not therefore a reason to conclude that it was not covered by legal advice privilege, as a summary of the legal advice given by HM Revenue & Customs lawyers.

As to whether there was otherwise an “insufficiency of evidence” that legal advice privilege attached to the text in question, the relevant evidence before the First-tier Tribunal was the text itself in the “closed” bundle, and the evidence of a HM Treasury official to the effect that the text was summaries of advice given by HM Revenue & Customs lawyers. The Upper Tribunal holds that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in rejecting the evidence of the HM Treasury witness, given that he was the only witness in the proceedings, that his evidence had been treated as reliable and credible in all other respects, that Mr Finch had not challenged the witness’ reliability or credibility, and that the First-tier Tribunal had determined the appeal without holding a hearing, on the basis that it could properly determine the issues without a hearing (being the test in the relevant procedural rule of the First-tier Tribunal). In all the circumstances, it was procedurally unfair to have rejected the witness’ evidence on the specific point about it summarising legal advice, without giving the witness a chance to respond to the tribunal’s concerns, in a hearing, or by written submissions.

In view of this legal error, the Upper Tribunal sets aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision as regards section 42 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and re-makes the decision, holding that, on the evidence before both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, the withheld text comprised summaries of confidential legal advice given by HM Revenue & Customs lawyers, and was covered by legal advice privilege, and that, in all the circumstances, the public interest in disclosing that text was outweighed by the public interest in maintaining the exemption based on legal advice privilege.