Heidi Bartley v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions: [2026] UKUT 251 (AAC)
Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber decision by Judge Citron on 29 June 2026.
Read the full decision in .
Judicial Summary
The Appellant was entitled to maternity allowance. The relevant statute set out that the period for which maternity allowance was payable – known as the maternity allowance period – was the same period for which statutory maternity pay would be payable (known as the maternity pay period), if the Appellant had been entitled to that. The same statute set out that the maternity pay period started 11 weeks before the expected week of confinement, unless regulations provided for it to start later than that.
The First-tier Tribunal decision, upholding the Respondent’s decision, found that the maternity pay period started at the 11-week date, because the relevant regulations did not apply. This was disadvantageous to the Appellant, because she had been outside Great Britain until shortly after the birth of her child, and she was disqualified from receiving maternity allowance, until her return to Great Britain. This meant that the later the maternity allowance period started, the longer the period for which she would receive maternity allowance. The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal, arguing that the relevant regulation did apply, such that her maternity allowance period should start on the day after the birth of her child.
The Upper Tribunal allows the appeal. In deciding whether the relevant regulation applies (regulation 2 of the Statutory Maternity Pay (General) Regulations 1986), the Upper Tribunal first analyses how far the “statutory fiction” of the Appellant being entitled to statutory maternity pay should be taken, applying the principles in the Supreme Court case of Fowler v HMRC. Based on this, the Upper Tribunal finds that paragraph (3) of regulation 2 applies, because the birth date fell before the date deemed to have been notified by the Appellant to her employer (as to when her employer’s liability to statutory maternity pay would have begun). This was sufficient to dispose of the appeal in the Appellant’s favour. However, the Upper Tribunal went on to consider whether paragraph (1) of regulation 2 would have applied if paragraph (3) had not; this involved consideration of an earlier Upper Tribunal case on paragraph (1) of regulation 2, Wade v North Yorkshire Police, and the question of whether the Appellant “ceased to work” for her employer in conformity with her notice to the employer, even though she had been on a career break with her employer at the time. Applying Wade, the Upper Tribunal decides that the Appellant did “cease to work” for her employer in this way, and so, that paragraph (1) of regulation 2 would have applied, if paragraph (3) had not, such that the maternity allowance period would have begun on the date notified (and not at the 11-week date, as found by the First-tier Tribunal).
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside and re-made in the manner argued for by the Appellant.