The incident was reported to the AAIB by the operator who in turn notified the Dutch Transport Safety Board (DTSB). A Dutch investigation was opened but the following day a formal request was made by the DTSB for the AAIB to assume responsibility for the investigation. The AAIB investigation was conducted by:
Mr J J Barnett Investigator-in-Charge
Miss G M Dean Operations
Mr P Sleight Engineering
Mr M Ford Flight Recorders
Some 11 hours after takeoff, at about 0330 hrs with the aircraft in Dutch airspace and at Flight Level 380, the No 1 (number one) engine lost power and ran down. Initially the pilots suspected a leak had emptied the contents of the fuel tank feeding No 1 engine but a few minutes later, the No 4 engine started to lose power. At that point all the fuel crossfeed valves were manually opened and No 4 engine recovered to normal operation. The pilots then observed that the fuel tank feeding No 4 engine was also indicating empty and they realised that they had a fuel management problem. Fuel had not been transferring from the centre, trim and outer wing tanks to the inner wing tanks so the pilots attempted to transfer fuel manually. Although transfer was partially achieved, the expected indications of fuel transfer in progress were not displayed so the commander decided to divert to Amsterdam (Schipol) Airport where the aircraft landed safely on three engines.
The investigation determined that the following causal factors led to the starvation of Inner fuel tanks 1 and 4 and the subsequent rundown of engine numbers 1 and 4:
Automatic transfer of fuel within the aircraft stopped functioning due to a failure of the discrete outputs of the master Fuel Control and Monitoring Computer (FCMC).
Due to FCMC ARINC data bus failures, the flight warning system did not provide the flight crew with any timely warnings associated with the automated fuel control system malfunctions.
The alternate low fuel level warning was not presented to the flight crew because the Flight Warning Computer (FWC) disregarded the Fuel Data Concentrator (FDC) data because its logic determined that at least one FCMC was still functioning.
The health status of the slave FCMC may have been at a lower level than that of the master FCMC, thus preventing the master FCMC from relinquishing control of the fuel system to the slave FCMC when its own discrete and ARINC outputs failed.
During the investigation the AAIB issued six safety recommendations. Two were published in Special Bulletin S1/2005 on 08 March 2005 and four more in an interim report published in the February 2006 AAIB Bulletin.
Download full report:
4-2007 G-VATL.pdf (6,659.01 kb)
Download bulletin summary:
Summary: AAR 4/2007 Airbus 340-642, G-VATL
Published 10 December 2014