Impouding decision for BU06 CYC
Written decision of the Deputy Traffic Commissioner for Wales for BU06 CYC
Wales Traffic Area
IMPOUNDING HEARING
APPLICATION FOR THE RETURN OF VEHICLE BU06 CYC BY REBECCA JANE CUFFIN
WRITTEN DECISION OF THE DEPUTY TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER
OFFICE OF THE TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER IN WALES
DECISION
The application by Rebecca Jane Cuffin for the return of the Iveco vehicle registration number BU06 CYC is refused, the claimant having failed to prove ownership of the vehicle or the ground for return of the vehicle in Regulation 4(3)(b) of the Goods Vehicles (Enforcement Powers) Regulations 2001 (as amended)
I direct that as soon as the period for appeal has expired on 24 November 2025 that the DVSA dispose of the Iveco vehicle registration number BU06 CYC in accordance with the Regulations.
Introduction
This decision concerns an Iveco box bodied 7.5 tonne heavy goods vehicle registration number BU06 CYC (“the vehicle”) that was detained by the DVSA (“the respondent) on 3 September 2025.
Rebecca Jane Cuffin (“the claimant”) asserted ownership of the vehicle at the time of the impounding and applied for its return.
A hearing commenced on 7 October 2025 and was concluded on 23 October 2025 to consider the application in accordance with the provisions of the Goods Vehicles (Enforcement Powers) Regulations 2001 (“the Regulations”) and the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document Number 7: Impounding (“SD7”).
The hearing
The hearing was initially listed at Caernarfon on Tuesday 7 October 2025. The claimant and respondent were informed of the hearing date by letter dated 17 September 2025.
Miss Cuffin attended the hearing as did Mr Ben Jones, counsel for the respondent. Traffic Examiner (“TE”) Thomas attended on videolink as a witness for the respondent (the detaining officer TE Haines-Burke being unavailable due to annual leave).
The hearing commenced, and I heard evidence from TE Thomas. It then became apparent that Mr Jones had not seen all the evidence served by the respondent ahead of the hearing including some potentially significant material. It also emerged that this evidence had been served on the claimant by means of an email zip file attachment that she had been unable to open. Miss Cuffin told me [redacted] and found it easier to read paper documents.
I decided that it was in the interests of justice and fairness to all parties that the hearing be adjourned so that I could be satisfied they had all had the opportunity to see the evidence that I had seen and were able to respond appropriately. An adjournment will also allow the attendance of TE Haines-Burke.
I therefore applied the power in Regulation 23 of the 2009 Regulations to extend the period of time for holding a hearing by 15 days to 23 October 2025. This was the first available date when the hearing could be listed before a traffic commissioner and will involving vacating an existing public inquiry listed at that time and date.
I took the opportunity to remind Miss Cuffin that the V5 registration document (or logbook) is not proof of ownership and to invite her to consider what other documentary proof she could provide of her ownership of the vehicle. I also issued directions for the service of any additional evidence by either party by 16 October 2025, and for all material to be sent to the claimant in paper form by post.
The hearing resumed at Pontypridd on Wednesday 23 October 2025. Miss Cuffin was present as claimant and Mr Jones as legal representative for the respondent. TE Haines-Burke also attended in person. Miss Cuffin confirmed that she had received paper copies of the evidence.
The statutory background
The Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 (“the Act”) and the Goods Vehicles (Enforcement Powers) Regulations 2001 as amended (“the Regulations”) make provision for vehicles operated by a person or an entity without the authority of an operator’s licence to be detained by an authorised person.
The owner of such a detained vehicle is entitled to apply to DVSA and subsequently to the Traffic Commissioner for the release and return of the vehicle.
Regulation 2 defines “owner” in this context as meaning:
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in the case of a vehicle which at the time of its detention was not hired from a vehicle-hire firm under a hiring agreement but was registered under the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994, the person who can show to the satisfaction of an authorised person that he was at the time of its detention the lawful owner (whether or not he was the person in whose name it was so registered);
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in the case of a vehicle or trailer which at the time of its detention was hired from a vehicle-hire firm under a hiring agreement, the vehicle-hire firm; or
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in the case of any other vehicle or trailer, the person who can show to the satisfaction of an authorised person that he was at the time of its detention the lawful owner.
In proceedings of this type that are adversarial in nature it is for:
- The claimant to prove on the balance of probabilities that she owned the detained vehicle at the material time.
- The DVSA to prove their right to detain the vehicle.
- The claimant to prove on the balance of probabilities that one of the grounds for its return applies.
Application may be made on four grounds contained in Regulation 4(3) of the Regulations (as amended by the Goods Vehicles (Enforcement Powers) (Amendment) Regulations 2009):
- “that, at the time the vehicle was detained, the person using the vehicle held a valid licence (whether or not authorising the use of the vehicle);
- that, at the time the vehicle was detained, the vehicle was not being, and had not been, used in contravention of section 2 of the 1995 Act.
- that, although at the time the vehicle was detained it was being, or had been, used in contravention of section 2 of the 1995 Act, the owner did not know that it was being, or had been, so used.
- that, although knowing at the time the vehicle was detained that it was being, or had been, used in contravention of section 2 of the 1995 Act, the owner—
- had taken steps with a view to preventing that use; and
- has taken steps with a view to preventing any further such use.”
The claimant sought the return of the vehicle in this case on ground b) namely that the vehicle had not been used in contravention of section 2.
Section 2(1) of the 1995 Act provides that, “no person shall use a goods vehicle on a road for the carriage of goods (a) for hire or reward, or (b) for or in connection with any trade or business carried on by him” except under an operator’s licence.
The circumstances of the impounding
Mr Haines-Burke gave oral evidence in accordance with his previous written statements.
On 3 September 2025 at 12 noon, TE Haines-Burke saw the vehicle being driven westbound on the M4 motorway between Junctions 33 and 34 near Llantrisant, South Wales. The officer caused the vehicle to stop at a DVSA check site.
The vehicle was described as an Iveco, two-axle heavy goods vehicle (HGV) with a maximum permitted weight of 7,500 kilograms with registration number BU06 CYC. The vehicle was yellow and fitted with a box type body. It was being driven by Mr Wade and there was also one passenger in the vehicle.
TE Haines-Burke examined the vehicle and found it was carrying furniture and other personal items (such a family photographs) with labels indicating the rooms to which the belongings should be relocated. The load appeared to indicate it involved a house move.
In the cab of the vehicle, the TE found leaflets promoting a business named Eco Property Clearances. The leaflets advertised clearance and removal services for commercial and residential properties. The leaflets offered “free no obligation quotes” and discounts to those with “quality recyclable goods”. It was noted the passenger in the vehicle was wearing a shirt branded with the “Eco Property Clearance” name, logo and slogan.
The TE’s enquiries located a website for the business that appeared to show the detained vehicle with the distinctive logo of the business on its side (this was not on the vehicle when detained and the TE suspected it had been added to the image on the website). The website promoted “professional home and business clearances.” The website also showed a smaller Ford Transit type pick up vehicle loaded with furniture.
The TE also identified that Miss Cuffin had previously been sent a letter by the DVSA on 3 May 2023 warning that they were concerned she was operating a vehicle in breach of Section 2 and warning that any vehicle encountered being so used would be detained indefinitely.
TE Haines-Burke interviewed Mr Wade under caution at the check site. Mr Wade said that he had started his journey in Hertford. He said the vehicle was owned by his partner Miss Cuffin and he was driving as a favour for her. He was delivering furniture from Hitchin to Swansea for a friend of Miss Cuffin. Mr Wade said the journey was not for profit and the vehicle was not used commercially or for hire and reward. Mr Wade confirmed that Miss Cuffin ran the business Eco Property Clearances but insisted that the journey he was undertaking was not related to the business.
TE Haines-Burke then impounded the vehicle because of his concerns it was being used commercially.
TE Haines-Burke explained he understood that Mr Wade arranged to stay in a hotel in Cardiff after the impounding. The next day, Mr Wade returned to the vehicle in a hired van and transferred the contents of the detained vehicle so that the delivery to Swansea could be completed.
The application for return of the vehicle
On 16 September 2025, the Office of the Traffic Commissioner (“OTC”) received an application from the claimant for the return of the vehicle (dated 9 September 2025).
The claimant asserted that she had been using her lorry to help a previous elderly customer to move house. The customer had paid “fuel only” and no money had been exchanged. The claimant said she had a smaller 3.5-ton truck that she used for commercial purposes. The lorry was used for personal use on holidays and for “livestock” use 7 days a week as well as for “friends/favours to help not work”.
The claimant provided a copy of a text type message from a Caroline Ghattaura. The message was addressed to David (The claimant had endorsed this as meaning the driver, Mr Wade). The message explained that the customer had chosen “your company” and they liked the fact it was an ecofriendly company/charity. The customer was relocating her elderly mother to Wales and had to dispose of a huge amount of furniture. The customer was impressed the “company re-homed these items to worthy causes”. The message continues, “We appreciated that any payment contributed towards the costs of fuel up to Wales”.
Evidence and Findings
Ownership of the vehicle
Miss Cuffin in her evidence at the impounding hearing insisted she was the lawful owner of the vehicle. She was unable to provide any further documentary evidence of ownership other than the V5 “log book”.
Miss Cuffin said she had purchased the vehicle from members of Mr Wade’s family in 2022 around the time she was registered as its keeper. She paid for the vehicle partly in cash and partly by trading horses. Ms Cuffin said she had no documentary evidence of this transaction. She said she could potentially obtain bank evidence of a cash withdrawal at around the time of the purchase. Ms Cuffin said she could no longer obtain a receipt from the seller of the vehicle as there had been a breakdown in family relationships.
I asked Miss Cuffin to explain why she had mentioned in her original application that the vehicle was the “last thing I have of my father” suggesting she had inherited the vehicle from him. Miss Cuffin could not give me a clear explanation for that statement in her original application.
Mr Jones on behalf of the DVSA made the point that it had been explained to Miss Cuffin at the first hearing that the V5 was not proof of ownership and she had been given the opportunity to produce further evidence in that regard (that requirement having also been set out in the original directions issued on 17 September 2025).
Miss Cuffin also gave evidence that she did not hold an entitlement to drive the vehicle and that it was driven by Mr Wade for the personal purposes she said it was used. Whilst it is not necessarily unusual in a commercial context for a large goods vehicle to be owned by a person who is unable to drive it themselves, it does appear less consistent with the context presented by Miss Cuffin that this was primarily a vehicle for the personal use of her and her family.
I have considered the guidance offered by the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document No. 7 and the following advice:
“The correct test is whether the appellant had produced sufficient evidence to satisfy the traffic commissioner upon the balance of probabilities, that he is the owner and not whether there is credible evidence that the vehicle is owned by anyone other than the claimant”.
Statutory Document No. 7 also refers to previous case law on this issue including “Construction Access UK Limited 2005/565” where the Upper Tribunal commented,
“the production of a log book is not conclusive evidence of ownership. Something more is needed. The Appellant in this case has failed to produce any evidence of ownership save for the log book and we doubt that the Appellant could in any event, produce anything more.”
I reach the same conclusion in this case. The claimant has failed to produce any tangible evidence of ownership beyond the V5 logbook. This is despite being given direction and ample opportunity to do so.
In the absence of such evidence, I cannot exclude the possibility that another person may have ownership or partial ownership of the vehicle. The claimant has therefore failed to satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that she is the owner of the detained vehicle.
I take account of the guidance offered by the Upper Tribunal in “Clayton Car Sales Limited T/2012/53” that the general rule is that ownership is the sensible starting point in any impounding hearing or decision because it is only the owner who can apply to a traffic commissioner for the return of an impounded vehicle
I determine that the claim by Rebecca Cuffin must fail as it has not passed that starting point by demonstrating ownership of the vehicle. I have nevertheless continued to consider the evidence on the other questions that would otherwise have fallen to be considered.
DVSA’s right to detain the vehicle
I received evidence from TE Haines-Burke in the form of a signed written statement and the exhibits as appeared in the brief. This was supported by his oral evidence at the hearing on 23 October 2025.
TE Haines-Burke stated that at the point of detaining the vehicle, he had reason to believe that the vehicle was being used for hire and reward and, that there was no operator’s licence in force authorising that use.
I consider that the facts as known to him at the time were such that it was reasonable for him to be that at the point of impounding, its officer reasonably believed that the vehicle was being used for hire and reward and, that there was no operator’s licence in force authorising that use.
Miss Cuffin stated that she did not accept that the DVSA had the right to detain the vehicle and described their actions as “stealing” the vehicle. This appeared to be based on her frustration that TE Haines-Burke had not accepted the assertions and explanations Mr Wade and her had offered at the time. Miss Cuffin did not seek to challenge the factual events described in TE Haines-Burke’s statement.
Those facts are that the traffic examiner encountered a 7.5-ton goods vehicle being used on a road to transport property belonging to a third party for the purposes of a house move. Those facts were accepted by the claimant as was the fact that there was no operator licence in force. The claimant’s issue is that the particular circumstances of the vehicle’s use did not require an operator’s licence. That is an issue for me to determine and is further discussed below.
In terms of the approach taken by TE Haines-Burke at the point of detaining the vehicle, I consider that the facts available to him at the time were such that it was reasonable for him to believe the vehicle was being used for hire and reward without an operator’s licence in force authorising that use.
On that basis, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that at the point of impounding on 2 September 2025, the DVSA had reason to believe that the detained vehicle was being or had been used, on a road, in contravention of Section 2 of the 1995 Act and they acted lawfully in detaining the vehicle.
The claimant did not raise any procedural challenges in relation to the requirements set out in the Act and Regulations. I have also reviewed the steps taken and I am satisfied those requirements have been met including the service of relevant notices on the claimant and other relevant persons, and adherence with the specified time limits (as extended).
The ground claimed for the return of the vehicle
The claimant’s basis for the return of the vehicle was that it was not being used for a commercial purpose on 3 September 2025 and had never been used for any such purpose that required an operator’s licence.
The claimant did not deny receiving the “pre-impounding” letter in 2023 although she claimed that related to her use of another smaller vehicle. She also claimed that subsequent investigation confirmed she did not need an operator’s licence. I am satisfied on that evidence that Miss Cuffin is aware of the circumstances when the use of a large goods vehicle requires an operator’s licence.
Miss Cuffin’s case was that the vehicle was used as a personal car by her and her family. It was used to transport water and feed for her horses as well as for the purposes of family holidays. Miss Cuffin claimed the vehicle was equipped with a projector screen for such use. TE Haines-Burke said that he did not see any evidence when he inspected the vehicle of such a screen or other indicators that it was used as a motorhome or similar accommodation. His view was that the vehicle was a straightforward box van used for transporting goods. The photographs I have seen of the vehicle would appear to bear out that view.
In any event, even if the vehicle was occasionally or even primarily used for private purposes, an operator’s licence would be required for any other use that fell within the scope of the Act.
There is some evidence such as the ANPR data and the change in mileage between the last MoT test in 2022 and the impounding in September 2025 that raises the question of whether the vehicle has been used for commercial purposes more regularly on other occasions. However, for the purposes of this application, I have focussed on the circumstances of the use on 3 September 2025.
Miss Cuffin accepts that she has a business named “Eco Property Clearances” that offers house clearance and house removal services. Miss Cuffin said that she has 3 open backed pick-up trucks that she uses for the house clearance work to take collected waste for disposal. Those trucks are not suitable for house removals and on those jobs, she claimed she worked in partnership with a family member who owns luton bodied vehicles.
Miss Cuffin insisted that she had never used the detained vehicle for the purposes of her business but said it is the same vehicle that appears in the images on the website for her business. She said she had shown the vehicle to give potential customers the impression the business was bigger than it was. She also volunteered that she had lied on the website about the extent of her experience in removals, to attract more business. Clearly I must take account of these admissions of knowingly making such false representations when considering what weight to give to Miss Cuffin’s other evidence.
In relation to the journey on 3 September 2025, Miss Cuffin said this had its origins in work she had undertaken for a customer of her business previously. The customer had mentioned that her mother was relocating from the London area to Swansea and Miss Cuffin said that she had agreed to assist with the move using the detained vehicle as a “favour”. She insisted that this was not a business transaction, and she would not have profited from the arrangement.
It was however agreed that the customer would cover the fuel costs for the journey. Miss Cuffin could not answer precisely what amount had been agreed, saying it would have depended on the actual mileage had the journey been completed. She also could not say what rate per mile had been agreed. Miss Cuffin said that no payment had been made for fuel in the end, because of the impounding. Miss Cuffin had taken on the cost of hiring the replacement vehicle and had not been reimbursed.
I am troubled by Miss Cuffin’s inability or unwillingness to provide more detail about the precise amount of reimbursement agreed in advance of the journey. I also question her assertion that payment was not received when the text message that she has produced from the customer, infers that payment was made. The tenor of that text message such as the reference to choosing “your company” also indicates this was more likely a business and not personal arrangement.
In considering the matter I have taken account of cases including “Albert v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1971] 2 All E.R. 1345”. Although dealing with the carriage of passengers, I considered the House of Lords finding in that case that the test as to whether a vehicle was being used for “hire or reward” was whether there had been “a systematic carrying […] for reward which, “went beyond the bounds of mere social kindness”.( ) It is immaterial that no contractual relationship was intended. The words “hire or reward” must be read disjunctively; “reward” is widely construed, and would be deemed where the carriage has a “flavour of business about it”.( ) It has been held that “almost anything which is an occupation, as distinguished from a pleasure - anything which is an occupation or duty which requires attention is a business”.( )”
I have also considered the more recent decision of the Upper Tribunal in “DVSA v Parker Body Repairs Ltd [2020] UKUT (18 December 2020) (AAC), Appeal No. T/2020/20” setting out the questions to be asked when considering if a standard operator’s licence is required:
- Does the carrying go beyond the “bounds of mere social kindness”?
- Does the carrying have a “flavour of business about it”?
- Does the carrying result in consideration, direct or indirect, which benefited the owner or user of the vehicle?
I find there are some undisputed and incontrovertible facts in this case:
- Miss Cuffin had been warned in 2023 about the consequences of operating a vehicle without an operator’s licence.
- Miss Cuffin runs a business offering house removal services.
- The detained vehicle has been used in advertising the removal services.
- The vehicle was being used to carry a third party’s property by way of house removal on 3 September 2025 on a journey of considerable length between South East England and South East Wales.
- On her own admission, Miss Cuffin was to receive a financial consideration for the carriage of the goods in the form of reimbursement of fuel costs.
I consider that all those facts taken together are capable of forming a compelling case that on 3 September 2025 the vehicle was being used on a road for the carriage of goods for hire or reward and therefore required the authority of an operator’s licence. The journey was to undertake exactly the type of service that Miss Cuffin advertises her business as providing. I find it is highly unlikely and implausible that such a journey was undertaken for no reward whatsoever. To use the words of the cases cited below, I consider the carrying here went beyond the bounds of “mere social kindness” and that there is a very strong “flavour of business” about the circumstances here.
However, for the purposes of determining this application, I am not required to make a finding that there has been use in breach of the statutory provisions. The proper question I am required to ask is whether the claimant has shown the negative, namely that the vehicle was not being used for such a purpose. The claimant has fallen far short of persuading me on the balance of probabilities that the grounds for return of the vehicle in Regulation 4(3)(b) of the Regulations are met.
Even if I had not found against the claimant on the issue of ownership, her claim would have failed in any event on the basis of a lack of evidence to support the grounds for return in the Regulations.
Consequently, I find this application fails and direct that as soon as the period for lodging an appeal (1 month from today) has expired that DVSA may dispose of the vehicle in accordance with the regulations.
Gerallt Evans
Deputy Traffic Commissioner
24 October 2025