Decision for the Impounded Vehicle W3 BYS
Decision of the Deputy Traffic Commissioner in the West of England Traffic Area.
IN THE WEST OF ENGLAND TRAFFIC AREA
RE. IMPOUNDED VEHICLE, W3 BYS
DECISION OF DEPUTY TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER G. PENGELLY
DECISION
The DVSA has proven a lawful basis to impound vehicle registration W3 BYS on 16.02.26 and the application made by Mr. David Harry Webb for the return of that vehicle is refused because none of the four grounds set out in Regulation 4(3) of the Goods Vehicles (Enforcement Powers) Regulations 2001 (as amended) are met by Mr. Webb.
Background
This is an application, dated 06.03.26, by Mr. David Harry Webb for the return of the above-impounded vehicle; the vehicle is an Iveco lorry used for carrying skips. It was impounded on 16.02.26 in the Tewkesbury area.
In considering this case, I have confined myself only to the papers that are on the Case Center system. I asked the Office of the Traffic Commissioner at Bristol to upload two further documents:
- A better copy of certain emails where the previous formatting made them difficult to read; and
- An email concerned with the service of the DVSA’s evidence on Mr. Webb (see paragraph eleven-(d), below).
Mr. Webb’s application is handwritten; he explains in that that his handwriting is not good. I have done my best to follow what he has written there. I confess I cannot read all of it.
It seems as if various public inquiries were listed to take place in Bristol between April and July 2026 to consider this application. All I can glean from the papers is that there certainly was a public inquiry listed to take place in Bristol before TC Bell on 07.07.26. I can discern, from an email in the case papers, that TC Bell did not determine the application but directed both parties, if so advised, to file skeleton arguments within seven days. I can see that the Office of the Traffic Commissioner at Bristol subsequently helped Mr. Webb by explaining to him, in plain English, what a skeleton argument was.
I was asked to deal with this case because I was the only Traffic Commissioner sitting last week with capacity to determine the matter urgently – I have had no previous involvement; I do not usually sit in this Traffic Area. In the circumstances set out above, I extend time for the consideration of Mr. Webb’s application until today under Regulation 23 of the Goods Vehicles (Enforcement Powers) Regulations 2001 (“the 2001 Regulations”).
It would be a poor start to the fair determination of any application by anyone that the latter was illegible (paragraph four, above); happily, in this case, there are two emails dated 30.06.26 setting out Mr. Webb’s case. After TC Bell’s invitation to Mr. Webb to file a skeleton argument (paragraph five, above), he wrote a further email dated 14.07.26 where he sets out his case again.
Taking all those emails together, I am confident that – whatever was precisely written in Mr. Webb’s original application – he has set out his case in full across these various emails. His case has remained consistent across them all.
Mr. Webb has always wanted the application to be dealt with in writing:
- I can see that from the terms of his original application; there, he also refers to himself as being 74 years old;
- I can also see that in one of his 30.06.26 emails he says this,
“I’m sorry i can’t be at the meeting [i.e. the 07.07.26 public inquiry] but at the minute my body won’t play ball but i [know] u don’t want to hear that so thanks very much for reading this and I’m [sure] u will give it some thought thank you very much”;
- I can also see an email from Mr. Webb, dated 07.07.26, in these terms,
“…I’m happy for it to be done on the paper work I’m not holding my breath on getting the truck back so wat will be will be sorry Ive been a bit slow getting back to u but as u no i was in the hospital today thank them very much for giving me time but i just can’t make it as much as id like to thank you again”;
I can see why other Traffic Commissioners have wanted there to be an oral hearing given the handwriting issues identified above. Having now read the bundle, I can also see that Mr. Webb’s emails do not engage with the pertinent DVSA evidence in this case. That is another reason why a public inquiry would have been beneficial for understanding Mr. Webb’s case and would probably have helped him.
I consider, however, that Mr. Webb has had sufficient opportunity to engage with the proceedings:
- He does not want an oral hearing;
- I have no confidence he would attend an oral hearing if I asked one to be listed again;
- This jurisdiction, as with any other, has finite resources and other demands on its resources. Whilst I would strongly have preferred to deal with this case at an oral hearing, I cannot justify listing another public inquiry where I have no confidence Mr. Webb would attend – he appears to be seriously unwell;
- If Mr. Webb did not have all the papers previously, he certainly had them from 09.07.26 when the papers on Case Center were sent to him by the Office of the Traffic Commissioner at Bristol;
- Mr. Webb can evidently read things sent to him digitally because he can send and receive emails; he tells me he prefers sending emails rather than writing things down;
- Mr. Webb had the opportunity, given to him by TC Bell, to say anything else he wanted to say in writing by 14.07.26 after which I am satisfied he had been given the DVSA’s evidence.
I consider, in those circumstances, with considerable reluctance, that Mr. Webb’s application should be determined on the papers.
If that decision leads to a determination that is adverse to Mr. Webb, then I am satisfied he has had sufficient opportunity to engage with me in writing and to request or attend a public inquiry for all of this to be dealt with there more fully.
Legal Framework
Regulation 3(1) of the 2001 Regulations provides, “Where an authorised person has reason to believe that a vehicle is being, or has been, used on a road in contravention of section 2 of the [Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 (“the 1995 Act”)], he may detain the vehicle and its contents”.
Regulation 4 provides,
“(1) In the circumstances described in paragraph (2), a vehicle detained by virtue of regulation 3 shall be returned to the owner, without the need for an application under regulation 10.
(2) The circumstances are that the authorised person is satisfied that one or more of the grounds specified in paragraph (3) is or are made out.
(3) The grounds are—
(a) that, at the time the vehicle was detained, the person using the vehicle held a valid licence (whether or not authorising the use of the vehicle);
(b) that, at the time the vehicle was detained, the vehicle was not being, and had not been, used in contravention of section 2 of the 1995 Act;
(c) that, although at the time the vehicle was detained it was being, or had been, used in contravention of section 2 of the 1995 Act, the owner did not know that it was being, or had been, so used;
(d) that, although knowing at the time the vehicle was detained that it was being, or had been, used in contravention of section 2 of the 1995 Act, the owner—
(i) had taken steps with a view to preventing that use; and
(ii) has taken steps with a view to preventing any further such use”
Regulation 10(2)(a) provides,
“(2) An application under paragraph (1) shall be given in writing and shall be accompanied by—
(a) a statement of one or more of the grounds specified in [regulation 4(3)] on which the application is declared to be based…”
Section Two of the 1995 Act, so far as relevant, provides,
“(1)Subject to subsection (2) and sections 3A and 4, no person shall use a goods vehicle on a road for the carriage of goods—
(a)for hire or reward, or
(b)for or in connection with any trade or business carried on by him, except under a licence issued under this Act; and in this Act such a licence is referred to as an ‘operator’s licence’.”
Section 58 of the 1995 Act provides,
“… ‘goods vehicle’ means a motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods, or a trailer so constructed or adapted…
‘carriage of goods’ includes haulage of goods;
‘goods’ includes goods or burden of any description…” (emphasis added)
I derive the following propositions of law from the summary of the Upper Tribunal’s case law in the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document Seven:
The applicant must satisfy the Traffic Commissioner, on the civil standard of proof, that s/he/it owned the impounded vehicle at the time it was detained;
Following that, the DVSA must demonstrate that it had a case for impounding the vehicle, i.e. that its officers had “reason to believe” that it was being used in contravention of the legislation. The DVSA must prove the existence of those grounds to the civil standard of proof;
After that, the applicant must make out one of the grounds in the 2001 Regulations; the applicant, at that stage, bears the burden of proof to the civil standard;
On the issue of ‘knowledge’ in the grounds (Regulation 4(3)(c)-(d)):
The applicant must prove it lacked the relevant ‘knowledge’; unfortunately, therefore, the applicant must prove a negative;
Knowledge on the part of the applicant can be ‘imputed’ where:
- The applicant would have acquired that knowledge if they had not “wilfully shut [their] eyes to the obvious”; or
- The applicant would have acquired that knowledge if they had not “wilfully and recklessly failed to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable person would make”;
In this context, recklessly means ‘not caring about the consequences of failing to make such inquiries’;
Knowledge should only be ‘imputed’ if there is a high degree of fault on the part of the applicant in failing to make such inquiries;
A person is taken to know something, even if they ‘actually’ do not, if:
- They know of circumstances that would indicate the latter to an honest and reasonable person; or
- They know of circumstances that would put an honest and reasonable person on inquiry about the latter;
For these two scenarios, mere negligence on the part of the applicant is insufficient, there must be evidence of dishonesty, or of a dishonest motive, on the part of the applicant failing to recognise/make inquiries which an honest or reasonable person would have made;
To assist with these various issues about knowledge, the Traffic Commissioners are encouraged to ask themselves the following questions:
- What inquiries would an honest and reasonable person have made in the circumstances faced by the person claiming the return of the vehicle?
- Did the claimant make such inquiries?
- Did the claimant wilfully refrain from making such inquiries?
- Did the claimant recklessly refrain from making such inquiries?
- Was a high degree of fault involved in wilfully failing to make such inquiries?
On the issue of what steps an applicant could have taken to prevent the vehicle’s improper use (Regulation 4(3)(d)), it is a high test. The applicant must take/have taken “all reasonable steps” open to it. The operator should demonstrate what “robust systems and procedures” it had put in place as well as any explanation of why those procedures were ineffective on any individual occasion;
If an applicant fails to establish a ground for the return of their vehicle, a Traffic Commissioner does not have a residual discretion to return the vehicle anyway; there is no concept of ‘proportionality’ in this part of the Traffic Commissioner’s jurisdiction.
Mr. Webb’s Application
Mr. Webb is not legally represented. I am not going to hold it against him that he has only ticked one ‘box’ on a form where it is plain his case runs wider than that. I will deal with his full application on its merits.
Mr. Webb’s case is that:
- He bought the lorry from a ‘Mr. Gibbons’ of Cheltenham on 02.04.25;
- The registration number when he bought it was a registration ending NEL;
- The lorry was not being driven by him on 16.02.26, but by his son;
- The lorry was empty when it was seized by DVSA – it had not, at the point it was seized, been loaded by his son;
- Mr. Webb is a member of the gypsy community;
- Mr. Webb believes that the DVSA officers were prejudiced against him on that account and were struggling to justify their actions that day, as evidenced by one of the officers having to have a lengthy phone call with someone to find justification to seize the vehicle;
- The lorry’s MOT was about to expire and it was about to be tested;
- Generally, Mr. Webb had the lorry to “do [his] own work”;
- He will sell the lorry if he gets it back from DVSA because he cannot use it anymore.
DVSA’s Evidence
Events of 16.02.26
On 16.02.26, the lorry was being driven by the applicant’s son on the A38 near Tewkesbury; it was carrying an empty skip.
The lorry was followed by officers to a third-party business based in Tewkesbury.
There, the officers observed:
- The vehicle’s driver, the applicant’s son, getting out of the cab and then manoeuvring a forklift truck;
- The forklift truck was carrying scrap metal/swarf in a bin;
- The bin was driven out onto the car park where the impounded vehicle was parked;
- The bin was emptied into a skip in the car park;
- The latter skip was of an identical colouring to the empty one mounted on the back of the impounded vehicle;
- The two skips on the floor of the car park were partly full of scrap metal/swarf.
Enquiries were made, by the officers, with the applicant’s son; the applicant’s son said the vehicle was his father’s and that the latter was aware he was using it.
The applicant’s son subsequently said he was using the vehicle for a “private journey”.
Enquiries were made with the applicant himself, following a phone call by the officers, who said that his son was using the impounded vehicle for “his own purposes”.
It was discovered that the impounded vehicle had been driven 2,623.7km in the period 19.01-16.02.26.
The impounded vehicle’s tachograph machine was calibrated to a vehicle with a registration ending ‘NEL under the company name ‘Severn Metals’. That machine showed that Severn Metals had been ‘locked in’ to it since 2024.
Records were found at the third-party business premises referring to scrap metal/swarf having been carried away by the impounded vehicle in late 2025 and early 2026.
Those records showed invoices, addressed to ‘Severn Metals’, discussing the transfer of waste from the visited business to Severn Metals.
The address of Severn Metals on those records was the same address as appears on the applicant’s son’s driving licence.
Historical Matters
A ‘Mr. David Webb’ formerly held a goods licence with the trading name ‘Severn Metals’; that licence was revoked with effect from 05.03.24.
There are three ‘David Webbs’ referred to in the papers in this case:
- David Harry Webb, the applicant;
- David Webb, the applicant’s son; and
- David Leighton Webb.
The DVSA’s report sometimes does not distinguish, at critical points, between the applicant and the other David Webbs. From other evidence in the papers, it is clear the revoked operator’s licence was held by the applicant’s son (the address on the former Severn Metals licence is the same as: (i) the address of his son’s driving licence; and (ii) the business address on the third-party’s records for Severn Metals).
There was an incident on 31.03.25, when the impounded lorry had a registration ending ‘NEL; it failed to stop for the DVSA. The applicant’s son was the driver on that occasion. The lorry was displaying the livery of Severn Metals.
An email from ‘David Webb’ of Severn Metals to the DVSA, dated 08.04.25, states that they [Severn Metals] were sorry to hear that that lorry did not stop for the DVSA but that it was not theirs anymore – it had been sold on 19.03.25.
On 14.04.25, a subsequent email was sent from Severn Metals confirming that the lorry had been sold on 19.03.25 to a ‘Mr. Gibbons’ of Cheltenham (see paragraph 21(a), above). The DVSA tried to trace ‘Mr. Gibbons’ and his address – both of those enquiries were fruitless.
The registered keeper information showed that:
- A lorry with registration ending ‘SXM was disposed of by Severn Metals on 19.03.25;
- A lorry with that registration was registered by the applicant on 23.04.25;
- The registration ending ‘NEL was held ‘on retention’ for Severn Metals from 03.04.25;
Enquiries have been conducted by the DVSA; those enquiries establish that:
- The chassis number for the lorry with the former registration ‘SXM was the same as the impounded lorry’s;
- The MOT on the impounded lorry was due to expire on 28.02.26; and
- Automatic number plate recognition (“ANPR”) records showed the impounded lorry was being used in the West of England area in late 2025/early 2026 on its new registration, the one ending ‘BYS.
Ownership of the Impounded Vehicle
I am satisfied on the civil standard of proof that Mr. Webb owned the impounded vehicle as of 02.04.25; I am satisfied it remained his vehicle on 16.02.26.
I reject the DVSA’s submissions to the contrary for the following reasons:
- Mr. Webb has produced a sales receipt in his name with his address in North Wales on it; the registration on the sales receipt ends ‘NEL;
- The seemingly late updating of the vehicle’s registered keeper information by the applicant is not determinative of the issue of ownership;
- The suspiciousness of the circumstances surrounding the disposal of the lorry (paragraphs 34-38, above) by the applicant’s son supports, not weakens, the applicant’s case about ownership;
- Mr. Webb’s son immediately referred to it as his father’s vehicle on 16.02.26 when approached by DVSA officers (paragraph 25, above);
- The applicant’s son is the only other serious candidate for the ownership of this vehicle and he says it is his father’s;
- No-one else has come forward to claim the vehicle.
So, I accept Mr. Webb’s case as to ownership.
Reasonable Belief to Detain
I am not at this stage testing whether the DVSA officers have proved something to be true according to the civil rules of evidence; I am testing whether the officers had “reason to believe” the vehicle was being used in contravention of section two of the 1995 Act at the point they detained it.
I find the DVSA have proved their officers had such a belief for the following reasons:
- They saw pertinent events with their own eyes (paragraphs 22-24, above); and
- They saw material in a third party business’ records providing strong evidence that the vehicle was being used to carry on a scrap metal disposal/recycling business previously (paragraphs 30-32, above);
Those two matters gave rise to a reasonable set of beliefs, on the part of the officers, that a vehicle over 3,500kg was being driven on a public road for ‘hire or reward’ or for/in connection with a business (paragraph 17, above). The inferences the officers were entitled to draw was that that skip lorry was engaged in carrying away scrap metal/swarf as part of a business operation which the applicant’s son was a part of.
Grounds for Return
I now refer to the various grounds in Regulation 4(3) as set out above at paragraph 15; I will label them sequentially, ‘Ground-A’, ‘Ground-B’, etc.
Ground-A
Mr. Webb does not argue Ground-A. The applicant does not contend that he or his son had a goods licence at the time – that is not part of the applicant’s case. I know of no other such goods licence from reading the bundle aside from his son’s which was revoked in 2024.
This ground is accordingly not made out.
Ground-B
Providing a person holds an appropriate personal or vocational driving licence, anyone can drive a skip lorry on a British road; a person only needs an operator’s licence if they are carrying goods for hire or reward or for/in connection with any trade or business carried on by them (paragraph 17, above).
Unfortunately for the applicant, carrying an empty skip ‘counts’ as carrying goods (see paragraph 18, above).
As to the purpose of the applicant’s son’s using that lorry on 16.02.26, neither he nor the applicant have explained what other use they had for it that day other than collecting scrap metal/swarf as part of a business.
All that both the applicant and his son have said is that they were there for their own purposes or for a private journey (paragraphs 25-27, above).
I cannot readily understand what personal use, not connected with a business, the applicant or his son had for that lorry.
What the evidence shows is that the lorry had been in use taking away scrap metal/swarf for that other business in Tewkesbury (paragraphs 29-31, above). I make a finding to that effect.
The applicant only succeeds on this ground if he can show that the impounded vehicle “was not being, and had not been” used without a valid operator’s licence. I find the vehicle was being and had been used without a valid operator’s licence.
The impounded lorry was evidently not being driven to an MOT test (paragraph 21(g), above); it had been parked at a third party’s business premises. No evidence of any MOT test has been forthcoming.
This ground is not made out by the applicant.
Ground-C
The applicant knew his son was driving the lorry that day (paragraphs 21(c), 25, and 27), above).
As aforesaid (paragraphs 49-50, above), the applicant has been unable to explain what possible purpose his son would have his lorry for that was not in connection with a business or for hire/reward.
I find that the applicant’s son had been using the lorry in the buildup to 16.02.26; that is evidenced by:
- The waste transfer records which show collections involving the impounded vehicle earlier in 2025/2026 (paragraph 30, above);
- The applicant’s son’s presence, collecting scrap metal/swarf, shortly before the vehicle was impounded on 16.02.26 (paragraph 24, above);
- The applicant’s son’s previous use of that vehicle in 2025 (see paragraphs 20(b), 35, and 38-39, above); and
- The ANPR records showing its use in the West of England (where the applicant’s son’s address is) rather than North Wales (where the applicant’s address is) (paragraph 39(c), above).
There is nothing in the evidence before me that suggests the applicant and his son are not ‘close’; in fact:
- The applicant’s coming to own the lorry so soon after it was alleged by the DVSA that the applicant’s son had driven it inappropriately (paragraphs 35-38; and
- The applicant’s then lending the lorry to his son regularly thereafter (paragraph 58, above);
Suggests the opposite is true.
The inference I draw from the evidence is that the applicant was helping his son out when the latter had got into trouble with the DVSA by allowing his son to keep the vehicle connected with his son’s business while allowing his son to claim to the DVSA that he sold the latter so he could not be responsible for the incident on 31.03.25.
Drawing those conclusions and threads of the evidence together, I now address the questions posed at paragraph 19(d)(vi), above.
What inquiries would an honest and reasonable person have made in the circumstances faced by the person claiming the return of the vehicle?
Answer: To ask his son what use he planned to make of the vehicle whilst he had it. To ask what his son needed it for. To check with his son, if he lent that vehicle for a long time, what use he was making of his lorry, periodically, over time.
Did the claimant make such inquiries?
Answer: No, the applicant has only ever expressed himself in the vaguest possible terms in the evidence in this case when discussing what he/his son say they were using that lorry for.
Did the claimant wilfully refrain from making such inquiries?
Answer: Yes, the applicant has never explained what use he himself had for a skip lorry without an operator’s licence. The only use I can see, on the evidence in the bundle, is its use to carry on a business of recycling/disposing scrap metal/swarf. That was a business his son formerly carried out under an operator’s licence. Absent any evidence suggesting a spectacular lack of communication between father and son, which seems inconsistent with an arrangement where the applicant trusted his son enough to regularly lend him a lorry, I find that the applicant was aware of his son’s business, the revocation of the licence of that business in 2024, and this lorry’s previous use in that business. The reason the applicant never made any of the inquiries above is because he knew his son was likely using the lorry to carry on that business without having an operator’s licence.
Did the claimant recklessly refrain from making such inquiries?
Answer: Yes, because the applicant knew that his son was very likely using the lorry to do something it should not have been doing without an operator’s licence and did not object to his son’s actions.
Was a high degree of fault involved in wilfully failing to make such inquiries?
Answer: Yes, the applicant very likely knew what his son was doing but chose to support his son rather than ask him to stop using his lorry illegally.
For all of those reasons, the applicant has not made out this ground.
Ground-D
The applicant does not argue this ground. His actions, described in paragraph 61 above, are inconsistent with his taking steps to prevent his lorry’s being used illegally
So, the applicant has not made out this ground.
Conclusion
I acknowledge that this vehicle cost the applicant a lot of money and that he did not drive it that day on 16.02.26.
I acknowledge that a skip lorry might occasionally be used by a householder to remove garden waste (or some such similar use) and that, providing a person has the right driving licence, a person does not need an operator’s licence to drive a skip lorry to do that.
The facts of this case, however, are different. I am satisfied that the applicant’s son was carrying on a business processing scrap metal, using this lorry, when he should not have been and that the applicant can properly be imputed with knowledge of those facts.
Whatever sympathy I have for the plight of Mr Webb to get his lorry back, I do not have any power to do that for the reasons explained at paragraph 19(f), above.
Decision
Accordingly, my decision is that the DVSA has proven a lawful basis to impound vehicle registration W3 BYS on 16.02.26 and that the application made by Mr. David Harry Webb for the return of that vehicle is refused because none of the four grounds set out in Regulation 4(3) of the 2001 Regulations are met by Mr. Webb.
Giles Pengelly
Deputy Traffic Commissioner
03.08.26