Decision for Scorpion Engineering Ltd (OH1070549) and Transport Manager Sean Donovan
Written decision of the Traffic Commissioner for the West of England for Scorpion Engineering Ltd and transport manager Sean Donovan
Western Traffic Area
SCORPION ENGINEERING LTD OH1070549
SEAN DONOVAN – TRANSPORT MANAGER
AT A PUBLIC INQUIRY IN BRISTOL 9 OCTOBER 2025
DECISION
The Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 (as amended) (“the Act”)
Pursuant to a finding of loss of good repute of primary director Nigel Hannon and Scorpion Engineering Ltd, the licence is revoked in line with Section 27(1)(a). Revocation will take effect from 24 January 2026.
Pursuant to a finding of multiple serious breaches of undertakings, specifically to comply with the rules on tachographs and not to overload vehicles, the licence is revoked in line with Section 26(1)(f). Revocation will take effect from 24 January 2026.
Sections 26(1)(c)(iii) and 26(1)(ca) are made out. Due to the sheer rate and persistence of offending, I attach considerable weight. The licence is revoked with effect from 24 January 2026.
The retirement of Sean Donovan as transport manager is accepted along with an undertaking that he will not seek to rely on his qualification in the future.
BACKGROUND
Scorpion Engineering Ltd is the holder of a standard international goods vehicle operator’s licence authorising the use of seven vehicles and four trailers from an operating centre near Swindon. The directors are Nigel Hannon and Penelope Hannon. The transport manager is Sean Donovan. The operator is engaged in vehicle transport.
The operator has compliance history. The most recent was a public inquiry before me in October 2017 where the issues were serious drivers hours matters and overloading. Within my decision, I noted “I do not accept that the gross overload in January was a miscalculation. The 7.5 tonne vehicle with a payload of around 3 tonnes was overloaded by half a tonne. This is compounded by the fact that it was not a one-off and has been repeated as recently as July this year.” Sean Donovan was present and appointed transport manager at the hearing.
DVSA conducted a desk-based assessment in June 2025. This appears to have been triggered by multiple offences at the roadside covering overloading, drivers hours, tachographs and mechanical condition. The outcome was unsatisfactory summarised as follows:
- There had been 22 traffic encounters which resulted in 24 defects and offences
- The tachograph in vehicle E20NJH had not been recalibrated from KP67YYP
- Arrangements for load security were incomplete
- No system to manage driver CPC
- No evidence of transport manager CPD
This outcome along with the roadside enforcement compliance history caused me to call the operator and transport manager to public inquiry.
Sean Donovan responded to the call-up by sending to my office a letter of resignation dated 2 September 2025.
THE PUBLIC INQUIRY
Director Nigel Hannon, transport manager Sean Donovan, general manager James Begley and transport consultant Andrea Cox attended represented by Scott Bell, solicitor. Maintenance compliance documents had been uploaded to Case Center in advance and traffic compliance documents were sent to DVSA enabling a pre-PI update to be provided. Finances were satisfactory. I noted that there were no written submissions; Mr Bell didn’t believe they were necessary in this case.
Mr Bell told me that Mr Donovan wanted to retire and there was a new application for transport manager for Mr Begley. They had brought with them the tyre which had been recently prohibited. Certificates of weight had not been provided by DVSA on several occasions due to weigh-pads being used. The case was quite nuanced.
Mr Hannon told me that his wife was a co-director but not greatly involved in the business. The business has three aspects, fleet delivery mainly for leasing companies, a 24-hour recovery business and 24-hour garage workshops. There were 25 staff. Eleven vehicles were used on recovery. Four vehicles were dedicated to fleet delivery and it was a separate fleet for recovery although o-licence vehicles have been used for that on occasion.
Sean Donovan had been transport manager since the 2017 inquiry. The plan was to move that across to James Begley who had joined the business as a school-leaver at sixteen. He had taken the CPC on his own back.
When they started in 2007, cars were much smaller, they moved Polo and Golf typically. They had moved from 3.5 tonne to 4.25 tonnes, then three 5.5 tonne Sprinters with trailers. He had assumed incorrectly that they would have a train weight of 8.25 tonnes but when stopped it became apparent that the train weight was 7 tonnes. They made attempts to have them upgraded via a single-vehicle approval but that had not been possible. Then they decided to go in for “overkill” but realised the drivers couldn’t drive the larger vehicles with the licences they held. So they needed to upgrade drivers and vehicles. They lost about £40,000 on the Sprinters. He hadn’t seen the manufacturers plate under the bonnet. They were going off the plate in the vehicle which just said zero zero zero.
Customers were requested to send through the make and model of a vehicle and the approximate weight. Drivers got their jobs on a tablet. They get the VRM, VIN. He and Mr Begley would go online and download the kerb weights. On 11 September, there had been a recent encounter which was overloaded. Mr Hannon told me that the job came through as a Renault Megane full electric which had an approximate weight of 1670 kgs. The truck had a payload of 1675 or 1680 kgs because the driver was very small and very light. When she arrived to collect it, it was a Renault Scenic which was a couple of hundred kilos over due to misinformation from their customer. The driver was relatively new and didn’t know different vehicle makes and models. The collection had taken place at 4 am and the driver hadn’t felt she could ring anyone to check.
Customers got the vehicle details wrong more often than they should. The plan was to rule out using the smaller vehicles entirely as they were a problem. Mr Bell showed me the recently prohibited tyre – it had a flat spot, not worn all the way around.
Mr Hannon had started to come in and do on-the-spot checks on the drivers. They had introduced a new system which required that drivers photograph tyres.
The issue with the tachograph E20NJH being calibrated incorrectly had been resolved in July. Mr Hannon had found dealing with the desk-based assessment “not good”. He was very proactive in these cases and the information was sent within a few days. He called TE Doodge who failed to respond after that point. There being no further contact, Mr Hannon had assumed everything was OK. A full file had been sent via email to DVSA but DVSA couldn’t receive it. He had evidence that the file had been sent.
It was accepted that the tachograph had not been calibrated on EJ20 at that time. That vehicle was specified on the licence but was not being used in scope. It was on recovery operations. A logbook was being used. DVSA referred to a number of vehicles for which digital tachograph data had not been provided. DO03TOW was a 4-axle hiab vehicle primarily used for moving plant and containers used under the o-licence. SE10TOW and SE12TOW were two 2150kgs Mitsubushi pickups so outwith operator licensing. Retrospectively they took the decision to comply and fit them with tachographs at a cost of about £3000 because of their use. That data was sent to DVSA but caught in the DVSA spam filter.
A lot of effort was put in to making sure the drivers were right. They had upgraded their licences. They had introduced gate checks. Andrea Cox overviews the procedures. She liaises with the drivers. She made sure with Mr Donovan that the trucks were downloaded. Ms Cox has a big part in the recovery accreditations too.
There are four drivers for the o-licence vehicles. DO03 is used maybe once a fortnight. The two 7.2 tonners, the 5.2 tonner and the 5 tonner are used daily.
I asked who had managed the specification and purchase of the 5.5 tonne Sprinters. Mr Hannon told me that it had been his decision. He had not done his due diligence. The train weight was on a plate under the bonnet. I took Mr Hannon back to the recent overload and put it to him that it seemed reckless to send a vehicle for a load when, even if the customer information was correct, there was a margin of only 10kgs. Mr Hannon told me it was legal.
Whilst the formal application to add James Begley as transport manager was not before me, it seemed opportune to hear from him. He told me that he had started with Scorpion about 12 years ago and took his CPC four years ago. He had been managing the business since alongside Mr Hannon. He had two admin assistants, Andrea came in to help, and there was a new admin support to allow Mr Begley to take on the transport management role. He had undertaken one day refresher training with another booked on 27 November.
The upgraded trucks could carry a lot more than the old ones. All customers would email an exact weight from the factory so the correct truck could be assigned. They rarely got anywhere close. The new vehicles had a capacity of four tonnes and the heaviest vehicle was an iQ Buzz at 2.4 tonnes.
Mr Bell moved to closing submissions. It was a longstanding operator. The history was a long time ago. It was a different business back then. The DVSA assessment showed that they were doing a lot right. The director had accepted that they had bought the wrong vehicles and that had been a costly mistake, some £40,000. The approach to DVSA and to the inquiry had been proactive. There were no other issues with the business. The overloading was quite nuanced and could be dealt with by a warning. An audit was offered but would not realistically show anything different. If regulatory action is warranted, four vehicles are in use every day so some wriggle room was needed.
Mr Donovan could be allowed to resign.
I retired to reflect. In doing so, I revisited the on-road compliance performance and found I needed to hear more evidence on that. I asked Mr Bell to take the operator through each encounter in turn.
On 11 February 2021, there was a 10-20% overload on RK68BCU with driver Barnett having an expired driving licence. Mr Bell told me that was a long time ago. Mr Hannon told me the vehicle was a 3.5 tonne truck. He did not immediately remember the circumstances. It was a recovery vehicle.
On 12 May 2021, BU20YPD was a 4.25 tonne Iveco mostly used on fleet delivery. The tachograph had not been calibrated. Mr Bell questioned the data on the report as it was not obvious which offences had been prohibited and most had not had fixed penalties. On that basis, the operator would not have been sent copies. The operator may not be aware unless they had been checking the encounter report.
On 11 November 2022, there was a level 4 overload with a £300 FPN, between 15 and 30% overloaded, which is over one tonne overloaded. BU20YPD was a 4.25 tonner. Mr Hannon told me that this was when vehicles started to get heavier. I challenged that. I also asked why that had not been a call to action back then. I accepted that there was insufficient evidence to make anything of the alleged false records. There was also insufficient evidence to deal with the drivers hours matters in December 2022 and April 2023.
Vehicle SJ66PHK had been found to have a tachograph not fitted in accordance with the requirements on 2 February 2023. I was told that the vehicle had been fitted with a new clutch which disturbed the tachograph seal on the gearbox.
On 11 October 2024, there was a level 4 overload, but Mr Bell noted that no fixed penalty appeared to have been issued. Mr Bell told me that the operator should be given the benefit of the doubt.
On 16 October 2024 vehicle AE19HCV was found at Cornwall Services with a level 3 overload. Mr Bell again pointed out that no FPN had been issued and suggested that DVSA must have taken a view on the day that the offences were not very serious. I declined to agree.
Mr Hannon told me that AE19HCV was on recovery when pulled into Cornwall Services. The customer vehicle was removed and a larger truck sent for it.
I expressed concern that Mr Hannon seemed not to understand the impact of running dangerously overloaded vehicles.
I asked why the overloaded vehicle SC17FBF wasn’t taxed when stopped on 13 January this year. It was an administrative error. YA70FBJ was one of the 5.5 tonne Sprinters stopped at Leatherhead on 7 March 2025 with no Ministry plate, and the registration plate obscured. It was more than 30% overloaded when stopped again on 3 June. HF72AYN was the little Peugeot that I had heard about earlier where the customer had declared the wrong vehicle type.
Mr Bell took issue with my description of the seriously overloaded vehicles as dangerous or reckless. DVSA could have issued FPNs or prosecuted but had not done so. I ought to take account of their roadside actions which did not support an argument that the actions were serious. If regulatory action was taken, some time would be needed to let customers know.
Mr Donovan was retiring with immediate effect. I granted a period of grace of 1 month for Mr Begley’s application to be processed. I accepted Mr Donovan’s resignation on the basis that he would not seek to use his qualification again.
I reserved my decision and closed the hearing.
POST HEARING
I noted Mr Bell’s concern that it seemed fixed penalties had not been issued in all cases where overloading offences had been recorded so I asked my office to write to DVSA for an explanation. That explanation was provided in the form of a Section 9 statement from a Ms Hazel Groombridge, Enforcement Policy Specialist. It is a general statement of policy rather than an assessment of each encounter which may have been more helpful. Nevertheless it was sent to Mr Bell for comment and he duly did so. I take both the DVSA statement and Mr Bell’s response in to account in my decision.
CONSIDERATION AND FINDINGS OF FACT
Almost all of Mr Hannon’s explanation for the various shortcomings is based on mere assertion – there is almost no supporting evidence for anything he has said. Unusually for this law firm, there were no written submissions in advance which was unhelpful. I found Mr Hannon’s oral evidence unconvincing so I am at times able to give it only limited weight.
I start with the issue of the digital tachograph fitted to the vehicle carrying the registration E20NJH. The vehicle was originally specified on the licence on 15 April 2024. Digital tachograph data was provided to DVSA for vehicle KP67YYP. Checks identified via the VIN that it was the same vehicle which had been subject to a cherished transfer. The vehicle’s technical record (page 258 of the brief) shows the registration number last changed on 18 March 2023. The subject vehicle was specified on the licence from August 2024.
E20NJH is a 3-axle tractor unit, not a specialised recovery vehicle. Digital driver data for the vehicle was provided to DVSA, albeit bearing the registration KP67YYP. Mr Hannon sought to persuade me that the vehicle had only been used for recovery work, not within scope of operator licensing. He referred to using it under a log-book, presumably on domestic hours but I can see no obvious exemption from the EU rules. I find that the vehicle had clearly been used withing scope of the EU rules for some very considerable time before the tachograph was recalibrated on 14 July 2025. Mr Hannon provided absolutely no evidence that the vehicle was not used under authority of the licence from April 2024 and I find it far more likely than not that it will have been. That is because a 3-axle tractor unit is not normally used for recovery operations and Mr Hannon went to the bother of specifying the vehicle. I find that Section 26(1)(f) is made out. The protracted length of time between the vehicle being put in to service and finally recalibrated only after DVSA intervention means that I attach significant weight.
Mr Bell’s latest submission properly declares a further encounter and mechanical prohibition since the public inquiry. That mechanical condition, as described by Mr Bell, was a driver error in failing to reinflate the air suspension following loading. If the tyre I was shown was that prohibited on 3 June this year, then I make nothing of it as it appears to have been a flat-spot only. The encounter history has one prohibition for a failed parking brake on one wheel but otherwise relatively minor items mainly dealt with by advice. That is surprising because the annual test performance is dreadful. The national average first time failure rate for HGVs is around 11.9%, this operator’s first-time failure rate is 22.58%. Failures are for multiple items, even accounting for the fact that all defects appear repeated on the test report in the bundle. It is rare for vehicles to pass without advisory defects, only 13 of the 62 tests in the report achieved that. I find that vehicles have not been kept fit and serviceable.
It is disappointing that the operator had not taken the time and effort to review the encounter report prior to attending the public inquiry. I give Mr Hannon credit for being able to provide some detail from memory but there was no supporting evidence. This is an operator operating regularly only four vehicles and with authority for just seven. The encounter report identifies twelve prohibitions over the 5-year period. That is a shockingly high number for such a small fleet. There are also five fixed penalty notices. Taken together, it identifies learning as non-existent. I find Sections 26(1)(c)(iii) and 26(1)(ca) to be made out and the sheer rate and persistence of offending mean that I attach considerable weight.
In attaching that weight, I take into account those of the operator’s explanations as were given. The most significant issue I was told about relates to a number of Mercedes Sprinter vehicles which were bought in 2023 and 2024. The registrations are YA70FBJ, YC71UZY and YC21JTN. Mr Hannon told me that they had been bought at the same time but the record shows the first two as having been specified in July 2023 and the last in May 2024. They remained on the licence until 25 June 2025.
HGVs must be fitted with a plate showing the maximum permissible weights. The requirement for the plate, from gov.uk, is that it is “displayed in the vehicle’s cab – it must be securely fixed, be clear enough to read, and in a position that’s easy to see and read it from”. The presence of the plate is a requirement for acceptance for annual test so there is no reason to believe that a plate was not fitted to these vehicles. Mr Hannon told me that he had assumed that the vehicles had a towing capability of 3 tonnes. He also told me that the plate only showed zeros so he had no way of knowing otherwise.
Plates and the plating certificate are freely available to download from the “check MOT” service. I have looked at each of the three publicly available documents. They are identical in respect of the weights shown.
As Mr Hannon said, the train weight is shown clearly as zero. What that means is that these vehicles were plated without a towing capability. They should never have had a trailer attached. That is plain as day from the plates. I cannot accept that Mr Hannon, who has held this licence since 2007 and so is an experienced operator, did not know that. He told me that it had been his decision to buy the vehicles. The role of the transport manager here is highly questionable but it seems that the transport manager was excluded from this investment decision.
I entirely reject the explanation that use of these vehicles with a trailer was some sort of innocent mistake. It is incumbent on an operator to make the most basic of checks and checking that a vehicle is fit for purpose is exactly that. If Mr Hannon did not explicitly know, then it was a reckless act not to find out and I find that he had imputed knowledge.
The situation is made far worse for two reasons. The first of these vehicles YC21JTN, was prohibited for an overload on 11 October 2024. Mr Hannon was from that point specifically on notice that the vehicles were not fit for purpose. Yet on 7 March 2025, YA70FBJ was found to be offending with a level 3 overload. The same vehicle was overloaded again on 3 June 2025. Even if Mr Hannon had not had actual knowledge when putting the vehicles in to service, he was on absolute notice in October 2024 and still consciously chose to offend eight months later.
The second aggravating feature arises from Mr Hannon’s oral evidence. He told me two things. The first is that the design train weight on the manufacturers plate was just 7 tonnes but he was operating at 8.25 tonnes in line with the C1E driving entitlement, so over a tonne over the weight the vehicle was designed to carry. He also told me that he had tried to have the vehicles up-rated but it had been impossible to do so. That reinforces the fact that the vehicles were incapable of operating at the weights at which he was using them and leads to the conclusion that the operation has been persistently dangerous between July 2023 and June 2025, and deliberately so from October 2024.
Further concerns arise from Mr Hannon’s explanation of the most recent overload, on 11 September 2025, two weeks after the call-up letter was sent when one would expect compliance to be at its highest. I was told that the customer had specified the vehicle to be a Renault Megane but it turned out to be a Renault Scenic. The first issue here is that, by Mr Hannon’s own evidence, had the car been the correct one, it would have put the vehicle just 5 kilograms under its design weight. Mr Hannon thought this was OK because the driver was “very small and very light”. His calculations would have had the vehicle loaded to 99.86% of capacity - working to such a fine margin is so risky as I find to be reckless. The second issue is that, even after all this time, the company did not have in place robust systems for knowing the weight of what they were carrying. That is a basic requirement. Section 26(1)(f) is further made out due to the persistent overloading and again I attach significant weight.
There are some positives. These are acknowledged in the DVSA pre-PI report. There are some systems in place for monitoring drivers hours. There are good systems for checking driving licences and missing mileage. PMIs seem to happen on time although roller brake testing outwith the MOT appears a very recent addition, post-dating the call-up letter.
I refer to the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document 10 on proportionality. As I have set out above, I find that this operator has pursued deliberate and reckless acts that pose a real danger to road safety. There will also have been commercial benefits from running smaller vehicles than the work required. The operator has caused drivers to offend by not specifying or deploying the correct vehicles and through reckless decisions. There is previous public inquiry history for very similar failings. This case falls readily in to the category of Severe and so I need to consider lengthy suspension or significant curtailment along with revocation and disqualification.
I ask myself whether this is an operator I can trust to be compliant in the future. I find emphatically that I cannot. That is because of the repeated failings over a lengthy period of time, knowingly and recklessly made. The encounter history is truly dreadful. Mr Hannon has been on notice for years in relation to the lack of capacity of the Sprinters but wilfully and recklessly chose to ignore that, even after it was pointed out to him by the enforcement agency. I am offered nothing to demonstrate that his cynical risk taking has abated.
So this an operator that deserves to be put out of business. The operator was professionally represented but gave no evidence of the impact of revocation. Had they not been legally represented, that would have been for me to elicit but I cannot go behind how the operator wishes to be represented or to present its case. So I base my assessment on what I was told. Scorpion Engineering Ltd employs twenty-five staff across three businesses. There is a 24-hour workshop and a 24-hour recovery business along with the vehicle delivery operation that relies on the licence. There are four drivers, so vehicle delivery would seem to be about 15 – 20% of the overall business. I am not aware of any reliance of the recovery and repair businesses on the very separate business of delivering cars for dealerships. For that reason, I do not find that revocation would be the end for this company. I do understand that there are contractual obligations which require a run-down period.
However, in case I am wrong on that, I move on to consider the Bryan Haulage question. Given the extensive and persistent history of dangerous non-compliance, seemingly not corrected by a previous public inquiry, I do find that, even if business closure were the outcome, this is a transport operation that needs to come to an end for the good of the public. I find that Nigel Hannon and, by extension given the second director’s lack of involvement, Scorpion Engineering Ltd, have lost their good repute. Section 27(1) is made out.
Sean Donovan as transport manager allowed this level of non-compliance to continue. He is 63 years old and has no previous history of non-compliance. It is clear that he had limited involvement as an external transport manager. That is a dangerous position to adopt. In the event, I balance the long history in the industry with this lack of control and accept his retirement along with his undertaking that he will not seek to rely upon his qualification again.
The licence is without professional competence and the period of grace I granted at the hearing has expired. The application of James Begley as transport manager has been withdrawn without explanation. A fresh application has been made for a Ricky Smith. I know nothing of him or his background. Without further evidence of his ability to instil compliance, I cannot accept that application. It would be unfair to Mr Smith to mark a refusal on his record so, having made the findings I already have, that application is to be marked as withdrawn.
DECISIONS
Pursuant to a finding of loss of good repute of primary director Nigel Hannon and Scorpion Engineering Ltd, the licence is revoked in line with Section 27(1)(a). Revocation will take effect from 24 January 2026.
Pursuant to a finding of multiple serious breaches of undertakings, specifically to comply with the rules on tachographs and not to overload vehicles, the licence is revoked in line with Section 26(1)(f). Revocation will take effect from 24 January 2026.
Sections 26(1)(c)(iii) and 26(1)(ca) are made out. Due to the sheer rate and persistence of offending, I attach considerable weight. The licence is revoked with effect from 24 January 2026.
The retirement of Sean Donovan as transport manager is accepted along with an undertaking that he will not seek to rely on his qualification in the future.
The application of Ricky Smith as transport manager is marked as withdrawn.
Kevin Rooney
Traffic Commissioner
22 December 2025