Decision for SA Autos & Recovery Ltd (OG2073161)
Written decision of the Traffic Commissioner for Wales for SA Autos & Recovery Ltd and Dennis Nelder, transport manager
WALES TRAFFIC AREA
SA AUTOS & RECOVERY LTD OG2073161
DENNIS NELDER – TRANSPORT MANAGER
AT A PUBLIC INQUIRY IN PONTYPRIDD, 21 APRIL 2026
DECISION
The Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 (as amended) (“the Act”)
Pursuant to serious adverse findings under Section 26(1)(c)(iii), (ca) and (f), the licence is curtailed to one vehicle and one trailer for a period of not less than three months with effect from 6 June 2026. Any application to remove that curtailment will need to be accompanied by a comprehensive independent audit of all compliance systems showing a high degree of compliance, and by evidence that, from a date one week after this decision is issued, that all equipment is subject to laden roller brake testing.
The good repute of Dennis Nelder as transport manager is tarnished but intact.
BACKGROUND
SA Autos & Recovery Ltd is the holder of a standard national goods vehicle operator’s licence authorising the use of two vehicles and two trailers from two operating centres in Haverfordwest. The directors are Christopher John Allen and Sean Edward Allen. The current transport manager is Kelly Leanne Richards who was appointed in December 2025. Her predecessor, who had been on the licence since it started in August 2024, was Dennis Nelder.
The operator has had previous regulatory history. On 6 November 2024, a strong warning letter was issued to the operator following an unsatisfactory DVSA desk-based assessment which was triggered by an S-marked prohibition issued to an out-of-scope vehicle. The operator undertook to commission a compliance audit of its systems which it did so on 22 July 2025. That audit appeared to record general compliance and sound transport management albeit the MOT first time pass rate for in-scope vehicles was zero percent. On review of the more recent DVSA investigation, that audit appears of concern.
The operator came to the attention of DVSA following the issue of an S-marked prohibition notice to trailer C073139 for an inoperative anti-lock brake warning light sequence and ABS inoperative. That triggered a maintenance investigation by Vehicle Examiner Mark Davies on 11 November 2025. The investigation covered thirteen individual compliance areas; only four were found to be satisfactory.
The outcome of the DVSA maintenance investigation appears to indicate a worsening of affairs since the earlier desk-based assessment and was found to warrant a call to public inquiry for both operator and former transport manager Dennis Nelder. Mr Nelder ceased to be transport manager in October 2025 but was in post for the focal period of the investigation. New transport manager Kelly Leanne Richards was appointed in December 2025 and not called to inquiry as the issues predated her.
THE PUBLIC INQUIRY
Directors Sean Allen and Christopher Allen attended accompanied by office manager Kim Allen and current transport manager Kelly Richards. They were unrepresented. Dennis Nelder attended represented by Scott Bell, solicitor. Mr Nelder provided in advance a detailed witness statement supported by an evidence bundle.
Finances were satisfied as a preliminary point.
The hearing was recorded and a transcript can be provided if required. I have recorded here only that evidence which is relevant to my decision.
The evidence of Dennis Nelder, former transport manager
Mr Nelder told me that he had left the Forces and entered the logistics industry around twenty years ago, initially in health and safety and compliance. He passed his TM CPC in 2021. He had trained as a consultant and was working for RHN Consultancy. RHN had assisted this operator with the application process. He visited once or twice a month. On 22 August 2024, the prohibited vehicle had been a light goods vehicle that he had not known to be operating. That prohibition led to the first DVSA intervention. He had not been made aware of it until 2 September 2024 when he was asked to assist in the response. They had then changed maintenance provider and moved to John Davies Commercials. All records had been maintained on a 1-drive system. Drivers reported defects through a WhatsApp group. He had visited John Davies Commercials and found that he also worked in the aircraft industry so assumed his workmanship was of a high standard. Mr Davies was believed to be time-served, not qualified.
Every PMI had a roller brake test although not always laden. They were constantly chasing John Davies for PMI reports which meant that vehicles left the workshop before the paperwork had been seen. It was the constant lack of paperwork that led to decisions to allow vehicles in service when he had not been properly informed. He couldn’t explain why they hadn’t changed provider again.
DVSA encountered the car-transporter combination on 23 September 2025 at the Coldra (M4 Newport). The vehicle had completed a PMI two days earlier. That prohibition had led to his decision to leave. On reflection, he had probably had too much of a consultancy head on and not a transport manager one. He refuted the operator’s assertion that he had left on health grounds; there may have been an occasional hospital appointment but it never cost him to lose any time. He had been aware of the MIVR a few days before it happened but was no longer transport manager so not asked to be present. He had seen the report after the event and responded to it.
In conclusion, he realised now that he had needed to have spent more time with the operator although had not had that conversation with them. He should have left a lot sooner. He had no intention of being an external transport manager again. Invoices were outstanding. He was spending 5 hours a week on the operator which was more than the minimum in the Statutory Guidance for a two-vehicle operation.
The evidence of Sean Allen
Sean Allen told me that the business did local collections of end-of-life vehicles and then transported them for Copart to Avonmouth. They had not responded to the DVSA MIVR as they thought they could rely on the transport manager’s (Mr Nelder) response. John Davies had come recommended and they now got to see the PMI every time.
Suspension or revocation would mean the loss of the Copart work and the end of the business. Curtailment would probably be survivable.
The evidence of Kelly Richards
Ms Richards told me that she had qualified as a transport manager in the fire service. She joined this operator in mid-December. She now got all the paperwork on time. She had put drivers on courses. Sean had attended an operator licence awareness course in May. They now had paper files as well as electronic. They would offer an undertaking for a compliance audit. She felt that there may have been a conflict of interest with the audit that had been carried out previously.
CONSIDERATION AND FINDINGS OF FACT
The operator has a 60% prohibition rate. The director Sean Allen was driving an articulated combination on 23 September 2025 when both unit and trailer were prohibited. The unit had a defective indicator and tyres – the driver “repaired” the indicator by tapping it as, apparently, he had done at the start of his journey. One might predict that the “repair” is unlikely to be a long-term one. The tyre defects had been identified at the PMI two days before but not actioned. The trailer had a defective ABS system with a warning light on the dash and the light on the headboard was not following the correct sequence. It is unknown whether the ABS would have operated as intended had it needed to - but the odds are stacked against it.
Director Christopher Allen was driving WU55OVM when it was encountered by DVSA on 22 August 2024. It was overloaded. The registration plate was missing and a fixed penalty was issued for that. A brake light was not working. It seems director Christopher Allen is, like his son, a model of leadership in how NOT to do it.
Annual test performance is even more dire. From four MOT presentations detailed in the report in my bundle, just the one passed first time and that had advisories for oil leaks and a minor fail for a reflector. It is absolutely clear that vehicles have been very far from fit and serviceable. Prohibitions have been issued and frequently for defects that should have been apparent to the operator’s driver or safety inspector, or both. Vehicles have not been kept fit and serviceable. Sections 26(1)(c)(iii), (ca) and (f) are made out without doubt and I attach significant weight, particularly given the close involvement of each statutory director.
It is clear that the rather detached approach of Dennis Nelder was never going to achieve compliance from two such cavalier directors. Visiting once or twice a month is rarely going to allow exertion of continuous and effective management of the transport operation. I remind myself that Dennis Nelder did not even know that his client was operating a 3.5 tonne local collection vehicle when it was prohibited in August 2024. I note, but do no more at this point, that the requirement in the legislation is for the TM to manage the transport activities of the undertaking. It is not seemingly limited to the in-scope vehicles. That appears to align with Sections 26(1)(c)(iii) which broadens the power to take regulatory action against an operator to prohibitions issued to “a vehicle of which the licence-holder was the owner when the prohibition was imposed”, very clearly going beyond specified vehicles. If an external transport manager does not attend on a frequent basis, how will they know what is actually going on?
In the positive, Dennis Nelder resigned after the September 2025 prohibition and before the DVSA investigation. The audit in July 2025 failed to identify the shortcomings in the way described by the DVSA report and I accept that Mr Nelder did not have an opportunity to contribute to that investigation until the report was compiled. Earlier involvement may have given a slightly different outcome, although that which can be polished to a shine is limited. He invested in legal representation for the hearing, providing a clear and comprehensive statement and evidence bundle in advance. It is clear that his qualification matters to him and it became clear to me in evidence that he has learned, the hard way, where he went wrong. And he was positively engaged with the operation, very far from being a transport manager in name only. For those reasons, a finding of loss of repute would be disproportionate but, in issuing a formal warning, I put him on notice that any recurrencies are unlikely to see such a favourable outcome. External transport managers must be in control of the operation to which they are attached, or resign.
So, I return to the operator and its two cavalier directors who struggle to listen to advice whether from a transport manager, maintenance provider or a vehicle dashboard. I ask myself, as I must, whether I can trust them to be compliant in the future. I really struggle to answer that question in the positive. The one glimmer of hope is transport manager Kelly Richards. Ms Richards said all the right things including that roller brake testing would be laden. But the pre-PI report from DVSA shows that not to be the case. I also do not accept the “risk assessment” for failing to carry out laden brake tests on the car transporter. That might carry weight when an operator is carrying new or valuable vehicles that one may not be permitted to put over a set of brake rollers (although for fear of what I am unsure). But this operator is carrying end-of-life vehicles, perfect ballast for a roller brake test. There are countless roller brake testers situated along the length of the M4 from west Wales to Avonmouth. So I read the risk assessment as saying “I can be sure that the brakes are working as intended because it would be mildly inconvenient to check that they are and it might cost me a few quid”. What absolute nonsense. This operator must introduce laden brake testing of all equipment now. I base the justification of that statement on the appalling test history including failure for service brake performance and I hope other operators take this message too. The risk assessment needs to confirm how the technician can certify that every part of every braking system is working as intended, not just say it would be a bit of a nuisance to find out whether it is or not. I will qualify that by saying that, if the combination when fully laden with a typical vehicle set is well below its plated weight, then there might be justification for a risk assessment to say that brake testing at that weight is reasonable.
Ms Richards has had the “benefit” of attending a public inquiry and having read this decision which will be published. She now knows very clearly what is expected of her. And I can trust this operator only because of her presentation at the public inquiry.
Having had regard to the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document 10, I judge this as a starting point of severe. I do that because of the very poor history but primarily because of the cynical risk-taking of both directors. The operator indicated that a time-limited curtailment should be survivable.
DECISIONS
Pursuant to serious adverse findings under Section 26(1)(c)(iii), (ca) and (f), the licence is curtailed to one vehicle and one trailer for a period of not less than three months with effect from 6 June 2026. Any application to remove that curtailment will need to be accompanied by a comprehensive independent audit of all compliance systems showing a high degree of compliance, and by evidence that, from a date one week after this decision is issued, that all equipment is subject to laden roller brake testing.
The good repute of Dennis Nelder as transport manager is tarnished but intact.
Kevin Rooney
Traffic Commissioner
26 May 2026