Decision for RG Removals & Transport Ltd (OM2073704)
Written confirmation of the Traffic Commissioners decision for RG Removals Transport Ltd, Transport Manager Ross Gray and Driver Ross Alexander Gray
IN THE SCOTTISH TRAFFIC AREA
RG REMOVALS & TRANSPORT LTD – OM2073704
ROSS GRAY – TRANSPORT MANAGER
DRIVER ROSS ALEXANDER GRAY
CONFIRMATION OF THE TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Background
RG Removals & Transport Ltd holds a Standard International Goods Vehicle Operator’s Licence authorising 4 vehicles and 2 trailers. The Director is Ross Gray who has been the Transport Manager since grant on 4 October 2024.
There is one Operating Centre at Yard 6, MacDougall Street, Greenock PA15 2TG. Preventative Maintenance Inspections are said to be carried out by ‘Ryan’, apparently in-house, at 6-weekly intervals. I noted the reference to Scania in the papers. That contractor has inspected the 44-tonne vehicle since May 2025, but he failed to notify me of this change.
Hearing
The Public Inquiry was listed for today, 28 January 2026, in Tribunal Room 1 of the Office of the Traffic Commissioner in Edinburgh. The operator, Transport Manager and Driver, Mr Gray, was present and represented by Mr Neil Kelly, solicitor.
Issues
The public inquiry was called and following notice that I was considering grounds to intervene in respect of this licence and specifically by reference to the following sections of the Goods Vehicle (Licensing of Operators) Act:
- 26(1)(b) – conditions on licence to notify changes, in this case relating to maintenance and to meet the licence requirements.
- 26(1)(c)(iii) – Prohibitions.
- 26(1)(ca) – Fixed Penalty Notice
- 26(1)(e) – statements relating to the Transport Manager meeting Schedule 3, and to abide by conditions on the licence
- 26(1)(f) – undertakings (vehicles to be kept fit and serviceable, effective driver defect reporting, complete maintenance records, overloading, drivers’ hours and tachographs)
- 26(1)(h) – material change:
- 27(1)(a) – repute, financial standing, Transport Manager meeting Schedule 3.
- 28 – Disqualification.
Mr Gray was also called to consider whether he had exercised effective and continuous management and therefore whether I should make a finding under section 27(1)(b) preventing him from relying on his Certificate of Professional Competence.
Mr Gray was also called to a conjoined Driver Conduct Hearing to consider whether he should be permitted to continue to rely on his vocational driving entitlement.
The operator was directed to lodge evidence in support including financial, maintenance and other compliance documentation. Compliance documentation was to be submitted to DVSA by no later than 7 January 2026 with finance and any representations to be sent to my office by 14 January 2026. Financial evidence met the prescribed sum.
Summary of Evidence
On 6 May 2025, DVSA encountered WU18 BWB being driven by Ross Gray at Doxey Weighbridge, on the M6 in Stafford. The vehicle was found to be overweight with Axle 2 overloaded by 910 kg (15.17%), Axle 3 overloaded by 1,370 kg (13.7%) and the gross weight exceeded by 1,420 kg (5.92%). I am unclear why these have been referred to as Most Serious Infringements within the Case Summary. However, a Prohibition Notice and Fixed Penalty Notice were issued. Tachograph analysis revealed that the vehicles had been driven on 11 April 2025 with no card inserted for a total of 49 minutes. Traffic Examiner Nigel Osmand subsequently invited Mr Gray to be interviewed under caution, which Mr Gray declined.
The above incident led DVSA to commence an investigation, conducted by Traffic Examiner Michael Munro. In advance of a visit, Mr Munro required relevant data and documentation to be produced. Mr Munro’s analysis of the data pointed to periods of driving with no card inserted.
It was noted that Driver Mr Gray had been on duty for 15 hours 52 minutes, including 14 hours 39 minutes, before driving. A driving period of 49 minutes was recorded (56.8 km at 71 km/h) after that extended duty time. There were a further five separate occasions where Mr Gray was said to have created false records by driving without a card inserted: 26 February 2025 (7 mins), 1 April 2025 (3 mins), 4 April 2025 (50 mins), 10 April 2025 (6 mins), and 11 April 2025 (49 mins). It was alleged that the manual entries were used to excuse the actual activity (see below).
DVSA alleged offences of knowingly making false records against Mr Gray. In interview under caution, he admitted to completing the period of driving on 26 February 2025. He was asked if he had created a manual entry during that extended driving time to conceal the period of driving with no card inserted? He answered: “I’m not sure, I don’t know.” He had tried to claim it was a yard movement, but the vehicle was sighted on the A589 Lancaster area. He said he was confused. He admitted he drove WU18 BWB with no card inserted on 1 April 2025. He claimed that he had to move out of the services but was unable to explain why he did not insert his digital card. He claimed he thought he could move the vehicle if he was on a break. He was unable to provide a printout or other endorsement, but he denied trying to hide his driving: “I was sleeping and got a chap on the door and moved the vehicle to another appropriate location and went back to sleep.”
On 4 April 2025, he acknowledged that it might have been him driving but there was no other explanation given the time at which his card was ejected. He could not explain why he had created a manual entry recording other work between 12:20 – 12:37, but to cover the evidence of driving which the Examiner put to him. He was asked whether he wished to comment: “Not really no.” It was a similar issue with the movement of WU18 BWB on 10 April 2025. Noting his manual entries, he was unable to provide any satisfactory evidence that it could have been anyone else driving. He had tried to suggest that the vehicle was elsewhere, until confronted with the ANPR evidence showing WU18 BWB was sighted 22:41 on the M74, South Lanarkshire Area, heading northbound and 22:34, M74 North Lanarkshire area, heading northbound on 11 April 2025. He was specifically asked: Did you drive vehicle WU18 BWB with no card inserted as you were aware that you could not make it back to your operating centre within the maximum 15hours permitted, to which he responded: “Maybe that’s what’s happened.”
On 28 July 2025, Mr Munro emailed Mr Gray, proposing to visit on 21 or 22 August 2025. There was no response so Mr Munro telephoned Mr Gray on 30 July 2025 and agreed to visit Mr Gray at his home address on 22 August 2025, as this is where the documentation was kept. As a result of this visit, Mr Munro was able to complete his report, highlighting the following:
- Journey Planning was initially poor due to taking all jobs offered but Mr Gray claimed improvement. Mr Ross admitted removing his card near the 15-hour limit to get home, suggesting poor planning. The infringement reports for February to June 2025 showed minor issues and were not produced monthly. Missing mileage reports for May to June 2025 were considered to be accurate, but earlier analysis revealed false entry for 26 February 2025, claiming a yard movement.
- Mr Gray could not explain Working Time requirement without prompting. There were no hours recorded for Mr Gray during the week commencing 19 May 2025 (but claimed annual leave). The weekly/average hours appeared too low.
- A new driver induction programme and company handbook were introduced only after 20 June 2025, following engagement of GRT Road Transport Consultants. However, Robert Gray is not an employee. There was said to be a verbal agreement in place and no invoicing. Copies of licences and CPC were held on file, but only one licence check completed (16/8/25); no previous checks.
- Missing mileage reports submitted were inaccurate, referring to “yard movement” when ANPR showed the vehicle elsewhere. ANPR data also confirmed that the driver card was removed while on the M74. Tachograph calibration certificates missing for some periods.
Mr Munro understandably questioned the level of management of the operation. Mr Gray repeatedly drove without inserting his card and made manual entries which proved to be false. On 26 February 2025 he drove for 4 hours and 36 minutes without a qualifying break. There were multiple breaches of daily rest on 1, 4, 10, and 11 April 2025 with rest periods below the required 9 hours or 11 hours, ranging from 6 hours 6 minutes to 8 hours 45 minutes. He admitted to driving without a card, citing reasons like lack of stopping places or assisting other vehicles but analysis and ANPR data confirmed vehicle movements during periods claimed as rest or yard movements.
Ross Gray admitted to being “overwhelmed” and only sought external help (GRT Consultants) after DVSA intervention. The consultants have been instructed to provide compliance support, tachograph analysis, monthly reports, and refresher training. Quarterly licence checks introduced via Tachomaster, with electronic records and expiry tracking. Robert Gray is now registered as an employee. There were said to be weekly timesheets and analogue charts for non-driving work and an improved scheduling to comply with drivers’ hours rules. The operator uses Tachomaster for data analysis and GRT provides monthly compliance reports. Manual entries (for leave) have been added to ensure accurate Working Time calculations.
I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities, that the manual entries were a deliberate attempt to mislead and to cover extended periods beyond the limits permitted for driving. There can be no other plausible explanation, particularly when Mr Gray claimed that the vehicle was elsewhere, but ANPR cameras showed WU18 BWB to be in use in very different locations. I found his explanations to lack credibility and did not reflect that actions of a professional driver and reputable Transport Manager.
Mr Munro’s update of 16 January 2026 reported minimal infringements identified, but the operator only generated the report on 15 January 2026. Feedback was provided during the TEVR to generate infringement reports monthly and feedback. The infringements identified date back to October/November 2025 and should have been signed/dated and this should have been disclosed. There were no substantial periods of driving without a card, which Mr Munro described as a massive improvement. The operator should have generated this report on a monthly basis and added comments to explain any periods of driving without a card. There have been no recorded encounters with either vehicle since. Mr Munro attributed this to assistance from the external transport consultants.
In addition, I noted the report from Vehicle Examiner Adrian Seadon. Since commencing operations on 2 October 2024, the operator has received two roadside encounters. Trailer number C245666, 20 September 2025, was issued with a delayed prohibition for park brake valve leak from body and connection. WU18BWB was clear of defects. The operator has presented 3 vehicles for test, with one failing at final attempt, giving a final failure rate of 33.3%. FE66 RFN, 14 October 2024, failed the MOT for: - • IM63 Lamps • IM71 Service Brake performance • IM73 Parking Brake performance Inspection Records
A photograph of the forward planner was seen, covering vehicles only. The operator provided two forms of inspection records. One being a paper industry standard version and an electronic version provided by R2C. Upon review of the industry-standard duplicate inspection records, it was noted that these documents are incomplete: had not been signed by the inspector, although they have been endorsed as “fit for the road” by Ryan Grey. In the brake performance assessment section, figures have been manually entered without an accompanying brake test printout. The records do not specify whether the brake test was conducted using a roller brake tester or a decelerometer. The tyre pressures for FE66 RFN, are all recorded at 85psi, which was unlikely for single and double fitment.
The electronic R2C records were completed at Scania (not notified as a maintenance provider). Two of the three inspections conducted at Scania were also completed by Ryan Gray, relating to WU18 BWB. All recorded tyre pressures are at 100 psi, except for 3 January 2026, where the front axle pressure is documented as 110 psi, when completed by another mechanic. The Examiner noted discrepancies in the DtP codes. The brake test printout dated 5 January 2026 was generated two days after the inspection record was signed off as “fit for the road,”
Driver defect reports were supplied late and then only images of multiple defect reports, all of which indicate NIL defects, with no evidence of rectification. Wheel security, the operator has provided two, wheel removal tags. These only show the initial torque and do not show the retorque. The torque tag provided from Scania, dated 30 June 2025, for WU18BWB, record the odometer at 672979 km, but the inspection record dated 24 July 2025, shows 672659 km.
The operator was, exceptionally, permitted to upload a letter of intent dated 23 January 2026 from Scott Robinson, Director of GRT Road Transport Consultants referring to an appointment to attend on 3 February 2026 to carry out a benchmarking exercise against Mr Munro’s earlier findings, with particular attention to be given to driver management and training, maintenance and driver inspections. A report is to be generated within 7 days, with ongoing support and tachograph analysis.
There are two vehicles specified, 17 tonne Iveco box van used 90% of the time involved in domestic removals. The 44-tonne vehicle is involved in haulage of pallets and for farmers. Some of those operations involve third party traction but he also hires in trailers for a couple of weeks at a time. When I asked to see the inspection records for those trailers, it immediately became obvious that no brake tests had been supplied. I have referred to a prohibition notice against a trailer, above. Even now Mr Gray does not appear to have the depth of knowledge required to exercise the level of scrutiny which equates to effective and continuous management. He had failed to address the differences in DTP code. It had not occurred to him to question the entirely consistent tyre pressure readings without any evidence that the pressures had been adjusted. The delayed prohibition issued to the trailer had not prompted him to check whether the brakes have been checked by the third party. When he attempted to explain the annual test failure where the handbrake was not holding, he was unable to explain why the vehicle had not been the subject of a thorough first use check having only been specified two days before. His brother, Ryan, continues to inspect the 7-tonne vehicle at the operator’s premises and without full facilities.
I accepted that the incident resulting in an overweight prohibition on the vehicle unit only and accompanying fixed penalty notice resulted from loading by port staff rather than Mr Gray. He told me of another incident where he had asked for the load to be repositioned as it was too far forward. He is also aware that he can check the actual weights from sensors displaying on the dashboard. That was a further example of how he had improved his knowledge and systems. Mr Munro’s guidance has proved to be vital to the improvement of these operations. It was impressed upon me that only 5 adverse incidents were identified from the 264 records which had been examined. I was invited to look beyond the pulling of the cards and to look at the extent of the infringements which these actions were designed to avoid. Mr Gray suggested that he had learned about pulling cards from agency drivers when he was engaged in agency work himself. That was before he qualified as a Transport Manager and sort this operator’s licence. He could offer no satisfactory explanation as to why, when he was challenged by Mr Munro, he chose to deny offences and indeed make matters far worse by claiming that the vehicle was elsewhere. In evidence Mr Gray kept referring to these incidents as “mistakes”, but they were far more than just ignorance as the attempt at cover up was deliberate. He was forced to admit that if an employed driver had taken this course, that driver would have been dismissed.
Determination
Driver Conduct
Mr Gray holds a substantive LGV entitlement with no endorsements or previous conduct history. His PCV entitlement apparently lapsed. He obtained the entitlement in December 2002.
The relevant legislation is set out in Sections 110-122 of The Road Traffic Act 1988. The legislation draws a clear distinction between Large Goods Vehicle (LGV) licence holders and applicants and Passenger Carrying Vehicle (PCV) licence holders and applicants.
Section 112 of the 1988 Act provides that the Secretary of State shall not grant to an applicant a LGV driver’s licence or a PCV driver’s licence unless he is satisfied, having regard to his conduct, that he is a fit person to hold the licence applied for. It is section 121(1) which defines conduct - in relation to an applicant for or the holder of a LGV driver’s licence or the holder of a UK licence for the Community, his conduct as a driver of a motor vehicle.
The Administrative Court, on the application of Meredith and Others EWHC 2975 (Admin) 18 explained that, whilst the personal circumstances of the driver are, at the preliminary stage of consideration of fitness, irrelevant to the question whether his conduct as a driver has been such as to make him unfit, save to the extent that those circumstances concern his conduct as a driver. Personal circumstances which go to mitigate the conduct itself (such as illness, or emergency, or momentary lapse of attention, or carelessness) will be relevant, while personal circumstances which would, in the ordinary sentencing exercise by a criminal court go to mitigation of penalty (such as loss of work, or other hardship, or the dependence of others upon the licence-holder) would not.
The Court did not go on to consider the applicability of the principle of deterrence, which was considered by the Court of Session in Thomas Muir (Haulage) Limited v The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [1999] SC 86, but regulatory action undoubtedly contributes to achieving of the purpose of the legislation. As the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document No. 6 on Vocational Driver Conduct advises, vehicles striking bridges or other road infrastructure pose a significant risk to occupants of those vehicles and other road users amongst others. Such collisions also result in disruption to the road and rail networks, resulting in a negative economic impact on businesses, particularly those such as Network Rail. Traffic commissioners understand that most collisions might be avoidable and caused because of negligence and poor training. The starting point is to impose a 4-week suspension per offence up to 6 offences but see below.
Operator and Transport Manager
Based on the evidence summarised above, I am satisfied that I should record adverse findings under the following sections: 26(1)(b) – conditions on licence to notify changes, in this case relating to maintenance and to meet the licence requirements, 26(1)(c)(iii) – Prohibitions, 26(1)(ca) – Fixed Penalty Notice, 26(1)(e) – statements relating to the Transport Manager meeting Schedule 3, and to abide by conditions on the licence, 26(1)(f) – undertakings (vehicles to be kept fit and serviceable, effective driver defect reporting, complete maintenance records, overloading, drivers’ hours and tachographs), 26(1)(h) – material change.
I can accept that some of those findings relate to historic incidents, whilst I retain ongoing concerns in respect of management of the maintenance provision. The facts outlined above fall far below what amounts to effective and continuous management.
As the Senior Traffic Commissioner identifies from the appellate case law, adherence to the rules relating to drivers’ hours is fundamental to road safety. The responsibility for ascertaining what is required and for complying with those requirements lies with the operator. Mr Munro gave evidence of marked improvement in that regard. I have attempted to set out the positive indications, above, which go some way to addressing the following negative elements:
- Ineffective management control and insufficient or no systems and procedures in place to prevent operator licence compliance failings.
- Operator failed to co-operate with or deliberately obstructed enforcement investigation.
- Insufficient procedures in place to ensure appropriate use of tachograph or manual records (including digicards) by drivers.
Mr Kelly suggested that the engagement of Driver Haddock to cover the anticipated driver conduct decision might also reflect a realistic and more mature approach from the Director/Transport Manager.
Mr Gray kept telling me that he had learned a lot. It was suggested that the stop had been a blessing; unfortunately, it was what Mr Gray did next which weighed heavily, amounting to deliberate acts by him. That was not simply a question of being overwhelmed or lacking in knowledge. He attempted to mislead, not in a particularly sophisticated way, as ANPR quickly undermined his version but even then, he felt unable to make admissions.
As the Senior Traffic Commissioner reminds Traffic Commissioners in Statutory Document No. 1 on repute, a licence is issued to an operator on trust that the operator will comply with the requirements. Dishonesty is a very serious matter which needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine the substance, nature and degree. As the Upper Tribunal usefully explained in 2023/144 Leafy Designs Ltd, whilst there may be degrees of dishonesty and generally speaking, there normally has to be an evaluation as to the substance, nature and degree of any dishonesty before a properly informed decision as to regulatory action may be taken, but where matters are straightforward that need not be a lengthy evaluation and need not generate a lengthy written explanation.
The facts of this case go far beyond the operator failing to take action on knowledge of the breaches. Here, the Director and Transport Manager were the culprit and creator of the false records. The Upper Tribunal decision in 2009/225 Priority Freight Ltd sets a question: “how likely is it that this operator will, in future, operate in compliance with the operator’s licensing regime?” Such a breach undermines the trust which can be placed in an operator, and which is the foundation of the licence grant. This conduct falls squarely within the definition of SEVERE, for the purposes of regulatory intervention. Mr Kelly persuaded me to treat the case holistically, in other words to look at the totality of the impact on Mr Gray when deciding what was appropriate.
In evidence, Mr Gray told me that he was realistic about the likely outcome of this Public Inquiry. He was repeatedly referred to as a young man, but he is in fact 28 years old. Nevertheless, his experience within the transport industry is extremely limited. He left college looking for an apprenticeship as a joiner but ended up joining his father, initially part time, working on removals. That business involved small vans, but he spotted the opportunity to use larger vehicles and set about gaining his LGV entitlement in 2023 and then his transport manager qualification in 2024. Initially he planned to only operate 1 vehicle but again spotted a business opportunity to undertake haulage of pallets. None of that excuses his poor judgement, nor can I be seen to condone these actions in other operators and Transport Managers. He has lost his repute as a Transport Manager, and I made that finding pursuant to section 27(1)(b). As per paragraph 108 of Statutory Document No. 10, the minimum period of disqualification for a transport manager is one year. Given the actions, it could have been much longer. It left the operator with no Transport Manager, resulting in an adverse finding under section 27(1)(a). I was persuaded to allow a short Period Grace (1 month) to provide tangible evidence upon which the period might be extended, or the licence will have to be revoked.
Mr Gray’s vocational entitlement is suspended for a period of 2-months. I gave very serious consideration as to whether the licence could continue. I could not help but wonder about the level of maturity at the time the licence was granted and whether the outcome might have been different if he had worked with an experienced Transport Manager first. That is why scrutiny of paragraph 14A(1)(d) of Schedule 3 is so important at the point of application. Following the cogent reasoning of the Upper Tribunal in 2017/055 Alastair Walter, a finding against his repute as Transport Manager can be distinguished from the repute of the corporate entity (operator). I weighed into the balance the improvements to which Mr Munro referred and the prospect of an experienced and effective Transport Manager in place. I took account of the impact of regulatory action. However, there was a clear argument for deterrent action, with the licence being curtailed by 1 vehicle (FE66 RFN) for 2 months from 23:45 on 30 January 2026, when the driver suspension will apply.
R Turfitt
Traffic Commissioner
28 January 2026