Decision for Rajinder Banga (PD1078264)
Written decision of the Traffic Commissioner for the West Midlands for Rajinder Banga as operator and transport manager
IN THE WEST MIDLANDS TRAFFIC AREA
Rajinder Banga – PD1078264
Rajinder Banga – Transport Manager
Decision of the Deputy Traffic Commissioner after a Public Inquiry heard 16th May 2025 at the Office of the Traffic Commissioner at Birmingham
Decision
Adverse findings are made subject to section 26(1)(b) of the Transport Act 1985, 17(3)(aa) of the Public Passenger Act 1981 and 17(3)(c) of the Public Passenger Act 1981.
Subject to section 17(2)(d) of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 I have attached a condition to the licence that the Operator is not to use no more than 12 discs at any one time. This condition is to run indefinitely.
Further and subject to section 17(2)(d) of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 I have attached a condition to the licence that the Operator must not use more than 10 PSV discs at any one time. This condition is to be in place over four weekends, for 17-18 May, 24-25 May, 31 May-1 June and the 7-8 June. For the avoidance of doubt, Mr Banga need not return two discs to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner each weekend. The Office of the Traffic Commissioner staff will mark this change on the digital system. Through Mr Oliver, Mr Banga is aware of the very serious consequences of breaching a PSV operator’s licence condition.
Mr Banga’s repute as a Transport Manager is tarnished but not lost.
Subject to section 155 Transport Act 2000 (1A)(b) £3,900 shall be expended by the Operator limited to the provision or improvement of local services or facilities. This order is made provisionally so that Mr Banga’s solicitor may address me on the length of the period for action. Provisionally, evidence that this money has been spent by the Operator limited to the provision or improvement of local services or facilities will be sent to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner, Birmingham by 4pm 29 August 2025.
Background and the Call to Public Inquiry
The operator name is Rajinder Banga trading as Banga Buses. The entity type is Sole Trader.
Rajinder Banga was granted a Standard National Public Service Vehicle Operator’s Licence under reference PD1078264 from the 10 March 2008. The Vehicle authorisation is for 13 vehicles. The sole director is Rajinder Banga. Mr Banga is also the sole Transport Manager on the licence.
As a result of an unsatisfactory Maintenance Investigation Visit Report (“MIVR”) undertaken on the 12 December 2024 and issues arising from the follow up visit on the 16 December 2024 a decision was taken to call a public inquiry. After an unsatisfactory Bus Operator Account Management report (“BOAM”) dated 24 February 2025 it was decided that both the MIVR and BOAM matters should be dealt with at the same public inquiry.
Both the Operator and Mr Banga as the transport manager were called to the Public Inquiry by call up letters both dated 10 April 2025.
There is a regulatory history. Mr Banga appeared at Public Inquiry in March 2016. Then, adverse findings made under sections 17 (3) (a); 17 (3) (aa); and 17 (3) (c) of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981.
Mr Banga also appeared at Public Inquiry in February 2009 when a warning was issued in the following terms “you are issued with a formal warning with regard to your future conduct as an operator”.
Basis of the referral
DVSA conducted an unannounced MIVR on 12 December 2024, the following shortcomings were noted:
• PMI’s consistently show minor driver related defects (on 67%);
• Temperature assessment not made for decelerometer brake tests;
• No formal procedure relating to safety defects and recalls;
• The driver defect reporting (“DDR”) system not effectively managed, it appears that a DDR record that had been checked on the fleet check and had been amended when a follow up visit was conducted on 16 December 2024;
• Above average MOT failure rate;
• No formal system in place to monitor vehicle emissions;
• Prohibition issued at fleet check for tyre cut to cords was driver related and appeared to be of a long standing nature; -
A response was received from Mr Banga’s previous solicitors to the issues raised within the report which challenged aspects of the report. At the Public Inquiry there was no material disagreement as to the facts. Conclusions that should be drawn from those facts were disputed. Mr Banga has consistently accepted amending the DDR report on the 11 December 2024 but offered the explanation that this was part of a training exercise.
Following complaints, BOAM officer, Robert Lees conducted a visit on 11 February 2025 which was marked unsatisfactory. He undertook 8 days of monitoring between 22 October 2024 and 27 November 2024 on three services. The following observations were made:-
• 65 journeys were monitored of which 60 were seen;
• 5 failed to operate giving an 8% non-compliance rate;
• 2 were observed more than 1 minute early, giving a non-compliance rate of 3%;
• 14 journeys were observed to be more than 5 minutes late, giving a non-compliance rate of 23%.;
• A total of 16 non-compliant journeys seen operating outside -1 minute to +5 minutes window of tolerance, giving a 26% non-compliance rate.
• The overall non-compliance rate for journeys that failed to operate, plus those observed operating outside window of tolerance was 21 out of 65, giving a non compliance rate of 32%.
• 0 of the 60 journeys observed, displayed the incorrect destination boards, giving a failure rate of 0%.
The Public Inquiry
A public inquiry was held on the 16th May 2025 with a one day time estimate.
In attendance were Vehicle Examiner Austin Jones (“VE Jones), BOAM Officer Robert Lees (“BO Lees”), Mr Rajinder Banga and his representative Mr Oliver, Solicitor. ## The Evidence
The factual matters were not materially contested and are accurately set out in the background and basis for referral. Elements of the evidence related to the findings of facts are set out below.
The burden and standard of proof
The burden of proof was upon the DVSA to prove any allegations made against the operator and/or transport manager(s). The standard of proof was the civil law standard, the balance of probabilities. In other words what is more likely than not to have occurred.
Where “reasonable excuse” is raised by an operator to explain why a service could not be operated on time then the burden of proof is upon them to prove that it was more likely than not that a reasonable excuse was present at the time.
Findings of fact
After carefully considering all of the evidence I have made the following findings of fact after applying the correct burden and standard of proof.
Contrary to section 26(1)(b) of the Transport Act 1985 namely the Operator has operated a local bus service outside of the timings registered with the traffic commissioner.
• I accepted BO Lees, entirely reasonable, evidence that BOAM officers cannot wait indefinitely for bus services after the period they are late. He marked five services as a “Fail to Operate” which he explained he did after a period of six minutes. Having assessed other documentary evidence and the oral evidence of Mr Banga I find it more likely than not that the services did operate, albeit very late.
• Four out of the 65 observations, Mr Banga, is entitled to rely on reasonable excuse. This reflects the will of Parliament that bus services will be expected to run compliantly 95% of the time.
• I accepted two further services, observations 37 and 41 were more likely than not to amount to an exceptional position such that they could amount to a reasonable excuse outside of the 5% window of tolerance. A combination of features existed together on those journeys which I was willing to accept went beyond the anticipated issues relating to normal traffic conditions which included a different Operator’s bus having broken down and blocked the road, reducing a two way traffic system to a single lane.
• I was asked to consider whether a reasonable excuse existed for observations 52, 54 and 55. There was some suggestion that emergency traffic lights may have been in place. It was conceded there was no evidence of this and as the issue developed during the public inquiry it was clarified that rather than emergency traffic lights there may have been temporary traffic lights in place. I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this amounted to reasonable excuse and have declined to find it so.
• In all other incidences no reasonable excuse(s) was found. In other cases the issues experienced by the operator were normal issues, to be accounted for in the 5% window of tolerance.
• Therefore of the 65 observations, 21 observations were found to be non-compliant. I have accepted a reasonable excuse for six observations. Four of these are reasonable excuse as per the 5% window of tolerance then two more observations, specifically observations 37 and 41. 15 non-compliant observations means a 23% non-compliance rate or 77% compliance.
• From the BOAM table of all 65 observations, in total there the originally 21 non-compliant journeys
• Two observations were early. One was recorded as two minutes early. The second was recorded as leaving three minutes early. These were observations 23 and 64. This is the total period the bus ran early. The window of tolerance accepts a bus one minute early.
• Observations 37 and 41 ran 15 minutes late (reasonable excuse accepted).
• Observations 7, 10, 11, 24, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 52, 54, 55
• Ran 6, 8, 9, 9, 10, 10, 11, 11, 13, 14 14, 15, 17 minutes late. This is the total period of lateness. The window of tolerance accepts a bus running five minutes late.
• I have accepted all five failure to operate as very late running services. These were observations 4 , 14, 39, 42 and 44. Mr Banga’s evidence was that these services were late. Observation 4 by 28 mins, observation 44 by 24 mins. For observations 14, 39 and 42 I have evidence that they completed their full run. The poor quality of the screenshots has prevented me from being able to set out the late running times.
Contrary to section 17(3)(aa) of the Public Passenger Act 1981 the Operator has not honoured the undertakings signed up to that:
• vehicles would be kept fit and serviceable
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The MIVR dated 12 December 2024 reported that “ Since the conclusion of the DVSA Remote Enforcement Office (DVSA REO) Desk Based Assessment (DBA) on 1/02/24 there has been 8 appointments for annual test resulting in 4 passes and 4 initial & final fails. This equates to a 50% initial and final fail rate. This compares unfavourably with the national PSV initial fail rate of 9.74% and the final fail rate of 6.63%.
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Mr Banga’s witness statement and oral evidence accepted the poor MOT pass rate. Between 2022 and 2024 36 vehicles were presented for MOT. 12 vehicles failed their MOT. “In 2025 no vehicles have passed the MOT first time and the two that passed on retest had advisory items marked”
• that drivers would report promptly any defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and that any defects would be promptly recorded in writing.
• The MIVR dated 12 December 2024 found “Maintenance records are predominately well completed but consistently show minor issues (4% of sample). Examples of minor issues include driver related defects present (67% of sample) and temperature assessment not made for decelerometer.
• One white, top copy, of a single DDR was retrospectively amended by Mr Banga and one of his drivers. The sheet was dated 11 December 2024. I accept that this was more likely than not part of a training exercise to demonstrate to the driver how to populate the form. This was an extremely poor decision. The DDR’s should be a contemporaneous record and should not be amended. If a situation arose where the need to retrospectively amend legitimately arose this record would need to be marked to make that clear. It is difficult to think of a situation where this would be legitimately necessary. The appropriate course would be to create an additional record and store the DDRs together. This would retain the audit trail that the DDRs are intended to uphold.
• I have declined to reach a finding of dishonesty or lack of integrity around this DDR. I have reminded myself that there is one civil standard of proof but that the more serious the allegation the more cogent the evidence should be, to reach the conclusion that the matter is more likely than not to have occurred.
• It was persuasive to my decision that the pink, bottom carbonated copy of the record was not amended.
• I received a witness statement from the driver confirming the circumstances in which the white DDR had been amended. I placed less weight on this as the evidence was untested by cross-examination.
• The context and the height of the substance of the amendment would have been to correct a driver ticking a box for features the vehicle did not have, rather than adding or deleting a defect on the DDR sheet.
• Contrary to section 17(3)(c) of the Public Passenger Act 1981 one of the Operator’s vehicles has been issued with prohibition notices by DVSA or the police in the past five years.
• There was a prohibition issued during a fleet check on the 12 December 2024. I have seen a photograph of the issue which VE Jones described as “tyre cut to cords”. The photograph presented as a hole in the tyre with obvious, visible wear to the tyre. In the course of the evidence it was agreed by VR Jones that this wear would more likely than not have occurred via “kerbing” whereby the tyre rubs along the accessible pavement. VE Jones made me aware that this is a common issue. It was further accepted that this defect was discovered prior to a walkround check of the vehicle that day.
• VE Jones’s evidence was that the wear to the tyre would likely have been evident for a greater period of time than one day due to the thickness of the rubber on the tyre. I did not need to determine this matter to make this prohibition finding.
Balancing Exercise
In the positive the Operator has:
• Co-operated with the enforcement investigation and with the public inquiry process.
• I have seen evidence of the investment of resources of time and money by the Operator to meaningfully improve the maintenance systems. The Operator has purchased Roller Brake Testing equipment and has engaged the services of a part time clerical worker and a bus services monitoring officer which will free up some time for Mr Banga.
• I accept Mr Oliver’s submission that this Operator has been trying to get things right.
• There is effective management and control by Mr Banga but that must be viewed in the round.
In the negative:
• Whilst I have assessed Mr Banga to be in continuous and effective control as a Transport Manager the public inquiry process has revealed areas of concerns which must be addressed. Notably, the low MOT pass rate and writing on DDR retrospectively are primary examples.
• There has been a persistence to the issues on this licence.
• There is a regulatory history on this licence. This is the Operator’s third public inquiry. Albeit, they are now of some age dating back to 2009 and 2016.
• The Low MOT pass rate. Between 2022 and 2024 of 36 vehicles presented for MOT 12 failed on initial testing. No vehicles have passed the MOT first time in 2025.
• There was an immediate prohibition dated 12 December 2024.
The conduct falls into the category of “Persistent operator licence failures with inadequate response or previous public inquiry history”. The regulatory starting point is “Severe to Serious”. I accept Mr Oliver’s submission that this case should be dealt with in the Serious category.
In coming to this conclusion I have given weight to the tangible evidence of meaningful steps towards future compliance. An example of this is that all vehicles are undergoing a PMI, to an MOT standard every 28 days now. An IRTEC qualified mechanic is inspecting the vehicles before two “in-house” mechanics will work on the vehicles. A third “set of eyes” is the mechanic undertaking the MOTs. New systems such as job notes and parts orders are to be implemented and Mr Banga has accepted that the age of his fleet will need to be addressed. A Roller Brake Tester has been purchased and a clerical worker has been engaged. A transport consultant has been engaged to conduct regular audits, importantly this consultancy has been embedded some time before the public inquiry and the Operator has provided evidence to me of actioning the recommendations from the most recent audit.
The low MOT pass rate is deeply concerning and must be immediately rectified. The MOT standard is a low bar as a road safety standard. I have been provided with documentary evidence of a new maintenance provider, recommendations from the transport consultant, the transport consultant’s guidance on this issue and communications regarding standard setting from Mr Banga to the new maintenance provider. I have also been provided with invoices of vehicles being prepared for MOT. Through documentary and oral evidence I have accepted that Mr Banga is authorising appropriate time and spending on getting the vehicles ready for the MOT. Moving forwards Mr Banga believes more scrutiny and management of maintenance will be required, which he has already commenced. He believes that ultimately the age of the fleet may prove to be commercially unviable and the vehicles will need to be replaced.
It is important to scrutinise the MOT failure position as of the date of the public inquiry. Whilst the new “three sets of eyes” system has been in place a vehicle has failed the MOT due to a blown headlight. VE Jones was able to assist with this. He agreed with Mr Oliver that the failure of that MOT was due to an “undetermined failure of a competent” and that it appeared to have been “presented for test with all bulbs working”. This evidence is critical to a fair analysis. Vehicles should not be failing their MOT, ideally at all and certainly not at the rate they have on this licence. It is also true that this type of MOT failure does not necessarily undermine the maintenance procedures an operator has in place. This point is a reminder of the value of the public inquiry process and the need not to sensationalise headlines of a feature of any case.
During the public inquiry issues of “kerbing”, DDRs and the recording of times for walkaround checks arose. Kerbing means a tyre scraping the kerb, which is common at bus stops. . Mr Banga is motivated to avoid “kerbing” of his tyres for both safety and commercial reasons. Drivers have been trained on this issue. End of driving duty checks have been introduced, albeit only in the last week, to record the condition of the tyres at the end of the driver’s duties on the back of the DDR.
Mr Banga accepts that drivers should be recording how long their walkaround check takes not just “15 min” across the board. It is not helpful to simply record that 15 min would be the expected time for a check. The actual time spent would assist Mr Banga as a Transport Manager far more and would be a much greater regulatory assurance.
The nature of the public inquiry process will require time and monetary resource, directly or by opportunity cost, for all operators. Over and above this, Mr Banga has engaged specialised advice and the services of commercial road transport lawyers and a consultant. I have seen from the written evidence and oral evidence before me the scrutiny Mr Banga has willingly invited from these independent third parties and the actions he has taken to improve his business. Mr Oliver covered with Mr Banga in written and oral evidence a series of difficult features of the evidence. It is to both of their credits, in their respective roles, that neither sought to minimise the issues that had arisen. Neither were there any attempts before me to cherry pick the evidence or engage in rising satellite issues to attempt to distract from the central features. This focus on the material failings and how they will be addressed has been important in my assessment of Mr Banga as a Transport Manager and for the future trust I can place in him as sole director, as a sole trader, of his business.
In light of all of the circumstances and the improvements which have been tangibly evidenced and which have begun to be embedded before the public inquiry I am persuaded by a fine margin that it would be disproportionate today to revoke the licence. If Mr Banga has to return to public inquiry it is difficult to imagine this last chance would be extended again. Big changes will need to be made. I trust that Mr Banga is aware what to do to make the changes.
A suspension of a PSV authority is an option. An immediate suspension of the authority will impact on the travelling public. The routes operated by Mr Banga are mainly “non-commercial” routes to the extent that other operators are not also operating on them such that passengers can, with relative ease, use another service. I have considered a delayed suspension to ease the burden to the travelling public and allow those who need to use the bus a notice period that an alternative provision will need to be made.
By reason of the regulatory impact on the travelling public and due to the positive features which I have credited above I have drawn back from imposing a period of suspension. The administrative and practical reality of a suspension is especially difficult for non-commercial bus routes. As a regulatory action, a short notice suspension would cause a great impact on the public. At the same time a suspension would not cure the issues before me.
I am persuaded that the appropriate and proportionate regulatory action is a reduction in the vehicle authority. As this is a PSV authority, this will be expressed as a condition on the licence.
Regulatory action is not a punishment albeit that it may have a punitive effect. Taking everything into account including the needs of the traveling public I have decided that I will order that the reduction in vehicle authority does not materially affect the transport operation. This will mean a reduction from 13 to 12 PSV operator’s discs indefinity. Further for the next four weekends a condition will be added to the licence to prevent more than 10 operators discs being used.
When asking myself the Priority Fright question of how likely is it that this operator will comply in the future? I have answered that the Operator can be trusted to comply if the Operator maintains the investment of time and money into improvements and the motivation to do so.
I reserved by Judgment on what, if any, sanction or penalty would be imposed to reflect the 77% punctuality rate. I have carefully considered the options and what would appropriately balance the regulatory objectives and the will of Parliament that those who offer bus services meaningfully serve the travelling public. I have considered the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document 14 and I have reminded myself of the principles from the leading cases of Ribble Motor Services Ltd v Traffic Commission for the North Western Traffic Area [2001] RTR 37, First Manchester Ltd 2012/015 and Diamond Bus Ltd [2019] UKUT 0040 (AAC).
The object of imposing penalties is to focus minds so as to achieve the statutory purpose. Traffic commissioners should impose sanctions on those who seriously fail the travelling public.
Penalties do not guarantee improvements and provide limited benefit to passengers affected by the early and late running services. Services that run early stop passengers being able to get onto the bus. Late services make those who rely on the bus late. There is also a wider issue in relation to public transport that those who have the privilege of a choice over public and private transport may be deterred from using bus services generally where the reliability of the service is poor.
The Senior Traffic Commissioner’s guidance is that “The application of a penalty (financial or otherwise) is likely to be most appropriate where an operator makes little or no effort to run reliable and punctual services, or shows a flagrant disregard for compliance or fair competition.”. My emphasis is added. It was this point in particular that I decided to reserve my position on to digest and reflect upon.
I have found on the evidence that Mr Banga has tried to comply with the punctuality expectations. Whilst very late services are deeply disappointing to those who use these buses I follow Mr Banga’s point that he still put the buses on, rather than not operate them at all.
I have seen the variation applications made to the Officer of the Traffic Commissioner before public inquiry. I have seen the communications via the “Ticketer” software with the drivers on punctuality. I have seen evidence that Mr Banga has improved his monitoring of punctuality. I have also been provided with evidence that Mr Banga has had to cancel the 5/5A service, because he, like other providers before him, has found the route too difficult to compliantly run.
Mr Banga has not made “little or no effort” and has not benefitted from unfair competition. I entirely accept Mr Oliver’s point that this is not a case where the timetable was manipulated to take bus fares from other companies. Neither are the maintenance issues a central feature of unfair competition as it relies to punctuality. Mr Oliver, rightly, made the point that the maintenance issues are a serious, but separate issue, at this public inquiry.
What I have come back to is that Mr Banga willingly chose to apply for the bus service routes before me. He set the timetable and had the power to seek variations or cancellations via the Office of the Traffic Commissioner. Mr Banga was not able to live up to the statutory expectation of 95% punctuality compliance. I have found that the rate based on a sample by BO Lees was 77%. This is a seriously failing to the travelling public and in those cases I should impose a sanction.
The starting point for under 80% compliance is a penalty of £400-£550 per authorised vehicle. This starting point is set out in statutory document 14 of the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s guidance.
I must follow the principle of proportionality when considering the amount of penalty to impose taking care to ensure that the amount of the penalty reflects the scale of the failures.
To reflect the efforts of Mr Banga, the scale of failures, the lack of more serious intention or disregard behind non compliance and the increased effort to address bus punctuality since the BOAM report, including the engagement of a bus services monitoring officer the appropriate and fair result is to exercise my discretion in a downward movement from the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s guidance when imposing penalties (financial or otherwise) under section 155 of the Transport Act 2000.
After exercising the downward movement to reflect mitigation, the appropriate level of the penalty is £300. As there were 13 authorised vehicles the amount of the penalty is therefore £3,900.
This level of penalty reflects that not enough was done to ensure compliance and as a result passengers were seriously affected. The best way to serve the needs of the travelling public in this case would be to order that this amount of £3,900 be expended by the Operator limited to the provision or improvement of local services or facilities. This order is made subject to section 155 Transport Act 2000 (1A)(b)
Had I handed down this decision orally I would have allowed Mr Oliver to address me on how long would be a reasonable period for this money to be used as envisaged and evidence be provided to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner. Having not sought this submission at the public inquiry I invited submissions in writing on this point after the public inquiry. Having considered the response, I will order that evidence that this money has been spent by the Operator limited to the provision or improvement of local services or facilities will be sent to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner, Birmingham by 4pm 29 August 2025.
Failure to provide evidence of payments to the value of £3900 by the 29 August 2025 would be a matter capable of leading to an adverse finding of repute.
Decision
Adverse findings are made subject to section 26(1)(b) of the Transport Act 1985, 17(3)(aa) of the Public Passenger Act 1981 and 17(3)(c) of the Public Passenger Act 1981.
Subject to section 17(2)(d) of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 I have attached a condition to the licence that the Operator is not to use no more than 12 discs at any one time. This condition is to run indefinitely.
Further and subject to section 17(2)(d) of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 I have attached a condition to the licence that the Operator must not use more than 10 PSV discs at any one time. This condition is to be in place over four weekends, for 17-18 May, 24-25 May, 31 May-1 June and the 7-8 June. For the avoidance of doubt, Mr Banga need not return two discs to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner each weekend. The Office of the Traffic Commissioner staff will mark this change on the digital system. Through Mr Oliver, Mr Banga is aware of the very serious consequences of breaching a PSV operator’s licence condition.
Mr Banga’s repute as a Transport Manager is tarnished but not lost.
Subject to section 155 Transport Act 2000 (1A)(b) £3,900 shall be expended by the Operator limited to the provision or improvement of local services or facilities. This order is made provisionally so that Mr Banga’s solicitor may address me on the length of the period for action. Provisionally, evidence that this money has been spent by the Operator limited to the provision or improvement of local services or facilities will be sent to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner, Birmingham by 4pm 29 August 2025.
Post script
I outlined the skeleton of my decision orally at the end of the public inquiry. I announced orally a finding contrary to section 26(1)(a) of the Transport Act 1985 namely that the operator had failed to operate a local bus service registered with the traffic commissioner. This finding would be inconsistent with my factual findings which are actually consistent with section 26(1)(b) of the Transport Act 1985, which reflects operating a local bus service outside of the timings registered with the traffic commissioner. No finding subject to section 26(1)(a) of the Transport Act 1985 is made.
Deputy Traffic Commissioner Moxon
19th May 2025