Decision for Mr. Scaffolding (UK) Limited (OD1126325)

Written decision of the Deputy Traffic Commissioner in the West Midlands for Mr. Scaffolding (UK) Limited

• From: Traffic Commissioners for Great Britain
• Published: 24 September 2026

• Subject: HGV operator
• Region: West Midlands
• Case type: Regulatory
• Regulatory decision: Licence revoked
• Published: 15 June 2026

IN THE WEST MIDLANDS TRAFFIC AREA

MR. SCAFFOLDING (UK) LIMITED - OD1126325

DECISION OF DEPUTY TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER G. PENGELLY

DECISION

As follows:

• The operator license is REVOKED pursuant to section 26(1)(h) of the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 (“the 1995 Act”) (change of circumstances - operator not fit), section 26(1)(f) (breach of undertakings – see paragraph 23(b) of the decision, below), section 26(1)(c)(iii) (prohibitions)
• All orders for revocation will take effect from 14.07.26 at 23:45;
• I make no order under section 28 against the operator itself.

Background

This was a public inquiry (“PI”) concerning Mr. Scaffolding (UK) Limited (“the operator”).

The operator holds a restricted goods vehicle licence that was issued in this Traffic Area in 2014.

The operator presently has an authorisation for four vehicles.

The operator was the subject of a DVSA maintenance inspection visit on 26.11.25; that visit was triggered by a prohibition notice issued on 10.11.25 near Stafford.

On 10.11.25, one of the operator’s drivers – Mr. Murtagh – was driving a vehicle for the operator with an insecure load; the driver was issued with a fixed penalty notice. Other matters discovered on 10.11.25 involved the operator itself being referred to the DVSA.

Vehicle Examiner (“VE”) Matthews conducted the DVSA’s visit to the operating centre in Birmingham. VE Matthews’ final report (“the MIVR”) is dated 24.12.25. The first version of VE Matthews’ report was read by the operator on 17.12.25.

The Call to Public Inquiry

The call-up letter was dated 03.03.26.

The letter listed several issues, the principal of which were:

• That vehicles or drivers have been issued with prohibitions in the last five years (section 26(1)(c)(iii));
• That a statement made on applying for the license was false/not fulfilled, namely that the operator’s vehicles would be inspected every eight weeks (section 26(1)(e));
• That undertakings on the licence have not been honoured (section 26(1)(f)), specifically:

Keeping vehicles in a fit and serviceable condition;

That vehicles would not be overloaded;

That driver defect reports (“DDRs”), safety inspections, and routine maintenance records would be kept for 15months and be made available on request; and

That drivers would promptly report defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and that any defects would be promptly recorded in writing.

• That there had been a material change of circumstances, namely whether the operator was fit to hold a licence (section 26(1)(h)).

The Public Inquiry

The PI took place at the Office of the Traffic Commissioner in Birmingham on 26.05.26.

Mr. Martin Ray, one of the operator’s two directors, was present and fully participated; Mr. David Price, the operator’s other director, was not present.

Ms. Cheryl Ray, the operator’s office manager, also attended. Ms. Ray and Mr. Ray are married.

Mr. Cowdell, the operator’s consultant, also attended.

The operator was represented by Ms. Dooher, counsel.

The Evidence

I had fully read and considered the bundle in advance of the PI.

I also read a bundle of looseleaf documents setting out various items of training that had been delivered by the operator’s consultants more recently; that was handed to me on the day. I asked for this to be submitted digitally at the end of the PI so I could read that in more detail.

Before the PI began, I confirmed with Ms. Dooher that no material challenge was made to the contents of the various reports/documents in the bundle; she confirmed there was no such challenge.

I heard detailed evidence from Mr. Ray during the PI; his evidence was split into two parts:

• The first part, by far the larger part, dealt with his evidence as to the substance - the various allegations made by the DVSA and his response on behalf of the operator;
• The second part dealt with his evidence on the effects of various types of regulatory action.

I also heard brief evidence from Ms. Ray and Mr. Cowdell.

Findings of fact

The burden of proof is on the DVSA in respect of any of the allegations it makes – the operator does not have to prove anything. The standard of proof is the civil standard: where I am satisfied that something is more likely than not to have happened, then my duty is to find that matter ‘proved’; where I am not satisfied that something is more likely than not to have happened, my duty is to find the matter ‘not proved’.

I found the following facts proved to the required standard:

The directors of the operator allowed two letters to be sent to the DVSA sometime around December 2025 and January 2026 that were responding to various issues raised in VE Matthews’ MIVR; those letters contained not only misleading assertions, but deliberate lies:

The specific lies in those letters were:

• That Mr. Murtagh had “…completed his [DDR] book [before 10.11.25] and not renewed it”; the operator now accepts there were no DDR books in use at all before 10.11.25;
• That “defect notes” were “created prior to” the preventative maintenance inspections (“PMIs”). The truth was that such records were not created before the PMIs but fabricated later and back-dated – retrospectively – to make the operator look, to the DVSA, like it had a safety system that generated written records when the operator did not have such a system;
• The sentence in one of their letters, “If we have used a vehicle that was declared VOR [vehicle off-road] then we have clearly failed” (emphasis added). The truth was that the operator knew it had used a vehicle in January 2025 that should have been marked VOR because it had missed its PMI;

The first of those lies is aggravated by the fact that the operator accused VE Matthews of not reading the operator’s first response letter carefully enough, i.e. not doing his job properly. The operator’s criticism of VE Matthews was unfair;

• The directors read the above letters before they were sent out:
• I reject any suggestion that the directors were understandably, rationally, or sensibly acting on the advice of any professional - if such advice was given at all by a professional - when they sent those letters. There are many instances where it is entirely appropriate for someone not immersed in the technical detail of how lorries work to rely on someone more knowledgeable than them to help them draft responses to letters to the DVSA about technical matters. Anyone concerned with operator licensing, however, knows that sending a letter containing complete lies to the DVSA when the latter want to see paperwork related to that operator’s road safety system, is a truly terrible idea. It is common sense; it is analogous to lying to the police. No-one in a regulated industry, trusted to operate a business which – if run badly – can lead to people being killed or suffering serious injury, needs to be told the above by anyone, let alone by a regulator. Mr. Ray was trying to minimise the scale of the directors’ wrongdoing when he tried to suggest, at this PI, that he was simply following his consultant’s advice;

Mr. Ray himself lied to VE Matthews when he said to the latter on the day of his visit that the reason there were no DDR books on 26.11.25 for the period before 10.11.25 was because, “…there is insufficient storage room to store DDR books… only a few pages are available”. Again, as rehearsed above (paragraph 21(a)(i)(1)), Mr. Ray accepted at this PI that there were no such books in use by this operator before 10.11.25;

The operator did not have an effective system before 10.11.25 to report defects with vehicles: as a result, drivers were not properly integrated within the operator’s safety regime at that time. The operator was unaware of the fact that a malfunction indicator light (“MIL”) was illuminated at a PMI on 24.10.25; the light was also ‘on’ on 10.11.25. Even if this fault was intermittent, as Mr. Ray said to me in evidence, on each occasion that a third party (e.g. the PMI mechanic or the DVSA) encountered this vehicle, the MIL was illuminated. If there was a proper, effective DDR system then the operator would likely have had a better understanding of the frequency of the intermittent fault and have seen the importance of this issue;

Despite training delivered in March 2025, the prohibition on 10.11.25 related to the same issue (insecure loads) as two previous prohibitions issued to this operator/its drivers since March 2024. One of those other prohibitions was issued on 10.01.25; it was issued when one of the operator’s directors, Mr. Price, was driving. My findings are:

• Driver training on a critical issue for road safety in the scaffolding industry cannot have been sufficiently emphatic or frequent for this operator’s drivers before 10.11.25; and
• The operator’s directors cannot have been properly supervising their drivers to make sure that loads were being secured on the operator’s vehicles before 10.11.25;

As at 26.11.25, the PMIs were of insufficient quality and record-keeping in respect of them was poor:

• As set out above (paragraph 21(a)(i)(3), above), one of the operator’s lies was to conceal the fact that a PMI had been missed altogether in January 2025;
• As at 26.11.25, PMI sheets showed that no brake test was being conducted: to be clear, it was not that there was a sub-standard brake test (e.g. an unladen roller brake test (“RBT”)) being conducted – there was no brake test being conducted at all. The operator promised, in its response to VE Matthews, “A loaded roller brake test will be carried out on all vehicles starting from October 2025”;

As at 26.11.25, there was no proper system for checking wheel security (wheel nut torque) and tyre safety. Ms. Ray, in her evidence, emphatically said there was an external tyre company that came in to examine such issues before 26.11.25. I accepted Ms. Ray’s evidence on the point. What I find is:

• There were insufficient records about such checks held by the operator; and
• Checks in respect of torque were not conducted by the operator itself between checks by the external contractor as contemplated by the Careless Torque Costs Lives publication;

The operator’s current/historic MOT failure score is/has always been excellent – 0%;

Despite the assurances rehearsed above (paragraph 21(e)(ii)) about laden RBTs being conducted at PMI from October 2025 onwards, this promise was not delivered: there was still a PMI not just where no laden RBT was done, but no brake test at all. The operator, in its May 2026 evidence, said this, “They [the maintenance provider] had confirmed that… [l]aden RBT[s] would be conducted at each PMI, but I understand that did not happen immediately. I can confirm that moving forwards, a laden RBT will be conducted at each PMI”;

The operator did introduce DDR books after the MIVR; however, a multitude of driver detectable defects were still being picked up by the PMI mechanic at more-or-less every PMI for the operator’s vehicles in the period 26.11.25-12.05.26 where there was no corresponding DDR. Driver walkaround checks were plainly not being conducted properly by this operators’ drivers at the end of 2025 into mid-2026;

There was no master log dealing with wheel nut torque produced to VE Matthews in 2026 when the operator was directed to provide “wheel removal/re-torque records” because there was no such log to give him at that time. However, there was a system for checking torque via the external tyre maintenance provider - yellow tags were kept and produced;

The operator’s consultants, who came on board in late April 2026, have delivered bespoke training on load security that was far more “in-depth” and appropriate than previous training delivered to this operator’s drivers. The operator’s consultants, generally, are highly impressive. I will say more about that below;

The operator’s consultants delivered 2.5 hours of training to drivers to improve the quality of the operator’s driver walkaround checks;

Mr. Ray is now more directly involved in supervising drivers during the day than he used to be; he is better able to supervise the operator’s drivers in loading vehicles appropriately and checking any maintenance issues with the vehicles;

The operator now has a master torque log for recording torque on the operator’s vehicles’ wheel nuts over time.

Moving through each of the findings, I now explain – in respect of each sub-paragraph - the weight I have placed upon each matter:

I place significant weight on this factor; my reasoning comes in stages:

Lying to the DVSA is a very serious matter: here, the lies were about material aspects of the operator’s safety regime in the aftermath of a MIVR;

More than just lies, DDR records were falsified and back-dated by the operator – I find this was a determined attempt to mislead;

Any PI involves a Traffic Commissioner, at the end of it, assessing what risks an operator poses and whether those risks can be managed/mitigated moving forwards to achieve the twin objectives of the legislation – to ensure road safety and ensure fair competition between operators. If an operator has lied about something material, then that fact may affect a Traffic Commissioner’s trust in that operator; a lack of trust may, in the end, be a decisive factor in a case;

Traffic Commissioners should consider the reasons why the operator lied on a particular point: a Traffic Commissioner may still end up trusting an operator who has lied at some point historically;

I give credit for the fact that this operator told me the truth before the PI via Mr Ray’s final witness statement; the operator did not force me to have to have to deal with the various inconsistencies in the evidence myself. The operator demonstrated a mature, adult approach to that degree. The credit I felt able to give the operator for that, however, vacillated during the PI; in the end, the level of credit was reduced by three matters:

• Having heard from Mr. Ray, I am confident I would have reached findings about lies and falsification myself: I am satisfied, here, the operator was basically forced to admit their lies because of the state of the evidence and the lack of cogency in their attempts to explain that evidence innocently;

• The operator minimised recent and historical poor performance on several matters (paragraphs 21(a)(iii), above, and paragraphs 22(b), (h)(ii), 35(b), below); this made me doubt that their belated honesty about the letters heralded a more open and transparent approach moving forwards;

• Related to (2), the operator still attempted to place a lot of blame on its consultant for sending the letters and advising them as they did in various respects (paragraphs 21(a)(iii), above and 22(b), below). The operator, via Mr Ray’s evidence to me at the PI, did not take sufficient responsibility for its actions;

I placed significant weight on this factor. Mr. Ray said in evidence, in effect, that when he lied to VE Matthews’ face about DDR books, that that lie – again – was him acting on the advice of his consultant. I explained to Mr. Ray that, according to the MIVR, his consultant was not actually present that day with him and VE Matthews – if the consultant was, he would have been referred to as one of those present for the operator by VE Matthews in his report. Mr. Ray did not have an answer to that point. I regarded this as an example of Mr. Ray minimising/refusing to take responsibility for something at the PI he had done and trying to pass blame to someone else;

I place significant weight on this factor. The purpose of many of the lies told in this case (paragraphs 21(a)(i)(1)-(2), above) was to try to ‘cover up’ the fact that there was no effective DDR system at that time. This operator’s safety system was informal with very limited records at that time. I find that the identification/rectification of issues experienced by drivers was ad hoc and inconsistent at this time in the operator’s life. It is not surprising that driver-detectable defects were being picked up at PMIs in this period even with the ‘bad’ first maintenance provider the operator complained of at this PI. It is not surprising that a MIL light was seemingly perpetually ‘on’ or intermittently ‘on’ (regularly) given the lack of DDRs. Swift action when a MIL is ‘on’ should be taken so that road safety is not compromised. The ineffective integration of the drivers in the operator’s safety system before 10.11.25 posed a risk to road safety;

I place some weight on this factor. Operators should be alive to the risks generated by their operations and be seeking to minimise or mitigate those risks. What is a significant risk to one operator may not be a significant risk to another. Here, this operator had a recurring problem – its drivers, including one of its directors, was repeatedly stopped and issued with notices for insecure loads. The operator should have taken effective steps to tackle the root cause of the problem – a lack of driver knowledge and a lack of rigour on the part of drivers. Whilst it was evident at this PI that Mr. Ray had taken steps to be tougher on this issue with the drivers more recently (paragraphs 21-22(m), above and below), the operator had not been robust enough - in terms of training and supervision/disciplining of drivers - in the period March 2024 to November 2025. The lack of response to this recurring issue in the operation presented a risk to road safety in the period from March 2024 to November 2025;

I place significant weight on this factor. Brake tests should be conducted at every PMI; it is a critical part of any PMI. The failure of the braking system of any part of a heavy goods vehicles poses a significant risk to road safety; there is a risk of catastrophic injury or death if a brakes failure occurs with a heavy goods vehicle in use. The DVSA’s Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness, in all its iterations, has insisted upon brake tests being conducted at every PMI for many years; as from April 2025, that requirement extended to laden RBTs being conducted at every PMI. By failing to carry out the most elementary checks on their vehicles at PMIs for a sustained period in 2024 and 2025, this operator’s safety system fell well below the minimum standards set for the whole of the industry for some time. This operator was able to undercut its competitors; further, the operator’s actions seriously imperilled road safety for a sustained period in 2024 and 2025;

I place some weight on this factor. Wheel security and tyre safety are safety-critical issues – very significant risks are posed to the public by heavy goods vehicles whose wheels are not secure or vehicles whose tyres are worn or at risk of failure. The operator’s safety system in this respect was not that contemplated by the DVSA’s Careless Torque Costs Lives publication as at 26.11.25. The operator does not appear to have been monitoring wheel torque for itself; the operator should have been actively monitoring wheel security, conducting checks itself, and keeping records to allow it to see patterns that were emerging. The operator appropriately engaged an external contractor but there was a dearth of information about the frequency of those visits or what the operator was doing between visits;

I place some weight on this factor; I bear in mind, however, that an MOT:

• Only tests whether a vehicle meets the minimum standards of roadworthiness to be legally in use on the roads in this country; and
• That it takes place once a year on a day known about in advance.

I place very significant weight on this factor. The operator cannot have been left under any illusions, having read VE Matthews’ MIVR, about how important it was that laden RBTs were conducted at every PMI. Promises were made by the operator to this effect (paragraph 21(e)(ii), above). The moment that the operator received a single PMI sheet, after December 2025, that indicated a laden RBT was not being done, this operator should have demanded – in the most vehement terms – an explanation from the maintenance provider about why that was not done. If there was no good explanation for why that was not done, the operator should have changed maintenance provider immediately. Much blame was placed, at this PI, at the door of the maintenance provider. This is the second maintenance provider to be criticised by this operator; such blaming:

• Failed to recognise that my concern, as a Traffic Commissioner, is not in processes (who is at fault between the operator and the maintenance provider) but in outcomes; my concern is making sure the lorry ultimately got the attention it needed, as part of an effective safety system;
• Minimised/misunderstood how serious it was that the operator’s lorries were not getting effective brake tests at every PMI.

When I read VE Matthews’ addendum report in this case (dated May 2026), I was very disappointed:

• The report showed an unladen RBT in January 2026;
• There was no brake test being conducted at all at a PMI in March 2026; and
• There was an unladen RBT in April 2026.

The lack of a brake test, at all – set against this operator’s history, above – is completely unacceptable. Poor quality PMIs during this period imperilled road safety and undercut the operator’s competitors who operated in a compliant way;

I place significant weight on this factor. Again, the operator cannot have been under any illusions about what it needed to do in respect of DDRs because they were told in the clearest terms by VE Matthews in December 2025. A heavy goods vehicle is not a private car:

• Wear on a heavy goods vehicle is heavier;
• The risk of injury in the event of an accident or vehicle failure is higher;
• Decisions about goods vehicles are often made by people other than the vehicles’ drivers;

PMIs are part of any effective safety system, but they are far from the whole of that system; operators cannot abrogate their responsibilities by making maintenance and safety issues their maintenance provider’s problem. Safety and maintenance issues are always the operator’s problem. Proper integration of drivers into the operator’s safety system, involving rigorous walkaround checks by drivers, the identification/reporting of defects by drivers, and timely rectification of any such defects by the operator, is needed to ensure road safety between PMIs. That is the system clearly described in the DVSA’s Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness. The operator’s failure to properly integrate drivers within their safety system in the period between December 2025 and May 2026 imperilled road safety;

I place some weight on this factor. There was no master log. Whilst torque tags were produced to VE Matthews, there was no evidence – among those - that a wheel that had been replaced at PMI had had its nuts re-torqued after the new wheel had been fitted by the mechanic. Again, the system described in the Careless Torque Costs Lives publication had not been implemented;

I place significant weight on this factor. It is evident from the materials produced to me on the day of the PI (paragraph 16, above) that this operator’s consultants have conducted a top-to-bottom assessment of the risks inherent in this operation and delivered appropriate, robust training ‘on the ground’ to every person of importance to the operation. Over 40 pages of detailed training materials have been provided to me. After hearing from Mr. Cowdell in evidence, I have considerable confidence in him and his consultancy to raise standards for this operator;

I place significant weight on this factor. I accepted Mr. Cowdell’s evidence that rigorous training has been provided to the drivers on this point and, with appropriate support/encouragement from the operator’s directors, that it will change the drivers’ approach moving forwards;

I place some weight on this factor. It indicates that there has been some change in respect of the operator’s practices since the MIVR;

I place some weight on this factor. It demonstrates that issues of wheel security are now being taken seriously and monitored over time in a systematic way.

Findings regarding breaches of the legislation

As a result of the above findings of fact, I find that the operator has fallen foul of the following provisions of the statutory scheme:

That vehicles or drivers have been issued with prohibitions in the last five years (section 26(1)(c)(iii));

That undertakings on the licence have not been honoured (section 26(1)(f)), specifically:

• Keeping vehicles in a fit and serviceable condition;
• That driver defect reports (“DDRs”) records, safety inspections, and routine maintenance records would be kept for 15months and be made available on request; and
• That drivers would promptly report defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and that any defects would be promptly recorded in writing.

That there has been a material change of circumstances, namely whether the operator is fit it to hold a licence (section 26(1)(h) (see further findings below).

Balancing Exercise

I repeat all my findings in this case, including the evidential weight I have attached to each one, to assess the operator as it appeared before me at the date of the PI.

Having carefully balanced the evidential weight I have given for all the positive findings in this case against the evidential weight I have given for all the negative findings (paragraphs 21-22, above) I have determined that balance tips firmly in favour of the negative findings.

I now go on to consider Annexe Four of Statutory Document Ten issued by the Senior Traffic Commissioner.

Relevant Considerations

I am satisfied that the following ‘negative’ factors apply to this case:

• There were several reckless acts that compromised road safety (paragraphs 21-22(c), (e), (h), and (i) above); further, the acts described at paragraphs 21-22(e) and (h) also clearly undermined fair competition between operators;
• There were attempts by the operator to conceal failings (paragraph 21-22(a) and (b), above);
• Historically, including periods in 2026, there was ineffective management control and insufficient systems/procedures in place to prevent operator compliance failings (paragraphs 21-22(c)-(e), (h), and (i), above);
• Historically, including periods in 2026, there was ineffective and insufficient driver training with insufficient or ineffective monitoring (paragraphs 21-22(d) and (i), above).

I am satisfied that the following ‘positive’ factors apply to this case:

• There is, albeit only with significant support from their consultants, very recent evidence of effective management control and appropriate systems/procedures now in place to prevent operator licence failings (paragraph 21-22(k)-(n), above);
• There is, albeit only with significant support from their consultants, very recent evidence of proper and effective driver/maintenance staff training with appropriate monitoring (paragraphs 21-22(k) and (l), above);
• There has always been an above-average first-time MOT pass rate for this operator (paragraph 21-22(g), above);

After hearing Ms. Dooher, I accept her submission that the positive factors identified in this case do justify a downward adjustment from the ‘severe’ category I was otherwise contemplating putting the operator in.

Whilst I was persuaded to move from the ‘severe’ category to the ‘serious’ category, I placed this case is the upper end of the ‘serious’ category; my reasons for that placement are:

Road safety was put at risk in several respects by this operator for a sustained period, including periods of time that were relatively proximate to the PI (paragraph 27(a), above);

This operator, because a previous listing of this PI had been adjourned, had longer than most operators to demonstrate improvement. As I explained to Mr. Ray in the PI, Traffic Commissioners can forgive many failings on the part of an operator in the past providing the operator learns from them, gets to grips with the issues it faces, and demonstrates sustained improvement at the time of the PI. The Traffic Commissioner’s jurisdiction is not a punitive jurisdiction; the only reason I have, and use, the powers I have is to achieve the objectives of preserving fair competition between operators and to ensure road safety. In my estimation, this operator spent months from December 2025 achieving minimal or no improvement (paragraphs 21-22(h) and (i), above) until they engaged their consultants in April 2026. The evidence of improvement that has been brought to this PI has:

• Been at the last minute; and
• Has largely been because of the intervention of the operator’s consultants.

The fact that Mr. Ray did the OLAT in January 2026 makes the lack of progress between January and April 2026 even more disappointing (see paragraph 35, below).

Holding a goods vehicle licence is a serious responsibility. The conditions and undertakings are printed on the licence at every renewal. As the Upper Tribunal held in the appeal case of T/2012/30 MGM Haulage & Recycling Limited [2012] UKUT 346 (AAC), at [4], operators are taken to have read long-standing publications such as the Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness, Careless Torque Costs Lives, etc., issued to assist them in understanding their obligations.

All holders of a restricted license are deemed to know the basics of operator licensing; as the Upper Tribunal held in the appeal case of T/2014/24 LA & Z Leonida (t/a ETS), at [4],

• “…it does not matter whether an operator’s licence is held by an owner operator, a partnership or a limited company because in each case the person or persons responsible for managing the business bear the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the road transport aspect of the business operates in compliance with the regulatory regime.  That means that they cannot plead ignorance or put the blame on the transport manager because they are required to have sufficient knowledge of the regulatory regime to ensure compliance in general and the proper performance of the transport manager’s duties in particular” (emphasis added)

It was the Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness that VE Matthews was relying on when he imparted all the advice he did to this operator in his report from the visit in December 2025.

This operator had a clear roadmap of what it had to do.

The level of improvement between December 2025 and April 2026 was poor; the reason for that is because, I find, the operator’s directors’ attitudes were poor. Three examples:

• Promises were made about the introduction of laden RBTs at every PMI in December 2025 that were not honoured (paragraphs 21-22(e) and (h), above).
• Rather than accepting the myriad of driver-detectable faults, where there was no corresponding DDR, for the operator’s vehicles in the period between December 2025 and May 2026 (paragraphs 21-22(i), above), Mr. Ray sought to play down the significance of the various defects identified by VE Matthews at the PI (paragraphs 21-22(i), above);
• The operator continually sought to blame its former consultant for things that the directors should have taken responsibility for (paragraphs 21-22(a)-(b)).

When I asked Mr. Cowdell, in his professional judgement, what the “problem” was with this operator when he started working with them, i.e. whether it was a lack of knowledge on their part of the regulatory regime or something else, Mr. Cowdell replied that he thought the operator had received bad advice and been “complacent” before his involvement. That answer made sense of the various observations I made in the preceding paragraph and of my observation at the bottom of paragraph 30, above.

In the appeal case of Arnold Transport & Sons Limited [2014] UKUT 162 (AAC) (“Arnold Transport”), at [13], providing guidance to Traffic Commissioners when considering an operator’s fitness at the end of a PI, the Upper Tribunal said,

• “It is… important for operators to understand… the old saying that: “actions speak louder than words” [applies in this context]. The attitude of an operator when something goes wrong can be very instructive.  Some recognise the problem at once and take immediate and effective steps to put matters right.  Others only recognise the problem when it is set out in a call-up letter and begin to put matters right in the period before the Public Inquiry takes place.  A third group leave it even later and come to the Public Inquiry with promises of action in the future.  A fourth group bury their heads in the sand and wait to be told what to do during the Public Inquiry… it seems clear that prompt and effective action is likely to be given greater weight than untested promises to put matters right in the future” (emphasis added)

In this case, Mr. Ray had obviously learnt a great deal from this PI and appeared emotional at various stages in it. I understand PIs are stressful; I made considerable allowances for that when I assessed his evidence in this case. Whatever my sympathy for Mr. Ray and his position, my duty is to probe and test an operator’s position at a PI so I can discharge my functions properly on behalf of the public.

However impressed I am by the operator’s consultants in this case, it is operator’s directors I must trust to hold a goods vehicle licence. Notwithstanding my findings at paragraphs 21-22(m)-(n), above, the directors did not achieve very much in the period from December 2025 to late April 2026.

In my estimation, the operator in this case fell somewhere between the second and third group described by the Upper Tribunal in Arnold Transport.

In the PI I explored, in some detail, the operator’s position if I took different types of regulatory action. The operator made it plain to me that a curtailment from four to three vehicles would have a significant effect on the operation but that it would “just about” remain viable. The operator made it clear that a suspension period of longer than 14 days, otherwise than in the Christmas period, would have fatal effects on the operator’s viability.

Mr. Ray told me that the substantial sums in the operator’s bank account could not be used to help the operator survive the effects of any regulatory action because those funds had already been earmarked for other uses.

I received further written submissions from Ms. Dooher, after the PI, addressing various other options open to me:

• Complete suspension for a period of nine days in August 2026;
• Curtailment from four to three vehicles indefinitely with a temporary curtailment to one vehicle for 16 days in August 2026.

Those measures would take effect, she submitted, alongside two undertakings from the operator:

• To hold an audit in six months; and
• To continue to work with their consultants for six months.

I pause to say that this operator has been well represented by Ms. Dooher who has said everything that could possibly be said on their behalf.

In her written submissions, Ms. Dooher has put forward, particularly at paragraph 43(b), above, a proposal that I have had cause to think about very carefully.

The starting point of the ‘serious’ category is:

• A 28-day suspension;
• Significant time-limited curtailment that may materially affect the operation; or
• Revocation with consideration of disqualification.

For the reasons I have already given (paragraph 30, above), I did not consider that the category starting point sufficiently meets the seriousness of the findings I have made in this case.

One of the outcomes in the ‘severe’ category is a significant indefinite curtailment that materially affects the transport operation.

I consider that a nine-day suspension (paragraph 43(a), above) is nowhere near sufficient to meet the seriousness of my findings in this case; that is not even close to the starting point of the serious category.

I do consider that the proposal at paragraph 43(b), above, is within the range of possible outcomes that may be consistent with my categorisation of the case in the upper end of the serious category (paragraph 47-48, above).

In this case, I have determined that that proposal would not sufficiently meet the seriousness of the findings I have made.

Trust between Traffic Commissioners and operators is a critical part of the regulatory system we have in Great Britain in respect of goods vehicle operators. As the Transport Tribunal said in the appeal case of 2006/27 Fenlon (“Fenlon”), 

• “…trust is one of the foundation stones of operator licensing. Traffic, commissioners must be able to trust operators to comply with all the relevant laws, rules and regulations because it would be a physical and financial impossibility to police every aspect of the licensing system all day and every day. In addition, operators must be able to trust other operators to observe the relevant laws, rules and regulations. If trust between operators breaks down and some operators believe that others are obtaining an unfair commercial advantage by ignoring laws, rules or regulations then standards will inevitably slip and the public will suffer” (emphasis added)

As in the appeal case of 2019/77 George Young’s Coaches Limited, this is a case that has involved findings of “deliberate deception”. This operator’s deception was serious. The reasons for the deception (paragraph 22(a)(iv), above) were to try to ‘palm off’ a DVSA vehicle examiner so that matters pertinent to road safety were not further investigated by him. Records were falsified with fake signatures – this was a determined attempt to mislead (paragraph 22(a)(ii), above). The operator’s directors at the very least acquiesced in all of this. The operator denied the deception until they filed their evidence for the PI.

As a Traffic Commissioner, I would have been capable of forgiving even serious deception by an operator if it was accompanied – at a PI – by:

• High levels of remorse on the part of the operator;
• Openness on the part of the person who lied explaining, to me, why they lied;
• Real insight into why the deception was wrong by whoever perpetrated it;
• Real insight into why it was important that what the deception was trying to cover up – here, a historically flawed maintenance regime - should have been done properly first time rather than lied about;
• An operator who took full responsibility for those past mistakes and promised never to repeat them;
• An operator who showed me, as part of taking that responsibility, that they had determinedly put right whatever they did wrong before, demonstrating insight into why they should have done things properly all along.

It brings me no pleasure at all to have to make a decision that may imperil or destroy people’s livelihoods, employment, or businesses. My duty, however, is to make decisions that advance the twin aims of the legislation and to make decisions that are fair to the industry, the public, and to the individual operator I am dealing with.

Unfortunately, I do not trust the directors of this operator to hold a goods licence:

• They lied to the DVSA in correspondence about important matters pertaining to the operator’s safety system;
• Mr. Ray lied to VE Matthews’ face at the latter’s visit about something important pertaining to the operator’s safety system;
• At the PI, the operator’s attitude, in my assessment, was such that:
• For a sustained period after the MIVR, it kept making the same mistakes the latter condemned (paragraphs 21-22(c), (e), (h), and (i));
• It only engaged the consultant that made any difference at the eleventh hour;
• The operator minimised historical and recent compliance issues at the PI (paragraphs 21(a)(iii) paragraphs 22(b), (h)(ii), and 35(b), above).

There was none of the maturity, reflection, or remorse (paragraph 54, above) that would have allowed me to take a more forgiving and lenient course.

Both directors have shown that the stress of intense scrutiny of their operation does not prompt them to act until the eleventh hour.

I am not satisfied that the proposed measures paragraph 43(b), above, which would be on the basis this was the operator’s ‘last chance’, is sufficiently robust regulatory action to achieve the aims of the legislation.

The operator had the clearest warning possible in December 2025 and did not react to it decisively or quickly enough.

There is minimal tangible evidence before me that the operator’s directors can give effect to the safety system described in the DVSA’s Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness:

• I should not be left to speculate, at a PI, about how matters might look in six months time; my duty is to assess the operator at the date of the PI, not to trust that – if I give the operator another six months of intense scrutiny working with competent consultants – that matters will improve;
• In any event, this is an operator that has lied, previously blamed two maintenance providers for issues in the operator’s safety system, wrongly accused a VE of not doing their job properly, and – at a PI – minimised recent issues in respect of driver detectable defects. Without more evidence, how can I trust that the operator will work co-operatively and harmoniously with their consultants, learning what needs to be learnt, even if the consultant attended continually? The day the operator’s evidence was to be assessed and tested in full to see whether it had really ‘turned a corner’ was the date of the PI, the 26.05.26. The operator’s attitude (see Arnold Transport quoted at paragraph 37, above) causes me to doubt that I can trust this operator to change, even with the assistance of competent consultants;
• Traffic Commissioners are not in the business of taking ‘chances’ on operators; a PI is a full/fair opportunity for a Traffic Commissioner to forensically assess risk as part of a process of considering, and weighing, evidence. The operator’s invitation at paragraph 43(b), above, amounts to an application for another six months to effect changes that should have started in December 2025, not April 2026, and for the audit to screen risk at that stage in the future so that the Traffic Commissioner can decide (then) whether to convene another PI. What the proposal fails to take account of is:
• The effect, on a Traffic Commissioner’s trust, of an operator’s doing very little for five months between December 2025 and April 2026 when it had a clear roadmap of what it had to do to preserve fair competition and ensure road safety; and
• That the findings made at this PI drive me to take action now, rather than take any step that may allow this operator to pose any further risk to the conditions of fair competition between operators and road safety, over the course of the next six months.

In Thomas Muir (Haulage) Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport, and the Regions [1999] S.C. 86, the Court of Session, at p.92e-g, (whose dicta were followed in this respect by the Upper Tribunal in 2007/459 KDL European Limited), held that general deterrence is a factor that Traffic Commissioners can rely on in imposing regulatory action, providing the latter advances the aims of the legislation and is not used as punishment.

I am confident that other operators, who spend significant amounts of time and money to be compliant, would react with horror if they learnt that an operator could come before a Traffic Commissioner – having done all that I have described above in this document and with the attitude I have described– and leave the PI room with their heavy goods licence intact.

After repeating all my findings of fact set out at paragraphs 21 and 22, above, and reviewing my further analysis of them at paragraphs 30, 54-57, and 61 above, I have decided that I cannot trust this operator to run a compliant operation.

In consequence, I have decided that it is proportionate that I answer the question posed in the Upper Tribunal case of T/2009/225 Priority Freight – ‘is this an operator I can trust to be complaint in the future?’ - in the negative. In consequence of that finding, I determine that this operator is no longer fit to hold an operator’s licence (paragraph 23(c), above).

Applying my analysis to the various factors I have set out above from Annexe Four of Statutory Document Ten (paragraphs 27-28), I conclude that the proportionate action I should take against this operator’s license is to revoke it.

I have decided that I should give consideration as to whether the operator’s directors should be disqualified.

Disqualification of Messers Ray and Price

Statutory Document Ten, at [65] provides,

• “There may be cases in which the seriousness of the operator’s conduct is such that a traffic commissioner may properly consider that both revocation and disqualification are necessary for the purposes of enforcing the legislation. The provisions are in general terms, consistent with the concept of deterrence, but assessment of culpability and use of words such as penalty should be avoided. The case law indicates a general principle that at the time the disqualification order is made that the operator cannot be trusted to comply with the regulatory regime and that the objectives of the system, the protection of the public and fairness to other operators, requires that the operator be disqualified” (emphasis added)

I have regard to the passages of Fenlon I quoted above (paragraph 52). I have also considered the other appeal cases about disqualification including 2018/072 St Mickalos Company Ltd & M Timinis and 2010/29 David Finch Haulage.

I note that I have taken serious regulatory action in this case against the operator – on the evidence I heard, the consequences of revocation will be catastrophic for Messers Ray and Price and the business.

In my view, the objectives of the legislation, to promote road safety and to preserve fair competition between operators, do not require me to take further regulatory action in respect of the directors.

I believe that both should be allowed to hold goods licences in the future.

Critical in any future assessment of whether they, or any entity they control, are fit to hold an operator’s licence will be:

• Whether they have learned the lessons of this PI; and/or
• Whether they can form an entity whose business model allows for the involvement of someone who can monitor and supervise the transport aspects of the business.

Decision

My decisions are:

• The operator license is REVOKED pursuant to section 26(1)(h) of the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 (“the 1995 Act”) (change of circumstances - operator not fit), section 26(1)(f) (breach of undertakings – see paragraph 23(b) of the decision, above), section 26(1)(c)(iii) (prohibitions)
• All orders for revocation will take effect from 14.07.26 at 23:45;
• I make no order under section 28 against the operator itself;

Giles Pengelly

Deputy Traffic Commissioner

15.06.26

Published 24 September 2026