Decision for McGill's Scotland East Ltd (PM0000932) and Midland Bluebird Ltd t/a McGill's Midland Bluebird (PM0000003)

Written decision of the Traffic Commissioner for the Scottish traffic area for McGill's Scotland East Ltd and Midland Bluebird Ltd t/a McGill's Midland Bluebird

• From: Traffic Commissioners for Great Britain
• Published: 7 November 2025

• Subject: PSV operator
• Region: Scotland
• Case type: Regulatory
• Regulatory decision: Formal warning
• Published: 6 November 2025

IN THE SCOTTISH TRAFFIC AREA

MCGILL’S SCOTLAND EAST LTD - PM0000923

AND

MIDLAND BLUEBIRD LTD t/a MCGILL’S MIDLAND BLUEBIRD – PM0000003

TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER’S WRITTEN DECISION

Background

Scotland East Ltd holds a Standard National Public Service Vehicle Operator’s Licence authorising 170 vehicles. It was known as First Scotland East Ltd from 5 September 2008 to 27 September 2022. At the commencement of proceedings, the Directors were Ralph Roberts, Colin Napier, and Grant Ballantyne. On 22 September 2025, Robert Lindsay Drummond and James Anthony Williamson were added as Directors. The Transport Managers were listed as Russell Henderson, Graeme David Leslie and John Scott. The current Transport Managers are Graeme David Leslie and John Scott, as Russell Henderson was removed from the licence on 7 January 2025.

There is one Operating Centre at Deans Road, Deans, Livingston EH54 8JY. Preventative Maintenance Inspections are said to be carried out in-house at 7-weekly intervals.

The first operator has attended Public Inquiry before. Financial penalties of £57,500, £23,000 and £30,000 were imposed as a result of hearings in November 2007, April 2010, and February 2016 respectively.

Midland Bluebird Ltd trading as McGill’s Midland Bluebird, holds a Standard National Public Service Vehicle Operator’s Licence authorising 297 vehicles. Again, at the commencement of proceedings, the Directors were Ralph Roberts, Colin Napier, and Grant Ballantyne. On 22 September 2025, Robert Lindsay Drummond and James Anthony Williamson were added as Directors.  The Vehicle Examiner had referred to Alan Campbell, but he resigned. The listed Transport Managers are Graeme Stuart Sinclair, David Leslie and John Scott.

There are three Operating Centres: Balfron Depot, 1 Dunmore Street, Balfron, Glasgow G63 0TU: Cowie Road, Bannockburn, Stirling FK7 8JW; 200 Stirling Road, Larbert FK5 3NJ. Preventative Maintenance Inspections are said to be carried out in-house at  the 3 depots, at 7-weekly intervals.

The second operator has also attended previous Public Inquiries. Financial penalties of £74,250, £14,850 and £15,000 were imposed as a result of hearings in November 2007, October 2009, and January 2013 respectively.  

Both entities became part of the McGill’s Group following acquisition in September 2022 (see below).

Hearing

The Public Inquiry was listed for 23 July 2024, the first operator having originally been considered for listing on 31 January 2024. There was an attempt to relist for 5 June 2024 but following notification of additional inquiries, it was heard today as a conjoined hearing, in the Tribunal Room of the Office of the Traffic Commissioner in Edinburgh. The operators were present in the form of the Directors, Ralph Roberts, Colin Napier, and Grant Ballantyne, represented by Andrew Woolfall of Backhouse Jones solicitors.

As indicated above, the evidence submitted in advance of the hearing was not sufficient so that I might satisfy myself in respect of financial standing. I was satisfied that I might grant a Period of Grace. In other words, discretion was exercised in favour of the operators. They were apparently confused as to the requirements as the evidence was not lodged with my office within the given period meaning that both licences might have been revoked. Immediately upon receipt that evidence was referred to me and I again exercised my discretion in favour of the operators, so as to discharge the Period of Grace.

I then held the remainder of my decision in abeyance so that further checks could be made and in accordance with the information received from Bus Users Scotland during the hearing. The delays in producing and assessing the updated information are further explored below.

The delay in the production of a final written decision is in large part attributable to the considerable pressures placed on this jurisdiction not least through the unavailability of experienced traffic commissioners. The delay in reappointing an acting traffic commissioner for this area has contributed unnecessarily to those pressures.

Issues

The Public Inquiry was called in order to consider whether I should intervene in respect of the first operator’s licence (McGill’s Scotland East Ltd) and specifically whether the operator had honoured the undertakings under section 17(3)(aa) namely that vehicles would be kept fit and serviceable, and whether vehicles or drivers had been issued with prohibition notices by DVSA or the police in the past five years, contrary to section 17(3)c); whether there had been a material change in the circumstances of the operator, and by reference to the continuing and mandatory requirements for a standard licence, namely establishment and professional competence, but the Transport Managers were not called in their own right.

In respect of the second operator’s licence (Midland Bluebird Ltd), the call up letter referred to undertakings under section 17(3)(aa) namely that vehicles would be kept fit and serviceable, and to employ an effective written driver defect reporting system, and whether vehicles or drivers had been issued with prohibition notices by DVSA or the police in the past five years, contrary to section 17(3)c); whether there had been a material change in the circumstances of the operator, and by reference to the continuing and mandatory requirements for a standard licence, namely establishment and professional competence, but the Transport Managers were not called in their own right.

The call up letter and addendums also put the operators on notice that I would consider whether it had failed to operate a local bus service under section 6 of the Transport Act 1985 or operated a local service in contravention of that section and if so whether I should impose a penalty under section 39 of the Transport (Scotland) Act 2001. The operator was also put on notice of the power to impose a condition under section 26 of the Transport Act 1985.

The operators were directed to lodge evidence in support, including financial, maintenance and other compliance documentation. Mr Woolfall sought a Period of Grace to show financial standing due to a change in auditor. Based on the evidence produced, I allowed a period of two months, pursuant to section 17(1)(a). It was only on 14 November 2024 that admissible evidence was received so that the operators could discharge the Period of Grace.

Summary of Evidence

“Maintenance”

I was referred to a prohibition rate of 53.85% for the first operator (East pages 103 to 118), the only notice (delayed) in the last 12 months having been issued against SN64 CKE at the Stirling Bus Station on 26 February 2024 with an ABS warning light illuminated and the emissions malfunction indicator lamp also illuminated, suggesting a failure in driver defect reporting.

The second operator was the subject of a DVSA maintenance investigation visit on 4 September 2023 by Vehicle Examiner Gordon Montgomery. The report (Midland pages 172a to n), followed an S Marked Prohibition, denoting a significant failure. That was issued to a vehicle at the Royal Highland Show, Ingliston on 22 June 2023 for a continuous fuel leak, after a fuel pump change on 13 June 2023. A fuel pipe was replaced, in order to lift the notice (Midland page 172W). Mr Montgomery engaged with Colin Smith, Fleet Engineer. He noted that, in the period since the change of ownership, from 23 September 2022 to 23 August 2023, 98 vehicles had been presented for annual test, with two outright failures. He also recorded that when tyres were changed by external contractors, the vehicles returned to the deport workshop to be audited and checked. He advised obtaining a method statement from the contractor (Midland pages 172e onwards). He referred to a response (dated 23 June 2023 from the Engineering Director (Midland pages 172x to cp):

“full and comprehensive response was received from the Operator and Transport Manager on 26 September 2023. Production 5 attached contains detailed explanation(s) to the shortcomings noted in section (s) 6 &10.

Supplementary documents have been provided by the Operator and are referred to in each section of the operator’s response (Production 5). These documents (1-17) provide more detailed evidence and information of the maintenance systems, corrective measures, investment, which have been put in place since the acquisition of the business from the previous incumbent.

The Operator has provided evidence (Attachment 12) that an additional failure attributed to their test history via Power BI is not visible to them via the Operator’s licence portal, the failure listed appears to be for notifiable alteration test (VTP5) at Livingston GVTS, this would have been due to a modification dimensional failing as opposed to a physical mechanical defect. The Operator’s final pass rate at annual test is still above 98% regardless of the mismatch of data.

Overall, this is a good Operator who take their licence undertakings very seriously and fully co-operated with this investigation. The Operator has demonstrated that they have investigated all the compliance issues and implemented corrective measures where required. The Operator has provided evidence and given assurances that compliance remains their priority as the business continues to evolve and grow.”

On 28 November 2023 notification was received of a bus fire involving vehicle being operated by the second operator, Midland Bluebird Ltd. As can be seen from the documents (commencing Midland page 44 onwards), the operator properly notified the Agency. The details showed that the incident occurred at approximately 16:05 on the A91 at Blairlogie, whilst following route 324 which runs from Dollar Academy to Stirling. At the time the vehicle (YX65 PXG, fleet number 4113) was carrying approximately 30 passengers. The driver, Amanda Roderickson, of the vehicle (the fourth that day), having been alerted by a passenger to smoke, and then to flames, pulled the vehicle over and evacuated all passengers. The driver called the Fire Service and the depot Duty Manager, Kyle Burns, who attended with the then Engineering Manager, and Alistair Brailey. The vehicle was recovered and taken to Larbert Depot Major Repair Unit.

That incident report, headed McGill’s Bus Group (Midland page 123 to 142), completed by Nathan Burge, records that Driver Roderickson, on approach to Tillicoultry, noticed that the water warning light was illuminated. She called the depot and spoke to the controller, P Stewart. He said that he would speak to the engineer. I infer this happened as she was told to proceed as there would be enough coolant/water to return to Bannockburn. It was when she was driving through Blairlogie that a young passenger alerted her to smoke and, whilst she was looking for a safe place, flames emerged.

Jim Brennan, the Depot Manager, apparently carried out interviews with Peter Stewart, the Duty Manager, and Alaistair Brailey, Engineering Manager (Bannockburn & Balfron). Mr Stewart confirmed the call from the driver on the traffic mobile to inform him that she had seen a coolant warning light on the vehicle. He consulted Mr Brailey and confirmed with the driver that the light was amber in colour. Mr Brailey advised that the driver could continue but added that if the light changed to red, he would get someone out to the vehicle. The driver subsequently called in a panic to say that the vehicle was on fire and asking Mr. Stewart to call the Fire Service. He went to alert Mr Brailey, who checked whether the bus was on fire, and proceeded to collect a fire extinguisher and another duty manager to drive up with him to the location. Mr. Stewart indicated that the vehicle was marked as fit to be allocated on the day. Mr Brailey indicates that the vehicle was off the road earlier in the day with a reported cold bus defect. It was assessed by Eddie Martin, Assistant Engineering Manager, and Andrew Frew, Mechanic, resulting in a coolant system boost pump being installed. They subsequently returned the vehicle to service. He corroborated Mr. Stewart, recalling a report of an amber low coolant warning on the dash. He confirmed whether there was any other warning lights illuminated. He involved Mr Frew, as there had been a new pump fitted earlier. He asked Mr Frew if the coolant level was acceptable and was reassured. Based on that information he informed Mr Stewart that the vehicle could continue. Shortly afterwards he was approached by Mr Stewart who told him that the vehicle was on fire. He and the Relief Duty Manager, Kyle Burns, headed to the location. They were delayed by traffic lights but on approach could see the blaze and two fire appliances in attendance. The police had already closed the road, and he introduced himself to the officers. He then checked on the Driver. A Fire Officer showed him what he believed to be the fire suppression cylinder.

The operator interviewed the four drivers for the relevant day: Andrew Abrahams, Thomas Hughes, Jane Bell, and Amanda Roderickson. Mr Abrahams (first) and Ms Bell (third) were unaware of any incident. Mr Hughes (second driver) indicated that he was travelling to the bus depot having commenced duty at 11:30, when he was stopped by police officers due to smoke having been observed from the exhaust. He reported this to Mr Brailey. It was checked at the depot there was no smoke or smell of burning oil. He was apparently told not to worry as there was nothing wrong.

As the photographs supplied illustrate, there was substantial damage to the vehicle. It could be seen that the fire started in the vicinity of the alternators on the off side of the engine. It spread along the upper near side panels and internal seats. It spread to the front of the vehicle causing complete loss at the cab area and CCTV hard drive. The vehicle was the subject of an engine repair in December 2022 with a rocker cover gasket replacement.

The report also records that on 7 September 2023, a Fleet Engineer from another connected entity within the group had circulated an ADL technical bulletin to all Engineering Managers, relating to this type of vehicle requiring the bulletin to be completed. The investigation ascertained that the technical bulletin had not been implemented at the Bannockburn depot. Mr Brailey claimed to have overlooked the bulletin as he was on holiday. When he was asked about the information received from Driver Hughes, the report suggests that he going to get the Assistant Fleet Manager to look at the vehicle but then forgot as there was lots going on. He resigned from 23 November 2023. The report concludes (Midland page 136):

“It is clear the vehicle being ran with low coolant caused insufficient cooling to the cylinder head and Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR) cooler. In turn, causing excessive temperatures in the EGR cooler. I believe this has led to the thermal limits of the rocker cover being exceeded. Causing the failure of the rocker cover, allowing combustible fluids to leak from the engine onto hot components resulting in the thermal incident. This failure mode is described in Alexander Dennis Service Bulletin 960-2….Fleet check across the group of all E200MMC Vehicle to ensure the ADL bulletin has been completed on each vehicle, this should be carried out by the Engineering Training officer to ensure these have been completed correctly and no errors have been made.”

The remedial measures identified in the subsequent action plan included:

“Implement a weekly and period defect report system, pulling the data from the engineering management software and sending to all Fleet Engineers and Engineering Managers throughout the group in a readable format that highlights repeat defects and top 10 vehicles. Fleet Engineer to discuss requirements with contractors working the backshift at the site. Their work should be heavily monitored to ensure sufficient actions are being taken.”

However, on 12 December 2023 there was bus fire on another of this operator’s vehicles (Midland pages 140 to 142). SP54 CGO (Fleet number 2811). On this occasion the vehicle was not in service but was travelling to the start point for the M4 route. The fault apparently occurred at approximately 7:45 on the A811 between Arnprior and Garden Lodge. Driver Scott Fergusson was assisted by an unnamed passing HGV driver who stopped and assisted, directing his fire extinguisher to the offside rear wheel. The Fire Service was called and used water to cool the offside rear wheel position. On return to the depot, it was noted that the offside rear hub bearing had suffered a catastrophic failure, leading to the failure of the half shaft, causing the rear hub to fail and move. The vehicle had a new hub nut fitted on 30 August 2021 with a lick tab washer, brake shoes and pins. The report concluded that:

“The vehicle had its wheel bearings checked as per manufacturers guidelines at each preventative maintenance inspection. The hub bearings where also maintained as per manufacturers guidelines.

The half shaft was found to be sheared approximately six inches from the hub flange. In close proximity to the outer bearing race. This was caused by catastrophic failure of the outer wheel bearing, due to this the offside rear wheel assembly and hub had become partially detached.”

Immediate remedial action required a fleet check of all Bannockburn B7TL hubs on 13 December 2023 and a fleet check of all B7TL hub bearings within the group by 17 December 2023.

A further delayed Prohibition Notice was issued on 29 January 2024 to SN66 WGX for an ‘S’ marked defect after it was found to have an “EBS warning light indicates the existence of a fault, yellow mil illuminated, this was a repeating defect that has been reported on numerous previous defect reports without an adequate repair.” The targeted operation at Stirling Bus Station resulted in visual checks of driver defect reports cards of in-service vehicles:

SN65 OKU – excessive oil leak from engine with engine MIL illuminated.

SN65 OJS – ABS MIL illuminated.

SN64 CKP – emissions MIL illuminated.

YX62 BMV – axle 2 nearside air suppression defective/deflated, and emissions MIL illuminated.

SN64 CKE – ABS MIL illuminated.

LO67 YZP – interior floor covering lifting – trip hazard, and engine MIL illuminated.

YX62 BBO – emissions and engine MIL illuminated.

BX64 WHZ – engine MIL illuminated.

The operator currently has a prohibition rate of 39.13%.

Mr Montgomery conducted a further visit on 26 February 2024. I referred to his Maintenance Investigation Visit Report dated 7 June 2024, which identified several shortcomings:

• Ineffective walkaround checks being carried out.
• Vehicles being used with reported safety defects.
• Unsatisfactory maintenance arrangements due to understaffing
• Ineffective system in place for managing vehicle emissions.
• Unsatisfactory mechanical prohibition rate.

A ‘technical document’ produced by Catlynn Transport Consultants on behalf of the operators and procured through the Group management, referred to what was described as a deep dive into the maintenance activities. The audit was apparently to confirm that engineering systems and standards were in place and fully embedded so as to meet the licence undertakings. A root and branch review was requested after senior managers recognised that recent significant expansion, the transition to zero- emission vehicles and the two vehicle fires required it to revisit its assessment of the maintenance function. Following ‘several vehicle fires’ it was felt that external support and expertise might be required to mitigate the risks to as low as reasonably practicable (i.e. as per as per its statutory duty). This was described as a proactive approach, despite it following those incidents. In summary, the auditors noted well developed elements. The fleet was apparently observed to be mainly in excellent condition. The report records a focus on ensuring that vehicles are available for service.

However, there appears to be an ongoing relationship with the Group from August 2023, with a planned 2-day review of the revised strategy and action plan due to take place on the 31 July and 1 August 2024. The report could not be considered to be from an independent source. The initial site visits were said to have identified several immediate actions “that could be taken” to strengthen governance of current processes. A further audit was suggested for early September to report on progress. “It is expected that we shall be able to report to the Managing Director that those improvements are demonstrable, consistent, and show a clear path to constant improvement.” In reference to a compliance audit by Lloyd Morgan carried out in June 2024, the operator told me that various files were apparently examined at each location totalling 96 Preventative Maintenance Inspection records for Midland Bluebird and 60 for Scotland East. I was told that for Midland Bluebird, two inspection records were found to be below standard, with all completed within the declared intervals. Eight vehicles were inspected during the Midland Bluebird audit and found two prohibitable defects: one for an oil leak, in excess of 75mm and one for a slight fuel leak from a fuel tank. The paperwork audit at Scotland East found everything to be in order. Four vehicles were inspected during the Scotland East audit and one (immediate) prohibitable defect was found: fuel leak from fuel tank due to a break in the welding. The audit resulted in a fleet check of Alexander Dennis E300 vehicles. The internal oil leak categorisation process was reviewed and re-issued. The Lloyd Morgan report dated 5 June 2024 was only disclosed to me in the afternoon before the hearing. The auditor, Mr Musto, found most of the compliance arrangements to be satisfactory. He suggested improvements in the driver defect report pro-forma. He also noted that, whilst mileage would be reported by a ‘shunter driver’ it would not normally be recorded on the walk round record.  A follow-up audit is to be carried out in early December 2024 (dates detailed below).

I noted that the business (which I took to be the Group) is in the process of recruiting an internal auditor. The management consultants suggested that there was an emphasis within the business is to improve the engineering performance and process, based on consistent best practice. This will apparently require a revised structure and reporting lines, leading to improved Director visibility, although the strategic planning will be carried out by the current engineering leadership team. I understood that Area Director/Management teams will be responsible for depot performance with workshop staff reporting through this line management. The Engineering Director/Management team will be responsible for providing the framework, policies, procedures etc. A new role of Chief Engineer (yet to be recruited) will report to the Engineering Director and be responsible to the Area Directors for workshop compliance. Workshop standards will be audited internally. Transport Managers would continue to be responsible for exercising full and effective ‘control’ (the duty refers to management) over the ‘regulatory aspects’ of the business including driving licences and qualifications, drivers’ hours and compliance with the working time directive, vehicles on the Operator’s Licence and maintenance compliance, vehicle documentation, Preventative Maintenance Inspections, annual tests, and driver walk rounds.

I was provided with a vision of improved Director visibility, through ‘town hall meetings’ with staff. The auditor suggested using the DVSA Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness as a base line, to include lost mileage, annual test first-time pass rate, and missed journeys. The report suggests the involvement of the auditors in the development of a suite of leading indicators, with a non-exhaustive list of bullets:

• Number of engineers per bus and current vacancy levels
• Staff Sickness and Absence Levels
• Vehicle Off Road Levels and Timescales
• Number of Staff Training Hours conducted
• Available staff hours
• Rostered Holidays and impact on available staff hours
• MOT expiry dates and annual test balancing
• Spare vehicle allocations
• Breakdown levels
• Driver reportable defect levels
• Major Unit failures
• Campaign compliance
• Servicing compliance
• Qualitative driver walk round check and audit of compliance
• Accident levels
• Top 10 defect cause categories
• Oil and Coolant consumption levels
• Repeat defect causes
• Wheel retorquing compliance
• Staff competency assessments
• Fire risk assessment completion and actioned
• PMI planning and compliance
• Shift pattern balance and appropriateness
• Vehicle steam cleaning
• Vehicle examiner IRTEC licensing validity
• Volume of Quality Checks carried out on vehicle inspections and effected repairs.

I anticipated that a number of these were already in place. I noted from the operator’s representations that driver inspection is being regularly spitted checked. In addition, the Group employs Return to Depot checks. I was also referred to the ‘walk the job initiative’ which is in addition to night-time deport walk-rounds by Directors and designed so that managers experience the bus service through the eyes of passengers. There are weekly reports to the Board of Directors.

The operators’ representations confirm that maintenance of vehicles on (PM0000003) Midland Bluebird is carried out at Bannockburn, Balfron and Larbert locations whilst maintenance of vehicles on (PM0000923) McGill’s Scotland East is carried out at Livingston. Roller brake testing facilities are in place at Bannockburn (also serving Balfron) and Larbert. It refers to the acquisition of the businesses and finding that a number of vehicles were in poor condition. Staff morale was said to be low, and there had been little or no investment in the facilities or people. All locations were running with 50% of the skilled labour provided through external contractors. It quickly became apparent that the Group needed to escalate fleet replacement and change local management. 90% of the engineering management team has been replaced. Only one of 13 team members remains from the date of acquisition. I was told that the structure has been remodelled and improvements across its Key Performance Indicators are evident. Both operators were said to suffer from a lack of in-house staffing. The recruitment issues were identified in the DVSA report.

In representations, the operator referred to the recruitment of 21 skilled engineering staff across both operations, since the acquisitions equating to 50% of all skilled staff. In order to attract those skills, the Group has increased remuneration and introduced a signing bonus. I was referred to failings at the Bannockburn location, identified in November 2023. The Directors implemented a performance improvement plan with weekly review meetings at the depot, involving Transport Managers, Site Management, Area Managing Director, and the Bus Group Operations Director and Engineering Director. I was assured that this is at the forefront of the Directors’ agenda.

I was also told about the investment since the purchase, in fleet and equipment, to ensure that the workshops are more than fit for purpose. Each location has access to diagnostic equipment, roller brake testers, smoke pro, and headlamp testing equipment in addition to a mixture of under vehicle access facilities dependent upon type of vehicle and work being carried out. An Engineering Standards Manual is in place across the business and in the course of its annual review. This forms the basis for the procedures across the Group. Any repair to a safety critical component must be quality audited by a supervisor or manager. The Group acted quickly to ensure that all inspectors in Midland Bluebird underwent IRTEC training. All vehicles are inspected at 4 weekly intervals (against the 7 weeks declared) by IRTEC trained inspectors. The Group is looking to extend the IRTEC inspector training to further skilled staff within the business as part of an internal training programme. The standardised Preventative Maintenance Inspection form covers all the items recommended by DVSA with additional servicing details and an enhanced brake performance section. Vehicle history files are held locally at the vehicle’s maintenance centre.

Mr Montgomery prepared an update report based on the information received from the operators, as per the Case Management Directions. That report is dated 18 July 2024. He recorded the supply of copy driver defect reports. He found them to have been completed to a good standard, containing greater information on diagnostics and rectification action taken by maintenance staff. He noted that the maintenance forward planner referred to all vehicle Preventative Maintenance Inspection dates for at least six months in advance. A copy of the wheel torque system was provided, containing information which demonstrates to him that that the system was functioning satisfactorily. I was provided with additional detail in the operator’s representations. He found that Preventative Maintenance Inspection records had generally been completed to a satisfactory standard, but made the following observations:

• Vehicle LO67 YZP (Fleet 0111) inspections on 1, 28 May and 25 June 2024 endorsed indicating a visual emissions test, despite emissions related defects detected on 28 May and 25 June 2024. No evidence of measured emission tests was provided.

• Vehicle YN57 BVV (Fleet 0605) inspections on 25 April, 23 May and 22 June 2024 endorsed indicating a visual emissions test. No evidence of measured emission tests was provided.

Since the completion of the last maintenance investigation and fleet check, there had been one roadside encounter, which was clear of defects and had presented 59 vehicles for annual test, of which 57 passed first time. Failure items related to Brake Systems and Components, Lamps, Aim of Headlamps.

“Punctuality”

Following complaints from the public regarding the cancellation of services in West Lothian, a request was made of Bus Users Scotland to carry out a monitoring exercise of the first operator (McGills Scotland East Ltd). This is reflected in the report dated 12 June 2024 (starts East page 68), referring to both operators. However, all the services analysed in that report were registered to the first operator (under PM0000923).

“Recording of data required daily ‘checking in’ to the operator’s website / or application from early morning and subsequently throughout the day although in most instances, the first issued list of cancelled or altered services rarely changed after 9:00am each day.

In starting the exercise on the 15th May it initially appeared that such cancellations and changes to services may have been few. This resulted from the fact that no such cancellations or alterations in fact appeared either via the company’s website or application that morning.

Accordingly, contact was made by phone with the company with a query if the information was in fact correct. The operator spoken to in fact, contacted her respective depot manager and confirmed that all services that day were in fact operating.

It is concerning therefore, how quickly the situation being monitored changed. Subsequent monitoring/viewing and recording of such cancellations were undertaken randomly on the 22nd, 30th May, the 1st, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 12th June. Throughout these observations, the resulting cancellations, and alterations to services increased almost exponentially. A complete list of the recorded cancellations and alterations to services is featured in Appendix 1 of this report.

Service timetable alterations were in fact compared to the respective registration document for every service as submitted by the operator to The Office for The Traffic Commissioner and in turn, requested by Bus Users from The Office for The Traffic Commissioner.”

“Observation Results In total 143 observations were recorded. Of these, 104 represented ‘Full journey

cancellations’ returning a percentage of 72.27%.

Of the 143 observations, 31 represented services that were ‘Altered from their originally scheduled/registered routes’ returning a percentage of 21.67%.

Of the 143 observations, 8 represented services that were ‘Reinstated from cancellation’ returning a percentage of 5.59%.”

“Total Observations 143 Full journey cancellations 72.27%

Altered from original route & schedule 21.67%.

Reinstated from previous cancellation 5.59%.”

“Summary In summary, it is genuinely felt that the recorded figures are both unprecedented and unacceptable to travelling passengers for whom, these failures of services are critical to all aspects of their daily lives whether that be to simply travel to and from a place of work or for education, accessing healthcare, shopping for essential provisions or to simply to avoid social exclusion.”

This followed previous monitoring exercises of the 26 Service from Livingston North regarding punctuality and failure to operate carried out over various dates from 12 January to 10 May 2022, which as raised in correspondence dated 9 August 2022 (East page 38) identifying a ratio of compliance at 86%. The response from the then Managing Director dated 23 August 2022 identified operational challenges faced at the time and identified by the Bus Users Scotland report. The response queried some of the observations but accepted that the compliance rate of 93.8% was still short of the required standard.

A further report from Bus Users Scotland dated 8 August 2022, was apparently received by the Office of the Traffic Commissioner on 4 November 2022 in respect of the X22 Service from Shotts (East page 49 onwards), carried out on various dates between 28 June and 31 July 2022, recorded overall punctuality at 71%. The response from the then Network Manager again referred to driver shortages. For some reason he suggested that this might equate to a reasonable excuse, but even on that basis the rate was only at 85%. This was queried on the part of the Traffic Commissioner in a letter dated 29 November 2022 (East pages 56 to 57).

Comparing the observations with the data held by the Office of the Traffic Commissioner suggested average compliance punctuality of between 74% and 83%, excluding early and late running.

In respect of Midland Bluebird Ltd, previous monitoring exercises of the 59 Service from regarding punctuality 13 September to 7 December 2022 identified a ratio of compliance at 81.82%, which between 1 and 26 June deteriorated to 70.59%. A monitoring exercises of the X10/X10A service between 5 June and 15 July 2023 showed punctuality at 86.96%, deteriorating 66.67% between 14 January and 25 February 2024; on the 56 service between 12 October and 6 December 2023 at 92.98%; and the X38 service between 17 January and 28 February 2024 indicating punctuality at 77.27%.

“Advocate’s Representations on Punctuality”

I was assured that the primary objective of Midland Bluebird and McGill’s Scotland East is to provide a punctual and reliable service. I could understand that this made business sense and that attendance at these proceedings might have a negative impact, but that object needs to be reflected in delivery. I was referred to external factors that had impacted on service delivery over the last few years: congestion, roadworks and illegal parking, which should have been reflected in timetable changes. The Group would appear well equipped to deliver this through the ticket machine estate and monitoring of real time reports from the dedicated control centre at Carmuirs House. I was also told about its internal “Punctuality Panels”. Real Time Passenger Information is communicated to digital display screens across the network and through the Midland Bluebird mobile app and website (but see above). Customers can track buses. The On-Street Team of Route Managers and Inspectors, and specifically Midland Bluebird city centre managers for Falkirk and Stirling etc, might be even better deployed, if running to published timetable.

Service 59 - Bus Users monitored between 13 September (1 week before takeover) and 7 December 2022 = 11 days monitoring with 22 timing point departures. The operator asserted that this was a small sample (1 in 112 - 0.9%) but acknowledged that four journeys did not comply. It cannot then seek to assert 100 % compliance relying on 10 journeys from mid-October to December 2022. Bus Users was reported as accepting the explanations given with a reissued report on 9 January 2023 at 95.45%. Monitoring between 1 June and 26 June 2023 = 8 days monitoring with 17 timing point departures showed punctuality at only 70.59%. The operator again queried the size of the sample (1 in 105 - 0.9%) but noted that all 17 journeys operated, 5 were late ranging from 7-10 minutes primarily due to some issues with electronic ticket machines and increased tourist demand. Changes to the timetable only followed in August 2023, and again in April 2024. There has been a request from the General Manager to revisit. I was asked to adopt its own assessment of “punctuality performance trend” through to June 2024 and following the amendment of the registered timetable on 14 August 2023 and again on 22 April 2024.

Service X10/X10A Bus Users monitored between 5 and 15 June 2023 = 11 days monitoring with 23 timing point departures showed punctuality at 86.96%. The operator queried the size of the sample (1 in 243  - 0.4%) but noted that all journeys operated but three journeys that did not comply, with two operating early due to driver error. One driver realised his error and pulled over. The driver suggested he was confused with term-time timetables. The late journey was due to a vehicle defect. Monitoring between 12 October and 6 December 2023 = 10 days monitoring with 57 timing points showed punctuality at 66.67%. The operator again queried the size of sample (1 in 47 - 2.1%) and the methodology used as it monitored Sunday services. Of the 12 departures monitored, four operated late, one due to a new driver being mentored and one due to a driver error. He is no longer employed. A formal request to repeat the monitoring exercise was apparently accepted in an email of 30 April 2024. I was again asked to adopt its own assessment of “punctuality performance trend” through to June 2024 and to accept that there had been a steady improvement in this service. The registered timetable was amended on 14 August 2023.

Service 56 Bus Users monitored between 14 January and 25 February 2024 = 4 days monitoring with 12 timing point departures showed punctuality at 92.98%with the intention to improve the reliability of the bus service in Cowie. The operator accepted the size of sample (1 in 78 - 1.3%) as a reasonable sample size. I did not understand the argument that “for the sake of 1 minute delay the +6 minutes departure would have been compliant making the overall performance across the monitoring report increase from 93% to 95%.” It referred to congestion in and around the Cowie and Stirling areas and claimed that this is a very good performance. I was again asked to adopt its own assessment of  “punctuality performance trend” through to June 2024 and to accept that there had been a steady improvement in this service.

Service X38 Bus Users monitored between 17 January and 28 February 2024 = 10 days monitoring 66 timing point departures, which showed punctuality at 77.27%. The operator queried the size of the sample (1 in 128  - 0.8%). It accepted that the route was subject to long-term roadworks and worsening peak time congestion. The timetable had become unachievable, so changes were introduced in April 2024 across another service allowing improvements in the standard of bus used on this service. It has requested a further monitoring exercise. I was again asked to adopt its own assessment of “punctuality performance trend” through to June 2024 and to accept that there had been a steady improvement in this service.

It was suggested that I might use the monitoring exercise carried out in January and February 2024 on the UniLink service, operating between Stirling City Centre and Stirling University. However, I noted the differences in the type of route and passenger demographic. Roy Cairns, Bus Compliance Officer was called to give evidence. He confirmed the amended report into the 59 service. He accepted that similar mitigations might be applied across the other five exercises. Using that methodology. he estimated that compliance would be at around 92-93%, corroborating the operator’s figure of 92.9%.

Preliminary Determination

“Maintenance”

Based on the evidence summarised above, I recorded formal findings against Midland Bluebird Ltd under section 17(3)(aa) for breach of the undertaking that vehicles would be kept fit and serviceable, and to employ an effective written driver defect reporting system, and section 17(3)(c) as a result of the prohibition notices. I noted the findings of improvements in systems across the group and the accepted state of both these operations at the point of acquisition.

In evidence, Mr Henderson confirmed the particular challenges which manifested themselves at the Bannockburn deport and which contributed to the incidents described above. Of the 294 vehicles acquired as part of the purchase, 106 were found to be in an unfit state for operation. He referred to fitters gone rogue and a management culture which had permitted this. The management team had been changed on four occasions since acquisition. A very telling insight into the culture of the depot was Mr Henerson’s description of shifts being run to suit the individual staff rather than the needs of the business and to deliver effective risk management. 

I heard that Prohibition Notices are investigated internally ensuring any required actions are taken and communicated across the wider Group. The fleet which was acquired had an average age of 15 years, with many over 20 years old and consisted of 131 vehicles. It now averages 9.83 years old, achieved by removing selected vehicles, such as 53 plate Scania models, and introducing 66 newer vehicles from other areas of McGill’s Bus Group to the Midland Bluebird fleet. 83% of the service fleet is now Euro-6 rated, which in turn required improvements in the depot engineering team and additional investment in diagnostic equipment. I am aware of the funded plans to introduce 30 electric buses to the Midland Bluebird fleet in the Falkirk and Stirling areas. The Performance Improvement Plan for Bannockburn depot is directed at ensuring performance returns to expected levels.

Noting the positive report received from Mr Montogomery regarding the direction of improvement, I accepted an undertaking for a full independent compliance audit of both operators to be supplied to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner in Edinburgh by midday on 31 December 2024. As indicated above, that will be completed by Lloyd Morgan. I left the operators in little doubt that I expect to see a fully satisfactory state of compliance.

“Punctuality”

As was noted, the desktop exercise undertaken by Bus Users Scotland, was at the request of the Traffic Commissioner for Scotland; unfortunately, she had left the post when the results were returned. I assumed responsibility on deployment to this case. Having previously warned another entity within this Group, there can be no misunderstanding as to what the operator is expected to deliver. This is a large operation, where the Group accepts the potential benefits, but must also meet the obligations upon which the community relies.

I have referred to the approach approved in 2015/008 Diamond Bus Ltd, Ribble Motor Services Ltd (as above); 2003/300, 2003/301 and 2003/302 Andrews (Sheffield) Ltd, Yorkshire Traction Company Ltd and Barnsley & District Traction Company Ltd etc. I referred to the guidance and relevant Practice Direction. It is now well established that the question of reasonable excuse is built-in to the analysis right from the beginning – everyday or regular occurrences are already allowed for through the application of the 6-minute window. I therefore resisted any suggestion of an over-elaborate investigation or unnecessary attention to detail. I was entitled to look at the overall result, rather than being compelled to assess every single reason advanced for the failure of a particular service to operate compliantly.

As the Court of Appeal explained in Ribble Motor Services Ltd v Traffic Commissioner for the North West Traffic Area [2001] EWCA Civ 172 17: a Commissioner is entitled to regard a sample of journeys monitored as sufficient and representative of an Operator’s operation as a whole and can then use that to make a comparison and extrapolate from it.  The Court of Appeal concluded (paragraph 57 of the judgment) that it was important that the statutory powers should not be emasculated by an over-elaborate approach to the investigation or an unnecessary attention to detail. The Court of Appeal has stressed the importance of traffic commissioners considering the question of the adequacy of monitoring in the round by adopting a global approach. As Mr MacKay explained, the monitoring exercises were targeted because, they directly related to passenger complaints, for example: Sunday services on the X10/X10A service. Similarly, the 56-service monitoring was in response to complaints as well as correspondence from the local MSP.  

It was accepted that any monitoring exercise will always involve a snapshot of how a service operates on any given day. The sample sizes are small due to resource constraints, but, as Mr MacKay of Bus Users Scotland explained, they are completed from a passenger perspective and therefore provide an insight into how a service operates.

As the Upper Tribunal has indicated, the window of tolerance and 95% punctuality target is a sensible and pragmatic approach to short-term problems causing congestion beyond which the issues should have been taken into account, when setting the timetable. The window of tolerance takes account of many of the day-to-day problems which operators can face, and operators can, reasonably, be expected to have contingent plans to deal with other, foreseeable, problems. Mr MacKay acknowledged that external factors affect punctuality including temporary road works, road closures with complex diversions due to the road networks, varying but increasing levels of traffic on the main artery roads in the west of Stirling, combined with lengthy delays on the Milngavie corridor due to utility upgrades within the greater Glasgow area. However, the monitoring exercises take account of these factors.  Congestion and road works can be planned for, and even repeated illegal parking requires some analysis.

I questioned the commitment to working in partnership with Bus Users given some of the responses to its findings. However, the response authored by Mr MacKay, Director for Scotland, Bus Users UK, dated 22 July 2024, referred to the constructive relationship with McGill’s Group and the apparent value placed on its reporting by the operators making up the Group. These operators are part of the Stirling Council Passenger Transport User Group which allows for a close working relationship with Stirling Council, and passenger representatives from across the Stirling/ Clacks area. There are also current agreements with both these operators to carry out follow up monitoring exercises with the specific object of assessing timetable enhancements and the remedial actions described on their behalf. Those are programmed to take place during 2024 to 2025 and are ongoing.

An operator should not be able to avoid scrutiny because of its total size particularly where, even the operator relies on improvements in punctuality spread over a period of time. Mr MacKay confirmed that passengers have access to more reliable information via the operators’ app and website. He described the roll-out of on street information across the Falkirk area and the reintroduction of hard copy timetables on buses and in the bus station to cater for passengers who do not have access to on-line information. That would appear to place even greater emphasis on running to published (registered) timetables. I have referred to the previous financial penalties above but could not ignore the observations of Bus Users Scotland on the improvement in operational standards since McGill’s acquired the two business. The established case law and processes allow a traffic commissioner to discount the findings presented to them by the relevant body and to give the operator the benefit of the doubt in certain circumstances. I noted the spare vehicle percentage of 18-20% but also the percentage of vehicles which had had to be replaced. Bus Users Scotland referred to improvements in vehicles, reliability, front line staff customer service, information available to passengers now both on-line and in hard copy form.

Given the suggestion of joint working and that punctuality was close to the published window of tolerance described in the Practice Direction, I challenged the operators to provide evidence of “an exceptional level of service delivery” by funding further independent punctuality monitoring to be carried out by Bus Users Scotland across a sufficient sample of both operations so as to demonstrate punctuality to at least the required 95% as set out in the Practice Direction and to meet the expectations of passengers in the west of Scotland. Those reports are to be supplied to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner by midday on 31 December 2024. It was explained that trust was being placed in both operators which cannot be abused, failing which financial penalties might be imposed.

“Updated Punctuality”

Having exercised the benefit of the doubt in respect of Clackmannanshire services: 51 and 52, or the Stirling 56 and 57 services, I was expecting the punctuality window to have been achieved. However, the report received by email of 20 January 2025 did not appear to cover any of the services which were registered by McGill’s Scotland East Ltd, when all the services analysed in the previous report dated 12 June 2024, were registered under PM0000923.  That updated report referred instead to McGill’s Bluebird and specifically the 351-service number X38 over various periods, and the same with the X10, X10A and 59. It suggested that there had been improvement from the figures produced dating from late 2022, 2023 and early 2024, to which I referred at the hearing. There was also reference to an additional vehicle in operation for peak time services on the X38. There was also a suggestion that 2 days of road closures should be discounted even when those closures should have been known about and the timetable altered.

Additional information from Bus Users Scotland explained that: “Following the PI, we discussed with McGill’s Buses Ltd and agreed the services which were to be monitored again, which were the X38,59, X10 and X10A.  McGill’s changed their name on the registrations from McGill’s Scotland East Ltd to McGill’s Bluebird Ltd during this timeframe.  They had also cancelled all services in West Lothian apart from the X38.  Therefore, we could not monitor the services that were cancelled.  The Clackmannanshire services such as the 51 and 52 as well as the Stirling 56 & 57 services were not required to be monitored again as the punctuality of those services were deemed to be acceptable during the PI….In checking the registration documents, we received from McGill’s I note the X38 shows the shortened PM3/351 - the 59 shows PM3/479 ‘ the X10 and X10A show PM3/689 and PM3/691. However, on the .gov.uk website to track a service, this number is listed against an old expired X38 service registration.” The operator disputed that, but for the purposes of my decision, made no material difference.

Communications dated 14 February 2025 sent on behalf of the operators clarified that by “the time of the hearing, none of the services operated by McGill’s Scotland East and monitored by BUS remained operational, all having been de-registered. The only “live” services that remained from the inquiry hearing, that had been monitored by BUS, were those operated by Midland Bluebird. It was understood by the operators that further monitoring would only relate to 59, X38, X10 and X10A services.” .  The Operator should have informed my office of the fact that the services considered at the hearing under the PM0000923 licence no longer existed in the same form, and further directions sought.

It was suggested that the 59 service was then 100% complaint; regarding the X38, I was invited to deem it 100% and discount two early running services due to short notice of major road closures: ““The X38 operated at 96.7% in September/October though this fell to 90.9% in November/December because of two ‘early’ departures. These departures were on the first day of a short notice major road closure which our client advised to BUS and then also to passengers via the company website and app. The road closure required a substantial diversion and the use of a shuttle bus. Passengers were provided with modified app information to take this into account though this caused an unforeseen problem in that some incorrect information was sent to drivers. As the morning progressed, this error was spotted by the company, and correct information was immediately sent to drivers via the Ticketer messaging system. The initial incorrect information caused the two services to operate early – prior to this diversion they had been running within their permitted tolerances.”

I therefore had 3 monitoring reports of  Midland Bluebird Ltd performance, showing the following:

• Monitoring exercises on local registered service 59 between 13 September and 7 December 2022 resulting in a compliance rate of 81.82%.
• Monitoring exercises on local registered service 59 between 01/06/2023 and 26/06/2023 resulting in a compliance rate of 70.59%.
• Monitoring exercises on local registered service X10/X10A between 5 June and 15 July 2023 resulting in a compliance rate of 86.96%.
• Monitoring exercises on local registered service 56 between 12 October and 6 December 2023 resulting in a compliance rate of 92.98%.
• Monitoring exercises on local registered service X10/X10A between 14 January and 25 February 2024 resulting in a compliance rate of 66.67%.
• Monitoring exercises on local registered service X38 between 17 January and 28 February 2024 resulting a compliance rate of 77.27%, and for McGill’s Scotland East Ltd
• Monitoring exercises on local registered service X22 between 4 July and 2 August 2022, and 28 June and 4 August 2022 resulting in a compliance rate of 74% and 66% respectively.
• Monitoring exercises on local registered service 21 between 19 December and 29 January 2023 resulting a compliance rate of 92%.

The hearing identified a discrepancy between the number of vehicles (217) and number of discs (297) issued on the Midland Bluebird Ltd licence was raised. That situation appeared to have worsened with 297 discs still in issue against the 178 specified vehicles. 

Regarding the X10 and X10A, I was invited to find compliance rates of 83.91% and 89.2% but to again discount those findings following a meeting with the Roadworks Commissioner, local contractors and the local authorities to try and find ways to improve this issue. It was not stated how that would occur.

In summary, it was suggested that the updated monitoring compared favourably with previous monitoring and showed positive steps to achieve services that reach or come as close as is reasonably achievable to the desired 95% punctuality target.

I took some time to consider those representations but admit to some frustration by the lack of previous communication from which I had not appreciated that the group had changed the name/entity against the registrations previously held by McGill’s Scotland East Ltd to McGill’s Bluebird Ltd, cancelling all services in West Lothian. The X38 remained with McGill’s Bluebird Ltd. I would have sought additional monitoring, if that had been made clear in representations. I asked that the Bus Registrations Team be alerted to the expired registration. The approach to notification of passengers regarding the X38, appeared at odds with the information I was given regarding reliance on paper timetables during the hearing. I was unclear why I might exercise my discretion and view the X38 as 100% compliant when the operator’s actions in fact resulted in incorrect information being sent to drivers. The problems arising from that error were entirely foreseeable. I did record that the report from Bus Users Scotland indicates that the 59 service was then 100% complaint. In respect of the X10 and X10A, I was not attracted by the suggestion that I might await further monitoring after what occurred with the registrations above. I therefore determined to proceed on the basis of 83.91% and 89.2% compliance.

I took account of such mitigation as I deemed reasonable. To be very clear, there is no additional qualification of what is “reasonably achievable”. To point out the obvious, importing a further qualification to the operator’s own would not achieve the regulatory purpose. I did not accept an argument around a missing door ram, when systems did not appear to have been designed to manage the risks including those to the driver were there to be occasion to open the engine bays in case of vehicle failure given the evidence on the state of the fleets. The MIL lamp clearly indicated a further and significant failing. I return to the issue of maintenance below. I did note the positive steps towards improvement but that the 95% punctuality target had not been met. 

I inferred that the details on gov.uk have been updated as against the expired X38 registration. I was unclear if the operator wished to pursue its argument with full details of the dates of notification of the road closure/diversion, and how that would have caused two early departures as well as addressing the notification of passengers (after I was given information at the hearing regarding reliance on paper timetables). Given the suggested starting point per authorised vehicle, I asked that my observations be put to the operator’s advocate to allow representations to be made. I was subsequently asked to extend the deadline for response as Midland Bluebird Ltd had been the subject of a DVSA Maintenance Investigation Visit on 24 April 2025, which was unconnected with these proceedings.  It was said that the operator was engaging with Bus Users Scotland on the question of whether the monitoring was representative of operations and formulating proposals on any intervention.

In granting an extension to 30 May 2025 I did not expect a 4-page letter at the last hour from its lawyers seeking to reopen issues for which the operator was responsible. In seeking to argue that monitoring exercises were too old and too small to be considered, based on its own interaction with Bus Users Scotland and its decision to alter the timetable, risked the impression of bad faith. I was unimpressed by representations for which I allowed additional time and appeared to be an attempt to avoid responsibility for previous conduct. The operators came dangerously close to being recalled. I struggled to see any real deterrence in its proposals to  increase the value of its assets by investing in RTPI screens. A suggested fare reduction was for a limited period. The comments were not well-judged and appeared to be made without knowledge of what occurred at the previous hearing. In addition, and to be very clear, section 39(4) of the Transport (Scotland) Act 2001 provides that any penalty imposed under subsection (1) above shall be payable to the Scottish Ministers. There appeared to be some confusion with provisions which might apply in a different jurisdiction.

Yet again, I gave the operator the benefit of the doubt and allowed it to correct the unfortunate impression left by those representations.

On 15 August 2025, I received further representations from Backhouse Jones, prepared by Mr Woolfall on this occasion. Those representations were far more persuasive and sought to argue that the reliability figures should be averaged at 86.55% but that penalties should be reduced further by reference to a number of mitigating factors, including the recent acquisition of the business, extensive roadworks, and ongoing engagement with councils and passengers. He referred to the trajectory of improvement and further planned timetable and resource changes. The operator requested that any penalty be proportionate, reduced to reflect the small proportion of affected services, and resolved without a resumed hearing.

I have considered those representations carefully. The acquisition of the relevant business was in 2022. The latest reliability reports on the X10/X10A services show
89.29% and 83.91%. I have taken account of some mitigation arising from ongoing and extensive roadworks, supported by Bus Users Scotland. That is reflected in my decision to accept the representations that the correct penalty is in the backet of £100 per vehicle.  An operator inspected to engage proactively with local highways authorities to try and plan for these events and to alter the timetable accordingly when the impact is long-term.   I have also limited that impact to the PM0000003 licence under which the X10 and X10A are now operated under. Again, credit is reflected in the decision not to apply it more widely across the two licences.

I rejected the suggestion that the penalty be further reduced because of the state of the vehicles. That was in part reflected in the time allowed for extra monitoring and I refer to my determination in respect of the maintenance, below. I am entitled to infer that due diligence was exercised during the purchase of these entities. At its most basic, due diligence is the exercise of care that a reasonable business is expected to take before entering into an agreement or contract of sale. The state of vehicles would have been reflected in the cost of the sale, or the management should have been aware. The statutory responsibilities on Directors are set out in section 172 Companies Act 2006 and include a duty to exercise independent judgement and duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. I do express my considerable concern that another large operator might have allowed vehicles to deteriorate to the state described above. There then followed the two bus fires placing members of the public at risk. That should properly attract the attention of the enforcement authorities. Operators must understand that standards apply to them regardless of their size or status.

“Updated Maintenance”

I previously recorded formal findings against Midland Bluebird Ltd under section 17(3)(aa) for breach of the undertaking that vehicles would be kept fit and serviceable, and to employ an effective written driver defect reporting system, and section 17(3)(c) as a result of the prohibition notices. I noted the findings of improvements in systems across the group and the accepted state of both these operations at the point of acquisition.

On 28 November 2024, vehicle TIW4227 operated under PM0000003 by Midland Bluebird Ltd was issued with an “S” marked prohibition, denoting a significant failure, with the following defects noted:

• Flap holding device defective and flap likely to close inadvertently and cause injury Axle Number 0.
• Oil leak from engine onto road surface dripping, in excess of 75mm diameter patch in 5 minutes Axle Number 0.
• Engine Malfunction indicator lamp illuminated Indicating a fault Axle Number 0.
• ABS warning light indicates the existence of a fault Yellow MIL illuminated Axle Number 0.
• Emissions Malfunction indicator lamp illuminated Indicating a fault Axle Number 0.

The following announced visit by Vehicle Examiner Mr Montgomery on 11 December 2024 determined that both the engine flap issue and emissions defect were longstanding issues. I was referred to correspondence dated 24 December 2024, and the response sent to the Examiner dated 27 December 2024 detailing the matters leading to the prohibition.

Those stated that the issue with the engine lamp identified at the Preventative Maintenance Inspection on 26 November 2024, a full diagnostic check had been completed and no issue identified, so the system was re-set. On 28 November 2024, during a first use walk round, the driver noted that the warning lamp was on. The engineer, Mr Wilkes was contacted, and he again reset the system. However, he did not endorse the defect report card, for which he received a warning The next driver used the vehicle with no issues. The next driver did not properly endorse the defect card with her details, but she did subsequently note an issue with a loss of air pressure. She called the office and was told to reset the system, which she did. The warning lamp then came on again and this is when the vehicle was stopped. The letter states: “Whilst the warning light detected by DVSA was the same light as originally reported by Emma Davidson, it should be noted that the defect had been investigated and cleared, and the vehicle had driven some distance, before the lamp came on again. It is not the case that the defect had simply been left and not dealt with. This was an intermittent fault on the vehicle where it was proving very hard to detect the root cause and repair. Every time the system was interrogated, it showed that the fault was no longer active.”

The operator disputed that the engine flap should have been noticed by a driver: “Its drivers are not instructed to open the engine bay and check inside, and this is not a check that the Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness suggests that drivers perform. Drivers are required to externally check that all panels or flaps are secure but there is no suggestion here that anything was loose. In line with all major bus operators, our client’s drivers are not trained or expected to be looking inside the engine compartment.”

It accepted that its fitter should have spotted the missing door ram at the inspection shortly before the prohibition was issued. This was a significant failing. The oil leak was blamed on a recently qualified technician. He was issued with a warning, and his work was to be more closely monitored. It was accepted that action should have been taken the lamp re-illuminated and after a previous endorsement. This again was a significant failing.

I turn then to the compliance audit of 4 December 2024 completed by Mr Musto of Lloyd Morgan Group, who was apparently impressed by the operator. Strangely, that report does not offer an explanation as to how a vehicle came to be operated with S marked defects on 28 November 2024. I do not pretend to understand how you distinguish between areas for improvement and matters which are unsatisfactory, but every single item was marked as a 6, i.e. satisfactory. Responses to questions regarding how prohibitable defects might be actioned before being brought back into service were slightly contradicted by the circumstances of the above prohibition.

Final Determination

I make very clear that these operators can no longer use the poor state of vehicles as an excuse for failing to meet published timetables. Both are given a final
warning. I find the repute of each entity to be severely tarnished by the finding of maintenance issues identified at the hearing and subsequently by the DVSA intervention on 11 December 2024. Any further reports are likely to result in consideration of more extensive intervention. I also take account of the previous reports of poor punctuality. 

In that regard, deterrent action is required in order to achieve the aims of the statute and to ensure that levels of service match the expectations of the travelling public in Scotland. Putting aside the Growth duty and other obligations on regulators outside the tribunal room, the duty to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members, is not my concern. That is one of the statutory obligations of the Directors. I have rejected the suggestion that the operators might use funds instead of paying a penalty. That would be to reward shareholders (including the Group), when the school children and public paid the price. The penalty to be paid to Scottish Ministers under section 39 of the Transport (Scotland) Act 2001 is £29,700. The Office of the Traffic Commissioner for Scotland will advise on how that payment is to be made.

R Turfitt

Traffic Commissioner for Scotland

23 October 2025

Published 7 November 2025