Decision for Henry Hulley & Sons Ltd (PC0003407)

Written decision of the Traffic Commissioner for the North West of England for Henry Hulley & Sons Ltd, and transport manager Mr. Alfred Crofts

IN THE NORTH WEST TRAFFIC AREA

HENRY HULLEY & SONS LTD – PC0003407

&

MR ALFRED CROFTS (Transport Manager)

WRITTEN DECISION OF THE TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER

DECISION:

  • Under provision of sections 17(1)(a) and 17(2)(a) of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (“the Act”), Operator’s licence PC0003407, held in the name Henry Hulley & Sons Ltd, is revoked with immediate effect.

  • Under provision of Section 28(1) of the Transport Act 1985, Henry Hulley & Sons Ltd, and sole director Mr. Alfred Crofts, are each disqualified from holding or obtaining an operator’s licence for a period of two years.

  • Under provision Section 155 of the Transport Act 2000 I impose a penalty of £6,650 for the operator’s failure, without reasonable excuse, to operate a local service under section 6 of the Transport Act 1985.

Background

Henry Hulley & Sons Ltd holds a Standard National Public Services Vehicle Operator’s Licence authorising 19 vehicles. At the time of writing the sole director is Mr. Alfred Crofts. Mr. Crofts is also the approved transport manager.

There is one operating centre at Calver Road, Baslow Bakewell, DE45 1RP. Preventative Maintenance Inspections are said to be carried out in-house at 5-weekly intervals.

The operator was subject of a DVSA Maintenance Investigation Visit Report (“MIVR”) on 11 December 2023 which was returned as unsatisfactory, and a Bus Operator Account Management (“BOAM”) report completed in January 2024 which reported a punctuality compliance rate of just 59%. The target compliance rate is established as being 95%, with the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s guidance (paragraph 60 of Statutory Document 14) indicating that, where the compliance rate is below 80%, a public inquiry is likely to be called.

Hearing and Company Liquidation

This operator appeared before me at Public Inquiry on Tuesday 04 March 2025 and was in attendance through director Mr. Crofts, and was represented by Mr. Murray Oliver of Smith Bowyer Clarke Road Transport Lawyers. Mr. Crofts was also called separately to the Inquiry so that concerns regarding his capacity as Transport Manager could be considered.

Mr Peter Cotgreave, a BOAM Officer for the DVSA, was also in attendance to assist. Mr. Cotgreave undertook the BOAM investigation with a colleague and produced the public inquiry statement from that report.

The public inquiry was adjourned, part heard, to allow further evidence to be produced, both by way of a further BOAM and an audit into the systems the operator had for ensuring compliance with the conditions and undertakings of the licence.

On 25 March 2025 I was notified by a local Councillor that Mr. Crofts had posted a notice stating that the business would “cease trading after operation on Wednesday 25 March 2025”. Despite Mr. Crofts’ very recent attendance at a public inquiry the operator failed to notify my office of this material change. I sought further information and was advised in correspondence from Mr. Oliver that Mr. Crofts would be writing to me regarding the material change. However, no such communication was received.

This office attempted to correspond with Mr. Crofts, but emails were returned with a message stating that the email address was no longer in use and no longer accessible.

On 01 April 2025 I received a Digital Surrender Form, signed by Mr. Crofts seeking to terminate the licence. I had regard to the directions of the Senior Traffic Commissioner at Annex 3 of Statutory Document 10 and, as regulatory action had already commenced, I refused the application to surrender the licence.

The inquiry was reconvened on 10 June 2025. Again, Mr. Crofts was in attendance, and was represented by Mr. Oliver. On this second occasion however I was informed that, as Henry Hulley & Sons Ltd had entered Creditors Voluntary Liquidation, Mr. Crofts was present, and being represented, in his role as transport manager, not director. I had regard, however, to Companies House records for that day and I noted the company status was “Active” with Mr. Crofts listed as it’s sole director.

Today, at the time of writing, the company status has been updated to “Liquidation” and Mr. Crofts remains the sole director. The company is not yet dissolved.

Issues

The Public Inquiry was called in order to consider whether I should intervene in respect of the operator’s licence and its registered services. The concerns were set out both in the call up letters, and at the commencement of the public inquiry, as follows:

  • Whether there was a failure to comply with conditions of the licence, namely the requirement to notify this office within 28 days of changes to the listed directors;

  • Whether there had been a failure to comply with an undertaking for an independent audit and if, as a result of the audit eventually provided, it was found that the arrangements for the maintenance of vehicles were inadequate;

  • If the Transport Manager continued to meet the requirement to be able to continuously and effectively manage transport operations;

  • Whether the operator had failed to operate a local bus service registered with the traffic commissioner and/or whether they had operated a local bus service outside of the timings that they registered with the traffic commissioner and/or whether the operator has failed to comply with the requirements set out in The Public Services Vehicles (Open Data)(England) Regulations 2020, namely to provide data related to timetabling, fares and automatic vehicle location; and

  • If the operator continued to meet the continuous and mandatory requirement to have appropriate financial standing.

Alongside possible regulatory interventions for suspension, curtailment (“variation”), revocation and disqualification, the call up letter and addendums also put the operators on notice of the power to impose a penalty under section 155 of the Transport Act 200, and the power to impose a condition under section 26 of the Transport Act 1985.

Summary of Evidence

Failure to Comply with Conditions of the Licence

Mr. Matthew Smales was added as a director on Companies House for the licence holding company on 07 November 2024. That change was not notified to this office within the 28 days required as per the listed circumstances set out on the licence.

During the first sitting of the inquiry, I was advised that Mr. Crofts had been incapacitated due to a serious illness. No evidence was provided in support. As Mr. Crofts was the sole director and transport manager at that time this raised questions as to who was controlling the business and undertaking the duties of a transport manager. I was made aware of a wide range of employees with various roles and responsibilities who assisted Mr. Crofts and, when he took ill suddenly, Mr. Smales stepped up to manage the business. The act of making him a director, I was told, was to secure his position of authority and provided security, leadership and management. Whilst it was accepted that there was, in a legal sense, a failure to notify the change, the sudden illness was provided as mitigation, with the assurances that transport operations were managed during that period.

Noting that the first sitting of the inquiry took place on 04 March 2025, and I was provided with mitigation for the failure to notify the change of directors, I was surprised to learn that on 05 March, less than 24 hours later, Mr. Smales was removed as a director. As before this change was not notified to this office.

Failure to Comply with an Undertaking on the Licence / Maintenance

Issues with maintenance first became apparent during a DVSA maintenance investigation visit in December 2023. The subsequent report highlighted unsatisfactory features in respect of brake testing records, vehicle emission monitoring, and little or no evidence of PSVAR training. The operator provided a prompt response setting out planned improvement and whilst some improvement was noted at a follow-up assessment by DVSA in March 2024, areas still in need of further development were identified.

Due to the initial issues, and in advance of the follow up assessment, the operator had agreed to have an undertaking recorded on their licence to have an independent audit completed by 14 August 2024 and sent to this office not later than 14 days later alongside the operator’s detailed proposal for implementing the report’s recommendations.

The operator had accepted this undertaking by way of an email dated 01 March 2024. By 17 October 2024 no audit had been forthcoming. Mr. Crofts was sent a reminder to which he responded to advise he was unaware of the undertaking – this is despite it being previously agreed in writing and recorded on his licence. Due to illness he requested time to arrange and complete the audit. That subsequent audit was provided to this office in January 2025, but was not fully complete as the detailed proposal for implementing the recommendations had not been provided.

The detail of the audit was of concern and set out a range of recommendations categorised as being “Essential and Important” and/or requiring “Immediate Action”. This included road safety critical recommendations such as:

  • Essential, immediate action required to ensure that driver defect reporting was effective with immediate action required to ensure that defect report cards were completed in full

  • Essential, immediate action required to update wheel removal and refitment procedures to include correct retorque procedures.

  • Essential, ongoing action to identify and record training for vehicle technicians and workshop staff.

  • Important, immediate action to implement planning systems for vehicle inspections, and to investigate instances of driver detectable defects with no corresponding driver defect report

In the positive, I note the operator’s first and final pass rate at annual test (over the past five years) reflects the national average and there has not been a failure since May 2023. I am also advised in evidence that the operator’s OCRS score is monitored regularly and is currently ‘Green’, having been ‘Red’ when Mr. Crofts first took over the business.

There are positive features here, but a comparison between the DVSA follow up assessment in March 2024 and the independent audit provided in January 2025 suggests some regression. The operator had already been put on notice by the DVSA in March 2024 that maintenance arrangements needed improvement, and it had been given advice on inspection and maintenance records. It is concerning that those systems were considered “mostly satisfactory” by the DVSA, but in need of essential and immediate action some 10 months later.

It is not contested that the licence holder has failed to comply with the specified undertaking for an audit. I am required to consider, further, whether there have been failures to comply with other, general, undertakings of the licence including the need to ensure there are adequate arrangements for maintaining, in a fit and serviceable condition, the vehicles used under the licence.

Transport Manager

As a result of the concern with the maintenance arrangements I am required to consider whether Mr. Crofts, the only named Transport Manager on the licence, is capable of ensuring continuous and effective management of transport operations as required in law.

I asked, directly, whether the issues raised have been caused by Mr. Crofts needing to balance the various responsibilities associated with running the licence holding company – particularly with the need to ensure compliance with the many aspects of punctuality still to be considered.

I note that Mr. Crofts is recently qualified as a Transport Manager, in 2021, and has undergone a two-day refresher course in 2023.He has been in the PSV business as a driver then owner for a number of years. He has also completed a further two-day transport manager CPC refresher course as recently as May 2025.

As to the question as to whether Mr. Crofts has taken on too much, he repeated the evidence referencing the many individuals that have been put in place to assist the various aspects of the business. It was, however, accepted that an opportunity was missed, to give him additional support, in appointing a second Transport Manager. I was initially given assurances that this support would be put in place and I formally recorded that as a statement of intent. That assurance can no longer be relied upon as the business has ceased trading.

Punctuality

In consideration of the question as to whether the operator had (i) failed to operate a local bus service registered with the traffic commissioner; (ii) whether they had operated a local bus service outside of the timings that they registered with the traffic commissioner; and (iii) whether the operator has failed to comply with the requirements set out in The Public Services Vehicles (Open Data)(England) Regulations 2020 I have regard to a number of reports.

The first is a Bus Compliance Assessment Report (“BCAR”) which is an assessment, by the DVSA, of the systems and procedures in place for the operator to review, consider, assess and react to the punctuality reports and data available. An initial assessment was completed in February 2024. This concluded with three areas marked as unsatisfactory/mostly satisfactory. The issues reported included that the ‘Ticketer System’ was not being monitored regularly, action was not being taken on the performance data, and no records were held on driver training or disciplining in respect of running times.

The DVSA noted a prompt response from the operator and a review of the systems, in May 2024, reported improvement primarily resulting from the appointment of a compliance officer. Whilst that compliance officer had left the business before the inquiry commenced, I was provided with evidence of the various systems and procedures for monitoring performance; for reacting in real time to challenges; and the various individuals involved in that process.

Whilst this might show the systems and procedures were available to the operator, the challenge to the operator is to evidence the success. In the case of Ribble Motor Services Ltd v Traffic Commissioner for the North West Traffic Area [2001] EWCA Civ 172 17 (“Ribble”) the Court of Appeal explained how

“Those of us who travel by public transport need these services, but we need them to be reliable.”

That decision also quoted the Senior Traffic Commissioner at the time who said

“Passengers have the right to expect their bus to arrive at, or very close to, the stated time. Otherwise, of course, there is little prospect of getting people out of their cars and back onto public transport – a goal which, presumably, operator’s share”.

Ribble established that the appropriate measurement of performance is to expect 95% of services to be “on time”, that being not more than one minute early, and not more than five minutes late. Anything outside of this tolerance needs to be considered against a test of “reasonable excuse”.

The second report was the BOAM report provided by the DVSA. This was produced following four days of monitoring services between 17 November 2023 and 17 January 2024. Two of the operator’s 13 live services were monitored (services 257 & 172). The exercise covered 31 journeys, concluding that 10 failed to operate, 2 were observed to be early, and one was observed to be late. This provided an overall non-compliance rate of 41% - therefore a performance of rate of 59%, against the 95% target.

The operator disputed a small number of the findings, and notified the DVSA, but the DVSA officer involved, who was helpfully at the inquiry, advised that he was satisfied he recorded his findings on the day and had no reason to adjust the report. It was also put to me that the reasons for failure to operate were recorded by the operator as being “bus unavailable”. In line with the advice offered in Ribble, I do not accept this as “reasonable excuse”. Paragraph 20 of Ribble distinguishes between “ordinary everyday occurrences” and “genuinely extraordinary occurrences”. It goes further to set out examples and includes mechanical failure as being “part and parcel of running a bus service for which allowance has been made within the window of tolerance”.

It was accepted that matters have, however, more probably than not improved since that date. The operator was able to provide a third report in evidence of their own recordings, using “Ticketer” which put a more recent and general punctuality rate as 87%. Whilst an explanation of how this is recorded was provided I do have concerns about a driver’s ability to manipulate aspects of the records where manual intervention is possible. That said, the fourth report, from the Bus Open Data Service (“BODS”), also records an improved position of 72%.

Regardless of the improved position, these new statistics are, notably, below the 95% threshold. The operator has failed to establish reasonable excuse, noting that the burden lies with them to do so. I note the suggestion that BODS is perhaps not entirely accurate as the data sets have not yet been updated. The operator claims, therefore, that the information being assessed is outdated. The flaw with this argument, however, is that the responsibility for recording the accurate timetable lies with the operator. Any delay to that process, caused by failure to have complete and accurate forms with the Office of The Traffic Commissioner, requires the operator to continue to provide the timetabled service until the changes come into effect. I have no reason to conclude that BODS is largely incorrect.

Financial Standing

Discussions on Financial Standing were held in private session. Whilst many of the points discussed are not sensitive, those following paragraphs which are in Bold/Italics are not to be shared with any party other than the operator. Those paragraphs are to be redacted from all other copies and are only to be released with the permission of the Traffic Commissioner.

The calling in letter had placed the licence holder on notice that, on consideration of the issues identified, I wished to be satisfied that these events were not caused by the failure of the operator to have appropriate financial standing. In preparation for the Public Inquiry the operator provided bank statements along with a communication advising that the statements would not provide evidence that financial standing was met. I was advised that representations would be made at the Inquiry to request a Period of Grace. Further directions were provided by me that the onus was on the operator to satisfy me, by way of evidence, that the McKee Test could be met.

 Reference to the “MeKee Test” relates to the guidance helpfully set out by the Upper Tribunal in 2014/008 Duncan McKee where it concluded that a request for a period of grace is required to be supported with evidence that it is worthwhile:

“Traffic Commissioners will need some tangible evidence, beyond mere hope and aspiration, that granting a period of grace will be worthwhile, and that there are reasonable prospects for a good outcome. Some sort of analysis along these lines will be necessary because, amongst other reasons, Traffic Commissioners have to decide how long to grant. Moreover, as with a stay, there is no point in granting a period of grace if the likely effect is just to put off the evil day when regulatory action will have to be taken”

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On 04 March 2025 I made a formal finding under Section 17(1)(a) that the licence holder no longer continued to meet the requirement to be of appropriate financial standing in accordance with Article 7 of the 2009 Regulations. I granted a period of grace for the shortcoming to be remedied. That period expired at 23:45 on 12 June 2025. The operator had been put on notice that, should the financial standing criteria not be satisfied before the expiration of the Period of Grace the licence will be revoked. Any request for an extension must be received before the expiration and must be supported with tangible evidence that the request has merit and I would expect to see a significant improvement from the position recorded at the date of the hearing.

During the reconvened hearing, which pre-dated the end of the period of grace, I was provided with what Mr. Crofts set out as the reasons for the business becoming unviable and his accountants giving him advice on 15 March 2025 to close the business.

[REDACTED]

As at the time of writing the period of grace has expired and the mandatory and continuous requirement to be of the appropriate financial standing has not been satisfied.

Findings

Failure to Comply with Conditions of the Licence

I am satisfied that there was a failure to comply with the conditions of the licence to notify this office of a change in directors. This has now occurred twice, firstly to notify the appointment of Mr. Smales, and again in relation to his removal.

Of concern was that Mr. Smales was removed as a director on 05 March 2025, less than 24 hours after the public inquiry commenced. I find it inconceivable that Mr. Crofts was not aware of the need to notify, certainly there is no mitigation to rely upon on this occasion for any failure to notify. Of greater concern was that the effective date of Mr. Smales’ removal was back-dated to 28 February 2025. This meant that at the time of the initial inquiry - when I was being advised that Mr. Crofts had a strong team supporting him, which included Mr. Smales as a director to provide “authority, security, leadership and management” – Mr. Smales had in fact been removed from that position. At no stage during the inquiry sitting on 04 March was I notified that Mr. Smales had been, or was to be, removed from his position as director. I find therefore that I was misled – through omission – by the evidence provided to me by Mr. Crofts. I also find that the condition to notify such changes within 28 days had not been complied with.

Accordingly, I make an adverse finding under section 17(3)(b). I disregard any initial mitigations and reasoning for the initial failure. Mr. Crofts would have been alive to the requirement at the time Mr. Smales was removed, and yet – as before – he failed to notify my office.

Furthermore, I consider the failure to make me aware of the change to directors during the course of the public inquiry to be a breach of trust. Trust goes to the heart of the licensing regime and loss of trust adversely affects the good repute of the licence holder.

Failure to Comply with an Undertaking on the Licence / Maintenance

The evidence before me is such that I am satisfied on the basis of probability that the operator did knowingly agree to the audit undertaking and subsequently failed to comply with it (i) in terms of the timeframe set, and (ii) in failing to provide a detailed response to the findings. Accordingly, I make an adverse finding under s17(3)(aa).

In order to assess the level of regulatory intervention that may be required due to a failure to comply with general undertakings, and on the understanding that this hearing would be adjourned to allow a further assessment on punctuality, I allowed an opportunity for the operator to undertake an independent compliance audit during the month of June 2025. Due to the operator ceasing all operations it was not possible for any further audit to be obtained. Whilst I was told that the failure to provide another audit may deprive the operator the opportunity to display effective systems I must have regard to the best available evidence before me.

Accordingly, I make adverse findings under s.17(3)(aa) that the general undertakings of the licence have not been complied with, namely the requirement to ensure vehicles are kept in a fit and serviceable condition as evidenced by the absence of effective defect reporting, wheel management systems and stretched inspection periods identified by the independent compliance audit. These were long standing failings having been previously identified in the DVSA audit some ten months prior.

Transport Manager

I had initially been persuaded by the proposal to appoint a second transport manager as a basis on which Mr. Crofts might retain his good repute as a transport manager. However, it subsequently transpired that Mr. Crofts was not open with me during the inquiry and failed to communicate with my office. The question I must ask is whether I can distinguish between Mr. Crofts the director, and Mr. Crofts the transport manager.

Representations on behalf of the operator suggested that I could and that I should make that distinction. I was asked to consider that, whilst there were some failings in compliance, these were not so poor as to determine loss of transport manager good repute. The substantive failings – notifying changes, managing the business, financial – were all down to Mr. Crofts’s failings as a director. It was put to me that, as transport manager, Mr. Crofts identified the shortcomings from the BOAM and set about delegating responsibilities and putting the appropriate personnel in place. He made changes to the timetables. I am also asked to consider the operator’s performance at annual test and at roadside. The OCRS had improved under Mr. Crofts’ tenure as transport manager.

I accept that there are positive features. I also note any finding which would result in Mr. Crofts losing good repute as transport manager would attract an automatic disqualification for at least twelve months. Balancing the negatives against the positives I find loss of good repute, and the disqualification for twelve months, would be a disproportionate finding. I make this determination by only the narrowest of margins. Accordingly, whilst Mr. Crofts does not forfeit his good repute as transport manager, I do mark it as severely tarnished.

Punctuality

I am satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the punctuality of this operation falls below the 95% threshold of compliance. Evidence available illustrates that punctuality, at its lowest, is recorded as 59% and, at the highest, as 87%. It is now well established that the question of reasonable excuse is to be built-in to the analysis right from the beginning – everyday or regular occurrences are already allowed for through the application of the 6-minute window. I resist any suggestion of an over-elaborate investigation or unnecessary attention to detail. I am entitled to consider the overall result and step back from assessing individual reasons for the failure of a particular service to operate on time or at all. The operator has provided no contemporaneous records setting out the causes beyond stating the vehicles were unavailable. I am, therefore, not minded to conclude that reasonable excuse has been established.

Noting the work undertaken by the operator, before it ceased trading, to improve matters I sought to allow an opportunity for a further assessment to be made. The purpose of the adjournment was to allow a new, updated BOAM report to be completed. This would ensure that consideration could be given to improvements – if any were to be identified – following the operator’s employment of compliance officers & complaints specialists, its additional training to drivers, its new complaints procedures, and its improved communication with customers and revision of the timetables. The cessation of operations has, however, denied that opportunity. I must therefore have regard to the best available evidence before me.

I agree with the representations made in March - that the lowest recorded punctuality performance would justify the maximum penalty but this would likely be reduced on account of the higher punctuality recorded by the operator and observed through BODS. Each of the findings are imperfect – the DVSA sample is small and offers a snapshot only, but it is an external and independent assessment which is an important feature. In my opinion it offers an insight which is closest to what members of the public would experience and for that reason it carries appropriate weight. Conversely, the BODS and Ticketer reports require accurate inputs which I’m not satisfied were fully complied with by the operator, but they do provide a wider range of data. Regardless, all three conclude that punctuality rates are well below the 95% level and the imposing of a financial penalty under Section 155 of the Traffic Act 2000 is therefore appropriate.

Financial Standing

The operator no longer satisfies the requirement to be of the appropriate financial standing.

DECISION

Punctuality Performance

On consideration of the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s starting points and considering that the evidence places punctuality performance within a range of 59% to 87%, I find that a penalty of £350 per authorised vehicle is justified and proportionate in the circumstances. As Henry Hulley & Sons Ltd is currently authorised for 19 vehicles I set the penalty at £6,650.

I note that the business is currently in liquidation, and I am mindful of the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s direction at paragraph 39 of Statutory Document 14 which reminds us that the objective of imposing penalties is to “focus minds so as to achieve the statutory purpose”. What, therefore, can be achieved by the imposition of a penalty? I consider, firstly, that the licence holding company is not yet dissolved and ought, therefore, to be treated as any company that, for now, formally exists; and secondly that the imposition of a penalty acts also as a deterrent to other operators. To quote paragraph 14 of 2007/459 KDL European Ltd:

“we are satisfied of the need “to make an example of the operator so as to send a warning to the industry as a whole”. This is consistent with the approach by the five-judge Court of Session in the Thomas Muir case where deterrence is expressly mentioned (“in particular for the purpose of deterring the operator or other persons from failing to carry out their responsibilities under the legislation”). This is not by way of punishment per se but, as Lord Cullen said, is “in order to assist in the achievement of the purpose of the legislation”.

Requirements to hold a Public Service Operator’s Licence

I go on to make the following adverse findings under provision of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981

  • Section 17 (1)(a) – That the operator no longer satisfies the requirement to be of good repute.

  • Section 17 (1)(a) – That the operator no longer satisfies the requirement to be of the appropriate financial standing.

  • Section 17(3)(a) – That the operator made a statement of fact which was false, or expectation has not been fulfilled namely that maintenance inspections would be completed at six-weekly intervals.
  • Section 17(3)(aa) – That the operator has failed to ensure appropriate systems to ensure that vehicles, including hired vehicles, are kept in a fit and serviceable condition.
  • Section 17 (3)(b) - That there has been a contravention of any condition attached to the licence namely the requirement to notify the Traffic Commissioner within 28 days of a change to the directors.

On review of the guidance provided by the Senior Traffic Commissioner on starting points for regulatory action, as set out at Annex 4 of Statutory Document 10, I place this case within the category of “Severe to Serious”. There are persistent operator licence failures with an inadequate response.

I consider the question posed by the Upper Tribunal in 2009/225 Priority Freight namely: how likely is it that this operator will, in future, operate in compliance with the operator’s licensing regime? I answer in the negative. The evidence before me in respect of this operator, and its director Mr. Crofts, leads me to conclude, regardless of the ongoing insolvency, that this is not an operator who can so comply.

I go on to consider the question posed by the Upper Tribunal in 2002/217 Bryan Haulage namely, is the conduct such that the operator ought to be put out of business? I answer this in the positive. The negative features of this case are well laid out above and whilst there are positive features these are undone by the breach of trust created by the omission of important information during the course of the inquiry about the changes to directors.

I therefore make a direction that this licence be revoked with immediate effect. I find that immediate revocation is justified and proportionate as it will not affect lawful operations due to the business not currently trading.

Disqualification

This is a serious case showing persistent operator licence failures with inadequate response. Having revoked the licence and found that the good repute of the operator is lost, I consider whether disqualification is appropriate. In respect of an operator or director the issue of disqualification is a discretionary matter. I am conscious of the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s guidance at paragraph 65 of Statutory Document 10 that such a direction is a potentially significant infringement of rights and should not be routinely ordered.  I must, however, balance this against the failings identified in this case and the loss of trust.

Despite the appointment and resignation of Mr. Smales, I am satisfied that – but for a short period of illness – Mr. Crofts has been the controlling mind of the business. He spoke at length about his varied responsibilities and discussed how he felt unable to complete the job and made the decision to close the business. I had been asked to make a distinction between Mr. Crofts as transport manager and Mr. Crofts as director – noting that the substantive failings resulted from Mr. Crofts’ director responsibilities. It was those failings of Mr. Crofts which resulted in the licence holding company failing to meet its obligations.

Accordingly, I make no distinction between the failings of Henry Hulley & Sons Ltd, and Mr. Crofts as its sole director. I have lost trust in them both and find that a period of reflection and learning is appropriate. I therefore disqualify both from holding or obtaining an operator’s licence for a period of 24 months. This sits in the midrange of a disqualification period following an operator’s first public inquiry, as set out by the Senior Traffic Commissioner at paragraph 108 of Statutory Document 10  

For the avoidance of doubt, I do make the distinction between Mr. Crofts’s conduct as director, and his conduct as transport manager. As such I find that this disqualification as a director does not extend to his role as a transport manager. His good repute as transport manager is severely tarnished, but not lost.

David Mullan

Traffic Commissioner for the North West of England

23 June 2025

Updates to this page

Published 14 August 2025