Decision for Dolphin Autos (Norwich) Ltd T/A Dolphin Travel (PF0000185) and Joshua Hall (Transport Manager)
Written confirmation of the decision of the Traffic Commissioner for the East of England for Dolphin Autos (Norwich) Ltd T/A Dolphin Travel (PF0000185) and Joshua Hall (Transport Manager)
IN THE EASTERN TRAFFIC AREA
DOLPHIN AUTOS (NORWICH) LTD t/a DOLPHIN TRAVEL – PF0000185
AND
JOSHUA HALL – TRANSPORT MANAGER
CONFIRMATION OF THE TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Background
Dolphin Autos (Norwich) Ltd holds a Standard National Public Service Vehicle Operator’s Licence authorising 40 vehicles. The Directors are Constance Maude Cooke, Melvyn Cooke, and Deborah Cooke. Joshua Hall has been the Transport Manager since 15 February 2024.
There is one Operating Centre at 2 Swanton Road, Norwich NR2 4LR. Preventative Maintenance Inspections are said to be carried out in house at 6-weekly intervals.
The licence is subject to various restrictions on the operation of small vehicles, which were offered at grant and requirements for regular brake testing and to have updated the Driver Handbook.
This licence commenced on 26 January 1995. As the additional requirements suggest, this is not the first regulatory intervention, with a Public Inquiry in 2003. A warning letter was issued in September 2009 referring to Prohibition Notices. A variation application to increase authority to 45 vehicles was granted on 2 February 2017, a further increase to 50 vehicles was granted on 29 July 2019, and again to 56 vehicles on 22 September 2020. Megan Cooke had been appointed as a Transport Manager from 6 February 2018. Alan Wells joined her from 22 September 2020. He was removed on 23 March 2021, after the appointment of Danny Eastland on 19 March 2021.
The operator was called to a Preliminary Hearing on 5 May 2022 following the issue of an S marked prohibition, when CUE 70 was presented for annual test on 10 August 2021. A Vehicle Examiner then visited and issued 3 roadworthiness Prohibitions (2 were cleared on the day) and he noted that driver detectable defects identified on inspection had not been reported by drivers, some inspection records were not signed off, tyre records had not been completed and the type of brake test not reported. Deputy Traffic Commissioner, Mr Baker was persuaded to issue a warning to the operator and Transport Managers upon receipt of an undertaking for an independent compliance audit. That was completed in October 2022 and reported that some inspection intervals had been extended and that there was a high level of driver detectable defects identified at most inspections. The operator agreed to have a follow up audit carried out in May 2023. That audit received in May 2023 apparently disclosed several unsatisfactory areas within maintenance systems, records and driver defect reporting. A DVSA investigation was requested.
Megan Cooke was removed from the licence on 31 July 2023. Around that time, the operator sought to voluntarily reduce the licence authorisation from 56 vehicles to the current level of 40 vehicles. The licence was curtailed by me at Public Inquiry on 23 October 2023 having taken account of the Examiner’s positive comments, and the improvements to date, but also the need to ensure action in respect of brake testing and driver defect reporting. I accepted undertakings, as above, and made clear that the operator should expect more significant intervention if there were further reports of non-compliance. I recorded detailed findings to assist. Ms Cooke failed to attend the hearing. Danny Eastland was removed from the licence on 1 March 2024 after Mr Hall’s appointment on 15 February 2024.
Hearing
The Public Inquiry was listed for today, 23 September 2025, in Tribunal Room 1 of the Office of the Traffic Commissioner in Cambridge. The operator was present in the form of Mr Cooke, Director, accompanied by a Mr Maryon, described as the general manager, and Ms Cooke, who lost her repute as Transport Manager, when she failed to appear at the last Public Inquiry. Mr Hall was also in attendance.
Issues
The public inquiry was called following notice that I was considering grounds to intervene in respect of this licence and specifically by reference to the following sections of the Public Passenger Vehicle Act 1981:
- 17(3)(a) – statements regarding inspection intervals and to comply with conditions on the licence.
- 17(3)(aa) – undertakings (vehicles to be kept fit and serviceable; to employ an effective written driver defect reporting system, to retain full maintenance records for the required period).
- 17(3)(b) – conditions on the licence to notify any occurrences which affect the ability to hold the licence, including professional competence.
- 17(3)(c) – Prohibition Notices.
- 17(3)(e) – Material Change:
- 17(1)(a) –good repute, financial standing and professional competence,
- section 28 of the Transport Act 1985 – Disqualification.
Section 28 Transport Act –disqualification.
Mr Hall was called separately to consider whether he had exercised effective and continuous management and therefore whether I should make a direction in respect of his repute under Section 17(1)(b) and Schedule.
The operator was directed to lodge evidence in support, including financial, maintenance and other compliance documentation. The latter documentation was to be with DVSA for analysis by 2 September 2025, with the remaining financial evidence and any representations to be with my office by 9 September 2025. I noted that one of the drivers was sponsored for racing.
Summary of Evidence
DVSA carried out a maintenance investigation on 13 May 2024. Given the previous history, it was concerning to note Vehicle Examiner Penny’s findings, usefully summarised in the case summary:
- Not all sections of the Preventative Maintenance Inspection records were completed, although improvement was noted on the more recent records; some Preventative Maintenance Inspections were conducted late with no VOR marking; incorrect brake results were recorded on some records.
- poor annual test history with some failure items which appeared to be driver reportable. 38 tests were referred to resulting in 27 passes, 5 after rectification and 6 final failures, giving a final failure rate of 15.79%. Failures referred to diverse components including brake systems, suspension, steering, condition of chassis, windscreen, wipers and washers, headlamp aim, lamps, indicators and hazards, seat belts and restraints, interior of body/passenger entrances and exit.
- There was still no vehicle emission management in place, with an absence of monitoring of Adblue usage. Only a small percentage of vehicles had Adblue systems fitted as the fleet is mainly older second-hand buses and coaches of over 12 years old in addition to 8 and 16 seat minibuses.
- The wheel and tyre management showed a marked improvement, but the operator was still required to ensure the use of wheel tags by the tyre contractor and retained in the vehicle files.
- Public Service Vehicle Accessibility Regulations compliance was found to be unsatisfactory. Training was said to have been provided to certain drivers but there was no record, or any written instructions in place.
- Reference was made to a further Prohibition Notice which was issued to AJZ 3440 at a spot check in Great Yarmouth on 10 May 2024. A number of defects were identified including the steering mechanism (two seized track rod end joints, inspected on 22 April 2024) and insecure body panel, defective lamps etc raising questions about the driver defect reporting. I was told that the driver had been dismissed.
The Examiner noted that “On my visit to the Operator on the 13/05/2024, the operator made available to me an inspection bay & other staff to assist with inspections of the fleet, also fully cooperative throughout my visit providing office space to check records etc. There has been a change in Transport Managers since my last visit with Joshua Hall taking over from Danny Eastland, Danny still working at the operator & assisting Joshua on a daily basis. The operator has & is in the process of bringing in more systems electronically, the transport office is now in a new building with all vehicles having a separate file & others records planners etc in a well organised manner. Areas of concerns are various PMI’s exceeding the 42 day set period & it’s MOT test final failure rate twice the National average, another concern is driver related defects at PMI’s, audits were stated as being carried out but no documentary evidence could be produced. From the part 2 of the MIVR response it shows issues will systems & staff. Since the new Transport manager has been in post he is going through all systems & procedures to get the operator fully compliant, from what has been seen on my visit & the willingness to take onboard advise, compliance should continue to improve, but the operator must be stringent with it audits & systems, especially Driver checks”. Mr Eastland had now left his position.
DVSA therefore decided to delay immediate action and to complete a desk-based assessment (DBA) in 6 months. DVSA’s Remote Enforcement Office duly commenced that exercise. The process dated 21 May 2025, suggested unsatisfactory compliance by the operator, summarised as follows:
- Inspection / maintenance records (unsatisfactory) – incomplete or missing inspection records. CN07 KZR had no records after 8 January 2025 (apparently after a faulty gearbox but no VOR form was produced), and the Examiner also noted use of incorrect brake code. In evidence I referred to the previous Public Inquiry. I was assured that the members of staff who used the wrong DTp codes was now closely supervised.
- PSV incident reporting did not fully meet the requirements.
- occasional instances of driver reportable defects being left to Preventative Maintenance Inspections to record, several defect rectification reports with no associated defect report.
- occasional non-safety critical defect failures, with no evidence of a pre-check prior to annual test. Annual test failure of CUE70 on 29 October 2024 for IM5. The operator apparently provided a report on this test failure, but it was inconclusive suggesting either faulty test equipment or an intermittent fault at the time. The operator did not evidence if additional testing had been carried out to ensure the vehicle remains compliant. The operator stated that an emissions test could not be carried out prior to test.
- Some evidence provided of vehicle emission management, but further improvements required.
- Wheel and tyre management found to still be ineffective.
Mr Hall responded to the assessment and indicated that drivers monitor exhaust fumes daily and that vehicles are subject to a smoke emissions test twice a year. He referred to leaks and defects being the subject of Preventative Maintenance Inspections as is Adblue consumption with a record of usage logged. Staff are regularly spoken to remind them of observing smoking vehicles. He indicated that he engages with the driver once a vehicle has returned from annual test to discuss how any defect was caused and the reasons for any failure. A meeting is then arranged with the maintenance provider to discuss how defects can be avoided in future. He carried out an investigation into the failure of CUE 70 on 29 October 2024 but concluded that no-one was at fault. Going forward, if a smoke reading is unavailable at Volvo Bus and Truck, a separate independent centre must be sought. I was told that it is produced for a voluntary check immediately prior to annual test
I referred to the supplementary report prepared by the DVSA Remote Enforcement Office and based on the documentations lodged by the operator in pursuance of the case management directions. 10 Preventative Maintenance Inspection reports were assessed. It was noted that there were still some minor shortcomings with advice given to clarify the details of any reported defect (example given referred to seatbelts) and detailed recording of the rectification (example given of CN07 KZR chip in window). The Preventative Maintenance Inspection record should reflect the condition of the vehicle as presented for inspection (example given of SF63 CSV which recorded the tyre tread depth only after repair. The checklist should represent the vehicle inspected and items not applicable (example given of CN07 KZR) and the updated declaration must align with the Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness, to confirm the rectification of all defects.
The operator provided evidence of a wheel security system with records of initial torque and re-torque carried out following wheel removal. The operator also provided evidence of torque and re-torque carried out at Preventative Maintenance Inspections when wheels do not appear to have been removed. The operator has been advised to adopt a single torque check where wheels have not been removed. The report confirmed the effectiveness of forward planning with the SIPCAT report showing inspections carried out on time although with continuing weaknesses in the driver defect reporting. No driver defect reports were provided, but evidence of the repair of defects was seen. The report notes that several defects were identified at safety inspections without accompanying driver defect reports. There is no evidence these defects had been investigated by the operator.
I was therefore interested to read the update report prepared by Vehicle Examiner Neil Ridge based on the documentation supplied:
- CN07 KZR – 2 x Preventative Maintenance Inspection reports, 2 x roller brake test printout, 2 x defect rectification reports, 2 x record of re/torque at safety inspection (No wheels removed).
- SN06 BOH – 3 x Preventative Maintenance Inspection reports, 3 x roller brake test printout, 1 x record of re/torque at safety inspection (axle 1 wheels removed), 2 x record of re/torque at safety inspection (No wheels removed), 1 x record of re/torque (offside rear only).
- SF63 CSV – 2 x Preventative Maintenance Inspection reports, 2 x roller brake test printout, 1 x record of re/torque and retorque at safety inspection (axle 1 nearside and axle 2 offside wheels removed), 1 x record of re/torque at safety inspection (No wheels removed).
- SP55 EEF – 3 x Preventative Maintenance Inspection reports, 3 x roller brake test printout, 1 x defect rectification report, 2 x record of re/torque at safety inspection (No wheels removed), 1 x record of re/torque at safety inspection (axle 2 nearside wheels removed).
- Forward Planner (suitable) with VOR record for SP55 EEF and SN06 BOH.
However, whilst there was evidence of repairs/rectification, no driver defect reports were provided. The Examiner noted that, whilst driver detectable defects had been identified at Preventative Maintenance Inspections, there was no evidence these defects have been investigated by the operator.
The Examiner recorded that there was evidence of a wheel security system with records of initial torque and re-torque carried out following wheel removal. The operator also provided evidence of torque and re-torque carried out during Preventative Maintenance Inspections and advised that a single torque check where wheels have not been removed to avoid the risk of over-torquing.
Determination
Based on the evidence summarised above, I was satisfied that I should record adverse findings under the following sections of the Act: 17(3)(a) – statements regarding inspection intervals and to comply with conditions on the licence, now rectified; 17(3)(aa) – undertakings – vehicles to be kept fit and serviceable; to employ an effective written driver defect reporting system, to retain full maintenance records for the required period, (I noted the improved record keeping, but further detail is required on the inspection record and annual test pass rate, although driver defect reporting remains a threat to continued compliance; 17(3)(c) – Prohibition Notices, further illustrating the issues with driver defect reporting.
The Examiner recorded, and I noted the significant improvements in areas of previous non-compliance. The adverse findings were mainly concerned with historic reports. However, an area of concern remained, namely the driver defect reporting, where driver-detectable defects were not being identified by drivers but later picked during Preventative Maintenance Inspections. The operator now relies on an app, but the system needs to be auditable. Frankly, given the age of the vehicles, the number of defects recorded did not appear to be consistent. I was told that steps had been taken by Mr Hall to address these concerns. One driver had been given a verbal warning following DVSA intervention. I was told that the operator had addressed additional spot checks. It is regrettable that Mr Hall did not think to bring that evidence to the Public Inquiry, although I noted the considerable improvements in systems such as emissions management and wheel security. I was also told that the drivers undertake two walk rounds per day. Again, I regret that this was not reflected in the records produced. Much was made in representations from Mr Martin about the additional requirements of running school routes and the narrow margins involved. That is the operator’s business model and older vehicles are devoted to this type of work. It is for the operator to adopt control measures which are appropriate to the risks involved. I was shown pictures of the trees and vegetation along the routes. That would suggest the need for driver defect reporting systems which are tailored to address heightened risks, instead of leaving a further check to the end of the day.
I sought additional reassurances from the operator and was given the following undertakings:
- all regular drivers will complete a Driver Certificate of Professional Competence module to include driver defect reporting buy 31 October 2025.
- to identify an independent body to carry out an audit to assess the systems for complying with maintenance and drivers’ hours requirements, and the effectiveness with which those systems are implemented, including driver defect reporting. The audit should cover at least the applicable elements detailed in the guidance on Operator Compliance Audits available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/operator-compliance-audits. A copy of the report together with the operator’s detailed proposals for implementing the report’s recommendations is to be sent to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner in Cambridge within 6 months of the Public Inquiry together with its response to any recommendations.
I weighed those undertakings together with the improved annual test pass rate, improvements in other systems into the balance. This was not the operator’s first Public Inquiry. The regular changes in Transport Manager did not appear to have assisted in bedding in new systems. I was assured that the operator had found the right person now. In that context I concluded that the answer to the question posed by the Upper Tribunal in 2009/225 Priority Freight, namely, “how likely that operator will comply in future” was more positive. However, there were still improvements to be made, and Mr Hall received a warning to that effect. The operator has presented a positive response each time there is contact by DVSA or this office, but it should not have taken this number of interventions to reach the current position, with further improvements to be made. As the Upper Tribunal confirmed in 2019/025 John Stuart Strachan t/a Strachan Haulage: “one of the aims of the regime is deterrence, both for the appellant and for operators as a whole, who might be tempted to flout the system”. In this case I deemed it necessary to spur the operator on to complete those actions and achieve the basic level of compliance required under the operator licensing regime.
I took account of the potential impact on the business and the potential impact on its ability to meet commitments, most notable the school contract work. I therefore imposed a condition, in effect curtailing the operator’s licence by 6 vehicles, to a total authority of 34 vehicles. The remaining discs must be returned to this office within 7 days of this decision. Its repute remains tarnished.
R Turfitt
Traffic Commissioner
23 September 2025