Decision for CR STEEL CONSTUCTION LIMITED (OD2036932)

Written decision of the Deputy Traffic Commissioner in the West Midlands for CR STEEL CONSTUCTION LIMITED

• From: Traffic Commissioners for Great Britain
• Published: 1 May 2026

• Subject: HGV operator
• Region: West Midlands
• Case type: Regulatory
• Regulatory decision: Licence holder disqualified and Licence revoked
• Published: 19 March 2026

IN THE WEST MIDLANDS TRAFFIC AREA

CR STEEL CONSTUCTION LIMITED - OD2036932

DECISION OF DEPUTY TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER G. PENGELLY

DECISION

My decisions are:

The operator licence is REVOKED pursuant to section 26(1)(h) of the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 (“the 1995 Act”) (change of circumstances - operator not fit), section 26(1)(e) (statements made on application false), section 26(1)(f) (breach of undertakings);

All orders for revocation will take effect from 06.04.26 at 23:45;

I make no order under section 28 against the operator itself;

One of the operator’s directors, Mr. Ridgewell, is DISQUALIFIED from:

• Holding or obtaining any type of operator’s licence;

• Being a director of, or holding a controlling interest in, any company that holds or applies to obtain any type of operator’s licence;

• Being a director of, or holding a controlling interest in, any company that is a subsidiary of any company that holds or applies to obtain any type of operator’s licence;

• Being a partner in any partnership that holds or applies to obtain any type of operator’s licence;

In any traffic area in Great Britain

These orders of disqualification are made under section 28 of the 1995 Act and start at 23:45 hours on 06.04.26 and end at 23:45 on 06.04.27 – it is a TWELVE-MONTH order.

Background

This was a public inquiry (“PI”) concerning CR Steel Construction Limited (“the operator”).

The operator holds a restricted goods vehicle licence that was issued in this Traffic Area on 07.11.20.

The operator is authorised to operate a single vehicle.

The operator was the subject of a DVSA maintenance inspection visit on 26.08.25; that visit was triggered by a prohibition issued on 31.07.25 at Northampton in respect of a vehicle the operator formerly owned. This operator’s disc was inexplicably left in the window of the other operator’s vehicle.

Whilst it was the above that generated the DVSA’s visit, the prohibition issued in respect of that vehicle is not something that this PI has concerned. This PI has largely centred around the findings of the maintenance inspection visit report (“MIVR”) dated 11.09.25 following the visit to this operator on 26.08.25 by DVSA Vehicle Examiner (“VE”) Hopwood.

The Call to Public Inquiry

The call-up letter was dated 22.01.26.

The letter listed several issues, the principal of which were:

That statements made on the original application for the licence were false (section 26(1)(e)), i.e. that vehicles would be inspected every six weeks;

That undertakings on the licence had not been honoured (section 26(1)(f)), namely:

• Keeping vehicles in a fit and serviceable condition;
• That driver defect reports (“DDRs”) records would be kept for 15months and be made available on request;
• That the drivers would promptly report defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and that any defects would be promptly recorded in writing; and
• That the Traffic Commissioner would be informed of any change in circumstances; and

That there had been a material change of circumstances, namely whether the operator was fit to hold a licence (section 26(1)(h)).

The Public Inquiry

The PI took place at the Office of the Traffic Commissioner in Birmingham on 05.03.26.

Mr. Craig Ridgewell, one of the operator’s directors, was present and fully participated.

The Evidence

I had fully read and considered the bundle in advance of the PI.

Before the PI began, I confirmed with Mr. Ridgewell that no material challenge was made to the contents of the various reports in the bundle.

Mr. Ridgewell was a little hesitant in confirming that at the outset of the PI; it became clear, however, that there was no material challenge to that evidence on the principal issues (paragraph eight, above).

Before the PI, I was made aware that certain materials (DDRs, torque records, etc.) had been sent by the operator to VE Hopwood after the deadline set in the directions issued on 22.01.26.

Before the PI, I indicated to the Traffic Area’s administrative staff that such evidence should be uploaded to the digital system, and thus put in the bundle for the PI, despite their lateness.

I heard detailed evidence from Mr. Ridgewell during the PI.

Findings of fact

The burden of proof is on the DVSA in respect of any of the allegations it makes – the operator does not have to prove anything. The standard of proof is the civil standard: where I am satisfied that something is more likely than not to have happened, then my duty is to find that matter ‘proved’; where I am not satisfied that something is more likely than not to have happened, my duty is to find the matter ‘not proved’.

I found the following facts proved to the required standard:

The operator failed to notify the Traffic Commissioner that there had been a change in the ownership of the operator when Katrina Ridgewell became a person of significant control in 2022; further, the operator failed to notify the Traffic Commissioner that Ms. Ridgewell had always, in fact, been a director of the operator from the start of the licence. Ms. Ridgewell became a director of the operator on 24.12.20;

In the period March 2024 to July 2025, the operator’s single vehicle was not going for its preventative maintenance inspections (“PMIs”) at the intervals specified on the licence; rather than going every 42 days (which was the interval at that time), it was going – in some cases – after 95, 120, and 287 days. Mr. Ridgewell’s case on that was that the vehicle had been used minimally at the time of those very large intervals; I rejected his case for two reasons:

• Mr. Ridgewell accepted in evidence there was no vehicle off-road (“VOR”) record-keeping system for the operator as at August 2025; accordingly, I could not see any records addressing whether the vehicle was VOR at any of the pertinent times for those large interval periods historically; and

• Comparing the mileages from the only 2024 PMI sheet in the bundle (June 2024, page 55) and the mileage as at April 2025 (page 117), the vehicle moved some 3,577km (2,223 miles) over a period of around ten months. This was not that different from the figure in the period April 2025 to January 2026 (see paragraph 18(j), below).

I accordingly reject Mr. Ridgewell’s case that ‘minimal use’ or the vehicle’s being ‘off-road’ were good reasons for not sending it to its PMIs;

• In August 2025, when VE Hopwood asked to see the DDR record sheets, they could not be produced on request because they were missing. One of the DDR books comprising those records was subsequently found under the driver’s seat; a previous DDR book was water damaged. It follows that, before August 2025, the DDR recording system was not a system that was operating effectively in the sense of there being durable records that could be made available on request. The specific undertaking on the licence that such records be “kept” for at least 15 months and “made available on request” was therefore breached in the buildup to August 2025;

• As at August 2025, there was a 50% MOT fail rate for this operator. I accept that there were only two MOT inspections totally for that vehicle with this operator at that time. Issues identified at the failed MOT on 18.03.24 were safety-critical issues such as seat belts and steering. An MOT, of course, only ascertains whether a vehicle meets the minimum standards of roadworthiness on one day of the year known about in advance; it follows, therefore, that a failure of anything at MOT means that the operator’s vehicle was not roadworthy at the time of the inspection. The following findings flow from that:

It is more likely than not that the vehicle was in service in a non-roadworthy condition before it was presented for its MOT;

The operator’s PMIs, without other systems in place, were not sufficient to ensure the operator’s vehicle was roadworthy; indeed, there was a PMI only three days before the MOT but the vehicle still failed the latter (pages 32 and 52); and

Any pre-MOT inspection that was performed cannot have been effective;

• As at August 2025, there was no, or no effective, wheel or tyre management system in place with the operator. In his MIVR, VE Hopwood summarised the provisions of paragraphs 5.2 of the DVSA’s Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness concerning the system operators are supposed to have in respect of tyre management. In his MIVR, VE Hopwood also summarised the provisions of the Careless Torque Costs Lives publication (which has been in existence, in one form or another for 20 years and which operators are taken to know: see paragraph 32, below) concerning the systems that operators are supposed to have regarding wheel security. On the day of the MIVR, VE Hopwood issued an inspection notice in respect of the condition of a tyre on the vehicle – there was a “deep cut” to a tyre’s side wall requiring “early rectification” (page 59);
• The operator failed to comply with the 22.01.26 directions issued in advance of this PI to serve its latest DDR records on VE Hopwood so that he could analyse them and comment upon them in the preparation of his addendum report. Again, this is a breach of the undertaking given by the operator at the outset of the licence to provide these upon request (see sub-paragraph (c), above);
• After the MIVR, tyre cuts were repeatedly raised as an issue in DDRs from 12.09.25-23.01.26; there are eleven such DDRs in that period. At no stage in the DDR records is there any record of:

The operator’s assessment of the issue, applying its own judgement; or

Any action be taken.

• From Mr. Ridgewell’s evidence, he accepted that the operator’s conscious decision was that the reported defect did not require action to be taken until it was considered at the next PMI; at that time, PMIs were at 12-weekly intervals. The vehicle attended PMIs on both 22.10.25 and 14.01.26; it received ‘advisory’ faults for “cuts in tyres” on both occasions. There was no visit between those PMIs by a qualified tyre-fitter or mechanic engaged to assess or ‘monitor’ the issue;

• No wheel removal or re-torque records were sent to VE Hopwood because such work was only commissioned when it was felt to be necessary and, aside from one re-torque record dated 13.02.26, the operator never considered it to be necessary. In evidence before me and in their response to the MIVR, the operator believed that its wheel nut indicators were an effective way of monitoring issues of wheel security over time;
• Notwithstanding there being issues in respect of a headlight bulb and a pipe leaking being identified in the PMI of 14.01.26, there was no reference to either of these in the corresponding DDR dated 13.01.26;
• The operator lowered the frequency of the PMI intervals from six weeks to twelve weeks following VE Hopwood’s visit. The vehicle was first registered in 2005; it got older, not newer, as time went on. Between April 2025 and January 2026, the vehicle moved 3,204km (1,991 miles) – that does not evidence a particularly low level of use. Considering the terms of paragraph 4.2 of the Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness, the number of issues being raised at PMIs, and the operator’s reliance on the latter as its principal way of monitoring the vehicle’s roadworthiness (sub-paragraph (g), above), the twelve-weekly interval was not appropriate for this operator;
• The operator now has a wall-planner and is taking the vehicle to its PMIs on-time;
• The DDRs are now being regularly completed and sent to the operator;
• Mr. Ridgewell attended the PI and answered my questions fully and to the best of his ability.

Moving through each of the findings, I now explain – in respect of each sub-paragraph - the weight I have placed upon each matter:

• I place little weight on this factor because, whilst it is important that operator licence checks are done in respect of anyone financially involved in an operator, I am satisfied that Mr. Ridgewell did not do knowingly or deliberately fail to notify this matter or otherwise seek to mislead the Office of the Traffic Commissioner;
• I place some weight on this factor because:

Six-weekly intervals were the interval specified on the licence at the time and, given the age and use of the vehicle, I find that was likely the appropriate interval in 2024 (paragraph 18(b), above);

The intervals set out at paragraph 18(b) above were very large and vastly exceeded six-weekly intervals; and

Even after the MIVR, this operator relied heavily on its PMIs to identify and address routine maintenance issues (paragraph 18(g), above). I find there was likely such similar heavy reliance placed on the maintenance provider in 2024 too.

• The effect of these three points is that the operator’s principal mechanism for ensuring the safety of its vehicle, in the period March 2024 to July 2025 was sometimes used so infrequently that, during those periods, there must have been an ineffective maintenance system for this vehicle. It follows from that this  operator’s decisions put road safety at risk in those extended periods between PMIs in 2024 and 2025;
• I place significant weight on this factor. DDR records are essential in ensuring that an operator makes the most of their drivers as another set of ‘eyes and ears’ monitoring the condition of the operator’s vehicle. If DDRs are not regularly submitted and reviewed, then an operator is depriving themselves of an important part of any effective safety regime - drivers spend hours a day in an operator’s vehicle and are often those best-placed to notice issues. The existence of records means that continuous themes and issues can be more readily identified by the operator (paragraph 6.1 of the DVSA’s Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness). Further, the DDR book’s being unavailable deprived VE Hopwood of the opportunity to look through communications between the driver and the operator to see if that aspect of the operator’s safety and maintenance system was effective as of August 2025. This important undertaking on the licence exists:

To help the operator run its safety/maintenance system; and

To allow the regulatory agencies such as the DVSA (and, ultimately, the Traffic Commissioner), to see evidence of this important aspect of the operator’s safety regime easily;

• If the operator found the book after the August visit, it could have subsequently sent that to VE Hopwood as part of its response to the MIVR – the operator did not. This undertaking on the licence, solemnly given to the Traffic Commissioner when the licence was granted, was flouted by this operator in 2025; it is an undertaking ultimately designed to advance the objectives of road safety and to achieve fair competition between operators so that all operators compete on the equal footing that, whatever decisions they make take in their businesses, they never take their road safety and maintenance systems below the level of being safe and effective;
• I place significant weight on this factor. As stated above (paragraph 18(d)), an MOT is the only day of the year, known about in advance, where an operator must make sure that their vehicle meets the minimum standards of roadworthiness in Great Britain. For a vehicle to fail an MOT on road safety critical matters is of considerable concern; as I explained to Mr. Ridgewell in the PI, an MOT fail indicates the general ineffectiveness of the operator’s safety regime. Mr. Ridgewell appeared to believe that there was nothing at all surprising or significant about a ‘fail’ at MOT providing steps were taken to rectify the issue identified by the mechanic. Mr. Ridgewell did not accordingly take from VE Hopwood’s visit that what was needed was:

For the operator to be, itself, actively involved in understanding the risks posed by its vehicle;

For the operator to be ‘on top’ of, and anticipating, risks posed by the vehicle based on its past performance; and

For the operator to be planning a bespoke maintenance or safety system that appropriately addressed those risks.

• If Mr. Ridgewell had absorbed that learning then he would have understood why an MOT fail was an indicator of issues in his general safety/maintenance regime and not given the evidence he gave at the PI;
• I place significant weight on this factor. Effective tyre and wheel management is an important part of any safety regime for a goods vehicle. Insecure wheels or damaged tyres are frequent causes of some of the most serious incidents that happen every year involving heavy goods vehicles on our roads. The scale of injury that can be done if a wheel comes off a goods vehicle in use is significant. It was evident, from VE Hopwood’s inspection notice in August 2025, that this was an area where the operator’s maintenance regime was ineffective in August 2025. The operator’s lack of a proper tyre management system put road safety at risk in the buildup to August 2025;
• I place significant weight on this factor. Mr. Ridgewell confirmed to me that he did not check the outbox of his emails to make sure that the folder he sent Mr. Hopwood contained the material. This is the second time where a reasonable request has been made for DDR records by VE Hopwood and DDR records have not been supplied. Mr. Ridgewell’s attitude, in evidence, was poor – he sought to blame VE Hopwood for not telling him that the folder he sent had nothing in it. It is not incumbent on busy DVSA staff to chase operators for material that it is their responsibility to provide upon request; again, that requirement is, itself, an undertaking on this operator’s licence (paragraph eight-(b)(ii), above). By the time of the directions in January 2026, the importance of these records being made available to VE Hopewood cannot have been lost on Mr. Ridgewell or the operator. The operator’s failure to provide records to VE Hopwood means that I am left trying to assess how much progress this operator has made since August 2025 without VE Hopwood’s expert insight and assistance – as is clear from this decision, however, I have managed to digest many of these records for myself;
• I place very significant weight on this factor. By the time of all these DDRs, the operator had had VE Hopwood’s report. The operator knew what it had to do in terms of establishing an effective tyre management system and what that involved; to quote from VE Hopwood’s MIVR (page 35),

“The operator must have arrangements in place to ensure the vehicle tyres are legal, safe and effectively managed, vehicle tyres should be regularly and closely examined for damage and wear, with mechanisms in place to address any identified issues. Any system put in place by the operator is required to be fully documented” (emphasis added)

• The operator had had a clear ‘warning’ about this issue from the inspection notice dated 26.08.25. In its response to the MIVR, the operator promised,

“…we have an account with a Mobile HGV tyre company (Dawson Tyres)… any defects affecting the safety of the tyre will be picked up and the tyre replaced or repaired…” (emphasis added)

• There was no evidence at PI that such a contractor was engaged – no records were produced to VE Hopwood or myself. The effect of Mr. Ridgewell’s evidence was that nothing was done about tyre issues, aside from the driver/himself monitoring them, because Mr. Ridgewell/the operator thought it appropriate for the matter to wait for next PMI to receive advice from a trained mechanic there. The operator’s conscious decision to not engage a trained contractor to conduct routine checks, or to seek advice from such a contractor when these issues arose between PMIs, put road safety at risk and allowed this operator to undercut other operators who took their responsibilities under their licences seriously;
• I place significant weight on this factor. Again, VE Hopwood clearly explained what the operator needed to do in his MIVR. It would have been clear to the operator after the MIVR, that checking a wheel nut indicator every morning with the naked eye would not be a satisfactory maintenance system in respect of wheel security. Wheel fixings should have been checked regularly, with the right equipment, and by someone who was trained to identify and monitor issues. The operator chose not to implement a proper system after August 2025 knowing that that was required; such a decision put road safety at risk and undercut other operators who took their responsibilities seriously;
• I place little weight on this factor. It is simply one illustration of an instance where driver walkaround checks appear to have been ineffective;
• I place significant weight on this factor. This was a vehicle first registered in 2005 – it is over 20 years old. A six-weekly inspection interval was far more appropriate to it. Lowering the frequency of inspections to twelve-weekly, when the vehicle got older, was inappropriate. Given the operator’s reliance on PMIs to identify and monitor routine issues (paragraphs 18-19(g), above), the reduction in interval frequency put road safety at risk and undercut other operators who took their responsibilities seriously;
• I place little weight on this factor. The wall planner sets out inspection intervals that are too infrequent and the PMIs are being used as a way of monitoring issues in respect of roadworthiness rather than the operator on a day-to-day level;
• I place some weight on this factor. The driver is plainly now participating in the operator’s safety regime. I cannot place greater weight on this factor because there is no evidence of the operator taking appropriate steps to assess reported issues for itself and to take steps, before PMI, to address the issues identified;
• I place some weight on this factor. I would have placed greater weight on it, and felt more confident about this operator moving forwards, if Mr. Ridgwell had not sought to minimise the seriousness of the matters in front of me at the PI by:

Suggesting that PMIs were an appropriate way of monitoring longstanding issues (paragraphs 18-19(g), above);

Suggesting it was unnecessary for him to engage tyre or wheel management company to attend regularly to check the lorry’s tyres and wheels (paragraphs 18-19(g), above);

Implying an MOT fail was not a significant cause for concern (paragraph 19(d)); and

Seeking to blame VE Hopwood for not receiving a folder full of records he did not attach (paragraph 19(f), above).

I recognise that appearing at a PI is a stressful experience; I made appropriate allowance for that when I assessed Mr. Ridgewell’s evidence.

I reserved my decision in this case because I wanted to reflect carefully on all the evidence I heard and read.

Findings regarding breaches of the legislation

As a result of the above findings of fact, I find that the operator has fallen foul of the following provisions of the statutory scheme:

That statements made on the original application for the licence were false (section 26(1)(e)), i.e. that vehicles would be inspected every six weeks;

That undertakings on the licence have not been honoured (section 26(1)(f)), namely:

• Keeping vehicles in a fit and serviceable condition;
• That, “Records are kept (for 15 months) of all driver defect reports, all safety inspections, routine maintenance and repairs to vehicles and trailers and these are made available on request”;
• That the Traffic Commissioner would be informed of any change in circumstances (co-director not originally put on the licence and she became a person with a significant interest in the company);

That there had been a material change of circumstances, namely whether the operator was fit to hold a licence (section 26(1)(h)).

Balancing Exercise

I repeat all my findings in this case, including the evidential weight I have attached to each one, to assess the operator as it appeared before me at the date of the PI.

Having carefully balanced the evidential weight I have given for all the positive findings in this case against the evidential weight I have given for all the negative findings (paragraphs 19, above) I have determined that balance tips firmly in favour of the negative findings.

I now go on to consider Annexe Four of Statutory Document Ten issued by the Senior Traffic Commissioner.

Relevant Considerations

I am satisfied that the following ‘negative’ factors apply to this case:

• There were reckless acts that led to an undue risk to road safety (paragraphs 16 and 19(c), (e) (g)-(h), (j), above);
• There was ineffective management control and insufficient systems/procedures in place to prevent operator compliance failings (paragraphs 19(b)-(i), above);
• There was insufficient change made between the MIVR and the PI (paragraph 18 and 19(f)-(l), above);
• There was, historically, a low average first time pass rate or multiple fail items at MOT (paragraph 18 and 19(d), above);

None of the ‘positive’ factors in Annexe Four applied squarely to this case. I gave some credit for evidence of a number of DDRs that were, with one exception, of a reasonable quality (paragraphs 18 and 19(l)).

I place this operator’s conduct in the ‘severe’ category of Annexe Four.

In my view, this is a case where the operator’s reckless acts compromised road safety and gave the operator a clear commercial advantage. The key issues in this case were:

• The operator’s and Mr. Ridgewell’s lack of knowledge of the obligations that came with holding a goods vehicle licence in the first place; and
• Following VE Hopwood’s visit, the operator’s and Mr. Ridgewell’s refusal to play any real part in creating and implementing a comprehensive, effective, day-to-day safety/maintenance regime that monitored and addressed risk between PMIs.

The regime that exists in respect of the maintenance of a goods vehicle under an operator’s licence is nothing like the regime that exists for someone who owns a private car. A single, annual MOT - where the owner is given a list of tasks to make their vehicle roadworthy again - may be acceptable to a car owner. The holders of goods vehicle licences must develop a system for maintaining and monitoring roadworthiness, including through appropriately-frequent PMIs, DDRs, a day-to-day system for checking/monitoring wheel security, tyres, an MOT, etc. The reasons why the obligations of holding a goods vehicle licence are so onerous is because:

• So much more harm can be done to other road users by drivers of goods vehicles than by drivers of cars; and
• Because important decisions about the operation of goods vehicles, unlike cars, are often made by people who do not drive them.

Lorries can only operate on our roads if operators sign up to, and then fulfil, an onerous and detailed set of conditions and undertakings.

The detail of what an effective maintenance regime involves is described in the DVSA’s Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness.

As the Upper Tribunal held in the appeal case of T/2012/30 MGM Haulage & Recycling Limited [2012] UKUT 346 (AAC), at [4], operators are taken to have read long-standing publications such as the Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness, Careless Torque Costs Lives, etc., issued to assist operators understand their obligations.

In any event, all holders of a restricted licence are deemed to know the basics of operator licensing; as the Upper Tribunal held in the appeal case of T/2014/24 LA & Z Leonida (t/a ETS), at [4],

• “…it does not matter whether an operator’s licence is held by an owner operator, a partnership or a limited company because in each case the person or persons responsible for managing the business bear the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the road transport aspect of the business operates in compliance with the regulatory regime.  That means that they cannot plead ignorance or put the blame on the transport manager because they are required to have sufficient knowledge of the regulatory regime to ensure compliance in general and the proper performance of the transport manager’s duties in particular” (emphasis added)

It was the Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness that VE Hopwood was relying on when he imparted all the advice he did to this operator in his report from the visit in August 2025.

This operator had a clear roadmap of what it had to do.

The safety regime that this operator should have been implementing should have involved:

A frequent PMI interval that was appropriate to the age of the vehicle being used;

Drivers submitting DDRs that were read, taken seriously, and acted upon by the operator’s directors;

A proper system for monitoring tyre treads and tyre safety over time, as well as a complementary system for monitoring wheel security too; and

An anxious, careful approach to maintenance issues to ensure that any issues raised or identified were swiftly resolved so that no or minimal risk was ever taken that imperilled road safety.

The operator knew all of this because, in terms, VE Hopwood told them in his MIVR.

The level of improvement between August 2025 and the date of this PI has been poor. The reason for that is because the operator’s and Mr. Ridgewell’s attitude were poor (paragraph 29(b), above); two examples:

• Promises were made about the introduction of a tyre maintenance system after the MIVR but never delivered (paragraph 19(g));
• Even after the MIVR, reliance was still being placed on increasingly infrequent (paragraphs 18-19(j), above) PMIs to monitor and identify routine maintenance issues, e.g. tyre wear (paragraph 18-19(g), above), wheel security (paragraph 18-19(h), above), etc.

In the appeal case of Arnold Transport & Sons Limited [2014] UKUT 162 (AAC) (“Arnold Transport”), at [13], providing guidance to Traffic Commissioners when considering an operator’s fitness at the end of a PI, the Upper Tribunal said,

• “It is… important for operators to understand… the old saying that: “actions speak louder than words” [applies in this context]. The attitude of an operator when something goes wrong can be very instructive.  Some recognise the problem at once and take immediate and effective steps to put matters right.  Others only recognise the problem when it is set out in a call-up letter and begin to put matters right in the period before the Public Inquiry takes place.  A third group leave it even later and come to the Public Inquiry with promises of action in the future.  A fourth group bury their heads in the sand and wait to be told what to do during the Public Inquiry… it seems clear that prompt and effective action is likely to be given greater weight than untested promises to put matters right in the future” (emphasis added)

In this case, the PI ended with Mr. Ridgewell saying – in terms – that he had learnt his lesson from the experience of this PI and would implement what he had learnt. Mr. Ridgewell, however, brought minimal tangible evidence of change with him to the PI room. Mr. Ridgewell accordingly fell somewhere between the third group and fourth group described by the Upper Tribunal in Arnold Transport.

In considering what weight I can give to Mr. Ridgewell and the operator’s assurances, any rational tribunal must look at the past - it is often the best guide to the future. The evidence of the historical attitude of the operator and Mr. Ridgewell (paragraphs 19(m), above), and of its more recent attitude (paragraph 37, above), mean that I can place no weight at all on this operator’s assurances at this PI.

I have never met Ms. Ridgewell so I cannot comment if she would be able to persuade me that she could turn this operator around; she has certainly not been effective in the past.

After repeating all my findings of fact set out at paragraphs 18 and 19, above, and reviewing my further analysis of them at paragraphs 29 and 37, I have decided that I cannot trust this operator to run a compliant operation. In consequence, I have decided that it is proportionate that I answer the question posed in the Upper Tribunal case of T/2009/225 Priority Freight – ‘is this an operator I can trust to be complaint in the future?’ - in the negative. In consequence of that finding, I determine that this operator is no longer fit to hold an operator’s licence.

Applying my analysis to the various factors I have set out above from Annexe Four of Statutory Document Ten (paragraphs 26-27), I conclude that the proportionate action I should take against this operator’s licence is to revoke it. I have also decided that I should give consideration as to whether the operator’s principal director, Mr. Ridgewell, should be disqualified.

Disqualification of Mr. Ridgewell

Statutory Document Ten, at [65] provides,

• “There may be cases in which the seriousness of the operator’s conduct is such that a traffic commissioner may properly consider that both revocation and disqualification are necessary for the purposes of enforcing the legislation. The provisions are in general terms, consistent with the concept of deterrence, but assessment of culpability and use of words such as penalty should be avoided. The case law indicates a general principle that at the time the disqualification order is made that the operator cannot be trusted to comply with the regulatory regime and that the objectives of the system, the protection of the public and fairness to other operators, requires that the operator be disqualified”

In respect of Mr. Ridgewell, I find that he:

• Was part of the operator’s conscious decision after the MIVR to leave issues of tyre wear between PMIs where the latter were then only being held at twelve-weekly intervals (paragraph 18(g). As I said at paragraph 19(g), above, that decision imperilled road safety and undermined fair competition between operators in the period August 2025 to the date of the PI;
• Was part of the operator’s decision to not create a proper system for checking and monitoring wheel security after he was informed as part of the MIVR that that was required (paragraph 18h). As I said at paragraph 19(h), that decision imperilled road safety and undermined fair competition between operators for the period from August 2025 to the date of the PI;
• Lacked a good reason for deciding, on behalf of the operator, not to send the vehicle for its six-weekly PMIs in 2024 and early/mid 2025 (paragraph 19(b)). As I explained above (paragraph 19(b)), that decision imperilled road safety between 2024 and early/mid 2025 and undermined fair competition between operators;
• Played a major part in the inappropriate decision to reduce the PMI interval to twelve-weekly intervals after the MIVR (paragraph 19(j), above). As I explained above (paragraph 19(j)), that decision imperilled road safety between August 2025 and the date of the PI and undermined fair competition between operators because it was an inappropriate interval;
• Failed to co-operate with the DVSA by providing the records by the required date; the latter failure to co-operate was then aggravated at the PI when Mr. Ridgewell sought to blame VE Hopwood for not chasing him (paragraph 19(f), above).

As the Transport Tribunal said in the appeal case of 2006/27 Fenlon (“Fenlon”), 

-“…trust is one of the foundation stones of operator licensing. Traffic, commissioners must be able to trust operators to comply with all the relevant laws, rules and regulations because it would be a physical and financial impossibility to police every aspect of the licensing system all day and every day. In addition, operators must be able to trust other operators to observe the relevant laws, rules and regulations. If trust between operators breaks down and some operators believe that others are obtaining an unfair commercial advantage by ignoring laws, rules or regulations then standards will inevitably slip and the public will suffer” (emphasis added)

I have also considered the other appeal cases about disqualification including 2018/072 St Mickalos Company Ltd & M Timinis and 2010/29 David Finch Haulage.

I cannot trust Mr. Ridgewell to comply with the regulatory regime that exists in respect of vehicle operators in Great Britain (paragraphs 44 and 46, above). That is because:

• As part of his directing this operator, he has persisted – over a substantial amount of time - in making decisions that imperilled road safety and undermined fair competition between operators (paragraphs 45(a)-(d), above). On the latter point, Mr. Ridgewell’s decisions to ‘cut corners’ and not implement a proper safety/maintenance regime meant that his particular operation’s standards fell well below the minimum set for all operators in this industry; and
• Mr. Ridgewell did not co-operate with the DVSA in making available critical documents that allow the DVSA and this industry’s regulator – the Traffic Commissioner – to properly discharge their functions on behalf of the public (paragraph 45(e), above).

The objectives of the legislation, to promote road safety and to preserve fair competition between operators, would be served by taking significant regulatory action in respect of Mr. Ridgewell.

Other operators, who invest significant time, effort, and money, to run safe and complaint operations, would lose confidence in the system of regulation we have in Great Britain if they were to learn that someone operating the way Mr. Ridgewell did could come before a Traffic Commissioner and not face significant regulatory action (paragraphs 44 and 46, above).

Repeating the above findings of fact at paragraph 45, I do consider that, in this case, I should take the further step – after having revoked the operator’s licence – of disqualifying Mr. Ridgewell from the industry (paragraph 44, above). For the reasons given at paragraph 47, I consider that to be a proportionate step that is required by the objectives of the legislation (paragraph 48, above).

I consider that twelve months is long enough for Mr. Ridgewell to reflect on the outcome of this PI but not so long that it means he should give up hope of being able to return to the industry.

I accordingly disqualify him for a period of twelve months.

Decision

My decisions are:

The operator licence is REVOKED pursuant to section 26(1)(h) of the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 (“the 1995 Act”) (change of circumstances - operator not fit), section 26(1)(e) (statements made on application false), section 26(1)(f) (breach of undertakings);

All orders for revocation will take effect from 06.04.26 at 23:45;

I make no order under section 28 against the operator itself;

One of the operator’s directors, Mr. Ridgewell, is DISQUALIFIED from:

• Holding or obtaining any type of operator’s licence;

• Being a director of, or holding a controlling interest in, any company that holds or applies to obtain any type of operator’s licence;

• Being a director of, or holding a controlling interest in, any company that is a subsidiary of any company that holds or applies to obtain any type of operator’s licence;

• Being a partner in any partnership that holds or applies to obtain any type of operator’s licence;

In any traffic area in Great Britain

These orders of disqualification are made under section 28 of the 1995 Act and start at 23:45 hours on 06.04.26 and end at 23:45 on 06.04.27 – it is a TWELVE-MONTH order.

G. Pengelly

Deputy Traffic Commissioner

19.03.26

Published 1 May 2026