Decision for CITY TRANSPORT OPERATIONS LTD (formerly A & A COACH TRAVEL LTD) (PB2024186)

Written decision of the Deputy Traffic Commissioner in the North East for City Transport Operations Ltd and transport manager Antoni La Pilusa

From:: Traffic Commissioners for Great Britain
Published:: 10 September 2026

Subject:: PSV operator and Transport manager
Region:: North East
Case type:: Regulatory
Regulatory decision:: Licence holder disqualified, Licence revoked, Loss of repute and Transport manager disqualified
Published:: 10 September 2026

IN THE NORTH EAST TRAFFIC AREA

DECISION

In the matter of the Transport Act 1985 (“the 1985 Act”) and Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (“the Act”)

CITY TRANSPORT OPERATIONS LTD (formerly A & A COACH TRAVEL LTD) -PB2024186

TRANSPORT MANAGER – ANTONI LA PILUSA

NOMINATED TRANSPORT MANAGER – JAMES FAIRCHILD

Decision

The operator’s licence PB2024186 is revoked with effect from 00.00 on 15th Sept. 2026 under section 17(1) & (2) of the Act.

The operator company is disqualified from holding or obtaining an operator’s licence for 18 months with effect from 00:00 hours on 15th September 2026 under section 28 of the 1985 Act.

The directors, Alexandra Cunningham and Antoni La Pilusa, are disqualified from holding or obtaining an operator’s licence for 18 months with effect from 00:00 hours on 15th September 2026 - sec.28 of the 1985 Act.

Antoni La Pilusa has lost his good repute as a transport manager and he is disqualified indefinitely from acting as a transport manager on any operator’s licence with effect from 00:00 hours on 15th September 2026 under para. 7B(2) of Schedule 3 of the Act.

Mr La Pilusa needs to re-take and obtain the TM CPC before acting as a TM again, as a formal rehabilitation measure under para. 7C(2) of Schedule 3 of the Act.

Background

Case called under Section 17 and Schedule 3 of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 and Sections 26 and 28 of the Transport Act 1985.

A&A Coach Travel Ltd was granted a Standard International Public Service Vehicle Operator’s Licence on 26 July 2019 with current authorisation for the use of 20 vehicles, with 12 vehicles currently in possession.

Alexandra Cunningham and Antoni La Pilusa were the directors listed on the licence at the commencement of the Public Inquiry (“PI”), with the addition of James Fairchild as a director at Companies House in late April 2026.

Antoni La Pilusa is the nominated internal Transport Manager (“TM”) listed on the licence, dedicating 40 hours per week to this role. James Fairchild was nominated as an additional TM on 2nd February 2026.

Propose to Revoke proceedings commenced against this licence on 2 June 2020 following the failure to provide adequate evidence of financial standing and the failure to provide an audit report in line with undertakings attached to the licence.

Following receipt of additional correspondence from the Operator and further evidence submitted (including the agreement to a further audit undertaking), the Propose to Revoke proceedings ceased on 22 June 2020.

This licence was called to a Public Inquiry on 12 December 2022 following an unsatisfactory Desk Based Assessment (June 2020) and Traffic Examiner Visit Report (May 2021), along with a further unsatisfactory maintenance investigation and bus monitoring exercise in June 2022.

At the Public Inquiry, Deputy Traffic Commissioner Mr. Evans curtailed the licence from 20 vehicles to 17 vehicles for a period of 11 weeks. The Operator, and Transport Manager, Antoni La Pilusa, were also issued with Formal Warnings, and a Period of Grace for the purposes of financial standing was granted for 4 months.

Maintenance Investigation Report - June 2023

On 24 April 2023, DVSA Vehicle Examiner, Paul Benson (“VE Benson”) conducted an unannounced visit to the Operator’s listed Operating Centre (OC) at HG3 1PW for the purposes of a maintenance investigation. The site manager stated that he was unable to access records and records were not received until 20th June 2023 after “several requests”.

VE Benson was unable to interview a Company representative during his investigation, Mr La Pilusa stating that he was “far too busy” on 2 separate dates in June 2023.

The completed Maintenance Investigation Visit Report (“MIVR”) was marked ‘Unsatisfactory – Report to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner (“OTC”)’ with the following shortcomings identified:

Serious incidents being hidden – No evidence of a PSV112, (notification of a serious incident) being used as required. A serious defect involving a nearside rear hub detachment on YU52 VYP on 16 April 2023 was not reported to DVSA
Clear evidence of vehicles used with reported safety defects – inoperative nearside indicator being reported prior to the vehicle entering service.
Prohibitions issued at this fleet check
Preventative maintenance records unsuitable, not properly completed, and, inspection intervals obviously not managed
No forward planning system in use
No robust VOR, vehicle off the road system, in place
No effectively managed safety defect and recall system in place
Driver walk round checks not being carried out effectively
No suitable system being used for drivers to report defects
Safety inspections not being carried out by the stated contractor/s and no evidence of relevant contracts
Examiner unable to establish contractor arrangements
No control system for emission control of vehicles
Ineffective wheel security systems
Insufficient evidence of disability awareness and training, vehicle security procedures and no suitable site security measures
Prohibitions issued to the operator during the required sample period demonstrate a weakness, or, a significant failing in the maintenance system.
Transport Manager/responsible person failed to demonstrate effective and continuous management control of the operation and lack of integrity –obstructing the investigation
No evidence of TM Continuous Professional Development.
VE Benson concludes, “this investigation has highlighted serious road safety complications”.

Antoni La Pilusa issued a response to VE Benson on 11 August 2023, informing of some serious personal circumstances which had resulted in a delay in responding to the MIVR findings. Mr. La Pilusa confirmed that a response would be submitted the next week. However, no response to the MIVR was received by VE Benson.

Traffic Examiner’s Drivers’ Hours Investigation – May to August 2023

On 9 May 2023, DVSA commenced an investigation into A&A Coach Travel Ltd (“the Operator”) to establish whether tachograph and drivers’ hours rules were being adhered to.

As a result, DVSA Traffic Examiner Colin Mawson (“TE Mawson”) requested the provision of relevant tachograph data so that analysis could be undertaken. TE Mawson identified several alleged instances of vehicles being driven with no driver cards inserted.

As a result, an additional request was sent to the Operator on 23 May 2023, requesting clarification as to who was driving each vehicle on the days where the alleged offences had occurred, and why this had happened. TE Mawson noted that a response was received from the Operator on 2 June 2023 informing him that the requested information was being prepared but that the person dealing with it was away.

A further Sec. 99ZA request for this information was issued by TE Mawson shortly after and delivered to the Operator’s premises on 6 June 2023. The Operator was given until 17 June 2023 to provide the information, but no further correspondence was forthcoming from the Operator.

An additional request was sent by TE Mawson on 21 June 2023, but once again no response was received. On 7 July 2023, TE Mawson issued a S99ZA letter to the Operator inviting Director, Alexandra Cunningham, to a voluntary interview at Walton Goods Vehicle Testing Station on 1 August 2023.

No response to this letter was received and nobody attended the interview on behalf of the Operator. A second request for an interview letter was sent by TE Mawson on 1 August 2023, with the same eventual outcome.

As a result, TE Mawson was unable to complete the investigation.

Formal Complaint Regarding Prohibition Notices Issued in April and May 2023

On 18 May 2023, the Operator issued a series of emails to DVSA appealing several Prohibition Notices issued to Company vehicles and lodging complaints about the conduct and actions of several investigation officers.

Upon receipt of the complaints, DVSA Vehicle Enforcement Manager Andrew Williams (“VEM Williams”) issued correspondence to the Operator on 22 May 2023.

In this correspondence, the Operator was informed that DVSA would investigate the complaints and were requested to provide permission for Antoni La Pilusa to speak on behalf of the Operator, details of the systems in place for vehicle maintenance and copies of the driver defect reports for the vehicles in question, along with the corresponding safety inspections and a copy of the forward planner.

A response to this correspondence was issued by Antoni La Pilusa on 23 May 2023, Mr La Pilusa stating that he did not see why is was necessary to provide the additional evidence to deal with the complaints and that he had been permitted to speak on the Operator’s behalf in the past.

VEM Williams proceeded to investigate the complaints and provided detailed explanations into each Prohibition Notice.

The following is a summary of VEM Williams’ findings:

The ‘detached hub’ vehicle YJ04FYT prohibition should have been ‘S’ marked (denoting a significant failure in roadworthiness compliance),
VE Williams particularly noted the failure to comply with the PSV 112 notification of a serious road safety incident,
Prohibitions were correctly issued to vehicle W671CWX
Regarding the operator’s claim that vehicle SN55BPO should not have attracted a prohibition for insufficient tyre tread depth as it was under repair, VE Williams asked the rhetorical question, “How can a vehicle have a tyre below legal limit if not being used?”
The Operator’s claims of vehicle SN55BPO not being in service for a number of weeks before 24th April 2023, was refuted by Automatic Number Plate Recognition (“ANPR”) data, showing use on 8 separate dates in April. As such, VEM Williams reviewed the prohibition and asked the examiner to delete the original prohibition and replace it with an ‘S’ marked Prohibition Notice.

VEM Williams concluded the investigation by stating that he fully supported the actions taken by the relevant examiners referenced in all of the submitted complaints.

A response to VEM Williams’ findings was issued by the Operator on 27 September 2023. In this response, Antoni La Pilusa stated that some findings were wholly refuted and that this would be reverted on in due course. However, no additional correspondence was received by VEM Williams.
### Bus Operator Account Management (“BOAM”) Investigation – June 2023

Between 15 June 2023 and 24 June 2023, TE Mawson conducted a bus monitoring exercise over a period of 3 days. During the monitoring period, a total of 41 out of 63 journeys monitored failed to operate, 2 operated late and one early, resulting in an overall non-compliance rate of 73%.

The Operator was invited to comment on the BOAM results by an email sent on 3 August 2023, and again on 23rd August, but no response was received.

The matter was subsequently submitted to the Traffic Commissioner (TC) for consideration, with the Traffic Commissioner deciding to commence Propose to Revoke (“PTR”) action against the Operator due to the failure to cooperate with two attempted DVSA investigations (TE Mawson’s drivers’ hours investigation in May – August 2023 and TE Mawson’s BOAM investigation in June 2023) along with the apparent failure of the Operator to provide an independent audit to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner as per an undertaking attached to the Operator Licence. The Operator was given until 9 November 2023 to issue a response to the PTR letters.

On 8 November 2023, Richard Wadkin of Pelly’s Solicitors issued a response to the PTR letters via email. In this correspondence, a Public Inquiry was requested to consider the issues in full. No attempt appears to be made to resolve the issues prior to the requested PI.

‘S’ marked Prohibition Notice and Maintenance Investigation – December 2023

On 5 December 2023, vehicle YJ04FYU received an ‘S’ marked, “Immediate”, Prohibition Notice due to, “Shock absorber mounting fractured, detachment imminent”.

As a result, DVSA Vehicle Examiner Michael Mann (“VE Mann”) conducted an announced maintenance investigation on 11 December 2023.

Present during the investigation was Antoni La Pilusa. The completed MIVR was marked ‘Unsatisfactory – Report to OTC’. with the following shortcomings highlighted by the VE:

Maintenance records unavailable – records had been scanned into an electronic file which was inaccessible. Paper records had been destroyed, “on the advice of the operator’s new maintenance consultant”, which the VE found to be “somewhat unlikely”. 25 days after the visit, promised records were still not provided.
Vandalised vehicle YJ07VXU belonging to operator reported abandoned on public road.
VOR system “unreliable at best” – following a meeting eventually held with the operator on 29.1.24, the DVSA examiner subsequently withdrew allegations relating to the use of 2 VOR vehicles based on ANPR mis-reads. An allegation of use of a vehicle without tax was also withdrawn.
Driver defect reporting system ineffective – Vehicle with “multi driver reportable defects” witnessed by VE Mann at roadside check. (pg. 246)
Evidence of driver reportable defects not being assessed and repaired before use.
Maintenance being carried out by mobile mechanics, TAC, who did not have access to suitable inspection/repair facilities at either the operating centre or at the workshop on Haigh Farm in York, stated by the TM.
MOT fail rate at 43%, initial fail, being significantly higher than the national 10% figure.
Based on this investigation, the VE refers to continuous and effective management by the TM not existing and the TM as being “obstructive”.
A response to the findings of the MIVR was issued by the Operator in January 2024. This report was not signed nor was it dated, so the author could not be confirmed by VE Mann. The response addressed each section of the MIVR, refuting several of the findings and providing explanations as to why the alleged shortcomings had occurred. The Operator also provided assurances as to how the issues would be rectified going forward.
Upon receipt of the Operator’s response, VE Mann marked the response as ‘unsatisfactory’, stating “this is an experienced Operator but yet the maintenance arrangements still seem to be in disarray. For the safety of all road users concerned – in my opinion a major commitment in improvement is required in maintenance standards to uphold this operator’s undertakings”. (pg. 247)
The VE also states, “when prohibition notices are issued there seems to be a desperate search for a maintenance provider to repair the defects. Vehicles are scrapped rather than re-tested. This leaves me concerned regarding the standards of the vehicles if they are not cost effective to repair. For example, vehicle YJ07VXU – one prohibition notice in a sequence of events, resulted in the vehicle being written off. It begs the question, who the regular maintenance team was at the time?” (pg.247)
The statement of garage director, Ryan Jackson, “they wanted a bodge, I will never put my name or business to such a low standard of work” highlights VE Mann’s concerns. (pg. 264)

BOAM Investigation – 2024

Between 23 January 2024 and 29 January 2024, DVSA Traffic Examiner Joanna Collins (“TE Collins”) conducted 3 days of bus monitoring on all of the registered services held by A&A Coach Travel Ltd. During this period, 94 journeys were monitored – of which 28 were seen and 66 failed to operate, representing a non-compliance rate of 62%.

Taking into account 27/28 journeys being more than 5 minutes late, and. “Incorrect Destination Boards”, TE Collins judged the total non-compliance rate across all journeys to be 100%.

Propose to Revoke Proceedings – September 2024

Following the submission of a variation application by the Operator seeking to change the nominated Operating Centre (removing Queen Street, Leeds, LS10 1SB and adding Old Brewery Yard, Leeds, LS5 3EE), concerns were raised as to the parking space available at the proposed Operating Centre. Letters were issued seeking clarification as to the availability on 15 May 2024, 7 June 2024, 11 July 2024, 31 July 2024 and 27 August 2024, with no adequate response being received.

Furthermore, the OTC requested the provision of financial evidence showing adequate finances for the vehicle authorisation requested. Although a bank statement was provided by the Operator, this was not a transactional statement, and therefore, could not be taken into account, without the provision of a trading account to assess the true financial standing position. No transactional statement was provided by the Operator despite an additional request by the OTC.

As a result of the above, PTR letters were issued by the OTC on 13 September 2024, detailing the Traffic Commissioner’s direction to propose to revoke the licence due to the apparent failure to satisfy the requirements to have appropriate financial standing and to have an effective and stable establishment in Great Britain. The Operator was given until 27 September 2024 to issue a response to the PTR letters.

A response to the PTR letter was issued by the Operator on 22 September 2024. In this response, the Operator explained that pictures of the proposed Operating Centre had been sent to the OTC on 5 August 2024. In addition, the Operator explained that the existing Operating Centre had become untenable due to acts of vandalism, damage and fuel thefts, including a recent fire, which was stated as being treated as arson by the police. A Public Inquiry was requested by the Operator in this correspondence.

On 5 March 2025, the Operator issued correspondence to the OTC notifying that they were no longer pursuing the variation application to authorise the use of the new Operating Centre at Broad Lane, Leeds.

Further applications in respect of operating centre

An application to authorise 18 Brown Lane, Leeds, LS11 0DN was submitted in November 2024. Again, requests for supporting evidence were sent and not responded to between 5th December and April 2025.

On 25th April 2025 that application was marked as “refused”. (pg. 436)

A variation application was subsequently submitted on 19 May 2025 seeking to remove the Operating Centres at Queen Street, Leeds, LS10 1SB and Spring House Farm, Harrogate, HG3 1PW and to authorise the use of at 18 Brown Lane, Leeds, LS11 0DN as the new Operating Centre.

The brief at pages 439-526 shows repeated attempts to obtain documentation from the operator, the same standard information re aerial photographs, rental agreements and parking spaces etc. requested in the applications cited above.

‘S’ marked Prohibition and Maintenance Investigation – September 2024

On 5 September 2024, vehicle LK55KKR was issued with an ‘S’ marked Prohibition Notice due to the following defects:

Immediate – Door, defective in operation, nearside, front, door is unable to operate, driver is aware of faulty door
Immediate – Seat insecure, and likely to become displaced, upstairs rear seats, 3 of the 5 seat backs are detached
Immediate – Inadequate illumination at entrance, constituting a risk of injury, centre door step, light above step inoperative
Delayed – Oil leak from engine onto road surface, dripping, in excess of 75mm diameter patch in 5 minutes, oil leaking from the engine, dripping over 125mm in 5 mins
Delayed – Powered lift fails to operate by the primary means – device inoperative
Delayed – A wheelchair passenger to driver communication device, inoperative, accessibility blue button communication device inoperative.

As a result of the ‘S’ marked Prohibition Notice, an unannounced Maintenance Investigation was conducted by DVSA Vehicle Examiner Geoffery Flatters (“VE Flatters”) on 26 September 2024. Present during the investigation were Alexandra Cunningham and Antoni La Pilusa.

The completed MIVR was marked ‘Unsatisfactory – Report to OTC’ with the following shortcomings identified:

Unauthorised Operating Centre being used
No maintenance records produced
Annual test history - clear evidence of no management control
prohibitions issued to the operator during the required sample period demonstrate a weakness or a significant failing in the maintenance system
breaches of conditions/undertakings
prohibitions issued at this fleet check
Missing first use inspection records
Ineffective vehicle off the road (VOR) system, no safety defect and recall system, in place
Ineffective walkaround checks being carried out
defects not appropriately assessed and repaired
No evidence of contract for safety inspections
Unable to establish contractor arrangements
No evidence of monitoring systems in place to ensure the correct operation of emissions control systems
Little, or no evidence, drivers and other relevant staff appropriately trained in disability awareness and assistance
No effective wheel security systems/ tyre management arrangements in place
No evidence of TM CPD.
Based on this investigation, TM does not have continuous and effective management.

A response to the MIVR shortcomings was required to be submitted to VE Flatters, but no response was received. As a result, VE Flatters issued a final reminder letter on 24 October 2024 requesting a full response to be submitted within 7 days of the date of the letter.

An unsigned/undated response letter was received by VE Flatters from the Operator on 30 October 2024. In this response, the Operator refuted many of the MIVR findings, providing explanations as to the shortcomings and assurances that compliance would improve going forward. On receipt of the Operator’s response, VE Flatters marked the response as ‘unsatisfactory’ and stated that the case would be forwarded to the Office of the Traffic Commissioner for further consideration.

Call to Public Inquiry – March 2025.

The original call up letter for Public Inquiry referred to, “consideration of regulatory action in view of concerns regarding the apparent failure to operate a local bus service in accordance with registered details, the apparent failure to fulfil statements of intent, the apparent failure to honour licence undertakings, prohibition notices issued, material change, good repute, professional competence, stable establishment and financial standing”.

Antoni La Pilusa was also called to the same Public Inquiry by separate letter in his capacity as a Transport Manager for consideration of his good repute and professional competence.

Additional information :

The operator was also advised by the call up letter, directions at hearings, and/or by correspondence, that events subsequent to the call to PI would be taken into consideration. The relevant matters are listed below:

‘S’ marked Prohibition Notice – June 2025 –

On 16 June 2025, vehicle LX06DZU was issued with an ‘S’ marked Prohibition Notice due to the following defect:

“A lift or ramp safety device, fitted as required, inoperative, ramp known fault”
A roadworthiness exemption notice was also issued by DVSA on the same day.

Pre PI Supplementary Report – VE Thorpe – August 2025

Based on records submitted to DVSA prior to the August PI, VE Thorpe reported:

There are serious deficiencies in the PMI reports provided, including a failure to have the name and signature of the inspector declaring that all safety defects have been repaired satisfactorily and the vehicle is in a safe and roadworthy condition.
There is a misuse of checkboxes, with items declared serviceable when not fitted; brake performance tests are not provided.
Of particular concern is the statement from VE Thorpe regarding 3x. evidenced PMIs from Northern Commercial Services not being produced by Northern Commercials. The signatory, Steve Jhakra, gave a signed statement under caution that he had not produced those reports and that they were fraudulent.
The operator refuted that evidence at pages 552bn-bq of the brief, stating that Steve Jhakra had given contradictory responses to DVSA in his interview and he should not be relied on. Objections were made to the format and content of the interview and ANPR evidence, stated as confirming that the vehicle in question was not at the vicinity of the Northern Commercials site on the 3 dates, is described as “unintelligible”.
Under “Test History”, VE Thorpe refers to the vehicle fleet not matching PMI records and the failure to maintain a correct current fleet list.
From September 2024 to 7th August 2025, the operator’s test history shows there have been 14 tests, with 10 failures for safety critical items. (“pg. 678”).

Regarding wheel and tyre management, VE Thorpe refers to the presence of a policy but the absence of a wheel torque procedure or records kept as required by GTMR.

VE Thorpe explains at paragraph 10, confirmed at the PI, how the failure of the operator to follow the procedure for removing prohibitions in simply presenting the vehicles for MOT test, obscures the Operator’s OCRS, test and encounter scores.

Pre PI Supplementary Report – VE Thorpe – June 2026

In preparation for the PI originally scheduled for February 2026, the operator was required to produce maintenance records for 3 identified vehicles by 25th November 2025. The records were produced 2 months late on 28th January 2026.

VE Thorpe explains 13 inspection reports being provided for the 9 vehicles with inspections being:

2 conducted in Blackburn YJ07 XME (27-08-25), LX06 DZU (13-10-25), by an unknown maintenance contractor and not in the operator’s name.
1 conducted in Barley Meadows, NK55 AHZ (12-08-25), not in the operators’ name.
1 conducted in Stromness, Orkney, KW16 3EE, PO54 NAA (06-10-25), not in the operators’ name.
2 illegible PMI, MF13 CYE (17-11-25) and YJ07 XME (27-08-25), requested from Mr Wadkin for a replacement, 04-02-26. These have not been supplied.
1 which is an invoice, in replacement for a PMI, YJ07 XME (23-10-25), with no registration Number and is not a PMI record. (168512 - AA02)
The VE cites 4 vehicles without legible inspection reports in the operator’s name and, refers to the requirement for first-use inspection reports, which are missing.
Inspection reports from the nominated provider omit important details such as address, location, remedial work on defects and the name, position of the person signing the vehicle off as roadworthy.
Tyre defects and missed PMI dates and continuing failures by drivers to identify defects recorded on PMIs are detailed.
Dangerous defects are identified in respect of 3 vehicles and brake tests are carried out after the PMI rendering the roadworthiness declaration invalid and being contrary to Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness (“GTMR”).
There are numerous ANPR sightings of vehicles declared as VOR.
S mark prohibitions have been issued at PG9 clearance
Use of vehicle subject to prohibition – Vehicle LJ61 CDX highlights a number of repeated concerns.
It was subject to a prohibition on 2.2.26. It was taken for annual test on 13.3.26 – Test abandoned (variation and refusal). It was then taken for Annual Test on 30.4.26 (when it should have been a PG9 clearance) - failed.
It was given an exemption to travel between Hoddy’s Recovery and Durham, but was then seen by 37 ANPR sightings on 19,21 and 26 May.
It failed MOT on 26.5.24 (again should have been presented for PG9 clearance)
Removed from licence 13.3.26 and 30.4.26. Passed Annual Test 3.6.26.

Continued to operate whilst declared off road with a Statutory Off Road Notification (SORN)

LX09 BXM was taken for test by Mr Pilusa on 20.1.26. The vehicle had previously been subject to a dangerous failure with PG9 being issued on the 12.12.25 for cords exposed on offside, front tyre. The Vehicle Standards Assessor recognised Mr La Pilusa who gave his name as “Antoni Cunningham”.
Vehicle LX09 BXM was stopped on 23.3.26. The tax was found to have expired on 31.1.26.
The vehicle was inspected and found to have several defects including chassis corrosion, the step snapped off and incomplete exhaust. Previous PMI sheet on 26.2.26 records blower inoperative, tyre low tread and front air bag mount corroded. The document has a declaration on it;
“I acknowledge this vehicle is not fit for road, with dangerous defects. I do not hold the repair company liable for any actions on the roads. I am taking the vehicle against the repair companies advice”.
This declaration was made 25 days prior to the vehicle being stopped on the public road by the police. The corrosion was a known defect and the vehicle has been allowed to be used on the road with a dangerous known defect.
The “I” “S” prohibition issued to NK55AHZ when the boarding ramp fell off (Fixed Penalty issued) is the second prohibition in respect of boarding ramp and is contrary to the operator’s stated PSVAR commitment and DVSA requirements. Whatever fault by the driver in checking the vehicle, the operator remains ultimately responsible for the condition of the vehicle.
MF13 CYE received an immediate prohibition for a front passenger door that would not close properly when it was encountered on 3.3.26. DVSA had received several reports of students having to exit on the road side of the vehicle and the driver had said he would tell Antoni. VE Thorpe states, “This is a known defected vehicle being used, prior to the DVSA encounter.”

Addendum Statement – July 2026.

A final update statement from VE Thorpe revealed two further adverse reports. Vehicle YT09 ZBY had been specified on the licence on 30.6.26. It was sent for MOT on that day and failed, due to loose wheel nuts on the offside and nearside wheel hub.

Vehicle LJ11 AAF was said to have been operated without tax since the licence expired on 1st April 2026 Mr La Pilusa stated that the vehicle had been taxed on 1st April. Over the luncheon adjournment, he produced one receipt with the “First Payment Date” cut off, and one further copy suggesting the first payment was not until 5th May, possibly backdated to 1st April?

Employment Tribunal (ET) – February 2023.

Finally, the operator/TM was formally advised that the decision of an Employment Tribunal, issued on 20th February 2023, would be taken into account in determining the good repute of the operator/TM. The formal Judgement is contained at pages 458-477 of the brief.

The operator was represented as a Lay Representative at the ET by, now director of the operator company, James Fairchild. James Fairchild, also features heavily in the Judgement, as a party to the abuse.

The employee in question was appointed as a driver in 2016, and again in 2019, after a brief break, and was known to have Asperger’s Syndrome. The decision states:

“The claimant was targeted with insults about his disability, predominantly from James Fairchild of the Respondent. The claimant’s uncontested evidence is accepted;
“Mr Fairchild had called the claimant an “illiterate cretin” on 22 January 2019. On another occasion on 27 June 2019 Mr Fairchild called the claimant an “imbecile” and referred to his “fucktardness”. He referred to him as “the spakka” in September 2019 and on 24 November 2019 Mr Fairchild said to the claimant: “just do what you are told to do you special needs waste of space”. On 5 December 2020, Mr La Pilusa, the respondent’s Transport Manager, referred to the claimant as “Mr Bean”.
“Mr La Pilusa threatened to dismiss the claimant if he didn’t stop pursuing an insurance claim”.
“Mr La Pilusa was visibly angry and when the claimant confirmed that he had gone through his insurers, he was told: “fuck off, you are sacked”.
Mr La Pilusa was said to have caused the claimant to have been dismissed from subsequent jobs by false reports.
“members of management had seen all of these comments including the transport manager and a director”.
The ET accepted “that Mr La Pilusa sought to intimidate and threaten the claimant if he did not withdraw an insurance claim”, and that amounted to Direct Disability Discrimination.
“the Tribunal concludes that the respondent did also contact the DVLA and the claimant’s new employer with the intention of making any future employment, particularly in a driving position, difficult for the claimant”.
Regarding Mr Fairchild, “the Tribunal considers that the correspondence from Mr Fairchild to the claimant’s solicitor on 4 March 2022 is to be categorised as an attempt to blackmail the claimant into dropping his proceedings and a further act of detriment”.
Mr Fairchild responded to a “ordinary polite” request from the claimant’s solicitors with an email of 20 October 2022: “YES HE DOES. He is lying, and we will show evidence to prove that HE and You are both LYING FUCKERS”.

At the PI, Mr La Pilusa sought to adduce a video of the claimant acting out as “Mr Bean”. I indicated that I would not go behind the Tribunal’s judgement and, in any event, the existence of such a video would prove little or nothing. It was noted that the Tribunal had dismissed Mr La Pilusa’s claim of “just banter”.

Public Inquiry

The original call-up letter was issued in March 2025. The August 2025 listing was adjourned at the request of the operator, because of the contents of the Addendum Report, served shortly before the hearing.

A hearing in February 2026 was adjourned, again at the operator’s request, because of the non-availability of VE Williams, albeit his attendance was at my request rather than the operator’s, and no questions were asked of him at the July hearing.

Other delays were down to availability of PI space and seeking to accommodate the non-availability of the parties.

At the PI on 15th July, the operator company’s 3 directors, Antoni La Pilusa, Andrea Cunningham and James Fairchild, attended. Mr La Pilusa attended as Transport Manager (TM).

They were not represented by Solicitors and confirmed that they were content and ready to proceed with the hearing.

DVSA was in attendance through VE Williams and VE Thorpe. DVSA Vehicle Standards Assessor, David Simmons attended as a witness.

There were a number of physical and virtual observers.

I outlined the main issues at the outset of the hearing and invited the operator/TM to deal with those issues and any matters deemed relevant during the course of the hearing.

I heard from VE Thorpe and invited questions from the operator/TM.

I heard from Mr La Pilusa as director/TM and Mr Fairchild as director/nominated TM.

Evidence

The volume of evidence in this case is considerable. In addition to the DVSA statements, there are the supporting documents and exhibits.

The operator sent in a suite of “Summary Submissions” in August 2025, a further suite of documents in February 2026 and a bundle of statements/documents on 14th July 2026.

The August 2025 and February 2026 documents were all considered by me at the time of submission and again before this hearing. Whilst it was indicated to the operator/TM I would not be able to consider documents submitted on 14 July 2026, the day prior to the hearing, in the event, I managed to go through those in the evening and morning before the 10.00 start.

All the statements and documents are contained in the Caselines bundle and the evidence given at the hearing is contained in the typed transcript.

Findings on the Evidence

It is important to note that the representations and submissions made by and on behalf of the operator company/TM made various complaints about DVSA Examiners. Nothing that was said or done at the Public Inquiry, on this, or on the previous date, gave me cause to doubt their integrity, objectivity and fairness. Conclusions and assessments within the MIVR’s are backed by the SIPCAT analysis tools and exhibits, which are consistently used across DVSA areas. In many cases, photographic evidence accompanies prohibition findings and I have been through the documentation and satisfied myself that there is clear and objective audit trail.

Where ANPR evidence has been adduced, DVSA has provided appropriate Statutory authorities, and corrections have been made to a relatively small number of reports following operator representations. I am satisfied that I can substantially rely on the ANPR records notwithstanding the operator’s blanket response that “ANPR cameras are not 100% accurate and can repeatedly log a stationary vehicle”.

At the PI Mr Pilusa indicated on behalf of the operator company that the DVSA evidence was “accepted” for the purposes of the hearing.

Each of the DVSA investigations has been hampered by late, partial production of materials by the operator/TM, or legal representative on their behalf. Far too many of the explanations come too far down the line after the event.

A consistent theme in the DVSA reports from 2023-2026 is the failure to keep clear and auditable records of vehicles of which vehicles are in use, off-road and on the licence. Clearly that was a concern of the Traffic Commissioner in 2022, when a specific undertaking was placed on the operator’s licence.

I can only conclude from the frequency of the admitted breaches of this undertaking that the operator’s approach is deliberate obfuscation. That pattern continues with the repeated taking of prohibited vehicles for a MOT test rather than a declared prohibition removal.

In their representations, the operator/TM state their assumption that VOSA are aware when they then take the vehicle for Annual Test, but a clear audit trail requires specific removal of the PG9.

The representations from the operator/TM contained many complaints about prohibitions issued against the licence. The series of prohibitions in 2023 led to the formal complaint from the operator which was assessed by VE Williams who attended the PI.

I find that the complaints have been objectively, fairly and professionally investigated and dismissed.

As an example, I refer to the “Immediate” prohibition issued on 21st April 2023 to vehicle YU52 VYP for:

Wheel hub damaged, failure or detachment imminent, nearside axle 2, wheels and hub detachment imminent. Hub locknuts not secured with locking washer as per manufacturing specifications,
Tyre bulging, caused by separation of its structure, nearside inner axle 2,
Exhaust system leaking, no immediate danger to health of occupants, exhaust manifold leaking.

The operator/TM lodged a “serious complaint about this and the actions of your investigating officers.” He refers to the vehicle having been recovered to the inspection site after it “suffered a failure of the axle”. It was “clearly confirming that the vehicle was in an “off road” state and not in service state”.

The Vehicle Examiner, VE Benson, provided a clear basis for the prohibition, namely,

The operator had failed to submit a PSV 112 (notification of serious incident) an important mandatory requirement on operators of public passenger vehicles.
The assembly had been re-built so that it appeared it could be serviceable,
On inspection of the hub assembly, a Hub nut locking washer was not present and a Hub nut thread was damaged,
The VE was informed of the condition of the axle, and, if further driven without repair, the hub assembly would likely detach from the vehicle.

I find the response of Mr La Pilusa, to complain about the issue of the prohibition, telling. His primary concern should have been the potential consequences of a detached hub occurring on a motorway with passengers and traffic around. As an experienced TM he should have been well aware of his duty to make a PSV112 notification to DVSA immediately.

With regard to the “Immediate” prohibition to vehicle YJ04 FYT (incorrectly described by the operator as “delayed”) on the 4th May 2023, the fact that a vehicle deemed “fit for service” by the operator was refused prohibition clearance speaks volumes for the relative merits of the operator’s and VE’s judgement.

Similarly, the upgrading of the prohibition for defective indicators to an “S” marked prohibition cannot be faulted where a driver has been instructed to continue a service, despite a known, and reported, Immediate prohibition defect.

Some of the detailed explanations in the operator’s representations seek to mitigate Mr La Pilusa’s personal culpability but do little to provide assurance as to the control systems in place.

As an example, at page 528 of the brief there is a statement from former Office Manager, Martin Ryles, regarding the above vehicle YJ04 FYT, issued with an Immediate prohibition (‘S’ marked) on 4 May 23 for defects including indicators not working and dangerous bodywork. The driver had previously reported the indicator defect on 3 May 23 and 4 May 23, but Mr Ryles states that neither he nor Mr La Pilusa had signed off the repair so the driver should not have taken it out. It is the TM’s responsibility to ensure that there is adequate supervision of drivers in the TM’s absence, and the fact that Mr Ryles allocated the vehicle with no knowledge of unrepaired reported defects, and with no authority for roadworthiness, shows the flaws in the operator’s systems.

The vehicle is then presented for prohibition clearance on 15 June 23 which is refused for 3 failures, including, accessibility features and brakes. That raises questions as to the likely use of the vehicle whilst the prohibition is in place between 4 May 23 and 15 June 23 and underlines poor maintenance standards and road safety risks.

Dealing with the Immediate prohibition to vehicle W671 CWX on 4.May 23, I concur with the VE’s assessment that a “sharp edge likely to cause injury to passengers is a serious defect not to be minimized by the operator stating “not as serious as those to YJ04FYT”. The absence of a defect report by the driver to the operator/transport manager is also noted.

Regarding the prohibition to SN55BPO on 24 April 23 for “tyre tread worn, beyond legal limit”, the VE has noted no VOR board. The VE notes the vehicle under repair for electrical faults, but, asserts the right of DVSA Examiners to prohibit a vehicle where “the general appearance suggests it was last used on the road in the seriously defective condition as found”. In this case it is hard to contradict the VE’s rhetorical question, “how can a vehicle have a tyre below the legal limit if not being used?”

Whilst there is a factual disagreement between the operator and the VE as to whether the manager present stated the vehicle was in, or out of, service, I note that ANPR records show the vehicle was in service on 21 April 23.

The Traffic Commissioner sought to remove the doubt as to whether vehicles were in or out of service by requiring the operator to specify vehicles in use. This was not done and it is consistent with the operator’s apparent willingness to allow defective vehicles to be on the road until they are physically beyond economic repair. I refer to the complaint decision letter and the VEM’s comments regarding “out of service” vehicles not having sufficient tread because of use on the public road.

With regard to the complaints, VE Williams states, “your complaint does not appear to dispute the examiners observations regarding defects but way/process these were found.” Nevertheless, in representations and at the hearing, Mr La Pilusa gave the dismissal of the complaint as a reason why the operator did not bother to formally complain/appeal against other disputed prohibitions. I consider those other prohibitions to be valid and relevant.

I find the following grounds for regulatory action established on the evidence:

False Statement when applying for the licence (sec. 17(3)(a)

Safety inspections would be carried out at nominated supplier. The operator has consistently breached this requirement and each DVSA MIVR highlights the errors, omissions and delays in the operator specifying maintenance contractors and providing evidence of maintenance contracts.

Further, the statement, PMIs will be carried out at regular 6 weekly intervals, has been shown to be false on a number of occasions.

Fail to fulfil general undertaking to keep vehicles fit and serviceable (sec. 17(3)(aa)

This ground has been proven by the number and frequency of prohibitions issued against the operator alone.

The operator/TM’s objections to some of the 2023 prohibitions are dealt with in detail in VE William’s detailed and well-reasoned complaint investigation report. The operator explains the failure to formally complain against recent prohibitions which they took exception to, by their disappointment at the outcome of their previous complaint(s). Nevertheless, those prohibitions, issued by different DVSA Examiners at different times and places, stand as valid and significant.

Similarly, the evidence of repeated MOT test failures is strong, objective evidence that the vehicles are not fit and serviceable, if they cannot even meet that minimum standard once per year, after pre-test preparation.

I note the evidence of VE Benson in June 2023, “this investigation has highlighted serious road safety complications. 10 vehicles had a partial inspection, 7 of these vehicles attracted an immediate prohibition. 3 of these have been “S” marked.” This is despite the recent, earlier PI and “full advice” having been given by VE Benson in May 2022.

I recount the evidence of VE Mann in December 2023. He referred to vehicles being presented for prohibition clearance and not being cost effective to be presented for test and then being scrapped, He states, “that doesn’t bear good reflection on the general condition of the vehicle especially the MOT only requires minimum standards”

Fail to fulfil general undertaking that drivers would promptly report defects and that defects and repairs would be recorded.

The failings in the driver defect reporting system has been evident in each MIVR from 2023 to present day, and confirmed in the independent Audit.

Fail to fulfil specific undertakings on the licence – Audit

There is no evidence of any attempt to comply with clear terms of the audit undertaking requiring submission by 15th July 2023.

The operator refers to the incident regarding his partner as being the reason he failed to respond to the VE/TE reports and the reason for the audit not being provided but this unfortunate incident, seemingly, occurred in July/August 2023 after the date for submission of the audit, when Mr La Pilusa was away in France.

The auditor states that he was “commissioned in August 2023” and says to the operator, “you were unable to complete until November 2023”.

Clearly, the audit was eventually done, but on the question of despatch to the OTC, the only evidence submitted by the operator/Mr Wadkin is a copy email at page 552a of the PI brief. The 8th November 2023 email is from the auditor, not the operator, and the only evidence of sending to OTC is an OTC staff member being “cc’d” on the message. It does not confirm the audit report was even an attachment for the cc’d recipient and there is no covering message to the OTC.

I made it clear to the operator/TM and their legal representative at the hearing in November 2025 (pg.552bb), that I would be dealing with the potential breach of specific undertaking to provide an independent audit at the eventual PI, and I asked both the operator and the OTC to confirm the factual background.

I note that VE Mann questioned the operator/TM about the audit on the 11th December 2023 and he records, “Mr La Pilusa stated it is yet to be completed but he will submit it to OTC by 31/12/2023.” Why would Mr Pilusa not have said it was submitted in November if he, or the auditor, had submitted it to OTC on the 8th November 2023? The OTC has no record of receiving the Audit report until September 2025, after the August hearing, and I find that to be a clear breach of the specific undertaking.

The contents of the independent audit report commissioned by the operator are particularly significant in this case, in the context of the operator’s challenges and complaints to DVSA regarding prohibitions and assessments.

The independent audit report has serious, and road safety critical, “unsatisfactory” assessments:

“The inspection records have gaps and are not completed and issued to the operator ahead of the vehicle being released into service. There is no evidence of inspection records since July 2023. The operator stated they have been completed but not been provided by their external provider. I have strongly advised they instruct the maintenance provider on completing the inspection record and signing the vehicle off as fit for the road before the vehicle is released into service.” (pg. 552p)
“The PMI sheets are not suitable for use on PSV inspections”.
“Not all defects on the inspection records are actioned and signed off and there is evidence of inspection of vehicles not being signed off fit for the road” (pg. 552q)
“Not all inspection records are signed off by the maintenance provider or a qualified person.”
“There are missing inspection records prior to Dec 2022. The operator states that this is due to changing maintenance providers who held all their records on the Truckfile system. There are also missing records for the period July to Nov 2023. I strongly advised on the legal requirement to retain 15 months PMI records for all vehicles or from the date the vehicle had a first use inspection.” (pg.552r)
“There are a number of failings in this section that need to be urgently addressed by the operator.”
“There are a number of defects in the Trutac system that have been marked serviceable that still require action. There is no-one in control of managing walk round check compliance and defects in the system to ensure that all vehicles have a daily walk round check.”
The unaccounted mileage report for the period June - Sept 2023 was also assessed and large amounts of unaccounted mileage was reported.
No training/training records on bridge strikes, safety and driver skills or vehicle familiarisation

The auditor concludes:

“On the basis of this report, there is much to do to bring the operation up to the minimum standards required to comply with your operator’s licence undertakings. I have to warn you that some areas would raise serious concerns for DVSA officers and need to be addressed quickly and effectively”. (pg.552f)

I find the contents of the independent auditor’s report to be a confirmation of DVSA concerns which should, but did not, prompt immediate remedial action from the operator/TM and improved compliance.

Fail to fulfil specific undertaking

To advise the OTC of the make, model and registration number of vehicles used under that licence, and will advise of any changes.

VE Flatters refers to the breach of this undertaking in his MIVR (30.10.24). The operator states in his response to the investigation, “I admit that the online record is not updated but there has been a lot of changes lately with vehicles, I will update.” (pg.362).

The TC considered that undertaking to be an important control function to enable clear identification of vehicles in use/off-road and to track their service and MOT history. The failure to comply with that undertaking is significant in the context of this operator’s history and the frequent swapping of vehicles and post-event claims of the vehicle being out of service or in private use.

Fail to fulfil general undertaking to maintain full and accurate maintenance records

The operator/transport manager has been slow and unhelpful in the production of records for examination. When VE Benson visited on 7th June 2023, Mr La Pilusa was “too busy” to discuss maintenance arrangements with DVSA. VE Benson describes, “after several requests for records I finally received Safety inspection records by email on the 20th June 2023.”

VE Mann refers to the absence of electronic and/or paper inspection records in December 2023. I agree that the destruction of all paper files is “somewhat unlikely” (pg.233). I would go further and say that any such action is unacceptable particularly in the context of this operator/TM’s history. The operator/TM admits to difficulties in electronic access so if the “new maintenance consultant” advised the destruction of relevant PMI records, which I very much doubt, the operator should not have followed that advice.

In response to the failure to produce records to VE Flatters in September 2024 the operator/TM states, “we used a vehicle as a temp office for current records, notes and forward planner, this worked fine temporarily”

The storage of records in a car in the workshop underlines the practical significance of an operator having a suitable operating centre with proper storage facilities. I refer to the judgement of the Upper Tribunal in the case of Tacsi Gwynedd;

“To keep vital evidence of regulatory compliance in an insecure location is unacceptable. The industry needs to hear that message loud and clear. We therefore find that this operator failed to make adequate arrangements for safely storing records of its regulatory compliance. That is a serious regulatory breach.” (Beech J, Tacsi Gwynedd)

I find this operator culpable for the same “serious regulatory breach” outlined by the Upper Tribunal.

The maintenance investigation reports are characterised by multiple maintenance providers with ad hoc, short term arrangements rather than an enforceable contract. This clearly inhibits quality control and effective performance.

The June 2023 MIVR by VE Benson, refers to Ashley Travel Limited who inspected 4 vehicles but had no maintenance contract.

The operator was criticised by VE Mann in December 2023 for using a maintenance contractor, TAC, who did not have the necessary facilities and VE Mann refers to the apparent “desperate search for maintenance provider” after prohibitions, yet the situation is clearly no more stable in September 2024 when the operator refers to 3 different contractors and says, “TAC are still providing maintenance for us, again we are in the process of obtaining fresh contracts, pending outcome of trial”.

VE Flatters makes allowance for the impact of the fire 16 September 2024 but notes, “I would expect that a competent transport manager, reinstate maintenance systems as soon as possible to ensure the current fleet is roadworthy”.

He continues, “The transport manager admitted to me that things are still “up in the air” which appears to indicate he is aware of the failings but is continuing regardless.

Mr La Pilusa says, “I admit that the online record is not updated but there have been a lot of changes lately with vehicles, I will update.”

The failure to maintain up to date and reliable records of maintenance contractors inhibits a clear audit trail for the operator/TM and for DVSA Examiners.

Vehicles and drivers have been issued with prohibition notices or the police in the past 5 years (sec. 17(3)(c).

The encounter history over the 5 year period up to 2nd June 2026, at page 394a of the brief, identifies 51 road side encounters, 15 Immediate prohibitions and 7 delayed prohibitions, a Mechanical Prohibition Rate of 43.14%. That history is poor for any operator, but for one with previous PI history, and, a PI outstanding for a substantial part of that time, it is wholly unacceptable.

Date	Vehicle	Prohibition	Defect(s)
21.4.23	YU52YUP	I	Wheel hub failure
		I	Tyre bulging
		D	Exhaust leaking
24.4.23	LK02NHC	I	Fuel leak
	SN55BPO	I	Tyre tread worn beyond legal limit
	YJ07VXU	I	Brake pipe damaged and failed
		I	Passenger seat likely to cause danger
4.5.23	YJ04FYU	I	Interior body panel – likely to cause injury
			Interior floor – likely to cause injury
	W671CWX	I	Passenger seat likely to cause injury
5.12.23	YJ04FYU	I/S	Shock absorber mounting fractured
5.9.24	LK55KKR	I/S	Door defective in operation
		I	Inadequate illumination at entrance
		I	Seat insecure
		D	Accessibility – wheelchair passenger communication to driver device inoperative
		D	Accessibility – powered lift inoperative
20.9.24	BX04MZP	D	Wheel nut loose
25.9.24	X354NNO	I/X	Flap door catch insecure
26.9.24	KX09BHJ	I/S	Tyre tread worn beyond legal limit
		D	Oil leak
	K5UCL	I	Interior floor lifting – likely to cause injury
10.10.24	X354NNO	D	Fuel leak
16.6.25	SF54TMV	D	Exhaust system leaking
	LX06DZU	I/S	Accessibility – lift/ramp inoperative
22.8.25	SN55BPO	X	Exterior body panel insecure/exhaust leak
9.10.25	NK55AHZ	I	Accessibility – wheelchair boarding device unsafe/ramp insecure, likely to fail
30.1.26	MF13CYE	I	Door jammed/cannot be opened
2.2.26	YJ15RCV	D	Shock absorber insecure
	LJ61CDX	D	Braking – EBS warning light on
3.3.26	MF13CYE	I	Door cannot be retained in closed position
23.3.26	LK09BXM	D	Chassis corroded N/S
		D	Chassis corroded O/S
		D	Interior floor weakened

The MOT Test history is equally concerning. The figures show 17 Tests and 6 x Initial Failures and 6 x Final Failures a failure rate of 35.29% against the National Initial Fail rate for PSVs of 8.55%.

These figures are probably understated in the operator’s favour by the use of unspecified, VOR vehicles.

Use of an unauthorised operating centre

The Act requires a suitable, approved “operating centre” having adequate facilities for meeting the needs of the business including designated parking bays, lit/covered areas for driver defect walk-round checks, maintenance and safe and secure parking and access. (Section 12 of the Act; Brent Pennells 2022/195)

The STC Statutory Document No. 4 on Operating Centres states, “An important aspect of the trust which lies at the heart of the operator licensing regime is that the traffic commissioner must be able to rely on an operator having in place:

addresses at which the operator and transport manager can reliably receive important correspondence (whether from the Office of the Traffic Commissioner or an enforcing authority or any other significant source); and,
a system which ensures that correspondence is fully answered, within any time limit which has been set, or else within a reasonable time limit and if documents are requested that they are sent.” (para.74)

In December 2023, a vandalised vehicle, YJ07VXU, was reported as being abandoned on a public road. The operator refers to their falling out with the repair garage in representations, but this is a consistent theme in their relationships with maintenance providers.

I refer to the evidence cited above of garage director, Ryan Jackson, in respect of YJ07VXU, “all they wanted was a cheap repair” the failure to pay a £450 bill by the operator and the lack of concern about the vehicle being left abandoned on the public highway. I concur with the professional opinion of VE Mann, “Vehicle YJ07 VXU…was still under the operators possession as the registered keeper. The dispute could be resolved at a later time and safety should have taken priority”. (pg. 245)

This operator’s approach to the specification of an operator’s centre has been dilatory and unprofessional in the extreme.

As at the public inquiry on the 26th August the operator had 2 operating centres specified, Spring House Farm, Harrogate, which the operator stated was “no longer available” and Queen Street, Leeds, which, “was not being used”.

In May 2024 the operator applied to replace Queen Street with Old Brewery Yard, Broad Lane, Kirkstall, Leeds. Letters were sent by the OTC requesting information on 15 May 24 and 7 June.24 and the operator failed to respond.

The failure to provide supporting documentation and the absence of “active” bank statements, led to the “Propose to Revoke” letter being issued in September 2024.

Again, the operator requested a Public Inquiry but no attempt was made to submit missing information in advance of a future PI.

On the 5th March 2025, the operator notified withdrawal of the Brewery Lane, Broad Lane, application, citing the “large fire caused by youths”. It is clear that Brewery Lane was being used as an operating centre without formal authorisation, noting the incomplete application from May 2024.

An application to nominate a replacement operating centre was not then made until May 2025 when 18 Brown Lane, Leeds was put forward. I have seen copies of the “Supporting Documents Required” letter sent to the operator on 31st May 2025 as with the previous application. It is clear and explicit and requires the information by 14th June 2025.

I find that the operator failed to comply with that, and subsequent, deadlines.

The application was formally “refused” on 3rd August 2025 for want of requested, and necessary, documentation. A further application has now been made and granted.

Having reviewed the information requested of the operator by the OTC, I recognise nothing different from that asked of other operators seeking to vary their operating centre, yet in this operator’s case, the process has been protracted and without resolution. This amounts to the operator gaining a potential unfair commercial advantage over operators who obtain and supply the correct contracts and information.

Northern Commercials findings

VE Thorpe’s August 2025 statement, and the recorded interview with Stephen Jhakra, raised concerns regarding the authenticity of the records produced.

The ANPR evidence raised substantial questions as to the location of the vehicle SF54 TMV on the dates when the disputed PMIs are said to have taken place. Similarly, with regard to LX06DCU and KN04XJB, when VE Thorpe states that ANPR evidence shows the vehicles were not in the location of Northern Commercials at BD4 6RB, or in the locality of Bradford, on the day of their stated PMI inspections.

However, Mr Jhakra did not attend the PI as requested. The operator has been denied the opportunity to challenge him on his statement and the operator has produced some documentation, one showing an invoice for a vehicle “DZU” for a “maintenance inspection” in February 2025 and one showing a “PMI” for a vehicle “SE54 TMV” on 8th April 2025. Neither of these documents at pages 552cg-ch of the brief are conclusive of the authenticity of 3 x. PMI’s on vehicle SF54 TMV on different and separate dates, but the operator has not had the opportunity to put those documents to the witness.

Findings in these proceedings are based on the balance of probabilities, but the more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence needs to be, and the allegation of “fraudulent PMI documents” is not proved to the required standard.

Of course, the doubts regarding the quality of PMI’s, the choice of maintenance providers and the absence of required brake test records remain.

Staffing

At the PI I was informed that of the 8 drivers “employed”, 3 were self-employed/limited companies. Whilst this issue did not appear in the call-up letters, and I therefore make no formal findings regarding it, I made the operator aware of my concerns in the following respects:

HMRC Rules – under which it is rare for a commercial driver to be properly “self-employed”,
The case of Bridgestep (2020 UKUT 121) – which highlights the absence of proper and necessary controls over self-employed drivers. In the case of the operator company, it raises substantial doubts over the application of “Staff Handbook” and “Employee Policies” to self-employed/limited company contractors, particularly the disciplinary policies. The essence of the limited company contract is that the limited company, and not the operator company, controls who does the work.
Section 81 of the Act which defines “operator” as, “the person for whom the driver works (whether under a contract of employment or any other description of contract personally to do work”. The underlining of personally is mine, and, arguably excludes limited company arrangements.

It is perhaps indicative of the problems in controlling self employed contractor/limited companies, that one such driver, Lisa Pinardi, features in 4 prohibition encounters over the last year or so, when Immediate prohibitions have been issued and driver reportable defects identified.

On 10 October 25 Lisa Pinardi received a final written warning in respect of a defective ramp prohibition. Reference was made to a previous driver reportable defect prohibition on 16 June 25.

However, the same driver is using the vehicle receiving an Immediate prohibition for a jammed door on 30 January 26 and again on 3 March 26. As mentioned above, the “staff handbook” is not relevant to the limited company contractor so where is the evidence of further disciplinary action or “contract management”?

Pre-PI Supplementary Reports – August 2025 and June/July 2026

It is important to note these supplementary reports are not intended to raise further regulatory investigations. From my experience, in the vast majority of cases they provide the operator/TM with an opportunity to demonstrate that they have taken on board the results of previous unsatisfactory investigations and introduced appropriate remedial measures.

In the August 2025 report, VE Thorpe refers to the 3 prohibitions issued, the questionable inspection reports, the high failure rate at test and not complying with previous undertakings and concludes: “Although there have been some small improvements, by evidencing reports and policies, when none were received previously. There are still safety critical shortcomings highlighted within this report and questionable evidence submitted.”

Regarding the June 2026 statement of VE Thorpe, I find the contents to be as negative and worrying as any Pre-PI Report I have seen. I refer back to the list of shortcomings specified in paragraph 59 above. The number and seriousness of the adverse reports I consider to be wholly unacceptable.

VSA David Simmons, attended and gave evidence confirming that it was Antoni La Pilusa he recognised as presenting the vehicle, LX09BXM, for test in the name “Antoni Cunningham”.

I heard Mr La Pilusa’s explanation of why he presented the vehicle for test in that name, the difficulty people had with the name “La Pilusa”, and I find it to be implausible. I have also seen reference to the vehicle in the PI representations.

I consider it far more likely that the vehicle was presented in the name Antoni Cunningham, to seek to obscure his, and the operator company’s, use of the vehicle. I note that despite Mr La Pilusa’s representations that it was a private sale vehicle, VE Thorpe relates it being used by AA Travel Ltd. at a roadside encounter, it was booked for test in the name of A&A and it was being driven on 23.3.26 by Lisa Pinardi, the self-employed company driver. The operator’s licence disc for A&A Travel Ltd was displayed on the vehicle and VE Thorpe stated that it was “on its way to pick up passengers”.

I further take into consideration the PMI sheet at page 935 in the name of “A&A Travel” and ANPR evidence showing 70 individual sightings on 6 separate days between 13.3.26 and 20.3.26 (pages 933-4) and 175 sightings between 10.12.25 and 9.2.26 (pages 938-9). This is far more consistent with commercial use than private mileage as claimed by Mr La Pilusa. Tax on the vehicle had expired on the 31 January 26.

I therefore reject Mr La Pilusa’s contentions that the recent serious failings regarding this vehicle, including use of the vehicle when “not fit for road, with dangerous defects” (page 768) is Its MOT status or any defects identified “have no bearing on A&A Coach Travel’s operator compliance” and TM’s repute.

The further evidence about the vehicle being taken from the maintenance provider, contrary to an explicit dangerousness warning and contrary to repair company’s advice, shows the most reckless disregard for the safety of the driver and other road users.

Similarly, I find the use of MF13 CYE on 30 March 26 with a known prohibitable defect that jeopardised the safety of school children entering and exiting the coach, wholly unacceptable.

Failing to comply with registered services

This is a purposive jurisdiction, and whilst the punctuality and reliability of bus services is an important issue, I heard from the operator that they no longer run registered services, and I therefore take no action on the 2023-4 BOAM matters. This is in contrast to the maintenance/vehicle quality issues which remain relevant, present, and critical to passenger and road safety.

Failing to cooperate with DVSA/OTC

The operator/TM’s interaction with DVSA and enforcement authorities is characterised by poor, or limited co-operation, and non-production, partial production, and/or, late production of records which should be “produced upon request”. I cite the following examples from the statements:

VE Benson – June 2023. Mr La Pilusa “far too busy” on to discuss unsatisfactory maintenance investigation report on 7th and 19th.
Operator “too busy” to discuss/evidence driver walk round system, Forward Planner, PSVAR system, PMI sheets.
“Several requests” to receive records which should have been “readily available”.
BOAM Investigation – June-August 2023. No response to repeated requests for comments on non-running or late services.
TE Mawson – May-July 23 – no response re request for “missing mileage,” despite assurance would provide.
Further failures to respond to requests for information in June and July 2023.
Failing to attend for interview in August 2023 – whilst I note the response of the operator’s representatives regarding the operator’s right not to attend voluntary interview, there is no excuse for simply not turning up, and the refusal to provide relevant information is not indicative of an open engagement with the enforcement authorities.
VE Mann – December 23 – when Ms Cunningham was sole director, “on multiple occasions Antoni La Pilusa stated that she would not attend any meetings with DVSA because of other commitments”.
11/12/23 – Andrea Cunningham failed to attend interview to discuss serious prohibition, “I had at least expected an explanation call”.
“It is considered the person is oblivious to the happenings and events at the OC or simply chose to ignore or engage with DVSA”.
Propose to Revoke Letters – October 2023, following failure to provide OTC with audit report, despite reminders.
September 2024 following repeated failures to supply documentation in respect of operating centre(s).
Documents requested for February 2026 hearing sent 2 months late and incomplete.

Considerations and Decisions

Balancing Act – Positives on behalf of the operator/TM

Before reaching any decision with regard to repute and potential regulatory action, I weigh in the balance the positives advanced by and on behalf of the operator/TM.

The operator has, largely, co-operated with the PI process and produced detailed representations.
Eventually, maintenance investigation reports have been responded to. Whilst some of the factual challenges should have been taken through appropriate, appeal channels, they demonstrate that the matters of concern in the reports were taken seriously. Nevertheless, the failure to produce complete records in a timely manner prevents full investigation and appraisal.
Representations refer to the introduction of the “CheckedSafe” App-based system to assist with driver defect reporting and VOR status and upgrades to the fleet.
Discussions have taken place with maintenance providers regarding future improvements.
A “Staff Handbook” and comprehensive model suite of staff policies/training documents has been supplied. I note my concerns regarding the applicability of the staff handbook to self-employed, limited company workers.
The Operator Compliance Risk Score (OCRS) is green for traffic enforcement.

The 3 directors attended the PI, and were respectful of the proceedings and the DVSA witnesses in attendance. Mr La Pilusa indicated that the operator company was accepting the DVSA evidence. They chose not to openly challenge the DVSA examiners and pointed to their written representations sent in shortly before the hearing.

Some of the detailed explanations in the operator’s representations seek to mitigate Mr La Pilusa’s personal culpability, but do little to provide assurance as to the control systems in place.

As an example, at page 528 of the brief there is a statement from former Office Manager, Martin Ryles, regarding a vehicle YJ04 FYT, issued with an Immediate prohibition (‘S’ marked) on 4 May 23 for defects including indicators not working and dangerous bodywork. The driver had previously reported the indicator defect on 3 May 23 and 4 May 23 but Mr Ryles states that neither he nor Mr La Pilusa had signed off the repair so the driver should not have taken it out. It is the TM’s responsibility to ensure that there is adequate supervision of drivers in the TM’s absence, and the fact that Mr Ryles allocated the vehicle with no knowledge of unrepaired reported defects, and with no authority for roadworthiness, shows the flaws in the operator’s systems.

The Requirement to be of Good Repute

Sections 14ZA and 14ZA(3) of the Act set out the requirement for an operator and a Transport Manager to be of good repute in accordance with the provisions of Schedule 3, paragraphs 1-5.

The Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document No. 1 Good Repute and Fitness, cites a number of examples of conduct relevant to repute/fitness other than the prohibitions, breach of undertakings, and false statements/failure to fulfil expectations, set out in my “Findings” section above.

Those established by the evidence in this case include:

Failing to supply records (Tacsi Gwynedd Ltd. 2015/040)
Failing to fully cooperate with DVSA/OTC (See paragraph 180 above) (Stephen McKinnie 2010/0043; Stephen McAuliffe 2013/029)
Using a vehicle with prohibitions in force (J & CM Smith Ltd 2006/445)
Persistent failure to comply with undertakings, especially following a warning (LWB Ltd. 2011/036)
First time Test failures, as “barometer of maintenance” (JA & VC Fryer Farms 2012/023)

STC Stat. Doc. No 1 also refers to the case of Arnold v DfI NI [2016] UKUT 0392 (AAC) 15;

“The Upper Tribunal in their decision: “underlined the word ‘fitness’ in both these provisions because it is critical to understanding the breadth of the requirement to be of good repute. It means, for example, that an operator who cannot be trusted to comply with the operator’s licensing regime is unlikely to be fit to hold an operator’s licence”.

The original call-up letter and public inquiry in August 2025 referred to matters which occurred in 2023-2024. I found those matters to be substantially proved by the adverse reports and evidence contained therein.

Delays in operator licensing proceedings can often work in the operator’s favour. The Traffic Commissioner is bound to consider the operator’s conduct and repute as at the date of the final hearing and if the operator has taken genuine, sustainable steps to address shortcomings identified in DVSA investigations and events, then the need for regulatory action can often be obviated and the purposes of the legislation achieved.

The Upper Tribunal has encapsulated this approach in the case of Arnold:

“It is important that operators understand that if their actions cast doubt on whether they can be trusted to comply with the regulatory regime they are likely to be called to a Public Inquiry at which their fitness to hold an operator’s licence will be called into question. It will become clear, in due course, that fitness to hold an operator’s licence is an essential element of good repute. It is also important for operators to understand that the Head of the TRU is clearly alive to the old saying that: “actions speak louder than words”, (see paragraph 2(xxix) above). We agree that this is a helpful and appropriate approach. The attitude of an operator when something goes wrong can be very instructive. Some recognise the problem at once and take immediate and effective steps to put matters right. Others only recognise the problem when it is set out in a call-up letter and begin to put matters right in the period before the Public Inquiry takes place. A third group leave it even later and come to the Public Inquiry with promises of action in the future. A fourth group bury their heads in the sand and wait to be told what to do during the Public Inquiry. It will be for the Head of the TRU to assess the position on the facts of each individual case. However it seems clear that prompt and effective action is likely to be given greater weight than untested promises to put matters right in the future.”

As part of the PI process, in keeping with other cases, the OTC has requested updated maintenance documentation prior to the listed hearings, in 2025 and 2026.

The supplementary statement from VE Thorpe dated 6 August 2025 shows ongoing concerns regarding preventative maintenance arrangements and MOT/prohibitions.

The June 2026 report, as summarised above, cites;

Vehicle used with known dangerous defect, against garage warning
Vehicle used with defective passenger door
PMI sheets not fully completed
Drivers defect reporting ineffective
Not specifying vehicles on licence
High MOT failure rate
High prohibition rate
Not auditing systems and inspections’

VE Thorpe states; “I conclude that there is no improvement from the previous reports”

The updated encounter history shows 8 x recorded roadside encounters with 6 x mechanical prohibitions, 3x. Immediate, 3 x. Delayed and 1 x. ‘S’ marked. VE Thorpe cites a prohibition rate of 75% between July 2025 and June 2026 more than three times the national average of 19.89%.

In response the operator/TM challenges the inclusion of “out of service” vehicles or “private” vehicles but the failure of the operator to maintain and produce clear, accountable vehicle/VOR logs and the extensive ANPR evidence that “off road” vehicles have, in fact, been used in service, gives me no basis to prefer the operator/TM’s evidence to the DVSA accounts.

Taking these matters into account, it cannot be said that this operator/TM has taken “immediate and effective steps to put matters right” as in the first/second category of operators cited in Arnold. At best, the operator falls into the third category, offering assurances and promises of better compliance in the future.

Good repute has to be considered as at the date of the public inquiry but that does not mean that the past is irrelevant. As stated in the case of Randolph Transport Ltd and Catherine Tottenham (UT/2014/59), “In many cases, the present is simply the culmination of past events”.

The key question is one of trust. As the tribunal said in the case of Priority Freight (2009/225);

“Before answering the ‘Bryan Haulage question’ it will often be helpful to pose a preliminary question, namely: how likely is it that this operator will, in future, operate in compliance with the operator’s licensing regime? If the evidence demonstrates that it is unlikely then that will, of course, tend to support a conclusion that the operator ought to be put out of business. If the evidence demonstrates that the operator is very likely to be compliant in the future then that conclusion may indicate that it is not a case where the operator ought to be put out of business. We recognise, of course, that promises are easily made, perhaps all the more so in response to the pressures of a Public Inquiry. What matters is whether those promises will be kept.”

There is a pragmatic side to the issue of trust and cooperation. As stated in the case of Arnold,

“The Tribunal has stated on many occasions that operator’s licensing is based on trust. Since it is impossible to police every operator and every vehicle at all times, the Department in Northern Ireland, (and Traffic Commissioners in GB), must feel able to trust operators to comply with all relevant parts of the operator’s licensing regime”

The fact that every interaction between this operator/TM and DVSA results in partial responses, non-responses and challenges places an extra burden on DVSA resources, and impacts upon the ability of the Examiners to respond to other critical road safety events.

The same additional burden on limited resources is shown in the operator/TM dealings with the OTC. Applications to change operating centres are straightforward. The documentation and evidence requested is clearly specified in STC Stat. Doc. No. 4 – Operating Centres. Yet when I look at the series of applications made by the operator, they are all characterised by incomplete applications, failing to respond to requests for more information, and on 2 occasions, “Proposal to Revoke” the licence letters. The operator then responds with a request for a PI, as is their right before revocation, rather than just providing the information and thereby avoiding delays and the cost implications of a PI.

It is also important to consider the evidential basis for trust in operator licensing. As stated with regard to fitness to hold a Restricted Licence in the case of James Craig and Partners t/a James Craig and Son (UT/2023/466), “the trust in question is not blind trust or based on mere assurance…. it is trust based on evidence that the applicant has knowledge of the regulatory regime and the skill, ability and willingness to implement the regulatory regime.”

It is this last element which I find particularly lacking in this operator/TM, having regard to the nature, frequency, duration and seriousness of the failures as set out in the paragraphs above.

Apart from the road safety concerns regarding the operator/TM’s record, there is also the fair competition element and further risks to safety. As stated in Arnold:

“In addition other operators must be able to trust their competitors to comply, otherwise they will no longer compete on a level playing field. In our view this reflects the general public interest in ensuring that Heavy Goods Vehicles (PSVs in this case) are properly maintained and safely driven. Unfair competition is against the public interest because it encourages operators to cut corners in order to remain in business. Cutting corners all too easily leads to compromising safe operation.”

The relevance of “fair competition” and the impact on the perceptions and behaviour of other operators ,and of the general public, can be considered with regard to the Employment Tribunal decision at pages 458-477 of the brief.

The Upper Tribunal has said, “What does “Repute” mean if it does not refer to the reasonable opinions of other properly interested right-thinking people, be they members of the public or law-abiding participants in the industry?” (Aspey Trucks Ltd. 2010/49” a case on application for an operator’s licence.)

Schedule 3 of the Act requires the TC to consider “all the relevant evidence” and “such other information in relation to the operation of vehicles of any description in the course of a business”, by the operator, its officers, employees and agents.

Paragraph 61 of Stat. Doc. No 1 cites the range of conduct relevant to good repute as determined in previous Upper Tribunal decisions which includes “breaches of other enforcement regimes”. Serious breaches of the employment responsibilities in respect of a disabled PSV driver is clearly within such “other conduct” and the 2023 Employment Tribunal decision is relevant to the operator’s good repute.

In respect of TM Mr La Pilusa, Article 6 of EU Regulation 1071/2009 – Conditions relating to the requirement of good repute – requires a Transport Manager to “at least” have knowledge or relevant law in relation to road passenger transport. Compliance with Section 20 of the Act, Public Service Vehicle Accessibility Regulations, (PSVAR), would be part of that required knowledge. The operator’s responsibilities, and his responsibilities, with regard to employment law and conduct towards a PSV driver with a known disability, would be part of his required knowledge.

Government and Industry generally have placed a high priority on accessibility and disability awareness in the public transport system. The employment of a driver with a mental health disability would be commendable, and a strong positive, but when the treatment of that individual is found to have amounted to constructive dismissal and unlawful discrimination, I find that to be an aggravating feature of this case counting against the operator’s good repute.

The fact that Mr Pilusa as director/TM and the newly appointed Director and nominated TM, James Fairchild, allowed, and personally contributed to that discriminatory conduct, undermines their good repute as directors/TMs.

The operator/TM has referred to the conduct in question being over 5 years old now, but the decision of the Tribunal was not published until 2023 and this is the first time a Traffic Commissioner has had the opportunity to consider the impact of the Tribunal’s findings on the operator/TM’s repute. I consider that it would be quite wrong to ignore it for the reasons stated above.

In terms of rehabilitation since the conduct in question, I have seen the Disability Awareness training, but there have also been 4 x prohibitions involving accessibility and breaches of PSV Accessibility Regulations (PSVAR).

Mr Fairchild made “in camera” written representations regarding the claimant in the ET proceedings. I stated that I would not go behind the Tribunal judgement, and, those representations themselves did not reflect well on Mr Fairchild’s past role and conduct.

I am asked to place particular trust in the new “re-branding” of the operator’s business as “City Transport Group Ltd”, with the addition of James Fairchild as a TM since February 2026. I have considered the documentation regarding his history and experience and heard from him at the PI. I am not convinced that the proposed changes provide any more than a veneer of reformation to this operator’s business for the following reasons.

Firstly, James Fairchild’s involvement is not new. He has been active in the operator’s business for a number of years as demonstrated in the Employment Tribunal Judgement which refers to Mr Fairchild working alongside the claimant since May 2018.

Secondly, Mr Fairchild’s involvement in the victimisation of the claimant during his employment with the operator company does not reflect well on his character. The Judge states, “The claimant was targeted with insults about his disability, predominantly from Mr James Fairchild of the Respondent.” Examples of Mr Fairchild’s abuse are set out in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Judgement, page 461-2 of the PI brief. Mr Fairchild is subject to strong criticism regarding his conduct in the ET proceedings and he makes admissions regarding his previous role in civil proceedings which again do not reflect well on him.

Thirdly, Mr Fairchild has limited experience as a transport manager, having passed the CPC in 2023/4.

Fourthly, the level of Mr Fairchild’s other directorial/TM responsibilities raised concerns regarding his capacity to exercise continuous and effective management in accordance with STC Stat. Doc. No 3 -Transport Managers.

Fifthly, despite the addition of Mr Fairchild as a director, and nomination as a TM, compliance performance on this operator’s licence has not improved. On his own operator’s licence, there have been a number of MOT failures placing the licence in the “amber” OCRS banding.

Finally, Mr Fairchild has done nothing to change the pattern of poor communication from the operator company and late submission of documents.

He has not been formally called to this PI in respect of his good repute, and whilst I hold back from doing so regarding his existing licence/TM commitments, those factors contribute to my lack of confidence in his ability to turn round the operator company.

The operator/TM and Mr Fairchild conceded that the positive changes are nothing more than assertions in the absence of auditable, organised maintenance documentation. They offer an audit undertaking if the licence is allowed to continue, and Mr Fairchild’s statement of 9 July sets out the consequences of revocation including the loss of jobs for 15 staff. Representations received for earlier hearings pointed to suspension of the licence as having a similar effect to revocation. A “curtailment” (reduction in authorised vehicles) to more than currently used is described as “manageable” but, in my view, would not meet the seriousness of the failings.

The operator has had since August 2025 at least, following the last hearing, to demonstrate improvements. He had notice of the hearing scheduled for February 2026, when again full documentation was requested and not produced on time. Finally, he had the call-up letter in March 2026 for the 15 and 16 July 2026, with the clear direction to produce relevant documents to DVSA at least 21 days before the hearing.

Mr La Pilusa refers to recent personal issues as affecting the late delivery of documents for this PI, but the pattern of late productions has been consistent, and the delays in concluding the PI have come from adjournment requests from the operator/TM.

I answer the Priority Freight question, “how likely is it that this operator will, in future, operate in compliance with the operator’s licensing regime?”, as “highly unlikely”.

I am entitled to take a holistic approach to prohibition history and MOT failures. A responsible, reputable operator does not accumulate the number of prohibitions and MOT failures over a period in excess of 3 years, especially when they were expressly warned about compliance history, maintenance standards and record-keeping at a previous PI.

An operator is expected to investigate and act on prohibitions and failures They may have complaints against drivers, maintenance providers and suppliers. However, they retain ultimate responsibility and must be proactive to avoid future failings particularly when they know they are facing the scrutiny of a public inquiry.

Similarly, the operator/TM should be proactive in their choice of maintenance provider and monitor PMI sheets for accuracy, completeness and quality. The failure to do this renders the preventative element of their maintenance regime inadequate, and I share the DVSA Examiners’ concerns about the over-reliance on MOT tests, the bare minimum standard for vehicle safety, and ad-hoc maintenance arrangements, rather than regular, contracted and audited service providers.

There is limited evidence to support the positive improvements stated by the operator/TM and Mr Fairchild in their submissions for this hearing. The failure of a PSV, YT09ZBY, at MOT test on 30th June 2026, for 2 x. “cracked, badly damaged wheel hubs” or loose wheel nuts, nearside and offside axle, classified as “Repair Immediately (major defects)” shows a continuing and worrying risk to road safety.

Whilst I consider the Employment Tribunal decision to be relevant to the question of good repute, it is far from determinative, as I consider that the maintenance and compliance failings would have been fatal to ongoing good repute in this case in any event.

Changes have been made and assurances are given as to the future. The “Operational Statement” of the 14th July details current and future contracts seeking to demonstrate the confidence placed in the operator by major customers and transport authorities.

“Significant investment” has been made in the fleet to ensure compliance with the PSVAR and there are plans to improve the presentation and public image of the business.

The problem in this case is that many of those promises have been given in the past and I simply do not trust the 3 individuals who appeared before me at the PI to deliver on those promises in a prompt and sustainable manner.

I have carefully considered the positive features advanced and the promises made, but they are substantially outweighed in this case by the serious negative findings.

The concerns regarding road safety and fair competition, the primary purposes of the legislation, must take priority over the operator’s potential losses or demise. Otherwise, trade and public confidence in the operator licensing regime will cease to exist.

Looking at the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document No. 10 – Starting Points for Regulatory Action, I place the operator firmly in the “severe”/”severe/serious” category.

The repetition of serious safety related prohibitions, the failure to fulfil undertakings inherent to the licence, the failure to fulfil undertakings specific to this licence, the lack of co-operation, non-production/partial production of documents to DVSA, and the serious failings in successive DVSA maintenance investigation reports and in an independent audit, are strong reasons for categorizing the conduct as severe. Added to this is the previous PI history and the recent DVSA assessments.

Operator’s responses show far too little regard for potential safety risks and recognition of their responsibility to prevent future occurrences. The PSV notification system is an essential part of that preventative system and the failure to notify 2x. PSV112 public safety events, the detached hub and the fire, is a serious and unacceptable omission. Similarly, the number of prohibitions relating to disability accessibility requirements for PSV operators.

I determine that the operator company has lost its good repute.

The Bryan Haulage question (Bryan Haulage No. 2 - 2002/217) follows my findings as to loss of good repute. I determine that the conduct of the operator over the relevant 3/4 year period leading up to this PI has been “so serious” as to require revocation of the licence and this operator ought to be put out of business.

I revoke the operator’s licence under sections 17(1) and (2) of the Act with effect from 00.00 on 15th Sept. 2026.

The call-up letter and my express warning to the operator/TM at the PI, advised the parties of the power to disqualify the operator, and its directors, from holding or obtaining an operator’s licence. Disqualification does not automatically follow revocation in these proceedings but the breadth, gravity and long duration of the features summarised in para. 236 above, make disqualification appropriate, proportionate and necessary in this case. I highlight in particular the willingness to compromise road safety by having unfit vehicles on the road, sometimes in flagrant breach of DVSA prohibitions, MOT failures and “unfit” declarations.

The operator company is disqualified from holding or obtaining an operator’s licence for 18 months with effect from 00.00 on 15th September 2026. The directors, Alexandra Cunningham and Antoni La Pilusa, are deemed to share equal and collective responsibility, for the serious failings on the licence. Ms Cunningham has been a constant as a director and she has previous PI history.

A warning letter was issued to the Alexandra Cunningham as a sole trader, in 2011 in respect of DVSA being unable to carry out a maintenance investigation. A further formal warning was issued to the operator and TM in 2018, and the licence was revoked in 2019 for lack of financial standing. Whilst she has delegated lead control to Antoni La Pilusa, I see no reason to distinguish between them as joint directors in terms of length of disqualification.

By way of contrast, the 3rd director James Fairchild, has only been a director since April 2026 and he has not been called in respect of his good repute. I take no action against him other than to note my findings regarding his role in the ET proceedings.

Regarding the separate call to PI for Antoni La Pilusa as a TM, Mr La Pilusa has a history of public inquiry hearings which, at the very least, confirm that he should know better the duties of an operator/TM and, that he has had more than adequate warning of the consequences of non-compliance.

In regulatory proceedings concerning licence PB10411280 – Alexandra Cunningham t/a A & A Coach Travel, Mr La Pilusa was the nominated TM.

In 2008 his repute was marked as tarnished. In 2010 he lost his good repute as TM, subsequently rescinded by TC, but formal warning issued.

In the same way that my findings regarding the unacceptable number of prohibitions, the high MOT failure rate, the breach of undertakings to keep vehicles fit and serviceable, the failure to keep proper records, and, failing to fulfil statements of expectations, makes revocation of the licence appropriate and necessary, it also provides the clearest evidence of Mr La Pilusa’s failure to provide “continuous and effective management” as a transport manager.

Mr La Pilusa’s repute as a TM is further undermined in this case by, his proven conduct in the ET proceedings, his direct involvement in the concealment of the commercial use of vehicles in a dangerous condition (see paras. 171-7 above) and his overall tardiness and lack of complete co-operation in his dealings with DVSA and OTC.

I have weighed in the balance the personal challenges outlined by Mr Pilusa, in August 2023 regarding his partner, in September 2024 regarding the fire, and, in June/July 2026 regarding health, but they do not excuse a pattern of behaviour over a period of 3/4 years leading up to this inquiry.

I determine that Antoni La Pilusa has lost his good repute as a transport manager having failed to effectively and continuously manage the transport activities of the operator. I take into account his previous warnings and the findings of the Employment Tribunal Judge in making that decision and in determining that the appropriate length of disqualification is indeterminate under Schedule 3, para. 7B(2) of the Act.

That disqualification is not disproportionate to the disqualification as a director as Mr La Pilusa needs to re-take and obtain the TM CPC before acting as a TM again, as a formal rehabilitation measure under para. 7C(2). I refer to the Upper Tribunal case of Silvertree Transport Ltd (2012/071).

All orders shall come into effect at 00.00 on 15th September 2026.

Anthony Seculer

Deputy Traffic Commissioner, North East Traffic Area.

5th August 2026

Published 10 September 2026

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