Decision for BOUDEN TRAVEL LTD T/A Bouden Coach Travel (PD1138814)
Written decision of the Deputy Traffic Commissioner in the West Midlands for BOUDEN TRAVEL LTD T/A Bouden Coach Travel, Morgan Knight, transport manager and drivers Obaida Yahya Qasem and Ting Bong Kan
IN THE WEST MIDLANDS TRAFFIC AREA
BOUDEN TRAVEL LTD T/A BOUDEN COACH TRAVEL – PD1138814
MORGAN KNIGHT – TRANSPORT MANAGER
OBAIDA YAHYA QASEM – DRIVER
TING BONG KAN – DRIVER
DECISION OF THE DEPUTY TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER
Decision
Pursuant to adverse findings under section 17(3)(aa), (c) and (e) of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (PPVA 1981) and further to the undertaking given below licence PD1138814 is curtailed under section 17(2)(d) of PPVA 1981 with effect from 23:45 hours on Sunday 11 October 2026 for an indefinite period and by attaching a condition to licence PD1138814 that the number of vehicles authorised under the licence is limited to 7 vehicles.
Reference to pages in the public inquiry brief are in square brackets e.g. [101].
Background
These joined proceedings are called under section 17 of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (PPVA 1981) and section 28 of the Transport Act 1985 relating to alleged breaches of operator licence PD1138814 by Bouden Travel Ltd trading as Bouden Coach Travel (the operator) and whether it’s transport manager, Ms Morgan Knight, has been exercising effective and continuous management. There are also 2 driver conduct matters called under sections 110-122 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 relating to drivers, Mr Obaida Yahya Qasem and Mr Ting Bong Kan. The public inquiry at 10.00am on 17 September 2026 was attended by Mr Adel Bouden, the operator’s sole director and Morgan Knight. Mr Qasem, Mr Kan and DVSA vehicle examiner Mr Austin Jones also attended. The operator was represented by Peter Cruikshank of Counsel. Mr Kan was assisted by a Cantonese interpreter, Ms Au Yeung.
The history of this matter is in the inquiry brief with background in the case summary [3-5] and call-in letter of 10 June 2026 [7-21]. I need not repeat this. In outline, the operator was granted a standard international public service vehicle licence on 13 July 2015. It is currently authorised for 14 vehicles and 14 trailers with 13 vehicles in possession working from its operating centre at Unit 18 Haywards Industrial Park, Orton Way, Birmingham B35 7BT. The operator provides coach services for aviation diversions, corporate events, occasional rail replacement services and some school services.
On 1 January 2026 DVSA received a complaint relating to a wheelchair passenger unable to board vehicle YT73BTE, a rail replacement service at Northampton Railway Station, at around 21:10 hours on 1 January 2026 [89-93]. Video footage of the incident was provided. On 16 January 2026 DVSA conducted an unannounced visit to the operating centre and met Mr Bouden and Mr Knight. The operator was aware of the complaint and that planned rail replacement services required a vehicle that was compliant with the Public Service Vehicles Accessibility Regulations 2000, No. 1970 as variously amended (PSVAR 2000). The DVSA officer was informed that although the driver, Obaida Qasem, was employed on a zero-hour contract he was fully trained in relation to PSVAR. He had been asked to cover the duty at short notice due to driver availability. The officer was also told that a video had been supplied by the complainant. The operator confirmed that customer relation training was being arranged for 3 February 2026. The DVSA report of 3 February 2026 [85-88] provided the following summary and recommendations:
“Following this incident and subsequent complaint it would appear that Bouden Travel Ltd are attempting to put measures in place to ensure future PSVAR compliance.
However, It appears that the procedures in place at the time were not robust enough when dealing with PSVAR requests and in this case the driver did not contact a responsible person representing his employer when faced with such requests.
Going forward it would appear that the operator is undertaking PSVAR refresher training with drivers and meeting with representatives of rail replacement services.
At this stage DVSA would recommend final consideration by The Office of The Traffic Commissioner.” [87-88]
A DVSA maintenance investigation visit report (MIVR) of 24 April 2026 [117-130] assessed two areas as unsatisfactory and recommended ‘Report to OTC’ with concerns arising from some incomplete record keeping, driver related defects being identified at PMI and above average MOT failure rates.
On 31 May 2026 vehicle YG22LUZ driven by Mr Ting Bong Kan received an S-marked prohibition due to the axle 1 and 2 offside suspension unit being deflated affecting vehicle control. There was also an emissions malfunction indicator lamp and an engine malfunction indicator lamp illuminated, indicating a fault on each. Mr Tan was issued with a £100 fixed penalty notice.
A DVSA pre-inquiry report of 8 September 2026 [358-359] concluded that driver walk round checks and defect reporting had not improved since the MIVR which has resulted in vehicles being operated in an unroadworthy condition, falling below the national average for PSVs, although the documents supplied on request appeared well completed.
The operator call-in letter referred to potential breaches of section 17(3)(a)(aa)(b)(c)(e) of the PPVA 1981. Due to the alleged breaches, concern was also raised that the operator may not have appropriate financial standing to hold an operator’s licence for the number of vehicles authorised and whether the company meets the requirement to be of good repute under section 14ZA(2) of the PPVA 1981. The call-in letter to Ms Knight of 8 June 2026 [22-33] explained that the inquiry would consider whether she continued to meet the requirements of good repute and professional competence in accordance with Schedule 3 of the PPVA 1981.The call-in letters to the drivers explained that the hearing would consider whether they should retain their LGV driving entitlement [431-433, 503-505].
Evidence and findings
Relevant evidence included the DVSA reports along with evidence received from the operator in relation to operations, management and finances in accordance with the case management directions.. I heard oral evidence from vehicle examiner Austin Jones; the two drivers, Obaida Qasem and Ting Bong Kan; director Adel Bouden; and transport manager Morgan Knight. As this is an existing licence the burden is on me to be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence as against the civil standard of proof, (i.e. on the balance of probabilities or, more likely than not) before making an adverse finding. Applying those standards to the evidence before me I make the findings below.
The operator accepted the shortcomings in the DVSA reports although it sought to explain and clarify some aspects of the shortcomings. I discuss these below. There are two primary concerns in this case whether the operator failed to comply with its PSVAR obligations and/or continues to do so. And whether its vehicle maintenance, management and oversight is such that it is non-compliant with the operator licencing provisions. I consider each in turn.
PSVAR
I have had the opportunity to review 2 videos of the 1 January 2026 incident provided to the DVSA. The driver, the operator and relevant staff and the DVSA had previously reviewed the videos. I have also reviewed the reports and operator’s responses to this. I have heard from Mr Qasem and the operator as to their respective positions.
My assessment of the incident on 1 January 2026 is that the operator was obliged to provide a PSVAR compliant service as part of the rail replacement bus service and it failed to do so. In my view, the non-compliance was caused by a failure to ensure that Mr Qasem fully understood how the vehicle’s wheelchair equipment operated rather than providing a non-compliant vehicle. Mr Qasem did try for some time to use the equipment but failed to activate the master control situated on the dashboard in the driver’s cab. He telephoned a friend in an effort to gain advice about how the equipment worked but without success. He did not phone the operator. After trying for around 10 minutes, the rail replacement staff at Northampton Station explained to Mr Qasem that the bus parked immediately behind vehicle YT73BTE was able to assist and it is understood that the passenger was able to travel on the alternative bus.
Paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 of PSVAR 2000 provides that:
(5) Any power-operated boarding lift or power-operated boarding ramp fitted to a regulated public service vehicle shall (subject to sub-paragraphs (6) to (9)):
(a) be capable of operation: (i) by means of a control situated in the driver’s cab, or (ii) by means of a control situated adjacent to the lift or ramp which shall only be capable of operation by means of a master control situated in the driver’s cab;
In my view, the master control was not an unusual feature unique to this vehicle, it is mandatory on all vehicles that use a lift or ramp as part of their accessibility equipment. Mr Qasem should have been aware of this at the time of the incident. From Mr Qasem’s evidence he appeared stressed and anxious during the incident no doubt concerned that he was unable to effectively work the equipment to enable the passenger to board his bus but also conscious that other passengers were being delayed. I accept that he was called to drive the bus replacement service as short notice and it appeared that Mr Qasem had not checked the equipment as part of his walk round check. Yet this equipment is a central component of a PSVAR compliant vehicle and must be checked along with the brakes, tyres, wheels, lights, seat belts and so on.
I accept that the driver had previously received training on operating wheelchair lifts and that he had informed the operator of this when he began working for them in May 2025 [348] but the driver had not used the equipment in his 3 years of part-time bus driving and had not checked the equipment when he began his work on 1 January 2026. The operator confirmed that training has subsequently been provided to all drivers on wheelchair access training and also on walk round checks. Although it remained unclear whether the required walk round checks include a check of all PSVAR equipment.
In summary I find that the non-compliance with the PSVAR 2000 arose through the failure of the driver not reminding himself of how the PSVAR equipment worked and failing to check that equipment during his walk around check. There was also a failure by the operator in failing to ensure that all drivers include a check of the PSVAR equipment during every walk round check.
Maintenance
The maintenance concerns that persist after the MIVR of 1 April 2026 and noted above in the pre-inquiry report have been exacerbated by the recent roadworthiness prohibitions. The operator and driver evidence for the failed suspension of vehicle YG22LUZ on 31 May 2026 was that the incident occurred while the vehicle was in motion and that the driver did not notice the suspension loss while driving. On later review, the mechanic advised that the fault could have occurred at any time and appeared to be a systemic fault that was being recorded regularly by the vehicle manufacturer [305]. The delayed prohibitions relating to illuminated indicator lamps for engine and emissions malfunction [221b] were again said to have arisen on the journey. The prohibition on 28 June 2026 related to an emergency lock that was not operating correctly on vehicle RE24TZH and needed repairing. The operator’s position is that the MOT pass rate is improving.
On balance, while the operator and transport manager have explained why the recent maintenance-based incidents have occurred, in my view they continue to point towards ineffective driver defect reporting and less than robust maintenance inspections. Further, the PMIs are carried on in-house and so the operator does have direct control and influence to ensure that they are carried out to the best possible standards.
Finances
There was discussion in private session about finances and I find that financial standing may be satisfied in the medium terms in the light of my decisions below.
Having regard to the above, I find that there have been the following breaches of the PPVA 1981:
- section 17(3)(aa) relating to undertakings given when applying for the licence including that vehicles are to be fit and serviceable, and that driver defect reporting would be undertaken with records kept for 15 months;
- section 17(3)(c) and that prohibition notices have been issued by the DVSA in the past five years; and,
- section 17(3)(e) and that there has been a material change in the circumstances of the operator in that it has breached the requirements of the PSVAR.
Decisions
The driver conduct matters are subject to separate decisions. In terms of the operator and transport manager and, having made the above findings, I consider paragraph 4 of the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document 10: The principles of decision making & the concept of proportionality (SD10). This underlines that the legislation exists to promote road safety and fair competition and that commissioners will have regard to the principle of proportionality in deciding what intervention is appropriate in the circumstances of each case. Paragraph 50 of SD10 notes that a traffic commissioner should consider all relevant negative and positive features of a case when reaching a decision.
The positive factors are that the operator responded promptly to the PSVAR complaint in terms of checking that its vehicle was compliant and in working order and also by addressing the concern of driver knowledge and understanding. It was important to ensure sufficient further training was provided to all staff. Similarly, the operator responded to the MIVR findings such that they are moving toward secure continuing compliance. However, there remains some work to be done.
The negative factors are that there have been material breaches of legislation and at the point of intervention by the DVSA it was in breach of its licence undertakings. I also have regard to the previous regulatory history as outlined in the case summary including that the operator was called to inquiry in March 2024, although I recognise that the concern at that time was on the engagement of drivers and that this has now been addressed by the operator.
One of the difficulties is that the operator and its transport manager have not, until recently, fully understood the nature and extent of their responsibilities under the operator licensing regime. Yet, operators are deemed to have knowledge of these. They make a declaration to that effect when they apply for their operator’s licence and on any subsequent application to continue or vary the licence. They are also expected to have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the advice and guidance that is publicly available. The Upper Tribunal in LA & Z Leonida t/a ETS [2014] UKUT 0423 (AAC) noted that:
- … it does not matter whether an operator’s licence is held by an owner operator, a partnership or a limited company because in each case the person or persons responsible for managing the business bear the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the road transport aspect of the business operates in compliance with the regulatory regime.
This means that they cannot plead ignorance or put the blame on others, such as drivers, they are jointly and severally responsible for non-compliance matters.
Taking into account the positive and negative factors noted above and by reference to the suggested starting points of regulatory action found in SD10, Annex 4, I find that this case may be regarded as serious to moderate. The operator offered an undertaking that it would carry out an independent audit in six months’ time. It also offered an undertaking to provide clear evidence of its financial standing including any long-term financial arrangements with the bank. I also have regard to the effect of any regulatory action proposed on the business.
I ask myself the question posed by the Upper Tribunal in 2009/225 Priority Freight & Paul Williams: do I trust this operator to be compliant in the future? Having regard to my findings, I answer that question: yes, I believe so. In the light of the above and accepting the undertaking that has been offered to me, I curtail the licence indefinitely from 14 vehicles to 7 vehicles from 23:45 hours on Sunday 11 October 2026. I do so to help ensure that the operator may focus on securing continuing compliance for that level of authorisation under the licence.
Should the operator wish to increase its authorisation to 8 vehicles, it can do so by requesting this in writing from the traffic commissioner. However, when doing so it must provide evidence of sufficient financial standing comprising the most recent 3 months bank statements and all other supporting material that demonstrates such standing. Should the operator wish to increase its authorisation beyond 8 vehicles it will need to formally apply to do so. In that regard it is likely to benefit from relying upon a favourable independent audit that records all areas of assessment as either satisfactory or mostly satisfactory.
In the light of the above findings, Ms Knight’s repute as a transport manager is tarnished but not lost.
Undertaking
The operator undertakes to identify an independent body to carry out an audit of transport safety and compliance systems. The audit will assess the systems for complying with maintenance and/or drivers hours requirements, and the effectiveness with which those systems are implemented. The audit should cover at least the applicable elements detailed in the guidance on Operator Compliance Audits available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/operator-compliance-audits. A copy of the report together with the operator’s detailed proposals for implementing the report’s recommendations is to be uploaded to the licence record via the Vehicle Operator Licensing self-service account, or, if the operator does not have a self-service account, emailed to notifications@vehicle-operator-licensing.service.gov.uk by 31 March 2027.
28 September 2026
Dr Paul Stookes
Deputy Traffic Commissioner