Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills
This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers’ skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior
Abstract
This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers’ skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers’ skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers’ employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.
This work is part of the Closing the Gender Gap in Africa: evaluating new policies and programmes for women’s economic empowerment programme
Citation
Eliana Carranza, Robert Garlick, Kate Orkin, Neil Rankin (2020) Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 9345
Link
Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills