Research and analysis

Foreward, Executive summary

Published 29 October 2026

Foreword

We are pleased to publish this year’s State of the Nation report, fulfilling the Commission’s statutory responsibility to report to Parliament on the condition of social mobility in the UK.

This report should be read as the next stage in the programme of work we began several years ago. Our starting point was that the national debate on social mobility needed to be grounded more securely in evidence. 

Since introducing our new Social Mobility Index in 2022, we have continually expanded its reach and rigour by adding demographic breakdowns across sex, ethnicity and disability, as well as launching our interactive Data Explorer Tool. Subsequent iterations have deepened our geographical precision down to upper-tier local authorities and broadened our scope to include long-term trend tracking and international comparisons. Together, these steady enhancements make this body of work the most comprehensive reporting on social mobility ever produced in the UK.

Our approach to social mobility

Since 2022, we have advocated using this foundation of monitoring data to reshape how we understand and address social mobility in public policy. For too long, public debate has focused on a “lucky few” model of social mobility: identifying a small number of high-performing individuals from lower socio-economic starting points and supporting their entry into elite universities and professions. This approach treats social mobility as a zero-sum game, managing a fixed supply of opportunities rather than expanding them. It addresses neither the “stickiness” at the top that protects entrenched privilege, nor the stickiness at the bottom that leads to long-lasting cycles of low opportunity and poor outcomes for some individuals, families and communities. 

Our approach shifts away from this distributional view toward a framework grounded in economic growth theory. The evidence points to the fundamental role of the economy in producing as well as distributing opportunities, linking innovative growth directly to upward social mobility. This challenge is not best understood through conventional equality, diversity and inclusion methodologies for analysing inequality. Instead, upward social mobility is fostered by open elites, created through competition, enterprise, business development and the creation of higher level occupations. Drawing on the work of Philippe Aghion and others, this framework shows that in a stagnant economy, relative mobility becomes increasingly positional, where one person’s advancement comes at the expense of another. By contrast, dynamic economies generate new firms, industries and routes to success. The central policy challenge is therefore not simply who gets access to existing elite roles, but whether the economy generates sufficient opportunity for broad-based advancement across all regions. This perspective connects social mobility directly to growth, innovation, entrepreneurship, skills and place.

Viewed in this way, social mobility’s greatest contribution is not that it tells us who gets ahead, but that it reveals whether our economic and social institutions are working properly. 

A society characterised by open competition, innovation, economic dynamism and widespread opportunity should produce both growth and mobility. Conversely, a society characterised by monopolisation, inherited advantage and geographical exclusion will tend to produce both low growth and low mobility. The value of the social mobility lens is therefore that it reveals the connections between these moving parts. It can help policymakers distinguish between symptoms and causes, outcomes and mechanisms, and interventions that merely reshuffle opportunities versus those that genuinely expand them. This offers a more powerful vantage point for public policy than frameworks that focus only on redistribution, representation or access in isolation.

Our ambition has been that this analysis of social mobility would provide an organising framework for addressing regional inequalities. It reinvigorates the “growth and reform” mantra that characterised the first devolution deal in England, in Greater Manchester in 2014, treating the two as intimately connected within a single coherent framework. As such, our recommendation is that social mobility should sit squarely within the emerging framework of devolution. This provides a coherent focus for each deal, establishing a strong framework for setting targets and measuring performance through place-based approaches to innovation, growth and improved life chances. 

To support this ambition, we have produced a large body of evidence and practical tools. This portfolio of work includes detailed geographical data across 203 local authorities, alongside research into the cultural and perceptual issues associated with social mobility and place. Through our Economic Growth and Innovation Group (EGIG) framework and associated tools, we enable the measurement of growth and innovation across the UK. We have also published research on the developmental factors and family circumstances most strongly associated with positive child outcomes. Furthermore, our growing body of work on the “sticky bottom”, where opportunity is least evident, examines youth unemployment, Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEET) rates and those in long-term receipt of welfare. As local structures take shape, we continue to make the case for integrating these evidence‑based solutions directly into devolution deals.

Key advances in the 2026 report

Our State of the Nation report for 2026 builds directly on this foundation. It marks three major analytical advances. First, we have used newly available linked census records from the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study to follow people from childhood into adulthood and compare their education, occupation and housing with their parents’. This is gold-standard data that allows us to examine long-term mobility outcomes in England and Wales over the last thirty years. Second, we have also developed new analysis using travel-to-work areas, which better reflect real local labour markets than administrative boundaries. And third, we have used census data to examine how the occupational structure of local areas has changed over 20 years across England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 

This robust evidence base challenges the sweeping claims that too often dominate public debate: that the UK is in a permanent state of crisis, that mobility is uniformly worsening, or that the only question that matters is how to widen access to a narrow range of elite professions. The reality is far more nuanced. Understanding this complexity allows us to be precise about what the barriers are, where they exist and what targeted improvements are required.

Our findings show significant variations across time, domain, geography and demographic groups. Recognising these patterns is essential if we are to design policy that delivers real, lasting opportunity across every corner of the UK.

Changes over time

In 1991, before the great expansion of higher education at the end of the 20th century, higher education inequalities were extremely high (around 40 percentage points between people from graduate and non-graduate families), but housing inequalities were particularly low (around 20 percentage points those from owner and renter families). Occupational inequalities were in between.

By 2021, the inequalities in all three domains had converged. Higher educational inequalities fell to 33 points (for both men and women), occupational inequalities to 25 points and housing inequalities rose to 36 points. In other words, intergenerational educational, occupational and housing inequalities of opportunity were much less different from each other (for early-career young men and women).

Relative occupation and occupational-wage mobility nuanced but stable

Much of the debate on social mobility focuses on relative mobility, which compares the chances of people from different socio-economic backgrounds reaching a particular outcome. Although some point to a decline, the new data confirms that relative mobility has been much more stable than suggested, though important nuances exist. 

Relative occupational mobility has improved among early-career people, but has shown little change among those in mid-career. At the same time, relative occupational-wage mobility has recently improved among early- and mid-career men and women after a long period of increasing stickiness. But among young women, relative mobility still remains significantly worse than it was among young women thirty years ago.

Despite drawing on different data sources and methodologies, both State of the Nation 2023 and 2025 reached this exact same conclusion. National survey cohorts and crossnational studies show a consistent pattern of broad stability rather than systematic decline. This alignment across distinct approaches reinforces our core argument that improving life chances depends fundamentally on expanding opportunity, which means creating more professional jobs and reducing regional disparities across the UK.

Absolute mobility matters

Relative mobility is an important measure, but absolute mobility is equally important, if not more so. Absolute mobility measures the overall percentage of the population who achieve a different or higher socio-economic position than their parents, showing whether a society is expanding total opportunity and real-term progress across generations. What enhances people’s outcomes is when the absolute number of opportunities increases, because the economy generates more managerial and professional occupations. This expansion is what allows large numbers of people to “move up” and it has been the defining story of social mobility in the UK since the 1970s.

Our new analysis offers a more reliable assessment of these long-term trends. It reveals that upward occupational mobility from the working class has risen substantially over the last 30 years. This means that more young people from working-class backgrounds have obtained professional jobs than in their parents’ generation. However, this upward momentum has recently slowed.

Education mobility improving

Upward educational mobility has improved substantially. Among people from nongraduate families, the proportion gaining degrees has risen sharply since 1991, reaching 33% for men and 42% for women aged 28 to 37 in 2021. And this has been associated with an improvement in equality of opportunity for higher education. Long-range upward occupational mobility from working-class origins has also increased. These are important gains and they should not be ignored.

Housing mobility declining

Housing mobility has moved in the opposite direction. In 1991, 67% of men and 65% of women aged 28 to 37 who had grown up in rented accommodation were homeowners. By 2021, these figures had almost halved, to 37% and 33%. This matters, because social mobility is not only about education or occupational class; it is also about the ability to build security, family life and independence. If housing becomes increasingly dependent on family background, then inherited advantage becomes more important.

Different outcomes for different groups

The report shows why we cannot treat social mobility as a single “national average”,

whether good or bad. Girls and young women continue to do better than boys and young men in education, yet this advantage does not translate fully into occupational level or pay. Many ethnic minority groups show strong educational outcomes, but some do not receive the same rewards in the labour market. Disabled young people, especially those from lower socio-economic backgrounds, continue to face persistent barriers.

Immediate concerns for young people

There are also immediate concerns for the next generation. Some of the drivers of mobility remain positive: parental education and professional employment have continued to rise, and business investment in research and development has nearly returned to its recent peak. But the transition from education into work has become more difficult. NEET rates among 16- to 18-year-olds reached 9% in 2024, the highest since 2012, and youth unemployment among 16- to 24-year-olds was around 16% in 2025. We need to ask whether enough young people are finding a place in education, training and work.

The importance of place and geography

And of course, geography runs through all of this. Our analysis of travel-to-work areas shows that opportunity cannot be understood properly by looking only at local authority boundaries. Some city regions generate strong labour-market opportunities across wider commuting zones. At the same time, some smaller coastal, rural and former industrial labour markets face weaker conditions, which can be hidden in broader area averages. The census analysis tells a similar story. The UK has shifted towards higher-professional employment, but those opportunities are not evenly spread across the country.

Turning evidence into action

For the Commission, the implication is clear. Social mobility policy should not be concerned only with helping a small number of people move into elite occupations. Nor should it reduce itself to identifying disparities and assuming that all gaps can be closed in the same way. Disparity analysis can be useful, but it is not enough.

We must actively build the supply of opportunity, driving enterprise, innovation and private-sector growth to expand the total volume of higher-level, higher-paid occupations across every nation and region. Placing this challenge at the heart of the devolution mission will ensure that growth is felt in local labour markets rather than concentrated in traditional hubs.

At the same time, policy must align education and housing directly with this growth narrative. Education remains vital, but it must operate in lockstep with economic demand by widening routes into employment, embracing technical qualifications alongside academic paths and dismantling the systemic barriers that cause persistent educational underperformance in specific communities. Similarly, housing must be treated as a pillar of growth and mobility alike; without restoring homeownership and housing security for young people, inherited backgrounds will continue to overshadow talent and effort. Addressing the challenges highlighted in this report demands a joined-up strategy centered on economic growth, absolute opportunity and place. Only with this renewed focus will social mobility become a meaningful reality for every individual and community across the UK.

Alun Francis,

Chair of the Social Mobility Commission

Executive summary

The Social Mobility Commission (SMC) monitors social mobility across the UK and makes recommendations to improve social mobility in England. Our annual report looks at the relationship between a person’s socio-economic background and where they end up in life, and at the conditions that support mobility across the UK. This year, we’ve strengthened the evidence base in 3 main ways: by adding analysis from the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study (ONS-LS), by using census data to examine long-term changes in occupational structure, and by introducing travel-to-work area (TTWA) analysis to reflect real local labour markets rather than administrative boundaries. This has given us more reliable measures using gold-standard evidence and has allowed us to undertake new analysis in underexplored areas like Northern Ireland.

Once again, our report is organised around our Social Mobility Index, which is our long-term project to develop and publish social mobility statistics enabling comparison over time. The Index has 3 linked pillars: mobility outcomes, intermediate outcomes and drivers. Mobility outcomes show where people end up later in life compared with their parents; intermediate outcomes show earlier points in the life course, such as educational attainment and early labour-market position; and drivers show the social and economic conditions that may make future mobility easier (or harder).

Across these chapters, the evidence shows some signs of improving mobility, especially on education and aspects of occupational mobility. For example, we see that parental education is now a much less important factor in whether children get degrees or not. However, there are also clear causes for concern, especially on housing, youth labour-market conditions and unequal access to good jobs.

In chapter 2, the clearest positive long-term trend is in upward educational mobility. Among people from non-graduate families, the proportion who went on to gain degrees rose from 11% of men and 7% of women in 1991 to 33% of men and 42% of women in 2021. Relative educational mobility has also improved, meaning that parental education has become a weaker predictor of whether children go to university, although inequalities remain.

Occupational mobility also shows some improvements. Among early-career adults, long-range upward mobility from working-class families into professional occupations rose from 25% of men and 20% of women in 1991 to 36% and 38% respectively in 2021. However, the pace of increase has slowed and relative occupational mobility has changed much less among people in mid-career.

In contrast to many other mobility outcomes, upward housing mobility, meaning movement from rented accommodation in childhood to owner-occupation in adulthood, has fallen sharply. Among early-career adults, it fell from 67% of men and 65% of women in 1991 to 37% and 33% respectively in 2021. By 2021, around 1.7 million people aged 28 to 37 years in England and Wales had experienced downward housing mobility, compared with around 850,000 who had experienced upward housing mobility. This means that parental homeownership has become an increasingly important factor in whether young adults can own their own homes. The evidence on occupational-wage mobility is more cautious, because wages are inferred from occupations. However, it also suggests that relative wage mobility for young women remains worse than it was in 1991.

Chapter 3 shows that educational success does not always translate into similar labour-market rewards. Girls outperform boys from age 5 years through to university, but since the pandemic GCSE results for girls have fallen more sharply than those for boys. Among non-disadvantaged girls, the share achieving a grade-5 pass in English and maths fell from 61% in 2020 to 55% in 2025, while among disadvantaged girls it fell from 34% to 27%. 

The ethnicity findings also show contrasting outcomes. By age 16 years, nearly 73% of free-school-meal-eligible pupils from the Chinese ethnic group met the benchmark level of a grade 5 or above in both GCSE English and maths, compared with 4% of Gypsy or Roma pupils. Yet strong educational outcomes do not always lead to equivalent labour market outcomes for all groups. Disabled young people face especially persistent barriers. For those from lower working-class backgrounds, the disability gap in economic activity remained at 32 percentage points and disabled graduates earned 8% less than non-disabled graduates with the same level of qualification.

Chapter 4 gives a mixed picture of the conditions shaping future mobility. There are positive signs in parental resources. In 2025, 45% of adults living in households with dependent children had a degree or above and 48% were in professional roles. Business investment in research and development also rose to £55.6 billion in 2024, close to its 2021 peak, which may support future growth in high-skilled opportunities. However, the data suggests that the immediate outlook for young people remains challenging. The proportion of 16- to 18-year-olds who were not in education, employment or training (NEET) reached 9% in 2024, the highest level since 2012, while youth unemployment among 16- to 24-year-olds rose to around 16% in 2025. The vacancy-to-jobseeker ratio also fell from 0.7 in 2023 to 0.4 in 2025, suggesting fewer opportunities for those entering the labour market.

Chapter 5 shows that geography can make these opportunities look different depending on the boundaries used. Local authorities (LAs) often do not reflect the realities of labour markets, because people frequently live in one area and work in another. TTWA analysis therefore reveals opportunities and disadvantages that LA analysis can hide. The most favourable labour market opportunities for young people and the strongest environments for innovation and growth remain concentrated in the south of England and in major city regions, with London, Oxford, Reading, Bristol and Edinburgh standing out. But the analysis also shows more favourable opportunities outside the South East, including Leeds, Derby, Preston and York. The main concern is that some smaller and more remote labour markets, including coastal areas such as Cromer & Sheringham, Skegness & Louth, Boston, and Margate & Ramsgate, appear much less favourable when analysed as real commuting zones rather than as parts of larger administrative areas.

Chapter 6 adds a longer and more precise picture of how the job mix has changed across the UK. Over the last 20 years, the higher professional class has grown and the higher working class has declined, reflecting the continuing shift towards a post-industrial, knowledge-intensive economy. But the gains have been unevenly distributed. In England, the higher professional class grew by 6.8 percentage points in Leeds and 7.7 points in Bristol, while places such as Birmingham, Middlesbrough, Stoke-on-Trent and Kingston upon Hull saw much smaller increases. London was unusual: its 5.9-point increase in the higher professional class was offset by a matching 5.9-point fall in the lower professional class. Northern Ireland showed particularly strong growth in the higher professional class and had largely caught up with Wales’s class profile by 2021.

Taken together, the chapters show that the UK has made real gains in education and in some forms of occupational mobility, but these gains do not guarantee equal access to secure, well-paid work or affordable housing. Social mobility policy therefore cannot rely on education and skills alone. People also need access to good jobs, fair pay, affordable housing and local economies that provide real opportunities without requiring people to leave the places where they grew up.