Transparency data

Minutes of the meeting held on 21 January

Published 20 March 2026

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Chair:

Dr Stephen Brien

Members: 

Les Allamby
Fran Bennett
Joanne Cairns
Bruce Calderwood
Rachel Chiu
Tom Clark
Daphne Hall
Phil Jones
Richard Machin
Owen McCloskey
Jacob Meagher
Professor Sharon Wright

Apologies:

Dr Suzy Walton

1. Private session

[Partially reserved item]

1.5. The Committee endorsed the Regulations Sub-group’s recommendation that the following regulations were suitable candidates for clearance by correspondence:

  • Social Security and Statutory Maternity Pay (Miscellaneous Amendment) Regulations 2026
  • Discretionary Financial Assistance and Discretionary Housing Payments (Amendment and Revocation) Regulations 2026
  • The Social Security Benefits Up-rating Regulations 2026

1.6. The Committee agreed that it was content for the above regulations to proceed as planned. The Chair asked the Committee Secretary to write to the Department to confirm the outcome, but to note:

  • In light of the modernisation of the claim process for Statutory Maternity Pay and Maternity Allowance, the Committee would like a briefing on its progress and further details of how it is operating, at an appropriate point once it has been established; and
  • Following the introduction of the Crisis Resilience Fund, the Committee requests a briefing on progress and how the new arrangements are operating, once it has been established; while ensuring that Discretionary Housing Payments in Wales are still offering the required support and are working effectively.

2. The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Claims and Payments) (Amendment) Regulations 2026

2.1. The Chair welcomed the following officials to the meeting:

  • James Wolfe (Director, Poverty Families and Disadvantage Directorate)
  • Amy Morgan (Deputy Director, Universal Credit Analysis Division)
  • Duncan Gilchrist (Deputy Director, Child Maintenance, Decision Making & Appeals, Poverty, Families and Disadvantage Directorate)
  • James Snelling (Grade 6, Universal Credit Policy Team Leader for Health, Childcare, Initial Assessment Period, Advances and Deductions)
  • Zaidah Chisty (Grade 7, Universal Credit Policy).

2.2. Introducing the item, James Wolfe confirmed that the intent of the regulations is to ensure that parents receiving Child Maintenance (CM) via deductions from the absent parent’s Universal Credit (UC) do not suffer as a result of the changes to the Fair Repayment Rate (FRR). UC has a priority deductions order to determine the order in which debt repayment is made. The regulations remove the existing sunset clause within the 2025 Modification Regulations and adjust the priority order of deductions from UC to ensure that CM deductions continue to be taken where appropriate (by moving them to the top of the order). It was stressed that deductions policy does not change the debt people owe to their creditors; they pay less over a longer period. He noted that Ministers are keen to ensure that this does not result in parents with care receiving less CM from the absent parent.

2.3. The regulations have been modelled on the basis of their likely outcome and the Department has previously briefed the Committee on the interim findings of its evaluation. Further analysis has been undertaken looking at the interaction between the FRR and the change in the deduction’s priority order and the ability to exceed the deductions cap for the CM deduction to be deducted from a UC award. Under previous policy iterations, deductions have been reduced from a potential 40 per cent to a maximum of 25 per cent, and now 15 per cent, of a household’s UC standard allowance. This was intended to leave low‑income households with more disposable income. However, a consequence was that the overall number of CM deductions deducted from UC would be reduced, given its placement in the priority order due to higher‑priority deductions, meaning some receiving parents would no longer receive payments.

2.4. It was highlighted that the latest analysis remains intertwined with FRR and therefore the impact on paying parents cannot be wholly separated from the priority order change. The Department modelled effects using outturn debt characteristics and applied three scenarios (pre‑change, FRR only, FRR plus CM deduction priority) to estimate resulting deduction packages. It was indicated that the preliminary outturn, following implementation, roughly aligns with earlier expectations. [REDACTED TEXT][footnote 1]

2.5. The Committee’s initial views were sought on whether further areas require focus ahead of the introduction of regulations to remove the sunset clause and make the CM deduction priority change permanent in April 2026. In addition, the Department confirmed that it would continue to monitor the FRR and CM deduction change impacts, by working closely with external stakeholders such as Citizens Advice and third‑party creditors.

2.6 Committee members raised the following main questions in discussion:

The policy intention stems from the introduction of the FRR, which reduces the overall cap on deductions from a customer’s UC standard allowance. The FRR was designed to reduce hardship caused by high deductions and to leave low‑income households with more disposable income. However, the reduction in the overall deductions cap risked displacing some CM deductions in favour of other higher‑priority debts. Without intervention, this would have caused receiving parents, often themselves in poverty, to lose income.

Ministers did not wish to create a situation in which receiving parents lost out financially because the FRR reshaped repayment priorities. Accordingly, moving CM up the priority order was a pragmatic, technical mechanism to maintain CM flows. While there are links to child‑poverty considerations, the intention was not to create a new poverty‑reduction instrument, but rather to preserve the intended distributional impacts of the FRR and prevent unintended losses for parents with care receiving child maintenance payments.

Has the change in the deductions order been a pragmatic way to support the finances of poor households?

The priority‑order adjustment was adopted specifically to prevent the FRR intended to help the poorest households from inadvertently reducing income to receiving parents. By ensuring that CM was maintained as a higher priority, the policy safeguarded cashflows to vulnerable households. This pragmatic approach ensured that the policy did not undermine its own fairness goals.

This is not the first time the priority order has been altered for policy reasons. Please confirm the rationale for treating the CM adjustment similarly?

Prioritisation rules have been changed previously to support broader policy aims. The CM deduction change was made to support vulnerable receiving households[footnote 2] and to align the deductions framework with the FRR’s intention of improving financial resilience among low‑income families.

What is the difference in data between the initial modelling and the emerging results?

The updated modelling includes two months of actual operational data. [REDACTED TEXT][footnote 3]. The outcomes remain broadly aligned with expectations, and the change in the number of CM payers affected broadly reflects the growth in the UC caseload between May 2024 when impacts were first modelled and August 2025 when implementation data was available.

What deductions have been displaced as a result of moving CM up the priority order?

The largest displacement relates to council tax arrears. Because CM deduction now sits higher in the deductions order, more CM deductions are being made, and council tax deductions have correspondingly fallen. This aligns with modelling and reflects the design of the policy. [REDACTED TEXT], it does not appear to have adverse impacts on claimants. [footnote 4]

Given that approximately [REDACTED TEXT][footnote 5] pay more, what level of negative consequences would be necessary for the Department’s diagnostic systems to detect harm?

The monitoring combines customer contact data and reports from third-party creditors. To date, none of these sources show increased hardship linked to the CM deduction change. When considering what scale of issue would be detectable, such channels typically pick up emerging welfare problems reliably. The absence of observable signals therefore suggests that any harmful impacts are likely to be small. Many UC claimants have short-term or volatile circumstances, making survey‑based approaches impractical. Instead, qualitative monitoring provides a proportionate mechanism.

Following the Department’s diagnostic work across multiple sources, does it remain confident that no significant signal of harm has emerged?

Analysis interrogated multiple datasets deliberately to avoid bias. Evidence was cross‑checked from DWP call logs, Citizens Advice, Ofgem, Ofwat, and other stakeholders. Across all sources, no sign of material hardship has appeared, and monitoring will continue.

What significant adverse consequences might arise from changes in deduction rates such as eviction, disconnection, or fines enforcement and how has this risk been assessed?

It was acknowledged that the potential catastrophic consequences (such as eviction or prison for unpaid fines) relate primarily to the FRR, not specifically to the CM deduction change. Evidence indicates no heightened risk of eviction or utilities disconnection. [REDACTED TEXT][footnote 6]

Most council tax impacts arise from the FRR, not the CM deduction change. Council tax arrears shifts attributable to the CM deduction change are comparatively small. [REDACTED TEXT][footnote 7]

How can the Department assess the position of small numbers of paying parents who may face significant deductions, including those paying up to 40 per cent of the standard allowance? Could experimental administrative data help identify vulnerable groups, and what flexibility exists for those in difficulty?

Affected paying parents typically experience increases of [REDACTED TEXT] per month. [REDACTED TEXT] [footnote 8]. Regarding flexibility, CM deductions are fixed by regulations, but DWP Debt Management can pause or reschedule advances repayments and advise on negotiations with third‑party creditors.

Could CM deductions result in scenarios where paying parents with children in their care lose more income than intended, and could future data better balance the wellbeing of children across both households?

[REDACTED TEXT][footnote 9]. CM policy is based on the principle of ensuring that absent parents contribute financially to their children, while care contributions reduce liability. Future experimental datasets will allow analysis of matched household types, enabling a fuller picture of any cross‑household impacts on children’s wellbeing.

Where paying parents genuinely struggle to cope with overall deductions, is there flexibility within the system to prevent severe hardship?

Although CM deductions are set to be deducted at a fixed amount, other deductions, particularly UC advances can be suspended or reduced temporarily. Debt Management teams can support claimants to renegotiate repayment schedules, ensuring that claimants have options to manage acute financial strain.

Given that some local authorities escalate council tax enforcement very   quickly while others do not, what regional variations exist and how might these affect households?

[REDACTED TEXT].[footnote 10] The dual purpose of CM deductions is to support struggling parents with care, and to ensure that non-custodial parents meet their responsibilities. CM reduces poverty overall, although this is not its sole design purpose.

Parents with care gain around £29 per month, net of fees. When will updated experimental data be available, and how do fees affect payment flows?

The collection fee is £1.40 per week. Paying parents typically pay £36.40 monthly, with receiving parents receiving approximately £29 after fees. More up‑to‑date experimental data on poverty impacts will be forthcoming once the dataset covers the policy implementation period. The Department agreed that they would provide a further presentation to the Committee when that data was available.

  For lone‑parent paying households, who may retain less of their UC award than other households, is mitigation possible without undermining the policy objective?

Liability is based solely on income and care patterns; the system does not compare household standards of living. [REDACTED TEXT][footnote 11]. CM inherently transfers resources from paying parents to receiving households, and this design is central to the system’s purpose.

Given the Department’s monitoring, does it remain appropriate to proceed without mitigation?

There is no evidence across any monitoring channels to justify mitigation. If significant harm had emerged, mitigations would have been recommended. Existing flexibilities remain available for those who request support, and there is high confidence in the policy’s performance.

Should the Department issue guidance to LAs and the voluntary sector to ensure that any emerging hardship cases are spotted early?

All agreed that clearer communication would have no downside and confirmed that stakeholder engagement will be strengthened now that the policy may become permanent.

Does the Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) sufficiently present the underlying reasoning and trade‑offs behind the policy, including material losses experienced by some households?

The EIA does not fully describe the broader pattern of impacts or clearly articulate the reasoning behind accepting certain adverse impacts as proportionate. Nor does it reflect the interaction between the FRR and the CM deduction changes. The Department committed to reviewing EIA drafting practices.

Does the EIA omit the broad pattern that CM payers did not benefit from the FRR in the same way as other groups, and could future EIAs provide clearer narrative?

The EIA focuses heavily on gainers and losers without setting out the systemic pattern specifically; that some CM deduction payers as a group did not benefit from the FRR in the same way as others and that protected characteristics were disproportionately represented. The Department committed to include richer narrative context in future EIAs and to ensure that cumulative policy interactions are made clearer.

2.7. The Chair thanked officials for attending and for the constructive and candid discussion. He also highlighted some areas where the Department could better assist the Committee in the future, namely by:

  • Providing clearer guidance to local authorities and third‑sector organisations on monitoring and reporting potential hardship cases;
  • Reviewing the Equality Impact Assessment, including the interaction of multiple policies; and
  • Providing illustrative case examples in future documentation.

2.8. In subsequent private discussion, the Committee agreed that it would not take the regulations on formal reference. However, it was agreed that the Chair would write to James Wolfe, copied to the Minister for Social Security and Disability, to recommend that the Department:[footnote 12]

  • Continues to monitor the impacts of the policy, including any differential effects on lone parents and the children in their care.
  • Retains flexibility in applying mitigations where individual circumstances may justify adjustments.
  • Keeps under review how the policy aligns with the Government’s wider child-poverty objectives and Article 14[footnote 13] considerations.
  • Ensures clear signposting through the Child Maintenance Service to debt advice and other appropriate support services, with provision of clear guidance on the treatment of CM within debt-advice assessments.
  • Update the Committee in due course on the Department’s monitoring activity and any mitigations under consideration (or indeed implemented).

3. The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment and Employment Support Allowance (Amendment) Regulations 2026

3.1. The Chair welcomed the following officials to the meeting:

  • Graeme Connor (Deputy Director, Health and Disability Reform)
  • Alex Fleming (Grade 6, Health and Disability Reform)
  • Joel Weston (Grade 6, Disability and Health Support)
  • Sonal Devshi (Grade 7, Health and Disability Reform)
  • Caitlin McCourt (SEO, Health and Disability Reform)

3.2. Introducing the session, Graeme Connor and Alex Fleming explained that the proposed Right to Try regulations form the first stage of what could be an expanded set of policy proposals if Ministers were minded to go further. At a high level, the proposals are intended to encourage more claimants of Universal Credit (UC), New Style Employment and Support Allowance (NS ESA) and Personal Independence Payment (PIP) to engage in paid or voluntary work. The proposals clarify in regulations that doing so will not automatically trigger a reassessment of benefit entitlement. They noted that the policy was first committed to in the 2024 Labour Party Manifesto and then in the Pathways to Work: Reforming Benefits and Support to Get Britain Working Green Paper.[footnote 14] The Government then published these draft regulations during the passage of the Universal Credit Act 2025. In essence, the regulations codify in law policy that has been mandated in guidance for a number of years. By doing so it is hoped that more claimants get a more solid assurance to try work, in contrast to the current picture whereby many claimants do not understand the rules around working and claiming, or do not trust the Department, so avoid taking a chance on work.

3.3. In practice, work coaches and decision makers are already expected to ensure that when a claimant engages in work, or seeks to do so, this does not constitute a relevant change of circumstances which triggers a new Work Capability Assessment (WCA) assessment or PIP award review. However, many claimants have remained fearful that any move into work, including volunteering, might be used against them in a future assessment. By setting out in regulations that undertaking work or voluntary activity alone will not in and of itself trigger a reassessment, the Department hopes to provide greater certainty and visibility than can be achieved through guidance alone.

3.4. The Department outlined how the Right to Try policy could possibly evolve, should Ministers be minded to do so:

  • Stage one: Codify current practice in regulations and extend this to voluntary work, thereby clarifying that voluntary activity as well as paid work should not, in isolation, be treated as a reason for reassessment.
  • Stage two: Amend and improve guidance for claimants, staff and stakeholders and conduct a communications plan to clarify both the current rules of working while claiming and the purpose of these regulations
  • Stage three: [footnote 15]

3.5. The Department indicated that while these regulations aim to be a positive enabler which improves employment outcomes, an assessment of impact is constrained by a lack of evidence, On this point it also noted that given the variety of barriers people with health conditions and disabilities can have (which can be transient or can change), there are real methodological challenges in evaluating whether a small benefit rule change like this will be the deciding factor in moving people into work. However, it is confident that these regulations should be seen as a positive first step [REDACTED TEXT] [footnote 16]

3.6. Committee members raised the following main questions in discussion:

Could you explain more fully what additional value the proposed regulations will deliver beyond what is already achieved through existing guidance? In particular, to what extent are these regulations simply converting current practice into legislation, and to what extent are they intended to drive a material increase in the numbers of disabled and health affected claimants of UC, NS ESA and PIP who feel able to try work or volunteering?

The principal purpose of the regulations is to put beyond doubt, on the face of legislation, that undertaking paid or voluntary work, in and of itself, will not trigger a reassessment. While current guidance already reflects this position (in the case of paid work), DWP research and stakeholder and claimant feedback suggests that claimants are not always aware of the guidance or, if they are, many mistrust the Department based on poor, previous experience.

The act of legislating is therefore intended to demonstrate the Government’s seriousness of intent and provide a clearer and more visible assurance than guidance alone can offer. Although the policy is part of a wider effort to support more disabled people and people with health conditions into work, the Department does not expect this first stage, by itself, to shift the disability employment rate significantly.

How closely do the proposed regulations mirror the Department’s current guidance, and where do they go further, particularly in relation to voluntary work? To what extent is voluntary work the genuinely “new” element in regulatory terms, as opposed to a simple restatement of existing practice on paid employment?

In relation to paid work, the regulations largely reflect the position already set out in existing guidance: namely, that taking up employment does not automatically constitute a change of circumstances requiring an immediate reassessment. The main innovation in regulatory terms is the explicit reference to voluntary work, which is not currently articulated in legislation and is dealt with less clearly in guidance. This later change is a direct consequence of a recommendation by the Right to Try Collaboration Committee.

Given the reference to hundreds of thousands of claimants who might consider work, what level of additional movement into work or volunteering is the Department realistically expecting as a result of codifying current practice in regulations and enhancing communications? Is there any working estimate, such as tens of thousands, of additional people entering work, or is it not possible to quantify the likely impact at this stage?

The available evidence does not support a robust quantitative estimate of the additional number of people who might move into work as a result of these regulations. As previously described, there are many factors affecting disabled people’s labour market participation, and it is difficult to isolate what impact this specific measure will have. The Department does not forecast a substantial change in employment rates arising solely from these regulations. That said, officials were confident that these regulations are a positive enabling step to encouraging more claimants to work.

Given that around one fifth of PIP recipients are already in work, and the policy is framed as a contribution to tackling economic inactivity, is this the most appropriate mechanism for achieving that goal? What is the rationale for including PIP, given that entitlement to PIP is not, in itself, contingent on whether a claimant is in work or capable of work? Is there a risk that bringing PIP within the scope of these regulations could inadvertently increase fear among PIP claimants that their work activity will be scrutinised more closely or will be used against them in future assessments?

Ministers are keen that all three benefits, UC, NS ESA and PIP are in scope. Including PIP in the regulations helps reinforce the message that people can receive PIP and be in work. There is a legitimate concern that greater visibility of PIP in this context might heighten anxiety among some claimants and this risk would need to be carefully managed through communications and guidance. PIP has been included in the scope of Right to Try as an intentional response to the Government’s desire to tackle economic inactivity and because evidence shows that fear of losing benefits remains a significant barrier to trying work among PIP claimants.

It is true that dual PIP and UC and/or NS ESA claimants can face the prospect of another scheduled PIP award review or work capability (re)assessment. At the moment, these assessments are conducted based on existing legislation and guidance. These regulations do not alter these in any way. The Department acknowledged the Committee’s point and agreed to further explore and, if necessary and appropriate, make clearer, in guidance, how the two assessments should operate together in light of these regulations.

For UC claimants who have health problems or disabilities but do not have an LCW/LCWRA determination, will there be any parallel “right to try” protection comparable to that envisaged for those on NS ESA, UC health journeys and PIP? More broadly, how will the Department ensure that those with significant health conditions but without LCW/LCWRA are not disadvantaged relative to those who do when they seek to test their capacity for work?

The main focus of the Right to Try regulations is on claimants who are already on the health-related journey, so those in receipt of UC and NS ESA with LCW/LCWRA, or PIP. All claimants on UC already have the ability to move into work and, if their claim ends, to return within six months without making a completely new claim, and this is built into the system. There are complexities around the position of those with health conditions who do not meet the LCW/LCWRA threshold, including in relation to work allowances, and communications would need to make clear what flexibilities and options exist dependant on whether someone is on the health journey or not.

For UC claimants without LCW/LCWRA who move into work under the spirit of Right to Try but subsequently find that the job is unsustainable because of their health condition, would giving up that job be treated as voluntary leaving, potentially exposing them to a sanction? How will the Department ensure that the policy does not leave people who have tried work worse off if it fails because of their health?

UC claimants with an LCW/LCWRA determination cannot receive a high-level sanction for leaving work voluntarily. For claimants without LCW/LCWRA determination, Work Coaches should document the reasons for leaving a job and to take account of evidence relating to a claimant’s health and circumstances when referring to a decision maker who will consider all relevant evidence before applying a sanction. Where health makes a job unsustainable or negatively affects the claimant’s health this would typically be considered good reason for leaving the job. It is theoretically possible for these claimants to be sanctioned, especially in cases where there is no evidence of the reason for leaving the job. The Department agreed to consider these issues so that the Right to Try policy is not undermined in practice.

The policy is presented as a protection for people with LCW/LCWRA who wish to try work, but there are claimants with health conditions who move in and out of this status and “yo-yo” between periods of being in and out of work. How will the Department ensure that these individuals are not exposed to sanctions or adverse reassessment outcomes when they attempt to work under the banner of Right to Try?

There is a group of claimants whose health conditions vary over time and whose status within the benefit system may change accordingly. Right to Try is intended to ensure that work in itself does not automatically trigger a reassessment for claimants with LCW and LCWRA determinations; however, the Department acknowledges that the broader framework around conditionality, sanctions and change of circumstances rules must also operate fairly for individuals with health conditions. The Department agreed to consider how the rules and guidance could be made more coherent and transparent and report back to the Committee outside of the meeting.

The Department understands that dual claimants can currently experience overlapping assessment and re-assessment processes. This remains true as long as the WCA and PIP award review exists alongside each other. The Government plans to remove the WCA replacing it with a single assessment based on the PIP framework. In the meantime, these Right to Try regulations cannot fundamentally change the way that these, quite different assessments work. The Department agreed to consider how the rules and guidance could be made more coherent and transparent for dual claimants and report back to the Committee outside of the meeting.

If the regulations provide that work alone will not trigger a PIP reassessment, how will the Department in practice know that a claimant is working if there is no requirement to report work as a change of circumstances? How does this sit with the Department’s expectations about claimants providing information relevant to their award?

PIP claimants face no requirement to report work as a change of circumstance (unlike in UC and NS ESA). The reasons why PIP claimants must contact the Department immediately are listed on the government website[footnote 17], they do not include starting to work and this will not change. The intention of the regulations is to address the false belief among PIP claimants that work could automatically trigger reassessment.

How does the Department intend to communicate a message that claimants can “try work” without being reassessed, when in practice there remain circumstances in which work, in combination with other factors, may still contribute to a reassessment? Has it been considered to allow those who have LCWRA or are disabled to take up a public appointment? Has the Department considered testing the messaging with advisers, stakeholders and claimants to ensure that it does not overpromise or inadvertently mislead?

Communicating the Right to Try proposals will present some challenges which, if poorly handled, could undermine trust. That is why a test and learn approach will be adopted, to test the effectiveness of different messages to see how they work for three key audiences: claimants with health and disability conditions, stakeholder organisations and the press. This will start with “myth busting” around existing rules, such as addressing the common misunderstandings of the 16-hour work rule (which only applies to NS ESA), looking to promote a better understanding of the UC work allowances and tapers, and then include the new regulatory assurances on top of that.

There is a concern that if, in the early tranches of cases, claimants who have acted in good faith under the Right to Try message nonetheless find that their work is treated as a change of circumstances and leads to reassessment or loss of benefit, such experiences could rapidly gain publicity and undermine the entire communications effort. How will the Department guard against this, particularly where the boundary between what does and does not constitute a relevant change of circumstances remains blurred?

There is that risk that if claimants’ early experiences are negative, it will be difficult to sustain a positive narrative. The regulations are intended to ensure that work in itself is not treated as a relevant change of circumstances; however, other reported changes, such as a significant improvement in health, may legitimately trigger reassessment. Clearer guidance and training will be required so that colleagues understand and apply the rules consistently, and this will be done alongside the communications campaign.

Would it be possible for the Department to publish a list of types of work or jobs that would never be treated as a relevant change of circumstances for reassessment purposes, so that claimants have clear assurance about what they can safely do? Could this be put into the relevant regulations?[footnote 18] If this is not possible, is there a risk that the regulations could, in practice, set people up to fail by appearing to promise a protection that cannot be delivered? Especially because the supporting paperwork indicates that “any activities customers do whilst working can be considered as part of a reassessment”.

In reality, it would be neither feasible nor desirable to produce a definitive list of jobs or activities that would never be considered as out of bounds during a reassessment. By design, these assessments seek to understand an individual’s functional ability in a holistic way and consider the nature of an individual’s original award alongside their current circumstances and functional ability. The Department agreed that in order to provide clarity, communications and guidance do need to be as clear as possible about the scenarios in which someone’s ability to work could be considered as a material change in circumstances which may affect their award. The Department agreed to look at this and consider whether it could be more explicitly explained in guidance.

Moving from guidance to regulations inevitably hardens some boundaries; however, this is necessary to give claimants and Ministers a clear statutory statement that work in itself will not trigger reassessment. The Committee’s concerns about potential contradictions and unintended consequences are important. The Department agreed that they would consider whether any further clarifications could be made to reduce the risk of contradictions and would share any amendments with the Committee outside of the meeting.

How will the Department manage the reputational risk that a strong public campaign encouraging claimants to “try work” could be undermined if even a small number of cases subsequently experience negative outcomes that appear to contradict the headline message? How would the Department respond if such cases were highlighted by the media alongside promotional material suggesting that it is safe to try work?

In any aspect of welfare policy which affects millions of claimants, there is always a risk that adverse individual cases could be picked up by the media and set against the Department’s overall narrative. The proposed UK wide press activity, stakeholder engagement and other communications will need to be carefully tested, developed and framed, and this needs to involve the testing of the message with claimants and representative organisations before wider rollout in order to manage that risk.

There have been circumstances in which evidence from employers has been used against claimants at tribunal proceedings. How will the Department ensure that the Right to Try policy does not repeat such experiences and that tribunal and appeal processes do not inadvertently undermine the intended reassurance?

There have been cases where work activity has been considered as part of reassessments, and this has contributed to mistrust. For those in receipt of PIP, around 20 per cent are already in work and being in work should not in itself prevent a person from qualifying. That said, questions about work will inevitably arise in some appeals and assessments; however, more work is needed to ensure that guidance and training emphasise that work should be interpreted in the context of overall functional ability, rather than as an automatic indicator that support is no longer required.

Given that one driver for moving guidance into regulations is that existing guidance has not always been followed consistently by staff, how will the Department ensure that work coaches and decision makers fully understand and apply the new framework? Does the Department hold data on which Jobcentres are performing particularly well or poorly in supporting disabled claimants into work, and will this be used when testing and rolling out training and communications for staff?

Effective staff training and guidance are critical. Like any new change, staff will be engaged and the Department will adapt training packages and online learning, with detailed plans still to be developed. It is acknowledged that performance inevitably varies between offices and this is always kept under review by the Department.

Appointment length can be a constraint, and these more complex discussions may require longer and/or more flexible engagement. The Department is considering how to engage more effectively with people who are not normally part of standard engagement patterns, and how the Right to Try policy would need to be considered within that wider context.

Has the Department considered moving more quickly to the third stage of the Right to Try programme, bringing forward a broader package of substantive changes rather than starting with a narrow regulatory change followed by communications? Would a larger, more comprehensive package be more likely to shift behaviour meaningfully than a cautious staged approach?

Ministers have committed to publishing these regulations by the start of the next financial year. They are keen to demonstrate progress by putting existing practice on a statutory footing and improving communications. [REDACTED TEXT][footnote 19]

If a claimant starts work and their clinical assessment later indicates improvement, could determinations be revised retrospectively on the basis that work was in fact a relevant change of circumstances that had not been notified at the time? How will the Department ensure that the policy genuinely alleviates fear rather than leaving a residual risk that undermines its intent?

Changes in health are rarely discrete events occurring on a single identifiable date. In most cases, it is difficult to say precisely when a claimant’s functional ability improved or deteriorated. For that reason, when a PIP review takes place, any decision to adjust an award in light of changed circumstances is generally applied from the point of the review decision onwards, rather than retrospectively, except where there is clear evidence of fraud. It is a complex area, and guidance will need to explain clearly how the Department would distinguish between work as a standalone factor, which should not trigger reassessment, and work as part of a broader change that may properly give rise to review.

As drafted, the regulations may not genuinely deliver the stated intent of providing reassurance and a practical “right to try” and could instead harden lines and expose claimants to new risks. Why are regulations necessary at this stage, rather than relying on improved guidance and communications. Is the Department confident that the benefits of legislating outweigh the potential downside risks identified in discussion?

Ministers wish to demonstrate a visible, statutory commitment that work in itself will not trigger reassessment, and that regulations provide a more prominent and authoritative signal than guidance. As has been highlighted, there are omissions and ambiguities in the existing framework, such as the treatment of change of circumstances issues and the considerations raised in relation to the fact that any activities customers do whilst working can be considered as part of a reassessment, which could usefully be addressed. As agreed, the Department will consider the issues raised in discussion and report back to the Committee outside of the meeting.

3.7. The Chair thanked officials for attending and for the constructive and candid discussion. He noted that the Department had committed to:

  • Clarify how sanctions decisions will operate where claimants attempt work that proves unsustainable due to health issues.
  • Give further consideration to the issues raised around clarity of assessment interactions and change of circumstances rules.

3.8. Subsequent to the meeting, and after careful consideration of the draft proposals and the evidence presented by the Department throughout the scrutiny process, the Committee concluded that the regulations as drafted do not provide the clarity or assurance needed to achieve their intended purpose. The limited scope of the amendments, and the ambiguity that remains around the treatment of work‑related activities short of starting work, risk undermining claimant confidence - which the policy seeks to strengthen. The Committee therefore decided that the regulations would be taken on formal reference. In writing to the Minister for Social Security and Disability to communicate that outcome, the Chair would set out the Committee’s concerns in the following areas:[footnote 20]

  • The relationship between the policy intent and the effect of the regulations;
  • Clarity on change of circumstances and the operational framework;
  • Consideration of alternative approaches;
  • Evidence base, assumptions and likely behavioural impacts;
  • Understanding of affected claimant groups; and
  • Structural and legislative considerations.

4. Private session

[RESERVED ITEM]

5. Next meeting

5.1. The next meeting is scheduled to take place on 4 March.

6. Annex A

6.1 Guests and officials

Item 2:

  • James Wolfe (Director, Poverty Families and Disadvantage Directorate)

  • Amy Morgan (Deputy Director, UCAD)

  • Duncan Gilchrist (Deputy Director, Child Maintenance, Decision Making & Appeals, Poverty, Families and Disadvantage Directorate)

  • James Snelling (Grade 6, Universal Credit Policy Team Leader for Health, Childcare, Initial Assessment Period, Advances and Deductions)

  • Zaidah Chisty (Grade 7, Universal Credit Policy).

Item 3:

  • Graeme Connor (Deputy Director, Health and Disability Reform)

  • Alex Fleming (Grade 6, Health and Disability Reform)

  • Sonal Devshi (Grade 7, Health and Disability Reform)

  • Caitlin McCourt (SEO, Health and Disability Reform)

Secretariat:

  • Denise Whitehead (Committee Secretary) 

  • Kenneth Ashworth (Assistant Secretary)

  • Robert Cooper (Assistant Secretary)

  • Edward Munn (Assistant Secretary)

7. Annex B

7.1 Correspondence A

James Wolfe
Director of Poverty, Family and Disadvantage
Department for Work and Pensions
Caxton House
Tothill Street
London
SW1H 9NA

27 January 2026

Dear James,

The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Claims and Payments) (Amendment) Regulations 2026

Thank you for the full and constructive engagement from you and your team in advance of and during the Committee’s scrutiny of the above regulations on 21 January. My colleagues and I appreciated the clarification provided on the rationale for removing the sunset clause, and the helpful update on the Department’s evaluation activity. Your explanation on the day, beyond what was included in the supporting papers, of DWP’s engagement with a wide range of sources to monitor the consequences was particularly valuable.

Following careful consideration of the proposals, and the supporting evidence presented to us, the Committee has decided that it does not intend to take these Regulations on formal reference and that they may proceed as planned.[footnote 21]  

However, I am writing to share a small number of observations and recommendations from the Committee about the need for ongoing monitoring, and the importance of flexibility in applying mitigations.

Lone parents and Article 14 European Convention on Human Rights considerations

The Committee notes that paying lone parents appear to be disproportionately represented in the group of Universal Credit recipients who retain less of their entitlement, as reported in Table 3 of the supporting papers.[footnote 22] However, the documentation did not explain what consideration had been given to the mechanisms, and the reasons, for this disproportionate impact.  We acknowledge the Department’s explanation that it is Government policy to deduct child maintenance payments from the paying parent. Nonetheless the Committee would welcome a clearer understanding of the factors that result in paying lone parents being disproportionately worse off, and whether mitigations for this group were considered in the policy design. If not, we consider it important to explore further whether there are interactions with other deductions or circumstances that may be contributing to the particular effects observed for such lone parents, and whether additional mitigations may warrant consideration.

Under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the principle established in Thlimmenos v Greece,[footnote 23] we understand that discrimination can occur where there is a failure, without objective and reasonable justification, to treat differently those people whose situations are significantly different. The Committee is of the view that further clarification of the Department’s reasoning in this area would be valuable in ensuring the policy aligns with that legal framework and with the Government’s wider child poverty aims in respect of paying parents, in particular lone parents, who have responsibility for other children.

In particular, the Committee would like to have further clarity on the potential impact on the children for whom paying parents – and in particular lone parents - have responsibility, and how this fits with the Government’s objectives in relation to child wellbeing and financial resilience.

Where there may be a risk of financial pressure contributing to disproportionate financial hardship, the Committee is of the view that the Department should consider the degree to which mitigations - such as greater flexibility in recovery of Universal Credit advance payments - might support the effective application of this policy.

Importance of clear information and signposting

It is evident that the first‑priority status of child maintenance deductions from Universal Credit may create additional financial considerations for some paying parents. Clear communication from the Child Maintenance Service about how child maintenance is treated within debt‑advice settings, and strong signposting to independent support services, will be important in ensuring parents understand their options and can access appropriate help. The Committee would welcome assurance that guidance, training and communications will support this.

Recommendations

In light of our constructive discussion, and our reflections set out above, the Committee recommends that the Department:

  • Continues to monitor the impacts of the policy, including any differential effects on lone parents and the children in their care.
  • Retains flexibility in applying mitigations where individual circumstances may justify adjustments.
  • Keeps under review how the policy aligns with the Government’s wider child‑poverty objectives and Article 14 considerations.
  • Ensures clear signposting through the Child Maintenance Service to debt advice and other appropriate support services, with provision of clear guidance on the treatment of child maintenance within debt‑advice assessments.

The Committee would welcome an update in due course on the Department’s monitoring activity - including the planned use of administrative data to discover more about the characteristics of the small number of paying parents who have high deductions - and any mitigations under consideration (or indeed implemented). The Committee secretariat will be in touch with you team to arrange a follow up discussion in due course. In the meantime, I would, naturally, be happy to discuss further any of the points raised in this letter if that would be helpful.

Thank you again for the constructive engagement at, and in the lead up to, the Committee’s scrutiny of these proposals last week.

A copy of this letter goes to the Rt. Hon Sir Stephen Timms MP (Minister for Social Security and Disability).

Yours sincerely,

Dr Stephen Brien
SSAC Chair

7.2 Correspondence B

The Rt Hon. Sir Stephen Timms MP
Minister for Social Security and Disability
Caxton House
Tothill Street
London
SW1H 9NA

12 February 2026

Dear Sir Stephen,

The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment and Employment and Support Allowance (Amendment) Regulations 2026

At its meeting on 21 January, the Social Security Advisory Committee undertook its statutory scrutiny of the above regulations, which enshrine within legislation the existing rules – currently delivered through guidance.

Our understanding of the policy intent is for this change to encourage disabled working age people to try work without the fear of repercussions to their benefit award, through the reassessment of their health condition for benefit purposes.[footnote 24]

The Committee recognises that a fear of reassessment represents a long‑standing barrier preventing many disabled people and people with health conditions from taking steps towards work. We also acknowledge the concerns that have been raised that the fear of losing benefits, or being reassessed unfavourably, can overshadow the potential benefits of trying work. Indeed, this is an issue that the Committee itself raised in 2022.[footnote 25] We therefore welcome the Government’s intention to address these concerns through the development of a ‘Right to Try’ policy.

We also acknowledge the broader context within which these regulations are positioned. Supporting people to build confidence, skills and capability for work is central to improving health, wellbeing and longer‑term financial security, and forms part of the Government’s broader reform agenda. The Committee recognises the opportunity that well‑designed policy has to deliver meaningful improvements in claimant experience and participation.

However, as you will be aware, the Committee’s starting point for its scrutiny of all regulations is to assess the extent to which the material impact of regulations delivers against the stated policy intent.[footnote 26] After careful consideration of the draft proposals and the evidence presented to us throughout the scrutiny process,[footnote 27] the Committee has concluded that the regulations as drafted do not provide the clarity or assurance needed to achieve their intended purpose. The limited scope of the amendments, and the ambiguity that remains around the treatment of work‑related activities short of starting work, risk undermining claimant confidence - which the policy seeks to strengthen.

Accordingly, we have decided to take these regulations on formal reference, under section 172(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. In doing so, the Committee considers it important to outline the main considerations that informed this decision and that will shape our next steps.

Relationship between the policy intent and the effect of the regulations

The Committee recognises the Government’s aim of offering clearer reassurance to claimants who wish to explore work. However, restricting the amendment solely to the removal of ‘starting work’ as a reassessment trigger does not address the broader framework within which work‑related activities may still be used as evidence of changed functional capability. We are concerned that claimants may not distinguish meaningfully between starting work and engaging in preparatory or exploratory work‑related activity. Without clearly defined parameters governing how such activities will be treated, many claimants are likely to continue perceiving reassessment as a potential risk. We therefore consider it important to explore how the Department expects the regulatory change to operate in practice, how it will be communicated, and whether further measures may be needed.

Clarity on change of circumstances and the operational framework
The Committee is concerned that claimants may find it difficult to understand what constitutes a change of circumstances capable of triggering a reassessment, especially with respect to activities undertaken in the context of having taken up work. Without clearer criteria - and clarity of how work‑related activities will be interpreted - there is a risk that the policy could fail to achieve the intended improvement in claimant confidence. We are therefore keen to understand how the Department intends to define, communicate and operationalise these criteria, and how consistency will be ensured across delivery.

Consideration of alternative approaches

The Department did not provide evidence that a full range of options was explored during policy development. In particular, it would be helpful to understand whether the Department considered time‑limited protections, clearer exemptions for low‑intensity or exploratory activity, strengthened linking rules, or lessons drawn from comparable systems. A clearer articulation of these points is required to help assess the degree to which the chosen approach is robust, proportionate and likely to achieve the intended effect.

Evidence base, assumptions and likely behavioural impacts

Given the central importance of claimant confidence to the policy’s success, greater clarity is required about the behavioural assumptions underpinning the proposals. It is not yet clear how claimants - especially those with fluctuating or complex conditions - are expected to interpret the amendments, nor how the Department has assessed the risk that claimants will still fear that undertaking work‑related activities might lead to reassessment. We remain unconvinced that the planned communications approach alone will be sufficient to shift entrenched concerns, or whether deeper structural changes may be required to give claimants the reassurance the policy aims to provide.

Understanding of affected claimant groups

It is important to understand which groups are most likely to be affected by the proposed change. This includes individuals with fluctuating conditions, those whose functional limitations vary depending on the nature of the work activity, and Personal Independence Payment (PIP) only claimants whose assessment triggers differ from those relating to Universal Credit or Employment and Support Allowance. A fuller understanding of these groups is required to support the Committee’s assessment of proportionality, likely impacts and potential unintended consequences.

Structural and legislative considerations

The Committee notes that the draft regulations do not modify the fundamental legislation underpinning Limited Capability for Work, Limited Capability for Work-Related Activity or PIP assessments. This may limit the degree of reassurance that can be achieved through these regulations alone. We would therefore like to have a greater understanding of the structural constraints that the Department considers apply in this area, as well as any alternative legislative or guidance options that may have been considered.

Next steps
The Committee is mindful of your commitment to Parliament that these proposals will be implemented by April 2026, and we will endeavour to provide our final report as quickly as possible. Given the considerable evidence the Department has already gathered through its consultation and collaboration committees – coupled with our own stakeholder discussions when we explored this issue in 2022 – we do not plan to issue a call for evidence on this occasion. Instead, we will have a more targeted engagement with organisations and individuals on issues where we consider there to be evidence gaps.  

We will keep the Department informed as this formal reference progresses. To support the early completion of our work, we would welcome any further analysis, evidence or modelling the Department can share, including material relating to behavioural assumptions, claimant segmentation, stakeholder input and the rationale underpinning the proposed approach. I would, of course, be happy to discuss any aspect of this letter with you if that would be helpful.

In closing, I would like to express my thanks to Graeme Connor and his team for presenting these regulations to the Committee on 21 January, and for the constructive and open engagement throughout our scrutiny of the proposals. I am grateful for the clarity, professionalism and candour with which your officials have supported our work.

A copy of this letter goes to the Secretary of State, The Baroness Sherlock OBE, Bill Thorpe and Graeme Connor.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Stephen Brien
SSAC Chair

  1. This response from DWP included reference to unpublished internal data. It has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  2. Parents with care receiving CM payments. ↩

  3. This response from DWP included reference to unpublished internal data. It has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  4. This response from the Department included reference to unpublished operational information. It has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  5. This response from DWP included reference to unpublished internal data. It has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  6. This response from DWP included reference to unpublished internal data. It has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  7. This response from DWP included reference to unpublished internal data. It has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  8. This response from DWP included reference to unpublished internal data. It has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  9. This response from DWP included reference to unpublished internal data. It has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  10. This response from DWP included reference to unpublished local authority operational procedures.  It has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  11. This response from DWP included reference to unpublished internal data.  It has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  12. Letter from the Committee Chair to James Wolfe (27 January 2026) is attached at annex B. ↩

  13. European Convention on Human Rights ↩

  14. Pathways to Work: Reforming Benefits and Support to Get Britain Working Green Paper ↩

  15. This response from DWP provided information relating to consideration or development of government policy. This text has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  16. This response from DWP provided information relating to consideration or development of government policy. This text has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  17. Personal Independence Payment (PIP): Report a change to your needs or circumstances ↩

  18. For example The Universal Credit Regulations 2013 ↩

  19. This response from DWP provided information relating to consideration or development of government policy. This text has been redacted at the request of the Department. ↩

  20. The Chair’s letter to the Minister for Social Security and Disability (12 February 2026) is provided at annex C) ↩

  21. Under the powers conferred by Section 173(1)(b) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. ↩

  22. “The table shows that paying parents, who are lone parents, will retain less of their UC award, when compared to all affected households – although this proportion is still substantially lower than the UC population as a whole. Any differences are likely related to the combinations of deductions these households have and could be amplified by the small numbers of households in each group.” ↩

  23. Thlimmenos v Greece (bailii.org), European Court of Human Rights, 2000 ↩

  24. Out of work disability benefit reform (2022) ↩

  25. We are awaiting clarification from the Department of an explicit articulation of the policy intent. ↩

  26. Including the additional information provided on 5 February in response to our follow up questions to the Department on 23 January. ↩

  27. Including the additional information provided on 5 February in response to our follow up questions to the Department on 23 January. ↩

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