Research and analysis

RPC opinion: aviation safety – regulatory reform

Published 12 June 2026

Lead department: Department for Transport

Summary of proposal: for the Department for Transport (DfT) to use primary powers to delegate to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) the power to directly regulate domestic aviation safety through tertiary legislation.

Submission type: options assessment – 16 July 2025

Legislation type: primary legislation

RPC reference: RPC-DfT-25067-OA(1)

Date of issue: 19 August 2025

RPC opinion rating

Fit for purpose:

• the options assessment (OA) sufficiently outlines and evidences the problem under consideration, though the argument for intervention lacks substantive evidence and could be improved by drawing on evidence from similar international interventions or legislative processes
• the OA would also be improved by ensuring that the objectives have specific and quantifiable metrics for measuring success of the policy against
• the OA provides a sufficient theory of change, though this could be improved by focussing more on the wider outputs and outcomes resulting from the intervention on the airline industry and for consumers
• the OA would be improved by providing information as to how the longlist was developed - nevertheless, justification for the choice of shortlisted options from the longlist is provided
• the OA contains a sufficient small and micro business assessment that briefly explains why it is not appropriate to exempt or provide mitigation for small, micro, and medium sized businesses, and provides a sufficient assessment of expected impacts
• the OA provides sufficient justification for the preferred option, with a reasonable assessment of it against the objectives and critical success factors
• the OA presents a limited summary of the impacts on total welfare, businesses, and passengers
• the OA could provide further explanation, evidence, and justification for the impacts on wider government priorities

RPC opinion summary

Rationale: Green

The options assessment (OA) outlines evidence from a range of sources to support its problem statement and some indication of the scale and nature of this problem. The argument for intervention lacks substantive evidence in some areas and includes argument for the preferred option not for government intervention generally.

The evidence base to support the argument for intervention could be improved by drawing on evidence from similar international interventions or legislative processes, as well as discussion of how other jurisdictions stay up to date with their international obligations where they have not delegated rulemaking to the aviation regulator.

The OA would be improved by detailing the SMART components for each objective in turn and ensuring that the objectives have specific and quantifiable metrics for measuring success of the policy against.

The OA provides a sufficient theory of change, though this could be improved by focussing more on the wider outputs and outcomes resulting from the intervention on the airline industry and for consumers.

Identification of options: Green

The OA includes 6 potential options within its longlist which are reasonably explained and assessed against the objectives and critical success factors (CSFs). The OA would be improved by providing information as to how the longlist of options was developed. Nevertheless, justification for the choice of shortlisted options from the longlist is provided.

The OA could also be improved by referencing alternative approaches followed internationally within the options considered. The OA contains a sufficient small and micro business assessment that briefly explains why it would not be appropriate to exempt or provide mitigation for small, micro, and medium sized businesses, and provides a sufficient assessment of expected impacts.

Justification for preferred way forward: Green

The OA outlines identified monetised and non-monetised impacts of the proposal, with comparison to the baseline. Key assumptions are included with relevant explanation and evidence. The OA provides sufficient justification for the preferred option, with a reasonable assessment of it against the objectives and CSFs.

Regulatory scorecard: Weak

The OA presents a limited summary of the impacts on total welfare, businesses, and passengers. The methodology appears to consider total implementation costs and benefits of regulations to be implemented by the CAA but is unclear on the different costs and benefits resulting from distinct effects of the policy. The OA could provide further explanation, evidence, and justification for the impacts on wider government priorities.

Monitoring and evaluation: Weak

The OA contains a weak evaluation framework which only sets out evaluation measures and methods for 2 of the objectives and 3 CSFs. The monitoring and evaluation framework should include specific questions to be evaluated, testing the policy of delegating this function to the CAA.

Summary of proposal

The proposal is for Department for Transport (DfT) to use primary powers in an aviation bill to delegate to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) the power to directly regulate domestic aviation safety through tertiary legislation. Through this, DfT would delegate to the CAA the power to create binding technical aviation safety and airspace requirements without secondary legislation, maintain existing powers for the Secretary of State for changes in policy direction and restore powers to create and amend criminal sanctions, to provide a more efficient and streamlined rulemaking process.

The OA considered 5 longlist options as part of its assessment:

• option 0: do nothing
• option 1: provide better clarity on existing law through improved signposting
• option 2: consolidate under the Basic Regulation pillar
• option 3: consolidate under the Air Navigation Order 2016 (ANO)
• 3a: consolidate using existing powers in the Civil Aviation Act 1982
• 3b: consolidate using existing powers in the Civil Aviation Act 1982 and amend these powers to allow more regulations to be put into compliance guidance
• option 4: create a new optimised legislative framework delegating technical rulemaking powers to the CAA

From the longlist of policy options 3 were taken forward to the shortlist – options 3a, 3b and the preferred option 4. The OA states that it expects the net present social value (NPSV) of the preferred option (option 4) to be positive, though presents a business net present value (NPV) of -£6.9 million which it argues does not account for significant non-monetised benefits of the policy, namely improved safety, harmonisation and sector resilience.

Key impacts include:

• additional costs to businesses of £5.6 million for familiarisation and administration and £2.4 million for training over the 2 year implementation period
• reduced complexity of safety regulations and greater harmonisation with international standards
• improved aviation safety through timely adoption of standards and implementation of requirements

Rationale

Problem under consideration

The OA notes that the UK’s aviation safety and aerospace regulatory framework is currently a fragmented and complex dual system of law (domestic and assimilated EU law) that has evolved over time. The current process for updating safety regulations is inflexible, resource intensive and requires significant time to prepare and adopt legislation, leaving it unsuitable for implementing continuously evolving technical rules originating in international law. The OA is relatively clear about the problem under consideration.

The OA outlines evidence from a range of sources to support its problem statement. Collectively this evidence demonstrates the structural issues in the existing aviation safety and aerospace regulatory framework, as well as some indication of the scale and nature of this problem:

*results from the Regulatory Reform Programme Control Board workstreams found that there is a growing backlog of over 100 technical regulations requiring secondary legislation changes, with current capacity only allowing about 10 amendments annually * technical expertise mainly resides with the CAA, whereas regulatory powers sit with DfT, resulting in duplication of work * the CAA estimates that some officials spend as much of 30-50% of their time answering questions about the regulatory framework and its implications for users due the complexity of aviation safety regulation * there have been lengthy delays between the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) updates to Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and the UK’s implementation of them, with some recent alignment taking between 4 and 12 years, though the longest being prevented by the UK’s EU membership until 2020

Argument for intervention

The OA sets out that the problem under consideration is a direct consequence of the existing legislative process for amending technical regulations, and that government intervention is therefore required to address this deficiency in the legal framework. This reads as a case of regulatory failure, though DfT has not specified this within its argument for intervention.

This argument for intervention is supported by explanation of how this failure to implement SARPs in line with the UK’s obligations under international law, mean that these updated regulatory requirements are not enforceable. Combined with failing to keep up with international standards, this could negatively impact UK industry competitiveness and faith in the UK’s regulatory framework, as well as damaging the UK’s international reputation and breach its international obligations.

These explanations have logic but lack substantive evidence to support them. The argument for intervention also states that there is no other means of delegating rulemaking powers to the CAA, which DfT regards as the most effective way of achieving a clear, certain, sufficiently flexible, and robust aviation safety regulatory model. This argument is for a specific intervention, not for government intervention generally to address the problem.

The argument for intervention could be better supported with a more detailed assessment of similar delegations of powers, either from other countries delegating such powers to an aviation regulator, or from other sectors in the UK, including on the success of these delegations and any lessons for the UK. This could be provided alongside an assessment of other countries who have not delegated such powers to an aviation regulator, or from other sectors in the UK, to demonstrate comprehensive consideration of regulatory frameworks.

The OA includes a section detailing different impacts expected to occur if the government does not intervene, which sets out various problems such as an increasing backlog of technical aviation safety regulations and problems harmonising with other jurisdictions.

Objectives and theory of change

The OA sets out 4 objectives of the policy:

• objective 1: improve the design of regulations - consolidate existing sources under a single legal pillar to make regulation more accessible and easier to understand
• objective 2: ensure timely updates - create a framework enabling rapid implementation of international standards and safety requirements
• objective 3: better utilise CAA expertise - move primary responsibility for technical regulatory standards to the CAA, reducing duplication of work
• objective 4: address deficiencies in powers - restore powers to create and amend criminal sanctions in aviation safety legislation

The OA would be improved by detailing the SMART components for each objective in turn, rather than assessing the policy against each of the SMART components. The objectives set out generally lack specific and quantifiable metrics against which to measure success of the policy.

The OA provides a theory of change diagram, split into inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts. The theory of change could be improved by focussing more on the wider outputs and outcomes resulting from the intervention on the airline industry and for consumers.

Identification of options

Identification of the ‘longlist’ of options

The OA includes 6 potential options within its longlist, options 0 to 4 including 3a and 3b. These options include a do-nothing option 0, option 1 to provide better clarity on existing law through improved signposting, option 2 to consolidate under the Basic Regulation pillar, options 3a and 3b which are variants of consolidating under the Air Navigation Order using existing powers in the Civil Aviation Act 1982, and the preferred option 4 to create a new optimised legislative framework delegating technical rulemaking powers to the CAA.

The OA does not set out the process followed for identifying the options included on this longlist. The OA should include information on the longlist identification process in line with Green Book guidance. The OA could also be improved by referencing alternative approaches followed internationally within the options considered.

Consideration of alternatives to regulation

The OA includes an alternative to regulation, outside of the do-nothing option, with option 1 being to provide better clarity on the law through improved signposting, explanation of and direction to guidance on legislative material. The OA assesses these options 0 and 1 against the objectives and critical success factors (CSFs) and sets out where they would not meet them.

Justification for the shortlisted options

The OA assesses the shortlisted options against the objectives and CSFs. Option 4 is assessed as meeting all SMART objectives and CSFs, while Options 3a and 3b are viewed to only partially achieve them due to continued resource-intensive secondary legislation requirements, limitations on flexibility to update regulations quickly and potential disruption to industry from significant structural changes to regulations.

The OA includes a table demonstrating the options framework filter process followed to move from the longlist to the shortlisted options. All the options are assessed against the 4 objectives, rated according to their ability to deliver against each objective, with options 0, 1 and 2 discarded, and options 3a, 3b and 4 taken forwards to the shortlist.

The OA describes each of the options and what would be expected to happen should they be implemented. Where the discarded options do not meet the objectives is set out in the options framework filter table, alongside the assessment of the options against these objectives and the CSFs in section 5. Following Green Book guidance all options should ideally meet the SMART objectives and then be assessed against the CSFs to narrow the longlist to a shortlist.

Small and micro business assessment (SaMBA) and medium-sized business (MSB) assessment

The OA uses ONS data on the size of businesses in relevant industries, viewed as a reasonable approximation of affected organisations, to indicate the number and proportion of organisations affected. This data indicates that 92% of affected organisations are micro or small-sized businesses, though these organisations and medium-sized businesses account for less than 5% of market share in the air transport sector.

DfT anticipates that any costs incurred will be proportional to the size of the business and number of approvals held and that small and micro businesses will not face disproportionate costs. The SaMBA would be improved by considering the potential impacts of higher costs to industry through the Scheme of Charges that could arise with the delegation of rulemaking to the CAA.

The OA also says that the primary benefit of the longlist options, reduced ongoing costs of regulatory compliance is likely to disproportionately benefit small and micro businesses, due to there being a significant fixed component to current compliance costs. The SaMBA would be improved by providing more detailed argument and evidence to support this assessment.

Justification for preferred way forward

Appraisal of the shortlisted options

The OA provides an illustrative example of the costs and benefits of regulatory measures of the kind it will enable the CAA to implement, using the IA from a previous measure from 2024. This is a good approach for enabled regulatory changes, but the OA does not explain how this example generalises to the proposed policy, which will bring forward many new regulations, the costs and benefits of which might not be similar to those of the example chosen.

Within the summary of analysis and evidence the OA appraises option 3 and option 4 against the baseline of option 0. A full NPSV is not provided for either, with the same business NPV estimate of -£6.8 million provided for both. The OA does state that the NPSVs of both options 3 and 4 are expected to be positive, with non monetised benefits not accounted for in the business NPVs.

For option 3 improved safety, harmonisation and sector resilience is expected, with option 4 additionally expected to bring reduced ongoing compliance costs and to enable innovation. The OA recognises the uncertainty surrounding a number of assumptions made and sets out methods for improving them with future work.

The OA provides explanation of the methodology underpinning the monetised business NPV estimates for options 3 and 4, setting out the key assumptions and data sources used to calculate the familiarisation, administration and training costs to business included.

The OA also explains potential non-monetised costs and benefits that are expected to accrue to the government, regulated individuals, operators, and passengers. We understand the effects of this policy to be a combination of (i) policy-induced transition costs of moving to the new framework, (ii) impacts from earlier introduction of regulatory measures already ‘in the pipeline’ (the backlog), (iii) impacts from a simpler single-pillar rulebook and (iv) costs from additional CAA rulemaking efforts either funded by DfT through Section 16 funding or from industry through the Scheme of Charges.

The OA is at present unclear on the distinct effects of the policy and the different costs and benefits resulting from them. DfT should revise the explanations of the effects of the shortlisted options to ensure each of the different effects are sufficiently explained, with clear methodologies on included figures where relevant.

The OA says that the CAA will remain accountable to the Department for Transport and Parliament but makes no mention of increased costs of (more) accountability to accompany increased delegation of rulemaking. If there is increased scrutiny by Parliament or oversight by DfT then these costs should be factored in to the department’s options appraisal.

The OA should also include some discussion of the risks associated with delegation of rulemaking: potential regulatory capture at the expense of consumer, environmental, or community concerns; narrowing of stakeholder influence meaning potential for reduced diversity of views shaping regulation; loss of strategic coordination across the wider transport system and with broader transport, climate and infrastructure objectives.

Selection of the preferred option

The OA states that option 4 is the preferred option and was shortlisted because it achieves all the policy aims, objectives and CSFs, with these explained in section 4. This section sets out that option 4 provides a more efficient, streamlined rulemaking process by delegating technical authority to the CAA, creates a single, coherent source of regulatory requirements, restores powers to create and amend criminal sanctions and enables faster implementation of international standards.

Regulatory scorecard

Part A

Impacts on business, including non-monetised impacts

The OA presents a limited summary of the impacts on total welfare, businesses, and passengers. The methodology appears to consider total implementation costs and benefits of regulations to be implemented by the CAA but is unclear on the different costs and benefits resulting from distinct effects of the policy. The OA could also provide further explanation, evidence, and justification for the impacts on wider government priorities.

The OA states that the proposal is expected to have a positive overall impact on business due to significant non-monetised benefits, though has an equivalent annual net direct cost to business (EANDCB) of £0.8million (2025 base year). The monetised costs to businesses include transition costs arising from familiarisation, administration, and training requirements, which are expected to be incurred in a 2 year implementation period.

The transition costs also result in an estimated business NPV of -£6.9 million in a 10 year appraisal period. DfT expects, however, that these will be exceeded by the benefits of the proposal, mainly reduced ongoing costs of complying with safety regulations. The OA sets out that reduction in the complexity of safety regulation will reduce compliance costs for business but notes in the scorecard that there will be greater quantity of regulation (with lower unit/average compliance costs per rule change).

This should be further explained to more clearly set out how these reduced compliance costs will materialise and the associated uncertainty around them should additional rule changes occur.

Impacts on households, individuals, or consumers, including non-monetised impacts

The OA states that the proposal is expected to have a positive impact on passengers, though an equivalent annual net direct cost to households (EANDCH) is not provided as no impacts on households were monetised. The OA says that there will likely be positive but unmonetized impacts on passengers through improved aviation safety from timely adoption of international standards, enhanced sector resilience leading to reduced disruption and potential time savings from more efficient operations.

Total impacts

The OA states that the preferred option is expected to have a positive overall impact on total welfare, with regulated businesses in the aviation sector being the primary beneficiaries of the proposal, alongside wider societal benefits. Timelier updating of technical regulations and the changes themselves are expected to lead to improved harmonisation with international standards, safety, sector resilience and increased innovation.

The preferred option is expected to increase legal costs for the CAA, due to their regulatory responsibilities. At this stage DfT have not determined how these will be funded, so there could be increased costs to industry through the Scheme of Charges to fund the CAA’s increased legal costs.

Distributional impacts

DfT expects no significant or adverse distributional impacts from this primary legislation across society, businesses or on specific groups.

Part B

Business environment

The OA states that the measure is expected to have a beneficial impact on the business environment by reducing the aggregate costs of complying with aviation safety regulation and enabling innovation and growth.

Trade and investment

The OA states the measure is expected to support international harmonisation through faster updates to technical regulations in line with international standards and practices, however no specific assessments of impacts on trade and investment are made. These assessments should be included and justified.

Natural capital and decarbonisation

The OA states that the preferred option is not expected to have a significant impact on the UK’s natural capital or on decarbonisation. DfT says there may be positive impacts on carbon emissions due to timely introduction of novel products. The OA should consider whether the delegation of rulemaking powers may lead to slower aviation regulatory responses to changes in government environmental or decarbonisation policy.

Monitoring and evaluation

The OA commits to undertaking internal monitoring and evaluation to review the effectiveness of the policy every 5 years. The OA contains a weak evaluation framework which includes 2 of the objectives and 3 CSFs to assess the policy against, with associated evaluation measures and methods.

The OA monitoring and evaluation framework would be improved by setting out key research questions to measure the success of SMART objectives with more detail on existing or future data sources to answer these questions. The OA does not cover unintended consequences that should be assessed alongside external factors for consideration that could affect implementation and how these could be measured.

Data collection

The OA proposes collection of qualitative data in the form of stakeholder feedback on perceptions of regulation, and quantitative data on compliance with regulations, time to implement regulatory changes and the number of rulemaking tasks in the pipeline.

Post implementation review (PIR)

The OA explains that as the preferred option involves primary legislation, there is no statutory requirement to include a review clause or conduct a formal PIR.