RPC opinion: private parking code of practice impact assessment
Updated 20 October 2026
Lead department: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
Summary of proposal: to introduce a statutory Private Parking Code of Practice setting minimum standards for private parking operators and debt recovery agents. The proposal includes a UKAS accredited certification scheme, a Scrutiny and Oversight Board, strengthened second-stage appeal requirements, mandatory data collection and government guidance. It also carries forward the £100 maximum parking charge and 40% early payment discount contained in the current industry Sector Single Code.
Submission type: impact assessment – 15 September 2026
Legislation type: statutory code of practice under the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019
RPC reference: RPC-MHCLG-25042-IA(1)
Date of issue: 28 September 2026
RPC opinion
Fit for purpose
As originally submitted, the IA was not fit for purpose. Following the department’s response to the RPC’s initial review notice, the RPC now considers the IA fit for purpose. The revised IA provides further evidence and analysis within the small and micro business assessment, compares the preferred package with three alternatives and provides further analysis of uncertainty and non monetised benefits.
RPC summary
Rationale: Green
The IA draws on a range of evidence which provides a sufficient basis for considering intervention, although this evidence does not establish the prevalence of poor practice. The department should distinguish more clearly between the underlying market and institutional failures, the adverse outcomes arising from them and limitations in the available evidence, and should qualify claims that the problems are systemic.
Identification of options: Green
The IA considers a sufficient range of component options, including regulatory and non-regulatory alternatives. The revised small and micro business assessment provides sufficient analysis to support the department’s decision not to exempt small and micro businesses. It recognises potential disproportionate impacts and identifies mitigations. The department should illustrate how fixed and activity-related certification costs could affect operators of different sizes.
Justification for preferred way forward: Green
The revised IA compares the preferred package with 3 alternatives, explains the additional assurance expected from UKAS accreditation and includes sensitivity and break-even analysis. The IA would be strengthened by further analysis of the interactions between components, behavioural assumptions, counterfactual growth and likely cost pass-through.
Regulatory scorecard: Weak
The scorecard summarises impacts on businesses, households and total welfare. However, the equivalent annual net direct cost to business (EANDCB) and equivalent annual net direct cost to households (EANDCH) have not been annuitised correctly. Several potentially material impacts are also not quantified or supported sufficiently. The IA should distinguish more consistently between transfers and social welfare effects and strengthen the evidence supporting its competition and distributional assessments.
Monitoring and evaluation: Satisfactory
The IA links monitoring to the objectives, identifies evidence on implementation and outcomes, and considers external factors and unintended consequences. It should set out when the policy will be evaluated as a whole, establish baselines and how attribution will be addressed, and identify what evidence would trigger review of major design choices.
Response to initial review
As originally submitted, the IA was not fit for purpose. The RPC issued an initial review notice because the small and micro business assessment did not provide sufficient evidence on exemption, disproportionate burdens and mitigation. The IA also did not provide sufficient comparative appraisal to support the selection of the preferred package.
The revised IA strengthens the small and micro business assessment. It provides further evidence on operator numbers and enforcement activity, while recognising that the available data do not identify the share of activity or poor practice attributable to small and micro businesses. It explains why a full exemption would remove most operators from the statutory framework and assesses partial exemptions and proportionate variations in certification requirements. The IA also distinguishes fixed and variable certification costs and identifies mitigation through scaled and capped sampling, activity-specific certification, phased implementation and surveillance requirements that vary with operators’ activities. The further evidence and analysis are sufficient to address the red-rated small and micro business assessment concerns.
The revised IA also provides a clearer basis for selecting the preferred package. It provides comparative appraisal of the preferred package and 3 alternatives, presents the assumed reduction in parking-charge notices as an illustrative scenario and tests a wider range of outcomes. The revised IA explains the additional assurance expected from UKAS-accredited certification, provides break-even analysis, reconciles the costs and savings included in the net present social value and compares the Scrutiny and Oversight Board with industry-led and government only oversight. These changes are sufficient to address the red-rated concerns about the preferred way forward.
Summary of proposal
The proposal is to introduce a statutory code setting minimum standards for private parking operators and debt-recovery agents. The preferred package comprises a new government code; retention of the £100 maximum parking charge and 40% early-payment discount; strengthened requirements for the two incumbent second stage appeals services; a government-produced certification scheme delivered by UKAS-accredited conformity assessment bodies; and an independent Scrutiny and Oversight Board.
The department considers the following options across the IA.
Option 1: Code of Practice options:
- option 1A: business as usual: retain the Sector Single Code
- option 1B: adopt the Sector Single Code without changes
- option 1C: reinstate the withdrawn code
- option 1D: introduce a new government code of practice (the new code)
Option 2: Parking charge cap options:
- option 2A: business as usual: retain the existing £100 cap and 40% discount rate
- option 2B: retain the existing £100 cap with an increased discount rate of 50%
- option 2C: reduce the cap to £80 and retain the 40% discount rate
- option 2D: reduce the parking charge cap to £80 and increase the discount rate to 50%
- option 2E: increase the parking charge cap in line with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) since 2012 and maintain the 40% discount rate
- option 2F: increase the parking charge cap in line with CPI inflation since 2012 and increase the discount to 50%
- option 2G: align parking charge caps with the withdrawn code
Option 3: Second-stage appeals options:
- option 3A: business as usual: retain the current incumbent appeals services without change
- option 3B: retain 2 incumbent services with strengthened requirements
- option 3C: single industry-led appeals service
- option 3D: single government-appointed appeals service
Option 4: Compliance and enforcement options:
- option 4A: mandate the accredited parking associations to enforce the code through the existing auditing schemes
- option 4B: government-produced compliance scheme enforced by the accredited parking associations
- option 4C: government-produced certification scheme run by UKAS accredited certification bodies
Option 5: Evaluation and oversight options:
- option 5A: business as usual: retain the existing evaluation and oversight approach (PPSAP)
- option 5B: government oversight supported by industry data
- option 5C: establish an independent Scrutiny and Oversight Board
These are filtered and combined into the following packages for comparative appraisal:
- preferred package: comprised of options 1D, 2A, 3B, 4C and 5C
- alternative package 1: 1D, 2A, 3D, 4C and 5C
- alternative package 2: 1D, 2B, 3B, 4C and 5C
- alternative package 3: 1D, 2B, 3D, 4C and 5C
The IA net present social value (NPSV) estimate of the preferred package is -£7.95 million. The IA reports a central equivalent annual net direct cost to business (EANDCB) of £32.8 million, although this has not been annuitised correctly.
Rationale
Problem under consideration
The IA sets out and discusses the following problems:
- motorist perception that the system is biased in favour of operators, inconsistent and opaque which leads to low public trust
- existing standards are insufficient to protect motorists from poor practice
- inadequate enforcement of the Sector Single Code
- parking charges are seen as a revenue-driven model, not proportionate enforcement
- perception that some business models create misaligned incentives and inconsistent practices
- misinformation preventing better outcomes for motorists
- uneven playing field for operators
The department provides evidence from stakeholder engagement, published DVLA data, industry data from the British Parking Association (BPA), and findings and recommendations from the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). It includes evidence that keeper-data requests increased from 1.9 million in 2012 to more than 15 million in the year to September 2025. This demonstrates the scale and growth of enforcement activity but not the number of unfair charges or prevalence of poor practice.
The revised IA recognises that the available evidence does not distinguish reliably between motorist non-compliance, operator error, operator poor practice, failure to apply existing standards and deficiencies in the standards themselves. The department argues that this evidence gap supports mandatory operator data collection and will enable evidence-based improvements to future iterations of the code.
Although the evidence does not establish the prevalence of poor practice, the department considers that the consistency of concerns raised by multiple independent parties indicates that the problems are not isolated. The IA should provide further support for, or qualify, its conclusion that the problems are systemic.
Argument for intervention
The IA refers to information asymmetry, limitations in voluntary self-regulation, inconsistent compliance and enforcement, adverse effects on motorists and inadequate data for effective oversight. It also explains the Secretary of State’s statutory duty to prepare, issue and keep a code under review. The statutory duty provides an institutional basis for action but does not by itself establish that each component of the preferred package is necessary.
The IA identifies several possible bases for intervention, but should distinguish more clearly between the underlying market and institutional failures, the adverse outcomes arising from them and limitations in the available evidence.
The IA states that government intervention is required to establish a clear, enforceable framework and to improve the speed and quality of outcomes for motorists. The argument for intervention would be improved by the department explaining more directly how the identified market and institutional failures give rise to the problems described, and why competition, existing consumer law, the Sector Single Code and other market mechanisms would not address them without the proposed statutory framework.
Objectives and theory of change
The IA includes the following 3 objectives:
- to fulfil the Secretary of State’s duty by preparing, issuing and maintaining a single statutory Private Parking Code of Practice that sets clear expectations, improves transparency, and raises standards across the sector
- to balance the needs of industry to manage parking effectively with the needs of motorists, by embedding fairness and proportionality in enforcement and outcomes
- to protect motorists by making the parking journey clear and fair, reducing unfair or disproportionate charges, and enabling informed decisions and effective engagement with appeals and redress
The objectives identify the intended direction of change and broad timescales but are not fully SMART. In particular, they do not specify the magnitude of the intended changes or clear success thresholds. This limits their use in comparing options and evaluating whether the intervention has succeeded.
The IA identifies a primary success measure for each objective, together with supporting and diagnostic indicators. These provide a clearer basis for measuring progress, but the IA should integrate the principal measures and intended timescales into the objectives and retain a focused set of supporting indicators.
The IA includes a theory of change comprising current issues, people to be influenced, how best to engage, activities, outputs and outcomes. It would be strengthened by distinguishing more clearly the expected contributions of the code, appeals reforms, certification and oversight, including the assumptions connecting activities, outputs and outcomes.
Identification of options
Identification of the ‘longlist’ of options
The IA covers component options across 5 dimensions: the form and content of the code, cap and discount, second-stage appeals, compliance and enforcement, and evaluation and oversight. The department uses consultation responses, operational experience and engagement with industry and motorist groups to inform the option descriptions.
The IA should explain clearly how the options evolved from the OA to the final-stage appraisal. The department should explain how consultation evidence led to options being retained, amended or discarded, and how the component approach generated the shortlist.
Consideration of alternatives to regulation
The IA considers business as usual, continued self-regulation, adoption of existing codes, information and guidance, industry-led appeals and compliance, government oversight, standards and accreditation. The department treats the government guide as complementary to regulation, which is reasonable given the statutory duty to issue a code.
The analysis should explain more systematically whether strengthened monitoring of the Sector Single Code during its transition period, targeted amendments to existing arrangements, or a narrower combination of statutory standards and industry delivery might achieve a substantial proportion of the objectives at lower cost. It should also state whether comparable domestic or international models were considered.
Justification for the shortlisted options
The department assesses the options for each component against its objectives and accordingly filters the options to separate component shortlists. The IA also identifies critical success factors (CSFs) relating to strategic fit, value for money, supplier capacity, affordability and achievability, but does not apply them consistently to show how their combined assessment informed the shortlisted component options. The IA would benefit from also ensuring that the objectives and CSFs used are sufficiently option-neutral to support comparison between materially different approaches.
For the code, certification and oversight components, the department only shortlists one substantive option. The department gives reasons including the statutory duty, need for independent assurance and perceived limitations of industry-led oversight. The IA should explain why monitoring the Sector Single Code through its transition period, and the complaints and government-guidance option, were not carried forward as package options. Despite these limitations, the narrative and option tables provide sufficient reasons for the shortlist.
Small and micro business assessment and medium sized business assessment
The revised IA contains a materially strengthened small and micro business assessment and overall provides sufficient analysis to support the department’s decision not to exempt small and micro businesses. It now draws on trade-association membership data, DVLA keeper-data requests and Companies House information, and explains more clearly why a full exemption would be inappropriate.
Small and micro businesses account for around 70% of BPA members and over 90% of IPC members. Although the 5 largest operators account for around 55% of keeper-data requests, the remaining activity cannot be allocated reliably by business size and there is no evidence that poor practice is confined to the largest operators. The IA explains that a full exemption would remove most operators from the statutory framework and could result in different levels of protection depending on the operator managing a site.
The IA also gives greater consideration to partial exemptions and alternative mitigations, including delayed implementation, reduced certification requirements, activity-specific certification, capped audit samples and surveillance requirements that vary with operators’ activities. It explains that weakening certification requirements could reduce the consistency and credibility of compliance assessment, while the preferred design seeks to limit burdens by scaling audit samples with operators’ sites, parking-charge volumes and activities.
The costs of certification to parking operators are uncertain because conformity assessment bodies have not yet been established or accredited. The IA identifies likely fixed and variable cost drivers and explains that sampling will scale with sites, charge volumes and activities. The department should provide an illustrative assessment of how fixed costs and activity-related certification requirements could affect representative operators of different sizes, using transparent ranges or proxies where commercial prices are unavailable.
The revised IA recognises that absolute costs are likely to be greater for larger operators, while fixed elements of application, familiarisation, documentation, internal compliance and engagement with auditors may impose a greater relative burden on smaller operators. It also identifies the preferred package’s principal business impacts, including £8.94 million of certification costs, and acknowledges that the certification estimate has increased since the options assessment.
The IA should also provide a proportionate assessment of impacts on medium-sized businesses. This should include the department assessing whether medium-sized operators face distinctive fixed-cost or transition effects and whether scaling arrangements mitigate them.
Justification for preferred way forward
Appraisal of the shortlisted options
The IA identifies impacts on businesses, households, government and wider social welfare and provides NPSV, business net present value (NPV), household NPV and reported EANDCB and equivalent annual net direct cost to households (EANDCH) estimates. It uses a ten-year appraisal period, a 2026 price base year and a 2026 present value base year, and applies a 3.5% discount rate.
The IA’s quantified impacts include reduced parking-charge revenue, lower second stage appeal fees, strengthened appeals costs, certification, data collection, government guidance and the Scrutiny and Oversight Board. Reduced parking charge payments are treated as transfers between operators and motorists and excluded from NPSV. The IA should distinguish these transfers consistently from any welfare effects arising from deterrence, fairness, information or pass-through.
The department acknowledges that evidence limitations restrict its ability to estimate the likely costs of the proposal to business, and so uses an illustrative scenario of a 5% reduction in parking charge volumes, within a 1% to 9% range to reflect uncertainty.
The IA would be improved by testing reasonable alternative projections for counterfactual growth in parking charge notices and by explaining the implications of assuming that payment, first-stage appeal and second-stage appeal outcome shares remain constant, given that the intervention is intended to alter these behaviours. Its analysis of the cap should explain more fully the likely impacts from assuming that all operators charge the maximum and distinguish evidence of compliance under the current system from evidence that the £100 cap or 40% discount causes that compliance.
The IA recognises that costs may be passed through to parking tariffs or landowner fees but does not incorporate an expected or partial pass-through assumption into its central analysis. It should distinguish clearly between its zero pass-through modelling assumption and full-pass-through illustrations and explain how a plausible degree of pass-through would affect the household, distributional and competition conclusions.
The department compares the preferred package and three alternatives on a consistent monetary basis. The comparison discusses implementation speed, independence, affordability, deterrence and pass-through and addresses the relevant initial review concerns.
Selection of the preferred option
The IA uses future evidence gathering, consultation and review to support the choices on the parking-charge cap, early-payment discount and second-stage appeals. It should explain more clearly why retaining the current cap and discount and strengthening the incumbent appeals services is preferable while further evidence is collected.
The IA explains how UKAS accreditation is expected to provide additional assurance through independent accreditation, surveillance and reassessment of conformity assessment bodies. However, the incremental cost of accreditation and structural separation relative to option 4B is not quantified, because the business costs of option 4B have not been estimated. The department should provide the best available indication of this incremental cost, using a range or identified cost components where proportionate, and relate this to the additional assurance provided.
The annex includes the department’s comparable monetised analysis of the alternative packages, providing relative EANDCB, business NPV, EANDCH, household NPV and overall NPSV estimates in table 10. The department also provides explanation of the differences between the alternative packages and the reasoning for preferring the selected package to those alternatives.
The monetised analysis of the alternative packages included in the annex is additive and so does not account for any interactions between components. The IA includes qualitative discussion of some relationships between components, particularly between standards, appeals, charge volumes, compliance and oversight. However, the analysis does not assess how the components may reinforce, weaken or otherwise affect one another’s impacts.
The IA states that changes in the number of parking charges issued have a negligible impact on the NPSV as they primarily represent a transfer between operators and motorists. The IA acknowledges that the extent to which reduced operator revenue is passed through to motorists or landowners could affect the distributional and competition impacts.
The IA states the necessary value of the non-monetised benefits for the preferred package to have a positive NPSV. The department contextualises this on a per motorist per year basis and in relation to average household expenditure generally, and on transport. The department also provides break-even analysis solely for the UKAS Certification Scheme, motorists avoiding the appeals process, and a 5% reduction in parking charges issued scenario.
Regulatory scorecard
Part A
Total impacts including non-monetised and distributional impacts
The scorecard reports a NPSV of -£7.95 million. It reconciles certification, appeals, oversight, guidance and data costs, offset by appeal savings.
The department assesses the overall effect on welfare as positive because it expects non-monetised benefits from clearer standards, stronger appeals protection, reduced stress, fewer disputes and greater confidence. The IA does not establish the likelihood or scale of the wellbeing and time-saving benefits, or demonstrate consistently that the identified benefits do not overlap. However, its break-even analysis shows that the NPSV would become positive if operators save at least 66 pence for each parking charge no longer issued.
The IA uses DVLA keeper-data requests as a proxy for parking charges but does not include the fee paid by private sector organisations for each request. A 2025 Department for Transport written parliamentary question answer states that this fee is £2.50 fee per enquiry. The department should consider whether avoided keeper-data requests would generate an incremental resource saving, and, if so, include this in the appraisal.
The scorecard identifies wellbeing, motorist time, court and debt-recovery effects, marginal operator savings, parking-space efficiency and possible congestion and productivity effects. These mechanisms are plausible, but the IA generally does not provide evidence of their likely scale. The department should distinguish between evidence, illustrative calculations and expected causal effects, and avoid double counting.
The scorecard should distinguish consistently between business revenue losses, household financial gains, transfers and changes in overall social welfare. Reduced parking-charge payments are a transfer and do not in themselves increase NPSV. The scorecard would also benefit from identifying and discussing any separate welfare benefit arising from the distribution of those payments or improved incentives.
Impacts on business, including non-monetised and distributional impacts
The scorecard reports a business NPV of around -£328 million and EANDCB of £32.8 million. The EANDCB appears to have been calculated by dividing the present value by ten rather than dividing the present value of net direct impacts by the applicable annuity rate. The department should correct this and update the figure throughout the IA. Most of the -£328 million business NPV is the assumed revenue reduction matched by the household transfer. Other costs include certification, strengthened appeals and data collection, partly offset by lower second-stage appeal fees. The scorecard should separate costs to trade associations, conformity assessment bodies, operators and landowners and state the number affected.
The business assessment should identify all material impacts and quantify them where proportionate, or explain why robust quantification is not possible. In particular, the department should consider whether material impacts arise from familiarisation, changed first-stage appeal processes and evidence requirements, remediation following certification, systems and training. The distributional assessment should distinguish between operators of different sizes and business models and consider how costs may fall on landowners and other affected businesses.
Impacts on households, individuals or consumers, including non-monetised and distributional impacts
The scorecard reports a household NPV of around £320 million. The IA also reports an EANDCH of -£32.0 million which appears to have been calculated by dividing the present value by ten rather than dividing the present value of net direct impacts by the applicable annuity rate. The department should correct this and update the figure throughout the IA. The household NPV reflects lower parking-charge payments under the illustrative scenario. The department assesses that gains accrue to motorists otherwise paying charges, while pass-through through tariffs or landowner charges could be spread across a wider group. The department illustrates full pass through at about 99 pence per motorist per year but does not estimate its likelihood or distribution.
The reported non-monetised benefits include reduced time, stress and uncertainty, clearer information and appeals, earlier resolution and fewer cases reaching debt recovery or court. The IA should provide stronger evidence on these effects and distinguish charges prevented through operator compliance from charges cancelled through appeals. The discussion of lower-income and rural groups is useful, but regional and equalities evidence is limited.
The household assessment should identify all material impacts and quantify them where proportionate, or explain why robust quantification is not possible. In particular, the department should consider motorist time, wellbeing effects, tariff pass-through and the distribution of impacts across relevant groups of motorists.
Part B
Business environment
The IA considers entry and expansion costs, economies of scale, concentration, innovation, operator viability, landowners and local economic activity. It uses the largest operators’ share of keeper-data requests as an indicator of concentration, but this is a measure of activity rather than market share. The department should support or qualify claims concerning entry, exit, acquisition, concentration, innovation and high-street activity.
Trade and investment
The IA states that the proposal has no impact on imports or exports. It also states that it may have a minor adverse effect on international investment through lower profitability, but does not provide evidence to support this conclusion. The claim should therefore be supported or qualified.
Natural capital and decarbonisation
The IA identifies potential effects in opposing directions: more efficient parking could reduce search traffic and idling, while greater confidence in parking could encourage car use. It also notes a small carbon footprint of digital systems and geographic variation. The narrative describes the direction of the environmental effect as uncertain, which is not consistent with the neutral directional rating. The department should reconcile the rating and narrative.
Monitoring and evaluation
The final-stage plan proposes continuous monitoring and periodic review through the Scrutiny and Oversight Board. It distinguishes early implementation monitoring from longer-term outcomes and links evidence to the 3 objectives. It covers process, impact and value-for-money considerations.
The plan covers operator readiness, certification, compliance and sanctions, charges and appeals, complaints, debt recovery, court escalation, guidance use, stakeholder views and motorist perceptions. The department recognises external market, economic, technological and legal developments and unintended and distributional effects.
The monitoring and evaluation plan should set out the key research questions, baselines, success measures and reporting responsibilities. It should also identify a proportionate evaluation approach for assessing which observed changes can reasonably be attributed to the intervention, or the intervention’s contribution where direct attribution is not feasible, taking account of underlying growth in enforcement activity and wider market changes. This could include contribution analysis or another theory-based approach where direct causal attribution is not feasible.
Data collection
The code will require standardised operator data through accredited parking associations, supplemented by conformity assessment bodies, appeals services, complaints, surveys and stakeholder evidence. The department considers these sources could address gaps on contraventions, compliance, appeals, sanctions, debt recovery and motorist outcomes.
The department should specify the data to be collected, their frequency and ownership, and how data quality, access and publication will be managed. Baselines should be established before or at implementation and data disaggregated by operator size, business model, geography and relevant motorist groups where proportionate.
Post-implementation review
The Act requires the Secretary of State to keep the code under review, but the IA does not specify when evidence on the code and associated certification and appeals arrangements will be brought together in an evaluation of the policy as a whole. The IA instead refers to continuous monitoring, establishment of the Scrutiny and Oversight Board within one year and a report within 2 years of the board’s first meeting. The department should clarify how these arrangements will support the statutory duty to keep the code under review, any separate review requirements applying to associated secondary legislation, and when evidence on the overall policy will be brought together in a formal evaluation.
The IA should also specify the evidence, criteria or thresholds that would trigger review of the cap, discount, appeal model, certification arrangements or mitigations for smaller operators, and explain the role of the Scrutiny and Oversight Board in evaluating the overall policy.