Decision

Initial assessment: complaint against a rating and indexing organisation by 3 members of civil society

Published 7 August 2026

1․ The UK Office of Responsible Business Conduct (ORBC)’s National Contact Point’s (NCP) initial assessment process is a decision on whether the issues raised in the complaint merit further examination. It does not determine whether the respondent has acted consistently with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct (the ‘OECD guidelines’).^{[footnote 1]}

When the NCP does not accept the complaint, it means it considers there is not enough information to merit further examination of the issues raised regarding the company’s responsibility under the guidelines. The UK NCP does not name parties in a complaint unless it has accepted the case for further examination. The UK NCP is not accepting this case. Consequently, the names of parties will remain anonymous.

2․ Rejection of this complaint at the initial assessment concludes the NCP process.

3․ The OECD guidelines alleged to have been violated are:

• Chapter II, General Policies: paragraphs 2, 11, 13 and 14
• Chapter IV, Human Rights: paragraphs 3 and 5

Summary of the UK NCP decision

4․ The complaint has been brought to the UK NCP against an enterprise (‘respondent’). The respondent is a multinational organisation with headquarters in the UK. The respondent is an independent index provider and benchmark administrator. An index is a product consisting of information, composed of a calculation that represents a hypothetical portfolio of securities to represent an asset class or market.

5․ The complaint was made by a group of 3 transnational non-governmental organisations (‘complainants’), all of which have an interest in human rights of the communities impacted by alleged corporate misconduct and/or seeking compliance by corporations with the OECD guidelines.

6․ The complaint alleges that the respondent’s conduct was inconsistent with Chapter II, paragraphs 2, 11,13 and 14; as well as Chapter IV, paragraphs 3 and 5 of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) (‘guidelines’), by failing to:

• conduct adequate human rights due diligence
• seek ways to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts to which they were linked through a business relationship

7․ After conducting an initial assessment of the complaint, the UK NCP has decided that this complaint does not merit further examination under the following paragraphs of the OECD guidelines:

• Chapter II, paragraph A(2) – ‘General Policies’
• Chapter II, paragraph A(11) – ‘General Policies’
• Chapter II, paragraph A(13) – ‘General Policies’
• Chapter II, paragraph A(14) – ‘General Policies’
• Chapter IV, paragraph 3 – ‘Human Rights’
• Chapter IV, paragraph 5 – ‘Human Rights’

8․ The UK NCP concludes that there was not a direct relationship between the respondent’s conduct and the alleged human rights harms identified in the complaint. 

Additionally, a business relationship, insofar as that term is defined in the OECD guidelines, has not been supported to exist between the respondent and the companies identified in the complainants’ annex.

The companies identified in the complainants’ annex allegedly have relationships with the Myanmar military, an organisation which is documented as having engaged in human rights violations.

9․ The UK NCP concludes that listing companies on their environmental, social and governance (ESG) indices does not create a business relationship between the respondent and the companies identified in the indices.

10․ The information submitted by the complainants does not support the inference that there is a direct relationship between the respondent and the alleged human rights harms identified. Nor does the information submitted support the conclusion that there is a business relationship between the respondent and the companies listed in the complaint. 

Therefore, the UK NCP need not assess the issue of leverage the respondent may have over the companies identified in the annex to the complaint.

11․ The UK NCP concludes that index providers are not institutional investors within the meaning of the OECD guidance for institutional investors.^{[footnote 2]} Consequently, the due diligence requirements recommended for institutional investors under that authority do not apply to this respondent.^{[footnote 3]}

12․ Pursuant to Section 3.6 of the UK NCP’s procedures for dealing with complaints, the UK NCP will close the case. 

The parties now have a right to request a review of the process. A review would be conducted by the UK NCP steering board. A review cannot result in overturning a UK NCP decision. Rather, it is intended to identify procedural errors in the NCP process and ensure they are corrected where possible.

Substance of the complaint

13․ The complaint was raised on 12 February 2024. The complainants alleged that the respondent has failed to conduct human rights due diligence on the companies identified in its ESG index prior to and during their listing. 

Consequently, the complainants allege the respondent thereby failed to comply with the following provisions of the guidelines:

• Chapter II, paragraph A2, A11, A13 and A14
• Chapter IV, paragraphs 3 and 5

14․ The complainants allege that the respondent’s rating and listing of 17 companies (collectively, the ‘companies’) doing business in Myanmar contravenes the respondent’s expectations under the June 2023 OECD guidelines in 2 important respects:

• they have breached the OECD principle to carry out adequate human rights due diligence regarding their rating and listing activities related to the ESG component

• they have failed to seek ways to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts to which they are directly linked through their financial relationships

15․ The complaint alleges that the companies which the respondent listed in the ESG indices were indirectly engaged in multiple human rights violations against the citizens in Myanmar which were in turn, in violation of the OECD guidelines.

16․ The complainants identify the following rationale in support of their complaint:

• Myanmar’s military has committed egregious human rights violations
• the companies doing business with the Myanmar military, directly or indirectly, are enabling and facilitating those violations
• the respondent bestows ESG benefits upon companies that are implicated indirectly in human rights abuse in Myanmar by listing them in their ESG index
• the respondent can exercise extraordinary leverage over the companies by virtue of the companies being listed in their ESG index
• the respondent is directly linked to adverse impacts in Myanmar through its business relationships with companies complicit in human rights abuses
• the respondent has a responsibility to conduct due diligence and to exercise leverage to prevent and mitigate adverse impacts on human rights
• the respondent has failed to conduct effective due diligence and exercise leverage in accordance with the OECD guidelines

17․ The complainants state they request assistance from the UK NCP on behalf of communities and individuals in Myanmar affected by the companies in which the respondent has a business relationship.

18․ The respondent accepted an invitation from the UK NCP to respond to the complaint, and denies the allegations made by the complainants.

19․ The respondent’s position asserts:

• the complainants do not have an adequate interest in the matter and should not qualify as parties within the meaning of the UK NCP procedures
• the respondent maintains that none of the allegations in the should be accepted by the UK NCP as they do not promote the effectiveness of the guidelines
• the respondent does not have a business relationship with the companies

20․ A timeline and details of the UK NCP handling process can be found in Annex 1.

UK NCP decision

21․ The UK NCP has decided that the complaint does not merit further consideration.

22․ The UK NCP does not consider the paragraphs identified in this initial assessment at paragraph 7 merit further consideration.

23․ The conclusions reached by the UK NCP in this Initial Assessment are based on the information provided by the parties to the and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).

24․ In reaching the decision on whether the complaint merits further examination, the UK NCP has considered the criteria set out in the OECD guidelines as follows:

• identity of the party concerned and its interest in the matter
• whether the issue is material and substantiated
• whether the issues are covered by the guidelines
• whether there seems to be a link between the enterprise’s activities and the issue raised in the specific instance
• the extent to which applicable law and/or parallel proceedings limit the NCP’s ability to contribute to the resolution of the issue and/or the implementation of the guidelines
• whether the examination of the issue would contribute to the purpose and effectiveness of the guidelines

Identity of the party concerned and their interest in the matter

25․ The OECD guidance for NCPs on the initial assessment of specific instances states that the complainant(s) should have some interest in the matters they raise in their submissions: “Organisations with mandates or objectives related to certain Responsible Business Conduct-related themes may also have an interest in issues touching on those themes (for example, instances of environmental harm, forced labour etc.). An NCP may consider the mandate of an organisation as well as its stated objectives, while considering the legitimacy of its interests in the matter”.^{[footnote 4]}

26․ In this specific instance, the complaint is made by 3 civil society organisations, all of which have expressed in the complaint and on their respective websites, an interest in human rights and compliance with the OECD guidelines. Two of the complainants have a focus on protecting the human rights of citizens in Myanmar.

27․ The complainants’ interest in the matter resides in their organisational objectives to address human rights issues and, in the case of one complainant, hold MNEs accountable for alleged violations of human rights abuses conducted by entities with whom they have a business relationship.

28․ Therefore, the UK NCP is satisfied that the complainants have a legitimate interest in the issues raised. The non-profit organisations (NPOs) have mandates and objectives relevant to the issues raised in the complaint.

Whether the issues are material and substantiated

29․ The complainants assert that the respondent holds extraordinary influence over the direction of ESG-labelled capital. Moreover, the complainants maintain that the respondents’ ESG ratings and rankings played a significant role in the decision-making process by investors through which ESG capital has been invested in the companies identified in the complaint.

The complainants further assert that ESG funds that are invested in companies with links to the Myanmar military, rely upon the respondent’s ESG indexes and company ratings to make their investment decisions.

Benchmarks and indices defined

30․ The Benchmark Regulation (BMR) in the UK, which is derived from the EU standard and adopted as retained law following Brexit, defines an index as a figure that is publicly available and is regularly determined, either by applying a formula or other calculations.

31․ An index becomes a benchmark within the scope of the BMR where:

• it is used to measure the performance of an investment fund for the purpose of tracking the return
• defining the asset allocation or a portfolio
• computing the performance fees^{[footnote 5]}

Scope of the respondent’s activities

32․ The respondent creates and maintains ESG indexes, which form the basis of many ESG-labelled funds that invest in companies.

33․ The respondent produces ESG ratings of these companies, which determine whether a company performs well enough on ESG-related criteria to be included on an ESG index.

The respondent’s scoring and listing process

34․ The respondent performs a service of scoring and listing companies based on publicly available information. The scoring and listing review consults several variables, including ESG conduct when making their ratings determinations.

35․ The respondent’s ESG scores include assessments of whether companies meet global standards such as the UN Global Compact Principles and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The respondent refers to these standards as the ‘human rights and community’ pillar of their ESG rating model.

36․ The services provided by the respondent include ESG scoring and ranking functions designed to use publicly available information to rate companies and assist investors in their decision-making process regarding their investments.

37․ The UK NCP first assessed whether the respondent had a ‘business relationship’ with the companies, and consequently, was required to exercise risk-based due diligence in the context of that business relationship.

If a business relationship exists, a secondary consideration is whether the respondent had the ability to apply leverage to influence the companies’ conduct related to their links to alleged human rights abuses attributed to the Myanmar military.

38․ According to the complainants, the respondent has a business relationship with the companies based upon its ESG scoring of the companies and inclusion of the companies within the ESG indices.

39․ The complaint focuses on 17 companies (the companies) identified as being included in the respondent’s ‘ESG’ indices. The complaint identifies the companies as being in the respondent’s ‘value chain’.

The complaint further alleges those companies have ‘links’ to the Myanmar military government. The companies’ operations included, but were not limited to, hosting public facing platforms where ‘hate speech’ was posted, sales of drones and weapons, financing and website hosting.

The complainant further asserts with supporting information, that the military government is known to commit human rights abuses. An annex to the complaint lists the companies, their links to the Myanmar military government, the number of indices they appear in, and their ESG ratings.

40․ The complaint does not identify any ESG scoring calculation, ruleset, or policy of the respondent that that is inconsistent the OECD guidelines.

41․ The complainant reasons that the companies have supported the Myanmar military objectives, either directly or indirectly, and they are listed in the ESG indices maintained by the respondent. Consequently, adequate due diligence was not performed by the respondents prior to, or during the course of the companies listing in the ESG index.

Otherwise, the respondent would not have included the companies in the ESG index or alternatively, would have removed the companies from the index once respondent was made aware of the companies’ links to the Myanmar military. Complainants’ inference presupposes that a business relationship as defined in the OECD guidelines exists between the respondent and the companies.

Business relationship

42․ Since 2011, the scope of the OECD guidelines has increased to include responsibilities regarding business relationships, and not just an enterprise’s direct operations. In this respect, the OECD guidelines provide that “enterprises should seek to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts where they have not contributed to that impact, when the impact is nevertheless directly linked to their operations, products or services”.^{[footnote 6]}

43․ The respondent states that it does not have a ‘business relationship’ with the companies it includes on its indices for the purpose of applicability of Chapter II, paragraph 13 of the guidelines.

44․ The complaint refers to the commentary to Chapter II (paragraph 17) to support its position that a ‘business relationship’ is to be interpreted broadly, encompassing all types of relationships directly linking organisations.

The complaint also refers to The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which states companies have a responsibility to “prevent or mitigate adverse impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships.”

Chapter II also provides insight into the types of activity that can constitute a ‘business relationship’ within the meaning of the OECD guidelines.

45․ A business relationship, according to the commentary referenced above, includes relationships with business partners, and entities in the supply chain which supply products or services that are directly linked to the business products, or services.^{[footnote 7]} The definition also includes financial services providers.

46․ There is ample support for the conclusion that investors use the respondent’s services in making investment decisions. Consequently, there is clearly a business relationship between the respondent and investors.

47․ The complainant has offered no supporting evidence that the respondent’s business services are directly linked to the companies listed in the ESG indices. The respondent provides no services to the companies. The companies provide no service to the respondent. Nor does the respondent receive or pay money to the companies rated and listed in the indices.

The scoring and rankings are based on the respondent’s methodology and ruleset and publicly available information. The companies do not occupy a place in the supply chain for the ESG scoring and index services provided by the respondent.

Consequently, it cannot be concluded that the rating and listing of the companies by the respondent, for the benefit of the respondent’s investors, creates a business relationship between the respondent and the companies alleged to be indirectly involved in the human rights harm referenced in the complaint.

48․ Alternatively, the complainants have referenced the OECD Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) Guidance for Institutional Investors as support for adopting expanded due diligence expectations for the respondent in this specific instance.

49․ There is no evidence or inference that the respondent is an institutional investor in the companies, insofar as that term is defined by the OECD in its publication ‘Responsible Business Conduct for Institutional Investors: Key considerations for due diligence under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational enterprises’ (2017) (‘Institutional Investor RBC’).

Consequently, the reference to Institutional Investors is inapplicable in this specific instance. The undisputed facts are that the respondent scores, rates and lists the companies but does not invest in the companies. The companies do not apply to or pay to be included in the indices. 

The OECD identifies an institutional investor as one being able to “seek to influence the investee through ownership”. It is undisputed that the respondent has no ownership interest in the companies alleged to have contributed to the harm identified.

Regulatory obligation of independence

50․ The respondent is regulated as a benchmark administrator (BMA) by the FCA. The respondent provides relevant indices in accordance with the UK Benchmarks Regulation framework. To comply with these regulations, and to maintain consumer confidence, it is essential that indices are built and maintained in accordance with a ruleset. 

A ruleset for a given index is created by the respondent and identifies how companies are given scores, how those scores are weighted, how information is gathered, and in what circumstances a company can be removed from an index.

51․ Under the UK Benchmark Regulations, the respondent has a duty to minimise conflicts of interest. The rules for the respondent’s indices are therefore written to minimise the need for judgement or discretion to be exercised by the respondent.

52․ Consequently, the respondent maintains they cannot attempt to influence companies to improve companies’ rating on an index, and to do so would violate the independence mandate identified in the FCA regulations.

53․ The companies may, however, be removed from the indices for factors such as market capitalisation, liquidity, compliance with regulatory standards and other performance metrics. None of the companies identified by complainant are alleged to be under sanctions.

54․ For the respondent, the inclusion of the companies in the index is subject to a ruleset, and therefore, if companies are included, and are given a specific weighting, it is in accordance with that ruleset. The respondent states that the rules attached to any given index are available for public viewing.

55․ The complainants have not claimed that the respondent has failed to comply with any given ruleset they have published, nor have they challenged any given index rule set.

Whether the issues are covered by the OECD guidelines

56․ There is no dispute that the respondent is a multinational enterprise within the meaning of the OECD guideline definitions of applicability.

57․ The respondent is domiciled in the UK. Therefore, it also satisfies the criteria that it is ‘in or from’ the territory of one of the adherents to the guidelines. The UK NCP found it to be appropriate to undertake an initial assessment of the complaint.

Whether there seems to be a link between the enterprise’s activities and the issues raised in the specific instance

58․ The complaint alleges that the respondent’s ESG scoring and listing on the index create a business relationship between the companies and the respondent, insofar as that term is defined in the OECD guidelines. The complainants assert that benchmarking benefits the companies financially because they are identified as being within the group of ESG listed companies by the respondent.

59․ Furthermore, the complainant concludes that being included in the ESG index increases the flow of capital from investors to the companies.

60․ The complainants further assert that a business relationship exists between the respondent and the companies because the respondent benefits financially from investors who use the respondent’s service to identify ESG rated investments.

61․ It is reasonable to assume without further examination that some investors consider placement in an ESG index when making investment decisions. That assumption does not, however, establish that a business relationship exists between the companies and the respondent merely because the companies may derive a financial benefit from being listed in the ESG index.

62․ The issue of leverage a respondent may have over a company alleged to have engaged in harmful conduct only becomes relevant if a business relationship exists between the respondent and the company engaged in the alleged harm. 

The level and extent of potential leverage over the companies does not create a business relationship. The existence of a business relationship is a threshold issue that must be satisfied before the UK NCP considers the extent of leverage the respondent maintains over the companies. 

The business relationship consideration is also a threshold issue during this initial assessment to determine if a case will be accepted for further examination. The UK NCP concludes there is no business relationship, within the meaning of the OECD guidelines, between the respondent and the companies alleged to have indirectly contributed to human rights harms by the Myanmar military.

63․ The UK NCP therefore considers that it would not contribute to the purpose and effectiveness of the OECD guidelines for the UK NCP to consider the complaint further.

The extent to which applicable law and/or parallel proceedings limit the NCP’s ability to contribute to the resolution of the issue and/or the implementation of the OECD guidelines

64․ No parallel proceedings have been identified by the parties.

65․ The UK NCP considers that accepting this complaint would not contribute to the effectiveness of the OECD guidelines, consequently, the complaint is not accepted, and the specific instance will be closed.

Next steps

66․ Pursuant to section 3.6 of the UK NCP procedures for dealing with complaints, the UK NCP will take no further action relative to the complaint. The parties may avail themselves of a request for procedural review as identified in the UK Procedural Guidelines. The parties will have 10 working days to request a procedural review. If a review is not requested within that time frame, the initial assessment will be published on the UK NCP website.

Annex 1: timeline of the initial assessment

Date	Action
12 February 2024	The UK NCP receives the complaint.
23 February 2024	The UK NCP confirms receipt of the complaint.
7 March 2024	The UK NCP send notice of complaint to the respondent.
10 May 2024	The UK NCP receives the respondent’s reply to the complaint.
9 October 2025	The UK NCP drafts the initial assessment and shares both the initial assessment draft and the factual commentary grid with parties for comment.
11 November 2025	Parties submit factual commentary to the UK NCP with their response.
1 May 2026	The UK NCP incorporates factual comments in the initial assessment and forwards them to the parties.
7 August 2026	UK NCP publishes the initial assessment.

Annex 2: guideline implications

The complainants implicate the following provisions of the OECD guidelines.

Chapter II: General Policies

• Chapter II, paragraph A(2) – ‘General Policies’
• Chapter II, paragraph A(11) – ‘General Policies’
• Chapter II, paragraph A(13) – ‘General Policies’
• Chapter II, paragraph A(14) – ‘General Policies’

Chapter IV: Human Rights

• Chapter IV, paragraph 3 – ‘Human Rights’
• Chapter IV, paragraph 5 – ‘Human Rights’

1. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, OECD Publishing (2023), Paris ↩

2. OECD, Responsible Business Conduct for Institutional Investors: Key considerations for due diligence under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2017) ↩

3. The complainants reference the expanded due diligence recommendations for institutional investors for illustrative purposes only. Nonetheless, it is worth nothing that the scope of the RBC Guidance for institutional Investors explicitly excludes Index Providers from its coverage. ↩

4. OECD, Guide for National Contact Points on the initial assessment of specific instances, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2019), page 6 ↩

5. FCA, UK Benchmarks Regulation ↩

6. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, Chapter II, paragraph A.12 ↩

7. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct Chapter II General Policies, paragraph 17 ↩