Decision

Bargaining Unit Decision

Updated 27 April 2026

Applies to England, Scotland and Wales

Case Number: TUR1/1512(2025)

27 April 2026

CENTRAL ARBITRATION COMMITTEE

TRADE UNION AND LABOUR RELATIONS (CONSOLIDATION) ACT 1992

SCHEDULE A1 - COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: RECOGNITION

DETERMINATION OF THE BARGAINING UNIT

The Parties:

National Union of Journalists (NUJ)

and

Politico

1. Introduction

1)         National Union of Journalists (NUJ) (the Union) submitted an application to the CAC dated 17 November 2025 that it should be recognised for collective bargaining purposes by Politico (the Employer) for a bargaining unit comprising “All editorial staff with a UK contract, ultimately reporting to the Editor in Chief and work at St Vincent House 30 Orange Street, London WC2H 7HH. For avoidance of doubt, our proposed bargaining unit excludes UK Policy Editor, UK Deputy Editor, Executive Editor, Head of Audio, Senior Executive Editor, Managing Editor, Europe and Senior Finance Editor. The remaining editorial staff, which we believe to be made up of 34 roles, form our proposed bargaining unit.” The location of the bargaining unit was given as St Vincent House 30 Orange Street, London WC2H 7HH United Kingdom.

2)         The application was received by the CAC on 17 November 2025, and the CAC gave both parties notice of receipt of the application on 18 November 2025. The Employer submitted a response to the CAC dated 24 November 2025 which was copied to the Union.

3)         In accordance with section 263 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (the Act), the CAC Chair established a Panel to deal with the case. The Panel consisted of Mr Andrew James, Panel Chair, and, as Members, Mrs Susan Jordan and Mr Nicholas Childs. The Case Manager appointed to support the Panel was Joanne Curtis.

4)         By a decision dated 5 January 2026 the Panel accepted the Union’s application. The parties then entered a period of negotiation in an attempt to reach agreement on the appropriate bargaining unit. As no agreement was reached, the parties were invited to supply the Panel with, and to exchange, written submissions relating to the question of the determination of the appropriate bargaining unit. A bargaining unit hearing was arranged for 26 February 2026 but could not go ahead due to one of the parties counsel being severely unwell. The hearing was rearranged and was held by virtual means on 20 April 2026. The names of those who attended the hearing are appended to this decision.

5)         The Panel is required, by paragraph 19(2) of Schedule A1 to the Act (the Schedule), to decide whether the proposed bargaining unit is appropriate and, if found not to be appropriate, to decide in accordance with paragraph 19(3) a bargaining unit which is appropriate. Paragraph 19B(1) and (2) state that, in making those decisions, the Panel must take into account the need for the unit to be compatible with effective management and the matters listed in paragraph 19B(3) of the Schedule so far as they do not conflict with that need. The matters listed in paragraph 19B(3) are: (1) the views of the employer and the union; (2) existing national and local bargaining arrangements; (3) the desirability of avoiding small, fragmented bargaining units within an undertaking; (4) the characteristics of workers falling within the bargaining unit under consideration and of any other employees of the employer whom the CAC considers relevant; and (5) the location of workers. Paragraph 19B(4) states that in taking an employer’s views into account for the purpose of deciding whether the proposed bargaining unit is appropriate, the CAC must take into account any view the employer has about any other bargaining unit that it considers would be appropriate.

2. Summary of the submissions made by the Union

6)         The question for the CAC to decide was whether the Union’s proposed bargaining unit was appropriate and if, and only if the Union’s proposed bargaining unit was not appropriate, the CAC must then determine an appropriate bargaining unit. The bargaining unit proposed by the Union comprised all editorial staff with a UK contract currently working for Politico which it believed was made up of 34 roles. For the avoidance of doubt the following roles were excluded from the bargaining unit: UK Policy Editor, UK Deputy Editor, Executive Editor, Head of Audio, Senior Executive Editor & Managing Editor, Europe.

7)         When making its decision the CAC should focus first on the Union’s proposed bargaining unit. The question was not whether the bargaining unit proposed by the Union was ideal or even whether it was better than any alternative bargaining unit proposed by the Employer but simply whether it was an appropriate unit. The threshold was a ‘comparatively modest level of appropriateness’ (see [7] of R(Kwik-Fit (GB) Ltd) Central Arbitration Committee [2002] ICR 1212). The CAC was not called upon to choose between rival contenders as to the appropriate bargaining unit: it was first required to determine whether the Union’s proposed bargaining unit was appropriate (TGWU and Tyco Electronics TUR1/521/06, 26 September 2006). If, and only if, the CAC considered the Union’s proposed bargaining unit was not appropriate, must the CAC cast its net further and determine an appropriate bargaining unit.

8)         In reaching its decision the Panel must consider whether the proposed bargaining unit was compatible with effective management for the purposes of paragraph 19(2)(a) of the Schedule. Compatible with effective management meant ‘compatible with’ or ‘able to co-exist with’ (TGWU & GMB and Gala Casinos Limited TUR1/206/02, 24 December 2002 and NUJ v Pearson Education Limited TUR1/652/08, 30 January 2009). The bargaining unit need not be compatible with the most effective management (Kwik-Fit at [15]). The question was whether the bargaining unit was a sensible vehicle for resolving disputes about pay, hours and holiday. Chapter 7 [1254] of Harvey’s provides (emphasis added):

Where there is a dispute, it is often the case that the employer protests that the proposed bargaining unit is incompatible with effective management. Sometimes the truth is that the employer believes that any form of collective bargaining (and therefore any bargaining unit) is incompatible with effective management, because it interferes with his preferred style of management (GMB and Northbourne Ltd (TUR1/183/02, 20 August 2002), CAC; Amicus & GMB and Liebherr Cranes Ltd (TUR1/332/04, 26 May 2004), CAC; URTU and First Line Contracts Ltd (TUR1/454/05, 2 November 2005), CAC). That is obviously not an acceptable objection in the context of the statutory scheme, based as it is on the premise that it is in principle desirable that these matters be resolved by collective negotiation with an independent union or unions, if that is what the workers want. In the present context, therefore, the concept of effective management is to be understood as relating principally to methods of resolving issues of pay, hours and holidays by means of collective bargaining (GMPU and Ritrama (UK) Ltd (TUR1/178/02, 11 July 2002), per the CAC). In paraphrase: taking account of the statutory criteria and of the way in which the undertaking operates and is organised, does the proposed bargaining unit offer a sensible and workable vehicle for settling by collective bargaining the pay, hours and holidays of the workers concerned?

9)         It was not in dispute that in the present case there were no existing national or local bargaining arrangements. It was also true that the workers shared a location of either the London office, or worked from home, and that there was no other office from which any individual could work. There were various patterns of work including some sole home working, some hybrid working, and some predominantly office working. This was facilitated by modern IT systems and connectivity in the production of an online digital product. The Union argued that the usual place of work, be it home or the office, had no material bearing on whether the bargaining unit proposed was appropriate. If the Employer considered these working practices to be consistent with running its business, then it could not sensibly argue that it was incompatible with the effective management of the proposed bargaining unit.

10)       Turning to paragraph 19B(3)(c) of the Schedule and the desirability of avoiding small, fragmented bargaining units within an undertaking, the Union submitted that the concern here was a risk of a plurality of units in respect of which collective bargaining was taking place (see [36] of Lidl Limited and CAC v GMB [2017] ICR 1145). The question was whether the workforce would be divided up into numerous groups prone to compete with each other (see R (Cable & Wireless Services UK Ltd) v Central Arbitration Committee [2008] ICR 693). In the present case the proposed bargaining unit avoided fragmentation and small groups within the undertaking which was plainly compatible with effective management. In contrast, the bargaining unit proposed by the Employer would cause just such mischief which the statute sought to prevent.

11)       Paragraph 19(2)(d) concerned the characteristics of the workers falling within the bargaining unit under consideration and of any other worker of the employer whom the CAC considered relevant. It was envisaged that any point about the inclusion of ‘editors’ within the bargaining unit would be said to relate to factors falling within paragraph 19(2)(d). It was not a general principle of industrial relations that the immediate managers of a group of workers should not be included in the same bargaining unit as those they supervised (see [31] of BECTU v Royal Shakespeare Company Limited TUR1/540(2006), 7 February 2007.

Harvey at [1269] stated (emphasis added):

An issue which crops up not infrequently is whether it is appropriate to include managers or supervisors in a group along with those whom they manage or supervise. Sometimes it is (eg ISTC and Premier Trade Windows (Wales and West) Ltd t/a Premier Trade Frames (TUR1/339/03, 10 May 2004), CAC); UNIFI and Cyprus Popular Bank Ltd t/a Laiki Bank (TUR1/367/04, 6 August 2004), CAC; CATU and Meadowstone (Derbyshire) Ltd (TUR1/466/05, 12 December 2005), CAC). Sometimes it is not (eg NUJ and North Notts Newspapers Ltd (TUR1/349/04, 17 June 2004), CAC; NUJ and The Reporter Ltd (TUR1/352/04, 16 June 2004), CAC); UCATT and Millennium Stadium plc (TUR1/444/05, 1 August 2005), CAC); Amicus and CCL Label (formerly Inprint Extended Text Labels Ltd (TUR1/473/05, 1 December 2005), CAC). There is no general principle of industrial relations one way or the other (BECTU and Royal Shakespeare Company Ltd (TUR1/540, 7 February 2007; Unite and Kettle Foods Ltd (TUR1/557/07, 29 June 2007), CAC). It may be particularly relevant to ask whether the team leader (howsoever designated) has disciplinary powers in respect of his team (so that he may be perceived to be one of ‘them’ rather than one of ‘us’), or whether his role involves any bargaining function (so that inclusion in the bargaining unit would give rise to conflicts of interest in that he would, to some extent, be sitting on both sides of the bargaining table) or whether he otherwise has a significant role in determining pay within the proposed bargaining unit (so that, again, there would be a conflict of interest: CWU and Cable & Wireless (TUR1/570/07, 7 September 2007) CAC; UCATT & Unite and Hillhouse Quarry Company (TUR1/735/10, 23 February 2011), CAC; GMB and The Noble Collection UK Ltd (TUR1/1284/2022, 17 October 2022), CAC). 

12)       The nature and extent of the roles was a question of fact for the CAC. The roles of these individuals posed no material conflict of interest; a bargaining unit containing editorial managers was wholly compatible with effective management. All roles within the bargaining unit shared common terms as evidenced from the contracts of employment, moreover they were all journalists in the general sense. As set out in National Union of Journalists and Bristol Evening Post and Press Ltd CAC Case No.TUR1/64/2001 the CAC was satisfied that journalism was a profession for which people were specifically recruited and trained and that, as regards the particular company concerned, the journalists undertook duties which were for the most part distinguishable from those of their non-journalist colleagues.

13)       In the present case the CAC was faced with a small workforce and bargaining unit and to exclude editors would be to encourage fragmentation and would undermine effective management. The editorial staff, alongside the reporters, were all journalists carrying out similar work with the editors’ focus on the content of the written products, which was similarly the focus of the other reporters. The editors had limited management responsibility going to matters of disciplinary, finance or the commercial direction of the company. To the extent that editors were managers, they managed the journalistic content. The editorial managers, while having general oversight and responsibility for the journalism and product, refer matters up the chain in regard to setting salary, conducting disciplinary processes, or directing the general management of the company. It could not be said that any of the editors sat on ‘both sides of the bargaining table’. They sat squarely with their fellow journalists. There was therefore no conflict of interest. This was borne out by various statements from Editorial Managers who have said the following:-

Manager 1 (a manager familiar with the functioning of the newsroom) said the Disputed Editors had “limited say in how much budget was available” to fill vacant positions. Discussions about available resources were undertaken between the UK Policy Editor and the Senior Executive Editor, they said.

Manager 2 — another manager familiar with the structure — said Disputed Managers: “have conversations about pay expectations with applicants.” These are relayed “to higher management rather than taking decisions on pay.” Disputed Managers “do not take part in budgetary decisions.”

Disputed Managers’ contributions to salary decisions after hiring are limited to advocating for salary rises on behalf of their direct reports to upper managers and providing grades from 1-5 in an annual performance review. These scores are used by HR to determine whether an employee will be given a raise or not. The editor is not involved in that process.

As the Employer says in its own submission, POLITICO is a multinational company with newsrooms in Germany, Belgium, France, the US, Canada and the UK and “remuneration is generally streamlined across jurisdictions.”

Manager 3 — a third manager familiar with the structure — said the Disputed Editors “are able to advocate for more resources in their teams and are ultimately accountable for the success of their verticals. They are not involved in spending decisions beyond approving travel/accommodation. They can call for more hiring, interview candidates, and make the decision to start [a] performance management process of an underperforming reporter, but do not have oversight of budgets or determine salary figures … Pay is ultimately determined by POLITICO HR, taking into account feedback given by managers through the annual appraisal process.”

Manager 4 — a manager at the company with a working knowledge of the newsroom structure — said the Disputed Managers “have no direct influence on strategic business decisions. They do lobby their bosses on hiring and budgets, for example for extra resource when staff are on long-term leave and over salaries for staff … Those decisions are made several rungs above them.”  

14)       By contrast, whilst the Employer asserted that the wider international group would be adversely impacted, the reality was that in its UK limb, the Employer’s proposed bargaining unit, if adopted, would lead to a need to have multiple bargaining units tiny in size at a small undertaking. It would lead to fragmentation and be unworkable. As evidenced at this level all individuals worked towards producing excellent content and worked in common with each other. In so far as there was an ‘us and them’ or two sides of any bargain, all the journalists, including the editors sat together, and the directors/management sat firmly on the same side.

15)       The CAC must not attach weight to specific titles given by the Employer without considering factually what it was that the individuals did. It was submitted that when considering the core question of appropriateness, the proposed bargaining unit put forward by the Union was wholly appropriate and compatible with effective management. Further, the Union acknowledged that parts of the Employer’s US editorial team was represented by a union and that this excluded all managers from the bargaining unit. But the Employer adapted its conditions and salary offerings to variations in legislation and local market across all of the countries in which it operated. It was difficult to understand, given the lack of specific plausible examples in the Employer’s submission, how the inclusion of the Disputed editorial managers would present an additional challenge or conflict. The Employer seemed to be arguing that the inclusion of the six ‘Disputed Managers’ may result in lower wage increase ambitions compared to their global counterparts thereby upsetting the twin apple-carts of global collective bargaining and effective management. This seemed unlikely. Ultimately though, the Employer’s cross-jurisdictional observations do not assist the CAC. Properly understood, it was a call to the CAC to compare the Union’s proposed bargaining unit against others and to choose ‘the better one.’ As noted previously, that was not the task in hand.

16)       For the reasons outlined above, the Union believed its proposed bargaining unit was appropriate in all the circumstances and compatible with effective management. It offered a sensible and workable vehicle for settling, by collective bargaining, the pay, hours and holidays of the workers concerned.

3. Summary of the submissions made by the Employer

17)       The Employer submitted that the appropriate bargaining unit in this matter was one that should exclude the following managerial staff: UK News Editor, UK Political Editor, Tech Editor, Energy Editor, Finance Editor and Transatlantic Editor, along with any other managerial roles which were created in the future (the “Disputed Managers”). The Employer did not oppose the principle of collective bargaining in respect of its workforce. However, it was essential that the bargaining unit be determined in a manner that was compatible with effective management, reflected the genuine community of interest among workers, and accorded with the statutory criteria set out in paragraph 19B of the Schedule.

18)       The Employer’s position on the appropriate bargaining unit was that it should comprise of all newsroom staff at St Vincent House 30 Orange Street, London WC2H 7HH, but should expressly exclude the following managerial roles:

1. the UK Policy Editor, UK Deputy Editor, Executive Editor, Head of Audio, Senior Executive Editor, Managing Editor, Europe and Senior Finance Editor (all of whom the Union proposed should be excluded too) (the “Agreed Excluded Managers”); and

2. the Disputed Managers.

(together the “Proposed Excluded Managers”)

19)       The Union’s proposed bargaining unit, which sought to include managerial staff alongside non-managerial employees, was neither appropriate for collective bargaining purposes nor compatible with effective management.  The Employer submitted that the inclusion of managerial staff (i.e., the Disputed Managers) within the bargaining unit would fundamentally undermine this primary statutory objective. This was because the inclusion of the Disputed Managers within the bargaining unit would create an inherent and irreconcilable conflict of interest. These Disputed Managers, along with the Agreed Excluded Managers, were responsible for implementing the Employer’s policies, conducting performance appraisals, administering disciplinary procedures, and making decisions regarding the terms and conditions of the very workers with whom they would share a bargaining unit. If the Disputed Managers were included in the unit, they would be placed in the untenable and conflicted position of negotiating on matters that they were simultaneously responsible for enforcing and administering.

20)       Further, during any industrial action, the Disputed Managers would face an impossible choice between their duty of loyalty to the Employer and solidarity with their fellow bargaining unit members. This would severely compromise the Employer’s ability to maintain essential operations and manage its workforce effectively during periods of industrial dispute.

21)       The Disputed Managers did not share a genuine community of interest with non-managerial employees. Their roles, responsibilities, and relationship with the Employer were fundamentally different. It was inappropriate for the Proposed Excluded Managers to collectively bargain their pay and benefits alongside more junior employees, given a potential conflict in how pay increases and bonuses were distributed. The Disputed Managers alongside the Agreed Excluded Managers, were often privy to confidential business information and strategic planning, which was not shared with the wider workforce. This created an inherent tension: these managers may have prior knowledge of the Employer’s confidential and commercially sensitive financial position, strategic plans, or negotiating parameters, placing them in an advantageous and conflicted position during collective bargaining. Including such disparate groups — those with access to confidential strategic information and those without—within a single bargaining unit would not reflect the genuine common interests that collective bargaining was intended to serve, and would, accordingly be incompatible with effective management.

22)       The characteristics of the Proposed Excluded Managers differed materially from those of non managerial employees in several key respects. These managers exercised decision-making authority and discretion on behalf of the Employer, often holding delegated powers in relation to recruitment, discipline, pay, hours of work, and grievance handling. Their career progression, training requirements, and day-to-day responsibilities were distinct from those of the workers they supervised. Further, managers participated in regular leadership meetings restricted to managerial staff, through which they discussed budgetary, operational, and people management matters in their capacity as management. These differences in characteristics supported the exclusion of all managerial staff (including the Disputed Managers) from the bargaining unit. The Employer entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Washington-Baltimore News Guild effective 1 February 2024, under which all managers, supervisors, and confidential employees were excluded from the bargaining unit.

23)       The Employer submitted that excluding managerial staff from the bargaining unit was consistent with established practice within the news media organisation sector (as highlighted by the NUJ & Bullivant case cited below for example) and reflected the conventional distinction between those who managed and those who were managed.

The CAC had consistently recognised in previous decisions that the inclusion of managerial staff within a bargaining unit may be incompatible with effective management. The exclusion of managers from bargaining units was also a well-established principle in industrial relations practice, both domestically and internationally, reflecting the inherent tension and conflict between managerial responsibility and collective worker representation.

24)       The Employer referred to the recent bargaining unit decision dated 6 March 2025 in the case of the NUJ & Bullivant Media Group Limited (TUR1/1435(2024) in which, the CAC Panel considered the question of whether Editorial staff with managerial responsibilities should be included in a bargaining unit. The Panel emphasised the importance of focusing on what the individuals actually did rather than limiting itself to job titles, and the need to identify any workers within the proposed bargaining unit who genuinely held management responsibilities covering, for example, the setting of pay, responsibility for financial and strategic direction and discipline and grievance. The Panel noted that this approach avoided the risk of individuals finding themselves on both sides of the bargaining table. Although the Panel ultimately included all staff journalists in that case, including Editorial staff (on the basis that the Editorial staff did not possess genuine managerial responsibilities), the decision supported the principle that workers with genuine decisional authority over pay, discipline, and strategic matters should be excluded to ensure compatibility with effective management. The present case was distinguishable: unlike the Editorial staff in Bullivant, the Disputed Managers did possess genuine managerial responsibilities. They were responsible for implementing the Employer’s policies, conducting performance appraisals, administering disciplinary procedures, and making decisions regarding pay and other terms and conditions. For this reason, the Employer submitted, the Disputed Managers should be excluded from the bargaining unit.

25)       In the bargaining unit decision dated 31 October 2023 in the case of the NUJ & Business Insider Europe Limited (TUR1/1338(2023), the CAC Panel considered whether the (1) Supervising Producer; (2) Managing Producer; (3) Editor; and (4) Senior Editor (together, ‘the Disputed Positions’) should be excluded from the bargaining unit. The Employer successfully argued that the Disputed Positions should be excluded. The Panel noted that these Disputed Positions had wide responsibilities over members of their teams relating to remuneration, recruitment, and grievance procedures. Further the Panel noted that these Disputes Positions provided general input into broader strategic decisions that affect the business as a whole. The Panel found it “inappropriate” for (2), (3), and (4) of the Disputed Positions to be included within the bargaining unit. The Panel noted that their inclusion would create a clear conflict of interest. The Employer believed this case was highly relevant to the current matter and for the reasons mentioned, supported the position for the Disputed Managers to be excluded from the Union’s proposed bargaining unit.

26)       In its bargaining unit decision dated 17 October 2022, in the matter of the GMB & The Noble Collection UK Ltd (TUR1/1284(2022), the CAC Panel rejected the Union’s proposed bargaining unit, finding that it was not compatible with effective management as it included senior managers responsible for reviewing pay and bonuses for other members of that bargaining unit. As such, their inclusion would present a “conflict of interest”, as it would entail them conducting negotiations on behalf of the Employer in a context where their own terms and conditions would be affected by the outcome of such negotiations. In its bargaining unit decision dated 29 October 2021, in the matter of the GMB & Eddie Stobart (TUR1/1219(2021), the CAC Panel rejected the Union’s proposed bargaining unit, finding that it was appropriate to exclude the Team Leaders and Supervisor from the unit. The Panel noted that the Team Leaders and Supervisor had very different day-to-day work to the Warehouse Workers, with the majority of their time spent dealing with Line Management/people matters. Further, the Panel highlighted the significant difference in pay levels between the Team Leaders / Supervisor and the Warehouse Workers.

27)       In its bargaining unit decision dated 17 April 2024 in the matter of the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) & The Press Association Ltd (TUR1/1378(2023), the CAC Panel accepted the Employer’s submission that Managers’ Deputies should be excluded from the bargaining unit alongside the Managers (to note: the Union had proposed a unit which only excluded the Managers). The Employer submitted that “the Managers and their Deputies worked as a managerial team” and thus should be “treated the same for the purposes of the proposed bargaining unit”. In its conclusion, the Panel pointed to the working relationship between Managers and Managers’ Deputies, finding: “if Managers were excluded from the bargaining unit and Deputies were not there was a risk of a wedge being driven between the Manager and Deputy whom are expected to work interchangeably in order to ensure the smooth running of the various departments with shared knowledge responsibility and mutual trust.” This would “create an artificial divide”, the Panel concluded, “which is inconsistent with effective management”. The Employer believed the Disputed Managers were akin to the Deputies noted in the above case and for that reason, should be excluded from the proposed bargaining unit.

28)       For the reasons set out above, the Employer respectfully submitted that the appropriate bargaining unit should exclude the Proposed Excluded Managers, including the Disputed Managers. Such exclusion was necessary to ensure compatibility with effective management, reflected the distinct characteristics and interests of managerial employees, and accorded with established industrial relations practice.

4. Considerations

29)       The Panel begins with the statutory framework. The Panel is required, by paragraph 19(2) of the Schedule to the Act, to decide whether the proposed bargaining unit is appropriate and, if found not to be appropriate, to decide in accordance with paragraph 19(3) a bargaining unit which is appropriate. Paragraph 19B (1) and (2) state that, in making those decisions, the Panel must take into account the need for the unit to be compatible with effective management and the matters listed in paragraph 19B(3) of the Schedule so far as they do not conflict with that need. The matters listed in paragraph 19B (3) are:

(1) the views of the employer and the union;

(2) existing national and local bargaining arrangements;

(3) the desirability of avoiding small, fragmented bargaining units within an undertaking;

(4)   the characteristics of workers falling within the bargaining unit under consideration and of any other employees of the employer whom the CAC considers relevant; and

(5)   the location of workers.

30)       Paragraph 19B(4) states that in taking an Employer’s views into account for the purpose of deciding whether the proposed bargaining unit is appropriate, the CAC must consider any view the Employer has about any other bargaining unit that it considers would be appropriate. The Panel must also have regard to paragraph 171 of the Schedule which provides that “In exercising functions under this Schedule in any particular case the CAC must have regard to the object of encouraging and promoting fair and efficient practices and arrangements in the workplace, so far as having regard to that object is consistent with applying other provisions of this Schedule in the case concerned.”

31)       In reaching its decision the Panel has taken account of the views of the Union and the Employer as expressed in their written submissions, responses to questions and oral submissions during the hearing. The centrality of the dispute was compatibility or otherwise with effective management.

32)       The Panel’s first responsibility is to decide, in accordance with paragraph 19(2) of the Schedule, whether the Union’s proposed bargaining unit is appropriate. That does not require the Panel to determine whether it is the most appropriate bargaining unit; only whether it is appropriate. This is the overriding requirement under 19B(2) and relates principally to the matters to be collectively bargained for under the statutory regime, namely pay, hours and holidays. The requirement is that the proposed bargaining unit would be compatible with effective management, not that it be compatible with the most effective management. Against the background of that overall responsibility the Panel has to consider the matters listed in paragraph 19B(3) of the Schedule, reminding itself that these matters must not conflict with the need for the unit to be compatible with effective management.

33)       The Panel notes that the statutory test is set at the comparatively modest level of appropriateness, rather than of the optimum or best possible outcome (see R (on the application of Kwik-Fit (GB) Ltd) v Central Arbitration Committee [2002] EWCA Civ 512, [2002] IRLR 395, [2002] ICR 1212, CA, per Buxton LJ). The Panel should not reject the Union’s proposed bargaining unit because it considers that a different unit would be more appropriate nor, in considering whether it is compatible with effective management, should the Panel consider whether it is the most effective or desirable unit in that context.

34)       It is relatively common to have different levels of seniority within the same bargaining unit. There is no reason, as a matter of principle, to exclude those in managerial positions from a bargaining unit which includes roles reporting to them. The central issue is compatibility with effective management. There is nothing we have seen which would indicate that the inclusion of the “Disputed Managers” is incompatible with effective management. In particular, there is nothing approaching a substantive conflict of interest.

35)       The current case can be contrasted with the Press Association case (see above) in which the Panel concluded at 59) and 61):

59)   The Employer called evidence from Mr Clifton, Editor in Chief. In answer to questions from the panel Mr Clifton stated that the Managers reported to him. In respect of pay rises Mr Clifton’s evidence was that for the past 2 years there had been an across the board increase of 6%. Neither the Managers, nor the Deputy Managers, or indeed Mr Clifton had been involved in that decision. In previous years Mr Clifton stated that there had been discretion as to the pay increases. Mr Clifton stated that there would be one pot for Managers pay increases and one pot for everyone else (including Deputies).  Mr Clifton stated that the Deputies pay increase would be determined and removed from the ‘everyone else’ pot prior to there being a discussion as to pay increases within the team. At this point the Deputies and their Managers would discuss pay increases within the team and agree an allocation. The Manager would then take the proposal to Mr Clifton. Ultimately neither the Managers nor Deputies would have the power to award an increase which would need to be approved by Mr Clifton. …

61) The Panel accepted the Employer’s evidence that if Managers were excluded from the bargaining unit and Deputies were not there was a risk of a wedge being driven between the Manager and Deputy whom are expected to work interchangeably in order to ensure the smooth running of the various departments with shared knowledge responsibility and mutual trust.

The Panel conclude that is distinguishable from the Politico case, where the Disputed Managers make no decisions over pay on a collective basis. Their decisions on the performance grade of each of their direct reports on an individual basis may influence the level of any increase in pay for that individual – but the decision as to whether to reduce or increase that performance score, and/or whether to withhold a pay rise/bonus as a result of the score, is made well above the level of the Disputed Managers.

36)       As for the NUJ & Business Insider Europe Limited decision (see above), the Panel notes that there was no dispute in that case regarding the inclusion of 44 employees in the Bargaining Unit. There was a dispute regarding the union’s proposed inclusion of 19 other employees, in four disputed roles, who had some management responsibilities. The CAC Panel determined that it was illogical to include in the proposed BU the role of Supervising Producers, who had reporting into them, Supervising Managing Producers, who were excluded from the union’s proposed BU. Therefore, the CAC decided that the Union’s proposed BU was not appropriate. In deciding to also exclude the other three remaining disputed roles of Managing Producer, Editor and Senior Editor, the CAC decided (paragraph 47):

Team performance and how effectively those in the remaining Disputed Positions manage their team are factors which influence the remuneration of these three roles. This differs from the way in which remuneration is considered for the team members themselves, which is linked to personal contribution only. Those in the three Disputed Positions are also required to provide substantive feedback, which is then factored into policy and wider business changes. If the three further Disputed Positions were included in the bargaining unit, we agree that this could create a conflict of interest. The conflict could be between their responsibilities to Senior Management, in recommending what their team should be paid, and their position as a member of the bargaining unit in respect of which these same matters are subject to collective bargaining. Significant and substantive input into the remuneration process of members of their team which includes access to confidential information, both in relation to the salaries of the individuals and also potential budgets and impact on the wider business, makes it inappropriate, in the panel’s view, to include them as members of the bargaining unit. Were these positions to be included in the bargaining unit there is also the potential that what those in the Disputed Positions recommend for their reports could directly impact, and potentially adversely, what remuneration package they themselves receive.

37)       There is no evidence in the case before this Panel that team performance or effective management specifically influenced the remuneration of the Disputed Managers. Although the Panel accept that their performance score will be determined by their effectiveness in their role, including management responsibilities, the Panel does not consider that creates a conflict of interest. All employees are expected to do their job effectively. If direct reports are under-performing, managers are expected to manage that individual appropriately, on an individual basis. That does not create a conflict in relation to collective bargaining over pay etc. Nor is there any substantive evidence before the Panel that the Disputed Managers were privy to confidential business information and strategic planning, which is not shared with the wider workforce. Again, this was a bare assertion, without specific examples being given, save for details about the pay of the members of their team. The Panel finds nothing unusual in relation to that.

38)       Further, the Panel is unconvinced that the input provided by the Disputed Managers into levels of pay on recruitment, or their decisions about performance review grades, disciplinary and grievance or performance improvement procedures, holidays, working hours and TOIL would create a conflict of interest. These are matters relating to the management of individuals within their team, due to their role as first line mangers in the business. They involve the application of policies and procedures which they have no decision-making power in relation to, but which give them some managerial discretion on an operational level. None if this is unusual for such first tier managers. To the contrary, it would be unusual if they were not given some discretion and all their decisions had to be approved by their managers; in other words, micro-management. We conclude that their input into such matters do not relate to and nor would they impact on collective bargaining in relation to pay, hours and holidays between the Union and the Employer. 

39)       Taking pay on recruitment for example, the Disputed Managers provide input into starting salaries, which the preferred appointee (following a competitive interview process) has indicated that they require, in order to agree to join the business. This does not in our view create a conflict when it comes to collective bargaining on pay increases on an annual basis. It is for those well above the position of the Disputed Managers to make a decision as to whether the Employer can afford to employ those individuals the starting salary they want. In the specific example given in evidence at the hearing, it was the Employer’s case that the difference between the pay requested and the pay the Employer was prepared to pay was relatively modest in any event. There was no specific evidence before this Panel, regarding any decisions made about pay on recruitment for any individual (which the Disputed Managers only have a modest level of influence over), which would have materially affected the amount available in the overall pay budget which is available for future pay increases on a collective basis.  

40)       For all of these reasons, the Panel considers that the Union’s proposed bargaining unit is compatible with effective management. The Panel considers that the Union’s proposed bargaining unit consists of a readily identifiable group of workers. The Panel notes that decisions relating to pay, hours and holiday entitlement are made by Senior Management within the Company and that there are currently no management structures in place to which the Union’s proposed bargaining unit would present a difficulty. 

41)       The Panel appreciates that a bargaining unit excluding the Disputed Managers roles is more preferable from the Employer’s perspective, and consistent with their arrangements in the US. The Panel also appreciates the constructive approach taken by the Employer to the application in general. They are not opposed in principle to collective bargaining. However, the Panel’s role is not to decide whether another bargaining unit would be more appropriate than that proposed by the Union. Provided that the Unions proposal is appropriate, that concludes the matter.

42)       The Panel has considered the matters listed in paragraph 19B(3) of the Schedule, so far as they do not conflict with the need for the unit to be compatible with effective management. The views of the Employer and the Union, as described earlier in this decision, have been fully considered. In relation to existing national and local bargaining arrangements, there are no bargaining arrangements of either description in place. In relation to the desirability of avoiding small, fragmented bargaining units within an undertaking, the Union’s proposed bargaining unit would be the sole bargaining unit within the Employer. Whereas the Employer’s proposal could potentially give rise to a request for recognition by the Disputed Managers, giving rise to fragmentation. There is no evidence of any demand for recognition for collective bargaining purposes on the part of other workers within the workforce and as a consequence no evidence of a risk of fragmentation of collective bargaining. The Panel has had regard to the object set out in paragraph 171 of the Schedule in reaching its decision.

43)       Finally, the Panel note that the Union’s proposed bargaining Unit does not exclude the role of UK Executive Editor, which was vacant at the time of the application but has since been filled. This is corrected in the bargaining unit set out below and is in line with the Union’s and Employer’s intention in respect of the Excluded Managers.

5. Decision

44)       The appropriate bargaining unit is “All editorial staff with a UK contract, ultimately reporting to the Editor in Chief and work at St Vincent House 30 Orange Street, London WC2H 7HH. For avoidance of doubt, this excludes UK Policy Editor, UK Deputy Editor, UK Executive Editor, Executive Editor and Head of Audio, Senior Executive Editor, Managing Editor, Europe and Senior Finance Editor.” In effect, the bargaining unit consists of all employees up to and including those in first line manager roles but excluding those in roles above that management level.

Panel

Mr Andrew James, Panel Chair

Mrs Susan Jordan

Mr Nicholas Childs

27 April 2026

6. Appendix

Names of those who attended the hearing:

For the Union

Madeline Stanley        -           Counsel

Mostafa Rajaai            -           NUJ Official (Lead)

David Ayrton                -         NUJ Official

Natasha Morris            -           NUJ’s Legal Officer

Emilio Casalicchio      -           Workplace Rep

Graham Lanktree        -           Workplace Rep

Isobel Hamilton          -           Employee within the proposed bargaining unit

For the Employer

Marianne Tutin                       -           Counsel

Charlotte Moorhouse         -           Associate of Jones Day

Meredith Jolivert                  -           Global CLO

Kate Day                                   -         Senior Executive Editor, Europe

Sonia Fernandes                  -           Global CHRO

Katie Palisoul                         -           GM UK

Sylvie Marissal                       -           Head of HR Europe

Laura Prier                                -         Associate General Counsel

Allison Hoffman                     -           UK Executive Editor