Research and analysis

ASB hotspot response pilot evaluation

Published 7 August 2025

Applies to England and Wales

Executive summary

Background

The Home Office commissioned Ipsos UK to conduct an evaluation of the Anti-social behaviour (ASB) hotspot response pilot. In 2023 to 2024, 10 police force areas were selected to pilot a hotspot patrol response to tackle ASB^{[footnote 1]}. This involved increasing the presence of police and other uniformed authority figures, such as local authority (LA) wardens, in hotspot areas with high levels of ASB. Funding was to be managed by police and crime commissioners (PCCs), working closely with police forces, community safety partnerships and local authorities to deliver patrols.

The evaluation, which also sought to explore the perceived intended outcomes of the pilot, adopted a mixed method, case study approach, which included 2 waves of quantitative and qualitative data collection. This included a public perceptions survey in selected hotspots, and qualitative research with pilot and patrol stakeholders as well as members of the public. Each of the pilot areas also provided monthly monitoring information and ASB prevalence data to the Home Office, which was reviewed as part of the evaluation.

Key findings: Early findings on effectiveness

The total person hours delivered under the pilot, including extended patrol activities, was 153,569 hours. Strategic leads across areas were confident that the funding for patrols had led to additional hours being spent to tackle ASB. A range of activity took place during the patrols including, where necessary, enforcement actions. In total, 1,298 arrests and 2,807 stop and searches were carried out during the pilot patrols. ASB tools and powers were also used during the patrols although most commonly these were informal warnings.

Stakeholders noted it was too early to assess the impact of the pilot, however they were confident that the intervention could have positive effects. For example, they felt that the patrols would have an impact on the prevalence of ASB. Further, patrollers felt that the patrols had a positive impact on the public’s feeling of safety and they felt that members of the public were positive about increased patrols in their areas. This was echoed by general public participants, who generally wanted to see increased presence from police and wider agencies in their communities, and also felt the intervention could reduce ASB incidents in hotspots.

However, statistics on prevalence reveal a mixed picture that tells us little about the effects of the pilot so far. Data shared by pilot areas with the Home Office outlining police-only prevalence data of ASB incidents in hotspots shows that prevalence increased in some areas compared to the previous year and decreased in others. It is also worth noting that stakeholders reflected that in the shorter term ASB prevalence could increase (in the relevant statistics) due to incidents being detected by patrols or an increase in reporting.

Further, there was no indication that the public had seen a decrease in ASB across the course of the pilot. The majority of survey respondents who took part towards the end of the pilot intervention (62%) had not seen a change in levels of ASB in the month prior to their response, while a further 18% reported a perceived increased in ASB. This was fairly consistent across areas. Those respondents were slightly more likely to have seen a decrease in ASB if they were aware of an increased uniform presence in the area (8%) compared to those that had not seen the patrols (4%); it is unclear what influenced those who reported a perceived increase although there is known to be a range of factors influencing ASB prevalence including seasonal variation.

Strategic leads and patrollers acknowledged that due to the flexibility within local delivery models and wider factors that influence prevalence of ASB it would be difficult to attribute impact to patrol delivery.

Stakeholders and the public highlighted the importance of patrols being to be one part of a broader holistic plan to tackle ASB. To reduce ASB overall, patrollers and the public noted the need for preventative and diversionary activities in addition to patrols, to address the root causes of ASB. Wider activities, including more accessible support services and hubs such as youth centres, were highlighted as possible solutions.

Key findings: Mobilising and delivering patrols

ASB prevalence data from police and (where possible) partners was key to informing hotspot selection. Generally, stakeholders felt the right areas had been selected. However, some stakeholders acknowledged that there was an overreliance on data in hotspot selection, despite Home Office guidance on hotspot selection stating that other forms of intelligence could be considered. Namely, it was acknowledged that ASB is often under reported potentially resulting in ‘hot’ areas being missed. Professional judgement, alongside ASB prevalence data-based assessment, was also seen as essential to ensuring the right locations were chosen.

Strategic buy-in enabled patrol mobilisation. Strategic leads emphasised the value of having strong established links between all partners agencies, particularly between the police and local authorities. Ensuring sufficient staff resource and the logistics of getting patrols up and running was a challenge to mobilisation. There was a consensus that the timescales for hotspot selection and mobilisation of patrols had been tight, and that areas would have benefitted from more time available for selection of hotspots. As a result, patrols were often reliant on police overtime models. Challenges in mobilising LA patrols included recruitment barriers and the short-term nature of the funding. The above led to delays in delivering multi-agency patrols, particularly patrols led by local authorities (LAs). Overall, such circumstances resulted in concerns about the sustainability of the patrols, given their reliance on voluntary overtime and willingness among patrollers to work overtime shifts which could be affected by a number of factors, including personal circumstances and preferences as well as wider overtime opportunities.

Between each pilot area, patroller hours varied with the average length of patrols ranging from 30 minutes to 7 hours. In addition, the number, size and clustering of hotspots within each pilot area varied, from 4 to 48, which impacted the length of patrols and number of patrollers. Other factors that might influence the length of patrols include the extent to which patrollers engaged with members of the community during shifts.

The use of neighbourhood policing teams, in particular, was viewed as an effective way to resource patrols. Police stakeholders reflected that these officers had the necessary skills to conduct patrols effectively and were often already aware of the ASB issues happening in their area. The importance of having consistently the same patrollers conducting patrols was highlighted in ensuring effective community engagement, local intelligence gathering and increased reporting of ASB. Community engagement was seen as key by stakeholders and the public as being a key enabler to building confidence among the public. It was also noted that having an increased visible authority presence in the area had made local business participants feel safer, for example when finishing work and locking up premises at the end of the day.

Patrollers and strategic leads were confident that patrols contributed to agencies’ knowledge of community needs. Patrollers reported receiving intelligence during patrols, both directly from members of the public and through observation. Members of the public also felt that patrols in communities were key to understanding local needs, including on the issues faced by their respective community, and potential strategies to tackle ASB. In some areas, specific activities were conducted to increase community engagement in addition to deployment of visible patrols.

Whilst there was increased awareness of patrols in some of the pilot areas over the course of delivery, awareness of the patrols generally was found to be low among the public. The public were also not clear on how to differentiate between the hotspot patrols with other types of uniformed presence. This could have affected the ability of patrols to impact such issues as: a feeling of safety among the public, their confidence in agencies to tackle ASB, and their readiness to report ASB. For example, awareness of patrols had a significant impact on confidence in agencies. Across all areas, 53% of respondents who reported being aware of patrols said they were fairly or very confident in agencies to tackle ASB, compared to only 28% of those that were not aware of the patrols. Some members of the public highlighted generally avoiding hotspot areas due to ASB, which could help explain why patrols had not been seen.

Conclusions and implications

A neighbourhood policing approach was highlighted as underpinning the effectiveness of the patrols. The importance of having the same patrollers regularly conducting patrols was highlighted in ensuring effective community engagement, local intelligence gathering and increased reporting of ASB.

Patrols were seen as one part of a broader, holistic, multi-agency approach needed to address ASB. As a range of often complex and interlinked risk factors were seen as influencing the likelihood of ASB perpetration, a holistic approach is required to tackle ASB where. For instance, patrols should sit alongside associated problem orientated policing plans. Existing partnerships can strengthen the development and delivery of multi-agency response to ASB. As a part of this effort, wider activities such as the availability of support services and diversionary activities are needed.

The public reported low levels of confidence and trust in agencies’ ability to respond to ASB reports. Patrols were seen by strategic leads and patrollers as an opportunity to streamline reporting of ASB, providing the opportunity for the public to report directly to patrollers. In addition to the patrols, a range of approaches aimed at improving trust and confidence, that is, providing information on patrol activity and impact to resident forums, or via social media and/or leaflets should also be considered.

Findings of this evaluation has informed hotspot programmes and further government policy. Following the pilot intervention, the previous Government has funded a national rollout of hotspot patrols across all 43 police force areas. This funding extends the focus of the patrols from ASB to also include serious violence, merging Grip funding in those forces who had received this funding previously. The government has now launched the Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee which aims to target declining police confidence with a programme of reform including visible patrols.

1. Introduction

The Home Office commissioned Ipsos UK to conduct an evaluation of the Anti-social behaviour (ASB) hotspot response pilot. The evaluation sought to monitor and evaluate the implementation and delivery of the pilots as well as identify emerging findings on the effectiveness of the pilot activities being delivered and perceived impact of the intervention. The evaluation also aimed to address the current gap in understanding of how a multi-agency hotspot patrol approach, led by police and crime commissioners, might impact both ASB incidents and the perception of ASB in the hotspot areas. A theory-based approach was deployed to understand links between processes and the perceived success of the pilots in meeting the intended outcomes.

1.1 Background

The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 defines ASB as:

• conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment alarm or distress to any persons
• conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to a person in relation to that person’s occupation of residential premises
• conduct capable of causing housing-related nuisances

The ASB Action Plan, which launched in March 2023, aimed to strengthen the then Government’s, and relevant partners’, response to preventing and tackling ASB. One of its commitments was to fund additional police presence to tackle ASB, with a particular focus on hotspots. This commitment was described as follows:

“With around £60 million we will fund an increased police presence to clamp down on anti-social behaviour, targeting hotspots. Police and crime commissioners will drive and lead the approach, working with their police forces and local authorities to identify parts of their community where a stronger, focused approach is needed due to anti-social behaviour. Initially we will work with 10 police force areas, but from 2024 will support a hotspot approach across every police force area in England and Wales, which will see thousands of additional patrols taking place in places blighted by anti-social behaviour.”

Hotspot policing is a strategy that targets the resource and activities of police and partner agencies within locations where crime is most concentrated (Hotspots Policing). The aims of hotspot policing interventions are to provide a deterrence effect through increased police presence (Hotspots Policing Technical Report, 2022).

Most evaluation studies on the effect of hotspot policing interventions have been conducted in the US, whereas only a few have been conducted in the UK. An evaluation conducted by Williams (2015) with the West Midlands police found a 14% reduction in street crimes and anti-social behaviour in targeted areas in relation to respective comparison hotspots. There is also evidence from an earlier national programme that areas in the UK targeted with problem-solving activity saw positive impacts on 5 of 8 types of anti-social behaviour, with 3 showing reductions compared to controls (Tuffin et al., 2006).

However, in the main, the focus of hotspot patrol interventions has been reducing crime, with little known on how effectively this approach tackles ASB. This evaluation sought to help address this evidence gap, while at the same time the Home Office decided that the intervention would move away from a model delivered purely by police to acknowledge the wider range of agencies responsible for tackling ASB and, hence, involve multiple partners in delivery.

Ten pilot areas were selected to pilot this approach in 2023 to 2024 ahead of a national rollout^{[footnote 1]} across England and Wales in 2024 to 2025. Funding was to be managed by PCCs, working closely with police forces, community safety partnerships and local authorities to select hotspots, mobilise and deliver patrols. The 10 areas were:

• Cleveland
• Derbyshire
• Durham
• Essex
• Lancashire
• Northumbria
• South Wales
• South Yorkshire
• Staffordshire
• West Midlands

1.2 Evaluation objectives

The overarching aims of the research were to:

• understand how effectively the hotspot pilot was being implemented across the pilot areas
• understand public awareness and perception of the hotspot patrols
• understand any lessons learned from the pilot implementation in preparation for national rollout

More specifically, the process evaluation sought to understand the following research questions:

• how were ASB hotspots selected?
• what resources did delivery leads use to select hotspots?
• what factors were considered when selecting hotspots? That is, geographical size, location, population density, for example
• what factors were considered when selecting the number of hotspots to patrol in?
• did delivery leads engage with stakeholders to identify/select hotspots?
• what are the enablers and barriers that facilitate/inhibit the successful implementation of hotspot patrols?
• did the enablers/barriers of successful implementation differ by delivery lead/location?
• what were the key success factors in the areas that adopted a multi-agency approach?
• any other factors/lessons/trade-offs that need to be considered to help inform the national rollout of the pilot?

1.3 Methodology

An initial scoping phase was conducted to inform the approach adopted by the evaluation. Scoping calls were conducted with relevant individuals involved in the design and implementation of the intervention in all 10 pilot areas. Alongside this, the delivery plans submitted by each of the pilot areas were mapped out to better understand proposed delivery, selection of the hotspots, and timings for delivery. This mapping exercise also informed the selection of the 5 case study areas. This enabled the selection of 5 areas with different delivery models and a good regional spread.

As reflected in Figure 1 below, a process evaluation was conducted which adopted a mixed method, case study approach. This included 2 waves of quantitative and qualitative data collection.

Figure 1: Overview of methodology

The mainstage included: interviews with strategic leads across all 10 pilot areas, a public perceptions survey in 4 hotspots (per each pilot area, at 2 timepoints), and further qualitative research in 5 selected case study areas, namely, interviews with a range of patrol stakeholders, local businesses, and members of the public. Further details on this approach are provided below and in Appendix A of this report.

Quantitative data collection - Face-to-face surveys in hotspot areas

Face-to-face surveys were conducted with residents as well as transient populations travelling through selected hotspot areas (that is, shoppers, commuters, people spending time in public parks, for example) by recruiting participants from either footfall directly at local hotspot areas or through doorstep interviews (depending on the type of hotspot). This ensured the survey sample included the full population of those who engage with the hotspot(s) including transient persons who interact with them but do not live in the local area, to also capture their views. The aim was to achieve a sample of 100 interviews per wave in each selected hotspot, and to capture changes over time.

It was not feasible within the scope of the evaluation to conduct surveys in all hotspot areas due to the difference in the number of selected areas (ranging from 6 to 48 per PCC area), as well as practical considerations such as costs and timings. However, face to face surveys were conducted in 4 hotspot areas in each pilot area to allow for different hotspots to be included (for example, residential area or shopping centre). It should be noted that consideration was given to researcher safety conducting face-to-face interviewing in high-risk areas (defined as having high overall crime rates). This led to some interviewers conducting surveys just outside the hotspot location although in the main this was minimal.

Qualitative interviews

In addition to the surveys, the main data collection for the evaluation was through interviews with a range of stakeholders (police, local authorities, charities, other agencies/delivery partners) involved in the design, implementation and delivery of the pilot, as well as local businesses, and members of the public. Mirroring the survey approach, interviews with each of these audiences were conducted at 2 timepoints: at the start of the intervention rollout, and then again nearing the end of the funding period.

Focus groups and interviews were conducted with the public within each of the 5 case study areas, recruited through completion of the survey. The focus groups and interviews lasted a maximum of 90 minutes and participants were given a £50 voucher in return for their time.

The data collected through the qualitative interviews was fully transcribed (or written up based on notes if any interviews were not recorded, for example, due to a given participant not consenting to a recording being taken). Qualitative data was then transferred and analysed in an analysis framework which was developed in line with the key evaluation questions. This qualitative dataset was then triangulated with quantitative data and secondary data (see below). Thematic analysis sessions were conducted throughout the evaluation’s data analysis phase, to discuss and consolidate themes and to identify and challenge findings.

Secondary data analysis

As a requirement of the funding, each pilot area was required to complete monthly data returns for the Home Office. This was separate from the evaluation Ipsos was commissioned to undertake. The monthly returns provided an indication of date and time of patrols, agencies conducting patrols and use of tools and powers. In addition to the data provided, areas also provided open-ended text on the types of activities conducted on each patrol. This included reference to engagement with businesses and members of communities and responding to incidents.

Data gathered through these monthly returns were reviewed by the evaluation team. The recording practices varied considerably, both at an area level and across the different agencies involved in delivering the patrols. As a result, it is difficult to draw insightful conclusions from this data.

Additionally, ASB prevalence data was provided to evaluators by the Home Office. The analysis of this data allowed for review of prevalence between the same quarter during the pilot and the year prior to the pilot. However, it should be noted that this only includes reported incidents of ASB collected by police forces so may not provide a holistic picture of ASB prevalence.

Limitations of the research approach

There are several considerations that should be highlighted in interpreting the findings from the evaluation.

Findings on the impact of patrols are based on perceptions of stakeholders and members of the public that participated in this evaluation.

Timeframes for the pilot meant that the full approach set out in areas’ delivery plans was not implemented in most areas until Autumn 2023 (for example, patrols being conducted by both police and partner agencies). Therefore, there was a limited timeframe within the evaluation for assessing the role of different services delivering the pilot.

Due to the sample size at hotspot level, comparisons within the survey data are made at area level, rather than at hotspot level.

Qualitative research with the public is not representative but provides a snapshot of views of those who are familiar with the hotspot areas. Further, research with the public only included those aged 18 and over. Therefore, the views of children and young people were not captured.

General public participants struggled to define ASB and differentiate it from crime. A definition was provided during the administration of the survey and during qualitative research discussions.

General public participants were shown maps of the hotspot (during survey and qualitative research) and asked to consider responses to questions in relation to this specific hotspot rather than the area as a whole or where they lived (if hotspot was not where they lived). Despite this, the public still sometimes struggled to discuss the specific hotspot areas instead they tended to instead reference areas where they lived.

The evaluation had limited engagement from businesses due to low levels of formal business contacts held by patrol stakeholders, and low response rates to the invitation to participate.

Review of monthly return data found that there were inconsistencies in how areas reported patrol hours across the individual data returns, which limits possible insights. For example, some areas reported entire shifts without accounting for breaks or travel between hotspots whilst other areas reported only for when patrollers were on-the-ground within a hotspot. Other differences included different ways of recording patrol times, and other non-ASB incidents or events occurring at the time of the patrol, which required more patrol activity (that is, spate of burglaries or football matches) but was not related to the pilot. These challenges demonstrate the complexity of gathering data from a range of agencies, often using different recording practices.

1.4 Ethical considerations

Ahead of fieldwork starting, the project was submitted to a full internal ethics review by Ipsos UK’s internal research ethics committee (REC). All participants were provided with comprehensive information leaflets to establish their understanding of the project, how the information they provided would be used and to ensure that participants would provide informed consent. It was made clear to them that taking part was voluntary, and that they had the right to withdraw from the research at any time. It was also explained that interviews would be treated confidentially, and findings presented anonymously in the final report.

1.5 Report structure

This report is structured as follows:

Chapter 2: Set up and mobilisation of patrols explores how hotspots were selected within the 10 pilot areas and the enablers and barriers to initiating patrols.

Chapter 3: Delivery of patrols explores how patrols were delivered across the pilot areas, including enablers and barriers to delivery.

Chapter 4: Perceptions of effectiveness explores stakeholder and the public view on the realised and potential impact of the patrols.

Chapter 5: Conclusions explores the insights that can be drawn from the evaluation.

2. Set-up and mobilisation of the pilot

This section explores the decision-making process behind hotspot selection, including the main factors which influenced this selection. It also includes the limitations to the mobilisation process identified by stakeholders.

Key findings

Reflecting the flexibility allowed for within Home Office guidance, the size of hotspots selected varied between pilot areas. Common examples included town centres, high streets, shopping areas, housing estates and transport hubs, such as bus and train stations. ASB prevalence data from police and partners was key to informing hotspot selection. However, some police stakeholders were concerned that there was an overreliance on statistics. Professional judgement was also seen as essential to ensuring the right locations were chosen.

There was a general consensus that timescales for selection and mobilisation had been tight and areas would have benefitted from more time to ensure the right selection. Further, strategic leads noted frustrations on not being able to overlap ASB patrol funding with other initiatives, such as Grip funding.

Stakeholders and members of the public generally agreed that selected hotspots would benefit from patrols. However, views on the seriousness of the problem of ASB in these areas varied.

Strong, existing partnerships and strategic buy-in across agencies was key to ensuring effective delivery and a multi-agency patrol response. The use of police overtime enabled police patrols to get up and running quickly, with LA patrols beginning later in the funding period, often due to a need to recruit LA wardens.

While overtime models helped to mobilise patrols quickly, there were concerns about the sustainability of a reliance on such models over the course of delivery. Stakeholders highlighted the role of neighbourhood policing teams in being able to support with ongoing patrol activity.

2.1 Hotspot selection

Each area funded to deliver the ASB hotspot response pilot was required to submit a delivery plan as part of receiving funding. A requirement of the delivery plans was to set out the proposed approach for tackling ASB through hotspot patrol response, including hotspot areas selected where the patrols would take place. To inform the delivery of the pilot, the Home Office provided guidance to PCCs to inform the design of patrols and their hotspot selection (Home Office, Anti-social behaviour hotspot response pilots guidance for PCCs; Internal document, unpublished). This guidance specified that a hotspot should be a defined static geographical area. Flexibility was given with regard to the size of hotspots. Areas were encouraged to consider the likely footfall and population levels of their selected hotspots.

The guidance also noted that areas should ensure that; hotspots were sufficiently ‘hot’, that is, noting high levels of ASB, and these levels being consistent over long periods of time; the shape and number of hotspots allowed for high coverage by patrols over the pilot; hotspots did not overlap; and where applicable, hotspots were not receiving Grip funding^{[footnote 2]}.

It was evident from the interviews with strategic leads that a range of factors had influenced hotspot selection, such as geographical spread, ASB prevalence data and professional judgement.

Overall, there was a general sense across pilot areas that the right areas had been chosen as hotspots for the pilot, particularly where professional judgement and local intelligence had been used alongside data. However, some stakeholders within areas that were more reliant on data felt that not all the hotspots selected were the correct ones and leads had relied too much on prevalence data. These frontline patrollers noted that there were other areas that were ‘hotter’ than the ones selected. This is discussed in more detail below.

“The data doesn’t reflect all the time what the issues are. So, I think, if you run only purely off data, you’re relying on the confidence of that community to give you the right areas to come and target. However, if you actually speak with the neighbourhood teams, say, ‘This is the data, do you agree or disagree?’…I would probably say half the area’s picked on data would be right, but there’s probably half the areas that aren’t particularly too bad, but there’ll be somewhere else that’s worse, but because the calls aren’t coming in, it doesn’t appear to be that based on data.”

(Patroller, Force C)

2.1.1 Geographical considerations

In accordance with the guidance, all areas selected hotspots according to location, defining the hotspots as static geographical areas. There was variation in the geography of hotspots and the locality of these across police force areas, with the size of the hotspots ranging from micro-hotspot (such as a street corner), to Lower Super Output Area (LSOA), ward and policing neighbourhood areas level. There was limited evidence on why certain geographic sizes were selected, particularly for those who chose larger hotspots. However, there was indication from some areas that the size was either guided by data and local knowledge of what areas would benefit from patrols; what was a realistic size to patrol within a specific timeframe; or using a systematic approach of dividing areas into grid or hexagon square-metre areas and mapping ASB incident data against this.

Within some areas, hotspots were concentrated in localities with larger populations where there was perceived to be highest risk and threat of ASB. For example, in Force A most of the hotspots (14 out of the 19 hotspots), were in areas selected due to their large population size. However, strategic leads in other areas highlighted the value of evenly distributing the funding across the area rather than focusing on population hubs.

In some areas, strategic leads engaged with stakeholders from both police and partners during the selection process, inviting them to identify areas they felt did not have sufficient resource or that they felt are overlooked by other funded interventions. One strategic lead noted the importance of funding being allocated to PCCs rather than police forces directly as they felt this allowed hotspot to be selected on a range of criteria rather than just risk and threat, which they thought would have been the focus of police decision making. They felt that this ensured the funding was spread across areas rather than being used only within specific city centres.

“It has been a way of shoring up those resources and maybe areas that didn’t have full focus before, are getting a lot more focus now.”

(Strategic lead)

For example, in Force J, leads felt it was important that each LA within the area received some funding rather than focusing on specific urban areas that might be the ‘hottest’. Force H adopted a similar principle, and evenly distributed hotspots across the area to prevent over concentration in cities.

“We, kind of, discussed the different options we could do around whether we do it based on pure need, and rank hotspots based on that, or to be a fair split across the different local authorities. And he [PCC] wanted to have each local authority get, kind of, a slice of the pie, so we divided up the funding that we were getting from the Home Office in the same proportions that we currently divide up our community safety partnership funding.”

(Strategic lead)

The Home Office guidance on hotspot selection for pilot areas also specified that hotspots should not overlap, nor should they include areas receiving Grip funding^{[footnote 3]}. In relation to being unable to select GRIP areas, strategic leads expressed concern that some areas they perceived would benefit from the patrols (due to high incidents of ASB) could not be included, while in some cases this could be beneficial due to high occurrence of ASB and serious violence locally^{[footnote 4]}.

“The point of frustration we had was around…they didn’t want us to overlap with…we have probably neglected some areas that this would have really benefited from because of the rules of engagement from the outset.”

(Strategic lead)

The above considerations are reflected in the approach to the national rollout of the hotspot response patrols, where ASB and Grip funding has been merged in 2024 to 2025.

2.1.2 ASB prevalence data

Data on the prevalence of ASB was considered as one of the key selection criteria for hotspots. Areas collated data on reported ASB incidents from police data and where possible, local authority data. In one area, fire service data was also used. The data was used to identify hotspots with high levels of ASB, in accordance with the guidance provided by the Home Office. Hotspots were usually concentrated around specific types of location where ASB was more prevalent. Common examples included town centres, high streets, shopping areas, housing estates and transport hubs, such as bus and train stations.

Case study 1

In Force I, the selection process was enabled through use of an existing precision policing document, reflective of problem-orientated policing. The strategic lead explained that this document covered incidents of crime and ASB, including the vulnerabilities of individuals and communities that might make them more susceptible to ASB. The document then allowed the strategic lead and their team to identify hotspots.

In addition, an ASB needs assessment was conducted by the PCC during hotspot selection. This evaluation tool provided a more detailed understanding of a specific issue within specific geographies by identifying the profiles of victims and offenders, examining factors such as age and ethnicity, and offering a granular street-by-street analysis of the situation. In this case, the needs assessment was useful in identifying actionable areas by providing a breakdown of elements that can be addressed or improved. Data was also used to analyse peak days, times and locations, which informed patrol activity.

The short, prescribed timescales for selecting hotspots was seen across all pilot areas as challenging. Strategic leads saw effective hotspot selection as fundamental to successful patrol delivery and felt that this process should not be rushed. There were calls for longer selection periods, or more flexibility to change hotspots during delivery, to ensure that patrols were taking place in the right areas. Areas suggested there would have benefitted from having additional weeks or months for setting up and implementing the intervention, with one area suggesting 6 months as a preferable timeframe. For example, strategic leads explained that the timeframes provided were not sufficient to thoroughly analyse multiple years of incidence data.

“I think we rushed it. We didn’t have a lot of time. It was like, ‘Here’s the pilot. Get started. Pick your areas.”

(Strategic lead)

In some cases, strategic leads also noted challenges related to gathering of data from local authority partners, either because of limited time to respond to data requests, or due to issues with incompatible reporting systems between LA and police datasets. In some cases, this meant leads had to rely solely on police data for initial hotspot selection, although they did note that in such cases the selection was then discussed with LA stakeholders to ensure their views were considered.

Using ASB prevalence data to inform hotspot selection was also enabled in areas where data sharing and collation was already in place. In some cases, this was facilitated by their proximity to each other. Stakeholders within Force H and Force D reported that they had police and LA officers who worked within the same building. They felt this enabled them to have good information sharing around any ASB incidents that happened on previous shifts that was necessary to share with other patrollers.

Some, particularly frontline police stakeholders, questioned the reliance on data and highlighted limitations to this approach. They noted concerns that relying predominantly on prevalence data meant that hotspot selection was being based on reported rather than actual levels of ASB. This could include certain types of ASB being underreported, or certain members of the public - for example those with lower trust of authorities - choosing not to report.

“The problem you’ve got around low-level antisocial behaviour and the drug dealing…is people won’t report it, they still do not report it. So, we still don’t always have an accurate picture of where those hotspots really are.”

(Patroller, Force D)

On the other hand, frontline police stakeholders also noted being aware of specific members of the community that frequently reported perceived ASB. This could include reporting the same type of incident multiple times, for example due to a specific neighbourly dispute, or some individual’s inclination to report groups of young people hanging out on the street, even when it was not clear that ASB was being committed. This could make some areas seem ‘hotter’ than really were.

2.1.3 Professional judgement

Alongside analysing prevalence data, strategic leads also spoke of professional judgment being used to inform hotspot selection. Using professional judgement had helped streamline the process of selecting hotspots, enabling leads to discount areas they might have otherwise selected if relying solely on prevalence data. Patrollers also highlighted the importance of considering insights from officers and/or staff familiar with local areas. This was evident in some areas, with feedback collated from partners and frontline staff, such as police community support officers (PCSOs) and community safety partnerships (CSPs).

Similarly, strategic leads also received feedback from frontline staff to discount specific problem locations that had previously posed an issue but were no longer considered an active hotspot. For example, in one area frontline staff urged leads to discount one hotspot that was associated with persistent ASB as reflected in the prevalence data. This was because ASB in this area was concentrated around a property, but a property closure order had been issued recently, negating the need for patrols. This hotspot was discounted from the pilot, and the lead noted it highlighted the importance of local knowledge.

“The important thing was not just looking at the stats, but have conversations, not even local commanders actually interest me, it’s the PCSOs and the PCs. Mostly PCSOs will tell you exactly what’s happening on the ground, and you can sit with them with a map, and they will tell you, you know, who’s likely to hang around where, and what the particular problems are, because they’re seeing it every day.”

(Strategic lead)

2.1.4 Public perceptions of ASB incidents in hotspot areas

Overall stakeholders and members of the public felt that patrols would benefit the areas selected. The survey conducted as part of the evaluation sought to assess the public’s perceptions of ASB prevalence. There were mixed views on how much of a problem ASB was in the selected hotspot areas. Overall, 52% of survey respondents in wave 1 felt that ASB was a fairly or very big problem in hotspot areas at the early stages of patrol activity. Across all pilot areas, women (56%) were more likely than men (49%) to see ASB as a fairly or very big problem, and those aged 45 to 64 (56%) were more likely to view ASB as a fairly or big problem compared to those who were aged 18 to 24 or aged 65 and over (both 65% respectively). The perception of ASB as a problem varied across pilot areas, from 40% thinking that ASB was a fairly or very big problem in Force I to 70% in Force A, though the reasons for this variation was not clear and the research is unable to conclude why there were large variations between different pilot areas.

Figure 2: How much of a problem is anti-social behaviour in this area/on the metro/bus network? (Wave 1)

Base: All wave 1 respondents (4,163)

The types of ASB that were seen to be a varied issue. ‘Youths hanging out on the street’ was the most common type of ASB witnessed or experienced by respondents (51%). Stakeholders also highlighted a range of ASB committed in hotspot areas which overlapped with the concerns of the public. These included youth-related ASB; ASB related to the night-time economy, particularly alcohol-related ASB and violence; fly-tipping; and vehicle related ASB.

Figure 3: Have you personally experienced or witnessed any of the following types of ASB in this area / on the metro / bus network in the last 12 months? (Wave 1)

Base: All wave 1 respondents (4,163)

Members of the public welcomed patrols in their areas and were pleased that there would be more uniformed presence, although awareness of patrols themselves was found to be low (discussed further in Chapter 3 below). Some members of the public recognised that ASB was an issue in their area and were optimistic that patrols would have an impact on its prevalence. However, this was not universal, and some felt that there were other areas with more serious issues which could, or should, have been selected as hotspots. Yet, even in these cases, members of the public did acknowledge that their location could still benefit from additional patrols even if they would have selected other areas if given the choice.

“I follow that Neighbourhood Watch thing…, it’s 20-odd pages long normally and a lot of it, can be put to [hotspot area]”

(General public, Force D)

“I don’t know why they’re patrolling here that much. I feel like there’s not much crime going on here.”

(General public, Force C)

2.2 Mobilisation

Alongside decisions on hotspot locations, pilot areas also had to consider mobilising patrol activity. Guidance provided by the Home Office specified that funding was to be used to guarantee additional police or other uniformed authority presence in the specific hotspot areas. Multi-agency working was strongly encouraged and no limits were set on the balance of patrols split between partner agencies. However, the guidance also specifically stated that the funding could not be used to recruit new police officers.

Strategic buy-in enabled patrol mobilisation. Strategic leads emphasised the value of having strong established links between all partners agencies, particularly between the police and local authorities. Along with the public, they recognised that ASB was an issue that required a multi-agency response to be tackled effectively. Leads felt that having positive existing relationships between partners contributed to a willingness to engage in regular strategic meetings and take a collective, problem-solving approach to the pilot. This in turn meant that they were better equipped to deal with the issues and to work together to mobilise patrols within short timeframes. Strong links established through existing community safety partnerships were explicitly highlighted as an enabler in some areas.

“I think what you need to understand is we’ve got really good community safety partnership established links across all of the statutory partners. So, ASB isn’t just a police issue, far from it, it’s definitely a community safety issue.”

(Strategic lead)

ASB was generally seen across agencies involved in pilot delivery to be a priority issue to be tackled. Strategic leads noted that in many cases this had led to a desire to mobilise and implement the patrols effectively. This buy-in was also seen to help increase uptake of patrols on the frontline, with agencies being able and willing to communicate the potential benefits of the pilot to patrollers.

However, limited time to launch the pilot was generally noted as a challenge. This was seen to have a negative impact on the process of resourcing of the patrols, making it more difficult to ensure their sufficient staffing, even where good existing partner relationships existed. The was consensus from all pilot areas that the timescales from the start of the funding period to launching the pilot were tight.

Launching over the summer was also said to have posed issues. Strategic leads and patrollers noted that there was lower resource available across agencies at the start of the pilot with more frontline staff using annual leave over the summer. Strategic leads suggested that the patrols should not have begun in a peak period of leave to mitigate challenges to establishing and mobilising the intervention, particularly when patrols relied on overtime or asking frontline staff to volunteer.

“I don’t know if people factored that in when deciding what the start date was going to be, because particularly as we’re relying on people doing it on good will, on overtime, and, you know, already we’re looking at holiday period where we’re looking at reduced numbers of staff. So, yes…that’s probably something I’d feed in in terms of the timing for when this starts - try and avoid peak holiday periods when you’re likely to have less people available.”

(Strategic lead)

One of the main factors influencing patrol activity was staff resource and the logistics of getting patrols up and running. Whilst all areas sought to deliver a multi-agency approach in conducting the patrols, the ability to resource this was impacted by the speed in which the patrols were to be set up. At the beginning of the pilot, most patrols were conducted by the police due to the tight timescales for launching the pilot and the ability to use police overtime to quickly resource the patrols. Patrols were considered easier to implement where local authorities had successfully recruited specific staff for patrols rather than relying on overtime, though this had taken time to achieve. For example, in Force I, the strategic lead reported that there were no appropriate LA staff in place to conduct patrols at the start of rollout, which had led to a delay in mobilisation outside of police patrols. Similarly, in Force C, 2 LA staff had been recruited to conduct patrols as their main role, but weren’t in post until mid-October.

“Because we were using local authority, we were looking at recruiting in temporary members of staff. So we knew approximately how many members of staff we’d be able to fund across, like, the 4 local authorities. And we were also looking at obviously, sort of, existing staff, where we’ve got those larger volumes, being able to take on some of that as part of overtime […] knowing what resource we had available, what our patrol patterns were going to be like, and so risk assessment, sort of, identified we needed to be dual crewing”

(Strategic lead)

The short-term nature of the funding was also referenced as challenging in resourcing patrols. This was particularly the case at the beginning of the funding period, where there had been evident resourcing gaps among non-police agencies to support with patrols. This included, for example, neighbourhood wardens within local authorities, where funding cuts had resulted in these roles no longer existing in many areas. Areas often spoke of the challenges of trying to recruit these roles due to there being no guarantee of the roles being funded beyond the funding period. This is discussed further in the next section on the delivery of the patrols.

“We only had a grant agreement up to March so we had to make some decisions there around whether we undertook some of that risk as an office to ensure that we could go out and at least offer a minimum of a years contract because otherwise we thought there was going to be significant issues in trying to recruit people in.”

(Strategic lead)

Challenges were faced by local authorities where plans were not put in place to hire additional staff and instead patrols relied on existing resource. In these cases, stakeholders reported that they struggled to get volunteers within their assigned teams to sign up to the patrols due to a lack of established overtime models for local authority wardens. Strategic leads noted that not all local authority staff were used to shift work and only worked overtime for one-off events. This made it more challenging to secure volunteers for regular overtime patrols. To resolve this, patrols were opened to wider council staff, which resulted in better resourcing of the patrols. In areas where plans were in place to hire new staff, local authorities faced challenges navigating lengthy recruitment and vetting processes as well as barriers in only being able to offer short term contracts. However, in some cases, this meant that police patrols had been implemented before local authority patrols which were mobilised only later in the funding period.

Having existing overtime models in place was cited as an important enabler to mobilising police patrols. These models aided early resourcing of the patrols and ensured they were up and running quickly. Although leads were initially concerned that they might not get the desired uptake on the overtime opportunities, they were generally encouraged by police officers responding positively. Some areas indicated that having an enhanced overtime rate made the opportunities more attractive and led to positive uptake.

“So, you’ve always got that in the back of your mind because it’s a lot of overtime patrols to keep fulfilling and we were a bit worried to begin with, thinking we might not get the uptake, we might only get 50% of them booked out and the other 50% no-one wants to do them. But it turns out that we actually got a really good response from the workforce. We’ve managed to get every overtime shift filled from when they started in July up until now, and that’s continuing, which is great.”

(Strategic lead)

Some strategic leads and patrollers also explained that being able to offer PCSOs the chance to do patrols as part of overtime shifts was an enabler. They noted that many overtime shift activities generally did not involve PCSOs and therefore, there was less competition for PCSO overtime resource. They felt that PCSOs could play an effective role in patrols due to their familiarity with local issues and their skills in engaging with communities.

While overtime models existed in agencies and these were key in mobilising patrols initially, areas found it difficult and challenging to resource patrol shifts across the length of the pilot. Strategic leads and police patrollers explained how officers were already faced with high workloads, burnout and long working hours, which impacted the appetite to conduct overtime shifts on their rest days. Police patrollers felt that the reliance on overtime for these patrols was adding to existing heavy workloads. In some cases, this meant that areas were reliant on a small pool of officers who were regularly signing up and conducting overtime shifts. Force E was an example of where an area had to change when they conducted patrols from weekend shifts to doing one patrol every 3 days to combat issues around resourcing. Fire service patrollers in Force C highlighted that it was easier to fill shifts between Monday and Wednesday but was harder to fill patrols later on in the week, with reduced resource available during weekends.

“We are seeing a picture where really willing and capable workforce are getting quite burnt out with daily business. So trying to get them to go out on top of the 40 hours a week to do another couple of shifts is very difficult”

(Strategic lead)

“Policing has always functioned on the goodwill of officers. Yes, there is a financial reward, but it still relies on officers wanting and being prepared to do that overtime.”

(Patroller, Force H)

There were also issues with competing overtime priorities within the police, particularly during busy time periods, which often resulted in staff being diverted to other issues. This resulted in agencies, particularly within the police, unable to fully staff all scheduled shifts. Police stakeholders voiced concerns about the overreliance on overtime as a model, and stressed that such an approach is not sustainable. Patrol delivery models are discussed further in section 3.1 below.

3. Delivery

This chapter explores how the hotspot response patrols and additional activities were designed and delivered across the different police force areas. It also discusses the enablers to patrols and activities being implemented, as well as any challenges areas faced in delivering the pilot.

Key findings

The total person hours, including extended patrol activities, delivered as part of the pilot was 153,569 hours. However, this reduces to 129,013 hours if data with no more than 2 police and 2 partners patrolling is excluded. Patroller hours varied between different pilot areas.

Police were involved in patrols in the majority of areas, with involvement of other agencies, such as local authority, fire service and youth workers, varying across the 10 pilot areas. Patrols were predominantly conducted by a single agency – often led by the police or LA – with some combined patrols taking place. As local areas were generally allowed to plan their own delivery models, in response to local ASB issues, the patrol activities, frequency and coverage of patrols, and who conducted the patrols also varied across pilot areas.

Strong existing partnerships among agencies was a key enabler to successful partnership working during the pilot. These relationships helped build a joined-up approach including information sharing enabling both effective single-agency patrols, and joint patrols.

The importance of having specific individuals regularly conducting patrols was highlighted in ensuring effective community engagement, local intelligence gathering and increased reporting of ASB. A neighbourhood policing approach was therefore highlighted as underpinning the patrols.

In total, 1298 arrests and 2807 stop and searches were carried out during the pilot patrols. However, they also cited using other tactics such as ASB tools and powers. For example police officers felt that arrests and stop and searches should be a last resort and in relation to that, where possible, other avenues were used to promote desistance from ASB.

The levels of awareness of the patrols in respective local communities were low. However, there was some evidence to suggest that community initiatives designed to increase public awareness of a uniformed presence in the area may have shown an early positive indicator. The survey data found that Force E, Force I, Force D, Force G and Force B all saw a significant increase in the number of participants who said they were aware of a uniformed presence from wave 1 to wave 2.

The aim of the pilot funding was to increase the visibility of uniformed presence, and subsequently reduce ASB incidents in areas of high prevalence. Whilst delivery of the pilot was to be led by PCCs, the guidance stated this could be in combination with police, community safety partnerships and local authorities. Each pilot area was required to outline their approach to delivering the patrols, including the activities that this delivery would involve. Whilst there were some commonalities, there was also evident variation in patrol delivery across areas, with several reasons cited as factors in the decision-making.

3.1 Patrol delivery models

A multi-agency approach to tackling ASB at a local level is underpinned by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The legislation established a duty on organisations, namely police, local authorities, and housing associations alongside other local agencies, to work collectively in responding to local ASB concerns. Therefore, most pilot areas designed patrol delivery models that included multiple types of agencies, which included:

• police: namely police officers or PCSOs
• local authorities: including roles such as community wardens, ASB officers, housing officers
• fire and rescue service: in one area due to specific types of ASB prevalent within identified hotspot areas, for example, deliberate fire setting
• youth workers or outreach workers: to engage with young people and to talk to them about diversionary activities
• transport security: in one area due to a transport system being identified as a ASB hotspot

Most pilot areas designed their delivery models in a way that involved different agencies in conducting patrols. Force A was an exception to this, where a decision was taken to limit patrols solely to local authority staff. This reflected the existing focus of police resource on Grip-funded patrols. In Force I, patrols were designed to utilise both local authority community wardens and police for patrols. However, recruitment and procurement challenges meant that local authority patrols were unable to begin, and patrols were conducted only by the police during the pilot.

Table 3.1 shows how each of the pilot police force areas designed their delivery model, and any changes that were made to the delivery model during the pilot.

Table 3.1: The delivery models for each pilot area

Pilot area	Delivery model	Number of hotspots	Size of hotspots
Force A	Local authority community wardens delivered patrols. The model was designed to implement 3 patrols per day in hotspot areas, every other day.	19	Specified areas within LSOAs - no more than 8 grid sizes
Force D	Patrols conducted by the police and community safety partnership (CSP) agencies, as well as diversionary activities through the voluntary and community sector. The delivery model aimed to have around 24 hours of police patrols per week, and between 4 to 9 hours for CSPs.	11 (2 hotspots were added during delivery)	250 metre x 250 metre grid squares
Force C	Patrols conducted by the police, fire service and local authorities. Activities also included youth support using police cadets to deliver leaflets to residents about the patrols, and community engagement with housing associations. The delivery model aimed for patrols to be conducted daily.	34 (hotspots were reconfigured and one additional hotspot created during delivery)	Wards
Force I	Police-only patrols. The delivery model changed slightly during the pilot, from conducting patrols 3 days a week to conducting them daily.	6 (One hotspot was added during delivery)	Policing neighbourhood (size of one or 2 LSOAs)
Force H	Patrols conducted by the police and local authorities, and the delivery model aimed to deliver patrols daily.	48	Hexagonal area of 40,000 square metres
Force G	Patrols conducted by the police and local authorities as well as voluntary and community sector organisations. According to the data, while patrols were mainly conducted by a single agency, there was evidence of joint patrols between agencies.	48 (98 hotspots were clustered into wider hotspots during delivery)	One to 8 clustered micro-beats (300 square metres per micro-beat)
Force E	Majority of the patrols were conducted by the police, with local authority patrols being added as part of the delivery model during the pilot. The delivery model aimed for patrols to be conducted for longer periods of time, such as a full 8-hour shift, between Fridays and Mondays. According to the data, while patrols were mainly conducted by a single agency, there was evidence of joint patrols between agencies.	14	Micro-beats within ward level areas
Force J	Patrols were conducted by the police and local authorities. According to the data, while patrols were mainly conducted by a single agency, there was evidence of joint patrols between agencies. Minimum length of patrols was 15 minutes in each hotspot, however there was no set requirement for length or frequency of patrols.	23	Specified areas within LSOAs
Force F	Police, local authorities and transport security conducted patrols. According to the data, while patrols were mainly conducted by a single agency, there was evidence of joint patrols between agencies. Patrols were more likely to be conducted on Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays.	4	Each hotspot varies in size, from an estate or road to a town. One hotspot is also the public transport network.
Force B	Patrols were conducted by the police and local authorities. The delivery model aimed to deliver 3 patrols per week, with an additional 2 patrols added during the pilot, taking it to a total of 5 shifts per week.	23	LSOA level

High-visibility patrols were conducted in all areas as the core activity of the pilot. Most of these patrols were on foot, with vehicles and off-road bikes only being used in a small number of areas. The use of off-road bikes for patrols was in response ASB incidents involving off-road bikes, an issue specific to South Yorkshire and the West Midlands.

“It is patrolling in full uniform, in hi-vis. It’s not sneaky beaky policing, this is getting out there on foot wherever possible and talking to people.”

(Patroller, Force H)

Most patrols were conducted by a single agency, that is, police-only patrols or local authority only patrols. However, there were instances of agencies conducting joint patrols in some areas. Pilot areas who designed joint patrols reported that they chose this approach to reflect the multi-agency approach taken to tackle ASB locally.

Stakeholders felt that non-police patrols, such as those conducted by local authority wardens, community safety officers or youth workers, were important in helping to support engagement with communities. In particular, they highlighted the impact these patrols could have on engaging young people and communities with low levels of trust and confidence in the police.

“With some families and some young people they won’t respond to the police but would respond to community easier…I don’t feel for one minute that the police presence isn’t needed because it absolutely is needed, I just feel that it just adds some more value to have the community input also.”

(Patroller, Force G)

Those who conducted the patrols across agencies reported enjoying them. Police stakeholders often cited they liked being able to take a proactive approach, being out on foot in hotspot areas and engaging with communities. They felt this reflected a more traditional style of neighbourhood policing. Strategic leads also noted that the patrols enabled the implementation of a problem-solving response to issues of ASB. They felt that the time available on patrols helped move away from a purely reactive approach only focused on incidents being officially reported. Stakeholders within local authorities reflected that the patrols enabled them to identify ASB and to build relationships with their communities.

“It gives them time to actually understand the issues and then try and put proactive problem solving plans in place, rather than only having the reactive time to deal with an issue and then, ‘Oh, something else has come in, I’ve got to deal with this now,’ and it goes less of a priority.”

(Strategic lead)

“I actually think word has got around, like, this is overtime that people actually want. Like, it’s a good overtime option because obviously the officers are there to be on foot out and about so they’re not being called off on response, they’re not going to 999s for instance. Because obviously that all has to be managed within business as usual capacity.”

(Strategic lead)

Even where patrols were delivered by a single agency, stakeholders noted that, existing strong multi-agency relationships allowed for effective collaboration within an area. This included facilitating data or intelligence sharing and was aided by monthly meetings and regular communications, which ensured there was a consistent message for all agencies involved within the pilot. They also provided stakeholders with regular updates and set direction for agencies, helping ensure all were on the same page ahead of the patrols.

“We work together in that aspect of we share information and we’ve got a really good information sharing policy and community at Barnsley.”

(Patroller, Force H)

Within the police, the use of neighbourhood policing teams was viewed as an effective way to resource patrols. Police stakeholders reflected that these officers have the necessary skills to conduct neighbourhood policing effectively and were often already aware of the ASB issues that were happening in the area. This meant that officers did not need much management as it was their ‘bread and butter’.

“They live and breathe those situations. They’re the ones who talk to the victims, see them every day, speak to the councillors, know the CCTV, know the criminals and the ASB suspects that they know that they’re intrigued in it - they’re living and breathing it every day. So, they would want to go and solve that issue because the next day they don’t want the problem again.”

(Patroller, Force C)

In some cases, overtime patrols were offered to wider police staff, such as PCSOs or officers in different teams. For example, in Force I, ASB overtime patrols were sometimes conducted by firearms officers. Patrollers recognised the benefits of officers doing patrols that weren’t part of their day-to-day role as they could as bring new ideas and perspectives, in addition to providing resource to deliver patrols.

“…it’s been quite heartening actually, they’re probably the most supportive of the pilot from the feedback we’ve had there, they’ve really enjoyed doing it”

(Strategic lead)

3.2 Patrol delivery

The Home Office guidance stated that each area was required to conduct regular, proactive operational activity in hotspots (Home Office, 2023, “Anti-social Behaviour Hotspot Response Pilots Guidance for PCCs”; unpublished document). The frequency of visits was a local decision, however the guidance suggested there should be one patrol in every 3 days on average as a minimum.

Most areas conducted patrols between 3 to 5 times a week. This varied between locations depending on whether force areas had decided to have a set number of days based on when ASB was most prevalent, or whether the force area had chosen to pick a ‘pattern’ to follow, such as conducting patrols every other day or 4 days on, 3 days off. Force I trialled different shift times to work out what works on different days. As a result, the frequency of patrols was increased from 3 days per week to 7 days per week and officers were offered 2 shift times on each day to choose from. This allowed patrols to better target identified ASB and increased flexibility for resourcing.

Some areas aimed to ensure there was an element of randomness to the patrols. This included ensuring patrols were not regularly conducted in the same hotspot at the same time on a given day of the week. This helped to ensure unpredictability in when there was uniformed presence in hotspots and reduce the likelihood that perpetrators would be able to avoid the patrols. For example, in Force H, to ensure there was randomness to the patrolled presence, patrols were not conducted at the same time in each hotspot. On a given day, 24 out of the 48 hotspots received high-visibility patrolling, and this would change each day (see case study illustration below).

“We wanted to introduce that element of randomness, so every other day means it’s changing every week and there’s no that predictability around it.”

(Strategic lead)

In most pilot areas visible patrols were designed to be short bursts of between 15 and 30 minutes within each hotspot. Stakeholders reported using the College of Policing Guidance on hotspot policing, the Koper Curve Theory^{[footnote 5]}, or academic research^{[footnote 6]}. These approaches recommend patrols should last between 15 to 30 minutes in each hotspot, multiple times a day at peak times. Evidence on hotspot policing related to crime reduction suggests that short periods of time in each hotspot was an efficient way to achieve a deterrence effect, and longer than 30 minutes would have diminishing returns on crime prevention.

The peak times of ASB prevalence were taken into account when deciding the length of patrols in hotspots. Areas often designed their patrol to reflect times when ASB was known to be higher to maximise the effectiveness of the patrols. Therefore, patrols were often conducted in the afternoons and evenings, and at the weekend. Peak times were identified through a mix of analysis of ASB data and, in some cases, an intelligence-gathering approach, where patrollers would engage with businesses in the area.

“We understood, you know, where we needed to be and when, and if you, kind of, like, broadened that out to be consistent, it ended up as, 2:00 to 10:00 across every area, really, that’s the peak. So especially, you know, Friday, Saturday nights in … all 3 town centre areas”

(Strategic lead)

“It’s very much intelligence-led what we do, and it’s community-led…we’ve got established links with the majority of the businesses in the area, so we’ll go and engage with them, ‘What time are they causing the issues? Right, okay.’ And we will target the patrols on those days and those times to do so.”

(Patroller, Force C)

In some areas, patrols were designed to have a specific focus on community engagement, in combination with preventing ASB. In these areas, patrols were often longer, with patrollers able to spend more time in each hotspot. This was to allow patrollers to engage with businesses and the public to raise awareness of the patrols, gather intelligence, or to be a more visible, constant presence.

“Being visible on the streets […] but also a constant presence rather than just in and out. Because we wanted the officers to be a bit like what they probably signed up to do when they became a police officer, was on the streets, engaging with the communities, understanding the issues within the local areas and then having the actual time to think about plans that they could put in place[…] This actually gives them the time to get that intel from the community.”

(Strategic Lead)

However, interviews with strategic leads in each of the pilot areas highlighted an element of inconsistency in the actual patrol lengths. Some areas reported lower than anticipated numbers of patrols and shorter than intended patrols and variation as to on which agencies were patrolling. For example, as mentioned in chapter 2, some forces faced issues with resourcing planned patrols, and coverage in some areas was lower than anticipated. Patrol length may have also been affected by officers spending time engaging with businesses or community members whilst on patrol or patrollers having to deal with any incidents that arose on patrols that required a response. In addition, it was also apparent from these interviews that the length of patrols also varied by hotspot. Alongside the factors listed above, this could also have been impacted by the size of hotspots and/or the proximity of the hotspots to each other.

These examples highlight the complexity of determining the frequency and length of patrols both within and across pilot areas. As mentioned in section 1.3, these issues were also reflected in the monthly data returns shared by areas with the Home Office. The monthly returns provided an indication of patrol lengths per hotspot, which highlighted wide variations in time recorded by each area, ranging from 30 mins per hotspot to 8 hours. It was also apparent from the monitoring information that information provided in the delivery plans on proposed patrol times differed, reflective of the qualitative discussions with stakeholders. The inconsistencies with the data returns, coupled with different delivery models and uptake on allocated funding, makes it challenging to interpret the monitoring information for insights on patrol lengths within specific hotspots.

Case study 2

In Force H, police patrols were often 2pm to 10pm, and local authority shifts varied from 4 to 8 hours between 10am and 10pm, depending on the day and local authority.

The patrol plan was to spend 20 to 30 minutes in one hotspot, with the overarching principle of visibility and public engagement. After the 30 minutes, the patrollers would move onto the next hotspot.

“…if you follow the Koper Curve principle the effectiveness drops, literally, it’s a bell curve and just drops off massively after 30 minutes. And, I think the coverage, bear in mind that again we’ve got 48 hotspots, which is an awful lot of hotspots”

(Strategic Lead)

The aim was to visit 6 hotspots in one district per shift, and to visit each one twice. There were 4 districts that were included as part of the pilot, with 12 hotspots in each district. The 6 hotspots for each patrol across all districts were selected at random. This was to ensure that each day there was 24 hotspots subject to high-visibility patrolling, and 24 hotspots that were used as a control. This aligned with their ‘cross-over design’ randomisation.

Both the police patrols and the LA patrols followed the same format, although less hotspots would be visited for the shorter LA shifts.

The time of visiting each hotspot was different to ensure there was not routine or predictability.

“I think in terms of antisocial behaviour, it’s best if you tackle it from an unpredictable point of view so they don’t really know when you’re going to be in the area. You can have a better chance of catching them at it.”

(Patroller, Force H)

The monitoring data, provided by each of the pilot areas to Home Office analysts, recorded how many people were patrolling in each shift and for how long. This provides a total number of person hours^{[footnote 7]} delivered by the patrols. The data reflects the range of patrol activity delivered in each of the areas. This includes times when there were a greater number of patrollers and patrol hours than expected from patrol activity specified in delivery plans. To account for this the data has been analysed to i) reflect typical patrol activity, as defined by areas, that is, 2 police patrollers and 2 partner patrols and ii) identify where larger scale patrol resource was allocated to events, such as local sporting events and community initiatives, which resulted in up to 20+ patrollers in some cases.

The total person hours, including extended patrol activities, was 153,569 hours. However, this reduces to 129,013 hours if data with no more than 2 police and 2 partners patrolling is excluded. Patroller hours varied between different pilot areas. As reflected in table 3.1, the average length of patrols ranged from 30 mins to 7 hours. In addition, the number, size and clustering of hotspots varied between pilot areas, from 4 to 48, which impacted the length of patrols and number of patrollers. Further, across the pilot areas there was only one area which included a transport hotspot. This resulted in up to 10 patrollers conducting patrols across the transport network, with the average length of patrols being 6 hours. This highlights the importance of considering the wider context and scale of delivery of high-visibility patrols across the different pilot areas, which is discussed throughout this chapter.

It is important to note the caveats of the monitoring information-data which the total number of hours is drawn from. As referred to earlier in this section, pilot areas reported using different recording systems which impacted the information gathered on patrols. For instance, whilst pilot areas were asked to provide the times they were patrolling in the hotspot areas, some areas noted that this may have included entire shift times. The range of hotspot locations and size of hotspots as reflected in table 3.1, resulted in the fact that for some of these cases the time taken to travel to and from hotspots was not removed from the patrol data. Therefore, the relevant figure may not accurately represent the time spent specifically within hotspot areas. In a small number of areas, there were issues around data being deleted in the early stages of the pilot. In addition, not all pilot areas used all their allocated funding, given difficulties filling shifts. This is likely to have had an impact on the number of hours logged patrolling in each area. It’s important to take these factors into consideration when looking at the number of logged hours, however it aims to provide an overview of the scale of the pilot patrols.

Several areas spoke of using or wanting to use GPS data systems to gather information on patrol activity. Whilst the aim of these systems is to provide real time information, some areas acknowledged limitations of the data gathered. For example, stakeholders in one area noted that they initially collated data through forms which patrollers filled in after each patrol. However, they found that police officers under reported how long they were spending in each hotspot so subsequently agreed that GPS data would be used instead. The GPS tracker reported where patrollers were, whether they were walking or driving, and if they left the hotspot area, every 5 seconds. However, a barrier identified was the need for this data to then be collated centrally at an area level.

3.3 Patrol activities

The Home Office’s hotspot response pilot guidance for PCCs provided examples of operational strategies and tactics that could be used in organising and deploying patrols. These were not exhaustive but included visible patrol (baseline requirement); community policing; and problem-oriented policing (POP). The delivery plans across all the pilot areas were successful in rolling out the activities listed within their delivery plans. Activities that formed part of the high visibility patrols included:

1. Problem-solving approaches to encourage patrols to conduct targeted activities within particular hotspots.

2. Community engagement, which can be categorised into 2 types of activities:

   • community-oriented policing, where patrollers visited businesses and spoke with members of the public; this also involved gathering community intelligence through conversations and observations
   • community initiatives, such as multiple agency action days to focus efforts on a particular problem (also known as ‘Days of Action” or “Nights of Action”), utilising local public perception surveys, online platforms, and leafletting in communities

3. Diversionary activities, such as signposting young people to local services.
4. Environmental audits to find evidence of ASB, such as littering or fly-tipping.

Patrollers also conducted activities less explicitly related to ASB, such as assisting medical emergencies. Police officers also reported they had to arrest offenders with active warrants, check bail conditions or attend other crime-related incidents while on patrol. In some cases, this took officers away from their high-visibility patrols to deal with an incident. In addition, some police stakeholders reported that the ASB patrols had created additional work for them which impacted their regular shifts. Extra work included dealing with warrants; providing updates on intelligence, ASB and safeguarding; and additional meetings. It suggests that there can be knock-on implications for ‘normal’ shifts. In some areas, police officers reflected that following arrests, they were able to pass the arrest to another team member or custody team so that the patrol could continue.

3.3.1 Problem-solving approaches

Problem-oriented policing (POP), also known as problem-solving policing, is an approach used by the police to develop a targeted intervention to tackle a crime or disorder problem (College of Policing). The Home Office guidance stated that pilot areas were encouraged to use problem-oriented policing as part of their operational strategies to delivering patrols in the hotspots. Intelligence-led tasking prior to and following patrols was seen as a driver towards implementing effective patrols. Stakeholders reflected that it helped to both target any known ASB problems or offenders within a hotspot, as well as to ensure a joined-up approach where pilot areas had multiple agencies conducting patrols, including those with joint patrols.

Stakeholders across some areas reported that they had implemented problem-solving approaches. There were operational orders or problem management plans that were created and given to patrollers ahead of each patrol. This was to ensure there was specific tasking within a hotspot to better target known ASB issues and perpetrators.

Stakeholder within the police and local authorities reported how plans were often communicated during regular briefings held prior to the start of a patrol. These briefings often included handovers from previous patrollers, sharing of information about incidents, and assigning specific tasks or areas to visit. In areas where joint patrols were conducted, stakeholders felt these briefings aligned agencies and ensured both had the necessary information ahead of a patrol.

“They tie in when they’re on duty together, they go to the police station and there’s a briefing. So, they’ll have the briefing and so everybody has got the most up-to-date information.”

(Strategic lead)

Case study 3^{[footnote 8]}

Within Force B, police had created problem management plans (POPs) for the 23 hotspots. These plans included information on the key issues within each area, as well as key times, dates, crime type and main offenders. This information was sent to officers that were conducting patrols to provide them with intelligence on specific ASB concerns. Patrollers were tasked with aiming for a 30% reduction in ASB within a given timeframe to provide officers with accountability for police officers to achieve.

“It then gives them [police officers] the accountability that they’ve got to try and achieve that and also, for each of those individuals that I’ve written down, they can do specific tasks for each of them to basically say, ‘This person has been referred for Immediate Justice.’ The next one, ‘We’re doing a multi-agency approach with this person.’ They do it on an individual basis, so really tackling the individuals that are really impacting our areas.”

(Strategic lead)

“Our officers are really happy to go out with the wardens, and the wardens are happy to come out with the police officers, and they’re invited to their ASB tasking meetings. So, everybody understands what the issues are within their areas and how we’re trying to tackle them.”

(Strategic lead)

3.3.2 Community engagement

Community engagement approaches were utilised as part of the patrol activities. This was conducted through community policing and community initiatives. Stakeholders reported that an emphasis on community engagement was helpful to raise awareness among local communities of how ASB was being tackled, to better understand communities’ awareness and perception of patrols, and to improve the ways through which communities can provide feedback.

“You can’t speak to somebody if you’re travelling at 20 miles an hour in (area) with a piece of glass between you and them. Use the bus. Walk. You’re more likely to engage with somebody if you can actually have a chat with them.”

(Patroller, Force G)

Most areas conducted activities that involved some form of community engagement, such as engaging with businesses and the public while out on patrols. During foot patrols, police stakeholders reported they would walk around main shopping areas and engage with businesses and the public. This also included engaging with people who were rough sleeping and arranging support via local rough sleeping teams.

“…each area has got an operational order which sets out the sequence of where they need to go, and who they need to talk to as well. So, you know, they’re engaging with certain supermarkets and big shops, and that sort of thing, and trying to put a bit of beat craft back into it”

(Strategic lead)

Both police and LA stakeholders also reported that speaking with the local community enabled them to talk about the ASB patrols and reasons behind them. It was noted that the patrols were a good opportunity to approach people and engage with them, which sometimes they do not get the opportunity to do. This approach was used to also help develop relationships with the communities, reassure residents about what they are doing, as well as gathering local information and intelligence.

“Sometimes we’re just talking to people. We’re not piling straight in going, ‘Are you starting fires?’ We’re just, you know, ‘Where do you live? Are you still at school? What’s in the local area for you to do?’ Just building that relationship as well…We’re trying to get that level of trust so that when we do pull up, they don’t scarper.”

(Patroller, Force C)

Patrollers and strategic leads were confident that patrols contributed to agencies’ knowledge of community needs. Patrollers from all agencies reported receiving intelligence during patrols, both directly from members of the public and through observation. This intelligence gathering was seen to be a key benefit of the pilot. As discussed above, patrollers enjoyed spending time in communities. They reported that it had enabled patrollers to get a first-hand picture of what was happening on the ground. For many, the patrols had allowed them to gain intelligence that they would not have otherwise gathered in their day-to-day role. They attributed this to having more time within communities. On the other hand, in one area, police officers within the neighbourhood team reported less impact of patrols on community intelligence as they felt this was already strong due to their regular and continued presence within local areas as part of their regular work.

“I wouldn’t be able to get that level of information if I was working generally, just as a normal dog handler or a normal PC. With me being tasked for this area for just this project, it gives me more time and it allows me to see more of the problems. So, yes, if it comes back to…the intel department of our force, to say you’re putting in a lot of logs, well done… that’s normally because I’m afforded the time under the scheme to do it.”

(Patroller, Force G)

Members of the public felt that patrols in communities were key to understanding local needs, including on any specific issues faced, and potential strategies to tackle ASB. Many within local communities welcomed the increased presence of patrols from across agencies.

“If you’re only observing the community from data and records, then you don’t actually know it. Whereas if you’re amongst it, you will get to know the people that are actually living in it.”

(General public, Force I)

The extent to which patrollers could gain this understanding was seen to be dependent on community engagement during patrols. While patrollers might gain some intelligence through observation, they often noted the importance of talking with members of the public, including businesses, to gather information about the community and its needs. As discussed above, these community engagement activities, both formal and informal, was seen as key pilot activities.

“100 percent, it has [improved understanding of community needs]… having people on the ground, seeing what the issues are, having people come up and talk to us and telling them what issues they’re having is invaluable…and especially it helps in my day to day job, because then we know what issues people are having, where the actual hotspots are within our hotspots.”

(Patroller, Force H)

Members of the public also highlighted the importance of such a community engagement and expressed that they would not want patrollers merely to walk through hotspot areas without interacting directly with the local community. This was particularly highlighted in areas with historic mistrust of authority agencies, such as the police. In these instances, members of the public warned that police patrols would make communities feel monitored if they did not try to engage with people. Instead, they expected patrollers to talk to local residents, explaining their presence and reassuring people about their purpose in the area.

“The more they interact with the community, the more they’ll understand it.”

(General public, Force H)

There was a general sense that participants would feel comfortable interacting with patrols, such as saying hello as they were passing by, and some felt they would feel confident telling officers any concerns they had. Amongst these participants, PCSOs were seen as more approachable, especially if they want to report or talk about something, but police officers were often seen as required and necessary for when a response was needed.

“Whenever we mention something that’s gone on along there and we’ve given them a description, the PCSOs that we’ve spoken to have gone, ‘I know exactly who that is. Leave it with me’.”

(General public, Force I)

Further, the need for regular, consistent patrollers was also highlighted. Patrollers and the general public felt that if consistent officers or wardens were conducting the patrols in a particular hotspot, the likelihood of community needs being better understood would increase. Individual officers could build specific relationships with members of the public, as well as business owners and staff.

“You really need to be an officer from that area and work in the area that you work every day, so you know it.”

(Patroller, Force I)

“If there’s that community officer who knows the community, knows the people in it, knows the areas where there might be concerns and they can target those, but also in particular knows…people in the shops or libraries or the pubs…I think the more that relationship’s there, the more secure people feel, but also the more effective they can be…”

(General public, Force G)

“I think it’s important that the patrols and the people doing the patrols engage with the businesses on a regular basis so they’re well-known in the area…you do need to know the business people and vice versa they need to know the wardens.”

(Business, Force I)

Patrollers reported using information gathered during patrolling to design their subsequent patrols. For example, they noted the use of community intelligence to plan the timing, frequency and length of patrols. They felt that this increased the effectiveness of patrols. As discussed above, areas increased community engagement during implementation to aid the gathering of this intelligence. Further, by collecting information across patrols, and in some cases across agencies, a clearer picture of issues could be gathered, and appropriate outcomes achieved. For example, in Force I patrollers reported using combined intelligence gathered during patrols to ensure sufficient grounds for a closure on a property could be met.

“It’s very much intelligence-led what we do, and it’s community-led…we’ve got established links with the majority of the businesses in the area, so we’ll go and engage with them, ‘What time are they causing the issues? Right, okay.’ And we will target the patrols on those days and those times.”

(Patroller, Force C)

3.3.3 Responding to ASB incidents on patrol

While on patrol, stakeholders across agencies could use ASB tools and powers that were relevant to their role^{[footnote 9]}. Tools and powers used by patrollers included informal warnings, community protection warnings (CPW), community protection notices (CPN), dispersal notices, enforcement of public space protection orders (PSPO), fixed penalty notices (FPN), acceptable behaviour contracts, fines, and warning letters. FPN, CPN and dispersal notices were cited as the most common powers used. Whilst these powers could be used to tackle ASB incidents that occurred during patrols, those patrolling were required to deal with wider incidents as appropriate to their role. For example, police officers on patrol may need to exercise their powers to arrest if they witnessed a crime, even if this was not related to ASB or the patrol intervention.

The police were the only agency who had powers to conduct stop and search and arrests. Stop and searches were often referenced as being more commonly used in areas with known violence or gang-related violence issues. The data reports that aside from use of informal warnings, arrests and stop and search were next most common responses recorded by patrollers, with a total of 1298 arrests made and 2807 stop and search. Some stakeholders felt there was an increase in the use of stop and search due to the ASB patrols. Reasons reported for this increase included how officers being in communities for longer periods of time, in some cases 8 hours, increasing the likelihood that they would be come across non-ASB issues that required use of powers.

“For the ASB and around that community confidence, for example, if you’re on the street for 30 minutes, the likelihood of you arresting someone or having a stop search would be a lot lower to if you’re in the area for 8 hours.”

(Strategic Lead)

However, PCSOs who supported police patrols do not have the same stop and search and arrest powers. PCSOs noted that this sometimes placed them in challenging situations, requiring them to wait for additional police resource to deal with an incident. For example, in cases where individuals or groups would refuse to disperse and move on, or when a crime had been committed and an arrest was necessary.

“Whilst it’s great having boots on the ground, you’re at a slight disadvantage if they’ve then got to try and get hold of a patrol to come and arrest somebody for whatever ASB they’ve done. Whereas if it was solely just for officers who have the powers of arrest, or specials I think you might achieve a bit more.”

(Patroller, Force I)

However, strategic leads and frontline patrollers were cautious about the use of stop and search as a power while on an ASB patrol. They highlighted the need for well-evidenced intelligence before conducting a search. They also cited that arrests were often seen as a last resort to tackling ASB incidents, particularly in relation to youth related ASB. For example, Force C issued young people with Acceptable Behaviour Agreements/Contracts and found these to be effective at preventing reoffending.

“Youth referrals and informal warnings given, so this is part of, obviously, there’s some young people where we’re just trying to make sure we have as much information on them as possible, so that if they aren’t working with organisations and they aren’t-, basically, if they’re not willing to be helped at that stage, we’ve got the evidence in the bag that we’ve tried and we’ve tried and we’ve tried with this young person.”

(Strategic Lead)

In addition, stakeholders in Force I also noted dealing with young people found in possession of knives without relying on arrests. Instead, intelligence was gathered and patrollers looked to work with partners to address the situation. In these cases, police officers asked young people where they had purchased the knives. They then contacted Trading Standards, asking them to visit those premises. Trading Standards were viewed as responsible for dealing with the problem premises who had sold restricted items to underage children.

“So, trying to, sort of, educate and advise young people, rather than lock them up routinely. But, that then gets you into the, sort of, ‘Where are they buying these things from?’ And then it gets, hence the initiatives with trading standards to go into the local shops and say, ‘What do you think you’re doing, supplying knives to these kids that are, sort of, carrying around the town?’… So, you know, it’s that sort of thing that’s been really effective from that point of view.”

(Strategic Lead)

In addition to use by police patrollers, there was some evidence that LA stakeholders used ASB tools and powers on patrols, such as issuing breaches for CPNs, FPNs, warning letters and acceptable behaviour contracts. Each pilot area was required to provide data on use of ASB tools and powers when on patrol in response to ASB incidents. The data provided shows there was wide variation in the use of tools and powers and it is unclear from the data and discussions with each of the areas as part of the research what influenced this range. However, LA stakeholders were more likely to report they were aware of what powers they could use but that they had not used them whilst on patrols.

Table 3.2: Use of tools and powers

Pilot area	Public Space Protection Orders enforcement actions	Dispersal Notices	Community Protection Warning	Closure Notices	Community Protection Notices	Fixed Penalty Notices
Force A	20	0	1	0	0	26
Force B	7	19	0	0	2	4
Force C	62	7	17	0	18	54
Force D	44	4	2	1	11	107
Force E	46	0	4	5	2	147
Force F	19	41	1	3	3	178
Force G	1	14	7	0	0	4
Force H	28	0	0	0	0	0
Force I	24	14	22	0	7	2
Force J	244	35	35	103	16	51
Total	495	134	89	112	59	573

Areas where there was a bigger emphasis on local authority or transport patrols were more likely to see higher numbers of informal warnings as the most used power. The data reports that informal warning was the most common response to ASB during patrol activity, with 3464 informal warnings given during the funding period. Reflective of the data included in Table 3.2, the use of informal warnings varied across the pilot areas, with one area reporting 20 informal warnings being given compared to another area reporting 2027. However, all areas reported use of formal tools and powers being seen as a last resort, which could therefore explain overall numbers of informal warnings given (Police perceptions of powers within the ASB, Crime and Policing Act, 2014). Stakeholders within the fire service did not have any enforcement tools or powers they could use during patrols. Instead, the key objective was to educate communities, particularly young people, about the dangers of fires and about ASB.

“That was probably the worst thing that I saw but again we’ve got no powers, I wouldn’t put myself or my colleagues in that situation because we haven’t got any powers…as a council worker we’re not protected in situations like that.”

(Patroller, Force D)

3.3.4 Community initiatives

Some areas utilised more explicit ways to promote the patrols and activities being delivered and to gather insight from their local communities on how they view ASB. These included:

1. Local public perception surveys: Force B and Force E conducted local public perception surveys to understand how the public viewed their activity on ASB and how confident they are in the police to tackle ASB.
2. Online platforms: There were examples of areas creating online platforms to either increase engagement, or to improve ease of reporting ASB. In Force E, a website was launched as a one-stop shop to support reporting of ASB. In Force G, patrollers had been using the pilot to increase knowledge and engagement about a platform that allows the community to engage with the police. Stakeholders hoped the platform would increase the police’s understanding of community needs.

“We wanted it to be a one-stop shop where someone could go to report ASB or to find out basically, is it ASB and who they should be reporting it to, because if they’re calling up 101 and then they’re on hold for 30 minutes, and then they’re saying it’s a council problem, that just goes against your confidence and then nothing will ever happen with that”

(Strategic Lead)

“As a result of these patrols and the engagement, we’ve been able to get the officers doing the patrols to let those community residents know about Force G Listens…I know that the number of people that have signed up and used (platform) is already higher and there’s a quicker uptake than any other police force areas that have introduced it.”

(Strategic Lead)

3. Multi-agency action days: These initiatives were designed to bring communities together with different partners together, such as the police and local authorities, to promote efforts to tackle ASB, as well as providing an opportunity for residents to ask questions. These days were often referred to as “Days/Nights of Action” and were usually centred around a specific activity. For example, in Force D, stalls were set up where partners (for example, police, local authority staff such as youth service, housing and community safety) came together to answer questions posed by local residents, who were encouraged to come and ask questions.

“I think the engagement, nights of action or days of action have really helped with that, because the residents have really engaged with us. It was almost surprising…it has been really good in understanding what the residents see, what they feel and what we can do.”

(Patroller, Force D)

4. Building on existing campaigns: Instead of developing a separate awareness campaign, stakeholders in Force I built on an existing campaign as part of the Safer Streets initiative. Stakeholders checked whether hotspot areas had received campaign materials. Where this wasn’t the case, materials developed as part of the Safer Streets campaign, particularly communications on reporting ASB, were provided to residents of hotspots areas. This reduced duplication that would have arisen if new materials had been drafted.

3.3.5 Public perceptions of patrol delivery

The evaluation sought to hear from people either living in the hotspot areas or who visit the areas regularly (that is. city centres or transport hubs). Both the survey and the qualitative research activities were designed to capture public awareness and perceptions of ASB and the patrols. The survey looked at people’s awareness of uniformed presence patrolling the area at 2 different time points within the pilot.

The survey data suggested that the public were not clear on how to differentiate between the hotspot patrols with other types of uniformed presence. Figure 4 shows that awareness slightly increased across the pilot areas between the 2 timepoints from 33% to 39%. Force E, Force I, Force D, Force G and Force B all saw a significant increase in the number of participants who said they were aware of a uniformed presence between wave 1 to wave 2. These were areas with some community initiatives designed to increase public awareness of a uniformed presence in the area. While the evaluation cannot draw a correlation between such initiatives being deployed and levels of public awareness, as there are multiple other factors that may impact awareness and might not be related to the patrols, it can provide an insight into increasing awareness of a uniformed presence.

Figure 4: Survey respondents who said ‘yes’ to being aware of a uniformed presence in their area, between wave 1 and wave 2

Base: Wave 1 all respondents (4,163); Wave 2 all respondents (4,059)

While there was a marginal increase in the overall level of the public being aware of a uniformed presence, how often participants saw uniformed presence was low^{[footnote 10]}. This remained relatively similar across both waves of the survey, where 17% of participants reported they saw them ‘very often’ or ‘often’ in wave 1, and 14% participants reported the same in wave 2. This suggests that while some areas saw a slight increase in awareness of patrols, the public were less confident on how often they saw them.

“I don’t think people know about it. There are still people that won’t go out at night. I don’t go to Asda because I’ll feel intimidated. I don’t know about it. Where has it been advertised? Is it something they’ve put onto the street hoping people realise there’s more police presence?”

(General public, Force H)

Qualitative participants in some pilot areas had noticed an increase in foot patrols, notably police patrols. These participants often referred to seeing an increase in community police wardens, PCSOs and police in the area in the last 12 months. However, it was often challenging to attribute this to the ASB pilot.

“We walked maybe 20, 30 metres up the road, there were literally 2 police officers that were just having a walk around, because there is always police walking around, and I feel like even more so recently, I feel like I’ve seen an increase in people just being generally aware.”

(General public, Force C)

“I have seen officers on the beat or whatever, just walking around seeing loads of people. I wouldn’t say their presence is huge, but I am aware of them being out at times of the day.”

(General public, Force G)

Other participants reported they had seen an increase in the number of police patrols in their area but they were in police cars or were police officers visibly attending an incident. This highlights challenges in how the public interpret the reasons why they have noticed an increased police presence, and difficulties in distinguishing who are conducting regular patrols and who are responding to specific incidents.

“I haven’t noticed them just walking around, assuring residents that everything’s okay. You’ll only see the police basically if something’s happened, that is, murder or someone’s been robbed.”

(General public, Force D)

In general, there was a lack of clarity on which agencies participants would define as a ‘uniformed presence’. While most were able to talk about the police as a uniformed presence, there was limited awareness amongst participants of the role of other partners such as local authorities, voluntary organisations, or the fire service.

From the qualitative findings from participants in the pilot areas, there were mixed reports on which agency the public would prefer to be conducting the patrols. Police were often the first agency that the public would suggest as responsible for tackling ASB, however there was recognition that it is important for all agencies to work together. Participants often saw the police as needing a law enforcement approach to ASB, whereas local authorities’ roles were more aligned with education and diversionary activities.

“I think it should be a joint effort because…the police have got a lot on already and they haven’t got a lot of people. And if the council and the South Yorkshire people that do the tickets and such could work with the police, maybe the antisocial behaviour might reduce.”

(General public, Force H)

“In terms of the people that have the power to actually do something about it in the immediate effect, then that is only the police, because nobody else has any”

(General public, Force I)

Participants also raised concerns during interviews about an increase in patrols leading to increased concern among communities about uniformed presence and the reasons why this was needed. This was particularly noted amongst participants who had seen an increased uniformed presence as they were not certain which officers were part of the hotspot policing pilot.

“Sometimes it can unearth people when they see police patrolling because they maybe assume something has happened and, you know, could be a possibility of 2 things. It can either make some people feel more comfortable thinking, ‘Oh, yes, there is police walking about. If there was anything to happen at least we might be able to get hold of them.’… and then on the other hand I think maybe it might put people off.”

(General public, Force G)

Furthermore, the public participants spoken with as part of this evaluation highlighted the wider societal responsibility towards tackling ASB. Participants described how it was everyone’s responsibility to reduce ASB in their areas, such as looking after the area that you live in, calling out bad behaviour or promoting education among parents and children and taking responsibility for your own actions.

“It’s called the ‘broken windows theory’. If you live in an area that’s full of broken windows, you’re not going to be bothered if more windows get broken. But if it’s a nice area, and then it’s damaged, you care more about it.”

(General public, Force I)

Overall, while there were barriers to the initial set-up and mobilisation of patrols, the implementation of high-visibility patrols with problem-solving approaches and community engagement was largely viewed as positive. Stakeholders who conducted the patrols felt that using a targeted approach and having ringfenced time to use a proactive approach enabled them to better engage with communities. However, there are still evident gaps to close between how patrollers view the patrols, and how the public view uniformed presence and the use of patrols to tackle ASB.

4. Early findings on effectiveness

This chapter explores perceptions of impact of the hotspot patrol pilot among stakeholders and the public. It also draws conclusions from the analysis of ASB prevalence data provided by pilot areas to the Home Office. Data collection for this evaluation occurred in 2 waves. This allowed for analysis of any changes over time, however, there are limitations to measuring impact. Namely, a wide range of factors could influence the prevalence of ASB, willingness within the community to report, trust and confidence in agencies and feelings of safety. Therefore, it is not possible to fully attribute any changes to the hotspot patrols. Further, the evaluation design focused on public and stakeholder perceptions and was not developed to accurately measure impact (that is, a quasi-experimental design was not possible).

Key findings

Stakeholders noted that it was too early to know the impact of the pilot. Moreover, the large number of other factors influencing ASB prevalence, confidence in agencies and feelings of safety made measuring of impact challenging. However, both patrollers and members of the public felt confident that the patrols could have a positive impact. They welcomed patrols in their communities.

Stakeholders and the public felt that the patrols would have an impact on the prevalence of ASB but data showed a mixed picture so far. Across both groups there were strong concerns about the risk of displacement of ASB. Stakeholders also noted that patrols could lead to an initial increase in prevalence of ASB caused by higher detection of incidents via patrols.

Both patrollers and the public acknowledged that patrols were one part of an effective approach to tackling ASB. They noted that wider activities, including more accessible support services and more diversionary activities were needed to address the root causes of ASB.

Awareness of the patrols among the public was seen to be key to the patrols being effective in improving feelings of safety, improving confidence in agencies to tackle ASB, and encouraging reporting of ASB.

Awareness of patrols had a significant impact on confidence in agencies. Across all areas, 53% of respondents who reported being aware of patrols said they were fairly or very confident in agencies to tackle ASB, compared to only 28% of those that were not aware of the patrols.

Therefore, community engagement was seen as key by stakeholders and the public. This was seen to be enabled by consistent patrollers being able to make strong individual relationships with community members and business staff.

Stakeholders noted the challenges of measuring the impact of the pilot. Strategic leads noted that while they were hopeful that the patrols had had a positive impact it was too early to be able to show clear evidence of this. Further, both stakeholders and the public felt that these patrols would need to be one part of a broader holistic plan to tackle ASB.

Strategic leads were confident that the funding for patrols had led to additional hours being spent to tackle ASB. As discussed above, the total number of people hours delivered by patrols across pilot areas was 153,569. Between each area, this ranged from 2,173 hours to 17,598 hours. As reflected in the monthly monitoring data on patrol activity that each pilot area submitted to the Home Office, areas noted how the funding had allowed them to have more officers, wardens and partners on the street with the goal of tackling ASB. However, it should be noted that patrollers, particularly police officers, were not able to limit their activity just to focusing on ASB. As discussed above, feedback from officers about activities conducted on patrols include tackling crime or helping with medical emergencies. Also, some pilot areas were not able to make use of all available funding due to resourcing issues in arranging overtime. Further, a small number of police patrollers highlighted their concern that the patrols would be perceived as an increase in police officers, rather than just an increase in hours due to overtime. For these police patrollers, the overall amount of time spent on ASB had not increased, but the time spent was more concentrated in certain areas.

“If we didn’t have this money, we haven’t got the resource to be able to do the level of patrols that we have been able to do. So, it has been significant.”

(Strategic lead)

4.1 Feelings of safety

Patrollers felt that the patrols had had a positive impact on the public’s feelings of safety. They recalled instances of members of the public and businesses feeding back that they felt safer having seen the patrols. Strategic leads were also confident the public were pleased that the patrols were being implemented. They were confident that an increased visible presence because of the patrols would put minds at ease with regard to anti-social behaviour.

“Everybody is glad to see that increased uniformed presence, they’re glad to see that the hotspot patrols around and about.”

(Strategic Lead)

Echoing the views of stakeholders, members of the public and businesses were positive about increased patrolling in their areas. Some business stakeholders noted that having an increased visible presence in the area had made them feel safer, for example when finishing work and locking up premises at the end of the day.

“My retail members especially the smaller independent ones, they’ve witnessed the extra patrols and they’re extremely happy to see more visible uniforms on the streets.”

(Business, Force H)

The public also expressed wanting to see increased presence from police and wider agencies in their communities. Many felt that this presence would increase their feelings of safety, particularly at times when they knew patrols were happening in their area. They noted that they would appreciate being able to tell a patroller about what was happening there and then, as opposed to having to contact agencies who were not already in the area.

“There are times when I’ve considered staying inside, worrying about going to the shop in case there are those people there again. But the best I could do was just tell the staff in the shop to keep an eye out for them. The thought of having a patrolling guard would put my mind at ease, a bit, as well.”

(General public, Force D)

The public particularly noted the desire for more patrols after dark to increase safety. Survey respondents across both waves were significantly more likely to report feeling unsafe or very unsafe walking through hotspot areas at night (50% in wave 1 and 48% in wave 2) compared to during the day (17% and 10% in respective waves). Reference was made to conscious decisions not to go to hotspot areas at night due to decreased feelings of safety.

“A huge effect…I think if you see an officer when you’re walking through the town, because once it goes dark…through the winter months, you know, hit 4 o’clock and it’s dark, and you’re walking through the town. If there’s not many about, you feel uncomfortable. It’s a natural that, ‘I’m here on my own,’ kind of feeling…seeing police officers makes you feel like, ‘Well, I’ve only got to scream, I’ve seen one in the town.’”

(General public, Force I)

At the same time, increased visible presence was not seen by some as improving feelings of safety. A small number of public participants noted that the presence of authority staff, and police officers in particular, would worry some people. In addition to mistrust of the police more generally, some participants also felt that if they saw police presence, they would have increased levels of anxiety that something bad was happening, or might happen, in their area.

“Sometimes my British friends feel unsafe when they see the police because they worry that something might happen.”

(General public, Force C)

Further, some noted that they did not want people to perceive their area as a ‘bad’ area as a result of regular police patrols. They were worried that people would be put off from living or setting up and running businesses in the area.

“It’s not a good sign that police are patrolling the street all the time…people may perceive that this area is not safe enough to live, or do business.”

(General public, Force G)

4.2 Confidence and trust in agencies

Strategic leads hoped that the patrols would improve confidence and trust in agencies to tackle ASB. There was a sense that the patrols had the potential to have this positive impact, particularly if the public were aware of and had interacted with the patrols. Anecdotal evidence from patrollers suggested that they were building strong relationships within communities, including with businesses. They felt that through building these connections, feelings of confidence and trust would increase.

“I think it’s increased the trust and confidence because they know that they’ve got this additional support.”

(Strategic lead)

However, awareness of the patrols among the public was low and increasingly this was seen to be crucial to realising this impact. As reflected in the methodology section in chapter one, it is important to note that awareness of the patrols may have been impacted by the survey being completed with adult participants during the day, when some of the patrols took place in the evening and engagement could have been with young people. Members of the public also noted that these decisions not to go to hotspot areas could decrease the likelihood of the public being aware of patrols, and therefore dampen the impact of patrols on feelings of safety. They acknowledged that the public were only likely to feel safer if they were aware that patrols were happening, and agency staff were there to help them.

“I wouldn’t go out after dark without my partner with me. I finish work at 5pm, my door’s locked. If I knew it was safe to go to Asda at night at 7pm, I’d go out at night on my own…I didn’t know there were extra patrols. The people that don’t know about it tend to stay away. You’re not going to feel safer because you don’t know.”

(General public, Force H)

Echoing findings from other studies, the public reported low levels of confidence in the capability of agencies and organisations to respond to ASB reports to effectively tackle ASB. Confidence in agencies to tackle ASB effectively remained the same across the delivery of the pilot. Overall, 37% of wave 1 respondents reported being very or fairly confident in agencies to effectively tackle ASB compared to 38% in wave 2. Strategic leads and patrollers also noted that confidence in agencies is generally low, and it would take time for this to improve.

Figure 5: How confident are you that local agencies (for example, police and local council) are tackling anti-social behaviour effectively in this area/on the metro/bus network? (Wave 2)

Base: All wave 2 respondents, 4,059; 13% don’t know excluded from diagram

Awareness of patrols had a significant impact on confidence in agencies. Across all areas, 53% of respondents who reported being aware of patrols said they were fairly or very confident in agencies to tackle ASB, compared to only 28% of those that were not aware of the patrols. Confidence also varied across police force areas. However, in all pilot areas, only a minority of wave 2 respondents reported feeling very or fairly confident (ranging from 29% to 48%). While it is not clear that higher confidence in some areas can be linked to patrol activities, some of the areas with higher confidence levels discussed specific community engagement and awareness raising activities, such as Force E (44% reported being fairly of very confident) and Force G (46%) designed to improve communication between the public and agencies. Strong community engagement was reiterated as being a key enabler to building confidence among the public.

“I think if police are patrolling but they don’t acknowledge residents, or they don’t really speak to people, or they’re stern or they’re not approachable, then I don’t think it would be really any benefit. But I think if they come across as approachable-, I know they’re still people of the law, but if they were to come across friendlier, or they were to come across less judgmental…But I think part of it is to do with patrolling, and part is to do with how they carry themselves within the community as well.”

(General public, Force G)

Case Study 4: Force G

In Force G, wave 2 respondents were more likely than the average to report feeling confident in agencies to tackle ASB (46%) than the overall average (38%). While it is not possible to attribute this to patrol activities, strategic leads and patrollers highlighted work being done to raise awareness of their community engagement platform. The platform allows the community to engage with the police. Stakeholders hoped the platform would increase police’s understanding of community needs.

“As a result of these patrols and the engagement, we’ve been able to get the officers doing the patrols to let those community residents know about [force engagement platform]… I know that the number of people that have signed up and used [force engagement platform] is already higher and there’s a quicker uptake than any other police force areas that have introduced it.”

(Strategic Lead)

4.3 Reporting ASB

It was important to the public that they see outcomes from their reporting of ASB to improve confidence in the longer term. Members of the public and businesses noted that their lack of trust, in part stems from a frustration over how reports of ASB are dealt with by agencies. Members of the public wanted to see evidence that reports were being taken seriously and that follow-up actions were being taken. Quicker response times from agencies was seen as key. Members of the public wanted reassurance that police would take reports and incidents seriously, responding in a timely manner and, therefore, ensuring that the public were kept safe. If they saw evidence of this, they noted that it was likely their trust and confidence in agencies would increase as a result.

“I think, if police were quicker to respond to things…people would feel generally safer, because they’d know that they could report it and it would be done, and be sorted.”

(General public, Force G)

“I’ve not got a lot of trust because I feel like when we have gone in to report these crimes or to report this antisocial behaviour, we’ve not been taken seriously. As in, nothing’s been done.”

(Business, Force I)

The public noted frustrations with avenues to report, and these were acknowledged by stakeholders. There was fatigue among the public and businesses because of challenges reporting incidents. Both the public and stakeholders noted that it could take a long time to get reports through via 101, with those reporting having to wait a long time to get through to complete a report. This had reduced likelihood of reporting. This was compounded by a sense that reports were not taken seriously or dealt with among the public. As discussed above, this also had a negative impact on confidence in agencies.

“The reason why people don’t report things is because A, there’s an ignorance of ways to report things, and B, historically the reporting line has been 101. And the experience of people dialling 101 has been horrendous. So, they just don’t want to do it anymore because they don’t want to wait for 40 minutes on the end of the telephone to report something.”

(Business, Force H)

“Collectively, we just think we’ve done it once, we’ve done it twice, we’ve reported things multiple times. If we’re not being taken seriously, we think what is the point in reporting. Whether we report it, whether we don’t report it, it’s the same outcome, nothing will be done…It just makes you think why should I if nothing is being done?”

(General public, Force I)

However, there was a general sense among public participants that the presence of patrols would increase the likelihood of reporting ASB. Most respondents across wave 1 and wave 2 of the survey said that patrols would be fairly or very likely to influence their likelihood of reporting (67% in wave 1 and 68% in wave 2). Yet, this increased likelihood to report also seemed dependent on levels of confidence in agencies to tackle ASB. Those who reported being fairly or very confident in agencies were significantly more likely to say that uniformed presence would increase their likelihood of reporting ASB (76% versus 64% of wave 2 respondents).

Figure 6: To what extent would the presence of uniformed patrols (e.g. police officers or local authority wardens) in this area/on the metro/bus network influence the likelihood you would report the anti-social behaviour? (Wave 2)

Base: All wave 2 respondents, 4,059; don’t know and prefer not to say excluded from diagram

Despite low levels of confidence to report ASB to agencies, strategic lead and patrollers highlighted that patrols could be an opportunity to engagement with communities which might aid reporting incidents of ASB directly to police and other partners. Patrollers noted regular incidences of the public making reports directly to them whilst in hotspots. Members of the public also noted during focus groups and interviews that they would feel more likely to report ASB if they could do so directly to a patroller that they happen to see, rather than having to go through traditional reporting mechanisms.

“If I saw the police officers around and I had something in mind, I would ask or report something from the other day.”

(General public, Force H)

However, this view was not universal. Some members of the public noted being worried about engaging with patrollers in public, particularly from the police, and not wanting to be seen as a ‘grass’. They feared risks of repercussions from those committing ASB or from others in the community with a mistrust of authority agencies and would not want to be seen reporting. These participants felt they would prefer to report any ASB incidents over the phone or online, rather than directly to a police officer.

“If you go up and talk to someone on the street and report something, you’re not anonymous then if anybody’s watching…some people wouldn’t want to be seen reporting something to a Policeman.”

(General public, Force H)

“I wouldn’t feel it was necessary [to interact] unless I’d seen something and I thought it was worthy of telling them, I might point them in the right direction. But again, you’ve got that stigma haven’t you? If anyone sees you talking to the old bill you might paint a bit of a target on your back.”

(General public, Force D)

Patrollers questioned the likelihood that the pilot would increase reporting beyond in-person reports to those patrolling. However, they did note that in the longer terms, if confidence in agencies was increased, as discussed above, members of the public might be more willing to report incidents as they would have more trust that these reports would be taken seriously and acted on.

“I feel like it’s restoring public faith in the police, making people more likely to report incidents to the police because they feel like the police are actually out there in the community a bit more. From that, we’re being able to be fed more information of what’s happening in each area. Maybe certain areas haven’t been reporting things for quite some time because they haven’t had the response they required after so the faith’s been lost, but now we’re starting to see areas reporting things again and we’re able to tackle those things in those areas.”

(Patroller, Force H)

4.4 Impact on ASB prevalence

There was a sense among all patrollers and the public that patrols should make a positive difference. They expected those at risk of committing ASB would be less likely to do so if they saw or were aware of patrols. Further, they expected that patrols would lead to increased use of tools and powers on those committing ASB, reducing their likelihood of future ASB perpetration. However, it is also worth noting that stakeholders reflected that in the shorter term ASB prevalence could increase (in the relevant statistics) due to incidents being detected by patrols or an increase in reporting.

“I do think it makes a big difference because once people know you are there, it definitely affects their behaviour. It affects people congregating.”

(Patroller, Force G)

“Physical patrols at certain times are a good thing to have…they’re visible, you see people. It might be random at different times of the day… just the fact that there’s a presence there I think is going to dissuade anybody from antisocial behaviour.”

(General public, Force G)

Statistics on prevalence reveal a mixed picture that tells us little about the effects of the pilot so far. Pilot areas provided the Home Office with police-only prevalence data of ASB incidents within hotspot areas comparing quarters in 2023 to 2024 to the previous year. It should be noted that as this data is police-only it may not represent a full picture of ASB in hotspot areas and comparison sites could also not be identified. Further, a lack of granularity within the data - that is, incidents were not coded by specific type, such as drug-related ASB, noise, harassment, for instance - limited the ability to identify patterns in changes of prevalence within types of ASB.

When viewed in relation to ASB prevalence compared to the same quarter of the previous year, prevalence appears to have declined in some areas but risen in others. Police-only data provided to the Home Office from pilot areas, shows a mixed picture when comparing ASB incidents between September and March of 2022 to 2023 and 2023 to 2024 as shown in figure 7 below. These timescales correspond to when patrols were live across all pilot areas in 2023 to 2024, early quarters have been excluded as not all areas had all intended patrols being consistently delivered until October 2023. Incidents appear to have decreased in the hotspots of 6 areas but increased in 3 areas. Force D has been excluded given the number of recorded ASB incidents in hotspot areas in both time-periods was very small (4 and 11 respectively).

Figure 7: Police recorded incidents of ASB in selected hotspots areas between October and March.

A similarly mixed picture emerges from looking at individual hotspots within pilot areas. Across all police areas, there were hotspots where in some quarters ASB prevalence was higher and others where prevalence was lower than the previous year, presenting no discernible pattern.

Further, strategic leads and patrollers noted the difficulty in attributing any changes in prevalence to patrols as many factors were seen to influence the prevalence of ASB. These factors could include the weather with stakeholders noting that ASB decreases when areas experience rain; the time of year, with certain types of ASB more prevalent in summer, and others concentrated around specific events, such as Halloween and Bonfire Night; and other events going on in the area, such as football matches.

Perceptions were also mixed, among both stakeholders and the public, as to whether patrols had yet led to a reduction in ASB so far. The majority of wave 2 respondents (62%) had not seen a change in levels of ASB in the month prior to their response, with 18% reporting a perceived increased in ASB in the month before completing the survey. This was fairly consistent across the pilot areas: the proportion of respondents that had seen a decrease in ASB ranged from 3% to 8%. However, as respondents were not comparing the same timepoints within the year, the seasonal nature of ASB, alongside other factors, may have impacted on perceived levels of ASB.

Figure 8: In general, have you noticed any changes in levels of anti-social behaviour in this area / on the metro /bus network over the last month? (Wave 2)

Base: All wave 2 respondents (4,059); don’t know and prefer not to say excluded from diagram)

Respondents in wave 2 were slightly more likely to have seen a decrease in ASB if they were aware of an increased uniform presence in the area (8%) compared to those that had not seen the patrols (4%). However, in both cases the majority (60% and 64% respectively) had not noticed a change. Respondents who reported living within hotspot areas were more likely to report that levels of ASB had stayed the same (69%) than those who visited the area frequently (51%) or occasionally (42%). However, it should be noted that the last 2 groups were more likely to respond ‘don’t know’ when asked about levels of ASB.

Further, perceptions of ASB prevalence also appeared linked to whether ASB was seen as a problem by respondents. Those that felt that ASB was a fairly or very big problem in their area were more likely to report that ASB levels had gone up (32%) compared to those that did not see ASB as a fairly or big problem (only 5%). The latter group were more likely to say that ASB had stayed the same (77% compared to 52% of those that did see ASB as a problem). Similarly, those that reported feeling unsafe in their area at night were also more likely to report an increase in ASB (26%) compared to those that felt safe (10%). However, feelings of safety, and perceptions of whether ASB was a problem did not seem to be linked to those reporting that ASB had gone down (consistently 5-6% across groups).

Overall, there are considerable challenges in attributing impact to the pilot, and any individual delivery models due to the flexibility within local delivery models and wider factors that influence ASB. Strategic leads and patrollers, whilst generally confident in the effectiveness of their designs, also acknowledged this difficulty. For example, one strategic noted that they felt short 15-minute high-visibility patrols were particularly impactful, whilst also noting they did not have the evidence to prove this. There was a sense that it was too early to be able to see the full effect of the pilot at the time of the evaluation.

“I’ve got no evidence to back it up…but I do think these short spurts of being visible, being seen and moving onto your next place, being visible, being seen.”

(Strategic lead)

4.1.1 Displacement effect

There was a general acknowledgement that patrols would not tackle the root causes of ASB and the risk of displacement was raised as a concern for both stakeholders and the public. As patrols were implemented, patrollers and members of the public felt it was likely that individuals would simply move their behaviour to other areas outside of the patrol boundaries. However, the likelihood of displacement, and potential mitigations, were seen to be dependent on the type of ASB as well as the specific hotspot area. For example, ASB related to drugs and alcohol were seen as likely to be displaced as patrols would not have an impact on the reasons why this ASB happens. Similarly, patrols were not seen as having the potential to tackle ASB related to homelessness as the patrols would not help individuals move into accommodation. Instead, these individuals would move elsewhere.

Some patrollers felt that vehicle related ASB would also be more likely to be displaced, due to the ease of movement from one hotspot to another when in a vehicle compared to individuals having to travel on foot for other forms of ASB. Reflecting this, in some areas, off-road bikes were used to try and mitigate this risk. However, not all stakeholders and members of the public were concerned. Patrollers in Force C, for example, were less concerned about the displacement of deliberate fire setting. They noted that fires were usually set within larger more rural hotspots. They did not believe that perpetrators would go outside of hotspot areas to continue to set fires due to the inconvenience of travelling. Further, members of the public in one hotspot in Force H noted that the community was very ‘insular’. They did not think that young people committing ASB would go to another area that they were not familiar with just to be anti-social. This echoes existing research which reports that despite concern that hotspot policing will cause displacement, the evidence shows this is not to be the case (Braga et al, 2019; Weisburd et al, 2006).

To mitigate displacement and reduce ASB overall, patrollers and the public highlighted the need for preventative and diversionary activities. The specific activities or services needed would depend on the type of ASB. For example, members of the public called for quicker and better access to substance misuse support services to tackle drug and alcohol related ASB, and wider services to tackle homelessness for other types of ASB. They also noted the need for better services, opportunities and activities for young people, such as youth centres to reduce youth-related ASB. Half of survey respondents noted youths and/or groups of teenagers hanging around the streets of hotspots across both waves. General public participants in focus groups and interviews also noted youth related ASB as a particular issue. However, they also acknowledged the impact of a lack of youth centres or other spaces for young people to go on the prevalence of this type of ASB.

“I think it is moving the issues around…I don’t think you’re ever going to stop it, because if someone wants to be antisocial, they’re going to continue to be antisocial, they’re just going to do it somewhere else.”

(Patroller, Force G)

Strategic leads and patrollers acknowledged this need and recognised that wider activities would play a key role in their holistic efforts to tackle ASB. In some cases, strategic lead noted utilising wider funding available simultaneously to this pilot to put such diversionary activities in place.

Case study 5: Force C

In Force C, additional funding available through the PCC was being used to supplement patrols with wider activities aimed at young people. This included football clubs for children and pop-up stalls, such as barbecues, where young people can come and engage with patrollers and other frontline youth workers. Patrollers were then signposting young people to this and wider youth provision while on patrols.

“[There is a] diversionary activity in [a town in Force C], which is a football club. I went there last Friday, and they get up to 128 young people. It was absolutely freezing last Friday and it was still busy.”

(Strategic lead)

Overall, gaps in the evidence base remain. This evaluation has not been able to definitively assess impact of the patrols on prevalence of ASB. Strategic leads, patrollers and the public were positive about the potential that this intervention could have, but it was too early to see impact and patrols would need to be part of a wider holistic approach to tackling ASB, including building trust among communities in agencies to tackle the issue, encourage reporting, and provide wider support to those at risk of committing ASB.

5. Conclusions

Overall, a total of 153,569 person hours were delivered as part of this pilot, including patrols and activities, such as community engagement initiatives. The evaluation highlighted consensus among stakeholders and the public that this represented an increase in hours spent targeting ASB within hotspot areas, and that increasing visible uniformed patrols could be effective in preventing and responding to ASB incidents.

Clear implications for ensuring that hotspots patrols are delivered effectively were also noted. These include:

The use of neighbourhood policing teams was viewed as an effective way to resource patrols. The importance of having the same patrollers conducting regular patrols was highlighted in ensuring effective community engagement, local intelligence gathering and increased reporting of ASB. A neighbourhood policing approach was therefore highlighted as underpinning the effectiveness of the patrols.

Existing partnerships can strengthen the development and delivery of multi-agency response to the patrols. Multiple agencies need to work collaboratively, including at a national level, to address the individual, societal and structural issues that influence the likelihood of ASB and crime. However, stakeholders cited barriers to delivering a multi-agency response, including resourcing pressures and reduced capacity of some services. Therefore, sufficient funding for agencies involved in the response to ASB is needed to allow capacity for collaboration with other services in the area. This is also impacted by short-term funding periods and limited time to set up and implement funding initiatives (discussed further below).

Patrols are one part of a broader, holistic approach needed to tackle and address the causes of ASB. A range of risk factors, which are often complex and interlinked, influence the likelihood of ASB perpetration. Hotspot patrols should align with broader national and local approaches aimed at addressing causes of ASB. Both stakeholder and members of the public highlighted the importance of addressing the causes of ASB and referenced activities such as increasing the availability of diversionary activities for young people.

Patrols need to be flexible in response to ASB incidents in the hotspots. A combination of prevalence data, professional judgement and local intelligence or community insights, particularly considering underreporting of ASB, are important to the ongoing assessment of ASB issues in the selected hotspots. Further, ongoing triangulation of these data sources, and ensuring community insights are gathered effectively (that is, via surveys, resident forums for instance) is also key.

Echoing findings from other studies, the public reported a lack of trust and low levels of confidence in the capability of agencies and organisations to respond to ASB reports. Consideration should be given to how agencies and organisations can work effectively with local communities on this issue. Whilst different agencies were involved in the patrols across the pilot areas, the public tended to view uniformed patrols as being conducted by the police. Agencies should consider ways to promote effective community engagement. To improve trust and confidence, approaches such as providing information on patrol activity and impact to resident forums, social media campaigns, and leafletting should be considered. Local campaigns to engage with communities should consider providing information on positive outcomes of reporting ASB and how this helps tackle incidents and increase public engagement with local community groups. When designing interventions, co-production with local communities should also be considered.

-Challenges of designing the intervention within tight timescales of the funding were highlighted. Strategic leads reported feeling under pressure to design, set-up and deliver the intervention effectively within the funding period. Further consideration should be given to providing longer-term funding which may help ensure that interventions are implemented and fully operationalised over a sufficient period of time to see impact. This would also aid assessment of the effectiveness of the intervention.

Findings of this evaluation has informed hotspot programmes and further government policy. Following the pilot intervention, the previous Government has funded a national rollout of hotspot patrols across all 43 police force areas. This funding extends the focus of the patrols from ASB to also include serious violence, merging Grip funding in those forces who had received this funding previously. The government has now launched the Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee which aims to target declining police confidence with a programme of reform including visible patrols.

Appendix A: Sample

Professional sample

	Wave 1	Wave 2
Strategic lead interviews	13	14
Frontline staff
Force C	5	3
Force D	5	4
Force G	3	3
Force H	5	3
Force I	4	2
Business staff
Force C	-	-
Force D	1	-
Force G	2	-
Force H	-	1
Force I	3	1
General public participants
Force C	13	13
Force D	10	10
Force G	3	10
Force H	8	7
Force I	13	7

Appendix B: Research materials

The questionnaire and topic guides for this project are available for download.

Download ‘ASB hotspot response pilot evaluation research materials’

1. For 2024 to 2025 the hotspot patrols have been rolled out to all territorial forces in England and Wales as well as merged with Grip hotspot policing, a Home Office funded programme targeting serious violence. ↩ ↩²

2. Grip funding was given to police forces to deliver enhanced hotspot policing to deter Serious Violence through visible patrol activity whilst adopting problem-oriented policing to address the root causes of violence within these locations. ↩

3. Grip funding is Home Office funding provided to police force areas to tackle serious violence. ↩

4. The national rollout of this pilot intervention merges funding for serious violence (previously Grip) and ASB hotspots, allowing areas to select any areas as hotspots. ↩

5. Koper CS. (1995). ‘Just enough police presence: Reducing crime and disorderly behaviour by optimising patrol time in crime hot spots’. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), pp.649-672 ↩

6. The evaluation did not capture the specific academic research these pilot areas used. ↩

7. This relates to number of hours each patroller recorded patrolling per patrol shift. ↩

8. The Immediate Justice (IJ) programme was introduced by the then government in 2023 and aimed to deliver swift enforcement to perpetrators of ASB and to allow perpetrators to repair the harm by undertaking unpaid work and helping improve public spaces. ↩

9. It should be noted that not all of these powers could be used in that moment of responding to incidents. ↩

10. This aligns with the number of people across England and Wales that reported seeing police ‘more than once a day, once a day, about once a week’ (14%) in 2022 to 2023 via the Crime Survey of England and Wales. ↩