Ariel Monitoring & Evaluation Support: Interim Impact & Process Evaluation

Question 1

About us

Accepted Answer

know. /nəʊ/v.
to understand clearly and with certainty

know.space^{[footnote 1]} is a specialist space economics and strategy consultancy, based in London and Edinburgh. We are motivated by a single mission: to be the source of authoritative economic knowledge for the space sector.

www.know.space hello@know.space

Question 2

Acknowledgements

Accepted Answer

We are grateful to all those within the project team who engaged with us over the course of this study, and for making their time to support the study with interviews. We would particularly like to thank Ryan King from the UK Space Agency for his input and advice over the course of the project. Responsibility for the content of this report remains with know.space.

Cover image: credit to arielmission.space. Available at: https://arielmission.space/index.php/ariel-publications

Question 3

Key findings

Accepted Answer

While there is a long-term nature to many routes to impact from the mission, the UK Space Agency’s national contribution has so far demonstrated strong initial progress across all four business case investment objectives. National funding – and the scientific and technical leadership it has secured - has led to greater UK returns from wider Ariel mission funding. Without this funding, a different mission may have been selected by ESA, and if Ariel was still chosen, UK involvement would have been greatly diminished. The benefits we set out are, in our view, highly additional.

Funding has led to an increase in the quantity and quality of UK science outputs, and has enabled collaboration within and outside the UK. National funding for Ariel has enabled the UK to shape the mission, provide leadership and influence, and set foundations for future benefits and potential roles in major missions. However, opportunities are tied to successful mission delivery.

While attribution challenges are inevitable for such missions, the emerging benefits are sizeable, even if not solely attributable to UK Space Agency national funding. For example, the emerging impact story on benefits from the Ariel Data Challenge and ExoClock initiatives, which leverage (and in-turn reinforce) the profile of the Ariel mission more, and also feature support aside from UK Space Agency funding.

The UK’s leading role on Ariel has helped attract talent to the UK, growing the skills base. It has also provided experience to early-career individuals, helping to develop in-demand skills in the space sector. Leadership over Ariel has been used to signal leadership to investors, with Ariel-related start-ups having secured millions in investment. While not wholly attributable to UK Space Agency funding, the events are linked to UK roles and AI/ML capabilities being developed as a result.

The UK Space Agency identified several targets to monitor benefits realisation for UK activities, and we conclude these targets are largely being met. In rare cases where they are not, we do not view this as a significant cause for concern, as broader factors (e.g. JWST-related publications) can influence observed trends. While emerging benefits are promising, many current activities are focused on positioning the UK for future benefits. Delivery challenges could easily derail the so-far positive view of how the UK is delivering roles and responsibilities on the mission. Our broad conclusion is that good progress has been made thus far, although there is a long way to go yet.

While the mission has helped attract and retain talent, retention risks are ever-present given its long-term nature. Some stakeholders felt these are exacerbated by uncertainty over future funding, with key personnel working on fixed-term contracts and seeking more stability. In some cases there are also single point of failure risks regarding knowledge transfer. While these risks have not materialised to date, they could present barriers to the realisation of future benefits.

The commercial benefit story is still at an early stage. In the words of one stakeholder, space science is the ‘funnel’ through which longer term commercial benefits can unfold from over time. There are promising start-up companies with links to Ariel, with over £14m of external investment secured so far, though with potential for much larger prizes on offer as a result of ongoing activities. While there is evidence of initial impact, it is too early to draw definitive conclusions.

The high level findings of our process evaluation are that, while there have been challenges with mission development (often beyond UK control), there are strong working relationships in place, with high levels of trust and collaboration between UK project team members, the UK Space Agency and ESA. The UK team is seen as delivering effectively despite limited resource. The Project Management Board is seen as working well, with strong expertise and “solution orientation”.

We provide recommendations to improve processes including by continuing robust risk assessments and mitigation planning, strengthening communications, ensuring realism in planning, and streamlining and aligning reporting requirements. We endorse the UK Space Agency and RAL Space implementing the recommendation of the independent ‘Sarri review’ to formalise RAL’s leadership role in technical areas. While recognising the realities of funding constraints, we also note that greater resourcing, if possible, would reduce several project delivery risks.

Performance against the evaluation questions set out in the 2023 M&E framework is positive, with all impact and process areas rated ‘amber’ or ‘green’ in our RAG ratings. Amber ratings often reflect that insufficient time has passed to assess outcomes definitively. Green ratings typically indicate strong initial progress - caveated by the fact that they reflect positive trajectories rather than significant socio-economic returns achieved to date.

Question 4

Interim process evaluation

Accepted Answer

Management and oversight

Working relationships within the Ariel consortium are considered strong by most stakeholders, including interactions between the UK Space Agency, the wider Ariel consortium, and ESA. The UK Space Agency is widely regarded as approachable, responsive, and communicative, while the Project Management Board (PMB) is praised for its technical expertise. Some stakeholders suggested the PMB could utilise this in discussions with ESA and ASI, while recognising this would require further resourcing.

As payload integrator, RAL Space is acknowledged as being highly competent and dedicated, though stretched thin in terms of resource and lacking the contractual levers to influence key partners. The Sarri review^{[footnote 2]} highlighted the need to formalise RAL’s leadership and enhance resource. All stakeholder groups had recurring views that greater realism in early planning, improved delegation of authority and control, and enhanced communications are key to progressing the mission towards successful launch.

Mission delivery

This evaluation focuses on the UK’s national investments into Ariel, rather than the broader mission. However, the two are interconnected, with cascading impacts that cannot be entirely separated. The UK’s leadership in Ariel continues to be viewed as key, to the mission’s overall success. Despite broader mission delivery challenges, both scientific and technical progress was noted.

The main mission challenge to date has been technical delays with telescope assembly, led by the Italian contractor Leonardo. While these delays are not specifically connected to UK Space Agency national funding, they place pressure on RAL Space’s resourcing and leadership of the consortium, and risk becoming a bottleneck that could affect the broader return on investment from UK funding.

Like many evaluations of UK research and innovation investments, we heard how UK-specific funding issues such as spending review uncertainties have impacted planning and staff retention. These impacts are real, though we recognise they are largely beyond the control of the UK Space Agency to address. The same is true for broader geopolitical factors – such as the war in Ukraine and the global semiconductor supply shortage – which had implications for broader mission delivery.

Rising costs within the UK Ariel consortium have required tough conversations around spend and transferring responsibility of elements to ESA. This is true of the active cryocooler system (ACS), where there is a risk of losing UK design IP before the CDR. While previous change control processes were considered broadly reactive, the UK Space Agency have now implemented a Change Control Plan. This mechanism is a good example of the UK Space Agency / the PMB being solution-oriented and proactive in finding processes to support smoother delivery of the programme.

Administration and resourcing

Examples of institutional resilience have emerged, including well-managed staff transitions that have enabled the retention of expertise and the continued upskilling of early career-researchers. UK team members have innovative concepts which could be explored further, which may result in future benefits around commercialisation. M&E activities were valued for tracking progress and helping form a narrative to convey impacts to the UK Space Agency and other senior stakeholders.

A key concern is resourcing, with team members often constrained by limited time and budget to pursue broader opportunities. Reporting burdens were seen by some as disproportionate, such as Researchfish requirements for small/bridging grants and changes in reporting templates. Additionally, given Ariel’s long timeline, staff turnover poses a risk to institutional knowledge, highlighting the need for ongoing upskilling within the UK consortium, supported by the UK Space Agency.

Question 5

Interim impact evaluation

Accepted Answer

Science

Whilst the bulk of the scientific return from UK Space Agency funding will be realised once the mission is operational, we view that funding has secured UK scientific leadership and led to an increase in both the quantity and quality of science outputs. We assess Ariel as being broadly on track to achieve scientific objectives, however future activities are required to fully realise objectives:

Prof. Tinetti, the UK mission PI, is restructuring working groups to enhance participation, maximise science return, and ensure agility to new exoplanet research from other missions such as JWST through pioneering publication and data policies.
Ariel-related research output has risen annually, despite some fluctuations, with 477 publications since 2018. The annual average has doubled from 43 to 87 during the analysis period. For comparative context, there were an annual average of 33 Gaia publications and 13 CHEOPS publications in the 3 years following launch (in 2013 and 2019 respectively)^{[footnote 3]}.

The UK project team is beginning to demonstrate early leadership over Ariel science. UK Space Agency funding is also enabling contributions from non-funded organisations across the UK:

The number of Ariel papers with a UK-affiliated first author has increased in both absolute and relative terms. UK authors appeared in 24 papers per year during the baseline, rising to 43 in the analysis period. Overall, 50% of Ariel-related papers feature UK authorship, positioning the UK at the upper end of the UK Space Agency’s target range.
31 UK organisations have published Ariel-related research, increasing by four in the analysis period. UCL leads (70%), followed by RAL Space (18%), Oxford (8%), and Cardiff (8%). While UK Space Agency-funded institutions dominate, contributions from St Andrews, Open University, and Exeter highlight broader interest in the mission.

There is increasing activity in the wider field of exoplanet science, although driven largely by other missions and ground-based observations – Ariel has not significantly influenced this yet.

Ariel will build upon data from exoplanet missions such as JWST, TESS, CHEOPS, and PLATO. The field is growing, with Ariel publications currently making up ~4% of the total.
UK authors contribute 12-16% of all exoplanet papers, reflecting strong national interest, though not necessarily linked to the UK Space Agency’s Ariel funding.

Citations have been growing quickly over our study, but they also take time to materialise, making year-on-year comparisons misleading.

To date, there have been 5,400 citations on Ariel-related publications with UK involvement, with 70% of these on publications from the baseline. Citations in the analysis period have risen by 900% since 2023, indicating growing visibility of UK Ariel research.
Ariel-related research has been cited in 614 news articles from outlets such as BBC, Forbes, and CNN, highlighting public interest. While media coverage does not directly indicate research quality, it suggests broader impacts could begin as Ariel starts returning data.

In the absence of UK Space Agency national funding, we view that UK roles, influence and outputs would have been greatly diminished for Ariel, and the mission may not have been selected. One of ESA’s other M-Class candidates (such as THOR or XIPE) may have been chosen, leading to a reduction in UK scientific leadership, and a change in mission focus. UK Space Agency funding has been key in driving additional scientific return and positioning UK researchers to exploit mission data.

Competitiveness & reputation

The UK Space Agency’s investment has fostered international collaboration and early gains in reputation, potentially positioning the UK for future missions. However, sustained influence depends on successful delivery. Broader reputational impacts will take time to emerge. UK researchers have collaborated widely, both within and beyond the Ariel consortium.

Collaboration has increased in both absolute and relative terms in the analysis period, with over 80% of publications internationally collaborative each year.
UK authors have collaborated with researchers from 37 countries in the analysis period, up from 32 in the baseline, showing a growing global network beyond the Ariel consortium.

There is early evidence of UK reputational benefits in the view of ESA and the consortium, although these are linked to delivery expectations, and could change quickly.

UK leadership roles on Ariel have increased influence over technical and scientific decisions, potentially positioning the UK for future space science missions. Early discussions are underway for UK involvement in NASA’s Habitable Worlds Observatory and PRIMA mission concepts, with UK team members shortlisted for the latter.
UK project team members have also received wider recognition, including 18 relevant awards and prizes since Ariel was selected, including a Knighthood and OBE. Some were given for lifetime contributions, with others more directly linked to the mission.

As benefits are inherently linked to UK leadership roles, we conclude it is unlikely that the same levels of international collaboration, influence, or reputation would exist without UK Space Agency investment.

Skills & inspiration

Through Ariel, the UK aims to leverage public interest in exoplanets to attract and develop the space talent pipeline, strengthening human capital in the sector. We view outputs and outcomes regarding upskilling and attraction of talent as establishing strong foundations for long-term outcomes and impacts. However, consistent funding of activities is key in ensuring they materialise.

Project teams have conducted engagement activities for diverse audiences which could sow the seeds for long-term benefits to UK space science and the wider economy, while also raising the profile of the mission.

So far, the project team has undertaken at least 155 public engagement activities, in at least 19 different countries. UK leadership roles have led to invited keynote speeches.
The nature of these events is as important as their number, and activities include both high-profile and targeted events, including major conferences and news appearances.

Two UCL-led initiatives have also played a crucial role in catalysing wider international participation in mission-relevant science, supplemented with targeted initiatives in the UK. The Ariel Data Challenge (ADC) and ExoClock are two emerging success stories with further potential impact.

The ADC has catalysed knowledge spillovers in the realm of AI and Machine Learning, and has experienced wider and deeper engagement with each iteration. The challenge has catalysed international and UK-based impacts (e.g. through Hackathons), and collaboration with the data science community is leading to exciting new developments. The challenge has become the largest public exo-atmospheric database, and one of the biggest astronomy related challenges ever hosted on a leading data science competition platform.
ExoClock has enhanced participation in astronomy from amateurs and students in conducting observations of exoplanet spectra, increasing from 160 observers in 2021 to over 450 currently. It has run several successful collaborations with UK schools and universities, and 10,500 observations have been completed from observers in 71 countries.

Attribution of benefits is complex here, as UK Space Agency national funding does not directly fund ExoClock and Ariel Data Challenge activities – however, without UK roles and leadership in the mission, outcomes would not manifest in the same way, so can be seen as being partly attributable.

Delivery of mission roles and responsibilities have led to technical and managerial skills development, attraction and retention of talent, and career progression of scientists and engineers within the project team, helping to build the space talent pipeline. However, uncertainty around long-term funding poses a future risk to retention for those on fixed-term contracts.

There are ~50 individuals in the UK project team, with a blend of early career and senior staff. UK management roles have been strengthened to manage the complex international consortium, particularly at UCL and RAL, while technical skills have been developed and showcased in AI, software systems and mechanical engineering, and data modelling.
9 staff members have been promoted as a result of their activities on Ariel, including PhD students, graduates, year-in-industry students and apprentices. Links between academia and industry are emerging, helping to strengthen skills in the wider space sector.

These benefits are inherently linked with delivery of mission roles, secured and financed by the UK Space Agency national contribution. Therefore, there is strong additionality associated with them.

Innovation

Another key objective of UK Space Agency funding is to stimulate commercial opportunities across data science and space technology, and we assess UK mission roles as having promising early impact across both areas. Close industrial-academic knowledge exchange in AI/ML, and potential follow-on mission opportunities are two key routes for commercial benefits. £14.6m in contracts and funding has been secured in-part due to Ariel, which could have future productivity benefits.

There are two Ariel-related start-up companies which have shown promising growth over the course of our study, Blue Skies Space Limited (BSSL) and Spaceflux. They have been successful in securing contracts, private investment, and creating employment in the UK space sector.

Scientific leadership over Ariel has supported the growth of BSSL, which was a company inspired by Ariel’s design precursor, ECHO. The organisation is commercialising space research through data access from small satellites, and is launching its first mission, Mauve, in 2025. They have employed 14 people to date, and UK leadership over Ariel was cited as a key factor in building investor confidence.
Ariel was also key in establishing Spaceflux, a space situational awareness (SSA) company which leverages AI/ML techniques developed as part of UK contributions to Ariel. They have employed 29 new people and secured at least 4 UK government contracts to develop sovereign optical SSA systems, becoming a leading global provider.

Beyond these benefits the project team are also pursuing commercial opportunities which could lead to sizeable impact for the UK. Progress in these areas should be tracked over time to see the extent they materialise. We identified other emerging commercial discussions, including:

3 emerging spin-outs in development, relating to the ADC, ExoClock, and data processing at Cardiff University, although the latter is not solely linked to Ariel.
RAL Space and Cardiff University have been shortlisted for involvement on a $1bn NASA mission concept (PRIMA), which is being pursued alongside other large mission roles. The case for UK involvement is strengthened by demonstrating capabilities on space science missions like Ariel (as well as existing heritage from Herschel).
Ongoing collaboration with industry on the ADC could also lead to commercial benefits and internal hackathon potential. Discussions with Kaggle, NVIDIA and Google DeepMind are ongoing to pursue opportunities alongside the 2025 iteration of the ADC.

Question 6

Next steps

Accepted Answer

We have tracked a broad range of metrics on an ongoing basis, to identify emerging routes to impact as the mission unfolds. This evidence has underpinned our impact evaluation, built over four iterations of evidence collection, synthesis, analysis and reporting to support ongoing benefits management at the UK Space Agency. Inevitably, we are tracking an emerging impact story. However, without consistent evidence collection, there is a high risk that the future evolution of trends are not captured, and the true impact of UK Space Agency national funding for the Ariel mission will not be known to the UK Space Agency. Ultimately, if data is not collected close to the time the impacts occur, the window of opportunity can close with it often being impossible to ‘retrofit’ such evidence.

As part of this study, we have interviewed key stakeholders and attended Project Management Board (PMB) meetings, collating perspectives on critical delivery factors, informing our process evaluation. These findings outline how the UK Space Agency’s contributions to Ariel have been delivered in practice, identifying key delivery lessons, best practices, and opportunities to optimise implementation. It will be critical to monitor the implementation of the lessons learned from this evaluation, as well as to assess future delivery factors, best practices, and lessons learned throughout the build phase, launch, and operational phases of the Ariel mission. These activities are vital to ensure the UK captures the full range of benefits from the investment in the future and maximises performance against the mission objectives.

Question 7

The Ariel mission

Accepted Answer

The Atmospheric Remote-sensing Infrared Exoplanet Large-survey (Ariel) mission is the fourth medium (M-class) mission in ESA’s Cosmic Vision programme, which will analyse the atmospheres of approximately 1000 exoplanets. In doing so, the mission will contribute towards understanding of how planets and atmospheres form, laying the groundwork in the search for life beyond earth. Data from the Ariel mission will also shape a discipline which was identified by the UK space science research base as one of the most important over the next 20-30 years^{[footnote 4]}.

The mission is currently expected to launch in 2029, alongside the rideshare F-Class Comet Interceptor mission. Development activities for the spacecraft and instruments are ongoing, including manufacturing, assembly, and testing. Alongside this, work is also ongoing to improve the preparedness of the scientific community to leverage the data releases from the mission.

Core mission funding comes through the ESA (mandatory) space science budget. As with other ESA science missions, ESA member states contribute national funding in addition to this ‘core’ funding, to secure leadership roles for individuals and teams in their country, for example in instrument development or in scientific direction.

It is this national funding that is the focus of this study. The UK Space Agency committed £30.3m through the National Space Science Programme (in addition to £6m towards the Ariel mission study phase) which, coupled with the UK’s significant expertise in exoplanet science, has secured a leading role for the UK on the mission. It places the Ariel consortium under UK scientific, engineering and programmatic leadership, representing the first time in a decade that the UK has achieved such a central role in the design, implementation and operations for a mission of this magnitude.

Ariel is led by a UK-based Principal investigator, Professor Giovanna Tinetti (UCL). STFC / RAL Space is leading a consortium of 17 countries building the payload module, which will be assembled and tested in Harwell. UK stakeholders are delivering the cryogenic cooler (STFC / RAL Space), optical ground support equipment (University of Oxford), and science operations and data processing (UCL, University of Cardiff).

Question 8

Background to this study

Accepted Answer

The UK Space Agency’s financial commitment to Ariel through the National Space Science Programme aims to deliver benefits and impacts aligned with four investment objectives outlined in the business case, namely to:

Scientific leadership: Secure UK scientific and technical leadership of exoplanet research, data science and space science by nominal end of mission.
International reputation & collaboration: Enhance the reach and reputation of the UK’s space sector.
Inspire, attract, and retain talent to upskill our workforce.
Stimulate innovation and commercial opportunities through data science and space technology.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) has been embedded into the UK Space Agency’s governance of Ariel national funding to monitor benefits realisation as the mission unfolds. know.space were commissioned in early 2023 to conduct these activities for Ariel, to provide a greater understanding of mission progress, the effectiveness of the funding, and the impacts it is producing. This report, produced in March 2025, represents the final deliverable from our M&E support over the last 2+ years.

This study was also designed to feed into and support the UK Space Agency’s wider M&E efforts and benefits management, which help the Agency assess progress, maintain accountability, and adjust programme strategies through evidence-based decision-making. This helps to ensure optimal use of public funds to benefit stakeholders across academia, industry, and public sectors, and contributing to the strategic national objectives set out in the National Space Strategy.

Large space science missions are long-term endeavours, and most of the benefits and impacts associated with UK science return and leadership are only expected to be realised after the mission is operational and returning data. However, through a regular cadence of data capture, we provide the UK Space Agency with early evidence to assess whether investment objectives are on course to be met. It will therefore be critical to continue to collect evidence over time, as the longer term benefits story plays out.

This report includes an interim process and impact evaluation, with the former examining delivery factors which have worked well or require improvement, providing timely recommendations to the UK Space Agency as mission progress continues, and the latter aiming to capture the full scope of realised impacts generated by UK Space Agency national Ariel funding to date.

To the extent possible, we have aimed to isolate the impacts of UK Space Agency national funding although inevitably, some impacts, outcomes and benefits are intertwined with wider factors and wider mission funding. Our impact evaluation utilises baseline and analysis periods for time series data, to provide a point of comparison between metrics prior to and following the announcement of the UK Space Agency’s £30.3m funding commitment. Attribution of impacts (i.e. the causal link between funding and observed outcomes) is assessed throughout, and the counterfactual scenario (i.e. what would have happened in absence of the funding) is explored per theme of impact.

Question 9

Methodological approach

Accepted Answer

To track emerging impacts and delivery factors, we conducted 6-monthly benefits management reporting to the UK Space Agency, which followed a broad 4 stage process - data collection, data analysis, synthesis and conclusions. This report includes a final iteration and summary of the 6-monthly reporting process, preceded by September 2024, March 2024, and September 2023 editions, that has been woven into our interim evaluations.

Across the study, we have employed a mixed-methods approach. We have utilised stakeholder consultations with individuals from all UK funded organisations in the project team (with no missing perspectives). While interviews provided valuable context, these findings could be influenced by optimism bias. To triangulate evidence, we draw on desk-based research, bibliometric and altmetric analysis as other key data collection methods, which we discuss in more detail in the Annex. Bibliometric analysis was conducted with our partners Digital Science, leveraging the Dimensions database (the world’s largest research dataset), supplemented by UK Space Agency Researchfish data. The time lags associated with publication and citation data are also methodological limitations which require consideration when interpreting bibliometric analysis.

Our interim process evaluation uses primary and secondary qualitative data sources to assess the extent to which UK Space Agency funding for Ariel has been delivered in an effective manner. Data collection efforts were driven by five core evaluation questions, for which early progress against has been summarised in Table 1. The evaluation also employed a real-time evaluation (RTE) approach to capture insights on mission delivery and to develop appropriate feedback and recommendations for subsequent phases of Ariel, as well as other UK Space Agency-funded missions.^{[footnote 5]} Our interim impact evaluation also uses a mixed-methods approach to collect indicator information at regular intervals, building upon the UK Space Agency’s existing work in the (UK Space Agency-internal) Ariel Benefits Realisation Plan. Each indicator has been attributed a baseline measure (i.e. initial conditions before UK Space Agency investment), and consistently measured over our study. In practice, the baseline is as much about providing context for future impacts rather than a mechanistic process of ‘observed impact minus baseline impact = net impact’. The baseline is developed to provide a general picture prior to UK funding, for context when interpreting future impacts.

In turn, evolution of these trends informed performance against the impact evaluation questions developed at the beginning of the study. These evaluation questions were developed to assess progress against the UK Space Agency’s investment objectives, and broadly follow the four impact themes of this study (progress against these evaluation questions is summarised in Table 2. We have used a theory-based evaluation approach, assessing outcomes from UK Space Agency investment through contribution analysis. This approach explores attribution through assessing the contribution an intervention is making to observed results (as measured by indicators) and verifies the intervention’s Theory of Change (ToC) and logic model, investigating factors that may influence outcomes. Evidence of contributions is summarised per impact theme, alongside a counterfactual.

To produce a streamlined narrative and understanding of the changes seen from the baseline to the current period, we have synthesised findings from across the 6-monthly reporting process, alongside qualitative insights gathered through stakeholder engagement or desk-based research. We provide broader concluding views across the progress of the Ariel activities, identifying general shifts in trends over this initial analysis period, and whether indicators are on track to meet their targets. Where targets are at risk of not being met, we identify the challenge and provide additional insight. A summary of target performance is provided in the Annex.

Question 10

Interim Process Evaluation

Accepted Answer

The process evaluation addresses the delivery effectiveness of the UK (nationally funded) elements of the Ariel mission to date, identifies factors which have both aided and hindered progress, and discusses the success of working relationships and management approaches. The evaluation is intended for internal UK Space Agency use, and feedback from stakeholders was provided on the basis of anonymity (where practicable). The evaluation also, where appropriate, identifies lessons and forms recommendations for future mission delivery.^{[footnote 6]} These are focused on UK and UK Space Agency involvement and in areas where UK activities can make an impact, recognising the divisions of responsibility between the UK Space Agency and ESA in mission delivery. In line with HMG Magenta Book principles, the process evaluation aims to answer the question:

“What can be learned from how the Ariel mission has been delivered?”

Whilst quantitative data can be useful, it can fail to capture the complexities and nuances of implementation or real-world challenges and successes. Therefore, this process evaluation relies largely on qualitative insights, emphasising the experiences and opinions of those involved rather than relying on quantitative indicators.

The recommendations which follow are a combination of suggestions from stakeholders, and know.space’s own expertise of evaluating similar programmes. Throughout, we have tried to make it clear where know.space endorse a recommendation. Where we do not explicitly endorse a recommendation, it may be because we lack the information to confidently do so.

RAL Space

There is, notwithstanding administrative and funding challenges, recognition that the Ariel mission has been well-managed. One stakeholder noted that Ariel has been the “best process they have experienced”, with good cooperation within the consortium. There is a consensus view that RAL Space are both competent and effective in their work - their work is seen as impressive, particularly given the resource constraints under which they are operating. Throughout the mission there has been a common acceptance that they are managing a very complex and large consortium (of over 16 countries, 600+ scientists and engineers, and international collaborations with NASA, JAXA and CSA).

“RAL are very competent. They know their business.”

“[RAL] have overcome every problem except for Italy.”

One of the main challenges associated with RAL Space is a criticism that too much was expected of too few at the organisation. Multiple stakeholders suggested at the start of the mission that the team was too lean, leading to overstretch and contributing to delays. A recurring tension arises from the fact that scheduling burdens often fall upon RAL Space despite it not having the authority, or appropriate delegations, to hold consortium members accountable. Stakeholders highlighted how RAL is a “couple of layers removed” from key decisions and suggested that earlier involvement from manufacturing authorities could have prevented some of the downstream problems. RAL was often praised for doing a good job “under difficult circumstances,” but there was consensus that they were set up to coordinate, not to drive, which does not allow them to resolve conflicts easily.

“RAL need to be able to influence Leonardo, and they are a couple of layers away. I’m not sure I could have expected anything more from RAL – with an injection of resources they can be more in control and in a better place to make decisions.”

“[The] burden is falling on a small number of people to deliver a complex programme.”

The relationship between RAL Space and ESA is seen as a particular strength, though a concern raised was that the UK Space Agency were not always kept well-informed regarding discussions between the two. It was noted that, on occasion, decisions were being made that could impact the programme, especially expenditure, without UK Space Agency involvement. This could be interpreted as demonstrating a need for improved communication and understanding between RAL Space and the UK Space Agency especially, to close the feedback loop and ensure nothing is committed to ESA before being discussed by the UK Space Agency and the PMB. One solution was to put a ‘change control’ process in place across the UK consortium partners.

More recently, constructive dialogue and working between the UK Space Agency and ESA resulted in the commissioning of an independent review by Giuseppe Sarri (a project manager from ESA’s JUICE mission). This review focused on the delivery of the Telescope Assembly by Leonardo as well as the organisation of the consortium, specifically seeking to evaluate the management and resourcing of the mission. Sarri made a series of recommendations, aiming to ‘enforce the role of RAL as lead technical authority’, and recognising that this would require a “change in mindset in RAL and [Leonardo]” to work together.

“Guisseppe [from ESA] was surprised by the number of staff [RAL Space] had to manage this – he thought we would need 10 more to be doing what we are doing.”

Amongst several other recommendations, the Sarri review set out the following areas of improvement to enforce RAL’s role:

Implement a larger team at RAL, covering all disciplines;
Work on the mindset of RAL to be a fast driver in taking decisions; and
Work on the mindset of Leonardo to accept RAL as a “kind of prime”.

Additionally, it outlined that direct decision and reporting processes between RAL and Leonardo must be established, albeit with ongoing monitoring from the funding agencies. These recommendations formalise actions already being undertaken by RAL, having previously developed a “shadow engineering team” model to follow activities carried out by delayed partners (such as Leonardo), and behaving more like a prime contractor without formally being one. RAL also plans to increase the team by several FTEs, financially-supported by ESA, which will allow them to manage in a more hands-on way.

Whilst these recommendations are welcomed by the UK Space Agency and RAL, there are reservations as to whether these actions will fix the underlying delivery issues. Therefore, planned mitigation actions include setting up a progress review after 6 months of implementing the Sarri recommendations, and ensuring that a “plan B” option is developed to safeguard against further stagnation of progress.

Indeed, a consistent message raised by consultees was that the constraints regarding resourcing at RAL, as well as the lack of contractual levers for them to utilise against those consortium partners failing to deliver, were known from the start of the mission. This includes being raised in the Gate 0 Review of the business case. This suggests that a more rigorous risk assessment procedure could have been established from the start, to identify potential technical, institutional and resource limitations. For risks that impact the critical pathway, it would be beneficial to proactively formulate actionable mitigation measures or set out feasible ‘plan B’ options, agreed by all key stakeholders, and consistently monitored and updated. It should be noted, however, it is beyond the scope of individual funding agencies to assess risks across the entire mission, particularly given the size of the Ariel consortium. In these cases, it is expected that ESA reviews of the mission proposal will identify such risks in addition to or in excess of those identified by national level assessments, due to greater resource availability and increased visibility across the whole mission.

ESA

By nature of its size and structure, engagement with ESA can be complex. However, the UK Space Agency, RAL Space and the wider consortium all agree that there is a strong working relationship with ESA – an opinion shared in return by the ESA Ariel team.

“ESA is a fixed-process entity, but we’ve had experienced good collaboration and spirit; this comes from the top and propagates through the rest of the team.”

“The relationship between all parties including ESA is very good.”

Indeed, one stakeholder expressed how this was not always the norm with space missions, and in their experience, there can often be a tense relationship amongst consortium members and ESA, due to competing priorities or demands. The pragmatic and respectful approach across the different actors on Ariel was highlighted as a strong example of the positive working relationships and attitudes of the people involved, with recognition that this trickled down from the consortium leadership – such as RAL Space, and the Ariel Mission PI, Prof. Tinetti.

“There is a good level of mutual respect on Ariel in general – a key positive for the mission.”

ESA have also shown to be flexible to challenges arising on the mission, including taking responsibility of the costs for the cryocooler electronics away from the UK national costs, as well as commissioning the Sarri review to find workable solutions to current schedule challenges. Upcoming areas where ESA is planning to step in further include the active cryocooler system, as well as supporting the additional FTEs required at RAL to manage the consortium more effectively.

However, these decisions from ESA can, we heard, often be quite reactive in nature. The setup of the mission, with a consortium driving the delivery of the payload rather than ESA itself, is not the norm for such complex missions as Ariel. A reflection within the UK Space Agency was how this means that the UK Space Agency itself is carrying an arguably disproportionate level of external risk. In response to challenges within the Ariel mission, the expected provision of additional ESA-funded resource at RAL Space has meant that the UK Space Agency and ESA have effectively engaged in a ‘risk-sharing’ model. It should be emphasised, however, that this was a reactive, rather than planned, development. If a similar mission were to occur in the future, the Agency should push for more of a ‘risk-sharing model’ with ESA when establishing the working relationship.

Leadership changes within ESA have at times, according to stakeholders, disrupted continuity and clarity in decision-making. While collaboration has been largely effective, occasional misunderstandings between ESA departments have occurred, leading to delays. A notable tension has concerned the issue of ownership with respect to data and preparatory science activities, particularly regarding project elements such as the Exoplanet Database (ExoDB). There have been instances where ESA’s role and ownership expectations have caused frictions, necessitating clarifications of authority and intellectual property rights, although this is predominantly in relation to the consortium overall rather than with specific UK actors.

Question 11

Mission delivery

Accepted Answer

To note, the focus of this evaluation is on the UK’s national investments into Ariel, rather than the broader Ariel mission. However, the two are inevitably interconnected, with cascading impacts that cannot be entirely separated. The UK’s leadership in Ariel continues to be viewed as both central, and key, to the mission’s overall success. Despite broader mission delivery challenges, both scientific and technical progress has been noted. The collaborative culture of UK-funded organisations, and the high quality of preparatory science activities are seen as strengths by consortium partners and ESA.

The most significant challenge on the mission to date pertain to the technical delays associated with the telescope assembly, led by the Italian contractor Leonardo. While these delays are not specifically connected to UK Space Agency national funding, they have provided additional pressure on RAL Space’s resourcing and leadership of the consortium. Furthermore, they risk becoming a bottleneck that could affect the broader return on investment from UK funding, and add to pressures on testing and integration.

In common with many evaluations on UK research and innovation investments, we heard how UK-specific funding issues such as spending review uncertainties have impacted planning and staff retention. These impacts are real, though we recognise that they are largely beyond the control of the UK Space Agency to address. The same is true for broader geopolitical factors – such as the ongoing war in Ukraine and the global semiconductor supply shortage – which have had implications for broader mission delivery.

Rising costs within the UK Ariel consortium, have required tough conversations around spend and transferring responsibility of elements to ESA. This is true of the active cryocooler system (ACS), where there is a risk of losing UK design IP before the CDR. While previously change control processes within the PMB were considered broadly reactive, with late-stage budget adjustments, the UK Space Agency has now implemented a Change Control Plan. This mechanism appears to be easy for the UK project team to use, and is a good example of the UK Space Agency / the PMB being solution-oriented and proactive in finding processes to support smoother delivery of the programme.

Mission delivery recommendations:

Sustain established improvements within the delivery process. The UK Space Agency should build on the improvements already made in relation to its Change Control Plan and milestone delivery. These refinements should be institutionalised and applied to future mission phases to prevent any reoccurrences. Risks to activities not on the critical pathway should still be monitored closely for budget / schedule slip. [know.space recommendation].
Establish regular technical check-ins and contingency planning. Implement regular technical check-ins to assess delivery risks and ensure contingency plans are in place around known pressure points. These check-ins should also monitor and address risks such as single points of failure. [Stakeholder recommendation].
Ensure early alignment of ambition and resources. The UK Space Agency should regularly review balance between the ambition of investment objectives from funding and available resources, to ensure the scientific and technical ambitions can be delivered within the available resourcing. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].
Support efforts to enhance internal communication at RAL. RAL is a large organisation, with different reporting branches (e.g. Space and Technology). In some cases, lack of robust communication has led to cost increases not being discovered rapidly enough / disagreements on costing elements. Closer internal communication, supported by the UK Space Agency where necessary, could be beneficial. [know.space recommendation].
Consider providing more dedicated funding towards outreach activities. Activities such as the ADC and ExoClock have proven beneficial and successful in upskilling and engagement activities. However, they are not directly tied to UK Ariel investment, and risk future de-scoping (resource constraints) or being shifted into other countries. If the UK Space Agency wishes to maintain strong UK leadership, and realise future benefits in-country, it could consider providing more dedicated funding towards outreach. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].

Schedule

The main driver for overall success in this mission will remain the successful deployment of the Ariel mission. While care should be taken to separate the UK’s national investments – the focus of this evaluation – from broader mission delivery challenges that are not related to this funding, they are inevitably interlinked due to UK’s leadership role on the mission.

Whilst much of the mission has progressed steadily, one of the most significant obstacles has been the delays related to the Telescope Assembly, which one stakeholder described as a “sore thumb which sticks out”, and causing significant bottlenecks for overall mission delivery. These delays have pushed back the structural and engineering model timelines, threatening key testing schedules. For example, such delays forced the adoption, in late 2024, of a revised schedule approach involving refurbishing an Engineering Model to flight standards to mitigate schedule impacts.

It is important to note that the Telescope Assembly is being led by Leonardo and ASI, and the control of these actors (and overseas contractors in general) is beyond the power of the UK Space Agency. However, it demonstrates the structural challenge in RAL’s ability oversee the consortium in a more managerial rather than coordinator position, as well as impacting their role as payload integrator.

In terms of timeline impact, estimates vary, with some stakeholders suggesting that even if recovery measures are successful, the launch date will slip. We heard, for example, that Ariel had previously managed to recover lost time but had again slipped back by at least 5 of the 8 months. One consultee explained how “for a long time, it has been that every month of the project leads to a 1-month delay,” illustrating the relentless knock-on effect of the telescope issues on the rest of the programme.

“The payload will be later. There’s likely to be a launch delay of between a few months and a year – between 9 and 12 months.”

These delays are also having an impact on testing and integration timelines. Assembly and integration work at RAL has been delayed whilst waiting for the telescope assembly, compressing the test schedule and leaving less buffer to absorb downstream risks. The structural and engineering models for the telescope are also behind schedule, stalling key activities such as system-level qualification and environmental testing. RAL Space noted that although much of the rest of the payload is progressing, the telescope delays make it difficult to maintain momentum along the critical pathway. There is, therefore, a risk that a compressed schedule could lead to rushed testing or deferred issues that impact long-term performance or reliability. While this is not a result of UK Space Agency national funding, it does inevitably have an influence on its future impact.

“This has placed pressures on test readiness. Schedule slips mean less time to absorb any problems we identify during integration.”

Furthermore, launch delays carry a broader risk beyond lags in the realisation of benefits: they could also materially reduce the overall benefits themselves. Scientific returns, reputational gains and broader opportunities are often time-sensitive, particularly in a competitive international environment where overlapping science missions and technological advancements can shift the value of any contribution or finding. Extended delays could risk Ariel losing its competitive edge, in turn diminishing the UK’s ability to maintain its scientific leadership and secure future mission opportunities. For example, scientific leadership may be reduced if other exoplanet-focused missions are launched before Ariel and ‘capture the headlines’, or Ariel being operational may come too late for the UK project team to leverage their proven knowledge and heritage on the mission for securing roles on other sizeable international missions.

Several stakeholders emphasised that whilst Leonardo are the primary cause of the delays, the UK is inextricably linked to some of the reputational and financial consequences due to its leadership role, especially regarding consortium management and outcomes that impact successful delivery of activities carried out by UK consortium member. It was suggested that repeated changes to the timeline, and the associated costs may force difficult choices elsewhere in the UK space science programme, as Ariel’s cost and complexity escalate beyond original estimates.

It was highlighted that it took ‘too long’ for the scope and seriousness of the Italian challenges to be fully recognised by all stakeholders, exacerbated by Leonardo joining the programme late in the design process. Therefore, more robust risk assessment activities enacted from the start of the mission could have been beneficial.

The outcomes of the Sarri review, with ESA willing to support more FTE at RAL so that they can play a stronger ‘prime’ role and thereby work more closely with Leonardo, will hopefully halt schedule slippage further. However, there is still uncertainty around the effectiveness of these proposed solutions. A ‘lesson learned’ by the UK Ariel team through these delay challenges is that more frequent progress reviews, to ensure solutions are impactful, will help alleviate these concerns. Additionally, that alternative options should be set out, in case issues continue to arise.

These delays have sparked broader reflection on how the mission was structured, particularly in terms of partner readiness and early industrial engagement. The UK Space Agency highlighted how it is the responsibility of the consortium in the formative phases of the mission to ensure the members have the correct capabilities to deliver. A robust ‘capabilities assessment’ earlier in the programme may have reduced some of these concerns, identifying weaknesses in contributors before responsibilities were formalised. For future missions where the UK is seeking to play a similar leadership role, the UK Space Agency should consider requiring more in-depth capabilities assessments for proposed consortiums.

Funding

One of the recurring concerns raised by stakeholders is the unpredictability generated by the UK government’s spending review cycles, which has been especially significant for the Ariel team in the lead up to March 2025. The so-called “cliff edge” effect - where decisions are subject to changes based on broader government priorities - creates significant risks for project continuity and delivery. Missions like Ariel operate on long timescales, requiring stable financial backing over multiple years. The current approach forces research teams to operate under considerable uncertainty, making it difficult to plan with confidence.

“The project team is dealing with considerable uncertainty related to the spending review cliff edge – it could become an issue for delivery, and for the retention of staff.”

This uncertainty has a direct impact on staff retention, where consultees described how they had to scramble for ways to maintain certain people within their teams. Researchers and engineers, understandably, seek job security to remain engaged with a project, yet the uncertainty of funding means that there is a risk that some could seek opportunities elsewhere, potentially leading to a loss of expertise. If the UK aims to maintain its broader leadership in exoplanet research and space science, some stakeholders recommended that (while recognising the limitations that the UK Space Agency face) the UK should seek to implement a more consistent and predictable funding strategy for long-term missions. Upskilling the new generation is key for maintaining institutional knowledge around exoplanets, but this will be put at risk if early career staff cannot find roles, do not want to risk the employment uncertainties, or seek better paid / reliable positions within the private sector.

“The bottlenecks are not ideas, but funding.”

We heard that the original business case, and subsequent funding approvals, were premised on the fact that Ariel “was at the top end of what they [the UK Space Agency] were willing to fund” and that cost increases risk having knock-on effects to the broader UK Space Agency space science programme. This is not unique to the UK Space Agency, and it was reported that most other countries are at the limit of “what they would like to fund into Ariel”, creating possible tensions going forward, particularly if costs continue to escalate.

Though beyond the direct control of the UK Space Agency, there are potential mitigation options. While fiscal realities will inevitably constrain the art of the possible, we heard suggestions and requests for further multi-year funding commitments from UKRI and the UK Space Agency, establishing contingency reserves to bridge funding gaps, and encouraging industry partnerships to supplement public investment where appropriate. As of March 2025, a number of stakeholders highlighted that there is a 6-month bridging period in place, to ensure continued funding in advance of the next spending review. Though broadly welcomed, this is generally seen as a short-term solution that fails to address the broader impacts of funding challenges and raises question about the additional administrative burden and continued uncertainty that accompanies such approaches. Solutions may be outside the control of the UK Space Agency, but the issues these pose were highlighted as real.

It was also highlighted that the budget was set before the recent inflationary challenges experienced globally, with several stakeholders observing that it is challenging for the mission to contain these cost increases “even within schedule margins.” There were concerns in the initial phases of the mission that both the overall level of funding for the mission, as well as the level of budget contingency built into the costs, were too low.

“Starting at this low base has meant that when we look at cost reduction in order to meet budgets, there are no work packages to jettison.”

Furthermore, there have been challenges with rising costs within the UK consortium, which could have key ramifications on UK investment. For example, as flagged in the October 2024 SPRP, the ACS forecast a £3m increase due to schedule delay, travel and shipping costs, longer test durations, and facility usage costs. These were driven by an ‘aggressive original schedule’ combined with an ‘underestimated complexity’ in the design. This has, in turn, led to decisions being made regarding ESA taking over responsibility of the development of the ACS, since these costs had risen above the UK Space Agency’s ability to fund.

“Every time ESA has to step in and help with funding, the country [the UK] takes a hit reputationally.”

Ongoing reporting had not captured the impacts of the ACS delays effectively, because it only monitored milestones in-year rather than longer-term, which is where most of the ACS milestones fall. There was an element of communication failure between the branches of RAL (Space and Technology) additionally, which could have otherwise helped catch the rising costs earlier. This demonstrated the need for more robust mitigation measures, as well as stronger internal communication measures within RAL’s structure. Furthermore, shifting the funding to fall within ESA’s remit risked some level of impact and return on investment, with RAL highlighting that when to transfer the responsibility was key. To maintain UK design intellectual property (IP) across the ACS system, it will need to be transferred to ESA leadership no earlier than post Critical Design Review stage. The benefit of retaining the IP is that it will lay the groundwork for future benefits for RAL Space / a UK organisation, helping it maintain leadership in the realm of cryocooler against other European competitors.

Beyond key hardware elements, several stakeholders – particularly those involved in the ExoClock and ADC initiatives – noted that there is little-to-no support provided under the UK Ariel investment for wider outreach activities. While small funding pools exist to support these efforts, driven primarily through other UK Space Agency and STFC small grants, their scale is often insufficient to maximise impact.

“Without going crazy, prize money could be increased: this would be helpful in increasing returns and engagement, but we can’t do this within the current UK Space Agency and STFC funding settlements or rules.”

“This is a very good investment for little money to reach a lot of people.”

In response to these funding challenges, stakeholders have responded by establishing not-for-profit organisations to access alternative funding steams, though doing so in itself also comes with considerable administrative challenges and overheads. Of particular note, one of these not-for-profits will be established outside of the UK. As a result of restrictive funding mechanisms, there is now a distinct possibility that future impacts will be realised beyond UK borders. Since these are a strong success story for wider Ariel initiatives, with UK organisations strongly at the helm, stakeholders suggested how the UK Space Agency could consider providing more dedicated funding towards outreach activities. This would allow impacts to both be maintained within the country, and also to grow, with consultees noting that there are large ambitions for these projects, but are impacted by resource constraints.

Change control plan

Recognising that earlier risk-sharing and gateway monitoring would have been appropriate, and to manage pressures around budget and scheduling, the UK Space Agency set out the Ariel Change Control Plan.

This control plan set out the formal processes through which significant changes to UK Space Agency-funded national contributions to Ariel are ‘raised, assessed, approved or rejected’ through the PMB. The aim is not to supersede or duplicate pre-existing mechanisms at consortium, ESA, and funding agency level, but rather to enhance the processes by ensuring the UK Space Agency PMB has input into any decision that can impact UK Space Agency-funded activity prior to formal acceptance.

These change categories cover:

Scope: Material change in scope to UK delivery activities, i.e. addition or removal of work packages, including changes resulting in diversion of effort from established work packages/increased cost
Schedule: Formal revisions to the payload module master schedule (including deployment of schedule margin)
Cost: Changes impacting on Whole Life Cost estimates and/or use of UK Space Agency-held contingency
Expenditure: Nearer term changes to spend rates that could affect in year affordability, i.e. under/overspend, and working allowance spend above project threshold
Investment objectives / benefits: Changes that could affect achievement of business case objectives and/or realisation of their underlying benefits

The change control plan also set out the thresholds to determine how the approval process is enacted, providing minor, moderate and major ranges across the change categories above, and who would be the decision-making entity.

In the 15th PMB meeting (March 2025), RAL presented a test run of the Ariel Change Control Request Form, submitting a change control request for the value of £627,000 for financial year 2024/25. This change was driven by a number of factors, including staff effort miscalculations, cleanroom rental, unplanned work and minor hardware and procurement issues. Whilst the changes do not directly impact on the scope or staff profile of the mission, it does increase the whole life cost. It is expected that some of the overspend will be absorbed into the 2025/26 National Satellite Test Facility (NSTF) testing budget, though a further control note is expected, which may raise the budget needs for that year beyond current allocations. One of the costs, pertaining to ‘Cleanroom rental for Suite A’, may be negotiated down after discussion internally at RAL Space. However, this was also flagged as an example where improved internal communication between different elements within RAL could be beneficial.

Of note, the March 2025 request specifically states that if the change were not to be approved, that “some activities would have to stop”, which would directly jeopardise project delivery and the achievement of business case objectives and benefits. This suggests a significant tightness within the mission budget, with little remaining contingency for further cost change.

Overall, the Change Control Plan mechanism appears to be easy for the UK project team to adhere to, and is a good example of the UK Space Agency / the PMB being proactive in finding processes to support smoother delivery of the programme.

Preparatory science activities

A challenge in large scientific collaborations is maintaining engagement whilst also preventing counterproductive competition. Within the consortium, this was observed to require careful management, with innovative thought-leadership from Ariel PI, Prof. Tinetti.

“The working groups were moving slowly with no pressure, which was a risk; we wanted to take the opportunity to train and lead new scientists while keeping momentum.”

To mitigate this risk, working groups have – during the lifetime of the mission - undergone restructuring. The broad approach that was adopted was to encourage alignment and ensure all teams remain engaged, through establishing hybrid ‘science interest group structure’. These have been designed to foster collaboration by permitting code and model sharing across groups and encouraging autonomy in forming collaborations within, and beyond, the consortium.

Ariel PI Prof. Tinetti is continuing work to develop and enhance collaboration opportunities. In doing so it is hoped that this new approach will minimise overlap and empower a larger research community to scrutinise results and invariably improve research outcomes and impact.

“NASA are already looking at new ways to do things – they really appreciated the open science and outreach activities.”

The preparatory science activities have been identified as a particular strength, with one stakeholder suggesting that preparations are proceeding “incredibly well” and could yield greater impact than larger NASA missions. Whilst not all of this is directly related to UK Space Agency investment, the leadership of PI role of Prof. Tinett combined with the process of restructuring of the working groups into special interest groups, will hopefully lead to long-term impacts for research, including for those in the UK.

Wider geopolitical context

Ariel is inherently an international mission, bringing together expertise from a number of partner nations and organisations, and hence faces wide geopolitical challenges. While many of these do not have direct links to UK investment specifically into the mission, it is important to understand the context within which the UK consortium members (and the mission overall) must operate, as these may impact progress for the team.

The mission has increasingly faced challenges to its broader supply chain due to events beyond its control, particularly in the wake of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, inflationary challenges, and broader material shortages. Stakeholders noted challenges in the supply of raw aluminium and titanium as a result of the conflict in Ukraine, whilst a global shortage of semiconductors and their components has also contributed to delays in component development and manufacturing.

“The shortage of materials due to the Russia-Ukraine war was cited as a key reason for delays in Italy. It’s now starting to seem that this was a convenient event for the Italians.”

The UK’s departure from the European Union has also introduced complexities in the progression of the mission, with certain administrative challenges to consider, such as work visas or impacts to overall costs. However, stakeholders stressed that while these were inconvenient, they were able to navigate them successfully and maintain overall progress.

As discussed, the timeline for activities, including for UK consortium members, has been impacted by delays from an Italian contractor. One stakeholder suggested that post-COVID economic pressures in Italy have strained Leonardo’s ability to meet its contractual obligations, whilst another felt Leonardo was overstretched due to taking on more projects than they had capacity for. Since the contract with Leonardo is directly with ASI, this means that certain contractual mechanisms are beholden to relationships between Italian actors, despite affecting wider mission activities and RAL’s responsibility to lead the consortium.

There is also a slight concern that financial uncertainty with respect to future UK Space Agency funding for the Ariel mission could lead to European partners stepping in to take over parts of the project, with one stakeholder suggesting that the “Max Planck Institute could get together and buy the UK out of this [Ariel],” potentially displacing UK leadership.

“If the UK withdrew [from Ariel], it would probably end the mission. The perception of the UK as a trusted partner would be negatively affected, impacting future opportunities.”

Despite these pressures, there remains a view within the academic community that participation in Ariel as supported by the UK Space Agency national investment has enhanced the UK’s standing within the international community, building trust with partners like NASA and ESA.

Question 12

Administration and resourcing

Accepted Answer

The administration and resourcing of the Ariel mission reflects a complex landscape that bridges both national and pan-consortium requirements. Like many other elements of this evaluation, the two cannot be entirely separated, and are inevitably interconnected. Nevertheless, the mission continues to benefit from strong institutional expertise, and the UK’s broader reputation within the space sector, supported by UK Space Agency funding. Positive examples of institutional resilience have emerged, including well-managed staff transitions that have enabled the retention of expertise and the continued upskilling of early career-researchers. UK team members have innovative concepts that they wish to explore further, some of which may result in future benefits realisation around commercialisation. Monitoring and Evaluation activities were valued for tracking progress and helping form a narrative to convey impacts to the UK Space Agency and other senior stakeholders.

However, a key area of concern is resourcing constraints, where team members oftentimes find themselves too limited in time and budget to explore wider opportunities. Overheads, such as reporting mechanisms, can place disproportionate administrative burdens on the UK Ariel team, who have highlighted that these were not always factored into the budget. There are also risks pertaining to institutional knowledge retention; since Ariel is a long-term mission, the likelihood of staff turnover (through retirement, new roles) can be high, and hence upskilling should continue to be a focus for the UK Ariel consortium team, supported by the UK Space Agency.

Administration & resourcing recommendations:

Consider providing additional / dedicated administrative support. The UK Space Agency should, where possible, allocate additional resources to support reporting requirements and broader administrative requirements experienced by stakeholders. Where possible, the UK Space Agency should continue to identify areas for further streamlining of administrative processes. [Stakeholder recommendation].
Consider providing additional resource (time) towards pursuing wider impacts. The project team is understandably focusing resourcing on direct project activity. Many have innovative opportunities they wish to develop, such as commercialisation and broader knowledge spillovers. From other evaluations, we have identified how spillovers can be a sizeable proportion of total benefits. Dedicated resource support to pursue these could build a stronger long-term impact narrative for Ariel in the future. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].
Manage institutional knowledge continuity. The UK Ariel project team, with UK Space Agency support, should establish strategies for retaining and transferring institutional and technical knowledge throughout the lifecycle of Ariel. Upskilling early-career researchers can ensure the loss of any one profile (e.g. through retirement, new jobs) does not overly impact mission progress. [know.space recommendation].
Reassess the role and suitability of Researchfish. The UK Space Agency should evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of Researchfish in capturing impact data. If the system continues to impose burdens without delivering commensurate value, alternative methods to capture impacts should be explored. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].
Streamline small grant reporting requirements in Researchfish. The UK Space Agency should review the inefficiencies caused by the number of follow-on/bridging funding grants required for the same programme (such as Ariel) into Researchfish. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].
Streamline and maintain consistency around reporting. The UK Space Agency should streamline reporting mechanisms with ESA’s where feasible, or where this is not possible, should maintain consistency in format / focus of its reporting, to alleviate administrative burden on the project team. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].
Continue monitoring and evaluation efforts. We recommend monitoring and evaluation efforts continue throughout the remainder of the Ariel mission. Stakeholders highlighted the value of M&E in identifying areas requiring support, showcasing impact, and informing broader decision-making. The process has enabled the UK Space Agency to track progress, and provided a rare formal opportunity for project teams to reflect on their contributions. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].

Staff resourcing

Staff within the consortium were considered by wider stakeholders to be motivated and talented individuals, with an entrepreneurial mindset in finding ways to produce best outcomes. The Ariel PI’s innovative thinking through her leadership on the preparatory science activities, and the drive within the consortium towards potential opportunities with artificial intelligence and machine learning were especially highlighted.

Overall, project team members were inspired by new ideas, and had concepts that they wished to explore further, some of which could have potential commercial benefits in the future if brought to fruition. Furthermore, UK Ariel organisations have been approached by other actors for opportunities on potential future missions, demonstrating wide recognition of their reputation.

However, one of the key challenges in the realising these opportunities was around the resourcing constraints that the team is feeling – intertwining funding and FTE associated with the mission. Understandably, not all of this is related to UK Space Agency investment, but there is a cascading impact across the team due to multiple pressures.

One stakeholder highlighted how cost-cutting measures had removed extra administrative support. This feeds into a wider barrier that we heard, around people being too busy on administrative activities and overheads, or too light on FTE, that they barely have enough time to focus on mission activities – and hence, were too resource-constrained to explore wider opportunities. In some cases, this has resulted in opportunities being turned down.

Furthermore, the burden of financial uncertainty has led to staff costs being underwritten by project teams themselves. Due to the fragmented and inconsistent nature of available grants, teams have had to cover salaries through unstable or self-sourced funding, creating additional uncertainty.

“We have had to underwrite staff costs due to the disjointed funding model. We will lose out to people who are able to obtain and leverage UKRI grants, which can last longer, for other projects.”

Stakeholder feedback also highlights the extent to which project teams are taking on unpaid or voluntary work to maintain mission-related activities. Tasks such as preparing newsletters, coordinating working groups, and reviewing literature are critical for the success of the mission or for capturing wider awareness in mission activities. And yet, they are often undertaken outside of with a reliance of people going ‘above and beyond’. This reliance on additional efforts of individual people is arguably unsustainable in the long run, reflecting an underlying issue that administrative and outreach activities are not adequately supported in the wider picture.

As stated, many of these are not tied to UK Space Agency funding, but provide rationale as to why there may be limitations in the impact narrative throughout the mission. If feasible, considering the inclusion of funding for administrative burdens / overheads and communication activities could ensure wider non-research activities could be adequately explored, leading to wider benefits realisation in the longer term. We heard how greater collaboration and alignment between funding bodies, including between the UK Space Agency and UKRI (STFC), could help provide a more stable financial conditions for research teams.

Institutional expertise and reputation

There is recognition amongst wider stakeholder groups that the UK organisations being supported by the UK Space Agency to deliver on the Ariel mission are providing strong institutional expertise and reputation to the consortium, with certain high-profile team members helping draw in wider interest through keynote speeches, publications and wider outreach activities.

However, one recurring concern from interviewees was the risk of single points of failure within the team, and risk of institutional knowledge loss, which can be particularly relevant for missions spanning many years.

For example, one stakeholder raised a risk around the small team at RAL – describing how they work over capacity to deliver the complex integrator role, but that if one or two core people from the institution were suddenly unavailable, it would have significant implications for project delivery. To a certain degree, this specific risk has been alleviated thanks to the Sarri review recommendations, where pressure on leadership at RAL should be lessened with more FTE support.

“The team at RAL seem to be working at 120% for years…that’s just not sustainable over a long time.”

“If they … fall over from being burnt-out, then there’s a significant knock-on impact to the project.”

For missions that run for over a decade, from selection through to launch and operation, staff turnover at relevant institutions can be expected. Where uncertainties arise is when people in key leadership roles choose to retire or transfer to other organisations, thereby risking a drain of institutional know-how and a loss of high-profile figureheads for the mission. According to one stakeholder, this is particularly true for academia, which is more likely to rely on individual expertise, rather than companies, which seek to maintain organisational knowledge regardless of staff.

“The strength of the person ultimately defines the performance of the institution – the institution could almost become worthless if the people are not up to [the task].”

“It is a single point of failure risk – if anybody leaves, this has large impacts.”

Staff retirement can be mitigated with enough warning, and indeed this has already been demonstrated within the UK Ariel consortium team. Prof. Matt Griffin has since retired from his role as the Head of the Astronomy Instrumentation Group at Cardiff University, acting instead as an Emeritus Professor and member of the group instead. However, he remains Co-PI on the mission, with the plan to remain for at least two more years, allowing for his expertise to be further leveraged and for other staff members at Cardiff to continue being upskilled.

A new role does not inherently mean negative outcomes. In fact, it could potentially bring benefits to both the consortium and the wider UK research base by providing promotions and expanding institutional knowledge. Ariel PI, Prof. Tinetti’s new role at King’s College London is one such example, where her promotion to Vice Dean (Research) for the Faculty of Natural, Mathematical & Engineering Sciences brings more full-time equivalent time for her role on Ariel, as well as helping deepen the knowledge of astrophysics at King’s College. However, if she had chosen a new role at an institution outside of the UK, the impact narrative would have been very different, as she is a key profile for the UK consortium.

Staff retiring or leaving for new organisations – especially roles external to the UK – can indeed cause a loss to UK investment, or an impact on UK influence and reputation within its relevant field. Examples highlighted to date within the UK Ariel team have either been mitigated or brought forth positive outcomes. Nevertheless, as Ariel is still several years away from launch and operation, these risks could still occur. Therefore, the UK Space Agency and partner organisations should consider establishing a long-term strategy to transfer institutional and technical knowledge, by upskilling the younger generations throughout the lifecycle of the Ariel mission.

Regular reporting to the UK Space Agency and ESA

Stakeholders recognised the rationale and necessity behind reporting requirements, with a general acceptance that oversight and transparency are necessary. However, there were broader frustrations at the amount of administrative burdens more in-depth tasking brought, such as the exercise of working through the attribution of cost and preparing for the SPRP, as well as the fact that not all of these activities had been factored into initial overhead costs for the team.

“[The] exercise…with attribution of cost was difficult, but I understood the purpose and understood why.”

“It is all far too much, but it’s not unreasonable.”

Throughout our evaluation period, a number of stakeholders highlighted the misalignment of reporting requirements between the UK Space Agency and ESA, which imposed an ongoing administrative burden. This was in reference to what information needed to be reported, how the information was presented, and the timing at which the reporting was expected. This created what some stakeholders felt was a constant demand for administrative obligations.

It was suggested that harmonising these processes, or finding ways to streamline reporting, could significantly improve efficiency across the mission. Nonetheless, since ESA is a large, process-driven organisation with strict reporting rules, often that meant the project team was hoping that the UK Space Agency would shift their administrative approach instead. Whilst members of the PMB acknowledged the high amount of reporting demanded of the consortium for ESA, this led to a concern, we heard, that UK participants sometimes perceived the UK reporting as an “additional tax” rather than a priority, despite the fact that the UK Space Agency is the funding body for their roles.

“Reporting requirements are out of sync with ESA; it creates a constant administrative burden.”

“The only thing paying for them is the UK Space Agency – the only cost impact is to the UK.”

This highlights the need to impress upon the UK consortium members that UK Space Agency reporting is as important, if not more so, than ESA demands.

Towards the end of this evaluation period, project team members focused on the fact that they have, for the most part, gotten used to the reporting systems and what is being asked of them. The key concerns were around keeping consistency at this stage and not changing the process again once a routine has been established, with interviewees explaining how the time taken to learn new reporting elements was part of the administrative burden.

“Don’t let them change the system again – that is where the overhead is.”

“[We are] spending so much time fixing processes – [the] cognitive load is too high.”

“It takes a lot of brainpower and time to put [something new] in place and get used to it.”

Therefore, the UK Space Agency should seek to streamline reporting further, or where this is not possible, it should aim to maintain consistency now in the format and focus of its reporting, to help ensure the project team settles into a regular cadence rather than constantly having to adapt. Of note, the UK Space Agency conducted a project delivery workshop at RAL in early 2023 involving all space science projects, where the Ariel delivery team were asked to identify any process changes they would like to see implemented. It was noted that no significant changes were highlighted, and that feedback suggested current approaches and reporting requirements were ‘helpful’. the UK Space Agency also host annual ‘Stop-Start-Continue’ reviews where they seek feedback from stakeholders and delivery teams to identify further changes and opportunities for improvements in processes, demonstrating that the Agency is proactively seeking to implement lessons learned where possible.

An additional concern raised around reporting was on the topic of the Researchfish reporting. Whilst consultees generally understood the benefits of using the platform, and the importance of having a consistent approach to capturing some of the grant impacts, they highlighted that for those with a high number of small follow-on / bridging grants for the same programme, this meant needing to attribute impacts against each of these small grants. This both watered-down the impact narrative and also put an unnecessary burden on the grant recipient. They explained how inputting so many details across so many grants took too much time, and hence the depth at which they could provide information was limited; if there were fewer ‘small grants’ to input, then the impact narrative could be more robustly set out.

This concern was raised at the 14th Ariel Project Management Board meeting (June 2024), with the UK Space Agency agreeing to carry out a “full cleanse” ahead of the 2025 Researchfish submission window. However, it was flagged to us by stakeholders in March 2025 (the closing of the submission window) that this had not been done. Hence, the UK Space Agency should consider again working with Researchfish to streamline some of the reporting requirements. Furthermore, the UK Space Agency could explore the overall effectiveness and efficiency of Researchfish in capturing impact data and reflect on whether alternative methods to capture impacts should be explored if it does not deliver commensurate value.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

M&E activities have played a central role in providing the UK Space Agency with an ongoing, structured understanding of benefits realisation across the mission. By tracking progress against defined targets, the process has enabled the UK Space Agency to proactively identify areas that may require additional support, as well as areas where processes and approaches are working well.

Stakeholders reported that they found engaging with the M&E team valuable, not only as a means of highlighting success stories and demonstrating broader impact, but also as a mechanism for feeding insights back to the UK Space Agency. It was noted that for some, the M&E process represented one of the few formal opportunities they had to reflect on their contributions to the mission.

“We need to put the whole story together.”

“Sometimes [the project team] need[s] help presenting narratives and the whole picture to DSIT.”

More broadly, and in contexts where the impact of research is inherently difficult to quantify – such as ‘science of the sake of science’ – direct conversations with research teams proved essential for capturing intangible benefits. These discussions ultimately provided a clearer and more nuanced view of the mission’s progress, and of its broader impact. This aims to be particularly useful in developing evidence-based approaches to communicating the impacts of Ariel to senior stakeholder groups and business case submissions, in an easily digestible format.

Overall, Ariel has been at the forefront of implementing monitoring and evaluation so early on within its lifecycle, being the first mission of its kind within the UK Space Agency to begin capturing impacts right from its initial phases. For our evaluation, we have been able to collect data in a consistent and timely manner across the last two years, which helps to identify timeseries trends and measure progress against the targets. This avoids the pitfalls associated with ex post evaluations, where missing data often lessens the impact narrative, which is an issue we as evaluators have witnessed on other missions (e.g. within our Gaia Interim Impact Evaluation). Therefore, we recommend that the UK Space Agency continues M&E efforts throughout the Ariel lifecycle, to collate an in-depth narrative across all impact themes regarding the value Ariel brings for the UK’s investment.

Question 13

Performance against process evaluation questions

Accepted Answer

Below, we provide a high-level overview of the performance of the mission’s processes against the evaluation questions set out in the original M&E framework report. Further information on the Red-Amber-Green (RAG) assessment process can be found in the Annex.

Table 1 RAG Rating on current progress in process evaluation questions

Evaluation Question	RAG rating	Performance
Are UK-funded Ariel activities being delivered as expected?	Amber	UK-funded activities are broadly on track, particularly in preparatory science activities. However, delivery has been impacted by significant delays in manufacturing, particularly around the telescope assembly (Italian contractor). RAL have consistently done good work, but their constrained resourcing means that they are now requiring additional support to deal with the aforementioned delays / broader consortium management. While core milestones have been met, rising costs (e.g. on the ACS) have prompted discussions around viability of who takes responsibility of ownership, since it is beyond the ability of the UK Space Agency to continue funding. For the ACS, this is now likely to be ESA. Multiple re-design efforts at Oxford have caused concerns within some PMB members. The UK Space Agency is perceived as being both responsive and approachable, whilst the ‘solution-oriented’ mindset of the PMB is welcomed by the project team.
How has the wider international context influenced delivery?	Amber	External geopolitical and economic developments have created persistent delivery challenges. The Ukraine conflict has disrupted access to key materials like aluminium and titanium, while EU Exit has introduced administrative complexities around supply chains. Inflation and post-pandemic economic pressures have impacted also contractor performance, most notably at Leonardo. Delays from actors such as Leonardo have a cascading impact across the consortium. There is a reflection that perhaps a ‘capabilities assessment’ should have been more robustly carried out by the consortium in the early stages, to ensure all actors could deliver as expected. These factors, though largely beyond the UK Space Agency’s control, have had significant impacts on timelines and overall costs, highlighting the importance of international risk planning in future mission design. More broadly however, there is understanding that the key elements driving delays (and associated fallout) do not stem from UK leadership, and hence there is no perceived risk to reputation as yet.
What delivery factors have helped or hindered progress against outputs and objectives?	Amber	Several factors have shaped progress: strong collaboration between the UK Space Agency, RAL Space, and ESA, as well as proactive scientific coordination and leadership, have helped maintain momentum. Individuals and organisations within the UK Ariel consortium are recognised for their expertise, reputation and leadership. A strong positive and collaborative mindset at all levels has allowed for difficult conversations to occur without being ‘personal’, in order to come to appropriate solutions. Beyond external factors (such as the telescope assembly), stakeholders highlighted how risks regarding low funding levels and resource constraints at RAL were already known during initial phases of the mission, and should have had stronger mitigation measures / ‘plan B’s put in place. Administrative burdens around reporting, the lack of overheads costed out, and people having too little time to explore wider spillover activities underscores the resource-constrained environment within which the team work. An underestimation of system engineering challenges and a lack of risk reporting beyond the in-year elements meant that rising costs on the ACS were not communicated efficiently. In more recent times, the uncertainty regarding the spending review has led to concerns around staff retention.
What project-wide working practices and interfaces have worked well, and / or could be improved upon in the future?	Green	Governance mechanisms such as the PMB and a positive and continually developing collaborative culture within the consortium have been highlighted as particular strengths. Effective communication between the UK Space Agency and ESA, and between technical teams, have improved over time. The Change Control Plan set up by the UK Space Agency has been tested at the most recent PMB, with positive feedback. This process should ensure impactful decisions are not being made without UK Space Agency / PMB input. It is understood that the UK Space Agency is not a technical body; however, some stakeholders highlighted that it could be useful to have the UK Space Agency’s ‘voice’ in the room more in discussions with ESA / ASI. Or indeed, that the PMB could be supported to provide technical expertise in this area. Also, whilst the PMB is effective, having properly in-depth conversations take time, and resolutions cannot always be formed in the time given for the quarterly PMB meetings. Streamlining interfaces and institutionalising lessons from current practices will improve delivery agility and cross-organisational alignment.
Are any delivery changes needed, and how would / could they be implemented?	Green	Much of the delivery mechanisms and working practices within the UK Ariel project team are working well. Areas where things could improve include having ‘interim’ (and lighter touch) meetings between the quarterly PMB meetings, to ensure there is enough time to come to a resolution and identify solutions to identified challenges. Furthermore, in leveraging lessons learned from previous challenges, the team could consider setting out more actionable mitigation measures for any risk that threatens the critical pathway, thereby having an agreed approach to trigger immediately if one of these risks came to pass. The UK Space Agency could support RAL in enhancing the internal communication within its organisation, to ensure there are no more rising costs which could be identified and negotiated at an early timeframe. Administrative burdens, especially around reporting elements, was a key area of concern. Simpler solutions include ensuring alignment of reporting between the UK Space Agency and ESA wherever possible, and limiting changes to the reporting format so that people do not need to learn new ways of implementing things. More complex solutions to implement would be around resource support, which of course comes with a cost that may not be addressable by the UK Space Agency. Indeed, many of the constraints on the delivery team were focused around ‘time’ and ‘money’, including on administrative elements but also for wider spillover activities. These may be challenging for the UK Space Agency to address, or indeed be outside of its remit.

Question 14

Management and oversight

Accepted Answer

The overall working relationship within the Ariel consortium is considered strong by most stakeholders, particularly with respect to interactions between the UK Space Agency, the wider Ariel consortium, and ESA. The UK Space Agency is widely regarded as approachable, responsive, and communicative and keen to foster strong working relationships, while the Project Management Board (PMB) is praised for its technical expertise and solution-orientated approach. Some stakeholders suggested the PMB could utilise their technical know-how further, for discussions with ESA and ASI, but with the recognition that this would require further resourcing.

As payload integrators, RAL Space is acknowledged as being highly competent and dedicated, though stretched thin in terms of resource and lacking the necessary contractual levers to influence and direct key partners despite bearing significant mission coordination responsibilities. The Sarri review^{[footnote 7]} in particular highlighted the need to formalise RAL’s leadership role in technical areas, and additional resourcing requirements.

Across all stakeholder groups there is a recurring view that greater realism in early planning, improved delegation of authority and control, and improved communications are key to progressing the mission towards a successful launch.

Management and oversight recommendations:

Conduct early capability and risk assessments. Where feasible, the UK Space Agency should introduce more rigorous capability and risk assessment procedures at the start of missions, to identify potential technical, institutional, and resource limitations that may lead to future cost overruns or delays. Strong mitigation measures should be set out in the risk register, agreed by all key stakeholders, and consistently monitored and updated. [Stakeholder recommendation].
Consider frequency of Project Management Board (PMB) meetings. Whilst regular PMB meetings are productive, frequent quarterly changes in schedule/budget/design for a long-running mission pose challenges. The UK Space Agency could consider implementing shorter, more dynamic PMB meetings between full-board sessions to resolve specific issues and respond to emerging risks more efficiently. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].
Consider further utilising the technical expertise of the PMB for ESA / ASI engagement. There is recognition that the UK Space Agency is not a technical delivery body, but this can also limit its wider engagement when seeking resolution to key mission challenges. The UK Space Agency could harness existing technical expertise of the PMB to engage with ESA and ASI with delegated authority. This may require moving PMB members towards a non-executive position where they are funded at a low level to increase programme management resource. [Stakeholder recommendation].
Implement Sarri Review recommendations. This includes enhancing resourcing support for RAL to enforce its role as a lead technical authority and behave more like a prime contractor in its relationship with Leonardo. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].
Ensure Sarri recommendation implementation is effective. While RAL should demonstrate willingness to ESA to implement recommendations, a 6-month progress review (with supporting evidence) should be held. At this point, either positive progress on the telescope assembly / relationship with Leonardo can be evidenced, or RAL / UK Space Agency / ESA should consider alternate solutions. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].
Outline a ‘plan B’ for addressing issues explored in Sarri Review. To ensure further slippage of the scheduling does not occur, additional options should be identified and agreed upon, concurrent to implementing the Sarri Review recommendations. This means after 6 months, if these recommendations are not providing success, a ‘plan B’ can immediately be actioned. [know.space and stakeholder recommendation].

UK Space Agency

There was a consensus that the UK Space Agency was both approachable and responsive. Stakeholders generally expressed a positive relationship with the UK Space Agency, acknowledging the agency’s proactive approach to dealing with requests. Communication, and a desire to foster an open and cooperative working environment, were highlighted as particular strengths for the UK Space Agency Ariel team.

“Our relationship with the UK Space Agency has been absolutely fantastic”.

Over the two-year evaluation period, the project team consistently conveyed that it was easy to work alongside the UK Space Agency, and that while some frustrations arose regarding aspects such as funding uncertainty, they also recognise the broader constraints within which the Agency must operate.

Stakeholders also noted that the UK Space Agency has been actively engaging with ESA, as well as playing a role in finding solutions to help empower RAL Space with the necessary drivers to minimise schedule slippage and reduce overall delivery risks. Where challenges have arisen, the UK Space Agency has aimed to be proactive in finding solutions to best of their abilities – noting that Ariel is a broad and complex mission, with certain elements being outside of their remit.

One of the limitations for the UK Space Agency is the fact that it is not a technical delivery body – nor is that one of its objectives. Instead, the Agency aims to add value in oversight and management, seeking to be involved where there is significant risk exposure. Understanding the intricacy of Ariel, this means that the UK Space Agency has tried to be visible in ESA’s technical reviews, including the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and soon-to-be Critical Design Review (CDR), despite the Agency usually not having presence in these meetings on other missions. Nonetheless, this means that there will always be engineering and technical-leaning conversations where the UK Space Agency will not be directly involved, since they do not have the scope nor always the in-house expertise. Often, they leverage the knowledge within the Office of Chief Engineer at the UK Space Agency or utilise the external technical expertise of PMB members. However, when impactful technical challenges occur, such as with the telescope assembly^{[footnote 8]} – one of the missions three primary instruments - carried out by Leonardo, some stakeholders expressed the view that it would be helpful to have the UK Space Agency more embedded into the conversations with ESA and the Italian Space Agency (ASI). Barring that, and understanding that ESA and ASI are more technical entities than the UK Space Agency, there was a suggestion that PMB experts could support in these discussions (see below).

Another concern raised was whether the UK Space Agency was delegating appropriate authority to its programme managers to make decisions at an appropriate level. Certain procedural aspects within the UK Space Agency can, we heard, risk leading to a reduction in flexibility and an adherence to process, increasing the administrative burden of those managing the mission and limiting their ability to act decisively. This challenge is compounded by the size of the UK team being smaller than many of its counterparts in agencies running similar-sized missions.

For the time being, reputational risk for the UK or the UK Space Agency has not been a major concern for wider stakeholders, especially as delays on the mission are understood to stem first and foremost from some of the Italian activities. However, there is still uncertainty around the business case renewal and the Space Projects Review Panel (SPRP), leading to concerns around the outcomes if UK were to withdraw from the mission. While most stakeholders did not think this is likely to occur, the ‘worst case scenario’ was perceived to be impactful not only for UK leadership, but for the viability of the mission overall.

Project Management Board (PMB)

The PMB was welcomed by stakeholders as being a “solution-orientated” governance body. The role of the PMB in providing external technical support was highlighted as a particular strength, harnessing a range of expertise from across the UK space sector, as well as the fact that many members have first-hand experience of navigating ESA missions.

“… when it comes to key decision points, external technical expertise is vital.”

One of the ways in which this expertise could be leveraged further is in discussions within the wider Ariel ecosystem. As noted previously, the UK Space Agency is not a technical body, but PMB members outlined how this know-how does not need to be ‘in-house’ at the agency, but could instead be harnessed through the PMB itself, who could then engage with ESA or ASI for technical discussions, acting with some sort of delegated authority from the UK Space Agency.

However, a challenge with this approach would be with the limited resourcing provided to PMB members, who currently receive day rates for activities such as PMB meetings. Stakeholders expressed that they do not always have the time to monitor project cost growth and schedule slippage beyond scheduled meetings, especially due to the size of the consortium and how many elements of the mission are still evolving. If members also began providing technical oversight in ESA or ASI meetings, then a shift towards a non-executive position may be necessary, where they are funded at a low level to provide a certain number of days per year for programme management. This would require more resources in an already resource-constrained environment.

Despite broadly positive views of the PMB members and their ability to help find solutions, there was a concern that some of the processes set out within the PMB are seen as a formality, or as an extra layer of bureaucracy hindering the progression of the mission.

“There is a cultural concern that PMBs are seen as an inconvenience – the sense that they are something in the way, rather than a fundamental part [of the process].”

This was especially noticeable at the October 2024 SPRP, where the original quality of proposals was not robust enough for a formal decision-making process. We heard that clearer justification and more granular descriptions of cost increases were required, with the opinion that if the project team was requesting such significant cost increases, they should appreciate the need for more effort in conveying the details and rationale. Buy-in from the team around these PMB processes is important for future SPRP meetings, leading into the business case renewal.

RAL Space

There is, notwithstanding administrative and funding challenges, recognition that the Ariel mission has been well-managed. One stakeholder noted that Ariel has been the “best process they have experienced”, with good cooperation within the consortium. There is a consensus view that RAL Space are both competent and effective in their work - their work is seen as impressive, particularly given the resource constraints under which they are operating. Throughout the mission there has been a common acceptance that they are managing a very complex and large consortium (of over 16 countries, 600+ scientists and engineers, and international collaborations with NASA, JAXA and CSA).

“RAL are very competent. They know their business.”

“[RAL] have overcome every problem except for Italy.”

One of the main challenges associated with RAL Space is a criticism that too much was expected of too few at the organisation. Multiple stakeholders suggested at the start of the mission that the team was too lean, leading to overstretch and contributing to delays. A recurring tension arises from the fact that scheduling burdens often fall upon RAL Space despite it not having the authority, or appropriate delegations, to hold consortium members accountable. Stakeholders highlighted how RAL is a “couple of layers removed” from key decisions and suggested that earlier involvement from manufacturing authorities could have prevented some of the downstream problems. RAL was often praised for doing a good job “under difficult circumstances,” but there was consensus that they were set up to coordinate, not to drive, which does not allow them to resolve conflicts easily.

“RAL need to be able to influence Leonardo, and they are a couple of layers away. I’m not sure I could have expected anything more from RAL – with an injection of resources they can be more in control and in a better place to make decisions.”

“[The] burden is falling on a small number of people to deliver a complex programme.”

The relationship between RAL Space and ESA is seen as a particular strength, though a concern raised was that the UK Space Agency were not always kept well-informed regarding discussions between the two. It was noted that, on occasion, decisions were being made that could impact the programme, especially expenditure, without UK Space Agency involvement. This could be interpreted as demonstrating a need for improved communication and understanding between RAL Space and the UK Space Agency especially, to close the feedback loop and ensure nothing is committed to ESA before being discussed by the UK Space Agency and the PMB. One solution was to put a ‘change control’ process in place across the UK consortium partners.

More recently, constructive dialogue and working between the UK Space Agency and ESA resulted in the commissioning of an independent review by Giuseppe Sarri (a project manager from ESA’s JUICE mission). This review focused on the delivery of the Telescope Assembly by Leonardo as well as the organisation of the consortium, specifically seeking to evaluate the management and resourcing of the mission. Sarri made a series of recommendations, aiming to ‘enforce the role of RAL as lead technical authority’, and recognising that this would require a “change in mindset in RAL and [Leonardo]” to work together.

“Guisseppe [from ESA] was surprised by the number of staff [RAL Space] had to manage this – he thought we would need 10 more to be doing what we are doing.”

Amongst several other recommendations, the Sarri review set out the following areas of improvement to enforce RAL’s role:

Implement a larger team at RAL, covering all disciplines;
Work on the mindset of RAL to be a fast driver in taking decisions; and
Work on the mindset of Leonardo to accept RAL as a “kind of prime”.