Statutory guidance

Appointing mayoral commissioners and setting/reporting allowances

Published 16 April 2026

Applies to England

Introduction

The English Devolution White Paper established an ambition not only to widen and deepen devolution, but to upgrade the systems that sit around it – strengthening local leadership, accountability and capacity so devolved institutions can deliver effectively. The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act takes this forward by structuring devolved responsibilities within areas of competence, providing a clearer framework for what combined authorities and county combined authorities (C(C)A) do and how mayors lead delivery across key policy and service domains.

As C(C)As take on more functions and responsibilities, mayors are increasingly expected to provide visible leadership and deliver tangible outcomes for local people. They also have an important convening role – bringing together local government, businesses, and public service partners to align effort around shared priorities. In practice, this means managing complex programmes, representing their place across a growing range of forums, and sustaining delivery momentum.

That is why the Act provides mayors with the option to appoint and remunerate mayoral commissioners. Commissioners are intended to be a key part of a mayor’s toolbox, bringing additional capacity, specialist skills and experience, and helping the mayor to advance their policy agenda and deliver against priorities within a specific area of competence. This can include supporting delivery, strengthening engagement with partners, and exercising functions on the mayor’s behalf.

This does not mean introducing a new cadre of people based on their patronage or politics. The emphasis of these appointments should be on merit, with mayors seeking high calibre individuals with the right expertise for the brief – their ultimate objective to foster prosperity in local communities. Commissioners will operate within a framework of accountability, proper conduct and public scrutiny, including a defined role for overview and scrutiny within the authority’s existing governance arrangements.

Alongside the commissioner model, the Act permits C(C)As to pay allowances to members who undertake special responsibilities in service of the C(C)A. This recognises the significant additional responsibilities members can carry, ensuring that those who contribute extra capacity, leadership and expertise are fairly compensated.

These reforms will help local areas feel the benefit of stronger leadership capacity. This guidance is intended to support C(C)As as these powers become operational, by setting clear expectations, sharing best practice and providing practical advice.

About this guidance

Legislative context

The powers relating to the appointment of commissioners and the payment of allowances for members with special responsibilities are provided by the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 (‘the Act’), which enables mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities to appoint commissioners and make a scheme to pay allowances, subject to appropriate governance and scrutiny arrangements.

These powers operate within the wider local government legislative framework, including existing provisions on C(C)A governance, overview and scrutiny, standards of conduct and remuneration, and should be considered within the broader statutory context.

Mayors in C(C)As can already appoint individuals to certain roles under existing legislation and local governance arrangements, for example, a Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime (where policing functions are exercised), a Mayoral Development Corporation Chair, and the Statutory Deputy Mayor appointed from within the C(C)A’s membership. This guidance deals specifically with the new role of mayoral commissioners introduced by the Act, and with the making of schemes to pay allowances for those commissioners, and to members who undertake special responsibilities on behalf of the C(C)A.

Some C(C)As have already appointed individuals who carry the title ‘commissioner’ in relation to specific policy priorities. As these new statutory powers are implemented, MHCLG’s expectation is that C(C)As will align any such roles with the statutory commissioner model and the governance arrangements set out in this guidance over time, to support consistency, transparency and clarity for local partners and the public.

Who the guidance is for

This guidance is principally for mayors and officers in mayoral C(C)As, remuneration panels, and members of overview and scrutiny committees. It will be of wider interest to individuals undertaking the mayoral commissioner role or working with commissioners.

Aim of the guidance

The aim of this guidance is to support C(C)As in the effective and proportionate use of new powers relating to the appointment of mayoral commissioners, and the payment of allowances to commissioners and members undertaking special responsibilities, as introduced through the Act.

Mayoral commissioners are a new leadership role within C(C)As, and the payment of allowances to members with special responsibilities represents an extension of existing local government practice, where local authorities pay members allowances for special responsibilities and C(C)As pay allowances to members of their overview and scrutiny and audit committees. This guidance is intended to support authorities in applying these powers consistently, transparently and in a way that strengthens local accountability and public confidence.

This guidance therefore seeks to:

• set clear expectations for how these powers should be exercised
• establish and promote good governance and best practice
• support mayors, members, officers, scrutiny bodies and remuneration panels to understand and apply their respective roles and responsibilities
• provide practical advice on governance, remuneration and operational arrangements

The guidance does not seek to replicate or restate legislative provisions. Instead, it is intended to help C(C)As interpret and apply the legislation in a way that is proportionate to local circumstances, while remaining consistent with good governance, value for money, and high standards of conduct in public life.

Status of the guidance

This is statutory guidance from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG). It is applicable to combined authorities and combined county authorities C(C)As, as well as mayors elected to those C(C)A areas, Overview and Scrutiny committees and Remuneration Panels operating in C(C)As.

Who must take account of different parts of the guidance is specified at the beginning of each section as determined in the Act^{[footnote 1]}. However, the guidance should be considered in its entirety by all users.

Relevant authorities must have regard to this statutory guidance when exercising the functions it relates to. Compliance with this guidance would be considered in MHCLG’s assessment of governance and improvement.

This guidance will come into effect on Royal Assent of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill.

Terminology

Where the following terms are used they should be interpreted as follows:

• ‘Act’ unless otherwise stated refers to the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026
• ‘Area of competence’ refers to the eight thematic areas under which C(C)A functions sit.
• ‘Board’ means the mayor (where applicable) and the constituent council members and also includes non-constituent and associate members where the authority has chosen to have such members.^{[footnote 2]}
• ‘Overview and Scrutiny committee’ includes ‘Local Scrutiny Committees’ where they have been established by the C(C)A.
• ‘Deputy Mayor’ or ‘Commissioner’ refers to those persons who can be appointed to assist the mayor under the Act.
• ‘Statutory Deputy Mayor’ means the person who must be appointed to act on behalf of the elected mayor if they are otherwise unable to. They must be appointed from the elected members of the C(C)A.

Expiry or review date

This guidance was published on 16 April 2026.

It will be kept under review and updated as necessary.

Selection and Appointment of Commissioners

The mayors for the areas of C(C)As must take account of this section of the guidance.

Selection

1. The mayor, working with officers of the C(C)A and elected members as appropriate, should determine the scope of the commissioner’s role and person specification, considering the mayor’s overall vision and policy aims, and the delegation of functions (see Delegation of Functions). This should be based on a clear rationale of where additional support would help achieve intended policy outcomes.

2. Commissioners may be responsible for overseeing everyday functions and operations as related to an area of competence. They may lead on the delivery of discrete pieces of work, such as specific mayoral priorities, projects or programmes.

3. The person specification should establish objective criteria, such as competencies, qualifications, or achievements upon which applicants can be assessed. It should also include the length of appointment, expected time commitment, and remuneration.

4. Commissioners should be appointed on merit, through fair and open competition. This means appointments must be advertised publicly by the C(C)A for an appropriate period, ensuring a broad range of candidates can be considered. The recruitment process should rigorously assess potential candidates’ suitability for the role, including through a panel interview. As a minimum the interview panel should comprise the mayor (or nominee) and a statutory officer^{[footnote 3]} of the C(C)A.

5. Following interviews, the candidate to be appointed should be determined by the mayor, who is expected to deliberate with other panel members. The mayor should inform the O&SC and set out why the candidate is being appointed and the area of competence they will operate in.

Scrutiny hearing

6. The O&SC has the option of holding a scrutiny hearing to scrutinise the nominee. This must be undertaken within 28 working days of notification from the mayor. The O&SC should carefully consider the purpose and focus of any hearing.

7. A nominee’s skills, experience, and abilities should be well understood from the panel interview. Therefore, whilst a hearing may discuss relevant points regarding candidates’ skills and experience, questions should generally focus on how they will act as a commissioner, considering the standards expected of individuals working in public office. This could include, for example, questions about:

• maintaining public confidence
• managing public money
• managing potential conflicts of interest
• awareness of statutory duties and governance standards
• integrity and ethical standards

8. The Chair should intervene if questions are irrelevant, unduly personal, or discriminatory.

9. On conclusion of a hearing the O&SC must provide a written response to the mayor detailing their findings from the hearing.

10. The mayor may disagree with the O&SC assessment and should respond confirming their position, and explaining why they disagree with the O&SC.

Appointments following an equivalent prior selection process

11. In some circumstances a mayor may make a direct appointment to a position without publicly advertising the role or undertaking a formal recruitment process. This must only be in instances where:

• the individual already holds a public or statutory role of comparable seniority and responsibility and;
• the individual was appointed to that role following a robust, fair, and merit-based selection process, providing assurance equivalent to that of an open recruitment exercise and;
• the skills, experience, and responsibilities assessed during that process substantially overlap with those required for the Commissioner role; and
• conducting a further recruitment process would not materially improve the quality, independence, or legitimacy of the appointment

12. The mayor must still write to the O&SC advising of the planned appointment and inviting their assessment. If the above criteria have been met, then it is expected a scrutiny hearing will not be required.

Terms and conditions of appointment

13. The terms and conditions of the appointment must be determined by the mayor. This must ensure the person’s work relates to at least one or more aspects of an area of competence. The areas of competence are:

• transport and local infrastructure
• skills and employment support
• housing and strategic planning
• economic development and regeneration
• the environment and climate change
• health, well-being and public service reform
• public safety (which would include fire and rescue services)
• culture

14. The precise brief of the commissioner and how it aligns to the area of competence they have been appointed against will depend on local circumstances. The examples below provide an illustration of how this could work in practice.

1. A commissioner operating in the economic development and regeneration area of competence may oversee the C(C)A’s investment pipeline and take a leading role in business engagement. They could be called the ‘Deputy Mayor for Business & Investment’.

2. A commissioner operating in the environment and climate change area of competence may oversee a strategy focused on rural affairs. This may incidentally relate to other areas such as housing, transport and economic regeneration. They could be called the ‘Deputy Mayor for Environment & Rural Affairs.

3. A commissioner may operate in the public safety area of competence, with responsibility for overseeing fire and rescue services and exercising those functions not reserved to the mayor. The mayor may ask them to assume responsibility for a flood resilience programme, delegating any further relevant functions as deemed appropriate. The commissioner may be called the ‘Deputy Mayor for Fire & Public Safety’.

4. Two commissioners may work within the transport area of competence. One could assume responsibility for overseeing the mayor’s active travel priorities, the other for rail and road. They could be called ‘Deputy Mayor for Active Travel’ and ‘Deputy Mayor for Road & Rail’, respectively.

15. Indicatively, commissioners could be appointed to do any of the following:

• exercise the functions delegated to them to achieve a specific policy objective
• lead on the development and/or delivery of a mayoral priority
• lead on the development and/or delivery of a major project or programme
• provide expert advice on their specialism in a particular field

16. The specific activities in scope should be determined between the Mayor in consultation with members and officers of the C(C)A as appropriate. Indicatively, this could include:

• the development/delivery of specific strategies, policies or reports
• convening and working with local partners and businesses
• representing the mayor at local, national or international forums and for interactions with the media
• chairing local boards or committees
• working with councillors
• attending committee and other meetings of the C(C)A

17. Commissioners act on behalf of, and as directed by, the mayor within their area of competence. This includes taking decisions on behalf of the mayor where they have been delegated to them.

18. The mayor can arrange for a commissioner to exercise specific functions within their area of competence. Where a function is not reserved to the mayor only, they must obtain the consent of the C(C)A. Some functions cannot be exercised by a commissioner, such as the approval of specific plans, strategies, reports, and other documents.^{[footnote 4]} The C(C)A should consider how a commissioner’s work relates to other relevant organisations within their area of competence. Where appropriate they should work closely and coordinate with these organisations for mutual benefit.

19. A commissioner’s terms and conditions should allow for a mayor to change, remove, or transfer a commissioner’s functions throughout the period of their appointment.

20. Commissioners are encouraged to ‘double hat’, and fulfil other representative roles related to policy, delivery, or governance activities as appropriate. This could mean for example, the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime taking on a wider brief related to the ‘public safety’ area of competence. Or, representing the mayor on a local or national forum, chairing a Mayoral Development Corporation, or chairing a statutory institution for delivering services. This should be complementary and without detriment to the commissioners agreed objectives.

21. Commissioners should be subject to the same standards and conduct that apply to employees in the C(C)A. The C(C)A should ensure appointments are aware of this. They should also explain the circumstances upon which a mayor can terminate a commissioner’s appointment, or upon which the O&S committee may recommend a termination of appointment.

Naming convention

22. Increased public understanding and engagement with local government is essential to maintaining our democratic system. Evidence shows that awareness of regional mayors among residents is often higher than MPs or local authority leaders^{[footnote 5]}. It is important this recognition also extends to those individuals appointed by, and working on behalf of, the C(C)A.

23. C(C)As should include the title of ‘Deputy Mayor’ in the naming convention for any appointment under this legislation. The Deputy Mayor title is likely to be widely recognised by the public and understood as representing the core leadership team of the authority. Authorities may use an alternative title, for example if the scope of the role, appointment duration, expected time commitment or public perception make it reasonable to do so.

24. Clear distinctions should be made between the Statutory Deputy Mayor, the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, and Deputy Mayor (commissioner) roles. Similarly, where constituent members of a C(C)A lead on a portfolio any title should be distinct from that of the Deputy Mayor (commissioner) role.

25. The C(C)A should publish on its website information explaining the responsibilities of any appointed commissioners. This should include making clear the distinctions with these other roles.

Conduct and working relationships

26. Mayors and C(C)As are best placed to determine specific working arrangements. However, because commissioners are a new role within C(C)As, it is important to understand how they are expected to undertake the role and work with others.

27. Commissioners are mayoral appointments, with their tenure directly linked to the mayor’s term of office. They will form part of the mayor’s leadership team, offering oversight and strategic direction to achieve the policy agenda. Commissioners can advocate on behalf of the mayor and the C(C)A, but this must be limited to furthering the overall objectives of the C(C)A.

28. Though principally responsible to the mayor, commissioners are expected to cooperate with officers, overview and scrutiny committees, elected members and any other persons when undertaking their duties.

29. Whilst they may be engaged by the C(C)A in a variety of formal capacities, they are expected to adhere to the same standards and conduct, commissioners differ from officers. Principally this is because:

• an officers’ employment with the C(C)A does not automatically end following a change of political administration
• officers are expected to consider the organisational interests of the authority impartially

Relationship with portfolio holders

30. The appointment of commissioners is intended to work flexibly alongside existing governance and delivery arrangements. In some authorities that may mean working with portfolio holders. Where they are used, portfolio holders are voting members that sit on the Board of the C(C)A, drawn from constituent councils within the area. Usually, they are the Leader of the constituent council. Portfolio holders oversee a specific area of work (their ‘portfolio’), which may include responsibility for specific service areas and policies. This will typically be grouped under a theme, such as ‘Education, Employment and Skills.

31. Portfolio holders play an important role in aligning local and regional interests. They help define the policy framework, provide strategic direction, speak on behalf of the C(C)A, and provide accountability and scrutiny for activities happening across their portfolio. Portfolio holders will also often be key witnesses for Overview and Scrutiny in their portfolio area, providing a primary route for member-led accountability. They are integral in building consensus across constituent councils to shape policies. Portfolio holders cannot be delegated functions.

32. In contrast, commissioners will have an emphasis on bringing specialist expertise and experience within their given area of competence, to deliver the mayor’s specific policy objectives. Delegating functions will help increase the mayor’s delivery capacity, allowing them to delegate ownership to a trusted and credible individual.

33. It’s important that portfolio holders and commissioners work together where their activities may overlap. This will be more likely, but not exclusive, to where a portfolio lead and commissioner are operating in the same thematic area of policy or service delivery. The C(C)A should ensure the respective briefs of both individuals, working arrangements and reporting processes support this cooperation.

Delegation and exercise of Functions

C(C)As must take account of this section of the guidance.

34. The decision to delegate a non-mayoral function should be discussed and voted on at a meeting of the Board, before a commissioner is appointed. This should form part of general considerations on what the mayor wants the commissioner to deliver. The decision will pass if a majority of members present, including the mayor, vote in favour.

35. The same process will apply in instances where the mayor wishes to delegate further functions to a commissioner, after appointment. However, the reasons for the additional delegation should be for a reasonable change in circumstances and explained by the mayor.

36. For those functions exercisable only by the mayor, the mayor should give notice of the intention to delegate at a Board meeting. Delegating mayoral functions does not require agreement of non-mayoral members, however the mayor should explain their reasons for delegation.

Role of the Public Safety Commissioner

37. Currently C(C)As can have two types of public safety functions: policing and fire. Both are dependent on the functions being coterminous and conferred by a separate statutory instrument. The range of public safety functions may grow over time. The commissioner model is designed to manage any future expansion of the public safety part of the devolution framework.

38. Where a mayor holds policing responsibilities, they may appoint a Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime (DMPC), who can be delegated some responsibilities.^{[footnote 6]} The mayor cannot delegate any of their policing responsibilities to anyone except a DMPC.

39. A commissioner can be delegated a C(C)A’s other public safety functions where they have them, for example fire and rescue functions. However, certain functions are retained to the mayor and cannot be delegated. These include, for example, appointing, suspending or dismissing the Chief Fire Officer.^{[footnote 7]}

40. Where a Mayor is responsible for policing and other public safety functions, they can choose whether to combine these functions in one role or two. They can either appoint their Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime as a Public Safety Commissioner so that they are responsible for all public safety functions. Or alternatively, they can appoint a separate commissioner to manage the non-policing public safety functions, within the mayoral area. This is a decision for Mayors to make based on local circumstances.

41. If the mayor appoints a Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime with authority over only part of the C(C)A, measures should be taken to assure residents that public safety will be considered across the entire area.

42. Where police and fire boundaries aren’t coterminous with the C(C)A geography it may be appropriate to appoint a commissioner to deliver a public safety brief specific to the mayoral area. A clear distinction should be made between the roles and responsibilities of a commissioner appointment and Police and Crime Commissioners while they are still in post. This includes use of the ‘Deputy Mayor’ title for the commissioner. The PSC’s work should be closely coordinated and congruent with the existing police and fire services as necessary.

43. Where areas are not coterminous PCCs will remain in place, until their term expires in 2028. A Police and Crime Board(s) (PCB) would then be established, who will appoint a Police and Crime Lead. In these cases, there will not be a statutory DMPC, but mayors could appoint a Public Safety Commissioner to liaise with the PCB and Police and Crime Leads across the police forces operating within the C(C)A geography.

44. Where a mayor exercises policing and/or fire and rescue functions, the relevant police force and fire and rescue authority remain subject to the statutory inspection regimes led by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. This includes consideration of the governance and delivery arrangements through which those functions are discharged, including where responsibilities are delegated on the mayor’s behalf.

Delegation of planning functions

45. Planning decisions can have significant implications on land use, property and other financial interests. They often attract considerable public interest and may be subject to legal action. This is why there are established practices around regarding the separation of duties and governance related to planning determinations in local government.

46. The delegation of planning work and functions to a commissioner may help improve the general management of planning activities in the C(C)A. This may benefit meeting the duty for each C(C)A to produce a Spatial Development Strategy (SDS) The SDS characterises strategic planning for an area, considering housing, infrastructure, economic and environmental factors. A commissioner with expertise in this area, and recognising they will not be affiliated with a particular council, may be well placed to engage and convene relevant parties across constituent councils and more broadly.

47. Where commissioners are involved in such activities, they are must comply with the relevant planning protocols and procedures that would equally apply to the mayor.

Paying and reporting of allowances for members and commissioners

C(C)As and relevant remuneration panels must take account of this section of the guidance.

48. This section covers guidance on the payment of elected members who work on behalf of the C(C)A (meaning Combined and County Combined Authorities here), and commissioners. C(C)As and remuneration panels must take account of this section of the guidance.

49. The Local Authorities (Members’ Allowances) (England) Regulations 2003 confer powers on local authorities to pay allowances. The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 confers powers for Combined Authorities and Combined County Authorities to make schemes for the payment of allowances for members who undertake a special responsibility on their behalf. It also confers powers to make schemes for the payment of allowances to commissioners.

50. The C(C)A must publish reports on the allowances paid to mayoral commissioners, and elected members undertaking special responsibilities on behalf of the authority. A scheme of allowances cannot be made until the C(C)A has considered a report by their relevant remuneration panel, and allowances payable under the scheme cannot exceed the recommendations made by the panel^{[footnote 8]}.

51. The C(C)A should advise the Remuneration Panel of the general responsibilities and functions a commissioner may undertake, to support the Panel in determining their recommendation. The C(C)A should also advise of any responsibilities beyond those specified below that would reasonably be considered a ‘special responsibility’ undertaken by members.

Considerations for the Remuneration Panel

52. The independent process of determining allowances for commissioners and members’ special responsibilities should follow established practice in local government. A panel therefore must consider what allowances, and their amounts, should be payable, with further consideration to this guidance. Reporting should outline the methods and evidence used to make any recommendations. This may include for example the benchmarking of similar roles and responsibilities to support their recommendations.

53. Clear recommendations should be made including a detailed breakdown of proposed allowances and their corresponding amounts. The recommendations should be reviewed on an annual basis.

Mayoral commissioners

54. Members of the remuneration panel should not be involved in the recruitment of a commissioner.

55. The delegation of functions to a commissioner may attract an additional allowance. The rate of that allowance may vary depending on the significance of specific functions to advancing the C(C)A’s agenda. It may be appropriate to group functions into categories for the purposes of determining different rates payable.

56. Where a commissioner is a salaried employee in the C(C)A or remunerated through another arrangement, this should not exceed the equivalent maximum allowance. This is to ensure that commissioners are paid equally, regardless of their specific employment arrangements.

Considerations for members with special responsibilities

57. The payment of allowances for members undertaking work on behalf of the C(C)A is expected to be in keeping with established practice in local government. The Act explicitly prohibits double-counting of C(C)A and local authority allowances. Members should ensure they are not remunerated twice for the same work, and if they believe this to be the case, inform their constituent council and the C(C)A.

58. C(C)As can already pay members for serving on Overview & Scrutiny and Audit committees. As a minimum, the payments for special responsibilities should also permit members to be paid allowances for the following as relevant to their role and specific responsibilities:

• representing their constituent authority at C(C)A meetings
• attending sub-committees
• any work and duties undertaken as a portfolio lead

Making a scheme for the payment of allowances

59. Remuneration is expected to be commensurate with the level of responsibility being undertaken by a member or commissioner. The scheme should determine the appropriate structure and criteria for allowances, considering the information and recommendations provided by the remuneration panel.

60. Allowances payable for mayoral commissioners and members undertaking special responsibilities should be incorporated into a single (new or existing) scheme. The allowances payable for commissioners should be determined and approved by the C(C)A before publicly advertising for a commissioner vacancy. The scheme should be reviewed and determined on an annual basis, informed by the remuneration panel’s annual review of their recommendations.

Reporting arrangements

61. The C(C)A must publish a report detailing the allowances paid to mayoral commissioners and members undertaking special responsibilities. This should be done annually and detail all the individuals paid an allowance, what the allowances were paid for, and the respective amounts. The report should make reference to how the allowances paid align with the recommendations of the remuneration panel. The report should be made available on the C(C)A website as soon as practicable.

Accountability

Overview and Scrutiny committees must take account to this section of the guidance.

62. This section covers guidance regarding standards and conduct and the making of recommendations to terminate the appointment of a person as a commissioner.

63. It is important that the work of commissioners is transparent, they are accountable and are held to the same standards as others in the C(C)A. A commissioner’s terms of appointment should ensure they are subject to the authority’s Code of Conduct, and any other relevant protocols, codes and guidance that would be relevant to staff of the C(C)A. This should include the requirement to register and declare pecuniary and other interests. Commissioners are expected to adhere to the standards of public life established by the Nolan principles^{[footnote 9]}.

64. They should not deceive or knowingly mislead the Mayor, the C(C)A, officers or the public. They should not misuse their position or information acquired in the course of their official duties to further their private interests or that of others. They should not receive benefits of any kind that others may reasonably see as compromising their judgement or integrity.

65. A commissioner’s terms of appointment should provide for a level of political restriction akin to a statutory officer^{[footnote 10]}. This means commissioners should not undertake party-political activities. However, as a mayoral appointment, commissioners speak on behalf of the mayor provided this in the context of advancing the C(C)A’s policy agenda only, and subject to the terms of their appointment. This is a divergence from officers of the C(C)A who are expected to act impartially, and therefore cannot make political arguments.

Termination of appointment

66. The Mayor can terminate a commissioner’s appointment at any time in accordance with their terms and conditions.

67. In addition, the overview and scrutiny committee (O&SC) have the power to recommend the termination of a commissioner’s appointment to the Cabinet. The O&SC have existing powers to review and scrutinise decisions, or actions taken.

68. When making a recommendation to terminate appointment the O&SC should detail a reasoned and evidence-based case for the determination. Generally, such a recommendation would be expected in case of unacceptable behaviour or bringing the organisation into disrepute.

69. Unacceptable behaviour includes conduct that fails to meet the standards of behaviour applied to commissioners by the C(C)A as established through codes of conduct, guidance, and policies in the organisation, and through the Nolan principles. Such behaviour does not necessarily need to have public or reputational impact to be of concern; it may be sufficient that the behaviour compromises the integrity, functioning, or values of the organisation.

70. Bringing the organisation into disrepute includes actions, internal or external to the C(C)A, that damage or risk damaging the reputation, standing or public confidence in the C(C)A, the Mayor of the commissioner. Reputational harm may arise even where no formal breach of internal policy has occurred, the overall effect on public trust and confidence must be considered.

71. These are broad circumstances in which a recommendation for termination may be justified. However, the O&SC should be mindful that other behaviours, failures or specific circumstances may merit such a recommendation. Any determination should be proportionate to infringements and made based on the context of each case and at the discretion of the O&SC.

72. Recommendations should be provided in writing to the C(C)A Board.

Compliance with Local Scrutiny Committees

73. Local Scrutiny Committees will provide stronger oversight of local decision making, with a specific focus on reviewing whether expenditure within a C(C)A achieves value for money. This system will strengthen the existing system of Overview and Scrutiny Committees, ensuring mayors and other key figures, including commissioners, are held to account. We intend for this new regime to apply to all Established Mayoral C(C)As from April 2027 and to be extended to all Mayoral C(C)As from April 2028.

74. For areas that operate an LSC, a commissioner will be automatically removed from post if, without reasonable excuse, they fail to attend six consecutive meetings or six within a 12-month period (whichever is reached first), if formally required to do so.

75. Commissioners will also fall within scope of civil penalties of up to £5,000 if they:

• refuse to attend a meeting of a Local Scrutiny Committee (without reasonable excuse)
• refuse to provide information to a Local Scrutiny Committee (without reasonable excuse)
• refuse to answer questions at a meeting of a Local Scrutiny Committee (without reasonable excuse)
• mislead a Local Scrutiny Committee when providing evidence or attending a meeting

1. See Schedule 3, paragraph 12 of the Act. ↩

2. C(C)As may use other terms such as ‘Cabinet’ depending on their specific governance arrangements. ↩

3. The statutory officers for a C(C)A are the Head of Paid Service (Chief Executive), Monitoring Officer and (Section 73) Chief Finance Officer. ↩

4. See Paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 2A of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 and paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 5B of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 ↩

5. Centre for Cities (2024) Metro mayors are the most recognisable local political figures in their area, polling finds ↩

6. Section 18 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. ↩

7. Paragraph 7, Schedule 2A of the Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 and Paragraph 7 of Schedule 5B of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (as inserted by Schedule 3 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026) ↩

8. The specifications of relevant remuneration panels for the purposes of paying allowances to commissioners, and members undertaking special responsibilities on behalf of the C(C)A, are effected by [SIs references] ↩

9. The Seven Principles of Public Life - GOV.UK ↩

10. As established in the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. ↩