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Consultation outcome

Government response: Trust-based pension schemes: Trustees and governance, building a stronger future

Updated 10 November 2026

Ministerial foreword

This is a pivotal moment for workplace pensions in the UK. Through the Pension Schemes Act 2026, we are reshaping the market: driving a landscape of bigger and better pension schemes, underpinned by a focus on value for savers through the Value for Money framework. The Act makes the journey into retirement simpler for millions through default pensions, and for defined benefit schemes it provides greater flexibility over the use of surplus funds for thousands of schemes. Delivering these reforms is well underway. This consultation response steps back to address something fundamental for the reformed pensions landscape: the governance protections that underpin the workplace pensions system and that will ensure its future success.

Strong governance is at the heart of a healthy pensions system, especially one that is consolidating at pace. We know from both UK and international evidence that good governance is central to better member outcomes and helps deliver greater retirement security for savers. As part of this, trustees play a vital role in protecting members’ interests.  

It is clear from the responses to the consultation that there is a shared vision for strong governance within our pension system: highly skilled trustees taking decisions in savers’ interests alongside clear accountability for outcomes. The responses recognise the strong foundations of our existing system. They also provide a clear call to action to build on this for the future market of fewer, larger schemes – where a smaller number of decision-makers will affect the outcomes of millions of savers.

It is imperative that we strengthen these foundations to protect savers and the pensions system as a whole against future risks. Around £2 trillion of people’s retirement savings is entrusted to the UK pensions system, and schemes will be overseeing the bulk of people’s lifetime pension savings as average defined contribution pension pots grow. The success of automatic enrolment depends on savers’ confidence that every pound they save is being managed in their interests. That confidence will be damaged if actual or perceived conflicts are allowed to exist, or if the interests of those making or influencing decisions are not clearly aligned with those of members. This is an issue we will return to in the context of future-proofing our pensions landscape. Member-Nominated Trustees (MNTs) have brought great value to our pension system – despite the design challenges in multi-employer schemes, we must find new ways of ensuring that a focus on the member and their needs remains central to decision making on trust boards.

The government is therefore announcing a package of measures to strengthen governance. We will work with industry to make sure that savers’ interests come first. Working closely with The Pensions Regulator (TPR), we will raise trustee skills and capability, address actual and emerging conflicts of interest, and strengthen the administration on which good member outcomes depend.

Our action will be proportionate and focused where the risks are greatest. We will work with TPR and the wider industry to turn these commitments into effective and proportionate action. In areas that will need legislation, we will take changes forward at the next opportunity. And we will further consider whether changes need to be made so that savers within contract-based pension arrangements have equivalent outcomes in terms of strong governance and protections.

I also look forward to the final report of the Pensions Commission next year. Its recommendations will offer a further opportunity to build a system in which more people save enough for retirement; receive better outcomes from their savings; and can have confidence that their money is governed to the highest possible standard.

I would like to thank the many stakeholders and partners who contributed their time and expertise to this consultation. We look forward to continuing that constructive collaboration as we deliver these reforms.

Torsten Bell, MP
Minister for Pensions

Executive summary

1. Following careful consideration of consultation responses and engagement with industry and government partners, we propose to take forward the following measures.

We will work with TPR and industry to continue to build trustee capability and expertise

2. Consultation respondents described a landscape of generally skilled and committed trustees while emphasising the importance of trustees across all schemes continuing to develop their knowledge and capability as the pension system evolves. This includes the ability to oversee and challenge advisers effectively and to respond to developments, including in artificial intelligence (AI) and cyber risk. These capabilities are relevant to trustees of every scheme but become increasingly critical as schemes grow in size and complexity to become systemically significant.

3. Respondents were sceptical of mandatory accreditation requirements, suggesting that these might discourage members of other regulated professions from engaging in trusteeship. We have seen the good practice already emerging in voluntary accreditation and welcome the industry’s work to strengthen professionalism more broadly. We do not want to inhibit that progress or create unnecessary barriers. Instead, we will work with TPR and industry to strengthen and broaden the trustee knowledge and understanding training offer with a set of proportionate and targeted competence frameworks. These will include board-level skills and expertise in areas beyond purely technical pensions knowledge.

4. To align with the common view expressed in consultation responses that trustee capability should be assessed across the board as a whole rather than on an individual trustee basis, we will introduce a new principle-based requirement for trustee chairs to assess and monitor their board’s collective skills. Proportionate regulatory reporting will give TPR greater visibility of board capability.

We will future proof the Master Trust authorisation and supervision regime

5. Looking to the future governance of Master Trusts, respondents argued that regulatory regimes must evolve alongside market developments. Respondents also supported a more proactive and supervisory approach to oversight. In line with this, we will update the Master Trust regime in several key respects in readiness for the future landscape. We will extend the authorisation and supervision framework to include governance and conflict management arrangements across the wider commercial model. We will also introduce requirements for TPR to approve key function holders within master trust providers. This will enable TPR to intervene more flexibly and proactively where schemes are at risk of breaching authorisation criteria, rather than waiting until a breach has occurred.

6. It will be paramount that the megafunds of the future are operated with the strongest levels of governance without perceived or real conflicts of interest that could erode savers’ confidence in pension saving. We will work with consumer groups and industry to consider ways to best structure governance so that neither conflicts of interest nor the appearance of conflicts of interest risks the long-term confidence of savers in pensions. We will consider whether the minimum number of trustees on megafunds allows for sufficient skills, expertise and diversity of thought.

We will consider how member voice can best be represented in decision-making in schemes that do not have MNTs

7. Turning to member voice, responses raised concerns regarding appointment mechanisms within Master Trusts, in particular for megafunds. Responses questioned whether the current exemption for Master Trusts from having MNTs was appropriate going forward and whether this allowed for sufficient challenge at board level or for the effective representation of members. We note that the Office of Fair Trading’s 2013 report on workplace pensions[footnote 1] suggested that the government should consider how best to optimise governance in multi-employer defined contribution (DC) workplace pension in the longer term. They referred back to what had been achieved in defined benefit (DB) schemes as having been a higher standard. We will respond to these concerns and consider how best governance within automatic enrolment (AE) schemes that are currently without MNTs can most effectively ensure effective challenge and representation of members.

We will work with TPR to reduce conflicts of interest through monitoring the provision of multiple services by professional trustee firms

8. Professional trustee use has grown across the UK pensions system and is playing a valuable role in ensuring that schemes are well-governed and run, providing skilled and knowledgeable trustees. Industry respondents recognised the benefits that integrated business models with the provision of other services can bring including efficiency, access to expertise and streamlined decision-making. At the same time, there were concerns that increasing concentration within parts of the professional trustee market and the growth of affiliated advisory services could create actual or perceived conflicts of interest. Rather than introduce restrictions on the provision of multiple services, we will work with TPR to reinforce expectations that trustees ensure advice received is independent and free from undue influence while continuing to gather evidence on this practice.

We will introduce safeguards around the use of professional corporate sole trustees

9. The professional corporate sole trustee (PCST) model has become an increasingly prominent feature of the pensions landscape. Industry research indicated that their use has doubled since 2021[footnote 2] and now extends to around a quarter of UK DB schemes. Respondents highlighted the benefits that PCSTs can bring including access to professional expertise, more efficient decision-making and stronger governance for some schemes. Concerns were raised about the concentration of decision-making within a single trustee entity, however. In particular, saver respondents and consumer groups noted that PCST models do not provide member representation, the breadth of perspectives or challenge typically available within a traditional trustee board. The government recognises the value that PCSTs can bring. At the same time, effective challenge, independence and diversity of thought is important in delivering good governance and member outcomes. We will therefore work with TPR and the industry to set clearer criteria on appropriateness of the appointment of PCSTs to schemes going forward, to ensure that PCSTs can continue to be used where they are most useful in smaller schemes and schemes approaching buyout but not where they could weaken challenge in schemes running on.

We will raise standards of administration by introducing minimum standards for, and TPR regulatory oversight of, pensions administration providers

10. As pension schemes become increasingly reliant on a concentrated administration market, responses highlighted that the existing regulatory framework does not adequately reflect the growing importance of administration providers to scheme operations and member outcomes. Respondents broadly supported a pensions-specific regulatory framework overseen by TPR. Stakeholders also noted that weaknesses in provider resilience could have significant consequences for scheme operations and member outcomes. The government, therefore, intends to work with industry to introduce mandatory minimum standards for pension scheme administration providers focused on accurate records, operational resilience and the ability to transfer administration services effectively. Alongside these standards, we will introduce a registration framework for administration providers and provide TPR with appropriate supervisory and enforcement powers. Trustees will continue to retain overall responsibility for scheme administration and member outcomes.

Chapter One: Good governance

Raising the bar

11. Good governance is essential to protecting savers and delivering good retirement outcomes. As the pensions system has evolved, new governance challenges have emerged for trustees, including ensuring effective oversight of larger and more complex schemes and managing a wide range of advisers and service providers. As we look to the future market, it is essential that trustees can access the expertise and advice they need while remaining unconflicted and continuing to act in the interest of savers.

We asked

Question 1: What do you think works well in the current trusteeship and governance system?

Question 2: What are the barriers to good trusteeship?

Question 3: Looking ahead to 2030 and beyond, what further support will trustees need to ensure effective scheme governance?

Respondents said

One of the most important features of a well-functioning trusteeship and governance system is flexibility to enable each governing body to best represent the interests of its own members. Every scheme has different needs and characteristics, and there is no one-size-fits all approach to their governance.

[Railpen]

12. Across all the responses, there was broad support for retaining the current trust-based system and trustees’ fiduciary duties. Most respondents agreed that the core tenets of effective governance are the quality of trustee decision-making, clear trustee accountability, diversity of perspective and access to appropriate professional support. There was general agreement that the priority for the period to 2030 should focus on practical support for trustees rather than adding further obligations.

13. MNTs, trade unions, pension schemes and member groups stressed the importance of lay trustees, especially those chosen by members. They said these trustees bring first-hand knowledge of the scheme and its members. This helps boards consider different views, ask challenging questions and understand how their decisions may affect members. A recurring view was that a good board requires collective capability rather than every trustee being a pensions technician. Lay trustees can therefore add value even where they do not possess the same technical depth as a professional trustee.

14. Looking ahead to 2030 and beyond, respondents suggested that lay trustees would benefit from funded training; protected time to carry out their duties; mentoring; and an up-to-date Trustee Toolkit. They did not support requirements that would make it unnecessarily difficult for people to become lay trustees. Many respondents argued that consolidation and professionalisation must not come at the expense of member representation. They called for members to retain a formal and influential role in the governance of larger consolidated schemes, Master Trusts and schemes run by a sole trustee.

15. A clear majority of respondents who commented said professional trustees strengthen governance by bringing expertise, capacity and continuity. Enabling schemes to manage complexity and take timely, well-informed decisions; particularly during complex projects or periods of change.

There are many examples of strong trustee boards delivering effective oversight, with member representation, constructive sponsor engagement, and increasingly diverse skillsets all contributing to high-quality governance.

[AON]

16. Respondents agreed that balanced decision-making is most likely where professional expertise is combined with members’ and employers’ perspectives, so that proposals are tested through informed challenge rather than shaped by a single interest or prevailing industry view. They also stressed that balance depends on trustees having sufficient independence, time and clear comparative evidence to consider alternatives, manage conflicts transparently and explain how the final decision serves members’ interests. They said that good trusteeship can be made more difficult by increasingly complex rules; excessive information; gaps in board skills; and challenges in recruiting and retaining trustees.

17. Professional and industry bodies generally thought the current system works well because it is flexible enough to meet the needs of schemes of different sizes and types. They said trustees make better decisions when they have access to professional advice, effective checks and independent review.

18. Employers and scheme sponsors valued the flexibility of the current system. They said schemes should be able to choose governance arrangements that reflect their own needs. They also recognised the benefits of professional trustees, clear responsibilities and thorough processes for appointing trustees.

19. Respondents’ main concerns were the burden of regulation; the difficulty of measuring how well trustees are performing; and the risk that detailed new requirements could increase costs or discourage people from becoming trustees. In relation to megafunds, particularly authorised Master Trusts, some respondents called for a clearer delineation between trustees’ strategic and fiduciary oversight and the operational responsibilities of executive teams.

20. Over the coming years, employers supported setting clearer standards for trustee skills; regulation that reflects the size and risks of each scheme; and better ways to assess leadership and performance. They also supported clearer routes for developing future trustees and clearer governance standards for megafunds. At the same time, they wanted schemes to retain enough flexibility to respond to their different needs and circumstances.

21. Administrators considered that governance works well where administration is treated as a core governance function with clear delegation, effective escalation routes and regular consideration of meaningful management information. Constructive relationships between trustees, administrators and advisers – supported by independent assurance – were seen as central to good outcomes.

Our response

22. The consultation highlighted strong practice across the trusteeship sector, providing a sound basis for the delivery of wider pensions reforms. However, as schemes become larger, more complex and increasingly concentrated, the governance framework must continue to evolve. Working with TPR, the government will build on the strengths of the existing system while addressing specific risks relating to trustee capability, oversight and conflicts of interest. Ensuring that trustees can continue to make effective and independent decisions in members’ interests. The measures set out below will support consistently high standards of trusteeship with stronger capability, appropriate oversight and effective management of conflicts of interest.

Governance of megafunds

23. As we move towards a landscape of future megafunds, the consultation asked if the existing governance arrangements for Master Trusts create sufficient independence and accountability for the future market. We need to ensure that governance arrangements in these schemes enable trustees to act independently of the provider and other commercial interests. Additionally, the TPR needs to have the tools to intervene in Master Trusts in the right way at the right time.

We asked

Question 4: Does effective scheme governance in a megafund require additional support or any specific changes in regulatory approach?

Respondents said

Megafunds will hold the retirement savings of millions of members and would therefore need to demonstrate the strongest governance. Regulatory oversight would need to include close examination of trustees, that they met appropriately high fit and proper standards and individually and collectively had the expertise and skills to govern such a systemically important and complex entity.

[LCP]

SPP agrees that it is appropriate for more stringent requirements to apply to the trustee boards of authorised master trusts or megafunds given the commercial context in which they operate, and the wider economic risks that will be entailed in managing at-scale megafunds.

[Society of Pension Professionals]

24. Respondents broadly agreed that the existing Master Trust authorisation regime has provided a sound basis for the growth of the Master Trust market and has generally secured good governance and positive outcomes for members. They also, however, highlighted concerns about the concentration of appointment powers within commercial Master Trust structures.

25. Many respondents argued that the framework was designed for an earlier stage of market development, such as before the emergence of the large-scale pension consolidators and future megafunds being established under the Pension Schemes Act 2026. Across trustees, schemes, providers, advisers, administrators and industry bodies, there was a consistent view that institutions responsible for the retirement savings of millions of savers should be subject to the highest standards of governance and regulatory oversight.

26. Respondents highlighted the increasing scale and complexity of Master Trusts and noted that trustee boards are now expected to oversee a much broader range of activities than in the past, including often sophisticated relationships with commercial providers and service firms. Several respondents observed that responsibility for delivering member outcomes increasingly sits across a wider governance ecosystem rather than solely within the trustee board itself.

27. Respondents emphasised the systemic importance of larger pension schemes. They argued that governance failings and poor decision making within future megafunds could affect very large numbers of savers simultaneously. As a result, respondents generally supported a more intensive and supervisory approach to regulation for the largest schemes, reflecting the significance of the assets and memberships involved.

28. A number of respondents argued that governance frameworks should evolve alongside these changes. Trustees, advisers and industry bodies generally favoured targeted enhancements to the existing Master Trust regime rather than the creation of an entirely new framework. Respondents also highlighted that some pensions regimes, particularly those frameworks applying to collective pensions and superfunds, contain governance and supervisory features that are not available in the Master Trust legislation. While there was no consensus on the precise reforms required, many respondents supported a more proactive and risk-based model of supervision for the largest schemes.

29. Several respondents suggested that governance arrangements for the future market may need to be more independent of commercial interests than those developed for an earlier generation of schemes. Consumer representatives, some trustee organisations and several governance specialists argued that the government should consider mechanisms to ensure that the degree of provider control over trustee appointments is properly balanced; especially in schemes that have reached significant scale.

30. Respondents who did not identify current governance failings frequently acknowledged that questions of legitimacy and independence are likely to become more important as pension assets become concentrated in a relatively small number of institutions.

At a fundamental level, governance must be independent of the parent scheme if we are to ensure that members’ savings are to be properly looked after.

[Age UK]

Our response

31. The growth in Master Trusts means that a small number of trustees will affect the retirement outcomes of millions of savers. As schemes reach scale, there is a need for a different approach. Respondents broadly supported building on the existing Master Trust authorisation regime and the government considers that a significant step change is now needed to ensure that governance across Master Trusts consistently supports trustees in acting independently.

32. We will, therefore, strengthen and extend the existing authorisation regime rather than replace it. To ensure consistency, we will extend the Master Trust authorisation and supervision regime to include governance and conflict management arrangements across the provider entity; as is currently the case in the superfunds and collective pensions regimes. This is an important part of ensuring TPR has an appropriate and consistent set of risk-based tools across the Master Trust, collective pensions and superfund regimes.

33. Furthermore, we will strengthen fit and proper requirements similarly. Bringing protections in the Master Trust regime more closely into line with these newer regimes. The requirements will also apply to key function holders whose roles influence the operation of scheme outcomes for savers in a similar way to the key function holder regime operated for superfunds. This will recognise that responsibility for the effective operation of a Master Trust extends beyond its trustee board. The precise functions in scope will be developed with TPR and industry to ensure that the framework is clear and proportionate.

34. TPR will be given stronger powers to intervene at an earlier stage where a Master Trust is at risk of failing to meet the authorisation criteria. Rather than having to wait for a failure to occur, TPR will be able to require the scheme and provider to take enforceable action to address identified weaknesses within an appropriate timeframe. This will support earlier, proportionate intervention. Giving schemes the opportunity to put matters right and help prevent emerging risks from causing harm to savers.

35. We will also strengthen significant event notification requirements for Master Trusts so that TPR receives timely information about developments that could materially affect a Master Trust’s governance, financial sustainability or continued ability to meet the authorisation criteria. Alongside wider information-gathering and supervisory powers, this will give TPR the visibility it needs to identify emerging risks in the interests of future savers.

36. We will work with consumer groups and industry to further consider how governance can be best structured to ensure that neither conflicts of interest nor the appearance of conflicts of interest could risk long term confidence in workplace pension saving.

37. Megafund Boards will need to have a broad range of trustee skills with sufficient capacity to undertake the significant role that will be required of the board. As such, we will also consider whether it would be appropriate to increase the minimum number of trustee appointments on the board of megafunds to ensure that they have the skills and capacity, as well as appropriate diversity of thought.

Professional trustees and provision of other services

38. The consultation recognised the growing importance of professional trustees in pension scheme governance and the benefits they can provide, particularly for smaller schemes. Evidence from recent research by TPR highlights this impact. It shows that schemes with a professional trustee were more than three times more likely to demonstrate strong value for members assessments than those without one.[footnote 3]

39. The consultation also explored the implications of increasing market concentration among a limited number of professional trustee firms as well as the growing use of PCSTs. It considered the potential for conflicts of interest where professional trustee firms – or commercially linked third-party providers – supply additional advisory or other services to a scheme, alongside how such conflicts are currently managed and the extent of any residual risk to members.

40. In addition, the consultation examined whether restrictions should apply to individuals acting as professional trustees. This included limits on the number of appointments they may hold to ensure that they have sufficient capacity to discharge their responsibilities effectively.

We asked

Question 5: Can you describe any potential or actual conflicts of interest that stem from the provision of further services within professional trustee firms and other third-party providers? How are these conflicts managed now? What is the scale of the residual risk in the market?

Question 6: Are additional safeguards needed to effectively manage these risks, given the need to balance members’ interests with effective scheme management?

Question 7: Should there be restrictions on individuals acting as professional trustees, such as the number of trustee appointments they can hold, to ensure individuals have the appropriate capacity to manage schemes?

Respondents said

41. Respondents generally viewed professional trustees as a valuable source of specialist expertise, governance capability and continuity, helping trustee boards navigate increasingly complex decisions. They broadly agreed, however, that actual or perceived conflicts of interest can arise where a professional trustee firm, or a connected company, provides additional services to the same scheme. Particular concerns included the risk that trustees may favour an affiliated provider when appointing, may be less willing to challenge poor performance from a connected provider; or may benefit commercially from cross-selling services.

42. There was also recognition that bundled services can offer lower costs, clearer responsibility and quicker decisions. Respondents, however, also accepted that commercial interests could affect the choice or review of service providers. This becomes more important where one organisation provides several services and the scheme would find it difficult to replace them.

The important factor is not whether a provider offers multiple services, but whether the appointment and review process is transparent, robust and clearly in members’ interests.

[Universities Superannuation Scheme]

43. A further conflict identified across stakeholder groups but particularly by members, pensioner groups and trade unions arose from the relationship between professional trustees and the employer that appoints and can replace them. This was considered relevant where trustees are making decisions on matters such as surplus distribution, discretionary increases or a scheme’s endgame.

44. Respondents generally recognised that these conflicts are currently managed through conflicts policies and registers; disclosure and recusal; separation between trustee and advisory teams; competitive procurement; independent advice; and documented decision-making. In addition, recent LCP research[footnote 4] found that just 49 trustees across the seven largest Master Trusts oversee around £168 billion, more than half of occupational DC assets. Most major Master Trust boards include representatives from professional trustee firms, and some draw trustees from multiple firms. This can strengthen mutual challenge and accountability for board decisions. Respondents generally considered that these arrangements work well, although many favoured clearer and more consistent firm-level standards.

45. Views differed, however, on the effectiveness of these arrangements and the scale of the residual risk. Professional trustee firms and some advisers considered that established controls generally manage the risks effectively and that integrated services can bring efficiencies, particularly for smaller schemes. Member and pensioner groups, trade unions and some advisers were more likely to view the conflicts as structural and difficult to manage, especially under a professional corporate sole trustee arrangement where there are no other trustees to provide challenge. Few respondents were able to quantify the residual risk across the market.

46. There was broad support for greater transparency and accountability in the management of conflicts, although respondents differed on whether this required new formal safeguards or more consistent application of existing arrangements. Some respondents also supported stronger independent assurance or oversight where a professional trustee firm provides other services to a scheme. A smaller group argued that existing legal duties, TPR’s General Code and industry standards were sufficient provided that they were properly applied and supervised.

47. Views also differed on whether certain services should be prohibited. Some respondents supported a complete separation between trusteeship and advisory services or restrictions for larger schemes and higher-risk decisions. Others considered that blanket prohibitions would remove legitimate benefits from integrated provision and disproportionately affect smaller schemes. Member, pensioner and trade union respondents placed greater emphasis on independent appointments, member representation and checks on employer influence, while many industry respondents preferred proportionate, risk-based safeguards focused on the quality and transparency of decision-making.

48. Respondents agreed that professional trustees must have sufficient capacity, particularly when several schemes require urgent attention at the same time. Most industry respondents opposed a fixed limit on appointments, arguing that workload depends on the demands of each scheme and the support available. Some member, pensioner groups and trade unions favoured limits to guard against overextension, however. Although there was no consensus on a numerical cap, most respondents supported a proportionate approach based on trustees demonstrating that they have the time, resources and contingency arrangements needed to fulfil each appointment effectively.

Our response

49. The government recognises that professional trustees can bring much needed expertise and experience to the governance of pension schemes. We also recognise the importance of existing business models in providing value for money for pension schemes and that this can include the provision of bundled services.

50. We consider that restrictions on the provision of advisory services to schemes – where a commercial relationship exists between the advisory firm and a professional trustee firm represented on the scheme’s trust board – would not be proportionate. We will work with TPR to gain a clearer picture of this practice as it continues to grow within the professional trustee market, including with respect to how professional trustees select service providers to schemes.

51. The government is clear that advice and services provided to trustee boards should be independent and not be influenced by commercial considerations to ensure that trustees are equipped to act in the interests of savers. Where trustee boards receive advice from entities with a commercial link to a professional trustee firm represented on the board, the scheme should be able to explain why the arrangement is appropriate. It should also explain how any conflicts will be managed and how they have satisfied themselves that the service provides value for members.

52. Finally, given that the majority of professional trustee appointments are across a broad range of schemes, we do not feel that restrictions on the number of trustee appointments held by any one trustee would be appropriate at this stage. In the current market, the appropriate number of appointments for trustees generally depends on the individual circumstances of the trustees and the schemes they govern; this is best left to their professional judgement. We will, however, keep this under review.

Sole trustees

Question 8: Are there situations where a PCST model is more or less appropriate and why? Should there be any restrictions or suitability guidelines on PCST appointments?

53. Respondents saw the PCST model as useful where a scheme needs specialist expertise, continuity or more agile decision-making. It was most commonly seen as beneficial for smaller schemes that have difficulty recruiting trustees and for schemes undertaking a buy-in, buy-out, wind-up or other significant and time-limited project. Respondents stressed, however, that suitability depends on the circumstances of the scheme and the quality of the governance arrangements instead of scheme size alone.

PCST models are not inherently unsuitable, but their use should be clearly justified by scheme circumstances and supported by governance arrangements that maintain effective challenge and protect member outcomes.

[Pensions UK]

54. Respondents generally supported proportionate safeguards around the use of sole trustees in pension scheme governance rather than bans. They wanted transparent appointment processes, regular reviews and clear records showing why a provider was chosen and how any conflicts were managed. Some supported independent review where a trustee firm appoints a related provider.

55. They did not generally support a simple cap on PCST appointments because this would not take account of the work involved or the support available to the trustee. They saw PCSTs as suitable in some circumstances, particularly for smaller schemes or schemes going through major change. Respondents, however, wanted the appointment process to consider independence, skills, capacity and the effect on member voice.

56. Views were more divided on when a PCST might be inappropriate. Industry bodies, professional trustee firms and advisers generally opposed blanket restrictions, arguing that the model can operate effectively across a range of schemes if it is properly governed. Member and pensioner groups and trade unions were more cautious, particularly where an effective trustee board would be replaced. Where decisions involved surplus distribution or discretionary benefits, member representation and diversity of thought were viewed as especially important. Across stakeholder groups, there was support for the appointment process to consider the reasons for adopting the model; the PCST’s independence and capability; and how effective challenge and the member perspective would be maintained.

57. Respondents also agreed that the concentration of decision-making under a PCST makes transparent processes and effective assurance particularly important. This includes managing the relationship with the employer that appoints and may remove the PCST as well as conflicts arising where the trustee firm or a connected company provides other services to the scheme. While most respondents considered that these risks could be managed, many noted that the necessary checks and balances are not applied consistently. Industry respondents generally favoured proportionate safeguards and independent review in higher-risk circumstances, whereas some member and trade union respondents supported firmer restrictions or regulatory approval of certain appointments.

Question 9: If the government introduced an enhanced code of practice for sole trustees what specifically would you like to see included? Do you think existing codes of practice already cover some or all of this?

58. There was broad support for clearer and more consistent standards for sole trustees. Respondents suggested that an enhanced code should set expectations for independence, conflicts of interest, collective and peer-reviewed decision-making, capacity and business continuity. It should also require PCSTs to demonstrate how they obtain independent advice, oversee related service providers, engage with members and periodically review whether the governance model remains appropriate. A common theme was that the code should provide practical assurance that decisions are robust and focused on member outcomes rather than simply restating general principles.

59. Respondents recognised that TPR’s General Code and the Association of Professional Pensions Trustees’ (APPT) industry code for PCSTs already covered many of these matters. Some therefore questioned the need for a separate code and warned against duplicating requirements. Others considered that the current arrangements rely too heavily on voluntary compliance and do not provide sufficiently consistent assurance at firm level. The balance of responses favoured building on the existing framework with clearer expectations, stronger oversight and more consistent application instead of creating an entirely separate or prescriptive regime.

Our response

60. The government recognises that there are circumstances in which there are potential benefits of the PCST model including the expertise, continuity and faster decision making they can bring, particularly for smaller schemes and schemes approaching buyout. We are, however, alive to the risks associated with concentrating responsibility in a PCST including a reduction in the range of views involved in decisions and a potentially greater risk of conflicts of interest.

61. We, therefore, intend to work with TPR and the industry to set clearer criteria on appropriateness of the appointment of PCSTs to schemes going forward. Ensuring that PCSTs can continue to be used where they are most useful in smaller schemes and schemes approaching buyout, but not where they could weaken challenge in schemes running on. In particular, we will introduce a new requirement for existing trustee boards to approve any transition to a PCST model proposed by the sponsoring employer, in line with these criteria, and for a resolution process if the existing trustee board reject the proposal made by the sponsoring employer.

Chapter Two: Trustees and their appointment

Appointment and replacement of trustees

62. The government sought views on whether further controls or safeguards are needed for trustee appointments to ensure decisions remain in members’ interests as the pensions landscape evolves. It also asked what role government, and regulators could play in helping schemes attract a diverse and talented pool of trustees, and whether limits should be placed on the length of trustee terms or the number of times an individual may be reappointed to the same trust.

We asked

Question 10: Given the future landscape for pensions, are any further controls or safeguards needed on the appointment of trustees to ensure that decisions are made in members’ interests?

Question 11: What role can government and regulators play in helping schemes to attract a diverse and talented pool of individuals to trusteeship?

Question 12: Should there be any limits on length of trustee appointment, or should they be limited in number of repeat appointments to the same trust?

Respondents said

63. Respondents argued that trustee independence should be assessed not only by reference to legal duties but also by whether trustees are able to exercise challenge without perceived dependency on the organisation responsible for their continued tenure.

64. Member representative groups, lay and professional trustees, actuaries and trade unions raised concerns about employers’ influence over the appointment and removal of trustees, including MNTs. They noted that this could potentially undermine trustee independence or create conflicts of interest.

65. Respondents also highlighted barriers to lay trusteeship including the absence of paid time off to carry out their duties and meet their knowledge and understanding requirements.

66. Industry respondents considered the pros and cons of time limited appointments, suggesting on the one hand that long tenures can lead to entrenchment and groupthink, while on the other hand that rigid term limits risk the loss of valuable institutional knowledge. They also raised concerns about professional trustees holding a large number of appointments. This concern was shared by some actuaries. Although, many stressed that trustee capacity is not solely dependent on the number of schemes but rather on the complexity of the schemes being managed and, where applicable, the available support from teams within professional trustee firms.

While rigid or arbitrary limits on trustee tenure are likely not to be appropriate in all circumstances, clear terms of office play an important role in maintaining effective governance.

[LCP]

Our response

67. As set out above, we will further consider whether current arrangements for appointment of trustees within Master Trusts remain fit for purpose in megafunds and whether they enable strong challenge and diversity of thought and clarity that decisions are clearly taken in savers’ interests.

68. We agree with consultation respondents that a diverse and capable pool of trustees is fundamental for good governance in the trust-based market. We are, therefore, committed to working with the industry to facilitate a diverse and capable pool of trustees. As we set out in further detail below, we plan to work with TPR to update the syllabus for trustee training. We will also work with industry to improve the accessibility and relevance of training and continuing development with a view to raising capability across the market. This will be crucial in ensuring the future market is governed effectively and in members’ interests.

69. With respect to term limits for trustees, we agree with the majority of consultation responses that the government does not need to impose a standard limit at this stage. While the UK Corporate Governance Code recommends a nine-year limit when assessing the independence of non-executive directors, pension schemes are long-term arrangements and can benefit from the continuity of scheme-specific knowledge and experience.

70. Mandatory limits could result in valuable expertise being lost, at important points in a scheme’s journey. We therefore consider that individual schemes are best placed to determine appropriate tenure, while guarding against the risks of groupthink and insufficient challenge associated with repeated or lengthy appointments. We will continue to consider how the governance of larger schemes can support effective challenge as the market develops.

Is there a role for a public (independent) trustee?

71. The consultation sought views on whether TPR should have the ability to appoint a public trustee in situations where schemes require replacement trustees or where orphan schemes have no trustee in place. This included asking whether a public trustee model, similar to those used in some other jurisdictions, could have a role as a trustee of last resort.

We asked

Question 13: Would it be appropriate to introduce a new public trustee who could be appointed by the Pensions Regulator? If so, in what circumstances would a public trustee appointment be preferable to a professional trustee from TPR’s independent trustee register? And why?

Question 14: Are there any reasons why TPR’s powers of intervention regarding trustees should be modified and if so in what way should they be modified?

Respondents said

72. Responses on the proposal for a public trustee were mixed. Some respondents argued that a publicly appointed trustee could provide an additional source of independence and challenge in certain circumstances, particularly where: governance had broken down; there was no suitable trustee available; or concerns existed about conflicts of interest or the ability of existing governance arrangements to act in members’ interests. A number of consumer representatives and governance specialists also suggested that an independent trustee could help strengthen member confidence in large and increasingly complex pension arrangements by providing additional assurance that decisions were being taken independently of commercial or employer interests.

73. Other respondents questioned whether there was a clear problem that required the creation of a new public trustee function. Advisers, providers and industry bodies argued that existing mechanisms – including TPR’s current trustee appointment powers and independent trustee register – already provided routes for intervention where governance concerns arise. These respondents generally preferred strengthening existing arrangements rather than creating a new class of trustee.

74. A recurring theme across responses was that the objectives associated with a public trustee – including trustee independence, diversity of thought, member confidence and effective challenge – were seen as important. Respondents, however, held differing views on whether these outcomes would be best achieved through a new public trustee role; stronger standards for trustees; enhanced regulatory oversight; improvements to trustee appointment processes; or wider governance reforms. While there was no consensus, responses highlighted broader concerns regarding governance, independence and accountability in an increasingly consolidated pensions market.

Our response

75. Many respondents pointed to TPR’s existing powers to appoint an independent trustee and the arrangements already in place for identifying suitably qualified professional trustees as being sufficient. Respondents considered that these mechanisms allow TPR to appoint a trustee with the skills and experience appropriate to the circumstances of an individual scheme. Some respondents questioned how a public trustee would be funded, held accountable and equipped with the necessary expertise. Respondents questioned further whether it would duplicate existing provision. Some saw a possible role in particular circumstances, such as where a scheme was orphaned and no suitable commercial trustee was willing or able to act.

76. As set out above, we will take forward changes to the Master Trust regime to enable more proactive intervention by TPR where a scheme is at risk of breaching its authorisation criteria. This will strengthen TPR’s ability to respond before governance concerns crystallise into more serious risks to members.

77. Responses also raised wider questions about how trustee independence, accountability and member confidence should be maintained as schemes become larger, more complex and increasingly systemically important. Respondents emphasised that governance and regulatory oversight will need to evolve alongside consolidation with clear arrangements for timely intervention where trustee independence, capability or continuity is at risk.

78. The government will continue to consider whether alternative approaches to trustee appointments, representation and governance, or further safeguards, may be appropriate for the future pensions landscape as the market develops. This will include considering how the governance of the largest schemes can continue to command members’ confidence as schemes grow in scale and complexity. We will work closely with TPR, industry stakeholders and other partners as this work develops.

Trustee directory

79. In 2023, the government and TPR committed to produce a directory of trustees, which would enable TPR to have greater clarity around the identity of trustees and, therefore, allow TPR to improve its oversight of trustees. TPR currently receives information about schemes and their trustees through scheme registration, updates and periodic scheme returns. Additional information is provided by schemes subject to authorisation and ongoing supervision. The scope, quality, consistency and frequency of this information, however, varies across the industry and between scheme types. The existing data does not enable TPR to reliably identify and track individual trustees across multiple appointments. The consultation sought views on the most effective ways to obtain further information needed to monitor and track trustees and provide a deliverable method of uniquely identifying individual trustees without significantly increasing the burden on TPR, schemes or trustees themselves.

We asked

Question 15: How can TPR ensure it has the information it needs for the directory without creating greater administrative requirements for schemes?

Respondents said

80. There was broad support across respondents for improving TPR’s visibility of trustee appointments through a directory. Most respondents favoured collecting information through existing regulatory processes, particularly the annual scheme return, and reusing information already obtained through authorisation, supervision and fit-and-proper assessments. Unique trustee identifiers and a secure TPR portal were also suggested to reduce duplication and protect sensitive personal information.

81. The main differences concerned the directory’s scope and operation. Some respondents supported a comprehensive directory while others preferred a narrower register focused on accredited professional trustees. Larger schemes cautioned against duplicating information already provided through supervision while industry bodies stressed the need for a proportionate approach for smaller schemes. Trade unions and member representatives placed greater emphasis on using the information to monitor trustee independence, workloads, market concentration and member-nominated representation.

82. Although respondents generally supported better regulatory visibility, there was concern about making the directory public because of trustee privacy. Respondents also called for greater clarity about the directory’s purpose, classifications and safeguards.

Our response

83. The government will continue to work with TPR to establish and test the feasibility of an initial Trustee Directory by 2029, using existing data and powers where possible. We will consider what legislative changes might be required to support this.

Chapter Three: Skills and knowledge

84. We asked how we can ensure trustees to have the knowledge, expertise and leadership skills required to make sound decisions and deliver good outcomes for members in a changing pensions landscape. We also asked what additional measures, if any, may be needed to support consistent standards across the trustee sector. Given the growing role of professional trustees in the pensions system, the consultation also sought views on whether additional requirements – including mandatory accreditation – should apply to ensure consistent standards and capability across the sector.

Accreditation for professional trustees

We asked

Question 16: What skills will trustees of trust-based pension schemes need in order to be an effective and efficient trustee board? For example, areas such as leadership experience, negotiation skills, investment management, (including sustainability-related investment management), communications, financial planning? What other areas should trustees have proficiency in?

Question 17: Would it be appropriate for TPR to set statutory higher standards for professional trustees? What should these standards look like?

Respondents said

85. Stakeholder respondents broadly agreed that trustee capability should be considered primarily at board level with trustee boards collectively possessing the skills and experience needed to govern schemes effectively. Respondents generally did not consider it necessary, or realistic, for every trustee to be an expert in all aspects of scheme management. Instead, there was broad support for all trustees having sufficient knowledge and understanding to participate fully in decision-making, scrutinise advice and exercise effective judgement, while drawing on the complementary expertise of other board members and professional advisers.

86. Across stakeholder groups there was considerable agreement that trustees of the future will require a broader range of skills than has traditionally been expected. Respondents consistently highlighted the importance of sound judgement, leadership, communication, negotiation and the ability to challenge advisers and service providers. Many also emphasised the need for boards to maintain strong collective capability in investment and funding matters including understanding investment strategy, sustainability-related considerations, private markets, retirement income solutions and, for DB schemes, funding, covenant and endgame issues. Respondents noted that, as schemes consolidate and governance models evolve, trustee skills requirements are shifting beyond traditional pensions expertise towards strategic oversight, risk management and decision-making in increasingly complex environments.

87. Respondents also identified a growing need for trustees to develop knowledge in areas associated with technological and operational change. There was significant support for strengthening capability around administration oversight, cyber security, operational resilience, data governance, AI and the management of outsourced service providers. Many respondents considered these areas to be increasingly important sources of risk and opportunity as schemes become larger, more data driven and more reliant on third-party service providers. Some respondents also highlighted the need for greater investment in trustee development, training and governance support functions to ensure boards can adapt to these changing demands.

88. While there was broad consensus on the importance of maintaining high standards of trustee capability, some differences emerged regarding the attributes that should be prioritised. Pension industry respondents tended to place greater emphasis on technical competence, governance expertise, investment oversight and the ability to navigate complex regulatory and financial issues. Member, pensioner and trade union respondents were more likely to emphasise independence, challenge, understanding of members’ circumstances and the value of diverse perspectives. These respondents argued that member insight, lived experience and a willingness to challenge employers and advisers were important complements to technical expertise and should continue to be reflected within trustee board composition.

89. Respondents generally supported high standards for all trustees but especially professional trustees and many recognised the role that existing accreditation frameworks – particularly those operated by the Pensions Management Institute (PMI) and APPT – play in promoting professionalism, continuing professional development and good governance. Many stakeholders favoured stronger expectations around training, ongoing learning, conflict management and regulatory oversight. Views, however, diverged on whether accreditation should be made mandatory.

90. While a substantial number of respondents supported mandatory accreditation and enhanced statutory standards for professional trustees, others cautioned against creating overly prescriptive requirements or barriers to entry. Concerns were raised that mandatory accreditation, particularly if applied more widely than professional trustees, could reduce the pool of candidates available for trusteeship and diminish the diversity of experience and perspectives represented on trustee boards. Several respondents therefore favoured proportionate or tiered approaches, with higher standards applying to professional trustees and those governing larger or more complex schemes, while preserving accessible routes into trusteeship for lay trustees.

We think the introduction of any mandatory accreditation requirements would be likely to intensify difficulties in recruiting lay trustees and should therefore be avoided.

[Isio]

91. Overall, responses suggested a preference for strengthening trustee capability through enhanced training, continuing professional development and clearer expectations around board skills and competence, rather than through a universal mandatory accreditation regime. Respondents generally supported a proportionate approach that builds on existing accreditation frameworks; strengthens trustee knowledge and understanding requirements; and improves visibility of trustee capability.

Our response

92. The government agrees with respondents that strong trustee capability is essential to effective scheme governance, particularly as pension schemes become larger, more complex and increasingly reliant on technology and specialist service providers. In addition, the government is placing new duties on trustees of DC schemes to design and deliver default pensions, either directly or through a third party. We recognise the important contribution that professionalisation, accreditation frameworks and continuing professional development already make in raising standards across the market. We support the continued development of these industry-led initiatives and will work closely with TPR and industry bodies to promote high standards of trustee capability.

93. We do not, however, intend to mandate accreditation for any type of scheme trustee at this stage. While accreditation can play an important role in demonstrating competence and supporting professional development, respondents highlighted the value of trustee boards drawing on a broad mix of skills, experience and perspectives. We are concerned that mandatory accreditation requirements could narrow the pipeline of potential trustees and discourage participation from individuals with valuable expertise from other professions, as well as member-nominated and other lay trustees. This could reduce the diversity of thought and experience that many respondents considered an important feature of effective trustee boards.

94. Instead, we will raise standards through stronger and broader knowledge and understanding requirements supported by continuing professional development and proportionate regulatory oversight. We will work with TPR to update the trustee knowledge and understanding framework so that it reflects the changing demands of trusteeship. This will include areas such as providing default pensions for savers; investment governance; oversight of advisers and service providers; trusteeship of large and systemically important schemes; cyber security; data governance; and AI.

95. Effective governance depends not only on the capability of individual trustees but also on the collective capability of the board. We therefore consider that trustee board chairs should play a clearer role in assessing whether their boards have and exercise the right balance of skills, experience and perspectives. We will work with TPR to develop a competency framework to support these assessments and introduce a new requirement for chairs to assess the level and the effectiveness of the skills mix on their board. We will also consider how TPR can make proportionate use of existing reporting and enforcement arrangements to gain greater visibility of trustee skills and board capability; helping them to identify gaps and target regulatory support where it is most needed and take action where appropriate.

Support for lay trustees

96. We sought views on how to ensure that member and employer perspectives are still reflected on and to trustee boards when there are fewer, larger schemes with no or multiple sponsoring employers. We also asked how lay trustees could be better supported to carry out their role effectively.

We asked

Question 18: We are moving towards models of trusteeship that do not include as many lay trustees as now, what important benefits or skills of lay trustees should we try to replicate in consolidated structures? And how should it be achieved?

Question 19: What support/continuing professional development (CPD) would you like to see put in place for lay trustees? Should all trustees be accredited? Would it lead to a trustee shortage? Who would pay for it including time as well as any learning and development costs?

Respondents said

97. Responses from the pensions industry considered that lay trustees bring diversity of thought, practical judgement and experience from outside the pensions sector. Their willingness to ask straightforward or fundamental questions was seen as a valuable source of challenge and a safeguard against groupthink. Lay trustees also provide knowledge of the scheme’s history, membership and sponsoring employer that may be difficult for professional trustees to acquire.

98. Respondents generally favoured retaining lay and member-nominated trustees where possible. Where this was not practicable, they suggested structured member engagement, member impact assessments and effective arrangements for preserving institutional knowledge.

99. Scheme respondents flagged that lay trustees’ knowledge of the scheme, employer and member circumstances can help boards assess the practical implications of decisions and communicate effectively with members. They thought consolidated schemes should try to retain member perspectives where possible through the use of member and employer representation where appropriate, supported by regular engagement.

100. Respondents suggested the principal barriers to effective participation in the market by lay and member-nominated trustees were the time and cost of training, rather than a lack of willingness among lay trustees to develop their knowledge.

101. As set out above, respondents emphasised the importance of appropriate skill mixes at the board level rather than at the level of each individual trustee. Most favoured a proportionate, board-led approach to CPD, informed by skills assessments and individual training plans. While some supported accreditation, others considered that making it compulsory could discourage candidates and accelerate the move away from lay trustees.

102. Responses from pension schemes tended to support regular, relevant training rather than a uniform curriculum. They considered that trustee boards should identify their own capability gaps and agree appropriate development plans, with training treated as a normal cost of governance. Some supported accreditation as a means of demonstrating competence whereas others warned that mandatory requirements could make recruitment more difficult, particularly for closed schemes or those already struggling to attract member-nominated trustees.

103. Member and trade union respondents placed particular emphasis on practical support from employers. This included paid release for meetings, preparation and training, alongside funding for any learning costs. Many considered that the Trustee Toolkit and ongoing scheme-specific training provided an adequate foundation and opposed mandatory accreditation where it might create a barrier to member-nominated trustees. Trade unions were also identified as an important source of training and support for lay trustees.

Our response

104. The government agrees with respondents on the important contribution that lay and member-nominated trustees make to pension scheme governance. We will continue to work with TPR to support these trustees through the development of training. We have decided not to introduce mandatory professional accreditation for lay or member-nominated trustees, or any other group of trustees, at this time. Nor do we consider it proportionate to place additional requirements on employers to provide paid time off or compensation for member-nominated trustees, although we will keep this position under review.

105. As set out above, we will also further consider appointment and removal arrangements for trustees of Master Trusts, with the aim of strengthening trustee independence and accountability. This will include whether the current model should be supplemented by appropriate independent oversight and a greater role for members.

106. Our approach is intended to support high standards of trustee competence while recognising the valuable member insight, scheme knowledge and diversity of perspective that lay and member-nominated trustees bring. By focusing on proportionate training and ongoing development, rather than mandatory accreditation, we can improve trustee capability without creating unnecessary costs or barriers to participation.

Chapter Four: Member voice

107. The consultation asked how members’ voices can continue to be heard and reflected effectively in governance arrangements as schemes become larger, more diverse and increasingly reliant on professional trustee structures.

We asked

Question 20: How can we ensure trustee boards take into account the perspectives of members in their decision making?

Question 21: Can you give any examples of best practice in the UK or internationally that demonstrate schemes taking appropriate account of their members’ views?

Respondents said

108. Respondents generally agreed that trustee boards should consider member perspectives as part of their decision-making, although views differed on how this could best be achieved. Respondents considered that member input can help trustee boards better understand member needs and preferences; improve the design and communication of decisions; enhance trust and accountability; and provide challenge and diversity of thought that may otherwise be lost as governance becomes more professionalised and consolidated.

109. Member representative groups and trade unions strongly supported maintaining or strengthening direct member representation, arguing that member-nominated trustees provide an important safeguard, bring first-hand understanding of member concerns and help ensure that members’ interests are reflected in key decisions. Many expressed concern that consolidation and the growth of sole trustee models could weaken the member voice unless accompanied by formal consultation and engagement arrangements.

110. Professional trustees, industry bodies, administrators and Master Trusts highlighted the use of alternatives to MNTs, such as member surveys, forums, advisory panels, complaints data, member outcome metrics and formal member impact assessments to ensure boards are informed by a broad and representative understanding of member views.

Best practice examples include the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) member panel, which provides structured input into trustee deliberations, and the use of open consultations, data analysis, and targeted communications to gather member insights on decumulation and retirement options.

[PMI]

111. Across stakeholder groups there was broad support for stronger member engagement; greater transparency around trustee decision making; and clearer mechanisms in order to demonstrate how member feedback has been considered when making decisions affecting members. Respondents highlighted a range of examples of schemes seeking to incorporate member views into governance. Member representative groups were most likely to point to governance structures that embed member representation directly in decision making, citing trustee boards of a number of large UK DB schemes with strong member-nominated trustee representation.

The BT Pension Scheme takes a systematic approach to understanding its members’ views. It gathers feedback through an annual member survey, a 3,000-member panel, post-interaction surveys and telephone and digital channels. In 2025, it collected 54,100 pieces of feedback from around 250,000 members. These insights are used to identify areas for improvement and inform the Scheme’s ongoing programme to improve member communications, services and journeys.

[Brightwell]

112. Industry bodies, professional trustees and advisers tended to focus on formal engagement mechanisms such as member advisory panels, member governance committees, surveys, focus groups, annual member meetings, workshops and structured consultation exercises. Several respondents argued that best practice involves not only gathering member views but demonstrating how those views have influenced decisions through feedback loops and transparent reporting.

113. Respondents recognised the challenges associated with replicating traditional member-nominated trustee models in large Master Trusts and megafunds, where memberships are diverse, geographically dispersed and often number in the millions. There was little consensus around any single model for gathering member views with many respondents favouring flexibility and proportionality over prescriptive requirements.

114. Several respondents also pointed to examples of more deliberative approaches, both in the UK and internationally, where trustees seek structured input from representative groups of members on significant strategic issues. Respondents generally agreed that good practice involves not only gathering members’ views but demonstrating how those views have informed subsequent decisions and communications.

115. Respondents generally supported retaining flexibility in how schemes engage with members while recognising that governance structures and appointment arrangements may need to evolve alongside wider changes in the pensions market to ensure decision-making remains independent and focused on members’ interests.

An innovative approach used internationally is the Participant Dialogue undertaken by Pensioenfonds Detail Handel, a Dutch scheme, in 2024. A representative group of around 50 members took part in three one-day meetings to share views on responsible investing and develop 49 recommendations that are being taken forward by the scheme’s board.

[LCP]

All 16 of our trustee directors are nominated by the members and employers of the schemes and have a broad understanding of member views; 8 directors are nominated by member organisations and elected by scheme members, with 2 specifically nominated and elected by pensioners and deferred pensioners and 6 by active members.

The schemes’ Pensions and Management Committees, which have been implemented by around a quarter of sponsoring employers and include over 150 committee members, are another key forum for understanding the member perspective.

The trustee recognises the importance of member views in its decision making, and seeks these views through various other means, including:

  • a dedicated online feedback group called “Platform” which is open to all members
  • an annual member survey undertaken in partnership with the Institute of Customer Service
  • members are given the opportunity to give a satisfaction, net-promotor and effort score, as well as provide verbatim comments
  • member surveys on sustainable ownership and an annual member-focussed
  • sustainable ownership report (specifically designed in response to member feedback)”

[RailPen]

Our response

116. The government is clear that member voice is an important part of good pension scheme governance. As we move towards a market of fewer, larger schemes, the distance between trustees and individual members is likely to grow. It will therefore become increasingly important that trustees understand the needs and circumstances of their membership and can demonstrate that members’ perspectives are appropriately reflected in their decision making.

117. We recognise the concern raised by respondents that the decline in member-nominated trustees could weaken the link between trustee boards and their members. However, we also recognise that the traditional member-nominated trustee model, developed primarily for individual employer DB schemes, cannot simply be replicated in the increasingly large and diverse DC schemes of the future. In schemes with potentially millions of members, spread across different employers and locations, appointing a small number of member-nominated trustees would not on its own ensure that the full range of member perspectives was represented.

118. Member-nominated trustees play a vital role in pension scheme governance by bringing valuable “skin in the game” to the trustee board. As such, they have an important role in challenging other trustees and advisers, infusing trustee boards with diversity of thought and protecting against groupthink. The government supports the value these trustees bring to schemes and member outcomes across the country.

119. There will continue to be an important role for member-nominated trustees where that model works well. But larger and more diverse schemes will also need to consider other effective ways of maintaining a meaningful connection with their members. The examples provided through the consultation, including member panels, surveys, forums and more deliberative approaches, indicate that there are potentially a range of often complementary ways of doing this. We expect schemes to adopt approaches that are appropriate to the scale, nature and diversity of their membership and which provide meaningful input into trustee decision making.

120. We will further consider how governance within automatic enrolment schemes that do not currently have member-nominated trustees can best provide effective challenge and embed consideration of member perspectives in strategic decision making.

121. Our wider reforms will support this approach by strengthening trustee capability, independence and accountability. Taken together with our further work on governance and representation, these measures will help ensure that consolidation does not weaken the member perspective and that members’ interests remain central to trustee decision making as the pensions market evolves.

Chapter Five: Administration

122. Pension scheme administration is fundamental to the effective operation of schemes and the delivery of good member outcomes. Administration providers are responsible for the day-to-day operation of pension schemes and critically a pension scheme administrator’s main role is to ensure that the right person receives the right amount at the right time.

123. Consequently, the consultation sought views on pension scheme administration. It considered whether administrators have the necessary capacity, skills and resilience, and whether the existing regulatory framework provides sufficient oversight. It explored whether clearer standards, greater consistency and enhanced regulatory oversight, including of Integrated Service Providers, may be needed to support a larger and increasingly consolidated market.

We asked

Question 22: What benefits and challenges do you foresee if mandatory minimum standards were introduced for scheme administrators and/or wider administration services such as Integrated Service Providers?

Question 23: Should TPR have the same levels of regulatory oversight as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) regarding administrators and/or wider administration services, and why?

Question 24: Should administrators have to be registered with TPR to be involved in administering a scheme? If so should TPR be able to deregister an administrator? (A model similar to that in Ireland) 

Question 25: What risks if any, do increased levels of consolidation activity in the DC sector pose to administration service providers? How can these risks be mitigated to ensure an orderly transition to megafunds?

Respondents said

124. There was broad support for introducing mandatory minimum standards for administrators. Many respondents agreed that a consistent baseline could improve data quality, cyber security, operational resilience and service delivery. Respondents also considered that minimum standards could strengthen accountability, support trustee oversight, reduce errors and delays and improve confidence in the pensions system.

125. Respondents consistently emphasised that any standards should be proportionate and outcome focused. Across stakeholder groups, there was strong support for building on existing regulatory and industry frameworks rather than creating a wholly new regime. Many argued that standards should focus on measurable member outcomes and key risks such as operational resilience, data quality and business continuity, while remaining flexible enough to accommodate different operating models.

126. Many respondents also cautioned against an overly prescriptive approach. Administrators, service providers and industry bodies warned that duplicative requirements or detailed process-based rules could increase costs, divert resources from member services, reduce innovation and place disproportionate burdens on smaller providers. Some suggested that such an approach could contribute to further market consolidation.

127. There was also general support for a stronger role for TPR in overseeing pension administration. Respondents, however, emphasised that any enhanced oversight should reflect the trust-based nature of occupational pensions and complement, rather than replace, trustee accountability. While views differed on the precise design of a future regime, many stressed that occupational pension administration differs fundamentally from the contract-based market.

128. Overall, respondents favoured a proportionate minimum standards framework overseen by TPR. Responses suggested that any future regime should strengthen oversight of administration providers while preserving the central role of trustees in acting on behalf of members.

129. There was broad support for exploring a registration framework for pension scheme administrators. Respondents generally recognised that administration services are becoming increasingly important to member outcomes as schemes consolidate and a smaller number of providers serve larger sections of the market. Many considered that a registration regime could improve transparency; give TPR greater visibility of the administration market; and support trustees when selecting and reviewing providers.

130. Respondents consistently emphasised that any registration framework should be proportionate and tailored to the occupational pensions market. Many favoured a model that would give TPR a more direct supervisory relationship with administration providers and strengthen accountability and resilience while avoiding unnecessary barriers to entry or reductions in market capacity. There was also support for TPR having powers to deregister providers in serious cases where they are unable or unwilling to meet expected standards.

131. Responses also highlighted the challenges and risks associated with increasing consolidation. Respondents noted that large-scale transfers can place significant pressure on capacity, systems and skilled resources, particularly where multiple transfers occur simultaneously. Concerns included poor-quality legacy data, migration errors, service disruption and cyber incidents with greater market concentration potentially increasing the impact of failures at individual providers. Some also warned that consolidation could reduce competition and make it harder for smaller or specialist administrators to remain in the market.

132. Against this backdrop, many respondents saw a role for TPR in monitoring market capacity and operational resilience across the sector. This could include identifying where the timing or volume of transfers creates operational risks; setting clear expectations for migration planning and resilience; and supporting these requirements through proportionate reporting and early-warning indicators.

Disorderly exit

We asked

Question 26: What role should TPR take in reducing the risk and impact of a disorderly market exit by an administration provider?

Respondents said

133. Consultation responses did not suggest that the failure of a major administration provider was likely in the short term. Respondents, however, generally supported a stronger role for TPR in identifying financial and operational pressures before they resulted in market exit. Across stakeholder groups, there was support for a preventative approach focused on monitoring market capacity and provider concentration alongside measures to strengthen operational resilience. Suggested measures included requirements for larger providers to maintain credible wind-down and transition plans; demonstrate data portability and continuity of critical services; and provide early notification where significant risks emerge. Some respondents also supported guidance for trustees on contingency planning, including contractual exit arrangements, access to scheme data and continuity of pension payroll.

134. Views differed on the extent of TPR’s role once a provider was failing. Some respondents favoured a more interventionist approach, including financial resilience requirements, formal oversight of transfers and a panel of administrators able to act as providers of last resort. Others argued that TPR should focus on market oversight, guidance and early engagement rather than managing individual provider exits directly.

135. Despite these differences, there was broad agreement that early intervention and effective transition planning would be more effective than relying on deregistration or forced transfers after services had already become unstable.

Our response

136. The government believes that trustees should retain overall responsibility for the administration of their scheme and for member outcomes. We, however, plan to introduce requirements for pension scheme administrators administering schemes regulated by TPR (public and private sector) relating to data and operational resilience. This will provide clearer accountability while maintaining trustees’ important oversight role.

137. Therefore, the government intends to work with the industry to design and introduce mandatory minimum standards for pension scheme administration providers. We intend to focus these minimum standards on the key foundations of good administration including accurate records, resilience and the ability to transfer administration services effectively. These are essential to ensuring members receive the right information and the right benefits at the right time.

138. We envisage taking a principle-based approach to data standards. Administrators should maintain records that are accurate, complete, accessible and capable of being transferred to another administrator without disproportionate cost, delay or manual reconstruction. This should be supported by appropriate governance arrangements, documented data definitions as well as controls, regular monitoring of data quality and plans to address material data gaps where they are identified.

139. We will consider how the standards should reflect the different needs and outcomes of defined benefit and defined contribution schemes and will engage closely with the industry to ensure the standards are workable and proportionate. To facilitate ongoing good practice in the industry, we plan to base these standards around existing standards for administration, including those published by TPR and the Pension Administration Standards Association (PASA). We also recognise that some administration providers will also be FCA-regulated providers. We expect wider initiatives, including Pensions Dashboards and the Value for Money framework to support continued improvements in service quality.

140. This should enable effective competition by making it easier for trustees to change provider. Removing unnecessary barriers to switching should help the market function more effectively and strengthen the incentives for providers to compete on quality.

141. We also intend to require pension scheme administrators who administer schemes regulated by TPR (public and private sector) to register with TPR. Registration will give TPR a clearer view of the administration market and help it identify risks early. We intend for TPR to be able to request information, investigate concerns and require administrators to put problems right. Where there are serious failings, TPR will be able to issue warnings, improvement notices and financial penalties.

Question 27: To help us better understand the trustee landscape and the potential impacts of any changes emerging from the consultation, we would welcome some information regarding the scheme or provider you are answering on behalf of in the table below.

142. We are grateful to those respondents who provided information about the scheme, organisation or provider on whose behalf they responded in response to Question 27. This information is important in helping us understand the breadth and composition of the trustee and provider landscape and in placing the substantive responses in their proper context.

143. It has also helped us assess whether issues are experienced differently across scheme types, sizes and governance models. It also helped us consider how any potential changes may affect different parts of the market. This evidence will support the development of proportionate policy that reflects the diversity of the pensions landscape and avoids unintended consequences for particular schemes or providers.

List of consultation respondents

  • Michael Johnson
  • Esso Pensions
  • Keith Horgan
  • Chevron UK
  • BP Pensioner Group
  • Trafalgar House
  • Knowa
  • Siva Shakar
  • Unite
  • Nick Hill
  • Alex Kent
  • Chartered IIA
  • ROPA (Royal Ordnance Pensioners Association)
  • Standard Life Master Trust Board
  • SPP
  • Aptia
  • Aon
  • TfL
  • ACA
  • John Tissington
  • MUFG
  • APL
  • John Springall
  • IGG
  • Johnson and Johnson Pensioners Group
  • AMNT
  • RSM
  • AMEX Pensioners Group
  • LawDeb
  • LCP (Lane Clark & Peacock)
  • APPT
  • EY
  • ECPA
  • CMS
  • Muse
  • UKSIF
  • Patricia Kennedy
  • ZEDRA
  • TPT
  • USS
  • Dalriada
  • Pension Administration Standards Association (PASA)
  • People’s Partnership
  • Falcon
  • Mercer
  • Capital Cranfield
  • Sackers
  • Broadstone
  • TISA
  • LLA
  • Aviva Pension Trustee
  • WTW
  • PMI
  • Lumera
  • XPS
  • Capita
  • Which?
  • Slaughter and May
  • Gallagher
  • Squire Patton Boggs
  • BESTrustees
  • First Bus
  • Vidett
  • Age UK
  • ABI
  • PwC
  • Brightwell
  • Standard Life
  • Pensions UK
  • Saul
  • ShareAction
  • Scottish Widows
  • Quantum
  • Railpen
  • Smart Pension
  • BA
  • LPPA
  • Intellica
  • First Actuarial
  • PPF
  • Hymans Robertson
  • Heywood
  • Andrew Evans
  • Legal & General
  • National Employment Savings Trust (NEST)
  • KCL
  • Pi Partnership
  • Arc
  • RWE Group
  • Authently Consulting
  • CFA
  • WLP LLP
  • Barnett Waddingham
  • Isio
  • Anon
  • UKSIF (second submission recorded separately)
  • TPR
  • Investors in People
  • 36 anonymous responses