Open consultation

Police and law enforcement access to DVLA driver licensing data consultation

Published 7 July 2026

About this consultation

This consultation begins on 7 July 2026 and ends at 11:59pm on 8 September 2026.

This consultation is aimed at:

• United Kingdom devolved administrations
• the National Police Chiefs’ Council
• police and crime commissioners
• police and law enforcement organisations
• regulators

Representations are also welcome from interested civil society and professional organisations.

Publication of responses

A paper summarising the responses to this consultation will be published on GOV.UK, including a list of organisations that responded (but not individuals’ personal details).

The government will also publish its formal response to the consultation on GOV.UK.

Confidentiality

Information provided in response to this consultation, including personal information, may be published or disclosed in accordance with access to information regimes (principally the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the Data Protection Act 2018 and the UK GDPR). If you want the information you provide to be treated as confidential, please clearly explain why. We will take full account of your explanation, but we cannot guarantee confidentiality in all circumstances.

How we use your information

The Home Office is the data controller for any personal data you provide. We will process your personal data for the purposes of this consultation on the basis of your consent and in line with the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018. We will retain consultation responses for up to 2 years. You have rights to access, rectify or, in certain circumstances, erase your personal data and to withdraw consent. You may complain to the Information Commissioner’s Office if you are dissatisfied with our handling of your data.

Complaints or comments

If you have complaints or comments about the consultation process, contact the Home Office at the address below.

How to respond

You can respond online or email your responses to ple-dl-consultation@homeoffice.gov.uk.

Responses can also be sent to:

DVLA Driver Consultation
Public Safety Group
2 Marsham Street
London
SW1P 4DF

Foreword

Policing and law enforcement rely on timely, accurate information to protect the public, prevent harm and bring offenders to justice. For many years, access to DVLA driver licensing data has played an important role in supporting these objectives, particularly in road traffic enforcement and in helping officers resolve incidents quickly and safely.

This consultation forms part of the government’s wider commitment to ensuring that data‑sharing frameworks are clear, lawful and fit for the future. As policing systems modernise, it is right that we review whether the statutory basis for accessing DVLA driver data remains appropriate, and whether it continues to strike the right balance between operational effectiveness and the protection of individual rights.

The proposals set out in this document do not start from a presumption of increased access. Rather, they are focused on clarity: clarity about who can access DVLA driver data, for what purposes, and under what conditions. A central theme is the strengthening of governance, safeguards and oversight, including statutory codes of practice, mandatory training and vetting, robust audit arrangements and enhanced transparency. These measures are essential to maintaining public confidence and ensuring that access is demonstrably necessary and proportionate.

We recognise that DVLA driver data contains sensitive personal information and that its use must be carefully controlled. That is why this consultation asks specific questions about the scope of permitted purposes. We are particularly keen to hear views on how safeguards can be designed to support legitimate operational needs while preventing misuse or disproportionate impacts.

I encourage all interested parties to engage with this consultation and to share their views and expertise. Your responses will help shape a modern, resilient and transparent framework that supports effective policing and law enforcement, protects individual rights, and maintains the trust of the public we serve.

Bethan Page-Jones

Director, Public Safety Group

Executive summary

The UK Government is launching a consultation to inform the next stage of reforms to the statutory framework governing police and law enforcement access to DVLA driver licensing data. The aim is to create a clear, resilient and future‑proof legal basis for access that better reflects modern operational needs, while maintaining strong safeguards for privacy, data protection and human rights. Currently automated access to DVLA data for the police and law enforcement is principally tied to road traffic purposes under the existing legislative gateway, and other uses rely on manual requests and case‑by‑case disclosure. This can create delays and inconsistency in asking for information, including in urgent safeguarding or time‑critical investigative contexts.

This consultation seeks views on how broad the permitted purposes should be for using DVLA driver data beyond road traffic enforcement. The government is consulting on a graduated set of options, from maintaining the current purposes, through extending access for serious crime and national security, to access for all crime, and the broadest option, access for the full range of policing purposes (including safeguarding and other public protection activity) as set out in relevant policing frameworks. Consultation responses will help determine what balance should be struck between operational effectiveness (using automated systems) and interference with individual rights, ensuring the framework remains lawful, necessary and proportionate.

A central focus of the consultation is governance, safeguards and public confidence. Under all options, the reforms are intended to be underpinned by a statutory governance model, including a statutory Code of Practice, mandatory training and vetting requirements, immutable (tamper proof) audit logs recording the purpose and justification for each access, and annual reporting to Parliament to enhance transparency and accountability. The Home Office also intends to maintain a public list of authorised organisations and permitted purposes, and to continue engagement with regulators, civil society and equality bodies as the framework is developed. The consultation asks what minimum standards and oversight measures are needed to ensure access is controlled, auditable and used appropriately across authorised organisations.

This consultation also addresses fairness and equalities impacts, recognising that expanding access may bring both benefits (for example, faster safeguarding and improved operational decision‑making) and risks, including the potential for disproportionate impacts in frontline practice and the risk of misuse of personal information. The proposals therefore emphasise mitigations through clear statutory rules, training, audit and transparent reporting, so that any disproportionate effects or misuse can be detected and addressed.

Finally, the government is clear that this DVLA driver data access consultation is separate from the Home Office’s work on facial recognition and biometrics policy. It focuses on clarifying and (subject to consultation) expanding the statutory basis for accessing driver licensing information for policing and law enforcement purposes, and it is intended to avoid mischaracterisation of DVLA access as enabling new biometric search capabilities. Access remains case‑specific and operationally justified, and the consultation is seeking views to shape a framework that supports public safety and effectiveness while protecting rights and maintaining public trust.

A modern legal framework for DVLA driver data access

Police and law enforcement have relied on DVLA driver licensing information for decades as a practical tool to confirm identity and driving status, support road traffic enforcement, and help resolve incidents quickly and safely. The current statutory gateway for automated access was established through section 71 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, operationalised by the Motor Vehicles (Access to Driver Licensing Records) Regulations 2001. Those provisions enabled officers to obtain DVLA driver licensing information through national policing systems for specified purposes linked primarily to road traffic enforcement and a small number of related statutory contexts.

The original case for a statutory gateway emerged from a wider drive to modernise policing information flows at a time when vehicle crime and roadside encounters created strong operational pressures. The consultation into vehicle crime in the late 1990s into vehicle crime, and subsequent policy work, led to a national shift away from slow, manual, paper‑based checks towards automated access via police systems. That automation has since become embedded into day‑to‑day policing practice: DVLA driver data is accessed almost 6 million times a year to support routine enforcement and checks, and it now sits within a landscape where policing is increasingly data‑enabled and time‑critical decisions are made to support fast‑moving operations.

The framework has evolved incrementally over more than two decades. As policing and law enforcement structures changed, the legislation and governance arrangements were amended “around the edges” to accommodate new roles, new organisations and cross‑jurisdiction activity without a wholesale refresh. In practice, that tinkering left a framework that can be hard to understand and even harder to explain clearly to the public and difficult to apply consistently across all the organisations and staff who legitimately need access. The current position is also operationally limiting while automated access exists for defined road traffic purposes, other policing and law enforcement uses require a manual request and case‑by‑case disclosure, relying on data protection exemptions and provisions rather than a clear, purpose‑built explicit statutory route. This can be particularly challenging in urgent scenarios where speed matters, such as safeguarding or time‑critical investigations, such as kidnapping or child abuse.

The need to refresh the framework has become more pressing as policing systems modernise. The programme to replace the legacy Police National Computer (PNC) with the Law Enforcement Data Service (LEDS) provides a practical and policy opportunity to re‑set the rules so they are fit for modern operational practice, system‑agnostic, and durable as technology changes. The Home Office’s policy intent, as reflected in the consultation documents, is to align the legal basis with contemporary data governance expectations: clearer eligibility (who can access), clearer permitted purposes (why they can access), and stronger baseline safeguards (how access is controlled, logged and overseen). In other words, the goal is not simply “more access”, but a clearer statutory framework with stronger governance, capable of supporting real‑time access through modern systems while retaining appropriate audit and scrutiny.

This is why the consultation focuses on the purposes for which DVLA driver data should be usable through the automated route. The Home Office is consulting on a set of options that progressively widen the permitted purposes beyond road traffic enforcement, ranging from maintaining the current scope, through expanding to serious crime and national security, to all crime, and, most broadly, covering the full range of policing purposes (including safeguarding and public protection). The options share a common governance “spine” (training, vetting, audit, reporting and a statutory Code), but differ in how far the law should permit use beyond the current road‑traffic baseline.

A central theme throughout the proposed changes is confidence in the system and demonstratable safeguards. DVLA driver data includes sensitive personal information such as names and addresses, and we recognise both the potential public protection benefits and the risks of misuse or disproportionate impacts. The new framework is therefore designed around minimum standards: mandatory training and vetting for authorised users; immutable audit logs capturing the purpose and justification for each access; and transparency through annual reporting and a public list of authorised organisations, permitted purposes and examples for use. The intention is to ensure that access is demonstrably lawful, necessary and proportionate, with resilient oversight capable of detecting misuse and addressing equalities concerns over time.

Finally, it is important to draw a clear boundary around what these changes are, and are not, about. The DVLA access regime is being progressed to clarify and strengthen lawful access to driver licensing information for policing and law enforcement purposes and is separate from facial recognition policy. It is focused on DVLA driver data access and the governance of that access, and the Home Office is keen to avoid misunderstandings that changes to this DVLA access and policies around wider biometric search capabilities. That separation matters for public understanding and for maintaining a clear, honest debate about the purpose of these reforms: enabling timely, accountable access to the information officers need, while strengthening the rules, safeguards and transparency that the public should expect.

DVLA driver data subject to automatic access

For operational policing and law enforcement purposes, a core set of DVLA driver data fields should be accessible via the automated route where access is necessary, proportionate and auditable.

Basic identity and contact information, name, address, and date of birth, are fundamental to confirming identity, resolving ambiguity between individuals with similar details, and supporting time‑critical decision‑making. These fields are routinely relied upon in policing engagements with the public, safeguarding activity and investigations: automated access would reduce delays associated with manual disclosure while providing clearer governance and auditability.

Driver specific regulatory information, such as entitlement to drive, endorsements, and relevant convictions, will remain accessible through the automated system, as these data directly support lawful enforcement and public safety objectives. Entitlement and endorsements are essential for road traffic enforcement and risk assessment during encounters, while conviction information relevant to driving or public safety can inform proportionate operational decisions. Access to conviction data should be clearly limited to what is necessary for policing and law enforcement purposes and aligned with existing criminal justice information‑sharing principles, thus avoiding duplication of wider criminal records systems.

More sensitive biometric‑type data, such as the photograph and signature, can provide significant operational value in confirming identity, preventing impersonation and supporting safeguarding activity (for example, locating missing persons or identifying vulnerable individuals). However, given the higher privacy sensitivity of these fields, their availability via the automated route should be subject to elevated thresholds, such as a defined operational justification, role‑based access controls, appropriate training requirements and strong audit scrutiny. This consultation concerns access by the police to DVLA driving data as opposed to the DVLA database being searched to identify an unknown individual. This would help ensure such data are used only where clearly necessary and proportionate.

Relevant medical information affecting the ability to drive is particularly sensitive and should be treated with the highest level of protection. Automated access to these details is not part of this policy proposal. This information will remain available to police and law enforcement through manual approaches to DVLA. This will ensure sensitive data remains tightly constrained.

DVLA driver use cases

The Police and law Enforcement Organisations have provided examples to illustrate how direct, timely access to DVLA driver licence data would support wider policing and law enforcement purposes. The examples demonstrate that the principal benefit is the immediacy of access to information at the point of operational need. Rapid access to accurate driver data can improve decision‑making in dynamic and high‑risk situations, reduce reliance on slower manual routes, and support more consistent and auditable use of information across forces.

Access to driving licence data also supports the police’s legal duties, including the obligation under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights to take reasonable steps to protect life, and the requirement under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act to pursue all reasonable lines of enquiry. In practice, these duties depend on officers having access to relevant information when decisions must be taken quickly. Delays in obtaining identity, address or licence status information can undermine risk assessments, slow investigations and, in some cases, increase the risk of harm to officers, victims and the public.

In proactive and reactive operational policing, driving licence information could play an important role in assessing risk during vehicle stops and other intelligence‑led operations. Knowing whether a suspected driver is licensed, disqualified or subject to endorsements can inform decisions about tactics, including whether pre‑emptive measures are necessary to prevent pursuits or other high‑risk outcomes. Given the volume of serious and organised crime, firearms and drugs‑related operations, timely access to reliable driver data supports more informed threat, harm and risk management in both planned and live incidents.

Driving licence data also provides valuable investigatory and safeguarding information where other systems may be incomplete or out of date. Police systems do not always hold a current address or reliable personal identifiers, particularly where individuals use aliases or have limited prior contact with the police. In such cases, driving licence records can assist with locating suspects, executing warrants, safeguarding victims, particularly in cases involving violence against women and girls, and avoiding unnecessary concerns by reducing the risk of attending incorrect addresses.

Timely identification and notification of a person’s next of kin is a core policing responsibility, particularly following sudden death, serious injury or other critical incidents. In such circumstances, delays in establishing identity or locating family members can cause additional distress and undermine public confidence in the police response. Where individuals are unidentified, carry no documentation, or have limited or outdated records on police systems, access to accurate driving licence information—particularly name, address and image—can play a crucial role in confirming identity and enabling prompt, sensitive notification of next of kin.

Driving licence data can be especially important where existing police records are incomplete or inconsistent, for example where individuals use aliases, have limited prior contact with the police, or where other databases do not hold current address details. In these cases, licence records may provide the most reliable means of identifying the deceased or seriously injured person and tracing relatives without unnecessary delay. Faster identification supports the police in meeting their legal and ethical duties, reduces reliance on prolonged investigative processes, and helps ensure that families are informed as quickly and accurately as possible, with appropriate support in place.

Finally, access to driving licence data supports specialist activity such as surveillance and investigations into child sexual abuse and exploitation. Images and licence details can assist with confirming identity, linking individuals to addresses, and conducting risk assessments before enforcement action is taken. Automated access, with appropriate safeguards, would enable faster and more effective action while maintaining accountability, auditability and proportionality in the use of sensitive personal data.

Policy options

P0 – Do nothing (maintain the current position)

Under this option, the existing legal and operational framework would remain unchanged. Automated access to DVLA driver licensing data would continue to be largely limited to purposes connected with road traffic enforcement under the Road Traffic Acts. Where police or law enforcement require DVLA driver data for non‑road‑traffic purposes, such as safeguarding, serious crime investigations or public protection activity, this would continue to rely on manual, case‑by‑case disclosure routes. This option would preserve the status quo, including existing delays, inconsistencies and reliance on discretionary disclosure mechanisms outside the automated system. The current Road Traffic Acts that would be maintained are:

• the Road Traffic Act 1988
• the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988
• the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981
• the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1995; and
• the Road Traffic Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1996

P1 – Road traffic and Serious crime / National security

This option would retain automated access for road traffic purposes but extend it to cover a limited set of additional purposes linked to serious crime and national security. Automated access would be permitted only where clearly defined thresholds are met, for example where the offence meets an agreed definition of serious crime or where access is necessary for national security purposes. Use beyond road traffic enforcement would be subject to tighter controls, including senior‑level authorisation, clear purpose limitation and enhanced audit requirements. Routine or low‑level policing activity would remain outside scope.

In addition to road traffic enforcement access purposes defined in Option 0, access would be also permitted for serious crimes defined through United Kingdom law. As such, seriousness is framed through the Serious Crime Act 2007, including the regime for Serious Crime Prevention Orders and the schedule of serious offences; this provides a recognised legal lens for defining the threshold of ‘serious’.

P2 – Road traffic and all crime

Under this option, automated access to DVLA driver data would be available for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of any criminal offence, in addition to road traffic enforcement. This would include access in support of a wide range of criminal investigations, subject to clear necessity and proportionality tests. Safeguards would be tiered so that more sensitive data fields or lower‑harm offences could attract higher thresholds, additional justification or exclusions. This option would reduce reliance on manual disclosure routes for criminal investigations while retaining controls to prevent disproportionate use for minor matters.

In addition to access for road traffic enforcement purposes as defined in Option 0, police and law enforcement would be able to access data for all law enforcement purposes defined in Section 31 of the Data Protection Act.

P3 – Full policing purposes

This option would allow automated access for the full range of policing purposes, building on P2 by including non‑crime activities that are central to modern policing. This would cover purposes set out in the PIRM Code, such as safeguarding vulnerable individuals, locating missing persons, protecting life and property, and managing public safety risks. While this is the broadest option in terms of permitted purposes, it would also be underpinned by the strongest safeguards, including clear statutory purpose definitions, mandatory training and vetting, robust audit trails, role‑based access controls and enhanced transparency and reporting requirements.

In addition to access for road traffic enforcement and law enforcement purposes as defined in Option 2, police and law enforcement would be able to access data for policing purposes. These purposes are defined as below.

In England and Wales, policing purposes are defined in the Police Information and Records Management Code of Practice and encompass the core functions and responsibilities of the police. These include protecting life and property, preserving public order, preventing the commission of offences, and bringing offenders to justice. In addition, policing purposes extend to any duty or responsibility placed on the police by common law or statute, reflecting the breadth of modern policing activity beyond purely crime‑focused functions.

In Scotland, similar principles are set out in the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012. The Act defines a constable’s general duties as including the prevention and detection of crime, the maintenance of public order, the protection of life and property, and the bringing of offenders to justice with due speed. These duties also include serving and executing court warrants and other legal processes, as well as attending court to give evidence, recognising the integral role of policing within the wider justice system.

The Scottish framework further articulates overarching policing principles that guide how these duties should be carried out. Policing in Scotland is intended to improve the safety and wellbeing of individuals, communities and localities, and to be delivered in a way that is accessible, proportionate and actively engaged with local communities. The Act emphasises the importance of preventative approaches to crime, harm and disorder, and requires the police service to act candidly and cooperatively in proceedings, including during investigations.

In Northern Ireland, policing purposes are set out primarily in the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000. The legislation requires police officers to carry out their functions with the aim of securing and maintaining the support of the local community, and of acting in cooperation with that community. This community‑focused approach is a defining feature of the policing framework in Northern Ireland.

Section 32 of the Act establishes a general duty on police officers to protect life and property, preserve order, prevent the commission of offences, and, where an offence has been committed, to take appropriate measures to bring the offender to justice. Together, these provisions define a consistent set of core policing purposes across the UK, while allowing for jurisdiction‑specific principles that reflect local legal frameworks and policing traditions.

The next section contains a questionnaire to help you assess our approach. The questions are available on the website for an automated response. Alternatively, this questionnaire can be completed and emailed to ple-dl-consultation@homeoffice.gov.uk.

Consultation questions

Section 1: About you and your organisation 

Q.1 Full name

Q.2 Organisation name 

Q.3 Job title and role  

Q.4 Address

Q.5 Email address

Q.6 Region / Jurisdiction in which you are based:

England 

Wales 

Scotland 

Northern Ireland 

Jersey 

Guernsey   Isle of Man 

Gibraltar 

Other 

A. Objectives and overall approach 

Q.7 Do you agree that the proposed changes will modernise and clarify the legal framework governing police and law enforcement access to DVLA driver licensing data? 

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Don’t know 

Please explain your answer, including whether you agree the framework should be clearer, more consistent and more future‑proof. 

Q.8 To what extent do you agree that the objectives below are the right objectives for this new framework? 

Objectives (please comment on each): 

a) Align access with public safety / crime prevention / safeguarding objectives

b) Make access for police and law enforcement clear and transparent

c) Regulate DVLA data use with defined purposes and safeguards

d) Simplify oversight and compliance, ensuring consistent standards

e) Enable policing to keep pace with technology while respecting legal and ethical obligations

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Don’t know 

Please explain, including any objectives you would add or remove. 

Q.9 Thinking about your operational environment are any difficulties envisaged in enabling oversight and governance? 

Yes

No

Don’t know 

Please explain, including any risks or benefits you foresee. 

B. Scope of application: permitted purposes (Options P0–P3) 

Q.10 Bearing in mind the stated objectives in question 2 which option (P0–P3) is most likely to achieve those outcomes, and why? 

• Option P0: Do nothing: access remains limited to Road Traffic Act purposes. 

• Option P1: Serious crime and national security (in addition to road traffic). 

• Option P2: All crime: law enforcement purposes (in addition to road traffic). 

• Option P3: Full policing purposes including all law enforcement purposes (in addition to road traffic and all crime). 

Please explain your answer, including operational impact, legal certainty, proportionality, and public confidence considerations. 

Q, 11 Do you see any issues in operationalising serious crime and national security for DVLA data access?  

Please include:

(i) definition approach

(ii) what should be in / out of scope

(iii) whether additional authorisation should apply

Q.12 If use is going to be for all crime should there be tiering thresholds to prevent disproportionate use for low‑harm matters?  

Yes

No

Don’t know 

Please explain your answer and, if yes, please describe a tiering model (e.g. higher thresholds for certain data fields, additional sign‑off for certain offence types, or limits on use in minor matters). 

Q.13 Does ‘policing purposes’ provide clarity on the extent of permitted uses that should be explicitly in scope, and which (if any) should be explicitly out of scope? 

Policing purposes are mainly, but not exclusively:

• protecting life and property
• preserving order
• preventing the commission of offences
• bringing offenders to justice
• any other police duty or responsibility arising from common or statute law

Please include views on non‑crime safeguarding and public protection scenarios (e.g. high‑risk missing persons, welfare checks, next‑of‑kin identification), drawing on operational examples, where helpful. 

Q.14 Are there any alternative options or ‘hybrid’ approaches we should consider (e.g. certain scenarios that need additional safeguards)?  

Yes

No

Don’t know 

Please explain, including why your alternative would better balance operational need and rights. 

Q.15 Should medical information remain accessible only through the existing manual route (i.e this policy approach does not intend to automate medical data that DVLA holds)?  

Yes

No

Don’t know 

Please explain, your reasoning. 

C. Decision making, necessity and proportionality (case level justification) 

The policy emphasises that access should be lawful, necessary and proportionate, supported by a code of practice and auditable.

Q.16 Do you agree that each access should require a recorded case level justification (purpose / necessity / proportionality), captured in an auditable way?  

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Don’t know 

Please explain, including what the ‘minimum details’ should contain. 

Q.17 What factors should be mandatory when assessing necessity and proportionality for DVLA access?  

Examples to consider:

seriousness of harm

urgency / time criticality

availability of less intrusive alternatives

whether the subject is a victim / witness / suspect

whether the access is for safeguarding

whether the requested data fields are the minimum necessary. 

Q.18 Does the draft statutory code of practice set out the framework for minimum standards for training, vetting, audit, record keeping, onward disclosure and inspection for all authorised organisations?  

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Don’t know 

Please explain, including any additional areas the Code should cover. 

Q.19 What should the annual report include to provide transparency and assurance?  

Examples to consider:

volumes by purpose category

compliance / audit findings

complaints

sanctions

error rates

any equality monitoring outputs

Copyright

© Crown copyright 2026.

This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0, except where otherwise stated.