Open call for evidence

Civil Contingencies Act 2004: Call for Views (HTML)

Published 14 July 2026

About this Call for Views

Summary:	The government is consulting as part of the Post-Implementation Review 2027 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
To:	The government invites anyone in the United Kingdom who participates in the UK’s resilience system (e.g., Category 1 or Category 2 responders and any voluntary, community or faith-based organisation) or those with expertise in the UK’s resilience system or specific elements within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
Geographical scope	The consultation is led by the Cabinet Office in the UK government, with input from the devolved governments. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 applies across the entirety of the UK, so we welcome responses from organisations across the UK. Where questions apply to specific parts of the UK, this is indicated.
Duration:	14 of July 2026 to 4 October 2026
How to respond:	To respond to this Call for Views please use the online survey system: Consultation Survey Link.  Where you are unable to use the online system, please contact ted@cabinetoffice.gov.uk to request a Word version of this template.  When complete, it should be returned by email to this same address as a Word document. All responses must be received by the department before the closing date, otherwise they will not be considered. Postal submissions will not be considered. We recommend that individual organisations provide a single consolidated response.
Enquiries to:	Enquiries for this consultation can be sent to: ted@cabinetoffice.gov.uk
Response	The government will publish a response to this consultation on GOV.UK within 12 weeks of its closing. If, for any reason, we are unable to respond to the consultation within 12 weeks, we will provide an explanation at the consultation page on GOV.UK about why this is not possible.

1. Introduction 

The Forthcoming Post-Implementation Review 2027 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004^{[footnote 1]} provides a legislative framework for emergency preparedness in the UK. It establishes a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level (Part 1), as well as providing emergency powers which can be used by UK government as a last resort to make emergency regulations to help deal with the most serious of emergencies (Part 2). 

The CCA 2004 is supplemented by the CCA 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 (the Regulations)^{[footnote 2]} and the CCA 2004 (Contingency Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 (the Scotland Regulations)^{[footnote 3]} which set out the duties on responders and specify in greater detail how they are to be performed.

The UK government has a legal obligation to review the Regulations every five years, which is established by Regulation 59 of the Regulations. The statutory review requirement is to: 

A. Set out the objectives intended to be achieved by the regulatory system established by these Regulations; 

B. Assess the extent to which those objectives are achieved; and 

C. Assess whether those objectives remain appropriate and, if so, the extent to which they could be achieved with a system that imposes less regulation

While the statutory requirement is only to review the Regulations, in previous reviews the UK government has also considered the CCA 2004 as a whole. For this review, the UK government is again taking the opportunity to review the CCA 2004 as a whole alongside the Regulations.

The CCA 2004, the Regulations and guidance underpinning the legislation are designed to deliver a single framework supporting civil protection in the UK. The regulatory system establishes clear duties and tasks for responders in relation to emergencies and emergency planning. It intends to: 

A. Establish a consistent level of civil protection activity across the UK;

B. Encourage consistency between Category 1 and Category 2 responders in the way this is carried out; 

C. Define the tasks that should be performed and establish that organisations should co-operate;

D. Ensure local responders retain the ability to make decisions -  in the light of local circumstances and priorities - about what planning arrangements are appropriate in their areas. 

The CCA 2004 and its accompanying Regulations have been found to provide a robust legislative framework for emergency preparedness across the UK since its introduction in 2004 – establishing a consistent level of civil protection activity and supporting multi-agency working in the preparation, response and recovery to a wide range of emergency situations. As such, any changes to it would need to be supported by clear reasoning, evidence and analysis of the costs and benefits - and, insofar as they relate to the CCA 2004, would require an Act of Parliament to implement. 

While the UK government continues to believe this to be the case, in line with leading practice it is important to keep this under regular review and make adjustments as required, especially given the volatile and fast-changing nature of the UK’s risk landscape. 

Alongside considering the existing provisions within the CCA 2004 and its accompanying Regulations, the UK government is particularly interested in exploring possible new extensions to the CCA 2004 which will help it continue to evolve to deliver its objectives in an ever changing landscape. The UK government Resilience Action Plan^{[footnote 4]} as well as other government strategic documents, have identified a range of strategic priorities for enhancing the UK’s resilience. Where appropriate this review is considering how changes to the CCA 2004 and its accompanying Regulations can support the delivery of key government commitments. 

In addition, there are a number of wider policy and legislative developments with potential to impact the framework for civil protection established by the CCA 2004. The increased role of Strategic Authorities and Mayors being driven through the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026^{[footnote 5]}, as well as wider possible reforms in the police, health, and fire and rescue service means that we need to consider how the CCA 2004 and its accompanying Regulations continue to drive emergency preparedness in light of these wider changes. This includes any implications following the outcome of the Independent review of police force structures^{[footnote 6]}, which will report later this summer.

As such, alongside reviewing the CCA 2004 as is, the UK government is particularly looking to gather views in the following areas:

A. Strengthening the local resilience system in the context of wider changes to the resilience landscape.

B. Defining the role of Strategic Authorities and Mayors in England. 

C. Considering whether UK government resilience arrangements should be brought under the CCA 2004. 

Call for Views and planned further engagements

This Call for Views will inform the review of the CCA 2004 and the Regulations and provide a vehicle for gathering qualitative and quantitative evidence from a wide range of stakeholders who make up the UK’s resilience system.

Guidance for completing the questions: 

• You are not obliged to answer all the questions below. If you do not wish to answer or comment on a particular question, please skip to the next question you wish to answer. 
• When filling out an answer using free text, please only address the relevant question(s). 
• Where you are proposing to change existing definitions or provisions within the CCA 2004 please provide clear evidence as to why the change should be considered. 

While the CCA 2004 and the Regulations apply to the whole of the UK, the devolution settlements and administrative arrangements that apply across Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are asymmetric resulting in differences in application. As such, not all questions are applicable to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Questions in Section 5  are dedicated to how the CCA 2004 specifically affects Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and have been developed with the relevant devolved governments. Respondents from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, will also likely wish to engage with other questions in the document which apply across the UK. The territorial extent of questions is clearly demarcated throughout.

Alongside this Call for Views, we will conduct wider engagement to explore the evidence gathered through the questionnaire. This will support a collaborative approach to considering targeted changes to the CCA 2004, to ensure it continues to meet its objectives.

2. Questions 

Section 1: About you 

This section is mandatory for anyone responding to this Call for Views. Questions seek to gather some basic personal information about you as the respondent. Please see Privacy Notice for Cabinet Office Consultations^{[footnote 7]} for information on how your personal data will be handled. 

1. What is your name?

[Free text]

2. What is your email address? 

[Free text]

3. In what context are you responding?

a. As a representative of an organisation involved in emergency preparedness or resilience work

i. Do you work for an organisation defined as a Category 1 or Category 2 responder (as set out in the CCA 2004)?  

[Yes, No]

ii. Do you work in a voluntary, community or faith-based organisation? 

[Yes, No]

[Strategic, Tactical, Operational, Other + Free text]

iii. What is the name of the organisation you are a representative of?

[Free text]

iv. In which UK country does your organisation operate? Please select all that apply.

England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland 

b. As a representative of a business, firm or trade body.

i. Which sector is the organisation most closely related (e.g., insurance, industry) 

[Free text]

ii. What is the name of the business, firm, or trade body?

[Free text]

iii. In which UK country does your organisation operate? Please select all that apply.

[England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland]

iv. What is the approximate number of employees of the organisation?

[Free text]

England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland 

c. As a member of an academic or research organisation 

i. What is the name of this organisation?

d. As an individual (and acting in a personal capacity)

i. What is your occupation? 

[Free text]

e. Other (please specify) 

[Free text]

4. Which of the following most closely describes your level of knowledge of risk and resilience related issues?

a. Expert understanding of resilience or risk management (e.g., Category 1 or Category 2 responder; COMAH site operator; academic focusing on resilience; risk manager; insurer; risk modeller).

b. Good insight into some aspects of resilience or risk management (e.g., business owner with experience of risk assessment).

c. General interest (e.g., member of the public).

Section 2: Local Arrangements for Civil Protection

Part 1 of the CCA 2004 focuses on local arrangements for emergency preparedness, establishing a statutory framework of roles and responsibilities for local responders and providing a structure and consistency for emergency preparedness activity. This section focuses on questions related to Part 1 of the CCA 2004 and the Regulations.

Part 1 of the CCA 2004

It defines two different categories of responder and the duties that they are required to perform; the details of those duties are described in the associated Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 (‘the Regulations’). Many of the functions within Part 1 of the CCA 2004 are devolved to the devolved governments in line with devolution settlements.

The CCA 2004 requires Category 1 responders to fulfil a full set of duties around assessing risk and planning for civil emergencies. Category 1 responders include blue light services (such as ambulance, police and fire and rescue service) which are likely to be involved in most emergencies. Category 2 responders, such as utility companies or transport operators, have a lesser set of duties around co-operating and sharing information with fellow responders. Category 2 responders are not involved in all emergencies, but play a highly significant role in some emergencies. 

Collectively, these duties facilitate emergency preparedness between these responder organisations at a local level by ensuring access to shared knowledge and plans, opening communication channels both between the organisations and with the public, and placing clear legal responsibility upon organisations to assess risk and plan for the outcomes of the risks that have been assessed. The CCA 2004 and the Regulations are also supported by statutory  and non-statutory guidance, which describe how responders can comply with the legislation, identify good practice and provide associated useful information. 

The CCA 2004 provides a basic framework defining what tasks should be performed and how co-operation should be conducted. Local responders work to this common framework, but under the principle of subsidiarity, make their own decisions in light of local circumstances, risk profiles and priorities about the appropriate planning arrangements for their areas. 

Without Part 1 of the CCA 2004, collaboration between local responders would be optional and may be inconsistent. Through the categorisation of responders, and the duties placed upon them, clear lines of responsibility are placed on organisations to prepare for the consequences of emergencies, and wherever possible keep impacts to a minimum. 

This section invites views on any required changes to Part 1 of the CCA 2004 to support emergency preparedness across the UK. We particularly invite responses from Category 1 responders, Category 2 responders, and those involved in emergency planning, response and recovery at the national, regional and local levels. 

Definition of an emergency

The CCA 2004 (section 1) defines an emergency as:

• an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom,
• an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom, or
• war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom.

For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) an event or situation threatens damage to human welfare only if it involves, causes or may cause - 

• loss of human life, 
• human illness or injury,
• homelessness,
• damage to property,
• disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
• disruption of a system of communication,
• disruption of facilities for transport, or
• disruption of services relating to health.

For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) an event or situation threatens damage to the environment only if it involves, causes or may cause - 

• contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radio-active matter, or
• disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life.

Questions

1. Does the current definition reflect your understanding of an emergency?

[Y/N]

a. If the answer to the above question is no, please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible. 

[Free text]

Categorisation and duties on responder organisations

1. Are there gaps in representation of responder organisations which would merit additional responders being categorised as Category 1 or Category 2 responders? 

To note, for questions related to responders in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland go to Section 5. 

[Y/N] 

a. If the answer to the above question is yes, please use the free text box to specify which responder organisation(s) should be categorised, providing evidence where possible. 

[Free text]

2. How appropriate are the current duties on Category 1 responders? 

[Very appropriate, appropriate, neither appropriate or inappropriate, inappropriate, very inappropriate]

a. Please use the free text box to explain your answer, including any duties which should be added, adjusted or removed. 

[Free text]

3. How appropriate are the current duties on Category 2 responders?

[Very appropriate, appropriate, neither appropriate or inappropriate, inappropriate, very inappropriate]

a. Please use the free text box to explain your answer, including any duties which should be added, adjusted or removed

Free text 

4. How effective are the CCA 2004 Regulations 2005 (UK) in supporting the delivery of duties set out in Part 1 of the CCA 2004?

[Very effective, effective, neither effective or ineffective, ineffective, very ineffective]

a. Please use the free text box to detail what specific amendments to the Regulations are required, providing evidence where possible to explain your answer. 

[Free text]

5. Please use the free text box to note anything in regards to Part 1 of the CCA and the Regulations (UK) that is not captured by the previous questions (max 250 words).

[Free text]

Section 3: Resilience Structures

In recent years, the resilience risk landscape has evolved rapidly, with risks becoming more interconnected and impacts cascading across administrative boundaries, communities, services and the economy. Effective resilience therefore depends not only on the capabilities of emergency responders, but on co-ordinated action across public services, businesses, infrastructure operators, voluntary, community and faith sector organisations, and individuals. 

This section invites views on whether current resilience structures arising from the CCA 2004 and the Regulations remain fit for purpose and explores how they could evolve to enable a whole-of-society approach to resilience in future. 

Local Resilience Forums in England and in Wales

Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in England and Wales are multi-agency partnerships made up of representatives from local public services, including the emergency services, local authorities, the NHS, and others. These organisations are known as Category 1 responders, as defined by the CCA 2004. LRFs are supported by organisations, known as Category 2 responders, including utilities, transport operators and certain health bodies.   

LRFs are not a legal entity and do not have powers to direct their members. They operate a partnership model under the CCA 2004, which places a collective duty on Category 1 and Category 2 responders to co–operate and support multi-agency co-operation across the full resilience cycle of preparation, response and recovery. 

In the preparation phase, forums assess local risks through Community Risk Registers and develop multi-agency plans to mitigate and manage those risks. During response, forums provide the framework for multi-agency co-ordination through Strategic and Tactical Co-ordinating Groups. The local police or fire and rescue service typically lead response co-ordination, in line with established doctrine, while other responders support according to their statutory roles. In recovery, leadership usually transfers to local authorities, with Recovery Co-ordinating Groups established to address the longer-term social, economic and environmental impacts of incidents. 

Resilience Co-ordinating Groups can also support co-ordination across wider geographies where risks or consequences extend beyond a single LRF area. This shift in leadership can be challenging where recovery arrangements are less mature or less well-resourced than response structures.

LRFs are funded through a combination of partners contributing from their own organisational budgets, locally agreed arrangements for co-ordination functions and limited central government funding for specific programmes. This creates variability in funding across local areas.

Questions in this sub-section look to gather evidence on how effectively current multi-agency partnerships delivered through LRFs are facilitating effective emergency preparedness, response and recovery. 

Questions 

1. Are LRFs and Strategic Co-ordinating Groups/Tactical Co-ordinating Groups/Recovery Co-ordinating Groups working effectively to deliver multi-agency preparedness, response and recovery? 

[Y/Somewhat/N]

a. Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing detail on the barriers to effective delivery and evidence where possible.

[Free text]

2. How appropriate is the current funding and partner contributions model to support LRF activity?

[Very appropriate, appropriate, neither appropriate or inappropriate, inappropriate, very inappropriate]

a. Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible. 

Free text 

Strengthening the Local Resilience System in England and in Wales   

LRFs in England and Wales play an important role in supporting multi-agency co-ordination. However, there are recognised challenges within the current model. LRFs were established in 2004, primarily to support preparedness for and response to localised, short-term incidents. The risk landscape has since evolved, with increasing frequency of complex, prolonged and cross boundary challenges.

LRFs bring together organisations that operate under different funding arrangements, accountability structures and, in some cases, geographic boundaries. This can create barriers to consistent collaboration and alignment.

Alongside this, the partnership approach can lead to varying levels of engagement across partners, and the system relies on voluntary co-operation. This can lead to inconsistency and limit the ability to secure sustained and equitable participation across organisations.

Although LRF boundaries are based on police force areas, the partner organisations within them operate across different, evolving organisational geographies. As a result, geographic alignment between these partner agencies and LRFs remains inconsistent. This misalignment creates challenges for multi-agency working within the LRF, with some partners spanning multiple LRF areas. As a result, co-ordination demands increase, duplication can occur, and already constrained resources are stretched further, this can also fragment engagement. This risks inconsistent representation, weakens partnership coherence and can create ambiguity around local leadership and accountability.

Coterminous boundaries between LRFs and responder organisations can simplify governance, promote multi-agency co-ordination, collective strategic decision making and reduce fragmentation across a shared geography.

The Police Reform White Paper (PDF, 2.7MB)^{[footnote 8]} committed to reducing the number of police forces across England and Wales. The Independent Review of Police Force Structures has been commissioned to recommend how this can be achieved with a move towards strengthened neighbourhood policing through the creation of local policing areas. The final report of the Independent Review is expected by the end of summer 2026, and final decisions on the make-up and boundaries of local policing areas and police forces will be made once the report is received.

There is currently no consistency of other tiers between the UK government and LRFs. This can limit opportunities to co-ordinate planning and resource allocation across wider geographies, particularly where risks and capabilities extend beyond individual LRF boundaries. There may be opportunities to strengthen arrangements for cross border working and streamlined engagement between local and national levels.

Local resilience does not currently operate within a single, defined professional framework. Consideration is being given to how capability, skills and career pathways could be further developed and strengthened.

This sub-section seeks views on potential options to strengthen the local resilience system, to ensure they remain effective in preparing for and responding to a complex and evolving risk environment.

Questions

1. What difference would putting LRFs on a statutory footing have on co-operation and multi-agency preparedness? Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible (max 250 words).

[Free text] 

2. What are the implications of current LRF geographical boundaries for supporting multi-agency preparedness, response and recovery? Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible (max 250 words).

[Free text]

3. What functions currently being delivered by individual LRFs could benefit from being delivered at a national or regional scale with co-operating LRFs? Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible (max 250 words).

[Free text]

4. What resources would be required to support the further professionalisation of the LRF workforce (e.g., minimum staffing, competency frameworks, training/exercising requirements, career pathways, shared services)? Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible (max 250 words).

[Free text]

Strategic Authorities and Mayors in England

The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026^{[footnote 9]} introduces new measures to expand devolution and empower Mayors and local communities. It represents a significant step in local government reform and stronger place-based leadership. By giving Mayors a more consistent set of functions, the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026 strengthens their role as visible, democratically accountable leaders with the authority to drive change - and to support more resilient places, where local public services are better prepared to respond to and recover from significant emergencies.

Currently, the roles and responsibilities of Strategic Authorities and Mayors in local resilience has not been defined in either legislation or accompanying guidance. In the UK Government Resilience Action Plan,^{[footnote 10]} the UK government committed to clarify and enhance the role of Strategic Authorities, and Mayors in local resilience, including through guidance and legislation as required, with the aim of putting a more resilient and accountable system in place. 

In addition, the Police Reform White Paper (PDF, 2.7MB)^{[footnote 11]} set out the government’s plans to strengthen local police governance arrangements as part of wider reforms to the policing system. In May 2028, the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) model will be abolished, and the functions will be transferred to Strategic Authority Mayors, where coterminous with policing, or to local government leaders through Policing and Crime Boards and Foundation Strategic Authorities. These new police governance bodies will be well placed within the local landscape to drive partnership working and collaboration across a range of public safety issues. 

Questions in this sub-section look to gather evidence to inform future decisions on how to appropriately embed Strategic Authorities, Mayors and potentially other local governance bodies in local resilience arrangements in England. As such we particularly invite responses from those involved in emergency planning, response and recovery in England. 

Questions

1. If Strategic Authorities were given a more defined role as a responder within the local resilience system, what should their core responsibilities be? Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible (max 250 words).

[Free text]

2. How might directly elected Mayors of Strategic Authorities provide visible leadership and accountability for resilience or emergency preparedness, response and recovery in their area? Please use the free text below to explain your answer, including consideration of the powers, levers or formal mechanisms they would need to discharge that accountability effectively (max 250 words). 

[Free text]

3. How should Foundation Strategic Authorities without Mayors, and areas without Strategic Authorities, work with Local Resilience Forums to strengthen local resilience leadership and accountability? Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible (max 250 words). 

[Free text]

UK Government National Arrangements 

The UK government operates a Lead Government Department (LGD) model, for risks within the National Security Risk Assessment, whereby risks are primarily owned and managed by LGDs. LGDs work closely with a range of other departments, devolved governments, and regulators to make sure risks are well understood, managed and prepared for across the risk life cycle. This model ensures that the responsibility and oversight sits with the organisation that has the greatest understanding, relationships and mechanisms for delivery to identify and address risks.

Currently, unlike local emergency preparedness arrangements, national arrangements are non-statutory and underpinned by the accountability of Secretaries of State to Parliament for their departments actions and performance. Since its introduction, whether national arrangements should be brought under the CCA 2004 has been an area of much debate and consideration. While the existing model has been found effective to support the UK’s ability to prepare and respond to the diverse types of emergencies by ensuring accountability sits with the departments possessing the necessary expertise and capabilities, it is appropriate to continue to explore whether this remains the most effective approach.

This sub-section looks to gather views on whether these arrangements are sufficient for supporting national preparedness.  

Questions

1. What, if any, impacts have arisen from national resilience arrangements being non-statutory? Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible (max 250 words).

[Free text]

Critical National Infrastructure

This sub-section refers to Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), which are assets crucial for keeping the UK running, and providing the essential services upon which we rely every day. It also includes infrastructure which, if disrupted, could have a significant impact on our national security and/or defence. 

Disruptions to CNI services can have major and wide-ranging impacts. For example, national infrastructure could be targeted by cyber criminals or terrorists for financial gain or to cause disruption. CNI may also be affected by hazards such as flooding or storms, which could, for example, lead to power outages or water supply disruption. The resilience of our CNI, therefore, is vital. It is fundamental that CNI sectors have robust business continuity plans in place ahead of time to ensure that where disruption does occur, the provision of these critical services can continue. There is also more that can be done to ensure consistency across all CNI sectors, and to ensure that all sectors and their operators are reaching the same set of high standards.

This sub-section looks to gather evidence on whether the role of CNI Sectors in the CCA 2004 is sufficient for supporting effective emergency preparedness and response.

Questions 

1. A number of Category 1 and Category 2 responders are drawn from CNI sectors. How appropriate is the role of CNI in emergencies captured in the CCA 2004?

[Very appropriate, appropriate, neither appropriate or inappropriate, inappropriate, very inappropriate]

a. Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible. 

[Free text] 

2. Should any further CNI sector actors be captured within the scope of the CCA 2004? 

[Y/N]

a. If the answer to the above question is yes, please use the free text box to specify which CNI sector actors should be captured and what roles they should have, providing evidence where possible. 

[Free text] 

Role of the Voluntary, Community and Faith Sector

The UK government is committed to ensuring that resilience is inclusive and reflects the diverse needs of communities. The tragedy at Grenfell Tower, and other emergencies, have emphasised the vital role of the voluntary, community and faith sector (VCFS) in providing support, co-ordination, and care for those affected. VCFS organisations have a deep understanding of local needs, the ability to build trust within communities, and specialist capabilities, which make them an essential partner in emergency planning, response and recovery. 

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommended strengthening partnership working between Category 1 responders and VCFS organisations, by amending Regulation 23 of the CCA 2004 to require Category 1 responders to “establish and maintain” partnerships with the VCFS, rather than the existing duty to “have regard” to relevant organisations. The UK Government published a consultation to collect views on the recommended change, and published a response to the consultation in December 2025^{[footnote 12]}. The consultation gathered valuable information on whether amending the existing statutory duty is an effective and proportionate means to strengthen engagement between categorised responders and the VCFS, and the challenges and opportunities within current partnership working. We are using the data collected to better understand the potential effects of any legislative change and conduct further data analysis, whilst also considering alternative options such as non-statutory levers. 

We do not intend to repeat any questions already answered in the public consultation within the Call for Views, however this sub-section seeks to gather any further evidence on whether partnership working requirements in the CCA 2004 are sufficient to support effective emergency preparedness and response activities between categorised responders and the VCFS.

Questions

1. What changes, if any, to the CCA 2004 could help improve partnership working between categorised responders and the VCFS? Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible (max 250 words).

[Free text]

2. Please use the free text box to provide further information on partnership working between categorised responders and the VCFS not captured by the previous question (max 250 words).

[Free text]

Resilience Structures Question

1. Please use the free text box to note anything in regards to Resilience Structures that is not captured by the previous questions (max 250 words).

[Free text]

Section 4: Statutory Powers 

The section encompasses the emergency powers which sit within the CCA 2004, powers to be used in the most serious emergencies. This covers Part 2 pf the CCA 2004, which provides a vehicle for special emergency legislation.

Part 2 of the CCA 2004

Part 2 of the CCA 2004 allows for the creation of temporary special legislation (emergency regulations) in an emergency without prior parliamentary scrutiny. An emergency is defined within the CCA 2004 to include events and situations which threaten serious damage to human welfare or the environment, as well as war or terrorism which threaten serious damage to the security of the UK. 

Emergency regulations are intended to be used for the most serious emergencies, when the government needs to bring in powers rapidly. The use of emergency regulations is a last resort option and planning arrangements at any level should not assume that emergency powers will be made available. They can only be deployed in exceptional circumstances. 

Emergency regulations can only be used under specific conditions and must be laid before Parliament as soon as possible once made. They lapse after seven days unless both Houses of Parliament pass a resolution approving them. If parliamentary approval is granted, emergency regulations automatically lapse at the latest 30 days after they are made. Further regulations can be made for a further 30 days, but again require approval by each House within 7 days, with provision for compulsory recall if either House is in Recess. They can be amended or rejected at any of these points and therefore at most provide a temporary legislative solution. 

 The CCA 2004 also specifies a number of things that the emergency regulations cannot do and places three primary conditions on their use, known as the ‘triple lock’. These are as follows:

• An emergency has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur; 
• The provisions sought are necessary and urgent for the purpose of preventing, controlling or mitigating an aspect or effect of the emergency;
• The regulations are appropriate and proportionate. 

To date, the emergency powers in Part 2 of the CCA 2004 have never been used. Government typically relies on sector-specific emergency legislation rather than the generic powers in the CCA 2004. These provide powers for use in specific scenarios (such as disruption to energy or water supply) and as such they have undergone the oversight and scrutiny to ensure they are proportionate to the circumstances that present themselves. As existing legislation, they are also known to those using or subject to the legislation, enabling effective implementation. 

However, the COVID-19 Module 2 Inquiry Report (PDF, 2.9MB)^{[footnote 13]} recommended that there is a need to review Part 2 of the CCA 2004 and consider its role in providing an interim emergency management framework in the early stages of a serious emergency until more specific legislation with appropriate parliamentary safeguards is passed. As part of this review, the Inquiry has recommended that the UK government consider the appropriate safeguards for using Part 2 powers for managing the response to Pandemics. 

This sub-section seeks to gather evidence to inform the government’s response to this recommendation, as well as the wider operation of Part 2 of the CCA 2004. 

Questions 

1. The CCA 2004 sets out strict conditions which must be met for emergency regulation to be made - this is known as the ‘triple lock’. Are these conditions still appropriate? 

[Y/N]

a. If you answered no to the above question, please use the free text box to explain your reasoning including, if relevant, how could the ‘triple lock’ be improved?

[Free text]

2. How appropriate are the current provisions within the CCA 2004 for how emergency powers can be used in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland? 

[Very appropriate, appropriate, neither appropriate or inappropriate, inappropriate, very inappropriate]

a. Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible. 

Free text 

3. Please use the free text box to note anything in regards to Statutory Powers and Part 2 of the CCA that is not captured by the previous questions (max 250 words).

[Free text]

Section 5: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

The CCA 2004 applies to the whole of the UK, though due to the different devolution settlements and administrative arrangements across Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, there are differences in its application. The devolved governments each have separate resilience arrangements and devolved responsibilities under the CCA 2004 and therefore any changes to the CCA 2004 will have to be carefully considered in terms of their impact on the respective administrations.

All changes to the CCA 2004 should be considered in terms of how they support the UK’s overarching resilience, while simultaneously respecting the devolved responsibilities and settlements in the UK. 

This section includes questions on specific elements of the CCA 2004 which affect Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. These questions have been developed with the relevant devolved governments. Responses will be shared with the relevant devolved governments, in line with the Privacy Notice for Cabinet Office Consultations^{[footnote 14]}, to future possible changes to how the CCA 2004 applies in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. 

Scotland

1. How appropriate are the responsibilities and duties set out in the CCA 2004 and the Scottish Regulations (2005)? 

[Very appropriate, appropriate, neither appropriate or inappropriate, inappropriate, very inappropriate]

a. Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible. 

[Free Text]

2. Are there gaps in representation of responder organisations which would merit additional responders being categorised as Category 1 or Category 2 responders in Scotland?

[Y/N]

a. If the answer to the above question is yes, please use the free text box to specify which responder organisation(s) should be categorised, providing evidence where possible (max 250 words).

[Free text]

3. Please add any further comments on the application of the CCA 2004 in Scotland that are not captured by the questions above.

  [Free text]

Wales 

1. How appropriate are the responsibilities and duties set out in the CCA 2004 for Wales? 

[Extremely appropriate, Very appropriate, Somewhat appropriate, Not so appropriate, Not at all appropriate]

a. Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible. 

[Free text] 

2. Are there gaps in representation of responder organisations which would merit additional responders being categorised as Category 1 or Category 2 responders in Wales?

[Y/N]

a. If the answer to the above question is yes, please use the free text box to specify which responder organisation(s) should be categorised, providing evidence where possible. 

[Free text] 

3. How appropriate would it be to introduce Wales specific Regulations under Part 1 of the CCA 2004? 

[Very appropriate, appropriate, neither appropriate or inappropriate, inappropriate, very inappropriate]

a. Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible. 

[Free text] 

4. Please add any further comments on the application of the CCA 2004 in Wales that are not captured by the questions above (max 250 words).

[Free text]

Northern Ireland

1. How appropriate are the responsibilities and duties set out in the CCA 2004 for Northern Ireland? 

[Very appropriate, appropriate, neither appropriate or inappropriate, inappropriate, very inappropriate]

a. Please use the free text box to explain your answer, providing evidence where possible. 

[Free text] 

2. Are there gaps in representation of responder organisations which would merit additional responders being categorised as Category 1 or Category 2 responders in Northern Ireland?

[Y/N]

a. If the answer to the above question is yes, please use the free text box to specify which responder organisation(s) should be categorised, providing evidence where possible. 

[Free text] 

3. Please add any further comments on the application of the CCA 2004 in Northern Ireland that are not captured by the questions above (max 250 words).

 [Free text]

Section 6: Final thoughts  

1. Please add any further comments on the CCA 2004 that are not captured by the questions above (max 400 words).

[Free text]

1. Legislation.gov.uk, Civil Contingencies Act 2004 ↩

2. Legislation.gov.uk, The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 ↩

3. Legislation.gov.uk, The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 ↩

4. Cabinet Office, ‘UK Government Resilience Action Plan’, 2025 ↩

5. Legislation.gov.uk, ‘English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026’ ↩

6. Home Office, Independent review of police force structures: terms of reference ↩

7. Cabinet Office, Privacy Notice for Cabinet Office Consultations, 2023 ↩

8. Home Office, From local to national: a new model for policy, 2026 ↩

9. Legislation.gov.uk, ‘English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026’ ↩

10. Cabinet Office, ‘UK Government Resilience Action Plan’, 2025 ↩

11. Home Office, From local to national: a new model for policy, 2026 ↩

12. Cabinet Office, Strengthening Partnerships Consultation Outcome Report, 2025 ↩

13. UK Covid-19 Inquiry, ‘Module 2, 2A, 2B, 2c Report - Core decision-making and political governance’, 2025 ↩

14. Cabinet Office, Privacy Notice for Cabinet Office Consultations, 2023 ↩