In late 2005 the African Union convened peace talks aimed at ending the conflict in Darfur. In May 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed by the Sudanese Government and one rebel faction, but rejected by the other rebel groups. It did not achieve peace and in certain respects it heightened the conflict, partly because it was the product of a deeply flawed process: the Sudanese parties were unwilling to engage in negotiations and failed to forge agreements; the African Union and its international partners, desperate for a quick accord, pursued a counter-productive strategy of deadline diplomacy; and the mediators were consequently unable to undertake effective mediation. The talks demonstrated that the acceptability and legitimacy of a peace agreement depend not only on its content but also on the process by which it is prepared and concluded.
Ethnopolitics (2007) 6 (4) 495-511 [DOI: 10.1080/17449050701277863]