This paper discusses a complex process of aid oriented towards taming the Colombian conflict. We show that, despite the grand declarations provided generously by all actors involved, there has been much strategic manoeuvring and inconsistency. We describe how Colombian decision makers made a transition from the intent of establishing peace as a nationalist programme to the effort of internationalising war. However, the transition interacted with—and was somewhat dampened by—the set of constraints they faced. A very important part of these constraints was related to the choice, when seeking key international partners, between the United States and Europe. Donors, at the same time, had their own objectives and constraints, and frequently promoted lines of action that were at odds with their stated objectives. At the same time, the analysis suggests that despite—and sometimes even because of—these limits some windows of opportunity for positive developments have been opened.
Military, Security and Development (2008) 8 (1) 71-107 [DOI: 10.1080/14678800801977112]