Electoral coalitions are becoming increasingly popular among opposition parties in Africa because they offer many advantages with respect to reducing party fragmentation and increasing incumbent turnovers. At the same time, however, they are often comprised of parties that are defined predominantly by their leaders’ personalities and exhibit little differentiation in terms of their policy orientation. Based on a dataset spanning all opposition coalitions since 2000 in Africa’s electoral democracies, this paper demonstrates not only that coalitions rarely defeat incumbents but also that they are only competitive when major opposition parties are involved. More significantly, the paper highlights that in many countries, a sizeable share of total electoral volatility is due to fluctuations in voting for opposition parties that have belonged to coalitions. The paper argues that such volatility reflects the inability of coalition members to build loyal constituency bases over time, which is critical for party development and broader consolidation.
Resnick, D. Are Electoral Coalitions Harmful for Democratic Consolidation in Africa? UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, Finland (2011) 27 pp. ISBN 978-92-9230-370-9 [WIDER Working Paper No. 2011/07]
Are Electoral Coalitions Harmful for Democratic Consolidation in Africa?