Transparency data

Minutes of the meeting held on 4 March

Updated 14 May 2026

Chair

Dr Stephen Brien

Members

Les Allamby
Fran Bennett
Joanne Cairns
Bruce Calderwood
Rachel Chiu^{[footnote 1]}
Tom Clark
Daphne Hall
Phil Jones
Richard Machin
Owen McCloskey
Jacob Meagher
Dr Suzy Walton Professor Sharon Wright

1. Private Session

[PARTIALLY RESERVED ITEM]

Consideration of postal regulations

1.4 The Committee endorsed the Regulations sub-group’s recommendation that the following regulations were a suitable candidate for clearance by correspondence:

• The Childcare Payments (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2026

1.5 The Chair asked the Committee Secretary to write to HM Revenue and Customs to confirm that the Committee was content for the regulations to proceed as planned.

2. The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 2026

2.1 The Chair welcomed the following officials to the meeting: Joel Weston (Head of Policy, Health and Disability Delivery), Gary Godolphin (Senior Policy Advisor, Health and Disability Delivery), Ellie Howe (Grade 7, Analyst), Oana Chernick (Grade 7, Analyst), Rachel Copley (Grade 7, Service Design and Management), Elizabeth Cookson (HEO, Disability Benefits), and Lawrence Packett (HEO, PIP Analysis).

2.2 Introducing the item, Joel Weston indicated that the new provision within the regulations would allow the Secretary of State to extend the length of an existing fixed term award of Personal Independence Payment (PIP), where that is considered necessary to “safeguard the efficient administration of PIP”. The power is confined to extending PIP awards; it does not allow for awards to be shortened or terminated, nor for entitlement levels to be changed. This allows for a clear legal mechanism to extend existing PIP awards without requiring a full reassessment, so that a revised review frequency can be applied to the current caseload. It will also ensure that claimants can be lawfully kept in payment where operational capacity constraints mean that reviews cannot be completed before award end dates.

2.3 The background to the change includes a significant and continuing rise in PIP claims, increasing numbers of changes of circumstances and award reviews, and the associated pressure on assessment providers and health care professionals. The measures sit alongside wider reforms announced at the Autumn Budget, including changes to the structure and frequency of PIP award reviews and the intention to increase Work Capability Assessment (WCA) activity and the proportion of face-to-face assessments across both PIP and the WCA.

2.4 In providing a background to how PIP award reviews currently work in practice, Joel explained that following the receipt of an award review form, a health assessment is undertaken by an approved Health Care Professional (HCP), whose advice is used to set both entitlement and the future review date. In around two‑thirds of review cases no new HCP assessment is required, and decisions are made on existing evidence. However, the cumulative effect of review cycles has led to a large and growing volume of assessments: approximately 40,000 award review invitations are currently issued each month, with volumes forecast to treble by 2030. Clearance times for reviews have doubled since 2022, and 72 per cent of reviews result in no change to the award, 19 per cent in an increase, and 9 per cent in a decrease, disallowance or no response.

2.5 To ease that burden, the Department concluded that the main lever available was the frequency of PIP award reviews. It had modelled different review patterns and concluded that a first review after three years and subsequent reviews after five years (operationalised as four‑ and six‑year awards) struck an appropriate balance between administrative efficiency and maintaining accurate entitlement. These longer review intervals are intended as minimum periods rather than rigid standards, with HCPs and Decision Makers retaining discretion to recommend shorter or longer awards, where justified, including ten‑year “light touch” arrangements for those with the most severe or stable conditions.

2.6 The policy would not be applied to claimants under 25, as evidence suggests more frequent changes in functional ability in that age group and a desire to engage them earlier with employment support. The Department acknowledged that extending review periods would delay some increases in awards where claimants with deteriorating conditions do not report changes as a change of circumstances but emphasised that claimants remain responsible for reporting changes. Communications would be strengthened to reinforce this. The Department confirmed that the extension decisions will carry appeal rights.

2.7 Committee members raised the following main questions in discussion:

(a) What are the Department’s underlying objectives in bringing forward these regulations at this point, why is this regulatory change necessary, and how should observers understand the connection between the wording of the regulations, the stated policy intent, and the downstream consequences for claimants and public spending

There has been a significant growth in PIP claims, changes of circumstances and award reviews, which has created substantial pressure on the limited pool of health professionals available to undertake assessments. In parallel, there are major pressures in the wider health assessment system, including a backlog of WCAs and reassessments. If no action is taken, the system would struggle to sustain current levels of award review activity. Against that backdrop, it has been identified that PIP award reviews are the main lever that could be adjusted to manage demand and preserve the overall functioning of the assessment system. The regulations are therefore intended to create a lawful mechanism to extend existing PIP awards, so that review frequency can be reduced and capacity can be used more efficiently across benefits.

(b) A number of factors have been suggested: operational pressures and the desire to increase face to face assessments and WCA activity, as well as the impact on Departmental Expenditure Limits and Annually Managed Expenditure (AME). How would the Department’s ministers publicly articulate the intent of these regulations in a clear and succinct way, and how does the broader resource allocation narrative reconcile with the more limited story about simply reducing review frequency?

The central concern is that the assessment system will “fall over” if capacity pressures are not addressed. While longer term reforms are being developed, there is an immediate need to act. These measures will provide the necessary power to operationalise this intent by allowing the Department to extend existing PIP awards, thereby reducing the volume of PIP award reviews and freeing capacity to conduct more WCAs and more face-to-face assessments overall. The Department accepted the importance of ensuring that the public narrative is aligned with this underlying purpose.

(c) The Department intends to standardise new PIP awards so that a claimant would usually receive a first review after three years and subsequent reviews after five years, while maintaining Decision Maker discretion. How will this standardisation be implemented in practice through guidance, and how will decision makers be instructed to balance the standardised approach with the need to exercise discretion in individual cases?

There is ongoing work with operational colleagues to develop updated guidance and training which will set out minimum review periods for first and subsequent reviews, together with clearly defined exceptions. Under the envisaged approach, standard minimum review periods will apply for most claimants aged 25 and over, while exceptions will be specified for under‑25s and for cases where the HCP recommends a significantly longer award, such as ten years for those with severe and/or stable conditions. HCPs will continue to assess the claimant, compile evidence and suggest a review period based on the likely trajectory of the condition. Case managers will then be guided, through both instructions and system prompts, to apply at least the minimum standard review period unless a documented exception applies.

(d) Where HCPs recommend shorter review periods than the proposed standard minimum, how will the Department ensure that the administrative systems and guidance reliably implement the policy of standardisation while respecting professional clinical judgment and individual circumstances?

HCPs will not be asked to change their assessment practice. They will continue to propose review periods based on clinical judgment. However, if an HCP recommended a review period shorter than the new minimum for a given category of case, the Department’s guidance and IT systems will require case managers to apply at least the minimum standard period unless a specific, documented exception applied. This approach is intended to preserve clinical input while ensuring that standardised minimum award durations are consistently implemented.

(e) From a Treasury and value for money perspective, what is the approximate order of magnitude of AME impacts associated with these changes by 2030, considering both the savings from less frequent PIP assessments and the effects of increasing face-to-face assessments and reallocating assessors to WCA? How does this relate to the principle that people whose conditions worsen should receive appropriate increases in support in a timely way?

Additional WCA related payments are currently being made but the Department has not been able to review such cases as frequently as intended. When reassessments occur, some claimants will continue to qualify, while others whose conditions have improved may see their additional benefit removed from that point onwards. The aim is to ensure that claimants receive what they are entitled to, not to remove support inappropriately. A higher proportion of face-to-face assessments can improve the accuracy of decisions by allowing more detailed discussion and examination. The Department acknowledged that while it is the case that some savings will arise from cases where claimants with worsening conditions do not receive an earlier tailored assessment, generating such savings was not a driver of the policy.

(f) Claimants who do not proactively seek reassessment may be some of the most vulnerable and therefore may be disproportionately affected in having delays to their awards. What analysis has been done to identify which groups are most likely to miss out in this way, and what information is held about their characteristics?

The Department indicated that it is aware that some claimants with worsening conditions do not report changes until an award review, and that this phenomenon already exists within the current system. Extending the review period inevitably lengthens the time that such claimants may remain on a lower level of benefit if they do not contact the Department. For this reason, the Department plans to strengthen communications, including using text messages and other channels, to emphasise the importance of notifying changes in circumstances. Where claimants do report a deterioration, the Department aims to bring them in for reassessment at the earliest opportunity. While the Department has information about age, there is more limited information about other characteristics of those who do not report changes. The Department is considering what further analysis might be feasible within capacity constraints.

(g) In relation to the WCA, many people with Limited Capability for Work and Work-Related Activity (LCWRA) status have reported worsening health and requested reassessment. There is, reportedly, a substantial backlog, with tens of thousands waiting longer than a year. How does the Department’s prioritisation of new claims over reassessments address this group, and if PIP awards are extended while claimants can still report changes of circumstances, will those who report worsening conditions risk remaining in the same position, waiting for reassessment? Has the Department factored in a likely increase in claimant-led requests for reassessment if awards are extended?

The Department could not confirm the numbers quoted but acknowledged there has been a backlog of WCA reassessments. That backlog includes claimant-led cases where worsening health has been reported; however, additional capacity has been brought in and the backlog is being cleared, with the aim of completing that work very soon.

The proposed changes are designed to create the capacity needed to manage all assessment activity, including both claimant-led and Department-led reassessments. New WCA claims would continue to be prioritised, but the intention was to process both types of reassessments rather than displacing claimant-led cases. Planning assumptions already incorporate an expected increase in PIP change of circumstances notifications associated with longer awards, and the service delivery model has been designed to accommodate this, alongside new claims and award reviews.

(h) What is the Department’s intended prioritisation between claimant-led and Department-initiated WCA reassessments, particularly given the scale of the backlog and concerns about whether it can realistically be cleared in the short term?

Once the backlog has been addressed, claimant-led and Department-led reassessments would be treated on an equal footing, with the only explicit prioritisation reserved for new WCA claims.

(i) If there were to be a surge in new WCA claims, is there a risk that reassessment, particularly for those who have already been waiting a long time, would again be deprioritised or delayed?

In the event of a substantial and unforeseen surge in new claims, there could be pressure on reassessment activity. However, there is no forecast that such a surge is imminent. The policy to reduce PIP award review volumes is intended to create sustainable capacity across the system, enabling the Department to manage new claims, award reviews and change of circumstances cases more effectively within existing resources.

(j) The Department’s rationale differentiates between age groups, particularly older claimants and those aged 16–24 but does not appear to draw similar distinctions by sex, despite noting that women are more likely to be affected. What is the basis for linking age to likely patterns of condition and assessment method, and does the emphasis on 16–24-year-olds reflect a shift towards aligning PIP more closely with employment outcomes, notwithstanding that PIP is not itself an employment-related benefit?

The rationale for treating younger claimants differently is two-fold. First, internal data indicates that with the younger age group there is a greater likelihood of improvement in health and functional ability over time. If reviews for this group are further apart, some individuals could remain on benefit longer than necessary. Secondly, more frequent engagement with 16–24-year-olds provides opportunities to identify and offer appropriate employment support at an earlier stage, in light of rising economic inactivity due to health reasons among young people. The Timms Review, a full review of PIP, is examining PIP assessments and the implications for wider support. Any future move towards attaching conditionality to PIP would fall within that broader reform work. However, the current proposals are primarily about managing inactivity and accurate entitlement, not introducing employment conditions into PIP.

(k) The regulations are framed as being for the “efficient administration of PIP,” which provides the vires for the change. However, the explanation of the broader strategy suggests a wider intent, including freeing up resources for WCA reassessments. Is the Department confident that a regulation drafted in terms of PIP administration alone lawfully supports changes in review periods that are partly designed to redirect resources to other areas of the system?

The proposed change should be seen as one step within a broader programme. During the pandemic and afterwards, the Department had extended some PIP awards by short periods without clear statutory cover, due to constrained HCP capacity. The new measure intends to regularise and extend that type of action by providing a specific power to extend awards, but only in favour of the claimant. This power cannot be used to reduce awards, only to keep people in receipt of PIP for longer where appropriate. The regulation does not capture every objective of the wider strategy, but it is nonetheless an important measure for ensuring the efficient administration of PIP in the face of rising volumes, and any consequential benefits for WCA activity are additional to the core purpose.

(l) It appears that the introduction of this measure, justified in the safeguarding of the efficient administration of PIP, is in practice being used to underpin improvements in the administration of another benefit. What is the justification and validity of that approach in terms of legislative intent and scope?

Even in the absence of the WCA and other benefits, it is still necessary to bring forward this regulation because of the pressures on PIP itself. The measure was originally developed to address PIP-specific issues and is required in its own right. As work has progressed, additional objectives, including creating capacity for other assessments, became associated with it. The measure remains grounded in the efficient administration of PIP, with any wider benefits being consequential rather than the primary legal purpose.

(m) Extending review periods will result in periods where claimants’ entitlement is incorrect. For claimants aged 25 and over this may not be to their advantage, whereas for younger claimants there is no equivalent compensating benefit. How does the Department reconcile this with the concept of efficient administration, which is not neutral as between accuracy and convenience of awards?

There is a tension between administrative efficiency and the strict accuracy of awards at all points in time. Data suggest younger claimants are more likely to experience change in their functional ability and that there is a policy justification for reviewing them more frequently. For older claimants, the policy aim is to reduce unnecessary repeat assessments where awards are likely to remain stable, while maintaining the ability for claimants to report changes in circumstances at any time. For some claimants over 25, longer intervals between reviews could result in periods where awards are not fully aligned with current need; however, the decision has been taken that this is justified when considering the overall benefits in terms of system sustainability and reduced stress for many claimants.

(n) The data provided on award outcomes by age appear inconsistent: the graphical data suggests fewer changed outcomes for 16-24‑year‑olds than for older groups, albeit with a higher proportion of reductions or disallowances. Can the Department clarify how the figures on change/no change and increases relate to the graphical data and reconcile these differences?

There may be differences between the figures provided in the narrative and those in the graphical data and there is a distinction between absolute volumes and proportions by age group. Analysts confirmed that figures had been updated since initiation and consideration of the policy. Updated data would be provided to the Committee outside of the meeting, along with a clearer explanation of how change, no change and increased award outcomes vary by age.

(o) The Committee is trying to establish the Department’s real intent and ensure that the regulations deliver on this, with the consequences of their application being understood. However, the equality matrices provided lack data and, while there is some analysis by age and gender, there is no data on ethnicity or other protected characteristics. Under the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED), how will ministers be able to explain what equality information is, or is not, available, and what indicative analysis or equality impact work, potentially by using external datasets or linked caseload information, has been undertaken?

The main constraint is limited data on certain protected characteristics within PIP administrative systems, particularly with ethnicity. The Department is able to analyse age and gender, and has done so, but face methodological and resource challenges in linking PIP data to wider population datasets or in merging datasets to provide robust analysis across multiple characteristics. The equality analysis used the best available data at the time and work is ongoing within the Department to improve the availability and usability of data on ethnicity and other characteristics, although this is complex and subject to time and capacity constraints.

(p) The Department often indicates that there is insufficient data to analyse equality impacts fully, yet other sources such as WCA data could be used given the high proportion of PIP claimants that also undergo a WCA, which will include a significant minority that are from ethnic minority groups. Why does the Department not draw on such proxy data to provide at least indicative insights? Is it confident that the current Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) meets the requirements of the PSED?

The Committee’s concerns were acknowledged. The Department indicated that it was cautious about presenting analyses based on proxy data that might misrepresent impacts or suggest disproportionate effects that do not in fact exist. It indicated a need to balance the desire for more granular analysis against the risk of drawing unreliable conclusions, and that it did not have the capacity to undertake more extensive work at this stage. The Department acknowledged the challenge laid down by the Committee and undertook to consider whether additional proxy data could be used to update and strengthen the EIA.

(q) Who determined that the EIA, in its current form, was adequate to enable the Secretary of State to have due regard to their duties in relation to these regulations?

The EIA was cleared at Senior Civil Servant level. The Department reiterated that it would consider further whether proxy data could be incorporated and whether the EIA could be updated in light of the Committee’s concerns, to better support the Secretary of State in discharging his obligations under the PSED. The Department agreed to come back to the Committee outside of the meeting to address its concerns.

(r) There appears to be a discrepancy in how the policy intent is described. Section 88(2) of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 already provides for PIP awards to be fixed term unless otherwise appropriate. If decision makers can already set awards for any length they consider suitable, why is this further regulatory change needed?

The Department acknowledged that the documentation could have been clearer in articulating intent. However, with regards to the legality of extending awards, the existing regulations do not permit the Department to extend the duration of an existing award in the way now envisaged. While there is flexibility at the point of award setting, there is limited flexibility to change the term of an award once it has been made, other than through existing revision and supersession grounds. The new measure will create a specific supersession mechanism to extend awards for administrative reasons, rather than relying solely on initial award setting powers. The Department agreed to provide a more detailed legal explanation of this position in writing following the meeting.

(s) The regulations are framed in terms of safeguarding the “efficient administration of PIP,” which focuses on system resilience rather than claimant outcomes. Given the broader description of the policy, to extend awards, reallocate capacity and manage a system under strain, why does the wording appear to be only concerned with administrative efficiency, and not with the substantive purposes that have been described?

It was a conscious decision to use the current wording, focusing on safeguarding the administration of PIP. This does not spell out the broader policy objectives, including implications for WCAs, but these are in addition to the primary purpose. This measure is intended to address situations in which the system is under pressure and awards need to be kept in payment for longer, and that, while alternative or more expansive formulations might have been possible, the chosen wording reflects the core administrative rationale. The Department agreed to reflect further and respond to the Committee outside of the meeting on whether any widening of the stated purpose would be appropriate.

(t) In light of the discussion about safeguarding PIP, it appears that there are multiple layers at play: the narrow regulatory change, the broader policy shift and the EIA which does not fully align. How will the Department address this apparent disconnect between intent, regulation and impact analysis? The Committee would be happy to provide any guidance to assist with this.

There is a degree of disconnect between the narrow legal change, the wider policy objectives and the scope of the current EIA. The Committee’s concern that the equality analysis is narrow, the policy change broad, and the regulatory amendment highly specific is acknowledged. The Department welcomed the Committee’s offer to provide guidance on what further information and analysis would be helpful and agreed that greater alignment between these elements would be beneficial.

2.8 The Chair thanked officials for attending and addressing the Committee’s questions.

2.9 In subsequent private discussion, the Committee confirmed that, due to concerns about the alignment between policy intent, regulatory powers and the EIA, further information would be required before it could complete the statutory scrutiny process. Accordingly, the Chair would write to the Minister for Social Security and Disability setting out the Committee’s concerns and requesting the following information^{[footnote 2]}:

• a clearer, written legal explanation of why existing powers are insufficient to extend awards and why the new regulation is required
• a strengthened and revised Equality Impact Assessment, including consideration of proxy data and broader policy intent
• clarification of the quantitative analysis of award outcomes by age, including reconciling figures presented in narrative and graphical form; and
• a public explanation of the policy intent

2.10 It would not be possible for the Committee to complete its statutory scrutiny of the regulations without this additional information^{[footnote 3]}

3-6. Private Sessions

[RESERVED ITEMS]

7. Date of next meeting

7.1 The next meeting is scheduled to take place on 22 April.

Annex A: Attendees  

Guests and Officials  

Item 2 

Joel Weston (Head of Policy, Health and Disability Delivery)
Gary Godolphin (Senior Policy Advisor, Health and Disability Delivery)
Ellie Howe (Grade 7, Analyst)
Oana Chernick (Grade 7, Analyst)
Rachel Copley (Grade 7, Service Design and Management)
Elizabeth Cookson (HEO, Disability Benefits)
Lawrence Packett (HEO, PIP Analysis).

Secretariat

Denise Whitehead (Committee Secretary)
Kenneth Ashworth (Assistant Secretary)
Robert Cooper (Assistant Secretary)
Edward Munn (Assistant Secretary)

Annex B: SSAC Minutes of the meeting held on 17 April 2026

Chair

Dr Stephen Brien 

Members

Fran Bennett
Bruce Calderwood
Rachel Chiu
Daphne Hall
Richard Machin
Owen McCloskey
Jacob Meagher
Professor Sharon Wright 

1. The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 2026

1.1 The Chair welcomed the following officials to the meeting: Bill Thorpe (Director, Disability and Health Support, Department for Work and Pensions) and Joel Weston (Head of Policy, Health and Disability Delivery, Department for Work and Pensions).

1.2 The Chair explained that the meeting had been convened as a continuation of the previous scrutiny session on 4 March in order to further explore issues arising from the Committee’s earlier consideration of the draft regulations. He emphasised that the Committee wished to establish whether remaining concerns could be addressed through clarification and further explanation.

1.3 He briefly recapped the Committee’s earlier concerns. The first had been clarification of scope, including whether the regulations were strictly about Personal Independence Payment (PIP) or were implicitly supporting wider policy objectives. The Department’s response had been helpful in making clear that these were regulations relating to PIP and that the policy intent should be PIP‑focused, even if members might reasonably read them alongside broader developments, acknowledging issues around the reality of assessment shortages.

1.4 The Chair identified the second substantive issue as the differential treatment of claimants under 25, and the third as the Equality Impact Assessment (EIA), while recognising that the revised EIA represented a significant improvement and reflected the scale of analysis the Committee had felt was necessary.

1.5 Turning to the issues relating to under‑25s, the Chair explained that he had previously held discussions with officials to better understand the Secretary of State’s thinking, particularly the desire not to set young people up for life on disability benefits. However, the Committee had found that this background was not clearly reflected in the Department’s response.

1.6 Committee members raised the following main questions in discussion:

(a) Could the Secretary of State’s objectives, assumptions and theory of change be clearly articulated, including why the regulations were being applied differently to under‑25s.

The Secretary of State had recently set out his vision and concerns about outcomes for young people who are not in employment, education or training, including in public speeches and interviews. He described this as a long‑standing labour market issue, with the number of young people who are Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEET) now just under one million, with a higher proportion of that group reporting health or disability conditions than in previous cycles.

The Secretary of State has commissioned Alun Milburn to examine the role of education, employers and related systems, with an interim report expected shortly and a final report later in the year. This is tied to poorer outcomes for young people on social security benefits, including disability benefits, and a growing number of children moving from Child Disability Living Allowance (CDLA) into adult disability benefits, which is serving as a “pipeline” into the adult health and disability system and, given poor employment outcomes on these benefits, is associated with long‑term scarring effects.

Following the Milburn review, the Department is likely to pursue broader reforms aimed at supporting young people into employment or education and reducing long‑term reliance on health and disability benefits.

Therefore, the decision not to apply award extensions to under‑25s reflected a concern that extending awards for this group would worsen outcomes. Younger claimants are currently more likely than older claimants to lose entitlement at award review, reflecting the mix of conditions on the caseload, including autism and attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD), and changes in functional ability as individuals move through early adulthood. Extending awards for this group was therefore seen as increasing the “stickiness” of benefits.

(b) Can the link between PIP and young people who are NEET be explained, and what evidence supports the link being made between PIP receipt and labour market outcomes?

Employment rates among young people on PIP are extremely low. While PIP is an in‑ and out‑of‑work benefit, longitudinal data suggests that young people who remain on PIP through their twenties often experience further disengagement from the labour market rather than improved outcomes.

(c) Is there a specific rationale for choosing age 25 as the cut‑off point, and does the evidence suggest outcomes change at that age?

25 is not a precise breakpoint but is used as a pragmatic and recognisable policy marker. Trends suggests that stabilisation occurs later in the twenties; however, the age of 25 correlates with age brackets in other systems, such as education etc.

(d) Why did the Department not consider varying award review practice by condition, given that some conditions are lifelong regardless of age? Is there a slant towards this based on neurological conditions and is there an argument that some conditions that are for life and may not improve could be given longer awards to help alleviate the burden on assessments substantially?

The Department has not considered a condition‑based distinction in this case. Previous work in this area had proved complex and attracted negative feedback, due to differences in severity and functional impact within diagnostic groups.

Thirty per cent of those in receipt of PIP have light touch, ten-year awards, so there is an argument that it would not entirely alleviate the burden as suggested. PIP assessments remain functional rather than diagnostic, and longer or light‑touch awards remain available for claimants of any age where appropriate.

(e) There appears to be a disconnect between the administration efficiency and potential discrimination to those under 25. Has that been fully considered?

This has been considered and the impact on young people not being in the labour market and the effects of this the rationale behind it. There is also the impact that PIP has on the basis of income substitution for young people, particularly those who may still live at home.

(f) How does the EIA support the specific argument being made about neurodivergent conditions, particularly autism, given the data presented which suggests that the likelihood of increasing and decreasing awards for autism is similar to other conditions; while ADHD points to a 20 per cent reduction?

The EIA presents data across all ages and does not include a discrete breakdown for under‑25s. While patterns for ADHD are clearer, outcomes for autistic claimants appeared similar to those for other conditions, and the Department acknowledged that this nuance could have been more clearly explained in the supporting data.

(g) Has the Department considered the risk that more frequent reviews may increase anxiety and disengagement among neurodivergent young people, leading to potentially worse outcomes?

This risk is recognised. However, extending award durations for under‑25s would, overall, worsen employment outcomes. There are also wider support measures, such as Pathways to Work, which is intended to operate alongside this policy. More details should emerge following the Milburn review.

(h) It is worth highlighting that the House of Lords conducted an enquiry into disabled young people and highlighted the health conditions that came about as a result of COVID or COVID lockdown, which indicated that the current cohort are more likely to have adverse health conditions, especially around mental health^{[footnote 4]}.

Noted.

(i) To what extent does the Department distinguish between correlation and causation when linking PIP receipt, unemployment and long‑term scarring effects?

The Department relies on longitudinal data and analysis of employment rates. While acknowledging the complexity of causation, it maintained that poor outcomes among young people on PIP are a serious concern and inform the Secretary of State’s approach.

(j) Several statements have been made about labour market effects, income substitution and scarring which appear to go beyond what peer‑reviewed evidence supports. How confident is the Department that the factual basis of these claims is sound?

The Department does not believe that it has made any factually inaccurate statements, stressing its strong analytical capability and the fact that it reviews available studies and data. The Department invited the Committee to share any alternative evidence for consideration.

(k) What mitigation exists for claimants who may miss out on award increases, particularly those approaching State Pension age?

Mitigation currently relies on encouraging claimants to report changes of circumstances; however, there is an acknowledgement that people do not always come forward promptly. In line with these changes and that risk, despite no additional mitigation, there will be reminders and communication encouraging people to notify the Department if there is any change to their condition and functionality, to ensure they have an accurate award.

(l) What evidence exists regarding young people moving from CDLA to PIP, and does this support assumptions about improved functional ability?

The Department has not undertaken a detailed breakdown of award outcomes by prior benefit history. However, the majority of PIP claimants aged 16–24, between 60 to 80 per cent, had previously received CDLA. The Department emphasised that adult PIP assessments focus on different functional activities associated with leading an independent adult life.

1.7 The Chair thanked officials for attending and for elaborating on the concerns raised by the Committee. In summing up, he indicated that the Department had agreed to provide the following information following the meeting in order that the Committee’s scrutiny of the regulations could be completed:

(i) a clearer articulation of the Secretary of State’s policy intent and theory of change in relation to under‑25s, reflecting the explanation provided orally; and

(ii) further consideration of how equality‑related risks identified during discussion, including missed award increases and the adequacy of mitigation, would be monitored.

1.8 Subsequent to the meeting the Committee agreed that the regulations would not be taken on formal reference, given that they are limited in scope and provide a lawful supersession power to extend PIP awards. However, it emphasised that concerns remained around: the clarity of the policy narrative, the strength and presentation of the evidence base, and the treatment of equality risks. The Committee would therefore consider the further response received from the Department at its meeting on 22 April and decide on whether any further action was necessary.

Annex C: Letter to the Minister for Social Security and Disability and the Department’s response

The Rt Hon Sir Stephen Timms MP
Minister for Social Security and Disability
Department for Work and Pensions
Caxton House
Tothill Street
London
SW1H 9NA

16 March 2026

Dear Sir Stephen,

The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 2026

The Committee undertook its statutory scrutiny of the above draft regulations, which introduce a new power to extend fixed‑term PIP awards, at its meeting on 4 March. We have unfortunately been unable to complete that scrutiny due to inconsistencies and gaps in the evidence presented to us and are writing to seek your support in addressing this, so that we can effectively fulfil our statutory obligations.

1. Lack of clarity and consistency in the policy intent

Our first objective in scrutiny is to ensure a clear and consistent connection between the stated policy intent, the scope of the regulatory changes and the consequential impacts as a result of the operationalisation of the policy. Where appropriate, we also benefit from that intent being contextualised within the Government’s broader agenda.

However, the written evidence provided within the SSAC Memorandum, presented to the Committee ahead of our meeting on 4 March, offered a variety of policy aims, objectives, and consequential benefits of the regulations. These ranged from the capacity to extend awards that risk expiring before a review can be completed for those with stable conditions, to improve operational efficiency to free up professional health capacity for other priorities, to reduce stress and uncertainty for disabled people, to substantial benefit savings. At times, the regulations are presented in the SSAC Memorandum as a narrow mechanism to support and “safeguard” the “efficient administration of PIP” and to enable alignment of existing awards with the Department’s revised Award Review policy. We also noted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Budget Statement in November 2025^{[footnote 5]}, and the Department’s own press release in December 2025^{[footnote 6]}, emphasised a more specific set of purposes including delivering more WCA assessments. While these were not inconsistent, the Committee was keen to ensure pre-scrutiny preparation enabled a clear underlying intent and focus was defined as the basis of scrutiny.

At our scrutiny meeting on 4 March, the Committee’s primary objective was to clarify the specific scope and purpose of these regulations. In oral evidence we heard that the Department intends the measure to play a much wider operational role: reallocating assessment capacity to WCA reassessments and expanding face‑to‑face assessments across benefits^{[footnote 7]}. The Department’s press release further describes the changes as part of a package designed to generate significant fiscal savings, again suggesting a wider set of purposes than those presented to us as the formal regulatory intent. The oral evidence described the savings from reducing the PIP reassessment frequency as an unintended consequence, and not part of the primary purpose.

This lack of coherence across the Department’s documentation, scrutiny evidence and public statements is a significant concern for the Committee as the policy intent has been framed differently in different contexts without focussed resolution at the scrutiny session. As the policy intent is the starting point for our scrutiny of all draft regulations. It is essential that we - as well as Parliament and the general public – have a clear understanding of the full intent, scope and consequences of the measures.

At present, we cannot confidently reconcile the narrow regulatory framing with the wider operational and strategic ambitions described to us. We ask the Department to set out one clear, authoritative public statement of intent, against which the regulations and supporting materials can be meaningfully assessed. This statement should clearly delineate the specific scope of the regulations from the Government’s wider agenda, and enable a direct connection to be made between the mechanics of the regulatory change and the outcomes articulated by the intent.

Additionally, the Committee was also concerned by the mismatch between the regulations’ drafted intent of safeguarding the efficient administration of PIP, and their described use of underpinning the WCA, a purpose which does not involve PIP at all. We would therefore recommend that you satisfy yourself that any apparent mismatches are resolved.

2. Under-25s

If the intent of the regulations is as described in the SSAC memorandum, it could be best achieved by reducing reassessment frequency for all ages. The Committee was not persuaded that the use of an age cut-off was consistent with the stated intent. The age rules proposed would actually reduce the effectiveness of the policy of relieving capacity pressures, whilst having financial effect of reducing awards both on younger and older PIP claimants versus alternatives^{[footnote 8]}.

Such a policy differential could be justifiable if there is available evidence to show that younger people’s awards are significantly more likely to change – both up and down – than older people’s awards, and that there are other a priori rationales for differential treatment of younger people. 

However, the evidence presented to the Committee did not show this. Indeed, the age‑banded graphs presented to the Committee only provided evidence that awards were more likely to reduce, and were inconsistent with other figures in the memorandum, a point acknowledged by officials during scrutiny. Hence, the proposed differential age rules in the application of the regulations were not supported by the level of evidence Ministers would reasonably require to understand adverse effects.

We recommend that the Department review the decision to differentiate the policy for under-25s to ensure it is consistent with the underlying policy intent, and set out a clear rationale supported by evidence for any such differentiation.

3. Equality Impact Analysis, and the Secretary of State’s Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) obligations

In preparing an Equality Impact Analysis (EIA), it is essential that the scope of the analysis matches the scope of the regulations and the intent – addressing the foreseeable and planned impacts of how the regulations will be implemented. Taking the narrower interpretation of the purpose of these regulations - limited to adjustments to PIP award review length - the Committee is extremely concerned about the quality of the EIA presented in support of that.

We are concerned that the EIA, as currently constituted, may not provide a sufficiently robust evidence base to inform the Secretary of State’s PSED obligations. In particular:

• the EIA as drafted reads as a justification of the policy, rather than an objective assessment of equality impacts to inform Ministerial PSED decision‑making. For instance, the EIA repeatedly emphasises benefits such as “reduced stress”, “reduced burden” and “improved claimant experience”, while adverse impacts are mentioned only briefly and are described as “justified by the policy rationale”. There is no structured assessment of magnitude, likelihood, or mitigation

• the EIA does not make adequate use of readily available proxy data, despite the Committee having repeatedly advised the Department on how to approach this where direct data is limited. Aligned to this, the EIA states that information relating to key characteristics is not held, with no attempt made to draw on linked datasets, administrative sources, or analogue evidence - all of which we have previously indicated are appropriate and necessary. For example, the EIA states that ethnicity data is not held for PIP claimants, and that although it holds relevant data within the Family Resources Survey it was unable to match race to age group or length of award. The Committee’s perspective is that indirect analysis is of particular value when direct analysis is not available. Hence, given that a very high proportion of PIP claimants also undergo WCA assessment, WCA datasets could also have used to provide indicative assessments. The EIA similarly provides no - or only very cursory - analysis for other characteristics despite the availability of relevant national datasets and administrative sources that, in our view, could have supported a meaningful proxy assessment^{[footnote 9]}. We note that the Independent Review of Carers Allowance Overpayments similarly observed that there was “limited collection and use of data to guide policy” within the Department^{[footnote 10]}.

• the impacts on particular groups most likely to experience delayed increases or reduced accuracy in awards are not sufficiently analysed or quantified, and the reasons for that delay and reduced accuracy. This is despite the SSAC Memorandum stating that £110m in Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) savings arise specifically from delayed increases to awards, and despite data on award‑review outcomes (72% unchanged, 19% increased, 9% decreased/disallowed) which could have been used to identify and quantify the groups most exposed to this delay

• if significant AME is being saved, a consequence is that some people will be receiving reduced benefit. And that in making that difficult decision, it is inconceivable that Ministers would not want to have as much information as possible on who is losing – both in general, and for the specific purposes of ensuring there is no unwitting discriminatory effect. In particular, there is inadequate consideration of mitigations, especially for those who might be least likely to proactively seek reassessment of deteriorating conditions

The Committee has engaged constructively with your officials on many occasions offering advice and support on how to produce a pragmatic, proportionate, and legally sound EIA even where administrative data gaps exist. However, the material provided here falls short of that standard by some considerable margin. Following the scrutiny session, we have shared with your officials a worked-up example of how publicly-available data can be used to remediate the gaps in this particular instance.

We are concerned that the EIA presented to the Committee may not be sufficient to fully support the Secretary of State in meeting the statutory duty of ‘due regard’. Where an equality impact assessment is thin, formulaic, or fails to engage substantively with the protected characteristics most likely to be differentially affected, it cannot discharge the PSED however conscientiously the Secretary of State approaches the material placed before him. Data gaps in EIAs may also hinder Ministers from having a clear line of sight on how each incremental or small policy change works alongside - or deviates from - long-standing trends that can accumulate to reinforce discrimination and reduce equality of opportunity.

As you will be aware, the PSED includes an inherent duty of inquiry, requiring the decision‑maker to have a conscious approach to the equality implications, supported by material that permits a genuine evaluation of impact^{[footnote 11]}. Where relevant information is missing, reasonable steps must be taken to obtain it^{[footnote 12]}. In cases where the scale of a policy is significant, or the affected group is particularly vulnerable, the duty may require a pause so that further relevant evidence can be gathered before proceeding. Proceeding solely on the basis of data to hand, where meaningful analysis could reasonably be obtained, does not satisfy the duty^{[footnote 13]}.

Therefore, it is evident that a stronger and more complete analysis (consistent with the scope of the policy intent) is not just desirable – we believe it is necessary for this Committee to deliver effectively its statutory duties and also for the Secretary of State to meet PSED obligations.

We strongly recommend that the Secretary of State should require a substantially improved EIA from officials before proceeding with these regulations. We also recommend seeking an improvement more generally on the EIAs produced by the Department.

In summary, the Committee will seek to complete its statutory scrutiny of these regulations once it has received a more comprehensive and considered version of the EIA and formal clarification of the policy intent. I have had constructive discussions with Bill Thorpe regarding the status of our scrutiny and what we need to complete it. We remain on hand to work constructively with the Department to ensure that the revised materials are sufficiently clear and robust and that the Secretary of State is properly supported and informed to meet the PSED obligations and make an informed decision.

Yours sincerely

Stephen Brien,
SSAC Chair

Department’s response

Stephen Brien
Social Security Advisory Committee
Disability and Health Support
DWP, Policy Group
Caxton House
6-12 Tothill Street
London
SW1H 9NA

21 April 2026

The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) (Amendment) Regulations 2026

Dear Stephen

Thank you for your letter to the Minister for Social Security on 16 March 2026 regarding The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) (Amendment) Regulations 2026. I am responding on his behalf as the policy director responsible for these regulations. This letter sets out the policy intent of the regulations and answers the Committee’s questions on the justification for not applying these regulations to those under the age of 25 and addresses the Committee’s points about the Equality Impact Assessment (EIA).

Background and wider context

In the Autumn Statement 2025 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced three measures which will make operational improvements to health assessments to ensure people receive the right health or disability benefit, deal with the reassessment backlog for the Work Capability Assessment (WCA) and ensure the Personal Independence Payment (PIP) system is sustainable: increasing face to face assessments across health and disability benefits, increasing WCA reassessment capacity and changing the frequency of PIP award reviews (AR). These measures also scored AME savings for the exchequer.

In respect of the last measure, the SoS is introducing two core policy changes. The first change is that there will be minimum award terms for new PIP claims for those aged 25 and over, which will be implemented from April 2026. No regulation change is required for implementation on new claims as the Secretary of State already has the discretion to set award lengths on initial decisions. The second policy change relates to the proposed regulations, which is to create a new power to extend existing PIP award terms to align with the minimum award terms for new claims and to enable the SoS to prevent claimants falling out of payment in limited circumstances, such as administrative capacity, war or a global pandemic. The other two budget measures and mention of Universal Credit (UC) and Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) were included in the SSAC memorandum for context and do not form part of the proposed regulation change which is solely in relation to PIP.

Policy rationale for the regulations

The intent is to keep the PIP system operationally sustainable in the face of rapidly rising caseloads by reducing the volume and frequency of award reviews, achieved through setting longer minimum award and review periods for most claimants aged 25 and over.

In doing so, the regulations aim to ensure that DWP can continue to deliver PIP as legislated, maintain assessment capacity, and provide a lawful mechanism to extend awards in periods of operational pressure, national or departmental disruption. Currently, PIP ARs and award terms are set on an individual basis, based on the claimant’s needs and the likelihood of those changing. They can vary from 9 months to an ongoing award, with a light touch review at the 10-year point. The policy on minimum award terms proposes minimum award terms of 4 and 6 years for claimants aged 25 and over, with award reviews set at 3 and 5 years. Exceptions to the policy will apply to those expected to recover or make significant improvements within a shorter timeframe, while extended review periods will remain in place for individuals with the most severe or long-term conditions.

The overarching aim of this policy and these associated regulations is to ensure that DWP can continue to operate the PIP system as set out in legislation. The incapacity benefit caseload and the disability benefits caseload have been steadily increasing since the pandemic. Both are forecast to further increase significantly between 2024/2025 and 2029/2030. In 2013/14, there were 1.7 million working-age people in receipt of PIP or DLA. By 2030/31, the working-age PIP caseload is forecast to be 4.4 million people. Given the increasing number of claimants on the caseload the forecast number of PIP award reviews per year (prior to these policy changes) was due to increase from 600,000 to over 1.5 million over the same period. This increase in demand for award reviews would have been extremely challenging to deliver given the historic challenge of recruiting and retaining health care professionals to carry out health assessments. Reducing the number of PIP award reviews that are required to be carried out by extending minimum durations for new and existing claimants will help us meet demand without risk of claimants falling out of payment. Following these changes the Department is forecasting that the number of PIP award reviews that will need to be carried out will broadly be flat between the period 2027/28 to 2029/30 before rising on a more sustainable trajectory.

The secondary benefit of these regulations is that in times of national or departmental emergency where DWP cannot deliver award reviews the Secretary of State will have a lawful power to extend award reviews for existing claimants.

Not applying these regulations to Under 25s

The broader goal of government policy is to reduce the risk of young people becoming NEET, and to avoid early working-life scarring effects associated with prolonged disengagement from the labour market. The intent is therefore to avoid keeping young people without functional need on PIP longer than necessary, given the risks that prolonged benefit receipt at this formative age can harm long-term employment prospects through income substitution (the replacement rate is higher for PIP recipients, given it is an in- and out-of-work benefit).

Younger claimants are more likely to experience changes in functional ability as they move through early adulthood and to lose entitlement at review. Analysis shows that claimants aged 16-24 are more likely to have a reduction in award at review – 24% of 16-24 award reviews are decreased or disallowed compared to 16% of overall awards reviews being decreased or disallowed^{[footnote 14]}. This demonstrates that young people under the age of 25 are more likely to see an improvement in condition and functional capacity than the general PIP population. Moreover, employment rates are low on the PIP caseload, with 20 per cent of the working age caseload employed in March 2024^{[footnote 15]}, compared to 53 per cent of all working age disabled people^{[footnote 16]}. Automatically extending awards for this group would therefore increase the likelihood of PIP receipt continuing beyond functional need, increasing long-term attachment to disability benefits and, in the Department’s assessment, worsening future employment outcomes.

On this basis, the Department has decided to exclude under-25s from these changes and to maintain more frequent award assessments for this group. It is important to note that if an individual’s condition was to deteriorate or improve, they are still able to report a change of circumstances at any time during their award period and ask for their award to be reviewed.

The Equality Impact Assessment (EIA)

We acknowledge the committee’s comments and feedback concerning the EIA that was included in the scrutiny materials. The Department believes that the original EIA was sufficient to allow the Minister to fulfil their Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED). Nevertheless, appreciating the committee’s constructive input and the importance they have placed on this matter, we are now providing an updated EIA alongside this letter. Given the policy is not being applied to under 25s the EIAs’ focus is naturally on those over the age of 25. The revised EIA has been reviewed by the Ministers as part of the discharge of their PSED obligations and they have indicated that they are content to continue with the broader policy and lay these regulations.

The proposals referred to the Committee

The Regulations referred to the Committee propose to make an amendment to the Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Job Seekers Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance Decision and Appeal Regulations. This is required as there is currently no lawful procedure to allow the Secretary of State to either revise or supersede award terms in these cases. Therefore, this amendment will grant the Secretary of State the power to extend the length of existing awards, in limited circumstances, where it is deemed necessary to do so to safeguard the efficient administration of the benefit. Efficient Administration will encompass scenarios where we need to prevent claimants from falling into hardship (by falling out of payment due to an inability to review their award) because of but not limited to, periods of assessment capacity shortage (such as in the current position), system outage or national crisis, such as war or a global pandemic affecting administrative capacity. These proposed regulations will enable the Secretary of State to extend PIP awards only to meet these and other unforeseen challenges. These regulations will engender a right of appeal. It is these proposals and the effect of the regulations that we request the committee to scrutinise.

Yours sincerely,

Bill Thorpe
Director, Disability and Health Support, DWP

1. Rachel Chiu left the meeting after agenda item 4. ↩

2. Dr Stephen Brien’s (Chair of SSAC) letter to the Minister for Social Security and Disability is held at annex C, alongside the Department’s response. ↩

3. A follow up scrutiny session was held on 17 April. The minutes from this session is held at Annex B. ↩

4. House of Lords - Think Work First: The transition from education to work for young disabled people – Public Services Committee ↩

5. Budget 2025 in full – GOV.UK ↩

6. Reforms to welfare system set to save £1.9 billion by the end of 2030/31 – GOV.UK ↩

7. Substantial drivers of the Department’s financial modelling presented to the Committee. ↩

8. The design of the proposals with the age break gives the appearance they have been structured in a way that maximise benefit savings – contrary to their expressed purpose (without convincing evidence to the contrary). ↩

9. Relevant data held relating to some protected characteristics (e.g. religion or belief, sexual orientation, and gender reassignment) may be limited, however that does not prevent a logical inclusion in the Department’s consideration of possible impact. For example, we would expect to see an assessment of impact for the gender reassignment category given the NHS confirms that young people who are referred for gender incongruence or gender dysphoria show significantly higher than expected levels of mental health disorders and neurodevelopmental conditions, including: autism spectrum disorder; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; anxiety; depression; eating disorders; suicidality and self-harm. ↩

10. Independent Review of Carer’s Allowance Overpayments – GOV.UK ↩

11. As established in Brown v SSWP [2008] EWHC 3158. ↩

12. As per the principles set out in Secretary of State for Education v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014. ↩

13. In Bracking v Secretary of State [2013] EWCA Civ 1345, the Court of Appeal emphasised the need for a “structured attempt to focus upon the details of equality issues” and that the duty cannot be discharged based on partial or inadequate evidence. It specifically states that “if the relevant material is not available, there will be a duty to acquire it and this will frequently mean that some further consultation with appropriate groups is required.” ↩

14. These figures differ slightly to the overall numbers presented in the challenge session although the overall story is the same. We will clarify these in the Equality Impact Assessment. ↩

15. Pathways to Work: Reforming Benefits and Support to Get Britain Working Green Paper – GOV.UK – table 2.17 ↩

16. Employment of disabled people 2025 – supplementary table MSR001, DWP, 2025 ↩