BSCC-FOI-0423-TH: police force compliance visits

Question 1

Annex A – List of (biometrics/POFA) compliance visits to police forces conducted by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner since 1 March 2021

Accepted Answer

Force	Date compliance visit conducted
Staffordshire	26/05/2021
West Mercia	27/05/2021
MPS	05/07/2021*
Yorkshire and Humber	15/07/2021
Kent	09/08/2021
Essex	10/08/2021
Derbyshire	07/10/2021
Greater Manchester	08/10/2021
Lincolnshire	26/10/2021
Leicestershire	27/10/2021
Somerset & Avon	30/03/2022
Dorset	04/05/2022
Surrey and Sussex	26/07/2022*

*These visits were conducted over two consecutive days

Question 2

Annex B – Reports (letters) sent to forces following compliance visits

Accepted Answer

Temporary Chief Constable Emma Barnett

Staffordshire Police

Send to: Emma.Barnett@staffordshire.pnn.police.uk

9 June 2021

Dear Temporary Chief Constable Emma Barnett

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Staffordshire Police

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to Staffordshire Police on 26th May 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by Staffordshire Police. Thank you for the warm welcome and hospitality on the day.

We were very grateful for the proactive approach taken by Staffordshire Police to the organisation of the visit and the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions. A number of areas of good practice were identified during the visit within both the Forensic Services and Justice Services departments. We also met a representative from the West Midlands CTU and were impressed with their knowledge and understanding of the PoFA provisions surrounding National Security Determinations. I hope that the force representatives present found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force in moving towards resolving issues in the areas that were proving problematic.

This letter contains recommendations to Staffordshire Police following the findings made during our visit. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. Retention of DNA samples under the CPIA exception. Forensic Services outlined that a blanket retention policy is currently in place for DNA samples relating to certain types of offence. This approach has been adopted to prevent samples that may require further specialised analysis, or which may become disclosable in court, from being destroyed (due to FSP backlogs). As the Commissioner outlined in his recent letter (dated 10th May 2021), the CPIA provision is an exceptional power which should not be used as a means for general retention of DNA samples. It is therefore recommended that processes are established which allow CPIA retention decisions to be taken on a case-by-case basis. The reason for retention should be recorded centrally and reviewed at least quarterly by those familiar with the forensic/scientific strategy for the case and who are aware of the PoFA and CPIA retention rules.

2. PACE 63G Applications. In contrast to the blanket retention policy outlined above, the OBSCC has not received any PACE 63G applications to lawfully retain biometric material from Staffordshire Police since 2017. Although it is not mandatory, many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for managing risk in certain cases where a suspect has not been charged or convicted, though it is considered that biometric retention may assist in preventing or detecting future crimes. It is recommended that Staffordshire police ensure there is awareness of the process amongst relevant teams and officers.

3. Voluntary Attendance. It is recommended that Staffordshire Police review and monitor the proportion of individuals with an eligible disposal whose biometrics are captured. This is to ensure opportunities for capturing biometrics are not missed.

4. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming with current IT systems. Staffordshire Police report that they, similarly, have such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Nevertheless, Staffordshire Police should be aware that the Home Office recommends that police forces apply the MOPI guidelines to their custody images and may therefore wish to consider the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, with reference to the current MOPI guidelines for custody images.

5. In light of recommendation 4, it is further recommended that measures are put in place to inform individuals upon leaving custody of their rights in relation to requesting deletion of their custody image and other records held by Staffordshire Police. Protocols for sharing custody images with the VIPER Bureau should also be reviewed to ensure those that should not be retained are not used for identification parades.

The OBSCC will write to Staffordshire Police in early 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

[section 40(2) redaction]

Chief of Staff

Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Chief Constable Anthony Bangham

West Mercia Police

By e-mail to: chief@westmercia.pnn.police.uk

10 June 2021

Dear Chief Constable Anthony Bangham,

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to West Mercia Police

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to West Mercia Police on 27 May 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by West Mercia Police. Thank you for the warm welcome and hospitality on the day.

We were very grateful for the proactive approach taken by West Mercia Police to the organisation of the visit and the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions. A number of areas of good practice were identified during the visit:

West Mercia Police demonstrated that a robust monitoring system is in place for DNA samples held for over 6 months under the CPIA exception which includes recording the rationale for retaining each sample and regular dialogue with the relevant OIC to scrutinise and review ongoing retention
Having identified that biometric capture for voluntary attendees (VAs) wasn’t recorded through Athena, West Mercia Police have developed a separate programme (VABS) which is yet to be rolled out but will eventually, once tested, be able to produce effective MI on VAs and help ensure opportunities are not missed to lawfully obtain biometrics
We were very impressed by your Forensics team who outlined that they are proactively applying DNA quality management standards in areas which they are not required to by UKAS. This is a model approach which we hope to see adopted more widely in the course of our visits to other police forces. The Commissioner met with the new Forensic Science Regulator shortly after our visit to West Mercia Police and commended the quality management approach demonstrated to us by your force.

Separately, we found the meeting with the PCC’s Chief Executive, Andy Champness, very helpful in understanding wider force governance issues and we are grateful for the time he took to meet with us.

I hope that the force representatives present found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force in moving towards resolving issues in the areas that were proving problematic.

This letter contains recommendations to West Mercia Police following the findings made during our visit. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

6. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming with current IT systems. West Mercia Police report that they, similarly, have such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Nevertheless, West Mercia Police should be aware that the Home Office recommends that police forces apply the MOPI guidelines to their custody images and may therefore wish to consider the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, with reference to the current MOPI guidelines for custody images.

7. In light of recommendation 1, it is further recommended that measures are put in place to inform individuals upon leaving custody of their rights in relation to requesting deletion of their custody image and other records held by West Mercia Police.

8. PACE 63G Applications. The OBSCC has not received any PACE 63G applications from West Mercia Police since 2017. Although it is not mandatory, many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for managing risk in certain cases where a suspect has not been charged or convicted, though it is considered that biometric retention may assist in preventing or detecting future crimes. The representative we spoke with outlined the processes in place for identifying relevant cases that had been NFA’d and where a 63G application might be considered, however there appears to be a disconnect between cases being identified and applications subsequently being made to the OBSCC. It is recommended that West Mercia police ensure that relevant teams and officers are aware and briefed of the relevant application processes to ensure opportunities are not missed.

9. Voluntary Attendance. West Mercia Police have already identified a backlog of ~500 individuals whose biometrics have not yet been taken but who have an eligible disposal. This is due to Covid-19 and the restrictions placed on footfall within custody suites. Your representatives outlined a logical risk-based approach to clearing this backlog. It is recommended that West Mercia Police continue this work to ensure those biometrics which can lawfully be retained are recovered.

The OBSCC will write to West Mercia Police in early 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

[section 40(2) redaction]

Chief of Staff

Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Dame Cressida Dick, Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

CC MOPAC and MPS Biometric SPOC

21 July 2021

Dear Dame Cressida Dick,

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Metropolitan Police Service

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 5-6th July 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by the MPS. Thank you for the warm welcome and hospitality on the day.

We are very grateful for the proactive and professional approach taken by the MPS to the organisation of the visit and the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions. We were pleased to see that effective action has been taken to tackle the biometrics related challenges discussed during our last visit in December 2019 and to address our specific recommendations, including in relation to unlawful matches and the monitoring of ‘released under investigation’ (RUI) cases. This work has been overseen by the MPS Biometrics Strategic Board which has a sub working group that meets monthly.

A number of areas of good practice were identified during the visit:

The MPS makes effective use of the PACE 63G application process to manage risk in certain cases where, although a suspect has not been charged or convicted, it is considered appropriate to retain their biometric material in light of vulnerability factors of the complainant/victim or the chief officer believes that retention is necessary assist in preventing or detecting crime. Roughly half of the 63G applications received by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner are submitted by the MPS Biometric Retention Unit which has in place effective mechanisms for identifying potential 63G cases and processing these applications. We are grateful that your Biometrics Coordinator has accordingly offered to share this best practice with other forces.
We have observed a decline in the use of arrest across police forces since the 2012 changes to PACE Code G in favour of voluntary attendance (VA). In some cases, VA has been used where arrest would – from a biometrics perspective - be more appropriate which has various implications, including removing the ability to conduct speculative searches on the biometric databases. It was therefore positive to see that the number of individuals dealt with via VA by the MPS has reduced by 40 per cent between 2016 and 2020, indicating a recalibration in the use of arrest/VA. In addition, we were pleased that processes have been implemented to help ensure opportunities are not missed lawfully to obtain biometrics from VAs. There remain some outstanding issues in this regard, though we understand the rollout of Digital Interview Recording in 2022 and the delivery of the new MPS CONNECT computer system in 2023 will enable effective resolution in due course. It is perhaps worth noting that, in a subsequent visit to Yorkshire and the Humber forces, some officers reported problems arising from their use of CONNECT and they were alive to the need to share these with the MPS to ensure that the relevant lessons had been learnt from their earlier versions of the system.
We met a range of experts across MPS Forensic Services and were very impressed by their knowledge of the PoFA provisions, the approach taken to the retention and deletion of CPIA DNA samples and the sharing of their expertise with other forces, such as with respect to the independent evaluation of potential fingerprint matches (to name just a few areas). In terms of their UK-wide responsibilities the Forensic Services team are managing some significant risk on behalf of UK policing and it was reassuring to see the level of professionalism and purpose with which they approach this role.

We were also very interested to learn of the new biometric technologies the MPS is currently exploring. Forensic Services colleagues demonstrated to us a rapid DNA capability which will soon be trialled in six custody suites and will enable a 90-minute turnaround time for DNA profile match reports. It was welcome to hear that a decentralised model for storing and processing DNA samples is under design to ensure their use is PoFA compliant and that the time-saving benefits of this technology can be fully exploited. We were also briefed on the trial at Islington Police Station of a digital booking-in system which uses facial recognition to register the attendance of subjects on bail with a view to reducing the burden on officers who administer the bail process and to encourage them to apply bail conditions to more offenders where appropriate.

Separately, we found the meeting with MOPAC’s Head of Operational Oversight, Robin Merrett, helpful in understanding wider force governance issues and we are grateful for the time he took to meet with us. We have offered to assist in the drafting of a suitably strategic section in the Mayor’s statutory Police and Crime Plan in relation to biometrics and surveillance which we know is a matter of some importance and sensitivity in London.

I hope that the force representatives present found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force in moving towards resolving issues in the areas that were proving problematic. This letter contains recommendations to the MPS following the findings made during our visit. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

10. RUI and VA. We commend the MPS Detention team for their work since our last visit to tackle issues surrounding the management of RUI cases and VAs. We recommend that that the MPS continues to prioritise progress on these issues via the measures identified and briefed to us during the visit.

11. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming with current IT systems. The MPS report that they, similarly, have such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Nevertheless, the MPS should be aware that the Home Office recommends that police forces apply the MOPI guidelines to their custody images and may therefore wish to consider the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, with reference to the current MOPI guidelines for custody images.

12. In light of recommendation 2, it is further recommended that measures are put in place to inform individuals upon leaving custody and those interviewed as voluntary attendees of their rights in relation to requesting deletion of their custody image and other records held by the MPS.

13. Section 18 holdings. Almost 300,000 fingerprint records are being held unlawfully on the CT fingerprint database operated by MPS’s Secure Operations Forensic Services (SOFS) as they do not meet the requirements of s18 Counter Terrorism Act 2008. While we are assured that these are held in a non-searchable format, it is recommended that SOFS continue to work closely with Home Office Biometrics to rectify this as soon as possible.

The OBSCC will write to the MPS in early 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit and in particular for finding time to meet with us yourself. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

Fraser Sampson

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Email: enquiries@obscc.org.uk

Chief Constable Lisa Winward

Via email: Lisa.Winward@northyorkshire.pnn.police.uk

20 July 2021

Dear Chief Constable Lisa Winward,

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to Humberside, South Yorkshire, North Yorkshire and West Yorkshire Police on 15th July 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by each police force.

We are very grateful to the team at the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Scientific Support Services for hosting us and coordinating the participation of a range of subject matter experts from each force in the relevant parts of the agenda. We welcomed the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions and were impressed by the strong, meaningful collaboration between the four forces which was clearly evident.

We were very pleased to see that a significant amount of work has been done since our last visit in 2018 to address our recommendations, including in relation to DNA sampling failures and the management of cases where individuals have been released under investigation. We were particularly impressed by the rigorous processes in place to monitor the retention of DNA samples held under the CPIA exception. A representative from West Yorkshire Police outlined that all DNA samples for specific serious offences are initially retained under CPIA and subject to weekly reviews to determine whether retention remains necessary based on the specific circumstances of the relevant investigation. These holdings are also reviewed quarterly at ACC level.

Separately, we found the meeting with the Deputy Mayor for West Yorkshire, Alison Lowe, very helpful in understanding wider issues relevant to the use of biometric and surveillance camera technologies in the local area. As the newly-appointed Deputy Mayor for Policing & Crime, Alison had a very clear view on the sensitivities of biometric and surveillance capabilities within local communities. We extended an offer to assist with incorporating biometrics and surveillance issues into the Police and Crime Plan for West Yorkshire and look forward to further engagement with the Mayor’s office in future. Finally, we also met with ACC Osman Khan and representatives from North East CT Policing and had a very practical discussion on the PoFA provisions surrounding National Security Determinations and the ways in which we might achieve greater consistency in matters of proportionality.

I hope that the force representatives who participated found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force in moving towards resolving issues in the areas that were proving problematic. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. PACE 63G Applications. Whilst we regularly receive PACE 63G applications from West Yorkshire Police (which are of a consistently high standard), North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Humberside Police have each submitted only a handful of applications since 2013. Although it is not mandatory, many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for managing risk in certain cases where a suspect has not been charged or convicted, though it is considered that biometric retention may assist in preventing or detecting future crimes. From our discussions during the visit, various issues associated with the case management of investigations appear to be impacting on the ability to make 63G applications before the case is ‘out of time’. It is therefore recommended that North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Humberside Police consider implementing processes to identify potential 63G cases at an earlier stage which would allow them to make better use of this statutory mechanism for lawfully retaining biometric material in serious offences. .

2. Voluntary Attendance. It is recommended that North Yorkshire Police and Humberside Police implement robust processes, monitoring and governance to ensure all that all opportunities for capturing biometrics from voluntary attendees following a positive disposal are exploited. Both forces outlined how they had identified this as an area where further work is required if they are to avoid missing opportunities for taking biometrics. (West Yorkshire Police outlined their approach which includes a diary booking system for postal requisitions and a dedicated officer to track the attendance of VAs and produce management information.)

3. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming using current IT systems. The four forces reported that they, similarly, have encountered such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Nevertheless, North Yorkshire Police should be aware that the Home Office recommends that police forces apply the MOPI guidelines to their custody images and may therefore wish to consider the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, with reference to the current MOPI guidelines for custody images.

4. In light of recommendation 3, it is further recommended that measures are put in place to inform individuals upon leaving custody of their rights in relation to requesting deletion of their custody image and other police records. West Yorkshire Police outlined that these arrangements were already in place and offered to share this best practice with the other forces.

We also noted that DNA samples held by the police forces themselves (as opposed to being held by their forensic service providers) were treated and managed as ‘property’ and the relevant Management Information was gleaned from property management systems. Given the nature of biometric material it may be more appropriate for it to be treated separately in the longer term and this is an issue the Commissioner intends to raise at his next meeting with the Forensic Science Regulator.

The OBSCC will write to North Yorkshire Police in early 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

[section 40(2) redaction]

Chief of Staff

Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Chief Constable Lauren Poultney

Via email: lauren.poultney@southyorks.pnn.police.uk

20 July 2021

Dear Chief Constable Lauren Poultney

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to Humberside, South Yorkshire, North Yorkshire and West Yorkshire Police on 15th July 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by each police force.

We are very grateful to the team at the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Scientific Support Services for hosting us and coordinating the participation of a range of subject matter experts from each force in the relevant parts of the agenda. We welcomed the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions and were impressed by the strong, meaningful collaboration between the four forces which was clearly evident.

We were very pleased to see that a significant amount of work has been done since our last visit in 2018 to address our recommendations, including in relation to DNA sampling failures and the management of cases where individuals have been released under investigation. We were particularly impressed by the rigorous processes in place to monitor the retention of DNA samples held under the CPIA exception. A representative from West Yorkshire Police outlined that all DNA samples for specific serious offences are initially retained under CPIA and subject to weekly reviews to determine whether retention remains necessary based on the specific circumstances of the relevant investigation. These holdings are also reviewed quarterly at ACC level.

Separately, we found the meeting with the Deputy Mayor for West Yorkshire, Alison Lowe, very helpful in understanding wider issues relevant to the use of biometric and surveillance camera technologies in the local area. As the newly-appointed Deputy Mayor for Policing & Crime, Alison had a very clear view on the sensitivities of biometric and surveillance capabilities within local communities. We extended an offer to assist with incorporating biometrics and surveillance issues into the Police and Crime Plan for West Yorkshire and look forward to further engagement with the Mayor’s office in future. Finally, we also met with ACC Osman Khan and representatives from North East CT Policing and had a very practical discussion on the PoFA provisions surrounding National Security Determinations and the ways in which we might achieve greater consistency in matters of proportionality.

I hope that the force representatives who participated found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force in moving towards resolving issues in the areas that were proving problematic. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. PACE 63G Applications. Whilst we regularly receive PACE 63G applications from West Yorkshire Police (which are of a consistently high standard), North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Humberside Police have each submitted only a handful of applications since 2013. Although it is not mandatory, many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for managing risk in certain cases where a suspect has not been charged or convicted, though it is considered that biometric retention may assist in preventing or detecting future crimes. From our discussions during the visit, various issues associated with the case management of investigations appear to be impacting on the ability to make 63G applications before the case is ‘out of time’. It is therefore recommended that North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Humberside Police consider implementing processes to identify potential 63G cases at an earlier stage which would allow them to make better use of this statutory mechanism for lawfully retaining biometric material in serious offences. .

2. Voluntary Attendance. It is recommended that North Yorkshire Police and Humberside Police implement robust processes, monitoring and governance to ensure all that all opportunities for capturing biometrics from voluntary attendees following a positive disposal are exploited. Both forces outlined how they had identified this as an area where further work is required if they are to avoid missing opportunities for taking biometrics. (West Yorkshire Police outlined their approach which includes a diary booking system for postal requisitions and a dedicated officer to track the attendance of VAs and produce management information.)

3. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming using current IT systems. The four forces reported that they, similarly, have encountered such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Nevertheless, South Yorkshire Police should be aware that the Home Office recommends that police forces apply the MOPI guidelines to their custody images and may therefore wish to consider the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, with reference to the current MOPI guidelines for custody images.

4. In light of recommendation 3, it is further recommended that measures are put in place to inform individuals upon leaving custody of their rights in relation to requesting deletion of their custody image and other police records. West Yorkshire Police outlined that these arrangements were already in place and offered to share this best practice with the other forces.

We also noted that DNA samples held by the police forces themselves (as opposed to being held by their forensic service providers) were treated and managed as ‘property’ and the relevant Management Information was gleaned from property management systems. Given the nature of biometric material it may be more appropriate for it to be treated separately in the longer term and this is an issue the Commissioner intends to raise at his next meeting with the Forensic Science Regulator.

The OBSCC will write to South Yorkshire Police in early 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

[section 40(2) redaction]

Chief of Staff

Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Chief Constable John Robins

Via email: John.Robins@westyorkshire.pnn.police.uk

20 July 2021

Dear Chief Constable John Robins

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to Humberside, South Yorkshire, North Yorkshire and West Yorkshire Police on 15th July 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by each police force.

We are very grateful to the team at the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Scientific Support Services for hosting us and coordinating the participation of a range of subject matter experts from each force in the relevant parts of the agenda. We welcomed the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions and were impressed by the strong, meaningful collaboration between the four forces which was clearly evident.

We were very pleased to see that a significant amount of work has been done since our last visit in 2018 to address our recommendations, including in relation to DNA sampling failures and the management of cases where individuals have been released under investigation. We were particularly impressed by the rigorous processes in place to monitor the retention of DNA samples held under the CPIA exception. A representative from West Yorkshire Police outlined that all DNA samples for specific serious offences are initially retained under CPIA and subject to weekly reviews to determine whether retention remains necessary based on the specific circumstances of the relevant investigation. These holdings are also reviewed quarterly at ACC level.

Separately, we found the meeting with the Deputy Mayor for West Yorkshire, Alison Lowe, very helpful in understanding wider issues relevant to the use of biometric and surveillance camera technologies in the local area. As the newly-appointed Deputy Mayor for Policing & Crime, Alison had a very clear view on the sensitivities of biometric and surveillance capabilities within local communities. We extended an offer to assist with incorporating biometrics and surveillance issues into the Police and Crime Plan for West Yorkshire and look forward to further engagement with the Mayor’s office in future. Finally, we also met with ACC Osman Khan and representatives from North East CT Policing and had a very practical discussion on the PoFA provisions surrounding National Security Determinations and the ways in which we might achieve greater consistency in matters of proportionality.

I hope that the force representatives who participated found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force in moving towards resolving issues in the areas that were proving problematic. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. PACE 63G Applications. Whilst we regularly receive PACE 63G applications from West Yorkshire Police (which are of a consistently high standard), North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Humberside Police have each submitted only a handful of applications since 2013. Although it is not mandatory, many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for managing risk in certain cases where a suspect has not been charged or convicted, though it is considered that biometric retention may assist in preventing or detecting future crimes. From our discussions during the visit, various issues associated with the case management of investigations appear to be impacting on the ability to make 63G applications before the case is ‘out of time’. It is therefore recommended that North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Humberside Police consider implementing processes to identify potential 63G cases at an earlier stage which would allow them to make better use of this statutory mechanism for lawfully retaining biometric material in serious offences. .

2. Voluntary Attendance. It is recommended that North Yorkshire Police and Humberside Police implement robust processes, monitoring and governance to ensure all that all opportunities for capturing biometrics from voluntary attendees following a positive disposal are exploited. Both forces outlined how they had identified this as an area where further work is required if they are to avoid missing opportunities for taking biometrics. (West Yorkshire Police outlined their approach which includes a diary booking system for postal requisitions and a dedicated officer to track the attendance of VAs and produce management information.)

3. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming using current IT systems. The four forces reported that they, similarly, have encountered such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Nevertheless, West Yorkshire Police should be aware that the Home Office recommends that police forces apply the MOPI guidelines to their custody images and may therefore wish to consider the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, with reference to the current MOPI guidelines for custody images.

4. In light of recommendation 3, it is further recommended that measures are put in place to inform individuals upon leaving custody of their rights in relation to requesting deletion of their custody image and other police records. West Yorkshire Police outlined that these arrangements were already in place and offered to share this best practice with the other forces.

We also noted that DNA samples held by the police forces themselves (as opposed to being held by their forensic service providers) were treated and managed as ‘property’ and the relevant Management Information was gleaned from property management systems. Given the nature of biometric material it may be more appropriate for it to be treated separately in the longer term and this is an issue the Commissioner intends to raise at his next meeting with the Forensic Science Regulator.

The OBSCC will write to West Yorkshire Police in early 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

[section 40(2) redaction]

Chief of Staff

Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Chief Constable Lee Freeman

Via email: Lee.Freeman@humberside.pnn.police.uk

20 July 2021

Dear Chief Constable Lee Freeman,

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to Humberside, South Yorkshire, North Yorkshire and West Yorkshire Police on 15th July 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by each police force.

We are very grateful to the team at the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Scientific Support Services for hosting us and coordinating the participation of a range of subject matter experts from each force in the relevant parts of the agenda. We welcomed the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions and were impressed by the strong, meaningful collaboration between the four forces which was clearly evident.

We were very pleased to see that a significant amount of work has been done since our last visit in 2018 to address our recommendations, including in relation to DNA sampling failures and the management of cases where individuals have been released under investigation. We were particularly impressed by the rigorous processes in place to monitor the retention of DNA samples held under the CPIA exception. A representative from West Yorkshire Police outlined that all DNA samples for specific serious offences are initially retained under CPIA and subject to weekly reviews to determine whether retention remains necessary based on the specific circumstances of the relevant investigation. These holdings are also reviewed quarterly at ACC level.

Separately, we found the meeting with the Deputy Mayor for West Yorkshire, Alison Lowe, very helpful in understanding wider issues relevant to the use of biometric and surveillance camera technologies in the local area. As the newly-appointed Deputy Mayor for Policing & Crime, Alison had a very clear view on the sensitivities of biometric and surveillance capabilities within local communities. We extended an offer to assist with incorporating biometrics and surveillance issues into the Police and Crime Plan for West Yorkshire and look forward to further engagement with the Mayor’s office in future. Finally, we also met with ACC Osman Khan and representatives from North East CT Policing and had a very practical discussion on the PoFA provisions surrounding National Security Determinations and the ways in which we might achieve greater consistency in matters of proportionality.

I hope that the force representatives who participated found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force in moving towards resolving issues in the areas that were proving problematic. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. PACE 63G Applications. Whilst we regularly receive PACE 63G applications from West Yorkshire Police (which are of a consistently high standard), North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Humberside Police have each submitted only a handful of applications since 2013. Although it is not mandatory, many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for managing risk in certain cases where a suspect has not been charged or convicted, though it is considered that biometric retention may assist in preventing or detecting future crimes. From our discussions during the visit, various issues associated with the case management of investigations appear to be impacting on the ability to make 63G applications before the case is ‘out of time’. It is therefore recommended that North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Humberside Police consider implementing processes to identify potential 63G cases at an earlier stage which would allow them to make better use of this statutory mechanism for lawfully retaining biometric material in serious offences. .

2. Voluntary Attendance. It is recommended that North Yorkshire Police and Humberside Police implement robust processes, monitoring and governance to ensure all that all opportunities for capturing biometrics from voluntary attendees following a positive disposal are exploited. Both forces outlined how they had identified this as an area where further work is required if they are to avoid missing opportunities for taking biometrics. (West Yorkshire Police outlined their approach which includes a diary booking system for postal requisitions and a dedicated officer to track the attendance of VAs and produce management information.)

3. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming using current IT systems. The four forces reported that they, similarly, have encountered such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Nevertheless, Humberside Police should be aware that the Home Office recommends that police forces apply the MOPI guidelines to their custody images and may therefore wish to consider the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, with reference to the current MOPI guidelines for custody images.

4. In light of recommendation 3, it is further recommended that measures are put in place to inform individuals upon leaving custody of their rights in relation to requesting deletion of their custody image and other police records. West Yorkshire Police outlined that these arrangements were already in place and offered to share this best practice with the other forces.

We also noted that DNA samples held by the police forces themselves (as opposed to being held by their forensic service providers) were treated and managed as ‘property’ and the relevant Management Information was gleaned from property management systems. Given the nature of biometric material it may be more appropriate for it to be treated separately in the longer term and this is an issue the Commissioner intends to raise at his next meeting with the Forensic Science Regulator.

The OBSCC will write to Humberside Police in early 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

[section 40(2) redaction]

Chief of Staff

Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Sent by e-mail only:

Chief Constable Alan Pughsley QPM

Copied to:

Kent Police and Crime Commissioner, Matthew Scott

Head of Forensic Services, Kent & Essex Serious Crime Directorate

13 August 2021

Dear Alan Pughsley,

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Kent Police

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to Kent Police on 9th August 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by Kent Police. Thank you for the warm welcome and hospitality on the day.

We were very grateful for the proactive approach taken by Kent & Essex Serious Crime Directorate to the organisation of the visit and the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions. We were pleased to see that several of the recommendations made following our last visit in 2018 have been addressed, including in relation to the processes surrounding the retention of DNA samples under the CPIA exception and the monitoring of cases where subjects are ‘released under investigation’ which is now undertaken using an in-house system developed collaboratively by Kent and Essex Police. More broadly, we were impressed by the knowledge of the representatives we met of the PoFA provisions and their overall approach to the retention of personal data including biometric materials. I hope that the force representatives present found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force in moving towards resolving issues in the areas that were proving problematic.

Separately, we found the meeting with the PCC Chief Executive, Adrian Harper, very helpful in understanding wider issues relevant to the use of biometric and surveillance camera technologies in the local area. During our discussion we highlighted the opportunity for PCCs and police forces to contribute to the statutory consultation on the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice which was recently launched by the Home Office and runs until 8th September. Further information on the proposed revisions to the Code and submitting a response is attached to this letter.

This letter contains recommendations to Kent Police following the findings made during our visit. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. PACE 63G Applications. The OBSCC has received just three PACE 63G applications to lawfully retain biometric material from Kent Police since January 2019. Although it is not mandatory, many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for to manage risk in certain cases where, although a suspect has not been charged or convicted, it is considered appropriate to retain their biometric material in light of vulnerability actors of the complainant/victim or the chief officer believes that retention is necessary assist in preventing or detecting crime. It is recommended that Kent Police ensure there is awareness of the process amongst relevant teams and consider offering training to support officers in making 63G applications to the Commissioner.

2. Voluntary Attendance. It is recommended that Kent Police establish a process for ensuring that all opportunities for capturing biometrics from VAs following charge and/or conviction are exploited. This should be accompanied by written guidance which is easy for investigating officers and others involved in the process to follow and makes clear who is responsible for each part of it.

3. PNC backlog. There remains a significant backlog of cases (c. 25,000) where arrest records have not been updated at the end of an investigation after the suspect has been ‘released under investigation’. It is recommended that work underway to clear this backlog is completed and that in future force records and the PNC are updated in a timely manner following the end of an investigation.

4. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming with current IT systems. Kent Police report that they, similarly, have such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Positively, we were briefed on work underway to develop a mechanism for applying the MOPI guidelines to custody images held locally on Athena. We commend these efforts to address this long-standing issue and recommend that Kent Police continue this work to bring the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review.

The OBSCC will write to Kent Police in early 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

[section 40(2) redaction]

Chief of Staff

Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Sent by e-mail only:

Chief Constable Ben-Julian Harrington

Copied to:

Essex Police, Fire and Crime Commissioner, Roger Hirst

Head of Forensic Services, Kent & Essex Serious Crime Directorate

13 August 2021

Dear Ben-Julian Harrington,

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Essex Police

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to Essex Police on 10th August 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by Essex Police. Thank you for the warm welcome and hospitality on the day.

We were very grateful for the proactive approach taken by Kent & Essex Serious Crime Directorate to the organisation of the visit and the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions. We were pleased to see that several of the recommendations made following our last visit in 2018 have been addressed, including in relation to the processes surrounding the retention of DNA samples under the CPIA exception and the monitoring of cases where subjects are ‘released under investigation’ which is now undertaken using an in-house system developed collaboratively by Kent and Essex Police. More broadly, we were impressed by the knowledge of the representatives we met of the PoFA provisions and their overall approach to the retention of personal data including biometric materials. We also met with a representative from the ERSOU CTU and discussed the PoFA provisions surrounding National Security Determinations. This is another area where good practice was demonstrated, as reflected by the high standard of NSD casework carried out by the team which is reviewed by the Commissioner as part of his statutory functions. I hope that the force representatives present found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force in moving towards resolving issues in the areas that were proving problematic.

Separately, we found the meeting with the Deputy PFCC, Jane Gardner, very helpful in understanding the views of your local communities towards biometric and surveillance capabilities and the PFCC’s approach to supporting legitimate, proportionate and accountable police use of these technologies. During our discussion we highlighted the opportunity for PCCs and police forces to contribute to the statutory consultation on the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice which was recently launched by the Home Office and runs until 8th September. Further information on the proposed revisions to the Code and submitting a response is attached to this letter.

This letter contains recommendations to Essex Police following the findings made during our visit. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. PACE 63G Applications. The OBSCC has consistently received a small number of PACE 63G applications to lawfully retain biometric material from Essex Police since 2018. Although it is not mandatory, many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for to manage risk in certain cases where, although a suspect has not been charged or convicted, it is considered appropriate to retain their biometric material in light of vulnerability actors of the complainant/victim or the chief officer believes that retention is necessary assist in preventing or detecting crime. It is recommended that Essex Police ensure there is awareness of the process amongst relevant teams beyond those responsible for investigating sexual-related offences, in particular those investigating burglaries and gang-related offences.

2. Voluntary Attendance. It is recommended that Essex Police establish a process for ensuring that all opportunities for capturing biometrics from VAs following charge and/or conviction are exploited. This should be accompanied by written guidance which is easy for investigating officers and others involved in the process to follow and makes clear who is responsible for each part of it.

3. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming using current IT systems. Essex Police reported that they, similarly, have encountered such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Nevertheless, Essex Police should be aware that the Home Office recommends that police forces apply the MOPI guidelines to their custody images and may therefore wish to consider the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, with reference to the current MOPI guidelines for custody images.

4. In light of recommendation 3, it is further recommended that measures are put in place to inform individuals upon leaving custody of their rights in relation to requesting deletion of their custody image and other police records.

The OBSCC will write to Essex Police in early 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely, [section 40(2) redaction]

Chief of Staff

Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Sent by e-mail only:

Chief Constable Rachel Swann

Copied to:

Derbyshire Police and Crime Commissioner, Angelique Foster Derbyshire Police Biometric SPOC, Lianne Dodd

1 November 2021

Dear Rachel Swann,

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Derbyshire Police

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to Derbyshire Police on 7th October 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by Derbyshire Police. Thank you for the warm welcome and hospitality on the day.

We were very grateful for the proactive approach taken by Derbyshire Police to the organisation of the visit and the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions. We were particularly thankful to [section 40(2) redaction] from EMSOU Forensic Services, whose knowledge and presence throughout the day was invaluable to understanding biometric compliance issues across the East Midlands collaborated forces as well the as wider legislative and operational issues forces are experiencing on the ground. We found the use of feedback to frontline officers when the fingerprints/DNA they have taken result in a match to be a great example of how the end- to-end process can be made relevant and rewarding without any great resourcing implications. We also appreciate the time taken by [section 40(2) redaction] and [section 40(2) redaction] to meet with us and discuss the National Security Determination regime, including the region’s central collaboration on CT which will be further supported by CT Command’s intention for each Regional Counter-Terrorism Unit to have a designated chief officer(s) who will consider NSDs to promote consistency in NSD decision-making.

Separately, we found the follow-up meeting with the PCC’s Chief Executive, David Peet, very helpful in understanding wider force governance issues and we offered to support the PCC with incorporating biometrics and surveillance into their police and crime plan.

We were pleased to see that a number of the recommendations made during our last visit in 2018, including establishing robust processes to ensure that DNA samples held in force are monitored on a regular basis, have been addressed. I hope that the force representatives present found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force in moving towards resolving issues in the areas that were proving problematic.

This letter contains recommendations to Derbyshire Police following the findings made during our visit which are similar to those recommendations made following our last visit in 2018. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. PACE 63G Applications. The OBSCC has received just one PACE 63G application from Derbyshire Police since the implementation of PoFA in 2013, and no applications since 2015. Although it is a discretionary power , many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for managing risk in certain cases where, although a suspect has not been charged or convicted, it is considered appropriate to retain their biometric material in light of vulnerability factors of the complainant/victim or the chief officer believes that retention is necessary assist in preventing or detecting crime. It is recommended that Derbyshire Police ensure there is awareness of the process amongst the relevant teams (such as those responsible for investigating sexual-related offences, gang violence, assault and burglaries) and consider assigning a SPOC for this area to support officers in making 63G applications to the Commissioner. Further, we encourage representatives from Derbyshire Police to attend a PACE 63G workshop we are running for police forces nationally alongside the MPS on 17th November 2021 to increase awareness and knowledge of the 63G application process. Information on this workshop will be shared with the Biometrics SPOC shortly.

2. Voluntary Attendance. Derbyshire Police outlined that they do not currently have a system in place for recording VAs or to monitor whether biometrics have been taken following an eligible disposal. However, it was explained that the force currently have a virtual VA sergeant to prompt officers to take biometrics from VAs and there is ongoing work to establish a process with the courts to ensure biometrics are taken at that stage if not previously captured. It is recommended that Derbyshire Police establish a process for ensuring that all opportunities for capturing biometrics from VAs following charge and/or conviction. The force outlined that the move to NICHE early next year should further improve the management and capture of biometrics from VAs. Furthermore, it is recommended that Derbyshire Police consider whether any re-sampling of biometrics from eligible VAs can be taken that may have been missed during the COVID-19 pandemic.

3. Monitoring of RUI. Derbyshire Police outlined that they continue to deal with issues arising from the Bail Act changes in 2017 and still has a considerable number of RUI cases open beyond the 12-month mark. It is recommended that Derbyshire Police continue their efforts to reduce this number, including action already in progress such as closing outstanding medical records that are keeping many cases open and using bail when necessary and proportionate.

4. CPIA Exception. Derbyshire Police outlined a robust monitoring system in place for samples held under the CPIA exception, including quarterly reviews to ensure retention is necessary and proportionate. It is recommended that Derbyshire Police ensure that, within the tracking systems already in place, the rationale behind the retention is recorded to justify the necessity and proportionality.

5. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming with current IT systems. Derbyshire Police report that they, similarly, have such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Nevertheless, Derbyshire Police should be aware that the Home Office recommends that police forces apply the MOPI guidelines to their custody images and may therefore wish to consider the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, with reference to the current MOPI guidelines for custody images.

The OBSCC will write to Derbyshire Police in mid 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

[section 40(2) redaction]

Chief of Staff

Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Sent by e-mail only:

Stephen Watson QPM, Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police

Copied to:

Greater Manchester Combined Authority

GMP Biometric SPOC, [section 40(2) redaction]

16 November 2021

Dear Stephen,

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Greater Manchester Police

I write following our visit to Greater Manchester Police (GMP) on 8 October 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. We were also keen to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by GMP. Thank you for the warm welcome and hospitality on the day.

We were very grateful for the proactive approach taken by GMP to the organisation of the visit and the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions. We were impressed with the knowledge of the PoFA provisions by the Forensic Services staff we met and were reassured that they had already identified key areas of concern and are taking positive action to address these. I hope that the representatives present found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force with resolving outstanding issues. For our part, the conversations during our visit were extremely insightful and have helped build on our understanding of the biometric and surveillance related issues forces are facing on the ground which we report on to Parliament, including the challenges that have arisen following legislative changes such as those arising from voluntary attendance and bail/RUI.

We are particularly thankful to you for the time you took to speak with us on the day and found the meeting helpful to understand wider force issues and strategic priorities

Furthermore, we would like to congratulate GMP for renewing its Third Party Certification under the ‘Raising standards: Third-party certification scheme’ which allows organisations to demonstrate that they comply with the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice. We were recently made aware that GMP were the first police force to achieve certification in 2016 and we are appreciative of your continued efforts to demonstrate to your communities that GMP surveillance camera systems are used transparently, accountably and proportionately.

This letter contains recommendations to GMP following the findings from our visit. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. PACE 63G Applications. The OBSCC has received only three PACE 63G applications from Greater Manchester Police to retain biometric material since 2013, and none since 2015. Although it is a discretionary power , many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for managing risk in certain cases where, although a suspect has not been charged or convicted, it is considered appropriate to retain their biometric material in light of vulnerability factors of the complainant/victim or the chief officer believes that retention is necessary assist in preventing or detecting crime. It is recommended that GMP continue to explore allocating resource to support officers in identifying and making 63G applications to the Commissioner and ensure there is awareness of the process amongst relevant teams such as those responsible for investigating sexual-related offences, gang violence, assault and burglaries. Further, we encourage representatives from GMP to attend a workshop we will be running on the 63G process alongside the MPS on 17th November 2021 to increase their awareness and knowledge to be able to make future applications. Further information on the workshop will be shared with the Biometrics SPOC shortly.

2. Voluntary Attendance. During the visit GMP outlined that they do not currently have a system in place for recording VAs or to monitor whether biometrics have been taken. The force outlined however to address this in part through the use of a dedicated officer to look at closed VA records. It is recommended that GMP establish a process for recording Voluntary Attendance which ensures that all opportunities to capture biometrics from VAs following charge and/or conviction are exploited. Furthermore, it is recommended that GMP review whether any re-sampling of biometrics for eligible VAs that may have been missed during the COVID-19 pandemic can take place.

3. Monitoring of RUI. GMP explained the ongoing issues around the large number of open investigations which have principally arisen from unsuitable IT systems and resourcing constraints. The force noted they are aware of the issue and outlined this should be aided by an improvement in functionality of the IT system in 2022. We recommend that GMP continue their efforts to address the management of RUI cases so that investigations can be closed in a timely manner.

4. CPIA Exception. We observed that GMP had in place a good monitoring process in place to ensure that samples held under the CPIA are regularly reviewed and scrutinised effectively. It is recommended that GMP introduce guidance to officers on applying the CPIA exception to retain DNA samples for extended periods to increase awareness, highlighting the necessary criteria and the robust reviews required thereafter.

5. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the potentially unlawful retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming with current IT systems. GMP report that they, similarly, have such difficulties and that custody images are not proactively reviewed and deleted where appropriate, unless an individual makes a specific request for deletion of the image. Nevertheless, GMP should be aware that the Home Office recommends that police forces apply the revised MOPI guidelines to their custody images and may therefore wish to consider the retention, monitoring and use of custody images in line with the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, with reference to the current MOPI guidelines for custody images.

The OBSCC will write to GMP in mid 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk-based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me. I wish you continued success in your new challenges on the other side of the Pennines and look forward to catching up again before long.

Yours sincerely,

Fraser Sampson

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Sent by e-mail only:

Chris Haward, Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police

Copied to:

Police and Crime Commissioner Marc Jones

Lincolnshire Police Biometrics SPOC, [section 40(2) redaction]

12 November 2021

Dear Chris,

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Lincolnshire Police

I write following our visit to Lincolnshire Police on 26th October 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. We were also keen to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by Lincolnshire Police. Thank you for the warm welcome and hospitality on the day.

We were very grateful for the proactive approach taken by Lincolnshire Police to the organisation of the visit and the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions. We were impressed with the knowledge of the PoFA provisions demonstrated by the representatives we met and were pleased to see that a number of the recommendations made following our last visit in 2018 had been addressed, including in relation to the monitoring of cases where suspects are released under investigation as well as DNA samples held under the CPIA exception.

I hope that the representatives present found the visit useful and that the feedback provided on the day will assist your force with resolving outstanding issues. For our part, the conversations during our visit were extremely insightful and have helped build on our understanding of the biometric and surveillance related issues forces are facing on the ground which we report on to Parliament. We are also currently discussing these with ministers and policy officials in the context of biometric and overt surveillance reform proposals outlined in the DCMS data reform consultation.

We are particularly thankful to you for the time you took to speak with us on the day and found the meeting helpful to understand wider force issues and strategic priorities.

This letter contains recommendations to Lincolnshire Police following the findings from our visit. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. PACE 63G Applications. The OBSCC has received only one PACE 63G application from Lincolnshire Police to retain biometric material since 2013, and none since 2018. Although it is a discretionary power, many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for managing risk in certain cases where, although a suspect has not been charged or convicted, it is considered appropriate to retain their biometric material in light of vulnerability factors of the complainant/victim or the chief officer believes that retention is necessary assist in preventing or detecting crime. It is recommended that Lincolnshire Police explore allocating resource to support officers with identifying and making 63G applications to the Commissioner and ensure there is awareness of the process amongst relevant teams such as those responsible for investigating sexual-related offences, gang violence, assault and burglaries. Further, we encourage representatives from Lincolnshire Police to attend a workshop we will be running on the 63G process alongside the MPS on 17th November 2021 to increase awareness and knowledge of the PACE 63G application process (an invite has been shared with the force Biometrics SPOC).

2. Voluntary Attendance. Force representatives outlined the introduction of a new capability (“Pronto”) for recording record VA interviews. However, the taking of biometrics does not currently feature on the application, nor is there any other system in place for monitoring whether biometrics have been taken following an eligible disposal. It is recommended that Lincolnshire Police establish a process for ensuring that all opportunities for capturing biometrics from VAs following charge and/or conviction are exploited.

3. DNA samples held in property stores. We note that DNA samples held in property stores are managed in conjunction with all other forms of ‘property’ held by the Lincolnshire Police. In the course of our visits to police forces nationally we have observed that it would probably be more appropriate for biometrics to be treated separately owing to their particular sensitivity and requirement for careful storage and strict monitoring. We recommend exploring whether alternative arrangements could be implemented for the management of DNA samples held in force following the end of the force’s service contract with G4S. If Lincolnshire Police were able to establish a biometrics records management which treated samples discretely from any other forms of ‘property’ this would probably be a national ‘first’ and we would be happy to assist where we could.

4. DNA sampling errors. Representatives outlined training and support measures put in place to address and reduce biometric sampling errors. For cases where errors do occur/samples prove to be insufficient, we recommend implementing a process to ensure re-sampling is undertaken.

5. National Security Determinations. Considering the volume of NSDs reviewed by Lincolnshire Police, we recommend exploring with regional CT Unit representatives the establishment of a designated chief officer(s) to perform this function for the region to promote consistency in NSD decision-making. This is consistent with CT Command’s intention for a regional chief officer model to be implemented nationally for the making of NSDs.

6. Custody images. The OBSCC understands that police forces throughout England and Wales are having difficulty with reviewing the potentially unlawful retention of custody images in line with the current MOPI requirements as the process is largely manual and very time consuming with current IT systems. We were very encouraged to hear the approach being adopted within your force and that Lincolnshire Police has undertaken to review their holdings in in line with MOPI guidelines and the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review, including c.150,000 hard copy images identified in force. We commend these efforts to bring force holdings in line with these guidelines and recommend that deletions continue to be progressed as a priority.

7. In light of recommendation 6, it is further recommended that measures are put in place to inform individuals upon leaving custody of their rights in relation to requesting deletion of their custody image and other police records.

The OBSCC will write to Lincolnshire Police in mid 2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk- based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact my office.

Yours sincerely

Fraser Sampson

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Sent by e-mail only:

Chief Constable Simon Cole QPM

Copied to:

Police and Crime Commissioner Rupert Matthews

Leicestershire Police Biometrics SPOCs

12 November 2021

Dear Simon,

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Leicestershire Police

I write in reference to the visit made by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and his office (the ‘OBSCC’) to Leicestershire Police on 27th October 2021. The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. The Commissioner also wished to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by Leicestershire Police. Thank you for the warm welcome and hospitality on the day.

We are grateful for the proactive approach taken by Leicestershire Police to the organisation of the visit and the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions. We were impressed with the knowledge of the PoFA provisions demonstrated by the representatives we met and were pleased to see that a number of the recommendations made following our last visit in 2018 had been addressed, including in relation to the monitoring of cases where suspects are released under investigation. We were also impressed by the force’s approach to monitoring and demonstrating compliance with the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice and were grateful to DCI Mark Sinski for taking the time to discuss the force’s use of overt surveillance camera systems with us.

I hope that the representatives present found the visit useful and that the feedback we provided will assist your force with resolving issues identified on the day and those outstanding since our last visit. For our part, the conversations we had with your staff were extremely insightful and have helped build on our understanding of the biometric and surveillance camera related issues forces are facing on the ground which we report on to Parliament. We are also currently discussing these with ministers and policy officials in the context of biometric and overt surveillance reform proposals outlined in the DCMS data reform consultation.

This letter contains recommendations to Leicestershire Police following the findings made during our visit. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. PACE 63G applications. The OBSCC has not received any PACE 63G applications from Leicestershire Police since the implementation of PoFA in 2013. Although it is a discretionary power, many forces make use of this provision and have found it a useful tool for managing risk in certain cases where, although a suspect has not been charged or convicted, it is considered appropriate to retain their biometric material in light of vulnerability factors of the complainant/victim or the chief officer believes that retention is necessary assist in preventing or detecting crime. It was promising to hear that force representatives had recently engaged with teams investigating relevant qualifying offences to promote the use of PACE 63G. To encourage and facilitate 63G applications, we recommend considering the appointment of a SPOC to identify potential cases (using data readily available from the PNC) and to assist officers with the application process. We also encourage representatives from Leicestershire Police to attend a workshop we are running for police forces nationally alongside the MPS on 17th November 2021 to increase awareness and knowledge of the PACE 63G application process (an invite has been shared with the force biometrics SPOC).

2. Voluntary Attendance. Force representatives demonstrated to us a new capability (“Pronto”) which has been recently introduced for officers to record VA interviews. However, the taking of biometrics does not currently feature on the application, nor is there any other system in place for monitoring whether biometrics have been taken following an eligible disposal. It is recommended that Leicestershire Police establish a process for ensuring that all opportunities for capturing biometrics from VAs following charge and/or conviction are exploited.

3. National Security Determinations. Considering the volume of NSDs reviewed by Leicestershire Police, we recommend exploring with regional CT Unit representatives the establishment of a designated chief officer(s) to perform this function for the region to promote consistency in NSD decision-making. This is consistent with CT Command’s intention for a regional chief officer model to be implemented nationally for the making of NSDs.

4. Biometric sampling errors & re-sampling. Representatives outlined work in train to reduce sampling errors which they assessed to be a product of a lack of appreciation of the importance of biometrics to investigations and the perception that biometric sampling is an administrative task. We are supportive of plans outlined to tackle this cultural issue, including through training materials which provide tangible examples demonstrating the significance of biometrics to investigations and criminal justice outcomes. We also recommend implementing processes to ensure re-sampling is undertaken in all cases where samples prove to be insufficient (as opposed to only those where a positive disposal is later recorded).

5. CPIA Exception. Leicestershire Police outlined the monitoring system in place for DNA samples held under the CPIA exception which includes quarterly reviews and an annual audit. Currently, however, samples held under CPIA are not destroyed when there are issues around confirming whether there is a continuing requirement for retention with the relevant investigating officer. It is recommended that Leicestershire Police adopt a ‘presumption of deletion’ where justification for continuing retention is not secured within a reasonable timeframe. It is also recommended that training and guidance on the CPIA exception is refreshed to help less-experienced staff understand the relevant considerations for CPIA retentions.

6. Custody images. Leicestershire Police outlined work undertaken to review c.50,000 historic custody images in line with MOPI guidelines and the recommendations of the Home Office’s 2017 Custody Images Review. We commend these efforts to bring force holdings in line with these guidelines and recommend that deletions continue to be progressed as a priority.

The OBSCC will write to Leicestershire Police in mid-2022 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations. Future force visits by the OBSCC will be planned taking a risk based approach and will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

[section 40(2) redaction]

Chief of Staff

Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Chief Constable Sarah Crew

Copied to:

DCC Nikki Watson

[section 40(2) redaction]

By e-mail only.

20 April 2022

Dear Sarah

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Avon & Somerset Police

Thank you very much for hosting my visit to Avon & Somerset Police on 30 March 2022 and for taking time out to meet with us. Apologies for the delay in our subsequent correspondence.

The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. I also hoped to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by Avon & Somerset Police which I was able to do. Thank you for the warm welcome and the hospitality shown by your team throughout the day.

We were very grateful for the proactive approach taken by Avon & Somerset to the organisation of the visit and the openness shown by all those involved to answering our questions. We were pleased to see that several of the recommendations made following our last visit in 2018 have been addressed, including those in relation to the processes surrounding s.63G of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which I believe is not yet being used to its full potential across England and Wales. We were also able to discuss the retention, monitoring and use of custody images. More broadly, I was impressed by the knowledge of the representatives we met of the PoFA provisions and by their overall approach to the retention of personal data including biometric materials.

Separately, we found the meeting with the PCC’s office representative, [section 40(2) redaction], very helpful in understanding the views of your local communities towards biometric and surveillance capabilities and the PCC’s approach to supporting legitimate, proportionate and accountable police use of these technologies. In our discussion we highlighted the importance of local elected policing bodies and police forces actively engaging with the revised Surveillance Camera Code of Practice and I have met (via Teams) with the Police and Crime Commissioner, Mark Shelford on 11 April 2022.

The following part of this letter contains recommendations to Avon & Somerset Police following the findings made during our visit. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to ask.

The following is recommended:

1. Voluntary Attendance. We listened to the developments made by Avon & Somerset Police in this area which is among the most pressing issue impacting upon the police retention and use of biometrics nationally. I was impressed with the work that your team have undertaken to adapt local practice to what is a national problem and would recommend that they continue refining and developing the Voluntary Attendance co-ordinator role and consider sharing this approach with other forces if they have not already done so.

2. National Security Determinations. The OBSCC has consistently received a small number of NSD applications from Avon & Somerset Police since 2018. It would be helpful to understand how this compares with the number of NSDs with forces of a similar size and with similar ports of entry; the OSBCC will raise this with CT Policing and share the response with you.

3. DNA Sampling. The South-West Forensics team highlighted the substantial backlog of elimination samples and the processing of CPIA holdings. The OBSCC recommends that the risks continue to be represented on the South-West Forensics Risk Register and reported to the Governance Board.

4. Custody processes. I noted that Avon & Somerset Police check the fingerprints of a person in police detention against IABS (the immigration database) using the Livescan system. While practices vary across England and Wales, each force should review the practices of searching against the fingerprints of those coming into police custody in this way, bearing in mind the proportionality and necessity of such searches in cases where there are no grounds to suspect the detained person of any involvement in immigration-related offences. In addition, I would recommend that Avon & Somerset continue to improve their process of informing visitors to custody how their images are used and how they might apply for these to be deleted.

5. PACE 63G Applications. The OBSCC acknowledges the progress that Avon & Somerset Police have shown in s.63G applications, and I appreciate the engagement that the force has had with the OBSCC guidance. It was highlighted that there remain some gaps in understanding how this statutory power to retain biometrics of individuals in order to assist in the investigation or prevention of priority crime and I would recommend further briefing/awareness training on the use of s.63G. My office will be happy to assist in this.

6. Emerging Technologies. We heard of the early plans Avon & Somerset Police are making to explore the use of Facial Recognition. The OBSCC recommends that Avon & Somerset Police ensure they engage with the public at all stages of the process, ensuring transparency and clarity and that the force has a good understanding of their communities’ views in relation to the use of this controversial surveillance capability. We will be happy to engage with Avon & Somerset Police throughout this process if that were felt to be beneficial.

The OBSCC will write to Avon & Somerset Police in early 2023 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations and future visits will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits.

Thank you again for all your help in connection with our visit. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Fraser Sampson

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

Chief Constable Scott Chilton

Copied to:

[section 40(2) redaction]

By e-mail only.

10 May 2022

Dear Scott

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Dorset Police

I write following my visit to Dorset Police on 4 May 2022, for which thanks for coordinating on Dorset’s side must be extended to [section 40(2) redaction], and to [section 40(2) redaction] for ably hosting. It was unfortunate that other diary commitments meant that none of Dorset’s senior leadership team was available to meet me on the day.

The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions. I also hoped to discuss the wider use of biometric technologies and surveillance cameras systems by Dorset Police, which I was able to do on the biometrics side. We were very grateful to all the staff for their open and engaged approach to our conversations throughout the day.

We were pleased to see that some of the recommendations made following our last visit in 2018 have been addressed, including around samples retained under the CPIA exception. One of the recommendations from the last visit in 2018 was to establish a process for ensuring all opportunities for capturing biometrics from voluntary attendees following a positive disposal are exploited. We were informed that there continue to be missed opportunities, in part as a consequence of covid restrictions, but that an instruction has recently issued, stating the expectation that biometrics will again be processed. I reiterate the importance of making best use of all opportunities to capture biometrics, and ensuring policy and guidance is in place to underpin this. One suggested approach was to include a reminder as part of an officer’s monthly workload check. I applaud any measure than can be taken to make best use of this vital capability. We discussed an issue raised on our previous visit in 2018, around the inability to record elimination samples on Niche, resulting in a variety of processes being adopted across forces. I understand the options to mitigate this are an IT fix or training, and would encourage the Dorset SLT to take this issue to the appropriate Chiefs’ Group to agree a consistent approach to be adopted by all forces.

I was interested to learn that Dorset routinely checks fingerprints of all arrestees passing through custody against all databases, including the Immigration and Asylum Biometrics System (IABS). This is common practice across many of the forces we have visited, and to all I have suggested giving consideration to the proportionality of such searches in cases where there are no grounds to suspect the detained person is involved in immigration-related offences.

At the end of our day, we had a short debrief with [section 40(2) redaction] and [section 40(2) redaction], where we set out the recommendations we would be making to Dorset Police, which I will now turn to. If you have any questions about the recommendations or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to contact my office.

The following is recommended:

7. Unlawful matches: We acknowledge that Dorset Police has not reported any unlawful matches, which is commendable, and that procedures and quality assurance processes exist within South West Forensics to ensure they were not released. We were told that, if an unlawful match was released, this would be escalated through the SWF management chain for investigation. We recommend developing and implementing a decision tree and notification process up to the CPS, which can be readily referenced should a case ever present itself. We suggest examining and learning from what other forces have done in this area (for example, EMSOU has developed a good process)

8. Voluntary Attendance: Notwithstanding the missed opportunities for capturing biometrics that have manifested through the use of voluntary attendance, we also discussed best practice in dealing with instances where biometrics are taken from voluntary attendees where there was no lawful basis to do so, given the four SWF forces differing approaches. We recommend harmonising the use, retention and taking of biometrics for elimination purposes from voluntary attendees across the four SWF forces.

9. PACE 63G Applications: We understand that the decision for Dorset Police not to make s63G applications to the Commissioner is underpinned by resource issues, having previously been trialled and reviewed through a records management lens. We were impressed with the processes for records and information management and the approach outlined by Lucianne Pharoah. However, we would encourage Dorset Police to adopt the approach used in some other forces and consider the use of this statutory power from an investigative point of view, examining what benefit retention of biometric material can bring to investigations, and how it may support the force’s crime prevention agenda. We recommend putting in place a clear policy to explain how 63G is operationally beneficial, and how those biometrics can be used to prevent and detect crime. We would suggest discussing the approach taken by the other SWF forces in the first instance, and my office would be happy to work with you to streamline your processes.

The OBSCC will write to Dorset Police in early 2023 to ask for an update on progress in relation to these recommendations and future visits will focus particularly on recommendations made during previous visits. If you have any concerns or queries in relation to the recommendations in this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me through my office.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Fraser Sampson

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

DCC David McLaren

Copied to:

[section 40(2) redaction]

By e-mail only.

29 July 2022

Dear Dave

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Sussex and Surrey Police

I write following my virtual visit to Sussex Police on 26 July 2022 (and Surrey on 27 July 2022), coordinated in such a way given the manner in which the forces collaborate on forensics matters. I was very pleased to meet you at the start of the day, and I am grateful to all your staff who made time to speak to my team and I, and the open and engaging way they approached our conversations. My particular thanks to Head of Strategic Forensic Services [section 40(2) redaction] for coordinating and hosting on your side: I recognise the huge amount of effort required to host these visits, and my office and I are grateful to Ian for ensuring the smooth running of the day, particularly given the shift from it being in person to online, due to the train strikes.

The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions, and I was pleased to have the opportunity to discuss Sussex’s positive approach to addressing and implementing all the recommendations made following our last visit in 2018. I was particularly impressed with the documents outlining the way each recommendation had been carefully considered in terms of the policies and procedures already in place in Sussex, and the governance structures that supported their consideration and implementation. Similarly, ACC Tanya Jones’s description of Sussex’s annual governance statement suggests this is a particularly valuable resource for the force, highlighting specific areas where additional effort needs to be focused. And while not specifically within my remit, its application to the world of biometrics is evident, as are the dashboards produced for audit purposes, and I would recommend other forces consider implementing something similar.

One of the recommendations from the last visit in 2018 was to establish a process for ensuring all opportunities for capturing biometrics from voluntary attendees following a positive disposal are exploited. It is good to know that the broader forensics policy provides detail on this, and while we were informed that there continue to be missed opportunities, I am encouraged by the fact that the conversations we had with your teams are prompting your staff members to consider further steps to close this gap. This for me is one of the more pleasing aspects of our visits to forces: that in the planning and preparation, those we are visiting take a fresh look at policies and practices in place, and identify for themselves where improvements and consolidations can be made.

I was informed that it is practice for officers in Sussex to take a second PACE DNA sample in custody, as part of the ‘forensication’ of suspects, regardless of whether there is already a DNA profile held on the national database. These second samples are then put in storage for months, and are often never used. Those who I spoke to as part of the visit were unsure why this practice came about, and the reasons for its continuance, and I am interested in this practice, particularly in terms of the diminishing viability of samples over time. My office has taken an action point to find out how long a sample generally remains viable, and will share their findings in due course. And we have also taken an action point around the requirement for forces to provide regular returns on the number of lost samples they have to the Home Office, as there was uncertainty around quite what should be classified as a ‘lost sample’, and therefore reported.

I was interested to learn that Sussex and Surrey, like many other forces I have visited, routinely searches fingerprints of all arrestees passing through custody against all databases, including the Immigration and Asylum Biometrics System (IABS). I have suggested to forces that consideration is given to the proportionality of such searches in cases where there are no grounds to suspect the detained person is involved in immigration-related offences. Indeed, the walk-through of the mobile capture capability (Pronto) highlighted that both IDENT1 and IABS are pre-checked, thus requiring no forethought from the officers deploying this technology whether IABS searches are proportionate. A solution to this may be that the pre-population is done away with, and officers must make the decision to include such a search rather than exclude it thereby reflecting the exceptional versus the routine. I would also encourage regular audits of the data which Pronto readily produces in order to get useful management information as to its use and contribution to priority areas.

Another key area we discussed was the s63G provisions in PACE empowering chief officers to make applications to retain the biometrics of those arrested for qualifying offences, where no further action is taken, but where the retention of their biometrics is considered necessary and proportionate for the purposes provided for. Sussex has never made such an application (neither has Surrey), and I understand that, while there is policy now in place on making such applications, the take-up from investigators has not happened, despite a variety of approaches to highlight the benefits that can be derived from this further retention. I suggest that an alternative approach is to consider it through a crime prevention lens, and have highlighted this to a number of PCCs that I have spoken to in conjunction with other force visits across England and Wales. Separately, my office will work with Ian to link Sussex with other forces that have only recently submitted their first applications, to understand how that final hurdle can be overcome.

It is clear that Sussex have in place well-established policy and procedures, and it appeared to me that your staff have a drive to understand where improvements can be made, and to develop and implement them. I was particularly taken with the force’s approach to footwear comparison, which is an area that most other forces have diverted funds away from and no longer expend much time upon. It was clear from Huw Jones’s engaging overview that it is an area that he is passionate about, and is keen for his colleagues to grasp the forensic benefits footwear comparison can bring. That he has managed to secure funding to link IT systems for such a niche subject area is to be commended.

Similarly, the two forces’ use of ANPR, and the audit systems in place are a good example of how data can be used to understand their use, and to provide the community with confidence on their deployment. It goes without saying that engagement with communities on the use of technology is a key way to gain understanding and trust on both side, and Paul Palmer’s work in this area is a good example of all that should be supported and encouraged.

Were this to have been a face-to-face visit, we would normally have a short debrief with one of the senior leadership team or the staff acting as hosts, to set out the recommendations we would be making. I am pleased to say that we were unable to identify any specific areas warranting a formal recommendation on this occasion, but have highlighted above a couple of areas where I consider further thought should be given.

If you have any questions about these, or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to contact me through my office.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Fraser Sampson

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

CC Gavin Stephens

Copied to:

[section 40(2) redaction]

By e-mail only.

29 July 2022

Dear Gavin

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Surrey and Sussex Police

I hope this finds you well; it’s been a while since we last spoke!

I write following my virtual visit to Surrey Police on 27 July 2022 (and Sussex on 26 July 2022), coordinated in such a way given the manner in which the forces collaborate on forensics matters. It was unfortunate that none of the Surrey senior leadership team was available on the day, but I was grateful to all your staff who made time to speak to my team and I, and the open and engaging way they approached our conversations. My particular thanks to Head of Strategic Forensic Services [section 40(2) redaction] and Surrey’s Head of Information Management, [section 40(2) redaction], for coordinating and hosting: I recognise the huge amount of effort required to host these visits, and my office and I are grateful that the day ran smoothly, particularly given the shift from it being in person to online, due to the train strikes.

The primary purpose of the visit was to review compliance with the sections of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) relevant to the taking, retention and use of DNA, fingerprints and footwear impressions, and I was pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the forensics policies shared by both forces, and how processing, retention and destruction work in practice. Across the two days of the visit, I was particularly struck by the evident drive staff members have to seek to continuously improve the well-established policy and procedures that are in place, and that preparation for the visit had led to a re-examination and questioning of established practices, and the need to forge further links across both forces.

For instance, one of the recommendations from the last visit in 2018 was to establish a process for ensuring all opportunities for capturing biometrics from voluntary attendees following a positive disposal are exploited. It is good to know that the broader forensics policy provides detail on this, and while we were informed that there continue to be missed opportunities, I am encouraged by the fact that the conversations we had with your teams are prompting your staff members to consider further steps to close this gap. Indeed, the custody manager we spoke to from Surrey recognised the benefits of an audit system in place in Sussex around voluntary attendees, and was keen to speak to counterparts in Sussex to understand the system better, along with its possible benefits to Surrey as a force.

This for me is one of the more pleasing aspects of our visits to forces: that in the planning and preparation, and the conversation on the day, those we are visiting take a fresh look at policies and practices in place, and identify for themselves where improvements can be made.

I was interested to learn that, like many other forces I have visited, Surrey and Sussex routinely check fingerprints of all arrestees passing through custody against all databases, including the Immigration and Asylum Biometrics System (IABS). I have suggested to all such forces that consideration is given to the proportionality of these database searches in cases where there are no grounds to suspect the detained person is involved in immigration-related offences. Indeed, the walk-through of the mobile capture capability (Pronto) we were given highlighted that both IDENT1 and IABS are pre-selected, thus requiring no forethought from the officers deploying this technology whether IABS searches are proportionate. A solution to this may be that the pre-population is done away with, and officers must use their own discretion as to the appropriateness of an IABS search. I would also encourage the regular audits put in place during the trial phase of mobile capture to be re-instated as business as usual.

Another key area we discussed was the s63G provisions in PACE to make applications to retain the biometrics of those arrested for qualifying offences, where no further action is taken, but the retention of their biometrics is considered necessary and proportionate for the purposes provided for. Surrey, like Sussex, has never made such an application. I understand that, while there is policy now in place on making such applications, the take-up from investigators has not happened, despite a variety of approaches to highlight the benefits that can be derived from this further retention. I suggest that an alternative approach is to consider it through a crime prevention lens, and have highlighted this to a number of PCCs that I have spoken to in conjunction with other force visits across England and Wales. Separately, my office will work with Ian to link with other forces that have only recently submitted their first applications, to understand how that final hurdle can be overcome. We have also taken an action point around the requirement for forces to provide regular returns on the number of lost samples they have to the Home Office, as there was uncertainty around quite what should be classified as a ‘lost sample’, and therefore reported.

It is clear that Surrey has in place well-established policy and procedures, and it appeared to me that your staff have a drive to understand where improvements can be made, and to develop and implement them. I was particularly taken with the approach to footwear comparison, which is an area to which most other forces no longer give much attention or resource. It was clear from CSI [section 40(2) redaction] engaging overview that it is an area that he is passionate about, and is keen for his colleagues to grasp the investigative benefits footwear comparison can bring. That he has managed to secure funding to link IT systems for such a niche subject area is to be commended.

Similarly, the two forces’ use of ANPR, and the audit systems in place are a good example of how data can be used to understand their use, and to provide the community with confidence on their deployment. It goes without saying that engagement with communities on the use of biometric surveillance technology is a key way to gain understanding and trust on both sides, and ANPR manager [section 40(2) redaction] work in this area is a good example of all that should be supported and encouraged.

At the end of our face-to-face visits, we would normally have a short debrief with one of the senior leadership team or the staff acting as hosts, to set out the recommendations we would be making. I am pleased to say that we were unable to identify any specific areas warranting a formal recommendation on this occasion, but have highlighted above a couple of areas where I consider further thought should be given.

If you have any questions about these, or would like further detail on our findings, please do not hesitate to contact me through my office.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Fraser Sampson

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner

END

BSCC-FOI-0423-TH: police force compliance visits

Freedom of Information Request

Annex A – List of (biometrics/POFA) compliance visits to police forces conducted by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner since 1 March 2021

Annex B – Reports (letters) sent to forces following compliance visits

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Staffordshire Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to West Mercia Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Metropolitan Police Service

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Kent Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Essex Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Derbyshire Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Greater Manchester Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Lincolnshire Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Leicestershire Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Avon & Somerset Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Dorset Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Sussex and Surrey Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Surrey and Sussex Police

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Freedom of Information Request

Annex A – List of (biometrics/POFA) compliance visits to police forces conducted by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner since 1 March 2021

Annex B – Reports (letters) sent to forces following compliance visits

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Staffordshire Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to West Mercia Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Metropolitan Police Service

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to the Yorkshire and Humber Police Forces

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Kent Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Essex Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Derbyshire Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Greater Manchester Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Lincolnshire Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Leicestershire Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Avon & Somerset Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Dorset Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Sussex and Surrey Police

Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s Visit to Surrey and Sussex Police

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