Decision

Decision for Reays Coaches Ltd (PC1038719), Former Transport Managers (TMs): Christopher Reay, Brett Caine & Adam Skelton and TM: Brian K Richardson

Published 8 February 2023

1. Introduction

Reays Coaches Ltd (“The Operator”) holds a standard international public service vehicle operator’s licence PC1038719 in the North West of England Traffic Area authorising the use of 70 vehicles with 37 vehicles currently in possession. The licence started on 19 October 2004.

The Operator and its relevant Transport Managers were called to public inquiry following a DVSA investigation that is summarised in more detail below. The call up was to consider regulatory action.

After the call up was issued, the operator applied to vary its licence to reduce its authority to 45 vehicles (reflecting its current level of operations). Consideration of that application was deferred to the public inquiry. The Operator had previously reduced its authority from 110 vehicles to 70 vehicles in July 2021.

The Operator’s directors are Christopher Walter Reay, Nicola Reay and Stephen Crossley.

The current Transport Managers are Brian Karl Richardson and David McManaman. Mr Richardson was appointed on 22 May 2019 and was called to the public inquiry to consider his good repute and professional competence. Mr McManaman was not called to the public inquiry as he was appointed in November 2021 and was not in post during the period that was under scrutiny.

Three former Transport Managers were also called to the public inquiry to consider their good repute and professional competence.

• Director Christopher Walter Reay was named as Transport Manager on the licence for three periods: between 13 January 2014 and 12 January 2018 and thereafter between 7 March 2018 and 22 May 2019 and finally between 15 December 2020 and 15 June 2021.

• Brett Joseph Caine was appointed Transport Manager between 27 June 2017 and 14 September 2017 and was reappointed between 10 January 2018 and 30 January 2019.

• Adam Skelton was a Transport Manager named on the licence between 5 December 2018 and 31 January 2019.

Messrs Richardson, Caine, and Skelton were also called to a conjoined driver conduct hearing to consider matters arising in relation to their vocational driving entitlement. The decision in relation to that aspect has been recorded separately.

2. The Call to Public Inquiry

The Operator was called up to public inquiry by letter dated 12 September 2022. This gave notice that the issues of concern to be considered related to Sections 17(3)(a), 17(3)(aa), 17(3)(c), 17(3)(e), 17(1)(a) and 14ZA(2) of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (“The 1981 Act”).

Transport Managers Reay, Caine, Skelton and Richardson were called up by letter of the same date that cited Schedule 3 of the 1981 Act.

The inquiry was originally listed for 7 November 2022 with a preliminary case management hearing on 14 October 2022. It was agreed at that hearing that the public inquiry should be relisted for the week commencing 16 January 2023 to allow all parties to be fully prepared. A further case management hearing was held on 7 November 2022.

I am satisfied the parties have fully complied with all the directions I made at the previous hearings.

3. The Public Inquiry

The Public Inquiry started at Golborne on Monday 16 January 2023 and was concluded on Wednesday 18 January 2023.

The operator was represented in person by its directors, Christopher Reay, Nicola Reay and Stephen Crossley. Transport Manager Richardson was also present. TM McManaman observed the hearing virtually and was not called to give evidence.

The operator, its directors and TM Richardson were legally represented by Mr James Backhouse of Backhouse Jones solicitors.

Former Transport Manager Caine attended by video link through Microsoft Teams with his legal representative, Mr Graham Quigley of Waugh and Musgrave solicitors. They consented to participating virtually to manage the number of individuals attending the inquiry room in person. I am satisfied they were able to fully participate in the proceedings.

The DVSA was represented by Traffic Examiners Peter Healy and Jennie Mitchell. The DVSA was also legally represented by counsel Mr Toby Sasse, instructed by Woodfines solicitors. I permitted that representation to facilitate the presentation of the DVSA’s evidence and for assistance on points of law, having regard to the guidance offered by Statutory Document Number 9: Case Management, particularly at para 45.

In advance of the hearing, I heard driver conduct hearings for a number of drivers alleged to have committed offences and infringements identified during the DVSA investigation. The parties were offered the opportunity to be present at hearings but chose not to do so. Copies of the decision on each driver’s vocational entitlement and my reasons for that decision were provided to the parties.

During the public inquiry, I heard evidence from the following:

• Former TM Caine
• Director and former TM Reay
• Director Crossley
• Paul Adamson (former Head of Training for the Operator) called by the DVSA as a witness.
• Colin Jackson (former Compliance Manager for the Operator) called by the DVSA as a witness.
• TE Healy
• TE Mitchell
• Gordon Humphreys of Fosters Tachographs, called by the Operator as an expert witness (assisted by John Evans)
• TM Richardson

Former TM Skelton did not attend. As stated above, a call up letter was issued to him on 12 September 2022 at the address held on the online licensing system. He was also called to the conjoined driver conduct hearing by letter issued on 22 September 2022 to a different address as held by the DVLA in. relation to his vocational entitlement. Further correspondence has been sent to Mr Skelton subsequently at the latter address, but he has not responded in any way.

I considered the guidance offered by the Senior Traffic Commissioner in Statutory Document Number 9 and specifically the contents of Paragraph 33 of the same, “In line with most tribunals there is a rebuttable presumption that a hearing will proceed as listed even in the absence of parties provided that: the traffic commissioner is satisfied that the party has been given the required notice, has been served with sufficient evidence, and that there are no other factors where the interests of justice require an adjournment.”

I am satisfied that Mr Skelton has been properly alerted to the hearing date and that without medical evidence or other good explanation, I am entitled to proceed in his absence. I also took account the number of other parties who were ready and eager for the hearing to proceed on its given date. A further delay in the apparently vain hope that Mr Skelton would attend was not in the interests of justice. For that reason, I determined that the public inquiry should proceed in the absence of Mr Skelton.

4. Background

In opening the inquiry, I commented that the overarching issue I wanted to consider was whether the Operator had effective management control and sufficient systems and procedures in place to prevent operator licence compliance failings. If concern about that aspect was made out, the next question was whether sufficient and effective changes had been made to ensure future compliance. If not, then the question arose of whether the Operator could still be considered to be of good repute and whether revocation under section 17(1) of the Act must be considered. That was in addition to considering if any of the grounds for regulatory action in Section 17(3), as set out in the call up letter, were met.

As one example of the reasons why such questions arose, I drew attention to the fact that since June 2017, the operator had appointed 12 Transport Managers with half of those appointed serving for a term of less than 3 months before their removal. The turnover was particularly significant in 2018 and 2019.

For the Transport Managers, the question was whether their conduct and involvement (or indeed lack of involvement) in previous matters called into question the good repute generally of each TM and more specifically whether each during his tenure had exercised effective and continuous management as required by Article 4 of EC 1071/2009.

These questions for the Operator and TMs arose from four specific areas of concern identified by the DVSA investigation. I indicated in advance of the hearing that those areas would be considered in detail at the public inquiry. It is important that I record at the outset, that the evidence heard at the inquiry indicated that some of these issues were significantly less troubling than they initially appeared. The issues and allegations in chronological area were as follows:

• Between July 2018 and December 2018 records of driver attendance at internal CPC training were falsified.
• Between September 2018 and October 2019, records of unaccounted kilometres were altered and allegedly falsified.
• Between June 2019 and February 2020, several drivers’ hours infringements were detected, a number involving the failure to record so called “positional journeys”.
• Between June 2019 and September 2019 4 drivers aged under 21 years were deployed to drive large PSVs when not entitled to do so.

The origin of the public inquiry is in the first of these issues. In January 2019, the DVSA became aware that records of driver attendance at internal CPC courses organised by the Operator had been falsified. Following initial inquiries into that matter, the DVSA decided that a more extensive investigation should be undertaken of the Operator’s compliance in relation to driver management and vehicle maintenance. It was during the subsequent investigation that the issues above came to light. The investigation proper started in June 2019 with the Operator asked to provide its tachograph data in August 2019. The initial Traffic Examiner’s Visit Report was completed in November 2019 but it was identified that further inquiries were necessary in the form of tachograph analysis and formal interviews with drivers and the Operator.

Although some initial interviews were conducted in December 2019 and February 2020 with the drivers alleged to have driven whilst under the appropriate age, the intention to interview the wider cohort of drivers involved in infringements was delayed by the onset of the pandemic and associated restrictions in March 2020. As a result, the driver interview process did not resume until October 2020 and was concluded in March 2021. Arrangements were then agreed to interview the Operator with that process being undertaken on 11 October 2021 with Mr Crossley attending on behalf of the company.

The DVSA had reported some of the issues to my office as they emerged, but a decision was made not to deal with the matters piecemeal until the entire investigation was completed. The implications of the delay in bringing all these matters to public inquiry forms part of my consideration below.

A vehicle examiner report in 2019 made some unsatisfactory findings but this was followed by another maintenance inspection in 2021 that was fully satisfactory (save for one minor “mostly satisfactory” finding). The maintenance documents submitted by the operator for this hearing were also inspected by a vehicle examiner and no major issues of concern were identified and for that reason, maintenance did not form part of the consideration at the public inquiry.

The Operator was previously called to a Public Inquiry in 2008 following an unsatisfactory traffic examiner investigation. The presiding Traffic Commissioner effectively curtailed the licence from 40 to 25 vehicles for three months. Christopher Reay, who was the company’s transport manager at the time, lost his repute and disqualified from acting in that capacity. His repute was restored following a preliminary hearing in 2014.

A warning letter was issued to Operator in 2016 following an unsatisfactory maintenance investigation.

A second Public Inquiry was called in 2017 following three separate wheel-loss incidents. A formal warning was issued to both the Operator and to Mr. Reay as the transport manager at the time.

Most recently the Operator was called to a public inquiry on 21 March 2021 in relation to a single and narrow concern. The police had reported that the operator had carried a group of anti-lockdown protestors to Manchester on 8 November 2020 (Remembrance Sunday) for a gathering that was in breach of the Coronavirus Regulations. I found the Operator had been actively misled by the group’s organiser and genuinely believed it was transporting the group to a Remembrance Day event that was permitted by the Regulations. Nevertheless, I considered the Operator should have exercised greater vigilance when accepting the booking and issued a formal warning on that basis. I do not consider that incident is relevant to the current public inquiry because of its distinct and individual nature.

Mr Richardson was also called to that public inquiry as the sole Transport Manager at the time of the incident. I found at the time that the incident concerned did not give any cause to call into question his good repute and professional competence and determined that no further action was needed against him. Mr Richardson has no other history with a Traffic Commissioner.

Mr Caine and Mr Skelton had not previously been referred to a Traffic Commissioner or called to a public inquiry.

Two other former Transport Managers were originally called to the public inquiry. Following submissions made on their behalf and a further review of the evidence, I issued a preliminary written decision setting aside that call and directing that no further action be taken against them.

5. The Issues

5.1 Driver CPC Training

The core facts of the issues that arose with driver CPC training were not in disputed. The key question is what knowledge did the Operator have or ought to have had of those issues?

It was accepted that the Operator had secured permission from the Guild of British Coach Operators to deliver CPC training to its drivers in house (in addition to training new drivers for their vocational entitlement).

By the summer of 2018, responsibility for delivering the training rested with [REDACTED] (also referred to in the papers as [REDACTED]) who had been appointed as a driver trainer. At around the same time it became apparent that the CPC entitlement of number of the Operator’s drivers was due to expire in September 2018. It was accepted that a there was therefore a degree of urgency in ensuring those drivers received the training needed so that they could renew their entitlement and remain available to drive after September 2018.

[REDACTED] told the DVSA in interview that he felt under considerable pressure to ensure the drivers were trained on time. He found that often drivers did not attend the scheduled courses as they were required for driving duties. [REDACTED] apparently came to the realisation that it would not be practically possible to have all the drivers trained on time.

From 23 July 2018 onwards, [REDACTED] asked various of the Operator’s drivers to sign the training register to claim they had attended a CPC course when in fact they had not done so. There was a total of 11 drivers who made at least one such false declaration, with a total of 27 false entries recorded between July and December 2018. It should be noted that whilst the drivers accepted, they were responsible for most of the signatures, there were some instances where it was suggested that someone else had added the driver’s name.

The approach to the falsification appears to have been unsophisticated and can even be described as a chaotic. It is notable that 8 of the 11 drivers concerned were individuals with junior management or other primarily office-based roles including Transport Managers Caine and Skelton. It seems [REDACTED] approached them to sign the register largely because they were conveniently available in the office to do so. By contrast there was one example of a service bus driver who described how [REDACTED] had met her whilst she was out on a route to persuade her to sign the register.

It is also notable that may of those who were asked to sign the register did not have CPC due for imminent expiry and there was no urgency in their individual cases. The fact that they were asked to sign the registers is an indication that [REDACTED] had effectively lost any sense of reality about the situation.

Nevertheless, the consequences of the attendance registers being falsified was that some drivers did have their CPC renewed in September 2018 when it should not have been and they were able to continue driving for the Operator until matters came to light in December 2018,

It should be noted that despite the falsification of the training registers, the CPC training courses were held and other drivers attended as required. The evidence I heard (including that from Paul Adamson, a previous training manager for the Operator) was that [REDACTED] was a capable trainer and there is nothing that would call into question the legitimacy of the training that he did actually deliver on behalf of the Operator.

The issue came to light in December 2018. A representative of the Guild of British Coach Operators spoke to [REDACTED] and made a comment about concerns that another operator may have been falsifying CPC training records. This prompted [REDACTED] to disclose his own actions to director Stephen Crossley.

The Operator thereafter launched its own internal investigation and I saw evidence of its cooperation with the Guild and its legal representatives. Mr Crossley also gave evidence that he became concerned at the place of the Guild investigation and decided to report the matter to the DVSA himself. It does appear the DVSA were already aware of that matter, but I am satisfied the Operator did not know that at the time it made its notification.

The Operator’s response included suspending those drivers who should not have had their CPC renewed until such time they had properly attended the required training. Some staff were also dismissed after internal investigation including Transport Managers Caine and Skelton.

I do not consider that the Operator’s response after December 2018 can be criticised.

Mr Adamson was briefly employed by the Operator between January and June 2018 including a role of Head of Training. At the request of the directors, Mr Adamson originally instructed [REDACTED] to develop a training programme for CPC renewal. Mr Adamson said he was concerned that the programme could be delivered without training at weekends and bringing in additional external trainers. Mr Adamson said he raised this concern with the directors but that they remained eager to deliver the training in house. Mr Adamson said [REDACTED] appeared pessimistic about the prospects of achieving the required training by September 2018. Mr Adamson left in June 2018 before the falsification of the registers started and he had no knowledge of that practice.

[REDACTED] in interview and in subsequent witness statements suggested he had acted largely on his own initiative. He did allege that a Transport Manager (who was briefly in post during July and August 2018) had told him words to the effect of “just get the drivers to sign”. That Transport Manager was not called to the public inquiry and was not interviewed by the DVSA. Mr Crossley commented that he found the allegation surprising as the Transport Manager would only just have been appointed when the alleged conversation happened. I share that scepticism as that Transport Manager’s name did not feature prominently in any other aspect of the investigation and [REDACTED] does not suggest there was any follow up by that individual.

Crucially [REDACTED] has not claimed at any point that the directors instructed him to act as he did. I find it is likely that the directors did put [REDACTED] under pressure to ensure the training was completed on time but not that they knowingly instructed or encouraged any falsification.

Progress on the training was reported to the weekly compliance meetings and it appears [REDACTED]’s assurances that matters were in hand were accepted.

None of the drivers interviewed by the DVSA suggested that they had made the directors aware of what was happening. Some drivers expressly stated that the directors were unaware. Others did make comments to the effect that the directors knew about the falsifications, but their assertions were not supported by any tangible evidence. As stated above, the courses were taking place and the directors confirm they could see drivers were attending. The issue was that some drivers had not attended and had falsely claimed to be there.

On applying the balance of probabilities, I find that there is insufficient evidence the Operator’s directors instructed [REDACTED] to falsify the training registers nor that they knew of that practice prior to the disclosure in December 2018.

I do find that the directors did not give sufficient attention to the practical challenges of delivering the required training over the summer of 2018 and failed to properly identify the risks that ensued. This included a failure to verify the assurances given by [REDACTED].

5.2 Unaccounted Kilometres Report

This issue came under focus after the DVSA examiners were shown a report created using the TruTrac system during their visit to the Operator’s premises on 28 October 2019.

The report was derived from the download of vehicle tachograph units and identified movements when a digital driver’s card had not been inserted. It was the responsibility of the Operator’s Compliance Team (latterly manged by Colin Jackson) to investigate movements exceeding 5 kilometres and then to insert an explanation in the relevant column for that movement (the column concerned had standard “dropdown” options with the capability to add text such as a driver’s name). If the initial investigation suggested an unacceptable explanation such as a driver’s failure to record a journey that would be the subject of further scrutiny and possible disciplinary action.

The report produced by Mr Jackson was produced on a weekly basis and discussed at the weekly compliance meetings with the directors and Transport Managers.

During the meeting with the DVSA on 28 October 2019, it became evident immediately that some of the entries could not be correct. For example, there were some movements of over 100 kilometres that were attributed to “yard shunting”. The Operator’s managers subsequently worked through the information recorded and made several changes after identifying several errors in the previous recording of reasons for the unaccounted kilometres.

In TE Healy’s initial statement dated 27 January 2022 he referred to an analysis of these records as indicating “that over a sustained period the Transport and Compliance Managers had both been implicit in intentionally altering the recorded figures” so that a false picture was given of the true situation.

On the face of it that appeared to be an allegation of deliberate falsification. However, the eve of the public inquiry, a further statement was submitted from TE Healy explaining the print outs in greater detail and noting that where the reason for a journey had been changed, the DVSA had not seen any further information to explain that change. This appeared to suggest the allegation was less stark that it first appeared.

Former compliance manager Colin Jackson was called as witness by the DVSA at the public inquiry. He accepted that as compliance manager (supported by an assistant) he was responsible for analysing the unaccounted mileage and recording his findings on the spreadsheet. He would either deal with any infringements himself or report them to Mr Crossley as director or Karl Richardson as Transport Manager. He confirmed the findings would also be discussed at the weekly compliance meetings.

Mr Jackson admitted that some of the entries he and his team made were clearly incorrect. He said he first became aware of this when the report was demonstrated to the DVSA examiners on 28 October 2019. He was subsequently informed by the Operator that he was under investigation as a result of the apparent errors, and he decided to resign before the process was complete.

Mr Jackson in evidence confirmed that he had not been instructed to make false entries nor was he told that he had to give certain reasons to explain the unaccounted kilometres. Mr Jackson accepted he had made errors but could not explain why.

My finding is that errors were made initially when giving reasons for unaccounted mileage. However, I find that was the result of a lack of care by Mr Jackson and others involved in the process rather than any deliberate attempt to provide a false picture. I was told that the system allowed one reason to be collectively applied to a number of entries at the same time and examples of that can be seen in the printouts produced. That supports the view that those making the entries were trying to complete the task in haste and not taking sufficient time to properly investigate each instance.

Some of the errors were so blatantly obvious that it is extremely unlikely that they would have been made deliberately by someone trying to deceive. There is the example given previously of a 134 km journey ascribed to yard shunting and other examples included school transport being given as a reason for journeys at weekends.

The errors were such that they were immediately apparent to the DVSA examiners and the Operator’s representatives when the report was discussed at the meeting on 28 October 2019. That being the case, it begs the question why those errors were not identified when the same report was discussed at the weekly compliance meetings in the months prior to the DVSA investigation.

I find that the most likely answer to that question is that there was ineffective scrutiny of the unaccounted kilometres reports at the weekly compliance meetings and the assurances given by Mr Jackson appear to have been accepted without question.

So, whilst I find that the reports were not deliberately falsified, the information they contained was often inaccurate as a result of careless preparation and there was a failure by the Operator and the Transport Managers at the time to verify their accuracy.

That does lead to a concern that the errors may have served to conceal potential offences and infringements by drivers, but I was not presented with any clear evidence of that. It is apparent that some of the entries were correct from the outset and action had been taken on drivers’ hours infringements identified. Further, when the reports were reviewed after the DVSA investigation the Operator did identify additional infringements and took appropriate action against the drivers. I was also given evidence that the Operator had since reviewed its approach to the Compliance Meetings generally and that it now takes steps to verify the findings of the uncounted mileage report.

5.3 Driver Hours Infringements

The DVSA investigation identified a total of 103 drivers’ records and hours infringements by 21 of the Operator’s drivers during the period investigated. These included the 15 instances when drivers aged under 21 had driven beyond the restrictions their licence. None of the drivers were prosecuted because of the pandemic and many of the alleged offences would have been time barred by the point the investigation concluded.

To give this some context to these numbers, the operator at the time employed some 178 staff, the majority of whom were drivers, and it operated around 108 passenger carrying vehicles. The DVSA examined around 1200 records and the infringement rate was calculated to be 0.76% at worst. It was neither practicable nor necessary for the public inquiry to consider in detail each alleged infringement, but it did appear that there were some allegations that had legitimate explanations. I find it is likely that if every alleged infringement had been tested, the infringement rate would have fallen to an even lower figure.

An infringement rate of less than 1% would not usually be considered exceptional although the number and proportion of such matters should also have been taken in the round with the nature of the infringements. The point was made during the hearing that the DVSA Earned Recognition scheme uses an indicator of a 4% infringement rate.

Many of the alleged infringements related to failures to record so called “positional journeys” namely the movement of empty coaches before or after planned operations or movements by drivers to or from PSV driving duties in private cars or company light vans (i.e., non-tachograph vehicles). This appeared to be a particular problem in relation to the use of vehicle on a contract the operator held in 2019 to move workers between Risley in Cheshire and Sellafield in Cumbria.

Early in the preparation for the public inquiry, the Operator indicated that it would be making a legal argument that there was no obligation to record such positional journeys at the relevant time in 2019 and early 2020. I subsequently received detailed and helpful legal submissions on the point from Mr Sasse for the DVSA and Mr Backhouse for the Operator.

Notwithstanding the initial position on the legal argument, the Operator confirmed it was its expectation at the time that drivers should record such journeys either by using their digital card (if driving a suitably equipped PSV) or otherwise by making a manual entry. It was conceded that on most of the occasions identified by the DVSA, the drivers ought to have made a record in compliance with company policy, if not also the law.

For that reason, at the conclusion of the public inquiry Mr Backhouse indicated that he was not pursuing the legal argument. He also properly made the point that the rules had changed in any event and there was now no doubting the need to keep records. I agree this lessened the imperative in my reaching a finding on the laws it previously applied. I also observe that it is not my role at public inquiry to reach a finding on whether a driver has committed an offence but to consider the wider question of whether the Operator had effective systems in place to prevent infringements.

Much time was spent at the public inquiry looking at the issue of drivers’ hours infringements and the positioning journeys in particular. Mr Backhouse in closing submissions accepted that such infringements were not being consistently managed in 2019. That was my conclusion from hearing the evidence and demonstrated by the fact that amongst those who failed to record a positional journey was Transport Manager Richardson. The Operator had a proper policy in place but was failing to enforce it consistently.

This is not to say that driver infringements were not identified and tackled. I saw evidence that was happening. The question is whether the number and nature of infringements identified by the DVSA were such that it should lead to an adverse conclusion in relation to the Operator’s management of drivers.

I do not consider that there was any evidence to suggest the Operator, or its Transport Managers were actively encouraging drivers to be non-compliant. I also accept that the nature of the infringements identified were not of the very most serious nature. Further, I do not consider the number of infringements can be considered either exceptional or representative of the Operator’s compliance in general. The Operator asserted (without challenge) at the public inquiry that the DVSA had examined some 102,000 separate journeys and only found around 88 drivers’ hours and record infringements.

It is correct that the issues related to the Risley-Sellafield journey were persistent. In summary drivers were attempting to travel a third leg back from Risley to the depot at the end of the week when that was a stetch within their allowed hours and the Operator had made provision for them to stay overnight in a hotel. It was nearly 6 months until the Operator took decisive action to stop the drivers attempting the “third” journey. However, when that journey is looked at through the overall perspective of the extensive operations at the time, it represents only a small proportion of the journeys undertaken and I cannot find it was representative.

I do not consider that the evidence I heard raises sufficient concern that would justify regulatory action on the basis of ineffective management of drivers’ hours as an issue in isolation.

5.4 Underage drivers

Between June 2019 and September 2019 there were 15 occasions when drivers then aged under 21 years drove large PSVs when not entitled by law to do so. 4 drivers aged under 21 years were deployed to drive large PSVs when not entitled to do so.

The drivers had been trained for their vocational entitlement by the Operator and had all passed their PCV driving test and driver CPC qualification. However due to their age, they were not allowed to drive large PSVs carrying passengers other than on regular services of less than 50km.That restriction excludes driving vehicles for private hire purposes regardless of the distance involved.

The issue with the use of under aged drivers came to the DVSA’s attention during a routine check at school premises. One of the under aged drivers was found to be driving on a private hire booking for the school. The Operator’s records were then checked, and the other occasions of similar conduct identified. The Operator immediately removed the drivers from any duty that was not permitted by their entitlement.

The drivers concerned were interviewed and all said they believed they were entitled to drive as the journeys were less than 50km. They clearly did not understand the true terms of the restriction extended to any non-regular passenger carrying journeys.

This lack of understanding appears to have also been the position in relation to the Operator’s planners when deploying the drivers on these journeys. I do not hear any evidence that the use of the underage drivers was the result of a conscious decision to deliberately flout the law. However, it does appear it does appear there was a lack of knowledge amongst key staff about the restrictions and a lack of systems in place to prevent such inappropriate deployment.

I heard that the Operator’s Coach Manager system is now configured to clearly identify any driver aged under 21 and to flag up that age to planners to prevent inappropriate deployment. It was conceded that functionality was available to the Operator in 2019. I find the fact it was not in use then further evidence the lack of understanding of this potential problem.

Karl Richardson was one of the Transport Managers in post during this period. He conceded that at the time he had also misunderstood the 50km rule and was unaware of the issue until highlighted by the DVSA.

5.5 Compliance generally

In relation to the Operator’s compliance overall, it should first be noted that the DVSA confirmed their investigation was prompted solely by the revelation of the Driver CPC training issue. It appears that there was nothing else in the Operator’s recent history up to that point in January 2019 that had attracted attention. The other issues discussed at this public inquiry came to light during the subsequent investigation.

There were two further features of the Operator’s approach to management in 2018 and 2019 that bear discussion.

First, there was a turnover of Transport Managers that must be regarded as extraordinary for a small or medium sized enterprise such as this. Since June 2017, no fewer than 12 different individuals were named as Transport Managers on the licence. In 2018 alone there were 7 changes of Transport Manager. Of those 12 Transport Managers, 6 were in post for 3 months or less and only 4 had a tenure in excess of 12 months.

I was told that the Operator faced significant challenges in recruitment due to its rural Cumbrian location and it had sought to address the matter by training staff to attain their Transport Manager CPC qualification. This is consistent with the Operator’s wider approach to supporting staff training and I agree does deserve some credit.

The Operator also highlighted that the short tenure of some Transport Managers in 2018 was due to them being dismissed for disciplinary reasons after misconduct came to light (Mr Caine and Mr Skelton for example). It appears however that other Transport Managers may have moved on as they were unhappy with the working environment.

I find that is it likely that the turnover of Transport Managers was a contributory factor to some of the issues discussed above. Although there were clearly good compliance systems in place, the number of Transport Managers, many of whom lacked experience meant those systems were not used as effectively as they could have been to prevent compliance failures.

The past turnover of Transport Managers also needs to be considered in the context of the current position. Mr Richardson has been in post now for over 3 years alongside Mr McManaman who was appointed in November 2021. There does not appear to be any immediate risk that position will change, and the Operator does appear to have achieved some much-needed stability in its Transport Manager arrangements since the DVSA investigation.

The second feature is the Operator’s expectation that all qualified staff are expected to undertake driving duties including Transport Managers and managers and others with primarily office-based roles. Obviously, there is no prohibition on Transport Managers undertaking driving roles and indeed in smaller operators such a prohibition could well be impracticable. Even with larger operators, there are advantages to Transport Managers and other senior managers undertaking occasional driving duties to maintain their own skills and understand the demands their mainstream drivers face. However, that must not be at the expense of a Transport Manager being distracted from the core role and the requirement to deliver effective and continuous management of the licence.

It was clear from the evidence of Mr Caine at the public inquiry and other accounts provided to the DVSA that many of junior managers and other administrative staff felt that their driving duties did interfere with their ability to perform their core function.

I find that again must be regarded as a contributory factor to the issues that arose in 2018 and 2019.

Although the Operator maintains that same policy on staff driving duties, I am satisfied the position is now more settled. Mr Caine’s account of the time he found available to do his Transport Manager work contrasts dramatically with the evidence that was presented of the adequate time that the current Transport Managers Mr Richardson and Mr McManaman have available to undertake that role (based on analysis of their recent driving records).

6. General Approach

In opening the public inquiry, I set out some points about the general approach that I would take to my consideration and as contained in Statutory Document 10: The principles of decision making and the concept of proportionality. I will repeat those comments here and as follows.

“In essence, the legal principle of proportionality requires a traffic commissioner when exercising a statutory function, to make decisions which are commensurate with the circumstances of each individual case and the purposes of the legislation. The Upper Tribunal has stated as follows - “… having granted a licence any regulatory action by the traffic commissioner should not be punishment in itself but designed to assist in the promotion and achievement of the legislation”.

Further, that the primary factor then to be considered is the impact on road safety and fair competition arising from the alleged breaches of the legislation by the operator. “Traffic commissioners must also have regard to the impact upon an operator of any regulatory action which might be taken in cases of non-compliance.”

Clearly it is a highly relevant in this case that the matters discussed mostly date back at least 3 years to a period between July 2018 and early 2020.

Whilst, I am entitled to go back as far as I need to in order to determine whether the operator (or the Transport Managers) can be trusted to comply in the future, I also have regard to the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s guidance that findings must be made as at the date of the public inquiry and should take into account any improvements made by the operator and any operator’s good compliance record.

I am also mindful of the impact that the delay in these matters reaching this inquiry may have on the recollection of individual witnesses and that has been a factor I considered when assessing the weight to be given to the evidence of individuals.

In closing submissions, Mr Backhouse sought to draw attention to the Regulators’ Code. I indicated that I would follow the guidance of the Senior Traffic Commissioner as set out in Statutory Document 0. At Paragraph 35 it is stated,

“The application of the Regulators’ Code is limited in terms of the traffic commissioners’ duties and not relevant to judicial decision making. However, I [The Senior Traffic Commissioner] am obliged to have regard to it when developing policies and procedures. The Statutory Documents describe the application of legal discretions and indicate a proportionate approach to the imposition of regulatory burdens and in doing so provide guidance and advice to those operators and drivers who are regulated by traffic commissioners.”

The guidance continues at paragraph 38 by stating, “The Upper Tribunal has recognised that the Statutory Documents provide a useful starting point. They are intended to provide a consistent basis for decision making and have been developed with regard to the Regulator’s Code. As the Upper Tribunal has made clear, in considering regulatory action a traffic commissioner needs to reflect on what is required as a deterrent, not only to the individual party but to others within the industry. However, the Code has limited application to individual tribunal decisions.”

I do not therefore consider that I am required to take account of the contents of the Regulator’s Code in reaching this decision. For completeness, I would add that I consider that my approach to this Public Inquiry is nevertheless consistent with the principles set out in the Code.

6.1 Reays Travel Coaches Limited

6.2 Consideration

The DVSA report initially presented to me commented that the failings identified, “are indicative of staff, previous and current adopting fraudulent practices over a sustained period. Transport Managers, planners and directors have allowed offences to be committed”.

I do not consider that I can reach such a grave conclusion based the evidence I have seen and heard by the end of this public inquiry.

The only evidence that I found of widespread fraudulent practice was that adopted by [REDACTED] and some of the Operator’s drivers in relation to the false claims of attendance at training courses. For the reasons I have set out above, I do not find that happened with the knowledge or encouragement of the directors. The only criticism I make of the Operator in relation to that aspect of the case, is that the directors should have exercised greater scrutiny that the training programme was being implemented appropriately.

I do not find that the completion of the unaccounted mileage records amounts to fraud. Inaccurate records were kept but that was the result of the compliance team’s carelessness and compounded by the failure of the management structure in place at the time to identify those errors.

Some of the individual driver infringements may have involved conduct by the driver that amounted to fraud. However, I did not find there was evidence that such conduct was at the instruction of the Operator nor that such incidents were so widespread it called into question the Operator’s approach to managing drivers’ hours.

Finally, I do not consider the use of the underage drivers was deliberate and was more likely the result of a lack of knowledge on the part of the drivers and their managers. The Operator and its managers ought to have exercised much greater care in deploying those drivers, but such a finding falls well short of suggesting a deliberate intention to flout the law.

In terms of assessing the gravity of the Operator’s position, I do not consider that the evidence supports a finding that there was widespread non-compliance across all aspects of licence management. Vehicle maintenance was generally satisfactory (with the issues in 2019 addressed by 2021). Whilst there were clearly some issues with managing drivers hours in 2019 and early 2020, I do not consider that the number and nature of the infringements was so disproportionate that they would justify meaningful regulatory action in themselves.

The remaining areas of concern are narrower but do justify consideration of regulatory action in my view. Whilst I give credit to the Operator for its approach to training drivers and Transport Managers and for its initiative in seeking to deliver CPC training in house, having chosen to accept that responsibility the Operator should have ensured the training was delivered appropriately. [REDACTED]’s claims of attendance at the courses could have been easily verified had the Operator chosen to do so.

Similarly, the Operator failed to identify the errors within the unaccounted kilometres report despite those errors becoming immediately apparent to its directors and Transport Managers when the DVSA visited.

The issue of the deployment of the underage drivers arose due to a lack of knowledge amongst key staff including Transport Managers of the legal requirements. I give credit to the Operator for its approach to training young drivers, but it appears it had failed to identify the risk of their being inappropriately deployed and therefore it did not make use of the systems it had available to it to prevent that happening.

This is not a case where there was an absence of management systems. Indeed, it seems some of the systems in place were exemplary. The issue that has been demonstrated is that those systems were not always used as effectively as they should have been to reduce the risk of non-compliance.

I saw evidence of the preparations for the weekly compliance meetings including detailed PowerPoint presentations prepared by the relevant managers such as Mr Jackson. It appeared a sophisticated and robust process, but the flaw in the approach was that it appears there was insufficient scrutiny and challenge to the information provided as demonstrated by the unaccounted kilometres report. I was also struck by the fact there appeared to be less evidence of outputs from the meetings compared to their preparation. This also raises questions about the effectiveness of those meetings previously.

The events of 2018 and 2019 cannot be viewed in isolation. The Operator’s previous history must be considered as well as its approach since then and the current position.

The Operator has been called to public inquires previously and was the subject of regulatory action in 2008. That was 10 years prior to the earliest of the issues considered at this public inquiry but nevertheless I would have expected the Operator to have still been mindful of the expectations set out then. I also think it is pertinent to highlight one passage from the 2008 decision. TE Healy, together with a colleague, was a witness at that inquiry too and was asked by the presiding Traffic Commissioner if he believed the company was capable of change. The answer was affirmative provided “there is better organisation, better management structure and provided that the operator keeps its eye on the ball and does not try to do too much”.

I have reflected on those words when looking at the operator’s position 10 years later in 2018. The business had grown substantially in terms of both staff and vehicles. I do not consider that development caused the issues by itself or that it resulted in widespread non-compliance. The Operator clearly had some good systems in place, and it had been the subject of Earned Recognition and Coach Marque audits at that time which had not found any issues of concern.

Other factors did however combine to leave the Operator vulnerable and exposed to the risk that it would fail in its obligations in certain areas. These factors included the turnover of Transport Managers and their collective inexperience together with amount of driving work being undertaken by key managers and administrators.

This was compounded by the Operator’s management structure at the time. In its submissions before the hearing, I was presented with organisational charts for 2018, 2019 and currently. There is a marked difference between the 2018 chart and the present chart. The chart in 2018 reflects the impression I gained from the witness evidence that there were confused lines of management and responsibility. This was not assisted by the turnover of staff. The structure now appears far clearer in terms of management responsibility and accountability and is supported by the evidence that there is stability in management staffing.

I have taken note that Mr Crossley only joined the business as director in 2017. He is an experienced senior manager in the goods sector but was still relatively new to the company and PSV operations in 2018. He is now far more experienced, not least having lived through this investigation, and I have confidence in his ability to positively influence the Operator’s approach to compliance. Similar considerations apply to the current Transport Managers.

I am satisfied the operator has moved on since 2018 and has addressed the vulnerabilities discussed above. The evidence it supplied of its current compliance in advance of the hearing was found to be generally satisfactory. TE Healy commented on that information that it indicated “a professional approach to Driver Management Systems that comply with the requirement of being a complaint operator’’.

7. Conclusion

The findings of fact referred to above lead me to the following findings in relation to the statutory provisions:

• The operator has not fulfilled its undertaking to ensure the laws relating to the driving and operation of vehicles used under the licence are observed and this satisfies the ground for regulatory action in Section 17(3)(aa) of the Act. This follows the findings made in relation to the use of underage drivers and the driver CPC training issue. The consequence of the false attendance registers was that some drivers continued to drive for the operator when they were not in fact entitled to do so.
• I also find the operator has not fulfilled its undertaking that the rules on driver’s hours and tachographs are observed and proper records kept and this also satisfies the ground for regulatory action in Section 17(3)(aa). This relates to the failure to ensure the records of unaccounted mileage were accurate and also to those drivers’ hours and recording infringements that were both identified by the DVSA and accepted by the operator.

Having reached these findings, I have considered the balancing exercise and have considered the positive and negative features by reference to the guidance in the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document Number 10.

The negative features in Statutory Document 10 that can be aligned to the matters found above are as follows:

• During the period investigated by the DVSA, management control and procedures were not fully effective in preventing operator licence compliance failings.
• The analysis procedures in place to detect falsification, drivers’ hours and Working Time Directive infringements were not fully effective.
• The fact that the driver CPC attendance records were falsified must be seen as evidence of ineffective driver training procedures.
• Evidence of previous warning letters or public inquiries

The same exercise with regards to the positive features in Statutory Document 10 and the features of this case can be recorded as follows:

• Some of the positional journey recording issues and the conduct in relation to the driver CPC attendance registers can be categorised as drivers (or other staff) disregarding appropriate instruction.
• There is now more effective management control and appropriate systems and procedures in place to prevent operator licence failings.
• This includes effective analysis procedures in place to detect falsification, drivers’ hours and Working Time Directive infringements addressing the flaws in that approach previously.
• • Proper and effective staff training with appropriate monitoring and disciplinary procedures in place
• Sufficient and effective changes made, with tangible evidence in support, to ensure compliance.
• The Operator co-operated with the enforcement investigation, including promptly reporting the driver CPC training issue.
• No road safety critical defects or “S” marked prohibitions.
• Low prohibition rate and above average first-time pass rate at MOT

I consider that the positive features outweigh the negative features, particularly when I consider that my findings must be made as at the date of the public inquiry. The delay in these matters reaching a hearing is regrettable but the Operator has used that time to its advantage by addressing the flaws and potential vulnerabilities in its previous approach.

This is now a much-changed operator to the one visited by the DVSA in 2019. The operation is much smaller in terms of vehicles operated and number of staff. I do not consider that the size of the operation in 2018 and 2019 was the cause of any difficulties that arose. Nor do I find that the evidence indicates the Operator adopted a culture of pursuing business opportunities at the expense of compliance. However, it is clear that when the operation was at its height, the Operator faced a number of challenges that left it exposed to the risk of non-compliance. Those challenges included the turnover of Transport Managers and the relative inexperience of staff in that role and other managerial roles. This combined with (and may have contributed to) a management structure with blurred lines of responsibility. The risks of non-compliance became manifest in the driver CPS training issue and to a lesser extent with the unaccounted kilometres reports and underage driver incidents.

The reduction in the size of the business is not entirely voluntary. The Operator was keen for me to understand that it was not to be seen as a concession that the operation was too big previously. The reduction is the consequence of the economic realities of the last few years and the impact of the pandemic on PSV operators. Nevertheless, I do draw reassurance from the fact that the Operator is now seeking to vary its licence to significantly reduce the number of vehicles it would wish to operate in the immediate future. That reassurance is also supported by the changes made to its approach to monitoring compliance, the clarity of the current management structure and the stability and experience that now exists at both director and Transport Manager level. The present size of the operation and the management arrangements do give confidence that the issues seen in 2018 and 2019 will not be repeated.

In closing submissions, Mr Backhouse for the Operator directly addressed the Priority Freight question of whether I could trust the operator to be compliant in future? His rhetorical answer was that the Operator had been generally compliant previously but not perfect. He argued that looking at the Operator as it is today, then “clearly” it could be trusted.

I agree with the submission that the Operator’s previous approach was imperfect but consider it can be better described as “largely compliant”. The areas where it failed to achieve compliance were narrow but significant.

My own answer to the Priority Freight question is that I do trust the Operator to be compliant in future but with some reservations. These flow from the fact that this is not the Operator’s first public inquiry and that the issues were allowed to arise despite previous regulatory action (albeit 10 years previously) and warnings.

The nature of the incidents that led to my findings that the grounds in Section 17(3)(aa) were met together with the time that has passed since then and the current position of the Operator all combine to persuade me that it would be disproportionate and unnecessary to consider regulatory action in the serious to severe category resulting in a material impact on the current operation. I make it clear that if I was considering these matters in closer proximity to the occurrences that prompted the public inquiry, I would have been considering action in that higher bracket. The passage of time has strengthened the Operator’s case that it has addressed the issues.

I consider that regulatory action in the moderate category beyond a formal warning is required. I take into account the guidance offered in Thomas Muir (Haulage) Limited (1999) SC 86 that such action has a purpose in “deterring the operator or other persons from failing to carry out their responsibilities under the legislation However, taking such considerations into account would not be for the purpose of punishment per se, but in order to assist in the achievement of the purpose of the legislation”.

Applying that guidance here, I consider that such action is needed as a deterrent to the Operator from falling back from its current standards, as it previously did after the 2008 public inquiry. Further other operators must also understand the consequences of failing to carry out responsibilities such as driver training. I do not seek to deter any operator from delivering in house training, but if it accepts that responsibility it must ensure that the training is competently delivered and properly recorded. There is a degree of trust involved when an operator undertakes its own CPC training, and it must ensure that any risk of falsification is properly managed. This operator failed to do that and must be shown to have been held accountable. Similarly, the same point about deterrent action applies to ensuring drivers are properly qualified for the duties allocated and in keeping accurate records of important compliance matters such as unaccounted kilometres.

I consider that the appropriate and proportionate regulatory action in this case should take the form of a limitation on operations for 28 days whereby the operator is restricted to operating only 45 vehicles.

Thereafter the Operator’s application to vary the vehicles authorised under the licence to the same number can take effect.

7.1 Former Transport Manager Christopher Walter Reay

Mr Reay has been the Operator’s longest serving Transport Manager in recent years. He was appointed in January 2014 after his repute was restored following his disqualification at the 2008 public inquiry. Mr Reay remained on the licence until January 2018. He was reappointed in March 2018 and remined on the licence then until May 2019. Mr Reay’s final tenure as Transport Manager was between December 2020 and May 2021.

The first concern that arose about Mr Reay was that he was a Transport Manager in name only and had not exercised effective and continuous management of the licence during his tenures. The second concern is that Mr Reay was a Transport Manager during the period when the driver CPC records were falsified, and the errors arose in the completion of the unaccounted kilometres report (he was not a Transport Manager when the drivers’ hours infringements arose or the underage drivers were deployed). Should the fact that those matters arose, and Mr Reay failed to prevent them reflect on his good repute?

I find the first concern was not supported by the weight of the evidence I heard during the hearing. The allegation that Mr Reay was not acting as Transport Manager was made by some of the drivers and other staff interviewed by the DVSA. It was claimed in written material seen before the hearing that he did not attend the weekly compliance meetings. The initial impression was also not assisted by the fact that Mr Reay did not feature prominently in the DVSA investigation. Despite the fact he was the Managing Director and longest serving Transport Manager, Mr Reay allowed Mr Crossley and Mr Richardson to take the lead in dealings with the DVSA.

Mr Reay’s explanation for that was that he took the lead on vehicle maintenance as Transport Manager and allowed others to deal with the DVSA as their focus was more on drivers’ hours. Mr Reay offered the same explanation for why there appeared to be little evidence of his direct involvement in monitoring drivers’ hours and subsequent disciplinary processes. Mr Reay said that he took an overview of that aspect of the Transport Manager’s role through his attendance at the weekly compliance meetings. He insisted he attended those regularly when in post as Transport Manager although conceded he may have missed some meetings thereafter.

I found the allegation that Mr Reay was a Transport Manager in name only was not borne out from the evidence I heard. The clear impression I formed was that he was a regular presence at the operator’s premises and was well known to all staff. Mr Jackson gave evidence that Mr Reay used to attend the weekly compliance meetings in early 2019 but he did not see him there in the summer of 2019. It was highlighted on Mr Reay’s behalf that coincided with him ceasing to be a Transport Manager in May 2019.

As discussed above, I am satisfied that Mr Reay as Director and Transport Manager at the relevant time did not instruct or encourage the falsification of the driver CPC records. I am also satisfied he was unaware of the practice before its revelation in December 2018. However, a Transport Manager’s responsibilities as set out in Statutory Document 3; Transport Managers, include ensuring that vocational drivers hold a valid driver CPC qualification and are adequately trained. As Transport Manager at the time, I find Mr Reay ought to have taken greater steps to ensure the training was being delivered and recorded properly.

Similarly, I make the same findings in relation to the unaccounted kilometres report. Mr Reay did not know that the errors were being made but as a Transport Manager attending the weekly compliance meetings and considering the reports presented, he should have scrutinised their accuracy more carefully.

These matters are such that I consider they are relevant to Mr Reay’s good repute. I balance this with the fact he was not the sole Transport Manager at the relevant time and the failings described are collective failings. I also give Mr Reay credit for the overall positive picture in relation to vehicle maintenance which was his primary day to day responsibility. I also take note that in the current structure Transport Manager responsibilities rest with two members of staff reporting through Mr Crossley to Mr Reay. That seems a more stable and sensible separation of responsibilities.

Having balanced those factors, I consider it would be disproportionate to make a finding that Mr Reay has lost his good repute. I find it is tarnished and this aspect of the case should be concluded with a formal warning.

7.2 Former Transport Manager Brett Caine

Mr Caine came under scrutiny because in his capacity as a driver, he had signed the training register to claim he was present at a CPC course on 31 July 2018, when in fact he had not attended the course.

Mr Caine at the time was named as Transport Manager on the licence. During his subsequent interview with the DVSA about the driver CPC issue and in written statements he supplied in advance of this hearing, he disclosed further information about his work as Transport Manager that called into question if he had exercised the required continuous and effective management during his tenure. His evidence at the hearing was consistent with his previous accounts.

The facts relating to Mr Caine’s position do not appear to be disputed. Mr Caine was first employed by the Operator in 2014 as an administrator (when he was aged around 23 years). Mr Caine was trained to analyse tachograph data by a previous Transport Manager and in 2017 he passed his TM CPC examination. Mr Caine has also qualified as a PSV driver in 2015.

Mr Caine was initially appointed to the licence as a Transport Manager in June 2017. He asked to be removed in September 2017 as he was unhappy that he was being managed by the then Head of Compliance who was not a qualified Transport Manager himself.

Mr Caine agreed to be reappointed in January 2018 and, unlike his previous term, was awarded an increase in pay to reflect the additional responsibility. He then reported directly to director Stephen Crossley. Mr Caine said he felt obliged to accept the post as he feared he would be dismissed otherwise. Mr Caine continued to work exclusively on the analysis of tachograph data. It was not disputed that he was not involved in the management of vehicles as that was the responsibility of other Transport Managers (of whom there were a number during 2018).

Mr Caine said he increasingly found himself asked to undertake driving duties for the Operator and this had an adverse effect on the time he had available to carry out his Transport Manager duties. Often, he would only have 1 or 2 hours a day to undertake the tachograph analysis work, and there were some days when he had no time at all to do such work. Mr Caine estimated he was falling well short of the 40 hours per week he had committed to Transport Manager duties when he applied for appointment.

Mr Caine said he was concerned about the situation and whether he was discharging his Transport Manager role as required. However, he did not voice those concerns to the Operator’s senior management, nor did he consider notifying the Traffic Commissioner. Mr Caine accepted that with hindsight he should have done so but said he was anxious at the time not to lose his job.

Mr Caine was dismissed by the Operator in December 2018 after his false signing of the training register came to light. It appears that if that incident had not occurred, Mr Caine would have continued to be employed as Transport Manager despite his own misgivings about the time he had available for the role. By all accounts, he was highly regarded for the tachograph analysis work that he undertook to the extent that it was suggested that his dismissal was may have partly contributed to some of the difficulties subsequently encountered by the operator in relation to that work.

I take note that the question of Mr Caine’s effective performance as Transport Manager arose solely because of his own comments in interview and in his other evidence. Mr Caine’s period as Transport Manager was not the subject of the DVSA investigation into drivers’ hours and I did not hear any other evidence of non-compliance that could be attributed to a failure by Mr Caine as an individual Transport Manager.

Mr Caine’s good repute also came into focus as a result of his actions in signing the training register. I accept that he did not have any personal incentive or motive to sign the register. His CPC was not due for renewal for another two years and there is a degree of mitigation that in Mr Caine’s case, the false claim that he attended the course did not result in him driving PSVs when he was not qualified to do so.

Mr Caine’s account was that he was approached by [REDACTED] in the office and asked to sign the register. It would appear that he agreed to do so with much initial thought as to his actions. Mr Caine gave evidence that he subsequently was asked to sign the register for a course that he had attended. When he did so, he saw his previous signature and he conceded that he regretted not taking that opportunity to strike it through. Mr Caine said he was asked by [REDACTED] to sign the register on further occasions to claim attendance at courses that he had not attended. Mr Caine refused to falsely sign on any further occasion.

However, Mr Caine also conceded that he did not alert the Operator’s senior management to what was taking place with the registers despite being aware that others were falsely signing to claim attendance. He understood [REDACTED] felt under pressure to ensure that drivers with their CPC expiring shortly had been trained. Mr Caine said that he did not report the matter due to his friendship with [REDACTED].

After his dismissal from Reays Coaches, Mr Caine obtained new employment as a driver. He has not sought to be appointed as a Transport Manager again but does assist in tachograph analysis for his current employer. Mr Caine told me he has no immediate plans to seek appointment as a Transport Manager but hopes to do so at some future point.

I consider the act of falsification in itself justifies a finding that Mr Caine has lost his good repute as a Transport Manager. Although Mr Caine signed the document in his capacity as a driver, he should have been aware that a Transport Manager’s duties include ensuring that vocational drivers hold a valid driver CPC qualification and are adequately trained.

Mr Caine understood the significance of his false signature as demonstrated by his subsequent refusal to repeat the conduct, for which I give him some credit. However, he failed to correct his false signature or to intervene to stop the practice continuing with other drivers. I note that Mr Caine was one of the first drivers to falsely sign the register in July 2018. If he had taken appropriate action then, he could have prevented the practice from continuing for a further 5 months to December 2018. It is inexcusable for a Transport Manager to having knowingly allowed that practice to continue without alerting his senior managers at the least or the Office of the Traffic Commissioner.

Mr Caine’s repute is further damaged by his failure to challenge the lack of time he was given to undertake his Transport Manager role. Statutory Document 3 contains the following guidance,

“A transport manager must always be more than just a transport manager in name. A transport manager risks their repute if they find themselves in this position. If a transport manager finds them-self overridden by the operator or their agent to the point at which the transport manager no longer has the requisite continuous and effective responsibility, the transport manager must first notify the operator in writing and then, if the matter is not resolved, is expected to take appropriate action.”

Mr Caine evidently did not follow that guidance.

I have balanced the gravity of Mr Caine’s conduct with some positive features. I consider it is relevant to note his age and inexperience. This was his first appointment as Transport Manager, and he had only ever worked for this Operator. Other than his own admissions about the time he had available to undertake his duties, there is insufficient evidence that he failed to discharge his duties competently. Mr Caine had been dismissed by the Operator before the other issues of concern to this inquiry arose. Further, the falsification was a single act and one from which Mr Caine derived no personal benefit (although the concealment of his actions and those of other drivers continued for several months).

Those positive features do not outweigh the negative aspects I have described above. Having balanced those features, I conclude that Mr Caine’s conduct must result in a finding that his good repute is lost and that he should be disqualified for a period of at least 12 months.

There is however one additional and very significant mitigating feature which I have not so far considered. That is the fact that this conduct occurred in 2018. Nearly 5 years have since passed and Mr Caine has not come to my attention for any other reason in the meantime. That delay was not attributable to Mr Caine. The investigation relating to his person involvement was effectively complete when he was interviewed by the DVSA in July 2019, but he has had to wait for a conclusion as his case has been carried along with the wider consideration of the Operator’s position.

Mr Caine has not sought reappointment as a Transport Manager during that period. He has completed a 2-day CPC refresher course and has also completed a course with the University of Southern Queensland entitled “Transitioning from Friend to Leader”. Mr Caine sought out that course as he recognised the issues that arose in 2018 were partly attributable to his misplaced sense of loyalty to [REDACTED].

The training that Mr Caine has sought is of the nature that I would have expected to see if an individual was seeking to restore his good repute after being disqualified as Transport Manager

If Mr Caine had come to public inquiry in 2019 or 2020 in the immediate aftermath of his conduct, it is likely that any disqualification imposed then would by now have expired. Further, it is likely that I would have viewed favourably an application made now to restore his repute based on the rehabilitative steps he has undertaken, and his clear recognition of the grave errors made previously.

I have considered if against that background it would now be fair and proportionate to make a finding that results in Mr Caine being disqualified and prevented from acting as a Transport Manager for a further period. Given the exceptional circumstances of this case, I do consider that such an order is necessary. Mr Caine’s frank acceptance of his previous mistakes, the rehabilitative steps he has taken, and the passage of time all combine to convince me that a formal finding that he has lost his good repute would no longer be proportionate and necessary.

I mark Mr Caine’s good repute as severely tarnished but not lost. I record a strong warning.

7.3 Former Transport Manager Adam Skelton

Mr Skelton was employed by Reays Coaches from March 2018 as Fleet Engineering Manager until his dismissal in December 2018. Mr Skelton was named on the licence as a Transport Managers for a brief period between 5 December 2018 and 31 January 2019. As with other staff, the Operator expected Mr Skelton to undertake driving duties alongside his primary role.

Mr Skelton’s good repute as Transport Manager was called into question because he also falsely signed the training register to claim presence at driver CPC courses that he had not in fact attended.

As Mr Skelton has not engaged with the public inquiry process, my understanding of his position is limited to the explanation he provided in his interview with the DVSA in July 2019.

Other than the falsification allegations, I have not been made aware of any other specific concerns about Mr Skelton’s good repute or discharge of his duties as Transport Manager.

Whilst Mr Skelton’s conduct bears some similarity to Mr Caine’s behaviour, there are some distinctions.

First, Mr Skelton signed the register on 4 separate occasions over 5 months. He claimed to have attended CPC training in July, August, October and December 2018 when he had not done so. In fact, Mr Skelton told the DVSA he had not attended any training courses during that period.

Mr Skelton’s CPC did not expire until September 2019, so it appears there was little purpose to the falsification for him. Mr Skelton explained that he had not really thought of the implications of what he was signing although he said he had hoped that he would have more time to do his fleet manager role if he did not have to attend the CPC courses. Mr Skelton said he was under huge pressure at work at the time. He said this caused him to make some poor decisions.

Mr Skelton was not in post as a Transport Manager when he signed three of the registers, but he was named on the licence when he signed on the final occasion. He was also in a position of responsibility within the company prior to being appointed a Transport Manager and attended the weekly compliance meetings.

Mr Skelton accepted he had not informed senior managers of what was happening with the training and had not thought to inform the authorities. He suggested the directors were aware of the plan to falsify CPC training but did not offer any tangible evidence for that assertion.

The second distinction with Mr Caine’s position is that Mr Skelton has not engaged with the public inquiry process. In addition to the doubt that creates as to whether he can be trusted to cooperate with the Traffic Commissioner in future, I have also not heard any evidence from Mr Skelton to reassure me that such conduct will not be repeated in future. Not have I been presented with any further mitigation or evidence of rehabilitative steps.

I refer to the comments I made above for Mr Caine in relation to the consequences for a Transport Manager’s good repute of any act of falsification relating to records required for driver compliance. Mr Skelton’s conduct was repeated and persisted for over 5 months, even after his appointment as Transport Manager.

In the absence of any significant explanation from Mr Skelton or evidence of other relevant positive features, any balancing exercise will be limited. As it stands, the negative features of his active participation in falsifying his own training record and failing to prevent the practice in relation to other drivers leads me to the inevitable conclusion that it is proportionate to find Mr Skelton’s good repute is lost.

I have considered the length of the disqualification order that must follow. I take into account the passage of time since the events concerned in 2018. I note that Mr Skelton has not come to my attention in that period. However, I have no other information available about any rehabilitation steps undertaken or how he now views his conduct in 2018. His apparent failure to engage with the public inquiry process and my office adds to my concern about whether he can be trusted to act as a Transport Manager in future.

Without evidence to provide me with reassurance on those points, I find it is impossible to determine a fixed duration for the disqualification as I cannot make a reasoned decision of when Mr Skelton could be considered rehabilitated and capable of regaining his good repute.

I therefore direct that he be disqualified from acting as Transport Manager indefinitely and until further order of a Traffic Commissioner. I defer the start of the disqualification to allow Mr Skelton the opportunity to request a hearing or make representations, including submissions on the length of the disqualification.

7.4 Transport Manager Brian Karl Richardson

Mr Richardson was first employed and appointed as a Transport Manager for the Operator in May 2019. He was therefore not involved at the time of the driver CPC issue.

The other specific issues of concern to this inquiry did arise after Mr Richardson’s appointment and his role in those matters has been considered.

One specific concern about Mr Richardson is the fact that he was responsible for some driver recording infringements in person after he failed to record two positional journeys. One of those journeys was in August 2019 to relieve a driver who had run out of hours whilst returning from Risley, a journey that he should not have attempted as the Operator had made hotel accommodation available. That practice by drivers was a common feature of the infringements identified by the DVSA. Mr Richardson was aware of that practice after the incident in August 2019 but it was allowed to continue apparently unabated until December 2019.

Mr Richardson accepted his error in terms of recording his own driving and have I issued a formal warning on his vocational driving record. Mr Richardson also accepted that he should have taken firmer action to enforce the Operator’s own policy on recording such journeys and preventing the risk of drivers’ hours infringements on the Risley service.

Mr Richardson also accepted that he had failed to appreciate the errors in the unaccounted kilometres report until the DVSA meeting. Mr Richardson was heavily involved in the subsequent investigation and correction of that report. I am satisfied that experience gave him a thorough understanding of why the accuracy of the report is crucial and how to ensure that the report is completed properly in future. Mr Richardson told me that since the DVSA investigation the approach in the weekly compliance meeting was totally different and he felt much more confident that issues were being identified and properly addressed.

In relation to the underage drivers, Mr Richardson conceded that he had also been under the misapprehension that they could undertake passenger carrying private hire journeys if they were less than 50km. He is now fully aware of the age-related restrictions and uses the Operator’s system to ensure that any such driver now employed is identified and deployed accordingly.

In closing submissions for Mr Richardson, Mr Backhouse drew attention the fact that the issues described above arose in the first few months following both his qualification and appointment as a Transport Manager. He was working as a part of a team, and I accept that it would be unfair to attribute sole responsibility for any issue to Mr Richardson.

Mr Richardson has remained in post as Transport Manager since May 2019 and must share some of the credit for the improvements made in the Operator’s approach since then. The stability he has brought to the Operator’s Transport Manager cadre must be welcomed. I also note that he has recently attended a two-day CPC refresher course.

I find that Mr Richardson must share some accountability for the issues that arose during the first few months of his tenure. I balance this with his inexperience at the time and the positive development he has since made in the role. For that reason, I determine it would be disproportionate to find his good repute is lost. I conclude that his repute is tarnished, and I record a formal warning.

Gerallt Evans

Traffic Commissioner for the North West of England

1 February 2023