Decision

Decision on Longchamps Limited

Published 12 August 2020

Companies Act 2006

In the matter of application No. 1986 by SAS Jean Cassegrain for a change to the company name of Longchamp Limited, company registration 08672978

1. Company 08672978 (“the primary respondent”) was incorporated on 2 September 2013 with the name LONGCHAMP LIMITED. This name has caused SAS Jean Cassegrain (“the applicant”) to make an application to this Tribunal, on 26 April 2019, under section 69 of the Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”).

2. Section 69 of the Act states:

“(1) A person (“the applicant”) may object to a company’s registered name on the ground -

(a) that it is the same as a name associated with the applicant in which he has goodwill, or

(b) that it is sufficiently similar to such a name that its use in the United Kingdom would be likely to mislead by suggesting a connection between the company and the applicant.

(2) The objection must be made by application to a company names adjudicator (see section 70).

(3) The company concerned shall be the primary respondent to the application. Any of its members or directors may be joined as respondents.

(4) If the ground specified in subsection (1)(a) or (b) is established, it is for

the respondents to show -

(a) that the name was registered before the commencement of the

activities on which the applicant relies to show goodwill; or

(b) that the company―

(i) is operating under the name, or

(ii) is proposing to do so and has incurred substantial start-up

costs in preparation, or

(iii) was formerly operating under the name and is now dormant;

or

(c) that the name was registered in the ordinary course of a company formation business and the company is available for sale to the applicant on the standard terms of that business; or

(d) that the name was adopted in good faith; or

(e) that the interests of the applicant are not adversely affected to any significant extent.

If none of these is shown, the objection shall be upheld.

(5) If the facts mentioned in subsection 4(a), (b) or (c) are established, the objection shall nevertheless be upheld if the applicant shows that the main purpose of the respondents (or any of them) in registering the name was to obtain money (or other consideration) from the applicant or prevent him from registering the name.

(6) If the objection is not upheld under subsection (4) or (5), it shall be dismissed.

(7) In this section “goodwill” includes reputation of any description.”

3. The applicant states that the name associated with it is “LONGCHAMP”. It states that it is “a luxury leather goods company with more than 1,500 stores in 80 countries and a significant online presence.” It is the owner of, inter alia, European Union Trade Mark (“EUTM”) no. 484170 for the word “LONGCHAMP” which, we note, was filed on 12 March 1997 and which is registered for the following goods:

Class 18 -

Fancy leather goods such as pocket wallets, identity card holders, purses, notecases, briefcases, photoholders, playing card cases, bridge cases; travelling bags, handbags, valises, umbrellas, briefcases of leather or imitations of leather, attaché cases, sports bags, pouches, travelling sets.

Class 25 -

Clothing, gloves, neckties, scarves, shirts, boots, slippers, footwear.

4. The applicant refers to the above as “the applicant’s goods”. It states:

“The trade mark has been put to extensive use throughout the UK and EU in respect of all the applicant’s goods, and has acquired a substantial reputation and enhanced distinctiveness through such use. As a result of this substantial use, UK consumers immediately identify the trade mark with the applicant’s successful and prominent luxury brand.

The applicant commenced use of the “LONGCHAMP” name as early as 1948 in Paris and the name and mark has been used in the UK for over 20 years…The applicant opened a boutique on Regent Street in 2013, which has become the applicant’s largest store in Europe. As a result, Longchamp is renowned in the EU and UK as a luxury goods brand…

The applicant also uses its well known LONGCHAMP mark on its website www.longchamp.com.”

5. The applicant explains that it objects to the company name LONGCHAMP LIMITED because: (i) the only distinctive part of the name i.e. “LONGCHAMP” is identical to the name in which it has goodwill, (ii) it commenced trading under the name “LONGCHAMP” prior to the registration of the company, (iii) it is not aware of any legitimate use by the company of the company name, and (iv) the company has “clearly not adopted the LONGCHAMP name and trade mark in good faith…the use of this term by the company can only be to benefit from the extensive goodwill built up in the trade marks by the applicant…”.

6. The applicant further states:

“This application is made as part of a wider effort by the applicant to assert its proprietary rights against persistent infringements by entities connected with the sole director of the company, Terence Ball.

Confirmation statements filed at Companies House indicate that CALTZ INVESTMENTS LTD is currently listed as a “person with significant control” of the company. Further, prior to 22 November 2018, CALTZ INVESTMENTS LTD was also listed at Companies House as “a person with significant control” of LONGCHAMP-PLAY LTD (company number 10738582) a company of which Mr Ball was also a sole director…”

7. We note that following an application filed by the applicant in these proceedings on 26 April 2019, an undefended decision was issued by this tribunal on 29 October 2019 in which LONGCHAMP-PLAY LTD was ordered to change its name (BL-O-661/19 refers). As the primary respondent did not comply with that order, on 5 February 2020, the name of LONGCHAMP-PLAY LTD was changed to 10738582 LIMITED.

8. The applicant explains that it has successfully opposed applications filed by the company for trade marks which consist of or include the word “Longchamp” or “LONGCHAMP” (nos. 3281016 and 3342219), the latter filed in the name of Caltz Investments Ltd. The applicant adds:

“In addition, there is strong evidence to suggest that Mr Ball has a history of UK directorship disqualifications and has been investigated by the Company Investigations branch of the Insolvency Service.”

9. The applicant indicates that it is claiming its costs and points to a letter before action dated 5 April 2018 addressed to, inter alia, the primary respondent in these proceedings which allowed until 19 April 2018 for various undertakings to be complied with, failing which, it was made clear an application to this tribunal would result.

10. The primary respondent filed a notice of defence, signed by Mr Terence Ball. Attached to the Form CNA2 is a number of documents. These were not filed as evidence in these proceedings. However, Mr Ball has signed the Form CNA2 and confirmed that he believes the facts stated in the Notice are true. As a consequence, we have read all these documents and have borne their contents in mind in reaching a conclusion.

11. Also attached to the Form CNA2 was what appeared to be a media card which bore, inter alia, the word “LONGCHAMP” as well as the following: “www.longchamp-play.com”, “sales@longchamp-play.co.uk” and a telephone number. As it was uncertain if this card contained any information, following the conclusion of the evidence rounds, on 29 April 2020, the tribunal wrote to the primary respondent by email and in so doing allowed it until 13 May 2020 to provide a paper copy of any documents that may be on the media card under cover of a witness statement. This resulted in a witness statement from Mr Ball dated 12 May 2020 accompanied by five exhibits. Having confirmed by email on 29 May 2020 that it had received Mr Ball’s evidence, in an email of the same date, the tribunal allowed the applicant until 20 July 2020 in which to consider responding to Mr Ball’s evidence. In an email dated 15 June 2020, the applicant indicated that it did “not feel that it is necessary to provide a response to this document.”

12. The following question appears in the Form CNA2: “State which of the allegations in the statement of grounds you agree with and which you deny”. While it is not necessary to record all of Mr Ball’s comments, we note he states:

“[The primary respondent] holds registered UK trade marks…[nos. 3020672 and 3079813] neither of which have been challenged and neither of which cover items that the applicant deals in…”

13. We note that the trade marks mentioned were applied for in September 2013 and November 2014 respectively and stand in the name of Vastin Ltd, whose registered address is also in Inglewhite Road, Preston. Both are for the trade mark shown below and are, cumulatively, registered for goods and services in classes 8, 10, 11, 15, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 32, 33, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44 and 45.

14. Mr Ball adds:

“The trading history of the applicant is not disputed but the simple fact is that there is no crossover in what the (sic) use the name for and what I use the name for. I do not accept that there has ever been any attempt by Longchamp Limited to pass itself off as the applicant. Longchamps Limited has not traded using the name of the applicant nor has it ever passed itself off as the applicant. There was an original Longchamp Limited formed on 4th July 1994 and dissolved on 27 April 2011. It was not until two years later that I formed Longchamp Limited.”

15. In response to the question: “State which of the allegations you are unable to admit or deny and which you require the applicant to prove”, inter alia, Mr Ball states:

“I cannot accept any of the allegations that have been made by the applicant. I have held this company for nearly six years…and never effectively trading. Further there are other companies using the Longchamp name, for example, Longchamp Holdings Limited, but no challenges have been made to them. Longchamp has always been a dormant company. In addition, the applicant does not suggest or identify any activities that are similar to their own. They are not adversely affected in any way by the existence of Longchamp Limited. They have failed completely to demonstrate how their own activities are adversely affected. In addition the applicant fails to address why it has taken them nearly six years to raise a concern in relation to a company that is not seeking to pass itself off as the applicant and has not traded nor does it intend to trade in any of the activities of the applicant.”

16. The primary respondent relies upon defences based upon sections 69(4)(c), (d) and (e) of the Act (shown above) adding that it is claiming its costs.

17. In these proceedings, the applicant is represented by Baker & McKenzie LLP; the primary respondent represents itself. Only the applicant filed evidence during the course of the evidence rounds. The tribunal dealt with the media card filed by the primary respondent with its Form CNA2 on the basis explained above. The parties were asked if they wanted a decision to be made following a hearing or from the papers. Both parties confirmed to the tribunal they did not require a hearing nor did they wish to file written submissions in lieu of attendance.

Evidence

The applicant’s evidence

18. This consists of a witness statement from Marilyne Serafin, the applicant’s Head of IP, a position she has held since 2006. The main points emerging from Ms Serafin’s statement are as follows:

The applicant is a world famous leather goods company engaged in the sale of a range of products under its “LONGCHAMP” trade mark including “handbags, luggage, women’s clothing, shoes, travel items and fashion accessories”;

The applicant was founded in Paris in 1948 by Jean Cassegrain;

The applicant operates in more than 1,500 stores in 80 countries and online;

The applicant has used the “LONGCHAMP” name in the UK for over twenty years and registered the name as a trade mark in 1998;

In 2018, the applicant (and its group of companies) generated global revenues of €519.5m, including €27.9m in the UK;

The applicant has 3,000 employees worldwide, with 109 employees in the UK;

The applicant opened a boutique on Regent Street in 2013, has a store in Westfield, London an outlet boutique in Bicester Village and three concessions in the UK. Exhibit MS2 consists of pages from what we assume is the applicant’s website and which bear a copyright date of 2019. All of the pages bear the word “LONGCHAMP” and contains references to, inter alia, “Women”, “Men”, “Le Pliage”, and “Gifts”;

In 2018, the applicant spent €1.8m in the UK on “marketing, advertising and promotion”;

“The applicant has also been the subject of extensive and widespread coverage in the UK press and media. The applicant and its LONGCHAMP name and brand is consistently and extensively written about in UK publications and is synonymous with luxury and fashion at the highest echelons.” Examples are provided and are as follows:

“Kate, Lila and Kendall hit the Longchamp front row” (stylist.co.uk – 8 September 2019);

“Kate Moss shows off her bronzed legs in a chic LBD as she attends Longchamp show during NYFW with daughter Lila Grace, 16” (Daily Mail online – 8 September 2019);

“Longchamp bags sales rise in the UK”, “French luxury bag maker Longchamp…” and “The accessories firm, which counts the Duchess of Cambridge and baking guru Mary Berry as fans, said performance in Britain was “good” in 2016. It boosted turnover to £15.1 million from £8.7 million in 2015, new accounts show. The firm also increased staff numbers to 76 from 51” (Evening Standard – 27 October 2017) – exhibit MS3 refers;

The applicant uses the LONGCHAMP brand on its website i.e. www.longchamp.com. What appears to be undated pages bearing the word “LONGCHAMP” (and which contain a reference to the United Kingdom) in relation to what is described as “Men – small leather goods – cases “ and a “compact wallet” and “pouch” for a woman are provided as exhibit MS4.

19. Ms Serafin states:

“26. Furthermore, the respondent appears to be actively trading on the website longchamp-play.com. On the homepage of the website, on the “About Longchamp” page, the respondent is clearly identified as the business that owns and controls the website, and is offering goods via the website: “Longchamp Ltd (sic) is an exciting new company…” and “all rights reserved © Longchamp Ltd”. The website lists “Play Equipment”, “Fitness “Equipment” and “Animal Decorations” as available to purchase along with product references, dimensions and prices.”

20. Pages from the website are provided as exhibit MS6. Although the pages appear to be undated, we note the second page of the exhibit contains the following:

“Longchamp Ltd is an exciting new company specialising in the import and sale of top-quality play, sports and fitness equipment.

Formed in 2014 and with headquarters in Preston, Lancashire, Longchamp works with local authorities, independent pub companies, farm activity shops, caravan parks and all other public–based activity venues seeking to utilise the best in play, sports and fitness equipment.”

And:

“Longchamp is the sole supplier of play, sports and fitness equipment imported from select and specially sourced factories in China.”

The primary respondent’s evidence admitted after the evidence rounds had closed

21. This consists of the witness statement of Mr Ball, dated 12 May 2020. Insofar as it is relevant, Mr Ball states:

“2. My father was an avid horseracing fan, who would travel to Longchamp in France to watch horse racing. In 2013, I formed the company, Longchamp Limited, in his memory, to market outdoor fitness machines and other products.

1. Longchamp Limited was incorporated on 2 September 2013. Around the same time, on 4 September 2013, initial trademark registrations were made. Further trademark registrations were made in November 2014 by associated companies, for different classes. The associated companies sell different products that do not clash with the Applicants’ products…

2. The Trademark, Longchamp is registered in the name of Vastin Limited, company number 10960551, which is an associated company to Longchamp Limited. The parent company to both Vastin Limited and Longchamp Limited is Caltz Investments Limited, company number, 10960551…

3. For a period of time, the outdoor fitness and play equipment products were sold through the brand name, Longchamp Play Limited. Exhibit (TB4) is a price list taken from the media card which was filed with the Form C N A 2.

4. Exhibit (TB5) is a photograph of the Longchamp brand plugs which go on all the products, including outdoor fitness machines and play equipment.”

22. The pages from the media card (exhibit TB4) are similar in nature to those provided by the applicant as exhibit MS6. Although they all bear, inter alia, the word “LONGCHAMP” they appear to be undated. At the top left of each page there appears the following “Retirement Clearance.”

23.That concludes our summary of the evidence filed in the proceedings to the extent we consider it necessary.

Decision

24. If the primary respondent defends the application, as here, the applicant must establish that it has goodwill or reputation in relation to a name that is the same, or sufficiently similar, to that of the company name suggesting a connection between the company and the applicant. If this burden is fulfilled, it is then necessary to consider if the primary respondent can rely upon defences under section 69(4) of the Act.

The applicant’s goodwill

25. Section 69(7) of the Act defines goodwill as a “reputation of any description”. Consequently, in the terms of the Act it is not limited to Lord Macnaghten’s classic definition in IRC v Muller & Co’s Margerine Ltd [1901] AC 217:

“What is goodwill? It is a thing very easy to describe, very difficult to define. It is the benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation, and connection of a business. It is the attractive force which brings in custom. It is the one thing which distinguishes an old-established business from a new business at its first start.”

26. The relevant date is the date of incorporation of the primary respondent which, in this case, is 2 September 2013. The applicant must show that it had a goodwill or reputation at this date associated with the name LONGCHAMP.”

Overview of the applicant’s evidence

27. This comes from Ms Serafin who, having held her position as Head of IP at the applicant since 2006, is well placed to give evidence on its behalf. Although the applicant has not provided revenue/promotional figures or exhibits which are dated prior to the relevant date, in her statement which is accompanied by a statement of truth, Ms Serafin states that the applicant has used its “LONGCHAMP” trade mark in the UK for “over twenty years”. Given the date of her statement in September 2019, that suggests use in the UK began prior to 1999. Although all of the exhibits provided bear the word “LONGCHAMP” or “Longchamp”, they are either undated or after the relevant date of September 2013. However, in 2013, the year the primary respondent was incorporated, the applicant opened a store in Regent Street, London and between 2015 and 2016, the applicant’s turnover in the UK rose from £8.7m to £15.1m with staff numbers in that period rising from 51 to 76. In 2018, the applicant’s revenue in the UK was €27.9m and in that year it spent €1.8m in the UK marketing, advertising and promoting its “LONGCHAMP” brand.

28. In her statement, Ms Serafin notes that in the Notice of Defence, Mr Ball states:

“The trading history of the applicant is not disputed…” .

29. It is possible that that admission conditioned the applicant’s approach to the filing of its evidence in support of its claim to goodwill/reputation. Regardless, the applicant’s evidence leaves a lot to be desired. However, assessing it as a whole in light of that admission and, inter alia, the turnover achieved in the UK in 2015, 2016 and 2018 and the amount spent on promotional activities in 2018, it would, in our view, be unrealistic for us not to conclude that by the relevant date in September 2013, it is far more likely than not that the use the applicant had made of “LONGCHAMP” in the UK from at least 1999 would have been sufficient to have generated sufficient goodwill to satisfy the requirements of section 69(7) of the Act.

30. In its Form CNA1, the applicant identified its goods as those listed in paragraph 3 above and in her statement Ms Serafin states that the field of business in which its goodwill exists relates to “a wide range of products, including handbags, luggage, women’s clothing, shoes, travel items and fashion accessories.” Although from after the relevant date, the exhibits provided refer to bags and small leather goods. While it is on the basis of that field of business any further conclusions we reach will be based, we shall return to this point later in this decision.

Similarity of names

31. The other initial burden facing the applicant is that the company name is

sufficiently similar to “LONGCHAMP” to suggest a connection between the company and the applicant. The company’s name is LONGCHAMP LIMITED. The only difference between the two names is the inclusion of the word “LIMITED” in the primary respondent’s name. In its Form CNA1, the applicant suggests that the word “LIMITED” is “merely a term used to describe a corporate entity and is not distinctive at all”; we agree.

32. As the word LONGCHAMP is the only distinctive component of the primary respondent’s name, we are satisfied that the primary respondent’s name is to be regarded as identical to the name under which the applicant has operated and generated goodwill such that its use in the UK would be likely to mislead by suggesting a connection between the primary respondent and the applicant. As the ground specified in subsection 69(1)(a) is established, the onus switches to the primary respondent to establish whether it can rely on any of the defences pleaded in the Notice of defence.

Defences

33. The statutory defences under section 69(4) are set out at the beginning of this decision. The primary respondent is relying upon the following:

Section 69(4)(c) - that the name was registered in the ordinary course of a company formation business and the company is available for sale to the applicant on the standard terms of that business;

34. Section 69(4)(c) of the Act relates to companies that were registered in the ordinary course of a company formation business being available for sale to the applicant on the standard terms of that business. As Ms Serafin points out in her statement, there is no evidence to suggest that is the case in these proceedings. As a consequence, the defence based upon section 69(4)(c) fails and is dismissed accordingly.

Section 69(4)(d) - that the name was adopted in good faith;

35. It is evident from the wording of s.69(4) of the Act that the onus is on the respondent to show that the contested name was adopted in good faith. The relevant date for this defence is the date on which the company name was registered i.e. 2 September 2013. In its application, the applicant states:

“The company has clearly not adopted the LONGCHAMP name…in good faith…the use of this term by the company can only be to benefit from the extensive goodwill built up in the trade marks by the applicant…” .

36. The following principles in relation to good faith can be extracted from the judgments of the Privy Council in Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust International Ltd [2005] UKPC 37 and the Court of Appeal in England and Wales in Niru Battery Manufacturing v Milestone Trading Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1446:

(i) Good faith is a broad concept which includes a failure to act in a commercially acceptable way. It includes sharp practice which falls short of outright dishonesty, and also dishonesty itself - see Niru Battery at para 164.

(ii) There is a combined subjective/objective approach to the honesty of a party’s behaviour. This involves (i) a consideration of what the party knew at the time of a transaction and (ii) how that party’s action would be viewed by applying normally acceptable standards of commercial behaviour - see Barlow Clowes paras 15–18, 28–32.

37. Our task is: (a) to determine what the primary respondent/Mr Ball knew at the time the contested name was adopted, and (b) whether the adoption of the name would be viewed as commercially acceptable behaviour when judged objectively. This means how reasonable men and women in the field would view the primary respondents’/Mr Ball’s behaviour (i.e. not simply how the primary respondent/Mr Ball viewed its/his own actions).

38. Insofar as point (a) above is concerned, in his witness statement accompanied by a statement of truth, Mr Ball states:

“2. My father was an avid horseracing fan, who would travel to Longchamp in France to watch horse racing. In 2013, I formed the company, Longchamp Limited, in his memory, to market outdoor fitness machines and other products…”

39. It is important to note that the applicant was fully aware that Mr Ball had made that statement when, in June 2020, it indicated that it did “not feel that it is necessary to provide a response to this document.”

40. As a starting point, we take judicial notice of the fact that the Longchamp racecourse is world famous and has been so for many years. As a consequence, the fact that Mr Ball’s father who as an “avid horseracing fan” attended race meetings at Longchamp is unsurprising, as is the fact that Mr Ball would have been aware of his father’s attendance at such race meetings. In addition, we remind ourselves that the applicant did not elect to challenge Mr Ball’s statement in any way. While it would have been much more satisfactory had Mr Ball filed evidence in support of his late father’s affiliation with horse racing and attendance at the Longchamp racecourse, we are prepared to accept that the passage of time may have made such an approach impractical.

41. Proceeding on that basis, when viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person applying normally acceptable standards of commercial behaviour, the fact that Mr Ball elected to honor his late father by adopting the name “LONGCHAMP LIMITED” in relation to conducting a trade in, broadly speaking, fitness machines is, in our view, not unreasonable. As a consequence, the defence based upon 69(4)(d) succeeds and the application fails accordingly.

Section 69(4)(e) - that the interests of the applicant are not adversely affected to any significant extent;

42. As the primary respondent has already succeeded under section 69(4)(d) of the Act, it is not strictly necessary for us to also consider its alternative defence based upon 69(4)(e). However, for the sake of completeness, we shall do so. To affect adversely the interests of the applicant to any significant extent the company name must do more than just sit on the register at Companies House. The onus is on the primary respondent to show why its company name does not adversely affect the applicant’s interests to any significant extent. The onus is not on the applicant. In her statement, Ms Serafin states:

“31…There is a real risk that the activities of the respondent will be in some way connected with the applicant in the mind of the public leading to dilution and tarnishment of the LONGCHAMP name and the goodwill and reputation of the LONGCHAMP name and brand…”

43. The primary respondent’s main argument is that there is no “crossover” in the parties’ fields of activity. It has, however, filed no evidence is support of its position. We have already commented upon the field of business in which the applicant enjoys goodwill/reputation. However, even if the applicant is regarded as having goodwill/reputation in relation to the field of business identified by Ms Serafin i.e. “handbags, luggage, women’s clothing, shoes, travel items and fashion accessories” (and not the more limited range of goods we identify in paragraph 30 above), we begin by noting that the Companies House website records the primary respondent’s “Nature of business” as “93130 - Fitness facilities.”

44. As this classification does not limit the primary respondent’s trading activities, it does not assist it greatly. It is, however, consistent with the evidence provided by both the applicant as exhibit MS6 and by Mr Ball, as exhibit TB4. Given what, in reality, appears to be the very different fields of business at issue, there is, in our view, unlikely to be any diversion of trade from the applicant to the primary respondent and we see no reason why any failings in either the quality of the goods which the primary respondent may supply or the manner in which it conducts its business (how its pays its bills for example), would adversely impact on the applicant in the manner Ms Serafin suggests. In short, we are satisfied that the interests of the applicant are not adversely affected to any significant extent and the application also fails on this basis.

Overall outcome

45. The defences based upon sections 69(4)(d) and (e) of the Act have succeeded and the application fails accordingly.

Costs

46. As the primary respondent has been successful, it is entitled to a contribution towards its costs, based upon the scale of costs published in paragraph 10.1 of the Practice Direction which, we note, includes the following: “Those without representation will normally receive 50% of the above but will receive the full expenses.” As the primary respondent has represented itself, we award it costs on the following basis:

Reviewing the application and filing a defence: £150

Fee for defence: £150

Preparing evidence: and considering the £250

Other side’s evidence:

Total: £550

47. We order SAS Jean Cassegrain to pay LONGCHAMP LIMITED the sum of £550 within 21 days of the expiry of the appeal period, or within 21 days of the final determination of this case if any appeal against this decision is unsuccessful. Under section 74(1) of the Act, an appeal can only be made in relation to the decision to dismiss the application; there is no right of appeal in relation to costs.

48. Any notice of appeal against this decision must be given within one month of the date of this decision. Appeal is to the High Court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and to the Court of Session in Scotland.

49. The company adjudicator must be advised if an appeal is lodged, so that implementation of the order is suspended.

Dated 6 August 2020

Christopher Bowen
Company Names Adjudicator

Judi Pike
Company Names Adjudicator

Mark Bryant
Company Names Adjudicator