

# Local to Global: Reducing the Risk from Organised Crime

# Contents

Home Secretary’s Foreword.....	3
Executive Summary .....	5
Part 1 – The Context.....	8
1.1 What is the risk from organised crime?.....	8
1.2 Planning assumptions .....	11
Part 2 – The Approach .....	14
2.1 A new strategic approach .....	14
2.2 Stem the opportunities .....	15
2.3 Strengthen enforcement.....	16
2.4 Safeguard communities, businesses and the state .....	22
Part 3 – Implementation.....	26
3.1 Intelligence .....	26
3.2 Improving the operational response.....	28
3.3 International cooperation.....	31
3.4 Research .....	31
3.5 Communication .....	32
Part 4 – Accountability .....	34
4.1 Stronger national leadership .....	34
4.2 Funding arrangements.....	35
4.3 Transparent accountability.....	36
Annex A: Actions.....	37
Annex B: References.....	41

## Home Secretary's Foreword



Organised crime is a serious problem that affects real people. Its impact is seen on our streets and is felt in our communities every single day. The drug dealing on street corners, the gangs terrorising our communities, the burglary and muggings by addicts, the trafficking of vulnerable young women into prostitution, the card cloning and credit card fraud that robs so many – all are fundamentally driven by organised criminals.

The overall cost to the UK from organised crime is estimated as between £20 billion to £40 billion a year. It involves around 38,000 individuals, operating as part of around 6,000 criminal gangs. Those organised criminals have a global reach and a local presence.

About half of all organised criminals are involved in the illegal drugs trade. Others are involved in human trafficking, fraud and money laundering, and organised acquisitive crime, ranging from armed robbery to organised vehicle theft. Many are involved in more than one crime type. As new opportunities arise, such as computer-enabled crime, organised criminals will be quick to take advantage and unless we have a flexible and effective response it will be the ordinary people of Britain who will pay the price.

This comprehensive cross-government organised crime strategy is the first of its kind in this country. It will help galvanise and coordinate the work of all those with a role in combating organised crime. For the first time it will mean all the agencies involved in tackling organised crime working to common objectives and with a clear line of accountability. The strategy puts an emphasis on preventative and self-protection work, alongside a focus on enforcement activity. It establishes a basis for enhanced international cooperation in combating this global threat. It also includes implementation work to improve our intelligence gathering, analysis and exploitation and further research to strengthen our understanding of the impact of organised crime.

In future, we will go even further. As well as the more strategic approach set out in this document, we will also establish a new National Crime Agency (NCA), a powerful body of operational crime fighters which will fight organised crime, secure our borders, tackle financial and economic crime and protect vulnerable children and young people. The NCA will become fully operational in 2013. It will make a major difference in the fight against organised crime. This strategy spells out the improvements we will make before that time.

For too long national government did not do enough to tackle national and international level crime – not any more. The publication of this strategy and the establishment of the National Crime Agency shows that this government means business in fighting organised crime.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'T. May', written in a cursive style.

**Theresa May**  
Home Secretary

# Executive Summary

1. This strategy sets out:
  - **The context** – the nature of the risk from organised crime and our planning assumptions for the period up to 2015
  - **A new strategic approach** with the following themes:
    - Stem the opportunities for organised crime to take root
    - Strengthen enforcement action against organised criminals
    - Safeguard communities, businesses and the state
  - **Implementation activity** to:
    - Enhance our intelligence – which drives the operational response
    - Improve the law enforcement response to organised crime, particularly through establishment of the National Crime Agency (NCA)
    - Develop our international cooperation
    - Improve our approach to research and communications
  - **Clear accountability arrangements** and the need for a transparent set of indicators so that the public can judge success
2. A full list of actions within this strategy is set out in Annex A.

## Part I – The Context

3. Organised crime involves individuals, normally working with others, with the capacity and capability to commit serious crime on a continuing basis, which includes elements of planning, control and coordination, and benefits those involved. The motivation is often, but not always, financial gain. Some types of organised crime, such as organised child sexual exploitation, have other motivations.

4. Organised crime is a global phenomenon, shaped and sustained by a number of strategic factors. These factors include conflict and instability where the rule of law is poor and where corruption associated with organised crime is prevalent. This is often coupled with poverty. It is facilitated by a more interconnected world aided by new technologies, and driven by a desire for personal gain and community tolerance, or ignorance, of organised criminality.

5. Organised crime poses a threat to the UK's national security. However, unlike other national security threats, the effects of organised crime are felt by individuals, communities, businesses and our economy on a daily basis. The overall cost to the UK from organised crime is estimated as between £20 billion to £40 billion a year. The view from law enforcement is that there are around 38,000 organised criminals impacting on the UK, involving around 6,000 criminal groups.

They are often opportunistic, lifetime offenders who do not necessarily see prison as a bar to continuing criminality.

6. Organised crime has many manifestations. About half of all identified organised crime groups affecting the UK are involved in drug trafficking and distribution – which, in turn, fuels a huge amount of acquisitive crime. Organised crime is also behind the trade in people smuggling and human trafficking; a significant proportion of the fraud perpetrated against individuals, business and the state; the supply of illegal firearms; and computer-enabled crime. Most significant organised crime groups will also be involved in money laundering activities. It also has other manifestations, including metal theft and the illegal trade of wildlife and waste trafficking.

7. Violence is sometimes used to enhance power and reputation, and corruption is a widely used tactic. Many individual victims will not realise that there is an organised crime element either directly or indirectly behind their victimisation.

8. The planning assumptions behind the development of this strategy are linked to the threat and the strategic factors. Some relate directly to the threat, for example the continuing significant profits to be made from supplying illegal goods and services.

## Part 2 – Approach

9. The aim of this strategy is to **reduce the risk to the UK and its interests from organised crime by reducing the threat from organised criminals and reducing vulnerabilities and criminal opportunities**. The key elements of our response are based on the following themes:

- **STEM the opportunities for organised crime to take root.** We will seek to stop individuals in the UK becoming involved in organised crime and tackle the causes of organised crime through overseas development and stabilisation work

- **STRENGTHEN enforcement against organised criminals.** We will use the full range of lawful interventions against organised crime, with hard-edged enforcement through prosecutions where practicable; but also by using a wider range of innovative disruptions. We will particularly strengthen our focus on tackling criminal finances
- **SAFEGUARD communities, businesses and the state.** We will help reduce their vulnerability to becoming victims of organised crime. We will raise awareness of the threat and methods used by organised criminals; provide the public and businesses with information to enable them to protect themselves; and ensure closer working with partners

## Part 3 – Implementation

10. We will deliver our response through implementing a programme of activity based on the following:

- **Intelligence** plays a critical role in understanding the threat from organised crime. We will improve our strategic intelligence analysis and augment this with better horizon scanning. There will be a sharper focus on exploiting intelligence to drive more enforcement action against more criminals, at reduced cost. The capability to intercept communications lawfully, and acquire communications data, is as important in tackling organised crime as it is in combating terrorism. We intend to continue to preserve these vital tools making the current regime as efficient as possible and enabling investigators to understand and keep pace with modern communications methods under current legislation
- We will **improve the operational law enforcement response** to organised crime in support of the **strengthen** strand of this strategy. This includes the establishment of a powerful new body of operational crime fighters in the shape of the NCA to

spearhead our response to organised crime by creating the appropriate national structure to combat serious and organised crime. Before full establishment of the NCA, interim improvements will include more effective coordination of activity at the national and regional levels, and enhancing the role of Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) and neighbourhood policing teams at a more local level. We will also improve the policing response to organised crime and to this end, there is a leadership role for individual chief constables, police authorities and (from 2012) police and crime commissioners (PCCs)

- **Internationally**, we will seek to enhance cooperation at all levels. This includes the Justice and Home Affairs Committee on internal security that ensures operational cooperation on internal security within the European Union; and through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) which works to counteract drugs, crime and terrorism. We will also work with smaller groups, such as the 'Quintet Group' on organised crime, which supports the Attorneys General of the UK, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in cooperating to combat organised crime. We will work directly with key allies such as the US, through the new UK/US Organised Crime Contact Group established to support enhanced strategic and tactical cooperation against the most significant geographic and thematic organised crime threats to the UK and the US
- Through **research** we will review the socio-economic cost of organised crime and enhance our evidence base of both the scale and nature of the threat from organised crime, and the impact that our activities to combat organised crime are having. We will develop a cross-government organised crime research strategy, drawing on new and existing research, and establish a virtual network of researchers to inform the response to organised crime

- **Communications** will play a vital role to inform and change public attitudes and behaviours towards organised crime. We will guide a new approach to informing the public about how they can protect themselves (as part of the **safeguard** strand) and work with law enforcement to combat organised crime in their communities (under both the **stem** and **strengthen** strands)

## Part 4 – Accountability

11. There will be clear national accountability arrangements for collectively overseeing implementation of this strategy which, through better coordination of effort, should be delivered at a reduced cost. We will also develop a clear set of indicators so that the public can judge the success of this strategy in reducing the risk to the UK and its interests from organised crime.

12. The Government is legislating so that, from 2012, police forces will become accountable to PCCs directly elected by the public.<sup>i</sup> The PCC will hold the chief constable to account for the totality of policing within their force area. This will include the response of their police force, sometimes working in collaboration with other forces, to threats and challenges that cross force area boundaries. Once established, the NCA will be held to account by the Home Secretary, but with a clear relationship with the police and other law enforcement agencies and with PCCs.

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i. PCCs will be introduced in England and Wales in 2012, subject to the passage of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill. There will be a PCC in each of the 41 police forces outside of London. The Mayor's Office for Policing will be the PCC in London, in addition to the Court of Common Council for the City of London

# Part 1 – The Context

## Summary

This sets out the nature and scale of the threat from organised crime at a global, European and national level; our planning assumptions about the factors which shape and sustain organised crime; and the interdependent factors that are relevant to our response.

### 1.1 What is the risk from organised crime?

13. For the purposes of this strategy, the definition of organised crime is individuals, normally working with others, with the capacity and capability to commit serious crime on a continuing basis, which includes elements of planning, control and coordination, and benefits those involved. A significant proportion of organised criminals are motivated, principally, by the desire to make money. Others, such as the perpetrators of organised child sexual exploitation, have different motivations.

#### A global problem

14. Globally, the United Nations estimates that the most powerful international organised crime syndicates each accumulate in the region of \$1.5 billion a year. The international drugs market alone is estimated to be worth £200 billion.<sup>1</sup> The National Security Strategy (NSS) also notes that cyber crime has been estimated to cost up to \$1 trillion per year globally.<sup>2</sup>

#### Europe

15. Europol's Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), published in May 2011<sup>3</sup>, highlights the regional threat posed by organised crime. The biannual report, which assesses current and expected trends in organised crime affecting the European Union, explores how

a new criminal landscape is emerging, marked increasingly by highly mobile and flexible groups operating across boundaries and criminal sectors. It shows that organised crime is changing and becoming increasingly diverse in its methods, group structures and impact on society.

## United Kingdom

16. The NSS and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), published in October 2010<sup>4</sup>, highlight a significant increase in the level of organised crime as a key (Tier Two) risk to the UK's national security.<sup>i</sup> They also outline large scale computer-enabled crime (as part of a wider (Tier One) cyber security risk) and border security as risks to the UK's national security, both of which have an organised crime dimension.

### Organised crime causes significant damage to people, businesses and the country

17. Unlike other threats to our security, organised crime is a continuous series of activities that destroys lives, harms communities and damages businesses. It also has a significant impact on public finances. The total cost of economic and social harm caused to the UK by organised crime has been estimated at between £20 billion and £40 billion each year.<sup>5</sup> We also know that the total cost of crime against business in the UK, a good deal of which is orchestrated by organised criminals, has risen by nearly 20 per cent from £10.5 billion to £12.6 billion since 2004.<sup>6</sup>

18. The collective view of law enforcement is that there are approximately 6,000 organised crime groups known to be targeting the UK with an estimated 38,000 individuals operating within them.<sup>7</sup> We believe that the majority of these identified criminals are based within the UK itself.<sup>ii</sup> Organised criminal activity is concentrated in London and the South East, the North West and

West Midlands, but all areas of the country suffer the effects of this criminality. The majority of identified organised crime groups operate across police force boundaries.

19. Knowledge of organised crime is provided by the United Kingdom Threat Assessment (UKTA). The current key threats are identified as:

- trafficking of controlled drugs;
- organised immigration crime (people smuggling and human trafficking);
- financial crime (fraud); and
- organised acquisitive crime (e.g. armed robbery, road freight crime and organised vehicle theft).

20. These activities are often supported by other crimes such as identity theft, intellectual property crime, illegal firearms, blackmail and extortion. The effects of these crimes are played out in our communities on a daily basis. Organised criminals often deliberately target the most vulnerable members of society. The sexual exploitation of children causes profound, long-lasting damage. Fraudsters repeatedly target elderly victims, stripping them of life savings. Drug trafficking to the UK costs an estimated £17.6 billion each year<sup>8</sup> and contributes to over 1,800 drug related deaths annually among addicts, usually from deprived backgrounds.<sup>9</sup>

21. From small family run enterprises to large multinational corporations, businesses can suffer significant financial and intellectual property losses, as well as reputational harm and loss of consumer confidence. This is of particular significance to enterprises that rely on the level of public confidence in their brand name. Organised criminals can undersell legitimate enterprises using illicit finances and tax avoidance, damaging the local economy and the UK's reputation as a safe and profitable place to do business.

22. Some organised criminals deliberately target the state by attacking the tax and benefits system. Defrauding the Exchequer means government has less money for public services. The cost of fraud by organised criminals is around

i. The National Security Council (NSC) has prioritised risks into tiers based on a combination of the likelihood of the risk arising and its potential impact

ii. This is based on mapping work undertaken by law enforcement agencies

£8.9 billion,<sup>10</sup> around a quarter of total UK fraud losses. Of this the estimated loss to the taxpayer from attacks on the tax and benefit systems is £5 billion. Organised crime ultimately affects everyone through higher prices, charges and taxes, even if they are not more directly affected by the impact of the criminal activity.

### **Organised criminals are ruthless in their pursuit of profit**

23. Organised crime groups attempt to control the market for their commodity or service and respond to changes in demand, price or risk. They use unscrupulous means to satisfy market demand, which provides a way of understanding their motivation.<sup>11</sup> Organised criminals also respond to law enforcement action and react to legislative or enforcement changes. For example, when specific commodities were protected from VAT fraud, criminals quickly found new commodities to attack the tax system with.

24. The capabilities of organised criminals expand as they gain experience. Many cultivate criminal contacts which enable them to be more flexible, for instance, in their use of routes and methods, which helps increase profits. They are early adopters of new technology. Technology has made more markets and victims more accessible, more quickly. Organised criminals also seek to exploit one-off opportunities such as the London Olympic and Paralympic Games.

25. Half of all organised crime groups are involved in more than one type of crime. Most organised crime groups are involved with money laundering to make their money appear legitimate.<sup>12</sup> To launder money, organised criminals often turn to cash rich businesses, like pubs and car washes, competing unfairly against those legitimately running such businesses. We recognise that we need a better assessment of the risk to the UK from money laundering, just as we also need a better assessment of how terrorist finance operates.<sup>i</sup>

26. Though relatively new, the cost to the UK of computer-enabled crime is estimated at £27 billion.<sup>13</sup> It broadly manifests itself in two ways: by allowing organised criminals to exploit new technology to commit old crimes, such as fraud, on an industrial scale; and by creating new crimes such as 'phishing'<sup>ii</sup> for personal data or hacking.

### **Organised crime groups are complex operations**

27. Organised crime groups vary in their structure and capabilities. In the UK many organised criminals work with a core of associates, but often move in and out of networks depending on the criminal activity. This includes 'specialists' such as facilitators, forgers or money launderers.<sup>14</sup> Such operations can take different forms, in some cases resembling the activities of multinational corporations whilst in others being comprised of small cells.

28. Most organised criminals regard law enforcement activity as a constant risk and imprisonment as an occupational hazard. Many criminals therefore develop a capacity to react quickly to law enforcement.<sup>15</sup> Successful organised criminals are even able to sanction criminal activity without personally having to take part. This makes it difficult for law enforcement to prove involvement of the most successful organised criminals.

29. Online criminals may be a loose affiliation of individuals in different countries, who never meet in real life. The use of the internet in cyber crime enables greater anonymity and reduces risks from law enforcement action as victims are targeted from abroad.

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i. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, recommends that countries develop and maintain a national assessment to identify and assess money laundering and terrorist finance risks

ii. 'Phishing' is a way of attempting to acquire sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication

30. Organised criminals face competition from rivals. Many seek to develop a reputation that discourages challenges to their market dominance. This may include the use of violence. However a reputation for unprovoked violence can be a liability as it draws the attention of law enforcement.

31. Organised criminals use corruption or coercion of officials to gain insider information to evade law enforcement and even exchange or trade it with each other. Some organised criminals rely on corrupt solicitors and accountants to protect them from the authorities. Corruption overseas that is associated with organised crime hinders the UK's diplomatic and commercial interests and threatens development.

### Improving our knowledge of organised crime

32. The annual United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organised Crime (UKTA) is an authoritative strategic intelligence based assessment. Drawing on intelligence from a variety of sources, it summarises the threats from organised crime to the UK. It has previously been produced by and (largely) for a law enforcement audience. In line with our overall transparency agenda, we will produce an assessment which better informs the public, the private sector, government and law enforcement about the nature and scale of the organised crime threat. We have said that when it is established in 2013, the NCA will be responsible for producing the UKTA.<sup>16</sup> In the meantime **the Home Office will publish a new public facing UKTA, beginning in Autumn 2011**, which will:

- provide an intelligence-based assessment identifying the scale and nature of the organised crime threats to the UK;
- set out trends and changes in relation to those threats;
- be better informed by local and regional intelligence; and
- set out key judgements and an evidence base to inform law enforcement priorities for action and business planning.

### 1.2 Planning assumptions

33. This strategy has been prepared for the four year period, 2011 to 2015, and is based on the following planning assumptions:

- assumptions about the **ongoing drivers** of organised crime and the opportunities that we need to stem;
- assumptions about the **means** by which organised crime is facilitated and that we need to strengthen our response against;
- assumptions about the potential **convergence of the threats** of organised crime and terrorism; and
- assumptions about the **interdependent issues** that affect our response.

### The ongoing drivers of organised crime

34. **Profit or personal gratification** will continue to be a motivator for individuals to engage in organised criminality, despite the risks that are involved in doing so. Organised criminals are aware that they are acting illegally, and conscious of the harm they cause. The significant profits to be made from organised crime override any concerns they have. There are many legitimate ways to attain a good lifestyle or social recognition. However a combination of social status, access, education, the desire to make money quickly and attitude to society may all combine to prevent or dissuade someone from taking the legitimate route.

35. **Goods and services** that are illegal, expensive or difficult to obtain will continue to attract individuals to the underground market. It is unlikely that the demand for illicit goods will decrease. Not all the goods and services organised crime profits from are illegal in themselves, but the involvement of organised crime may be ignored or unknown. Some people purchase counterfeit (and therefore cheap) clothes or DVDs; some buy sex or labour services from trafficked people; and others use illegal drugs. By creating this market and tolerating its delivery by organised crime, these people are contributing in the long term to the adverse

impacts on vulnerable people and communities, as well as harming businesses and our economy.

**36. Poverty** will continue to be a driver of organised crime. Within the UK, people in deprived communities, already involved in low-level criminality or who have family or other connections, can be at risk of becoming involved in organised crime. Internationally, organised crime can perpetuate instability by further undermining the rule of law, and threatening communities and legitimate businesses. Some people are drawn to involvement in activity that either directly or indirectly assists organised crime groups as a means to support themselves or their families. The international aid and development budget is significant but it is insufficient globally to remove poverty as a major driver.

**37. Conflict** will continue to create opportunities for organised crime groups. The SDSR states that instability and conflict overseas can pose risks to the UK, by creating environments in which organised crime groups can recruit for, plan and direct their international operations. Particular characteristics that allow organised crime to flourish are when the rule of law is ineffective, because of turmoil, corruption, a lack of capacity or when the links between the state and business are too close. These would have the same impact were they to occur within the UK as overseas. In a similar way to how terrorist groups exploit uncertainty and instability in some regions, fragile countries will be attractive places for organised crime groups to operate in. Many unstable countries are also poor. In the organised crime context, the combination of conflict and poverty in a source country is most obvious in Afghanistan which is the source of 74 per cent of the world's opium production.<sup>17</sup>

**38. Migration levels** from poor, fragile or weak countries will continue to fuel the supply of illegal immigrants and victims of human trafficking. The UK will remain an attractive destination for legal and illegal immigrants so long as the economic or political situation in source countries is bleak.

### **The means by which organised crime is facilitated**

**39. Globalisation can facilitate organised crime.**

The world is more interconnected through technology, international travel and migration and trade in goods, services and capital. The growth in the use of internet based and mobile communications has changed the way we communicate with one another and revolutionised the way businesses make and move money across the globe in ways that would have been inconceivable a few years ago.

**40. A range of techniques** will continue to be adopted by organised criminal groups. In common with terrorist groups these will be both established and innovative. The use of the internet and other new technologies to both commit and facilitate crime will continue to expand rapidly. The development of new technologies has outpaced the growth of global mechanisms to govern and regulate it. Criminals are using these new technologies to talk to each other, to plan their crimes, target their victims and to evade law enforcement. To combat the opportunities that these new techniques offer criminals, we must ensure we deal with the new risks and challenges that they pose to public safety, whilst respecting the rights of the ordinary citizen to privacy.

**41. Opportunism** will increase as criminals become more flexible and broaden their operations. This will be driven by the profits that are available. Organised crime groups will continue to be adept at adapting their operations to maximise their profits and to exploit perceived weaknesses in our response.

**42. Transit routes** for organised crime will vary as organised crime groups continue to adapt their operations according to changing situations and opportunities. 'Rogue' states will also continue to support organised crime groups to try to protect their own strategic interests.

43. **Corruption** of public officials, both at home and overseas, will facilitate crime, as will the unwitting involvement of businesses and other enterprises. Organised crime groups will seek to make use of links to law enforcement and prisons, the legal and accountancy professions and those in the private sector. An increase in this threat is likely.

### **A convergence in threats?**

44. Much progress has been made in terms of our knowledge about the threats to this country from terrorism and organised crime. However, more analysis needs to be done as to whether these threats are converging and, if they are, what this means for the safety and security of the UK. There may be increased opportunities for law enforcement and intelligence interventions. As set out in the SDSR we will continue to explore the potential synergies between our organised crime and counter terrorism policing capabilities to maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of our combined effort.

### **Interdependent issues that affect our response**

45. **International collaboration** will continue to be vital for our response to organised crime and our domestic security. We know that organised crime is a global problem as well as a local one. We must deepen our cooperation and engagement with our international partners as part of a shared objective to reduce the international threat from organised crime and promote a stable global environment.

46. **A multi-agency response** will remain integral to our approach to combating organised crime. This includes maximising the ability of police forces to collaborate effectively to coordinate the response. We will facilitate this by pressing ahead with our drive to coordinate law enforcement activity. The implementation section of this strategy sets out our approach to building on the existing coordination arrangements.

## Part 2 – The Approach

### Summary


The aim of this strategy is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests from organised crime. To realise that aim, we will implement a new strategic approach, based on the following themes:

- Stem the opportunities for organised crime to take root
- Strengthen enforcement action against organised criminals
- Safeguard communities, businesses and the state

### 2.1 A new strategic approach

47. The risk to the UK from organised crime is a product of the level of threat that we face and the extent to which we are vulnerable to it. The aim of the organised crime strategy is therefore to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests from organised crime by reducing the threat from organised criminals and reducing vulnerabilities and criminal opportunities.

48. Our new approach is designed to provide a unifying direction for activity across government, our law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, the wider public sector, business and the public. It puts a new emphasis on prevention and self-protection activity alongside a greater push to ensure more enforcement activity takes place against more organised criminals, at reduced cost. This is reflected in our three pronged approach: to **stem** the opportunities for organised crime to take root; to **strengthen** enforcement to deal with the threat; and to **safeguard** communities, businesses and the state. There are similarities in our approach to our response to other national threats such as terrorism.



## 2.2 Stem the opportunities

49. The objective is to **stem** the opportunities for organised crime to take root, before it can affect the UK. Priority actions include:

### Stopping individuals in the UK becoming involved in organised crime

50. There is little published research on how people become involved in organised crime. Operational experience suggests recruits are already involved in low level criminality or have family or other relationships of trust with organised criminals. Low level criminals can progress into organised crime through contact via criminal networks or in prison. Drug traffickers may see members of street gangs as disposable foot soldiers willing to take the greatest risks in street level distribution. Street gang members may see this as an opportunity to earn a reputation and move into organised crime.

51. Family connections and shared backgrounds and experiences, such as common ethnicity or time spent in prison can establish trust and

create opportunities for criminal collaboration. Family based organised crime groups continue to flourish in parts of the UK. However, it is also the case that organised crime is changing and our traditional view of how people become involved may need updating.

52. Breaking the cycle of criminality and depriving organised crime of new recruits will be difficult. To improve our response, we need to understand better how people turn to organised criminality. This will help identify opportunities for intervention. **The Home Office, working with law enforcement and Criminal Justice System (CJS) partners, will conduct an analysis of the criminal ‘career pathways’ of identified organised criminals.**

53. We will place a particular focus on young people. We know that lack of opportunity and lack of guardianship are drivers of crime. Neighbourhood policing teams, CSPs, youth and family services can work with young people and families who are at most risk of being drawn into organised crime. What these entities have in common is a commitment to making communities

safer by preventing young people getting involved in crime in the first place; working with vulnerable families in high crime areas and providing support to offenders for the benefit of both the offender and society as a whole. The voluntary and community sector also plays an important part here.

54. There is also a need to highlight the dangers of organised crime and reduce the attraction of the perceived lifestyle and rewards from such criminality – which will involve a sharper focus on tackling criminal assets. **The Home Office will establish a working group of relevant partners and agencies to develop proposals to stop young people being drawn into organised criminality.**

#### **Tackling the causes of organised crime through development and stabilisation work abroad**

55. Development and capacity building programmes, including those administered through the Department for International Development (DFID), play an important role in UK efforts against organised crime and other national security threats by addressing security, justice, accountability and corruption issues. Concentrating such efforts on countries that are priorities for our response to organised crime can help to reduce the foothold organised crime has in them.

56. Some of the world's poorest people can find themselves sustaining organised crime. This includes making use of people smugglers and traffickers to migrate or growing coca or poppy to supply the cocaine and heroin markets in the UK. The UK works with foreign governments to develop their capacity to prevent organised crime groups from being able to offer a more profitable way of life than can be obtained through legal means. The Home Office will work with DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to ensure these programmes are being used to best effect.

57. The Government is increasing UK spending on overseas aid to £12 billion per year by 2013. Over the next four years, DFID will work to

facilitate growth and private sector investment, improve educational opportunities, and support citizens to hold governments to account for public services. But more can be done. Therefore **DFID, working with others, will help address organised crime by working to build stability and reduce corruption in priority countries.** DFID will do this by expanding its programmes on security and justice, accountability, and anti-corruption. This is set out in the new 'Building Stability Overseas' strategy.<sup>18</sup>

### **2.3 Strengthen enforcement**

58. The objective is to **strengthen** enforcement activity against organised criminals using the full range of interventions. This includes hard-edged enforcement through prosecutions where practicable, but also the use of a wider range of innovative disruptions.

59. Within the mix of interventions, law enforcement and criminal justice professionals must judge the appropriateness of a prosecution orientated approach against the nature of the threat and available law enforcement capabilities.

#### **We will improve how law enforcement combats organised criminals**

#### **By taking an integrated approach, from the local to the global**

60. Core to our approach of strengthening the enforcement response to the threat from organised crime is the principle of an 'integrated operating model' – with all key partners working closely and collaboratively together to maximise their impact against a wider range of organised crime groups. This includes having a shared view of the problem in order to identify organised criminals and their connections; a 'tiered' response where the right level of action is taken; a wide range of disruption techniques which creatively identify ways to disrupt organised criminals; and a coordinated approach with the NCA at its heart from 2013 and, in the interim, a new organised crime coordination centre.

61. The implementation section sets out our immediate next steps for improving these critical elements of this strategy.

### Through criminal and civil justice interventions

62. Many interventions aimed at disrupting organised crime rely on the civil justice system. Interventions such as non-conviction based Serious Crime Prevention Orders, civil recovery, civil litigation, and other civil orders are an important part of our approach. **The Ministry of Justice will review the rules and processes to ensure the civil justice system can process orders in a fair, effective and efficient way.**

A forthcoming Green Paper will also present proposals aimed at maximising the amount of sensitive material that can be disclosed in non-criminal judicial proceedings, whilst ensuring that the necessary safeguards are in place.

#### Case Study A: Tariq Dad

In July 2010, Tariq Dad and three associates were sentenced for conspiracy to supply cocaine. Dad has a long history of organised crime including heroin trafficking, money laundering, fraud and blackmail, despite lengthy prison sentences. A systematic programme of disruption by the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in conjunction with Avon and Somerset Police progressively damaged his reputation amongst criminals and undermined his capacity to stay in business. As his influence deteriorated and his debts mounted, he made an attempt to dominate the regional crack cocaine market and had to take a more hands-on role. Evidence was obtained to charge him with conspiracy to supply cocaine. Every link in Dad's drug distribution chain was attacked and dismantled – from street dealers to suppliers in London and Turkey. So far, sentences totalling over 180 years have been handed out to 20 people as a result of operations by SOCA and its partners linked to this investigation.

### By fighting organised crime abroad and at the border

63. The Government will improve its strategic oversight of the UK's international efforts against organised crime. Experience suggests that in some circumstances it may be more cost effective, as well as tactically advantageous, for enforcement activity to take place outside the UK. The UK deploys significant resources overseas through FCO, SOCA, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), UK Border Agency (UKBA), DFID and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Whilst only SOCA overseas officers are dedicated solely to organised crime, other staff help to combat organised crime, complementing their core responsibilities. However, this effort is not always effectively coordinated. To help address this **the Home Office will work with FCO to ensure that organised crime is appropriately reflected in Country Business Plans<sup>i</sup> and to inform their funding decisions on drugs and crime projects.**

64. Complementing the country business plans, we will focus specifically on countries that are the most significant source or transit points for organised crime affecting the UK. **The Government will develop a common organised crime priority countries list where we will prioritise our collective efforts by providing strategic direction and coordination for the political and law enforcement resources that can be used to address it.** This work will be aided by FCO-funded programmes including £16 million for counter narcotics and rule of law in Afghanistan. A further £2 million of ring-fenced funding will be made available within the bilateral programme for spending on drugs and crime projects for 2011/12.

i. The FCO requires British Missions abroad to produce an annual country business plan setting out what they will deliver

65. Intervening in countries which are the source of a particular threat, or a transit route to the UK, can be highly effective. For example, 95 per cent of heroin in the UK originates from Afghanistan,<sup>19</sup> transiting through Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Some crimes, such as fraud and computer-enabled crime can be conducted from abroad. Part 3 explains how we can improve our enforcement activities abroad by using our resources more effectively and cooperating better with partners.

66. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) also assists in counter narcotics activity, particularly in Afghanistan and the Caribbean. Where appropriate, and as resources allow, the military conducts tasks at the request of lead government departments, or in support of, or collaboration with, international partners. To optimise how defence may continue to make an effective contribution to counter organised crime, within resource and operational constraints, **the Home Office and MoD will work together to make new arrangements to ensure that organised crime is considered within MoD tasking decisions for deployment of maritime assets overseas.**

67. Many organised criminals affecting the UK live and run their criminal businesses in other countries. Restrictions on travel and on entry, or greater targeting at the border, can frustrate those involved in organised crime, deterring them from targeting the UK.

68. **UKBA, together with partner law enforcement agencies, will deliver improvements in border security against national security threats including the threat from organised crime.** As set out in the SDSR, this will be achieved by using new technologies; making structural changes; establishing a dedicated Border Policing Command in the NCA that will bring together current enforcement assets to deliver a more coordinated response to organised cross-border crime; prioritising activities overseas; strengthening the visa process; and, where appropriate, making use of the private sector.

69. **UKBA, together with partner law enforcement agencies, will prioritise, alongside other national security threats, the identification of those involved in organised crime entering or leaving the UK,** through the use of the e-Borders system to conduct pre-departure checks. When established, the Border Policing Command of the NCA will play a key role in strengthening border security, tackling organised crime and the trafficking of people, wildlife, weapons and drugs. Driven by a single, coherent border security strategy, and building on a shared intelligence picture, it will ensure that all law enforcement agencies operating in and around the border work to clear, mutually agreed priorities. It will task and coordinate law enforcement activity by its own officers, those in other NCA commands and work with other law enforcement agencies at the border, to better join up the response to serious and organised criminality.

#### **By equipping law enforcement with the right tools, technology and intelligence**

70. The SDSR assessed that communications data and lawful interception capabilities are vital for fighting serious crime and countering terrorism. There is good reason for communications data to continue to be used as a fundamental, targeted tool for investigators. As new communications technologies evolve, the work of the police and other agencies in solving crime and protecting the public is becoming even more complex.

71. Our technological and intelligence capabilities provide us with a vital edge in combating organised crime. Covert surveillance and communications intercepts enable law enforcement to target activity where it can have the greatest effect. This is collected through techniques as permitted by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000.

72. Communications data and intercept intelligence are key factors in over 95 per cent of SOCA investigations directed at the organised crime groups assessed as causing the most harm to the UK.<sup>20</sup> The Government intends to

preserve the ability of law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies to use these capabilities within the appropriate legal framework. There will be a significant detrimental impact on public safety if nothing is done to address evolving communication technology and vital capabilities will degrade without action – we need to work hard just to stand still. We are doing much, with more that can be done, under current legislation to enable investigators to understand and respond to the technology challenge; this includes rolling out a programme of UK wide training to investigators to enable them to understand the changes in technology and its implications for investigations.<sup>i</sup> Other work is also underway to improve efficiencies.

73. This is not about developing new, more intrusive capabilities. It is about preserving the capabilities already in use to keep the public safe on a daily basis and ensuring robust safeguards prevent any abuse of data. However, we need to do more to continue to preserve these vital capabilities. **We intend to introduce legislation to meet the challenges of new and emerging technologies, whilst ensuring they are subject to robust and effective safeguards in line with the Government’s commitment on civil liberties.**

74. The additional £650 million allocated to help protect the UK in cyber space (including £63 million for computer-enabled crime) will help the UK to make a step change in our law enforcement response to computer-enabled crime. The response will be set out further in the forthcoming ‘Cutting Crime Online’ strategy, to be published by the Home Office.

### Case Study B: Operation Amberhill

Amberhill, a unit in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), is the only one of its kind in the world and has been using innovative processes to prevent and disrupt the use of false ID documents by organised crime networks. It maintains an ever growing database of false ID documents which it then shares with public and private sector organisations.

Successes include:

- £16 million of fraud identified in the private sector;
- £300,000 fraud prevented in the first month of making the data available to customers;
- 43,000 matches linked to housing benefit, government payroll, student loans, failed asylum seekers and visa applicants; and
- 18 cross-European criminal networks linked to Amberhill data.

### We will target criminal finances

75. Money is central to virtually all organised crime. It is not only a reward of crime, but also a driver, with profits funding future criminal activity. We have made good progress in targeting criminal finances but we aim to do more. A greater impact on the financial network will reduce the operation and profitability of organised crime.

76. Most criminal proceeds are laundered to hide their true origins. Many organised criminals also hide or disperse assets to prevent their recovery by law enforcement. We already have formidable powers for investigating criminal finances and recovering assets from criminals through the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002. However, the process is long; it takes on average 22 months to enforce a confiscation order. It is even longer for ‘high value’ or complex cases involving high end organised criminals.

i. This is led by the Home Office and works closely with partners in operational agencies and industry

77. We will make the asset recovery process quicker, more robust, and more effective by implementing uncommenced legislation to strengthen the ability of law enforcement to recover assets; examining what new powers may be needed; and working across government to remove blockages in the confiscation order process.

78. We will hit assets held overseas. Recovery of assets overseas has been too poor for too long. It can be difficult to enforce confiscation orders especially where legal agreements are not in place. We will work with the FCO to identify the main countries used by organised criminals to 'hide' their financial assets and work with foreign jurisdictions to enhance recovery, aiming to effect a step change in amounts recovered.

79. We will increase our capability to tackle criminal finances. We have removed unhelpful targets (such as the asset recovery targets) to allow law enforcement to focus more intensely on organised crime networks. We will increase awareness of the importance of tackling criminal finances and mainstream the use of financial investigation as a cost effective and efficient way of combating organised criminals. **We will explore the potential for greater private sector involvement to deliver both value for money and an increase in our capacity to hit criminal finances.**

80. We will take a more strategic approach to tackling criminal finances. This will include greater use of asset denial to deprive criminals access to their assets, even if it may not be possible to recover them, and increasingly targeting the specialists essential to organised crime finances. We will also work to prevent abuse by money service businesses. Focusing our activity on these specialist money launderers will have a disproportionate impact on organised crime greater than the value of any assets seized or sanction they face.

### Case Study C: Operation Redbone

Eleven members of a Ukrainian crime gang who stole £4.5m through tax fraud were jailed in July 2010 for a total of more than 40 years following a complex investigation by HMRC. The criminals used the money to buy fast cars and rent luxury apartments in London and HMRC officers found £360,000 in cash as well as weapons when they arrested the gang.

The gang attempted to claim more than £8 million in tax repayments but significant numbers of tax returns were identified as fraudulent and the repayments were stopped. HMRC officers subsequently searched seven properties in West London in July 2009 where they uncovered a production line of fraud. Each member of the crime group was assigned specific roles to carry out the fraud; one address contained hundreds of bank cards, another held National Insurance number application forms. A third address contained hundreds of thousands of pounds in cash and weapons were found at a fourth property.

### We will tackle the associates and enablers of organised crime

81. A comprehensive but targeted approach to combating organised crime means going after the criminals and their associates and facilitators. Many organised criminals run 'front' businesses. These may appear legitimate but can provide cover for criminal activities, or provide funding streams to help conceal criminal money. They also compete unfairly with legitimate businesses. **We will develop a range of measures to target and disrupt 'front' businesses (for example through revocation of licences) and HMRC will use its tax powers to disrupt 'front' businesses identified to have a significant amount of unpaid tax. We will also explore how the powers of the Insolvency Service can be used to a greater extent to investigate and disrupt disreputable companies.**

82. Identity crime facilitates a wide range of criminality, including organised crime. It is carried out by acquiring or using identity documents for criminal purposes. The National Fraud Authority (NFA) and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) have completed a strategic threat assessment of identity crime. **This will be used to inform the development of a government action plan on combating identity crime.**

83. Organised criminals use corruption to access privileged information and avoid detection. Money is often an inducement, but family ties, 'friendships' and other relationships are also used to corrupt officials both in the UK and abroad. A recent report by Transparency International highlighted the need for more action to understand and combat the growing threat of corruption in key sections of the UK.<sup>21</sup> Many public and private sector organisations, including all law enforcement agencies, have guidelines guarding against staff corruption. SOCA offers help and advice on public sector corruption in relation to organised crime, although we do not yet know the full extent of the problem. **SOCA will carry out an assessment of the extent of corruption by organised criminals in the public and private sectors and recommend ways for addressing it.**

84. Organised crime groups also use professionals, such as some in the legal and accountancy professions, to support their enterprises. These professions are often regulated or require membership of a professional body which has the power to investigate and stop members from operating. Working with such bodies to limit this support will make it harder for organised criminals to operate. **We will continue to increase collaboration between law enforcement officers and regulatory and professional bodies to thwart corrupt businesses that facilitate organised crime.**

#### **We will enhance the criminal justice approach**

85. The Government will enhance the criminal justice approach so that it contributes more effectively to combating organised crime. This

will involve a stronger focus on lifetime management of offenders, including a more effective multi-agency approach to organised criminals in prison, together with increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal trial process. In support of efforts to target criminal finances we will work to increase the priority given to criminal confiscation efforts at all stages in the criminal justice system.

86. The challenge for law enforcement and criminal justice agencies is to ensure more enforcement activity can take place against more organised criminals, at reduced cost. In deciding whether to mount a criminal investigation, they will be driven by what is possible and appropriate in light of available interventions and to reduce the threat. Whilst they will always want to consider an investigation leading to a criminal justice outcome, they may, in light of these considerations, quite properly decide to undertake lawful activities which disrupt and reduce the threat from organised criminals.

87. In order to improve the efficiency of the criminal trial process **the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) will develop proposals to modernise and reform the criminal justice system.** This includes a review of the disclosure regime together with the judiciary and the Attorney General's Office (AGO), with any emerging proposals for legislative change to be reported later in the year. The 'Cutting Crime Online' strategy will outline how we will enhance the response for the prosecution of online criminals.

88. **The MoJ will develop and mainstream the principle of lifetime management of organised criminals.** This will involve intensive focus on disrupting their activity. Full use will be made of the range of orders available, such as serious crime prevention orders and financial reporting orders. Successful lifetime management is dependent on law enforcement and criminal justice agencies working together with a diverse range of partners across the public, private and non-profit sectors.

89. Witness protection, including the ability to give evidence anonymously, encourages witnesses to testify, as does the use of special measures within court. We are working closely with the police to strengthen the support provided through protected persons programmes. To bring offenders to justice across jurisdictions, the UK has mutual legal assistance and extradition arrangements with more than a hundred countries. This helps prevent the creation of safe havens for criminals.

### **We will develop a more effective multi-agency approach to organised criminals in prison**

90. Prison hinders the ability of organised criminals to operate, but does not prevent it altogether. Some organised criminals continue to manage and direct organised crime groups, commission violent offences and intimidate witnesses from prison. For some, a custodial sentence is a risk worth taking. It may also provide opportunities to network with other criminals.

91. There are some fundamental issues which require early resolution. These include: the use and sharing of intelligence between law enforcement agencies and the National Offender Management Service (NOMS); the configuration of police prison intelligence capabilities; denying criminals access to illegal drugs and mobile phones in prison; and addressing the issue of staff corruption, which undermines trust between law enforcement and criminal justice partners and the confidence of the public in the integrity of the whole criminal justice system.

92. The core responsibilities of NOMS in England and Wales, to protect the public and reduce reoffending, align closely with the drive to combat organised crime. The Ministry of Justice Green Paper 'Breaking the Cycle', published in December 2010, highlights the need to share intelligence and tackle staff corruption, and commits to investigating new technologies to tackle drugs and mobile phones in prisons.<sup>22</sup>

93. Responding to these problems is challenging, resource intensive and requires joint working between law enforcement and criminal justice communities to produce a systematic and persistent approach. **The Home Office, MoJ and NOMS will propose a refreshed package of measures on dealing with organised criminals in prison**, covering improved intelligence sharing arrangements, tackling drugs and mobile phones in prisons, and corruption.

### **2.4 Safeguard communities, businesses and the state**

94. The objective is to **safeguard** communities, businesses and the state by reducing their vulnerability to being victims of organised crime.

#### **Raising awareness of organised crime**

95. Raising awareness of a particular crime issue can help reduce victimisation, such as making people aware of the tactics employed by organised fraudsters. We will provide information to enable the public, voluntary sector and businesses to recognise when they may be vulnerable to organised crime. The voluntary sector is leading the way with campaigns such as [thinkjessica.com](http://thinkjessica.com) on mass marketing fraud. **The NFA, through Action Fraud, will help coordinate the awareness raising activities of the counter fraud agencies for the public and businesses.**

96. In order to raise awareness successfully, the challenge lies in making clearer the link between offences, and their impact, particularly those crimes that are less apparent. Computer-enabled crime can cause significant loss but it is not necessarily viewed by the public in the same way as burglary and theft. As a result, the public is not motivated to protect themselves against it. Intellectual property crime is another example of the link between the impact of organised crime and the threat not being clear. Counterfeit goods are cheaper than the genuine article but the profits are huge because of the scale of criminal operations. These profits damage legitimate trade which harms the economy, deprive the public

of taxation to fund vital public services, and fuel further organised crime. **We will use the planned cross-government communications strategy to make clear the link between certain criminal offences and organised crime.**

97. Understanding the vulnerability of different groups to fraud will enable a more targeted communication. The NFA is working with both public and private sector partners to develop effective and targeted communications.

98. Some organised crime groups seek to groom children for serial sexual abuse. We have statutory arrangements for safeguarding victims but we need to improve our understanding about how organised crime groups select victims and so we will work with child protection services to reduce the potential for organised grooming to succeed. The thematic assessment recently published by the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP), 'Out of Mind, Out of Sight', will help to inform this.<sup>23</sup>

#### Case Study D: Operation Retriever

Operation Retriever was a major proactive police investigation into the organised sexual exploitation of girls in the Derby area between January 2008 and April 2009 involving 13 defendants and 27 victims. The case involved an organised group targeting vulnerable young girls by 'befriending' and exploiting them. Grooming occurred outside schools and other teenage 'hotspots'. Offenders established trust through gifts, meals and alcohol. Exploitation took place in hotel rooms and homes. Although they were driven by sexual gratification rather than money, Derbyshire Police established that the offenders combined child sexual exploitation with some characteristics of organised crime groups in terms of planning and seriousness.

#### Helping the public and business protect themselves

99. Criminals exploit weaknesses. These can include lack of awareness of criminal threats, gaps in business processes or systems or a lack of focus on organised crime risks to products or services. Addressing these weaknesses will help in designing out opportunities for organised crime. For example, online criminals pose a significant challenge against the computer systems of individuals, businesses and governments. It is estimated that, in relation to government systems, good protective security will effectively mitigate 80 per cent of those vulnerabilities.<sup>24</sup> The forthcoming 'Cutting Crime Online' strategy will set out how the public, businesses and government can better protect themselves from the effects of such crime. **A best practice guide on fraud prevention will be developed and issued to counter fraud agencies by the NFA.**

100. Identity crime is invasive and damaging. Government, law enforcement and the private sector are working together to help the public and businesses protect their personal information. Advice can be found at [identitytheft.org.uk](http://identitytheft.org.uk) on how to keep personal and company information secure and how to be alert to attempts by criminals to extract information e.g. through pretending to be a legitimate organisation.

101. The NFIB provides alerts to help individuals and businesses protect themselves from fraud. Both SOCA and the MPS have direct channels to industry through sector specific forums. **The NFA and the NFIB will ensure fraud alerts to the public, businesses and public sector are coordinated and effective, reaching the right audience at the right time.** This will enable people, businesses and public sector organisations to protect themselves better.

### Case Study E: Operation Archway

City of London Police's Operation Archway collects and disseminates intelligence on boiler room fraud for the UK. Boiler room, or share sale fraud, is a crime which involves cold calling by bogus stockbrokers to persuade the purchase of worthless or non-existent shares, or to buy genuine shares at significantly inflated prices. The average loss in each share sale fraud is £26,000 per victim.

Archway receives intelligence from a range of sources, and works with other law enforcement agencies (in the UK and abroad) and the banking sector to identify share purchase fraud offenders, support investigations and identify effective disruption opportunities. In early 2010 the Operation Archway team and Financial Services Authority (FSA) obtained a list compiled by fraudsters which contained the names and addresses of 6,500 potential victims. Operation Warn was initiated and involved writing to all those on the list to advise that they may be targeted by mass marketing fraudsters, and to provide advice on protecting themselves from falling victim.

### We will work closely with private sector and civil society partners

102. Business and industry have been leading the way in developing safeguards to protect themselves and their customers from organised crime. This takes many forms, including support to law enforcement investigations through provision of access and intelligence, reducing availability of items that can be used for organised criminality, improving procedures such as 'knowing your customer', and sponsoring and conducting public education efforts. We will work with business in a mutually beneficial way to reduce the impact of organised crime, not imposing regulatory or legal burdens. Ahead of the NCA being in place, the Government will set up the Economic Crime Coordination Board to put in place the strong foundations for the NCA's Economic Crime Command. This will involve a number of agencies working together to better

focus resources, improve the intelligence picture and step up the work on prevention. Alongside this, **the NFA will lead the development of a new strategic approach to tackling fraud across the public, private and non-profit sectors, to be published in Autumn 2011.**

103. Designing out crime is a powerful approach to preventing and reducing crime and countering terrorism. This means engaging closely with business partners to ensure that the design of the products and services we use, and the places where we live and work do not create easy or rewarding opportunities for crime. Examples include the design of banknotes and credit cards to prevent counterfeiting, and the use of radio frequency identification tags (RFIDs) and stronger system controls to manage supply chains and prevent counterfeiting and loss. **The Government will facilitate more of this by establishing a new Forum for Innovation in Crime Prevention.**

The Forum will identify major opportunities for preventing and disrupting crime and will propose solutions that will incentivise business. It will meet quarterly and will be chaired by a Home Office Minister and its membership will be drawn from science, technology, industry, business, design, law enforcement and government.

104. Business assists law enforcement through reporting of crime. This includes reports of crimes, suspicious activity reporting from financial and chemical companies, and joint investigative units and projects, such as the UK payments led money laundering projects. We will work with industry to identify further opportunities to generate information on criminal activity.

105. Charitable or non-profit organisations play a role in understanding the threat or reducing the harm from organised crime. Some, such as Victim Support and Crimestoppers, work across all types of crime, including organised crime. Others are partnerships with business or are supported by industry. It is important that the voluntary sector and local businesses get involved in reducing crime and that keeping the community safe becomes the shared responsibility of neighbourhood police, partners and local people together.

106. We use the experience of voluntary groups in working with victims and criminals to increase our understanding of the vulnerabilities of victims, and the motivations and thought processes of criminals, and thereby improve our response, and inform the content and delivery of our communications. Voluntary groups can themselves become victims of organised crime. Therefore, **the NFA and the Charity Commission will develop a strategic response to reducing the threat and impact of fraud against the charitable sector.**

### **Ensuring the state adequately protects itself against organised fraud**

107. It is equally important that the state does everything it can to ensure that it is also well protected against organised fraudsters. The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) already has organised fraud teams in place to identify and disrupt attacks on the benefit system. These teams work closely with others across government to share intelligence and assist in anti-fraud operations which might include identify fraud, stolen identities, counterfeiting and employer collusion. In 2013 the DWP, working together with HMRC and local authorities, will introduce a Single Fraud Investigation Service aimed at investigating all welfare fraud. With increased resource at its disposal the single service will be better equipped to identify organised attacks on the welfare system. The DWP will also introduce a specific sanction to ensure that those caught committing organised benefit fraud are punished.

## Part 3 – Implementation

### Summary

The following activity will enhance our ability to deliver effectively the strategic approach set out in Part 2 in order to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests from organised crime:

- Enhance our intelligence capabilities to inform policy development and target the law enforcement response
- Improve the operational response
- Develop our international cooperation
- Improve our approach to coordinating and sharing the results of research to better understand the nature and scale of organised crime and what works in combating it
- Develop our communications approach to inform the public about how they can protect themselves and work with law enforcement bodies to combat organised crime in their communities

### 3.1 Intelligence

108. The most effective organised crime groups are highly sophisticated operations, many with global reach. They operate covertly and go to great lengths to avoid detection by law enforcement. Intelligence gathering and analysis play a critical role in combating organised crime. We will improve our efforts by using intelligence to develop forward looking policies and to target the law enforcement response to where it can be most effective. Intelligence helps combat organised crime by identifying threats, building knowledge, understanding how organised criminals perceive our vulnerabilities and supporting law enforcement activities abroad and in the UK.

#### **We will develop a better framework for intelligence collection**

109. We will ensure we have the right arrangements to ensure intelligence is collected on a consistent and prioritised basis. The current intelligence framework is informed by the threats identified in the UKTA. The National Intelligence Requirement (NIR) guides law enforcement agencies' collection of organised crime intelligence by identifying priorities aligned with the threats and operational requirements. Based on this, the law enforcement response is set out in the UK Control Strategy on Organised Crime.<sup>i</sup> The intelligence

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i. Unpublished. The control strategy is a framework for coordinating action by the relevant UK and overseas agencies

agencies' work is in turn prioritised by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and is approved by Ministers. **We will review the NIR to maximise its effectiveness as a framework for intelligence collection.**

110. Law enforcement agencies have invested considerable resource in developing intelligence capabilities. However, these are sometimes within operational silos and are deployed tactically against local threats and imperatives, without sufficient regard to national priorities and strategic considerations. The NIR has been effective at identifying intelligence priorities aligned with the national threat level. However, its use amongst individual police forces is less obvious and they have sought to develop their own intelligence needs and priorities. **To tackle this, we will introduce a more comprehensive method of setting out intelligence collection priorities.**

111. We will also ensure that we improve the way that intelligence is collected in local communities. Too often organised crime groups are able to operate in certain communities because a wall of silence surrounds their activities. This is because their activities are unknown or tolerated or because people are fearful about reporting it. We will work to break down these barriers to improved local intelligence by encouraging the police and their local partners to work together to share information when it is available. **We will do this by encouraging existing members of CSPs to join up their approach to specific operations wherever possible.**

**We will keep ahead of organised crime through horizon scanning**

112. Identifying socio-economic, political and technological changes that could impact on our ability to combat organised crime should allow us to manage the risks and enable us to seize opportunities more quickly. Strategic assessment and horizon scanning should feed directly into policy making and risk assessment. We will therefore adopt this approach by conducting horizon scanning to ensure our understanding stays ahead of organised criminals. **SOCA (and**

**from 2013, the NCA) will coordinate and prepare regular horizon scanning reports on organised crime for Ministers, policy and law enforcement partners.**

**We will use intelligence to aid enforcement and develop policy**

113. We will develop a sharper focus on exploiting intelligence to drive more enforcement action against more criminals, at reduced cost. The way intelligence is assessed and operationalised will be crucial in realising this. This will be aided by the NCA and, in the interim, a new multi-agency organised crime coordination centre which will act as a central hub for the analysis and dissemination of operational intelligence on organised crime. This will provide law enforcement partners with the intelligence they need for sharper tactical prioritisation and decision making against organised criminals. **The Home Office will ensure that an interim organised crime coordination centre with full multi-agency buy in, is in place by November 2011.**

114. Intelligence can be used more widely than just immediate operational activity. By building a strategic picture of criminality, it can improve longer term operational planning and prioritisation. It also leads to policy making that has a deeper and more wide ranging impact. Applying expert analysis to intelligence from across the relevant agencies will help develop a richer assessed threat picture, which is more authoritative and greater than the sum of its parts. **The Home Office will oversee the development of a new approach to improve the synthesis, analysis and dissemination of all types of intelligence gathered from different agencies and sources.**

**We will disseminate intelligence more effectively**

115. The HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) report into the police service's response to organised crime<sup>25</sup> recommends forces improve the use of intelligence to inform robust tasking processes. There is scope for improvement in

intelligence sharing between all law enforcement agencies. There are examples of good practice but the sharing of intelligence must become everyday practice and must include the ability for police forces, and national agencies, to allocate action to the most appropriate partner. We will therefore **enhance intelligence sharing by law enforcement by establishing common formats and embedding good practice**. We will look at whether the legislation impedes data sharing and encourage law enforcement to have a presumption toward lawful sharing of data.

116. Organised crime often straddles police force boundaries. Regional Intelligence Units (RIUs) collect and analyse information across the region – identifying networks between seemingly separate organised crime groups, and ensuring that those groups whose criminal activities go beyond the boundary of a single police force area do not escape detection. They also enable the sharing of intelligence between agencies at a regional level – both by having embedded officers and staff from SOCA, UKBA and HMRC, and through the Government Agency Intelligence Networks (GAIN) some have already established.

#### Case Study F: East Midlands Specialist Operations Unit

The East Midlands Specialist Operations Unit operates a network that facilitates referral of information beyond traditional law enforcement partners, including Trading Standards, Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), Gambling Commission, Environment Agency and the Federation Against Copyright Theft (FACT). In 2009/10 the network facilitated 139 referrals leading to 14 arrests and £328,000 in assets seized or confiscated.

117. The work with the multi-agency GAIN partnerships has also led to real successes with one leading organised criminal recently quoted after arrest as saying: 'I don't mind that you did the warrants and everything, we get used to that. But why did you have to bring all of them other people with you. The council, Environment

Agency, Inland Revenue (sic) and VAT people, rates people. They have caused us so much aggro. Why did you do that? We've had so many problems with them since then.'

118. To enhance intelligence sharing **we will ensure RIUs continue to develop as an important resource, enabling intelligence collection and dissemination between forces and agencies and we will work with all regions to adopt the GAIN approach in their areas**.

119. Providing a more complete local picture on criminality will help ensure organised crime receives the local attention it needs. Neighbourhood policing teams are often very good at obtaining local intelligence through their relationships with local communities. **We will identify best practice in the dissemination of neighbourhood and local intelligence that can be used to brief local authorities, police authorities (now) and PCCs (from 2012), on organised crime**. This will help ensure local leaders are better informed and engaged in relation to organised crime threats in their localities.

### 3.2 Improving the operational response

120. Alongside the implementation of a new strategic approach, the Government will oversee an improvement in the operational law enforcement response to organised crime. The step change will come with the advent of a new crime fighting capability in the shape of the NCA in 2013. We have now published our plan for how the NCA will operate and its scope, functionality and structure.

121. The Government is clear that improvements can be made before then, which will pave the way for the NCA's introduction. The imperative is to make the policing contribution to the fight against organised crime more effective and coordinated, and improve the connectivity between the police service and, in particular, SOCA. This should be seen in the context of our wider reform of policing, particularly the replacement of bureaucratic accountability with local democratic accountability through PCCs,

facilitated through greater transparency about what is happening about levels of crime in local areas.

### The position in 2013

122. Once established the NCA will tackle serious and complex crime and bring organised criminals to account, in partnership with local and international forces. Its focus will be on fighting organised criminality, strengthening border security and on tackling other serious and complex crimes, including economic crime, computer-enabled crime and child exploitation.

123. The NCA will collect and analyse its own and others' intelligence, building and using a comprehensive strategic and tactical picture of serious and organised criminality. It will harness the latest technology to ensure that, subject to robust safeguards, its intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities match the threat posed by criminals who seek constantly to evade detection.

124. The NCA will prioritise action and for the first time, will undertake tasking and coordination of law enforcement assets, as well as working with others such as HMRC, to deal with criminality that requires a national response. The NCA will have the specialist operational capabilities that add most value to those in police forces and other law enforcement partners (including those on computer-enabled crime, economic crime, human and drug trafficking and child exploitation), collectively enhancing the fight against serious and organised criminality.

125. The leadership and culture of the NCA will reflect its crime fighting nature. The head of the NCA will be a senior chief constable and the NCA will be open, collaborative and non-bureaucratic. From the outset, a key objective will be to demonstrate its impact publicly, including to local communities.

### Improving the operational response in the short term

126. There are some key measures, largely developed by existing law enforcement agencies, which can drive improvements in the operational response to organised crime in the period before the NCA becomes fully operational in 2013.

#### Policing contribution

127. Individual chief constables, police authorities, and PCCs from 2012, have a pivotal role in making improvements, driven by their responsibility and desire to tackle the organised crime that impacts on their local communities. Once established PCCs will be supported by effective, clear and coordinated national arrangements so that they can balance their local and national responsibilities.

128. These national responsibilities will be shaped by the Home Secretary's forthcoming Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR), which will set out the national threats (such as organised crime) that require a collective response from the police service. PCCs will use this when undertaking their local planning to ensure that they properly take account of their force's national responsibilities. They will also use it to ensure that the resources of their respective police forces can operate together effectively when needed – for example in joint operations. PCCs and chief officers will also be under duties to collaborate with other forces where it can improve efficiency and effectiveness – as is the case for tackling organised crime.

#### National and regional response

129. At a national and regional level, the following are priorities for action:

- establish a new multi-agency organised crime coordination centre to function as a national hub to collate, analyse and disseminate for action criminal intelligence relating to organised crime. It will also be the key building block for the NCA's eventual

tasking and coordination role, and will drive improvements before then. This centre will become operational by November 2011;

- ensure the consistent application by all law enforcement partners of a process for identifying the threats, harms and risks posed by organised criminals (via what is known as the 'organised crime group mapping' process);
- implement, across law enforcement agencies, an agreed approach to improving prioritisation activity and an agreed set of principles to determine which agency should have primary responsibility for taking action against identified criminal groups (known as the 'integrated operating model');
- further develop law enforcement tools and techniques for tackling organised crime and further develop a way of taking action against large numbers of organised criminals (a concept known as the 'high volume operating model'); and
- turn current regional policing capabilities (comprising Regional Asset Recovery Teams (RARTs), Regional Intelligence Units (RIUs) and multi-force operational teams) into a more integrated network, with greater consistency and interoperability, ensuring intelligence is turned into law enforcement activity and that all this is supported by effective regional and national coordination arrangements. The policing community has already started this work through the development of the concept of integrated regional organised crime units.

**130. The Government will look to a reformed Organised Crime Partnership Board (OCPB) to drive the implementation of the key national and regional elements of the operational response.**

Given its importance to the future success of the NCA, we propose that the OCPB should, in future, report through the governance arrangements devoted to establishing the NCA and be aligned to the new governance arrangements for the implementation of this strategy.

### Local response

131. The impact of organised crime is felt by people and businesses and local communities every day. Our response must therefore be effective at the local level by tackling this criminality, supported by local communities. There is a clear role for neighbourhood policing teams and CSPs, building on the innovative work that many are already engaged in. The lawful sharing of data between agencies helps develop a more comprehensive picture of crime at the local level which, in turn, can assist in identifying local priorities and improving the effectiveness of partner action. **We will look to the OCPB to develop specific proposals for enhancing the role of neighbourhood policing teams and CSPs in combating organised crime.**

#### Case Study G: Project Gulf

In June 2009, Greater Manchester Police and SOCA began looking at ways they could tackle serious and organised crime at a local level. An area in Salford where organised crime was having a significant impact on the local community was selected. Partnerships were forged between law enforcement agencies, the local authority, CSPs, the DWP and the private sector.

The results from all these partnership operations have been far reaching with a number of arrests for a wide range of offences. This has led directly to arrests linked to illegal immigration, benefit fraud, dealing in counterfeit goods and drug cultivation and supply, plus the seizure of assets worth over £1 million.

### 3.3 International cooperation

132. The UK will seek to enhance multi-lateral cooperation. In the European Union (EU), we will actively participate in the Justice and Home Affairs Committee on internal security, which ensures operational cooperation on internal security, and develop our cooperation with Europol, and Eurojust.<sup>i</sup> The UK broadly supports the EU's Internal Security Strategy as a guideline for future action on EU internal security and supports more operational collaboration between agencies in Member States. As a means of maximising this cooperation, **the Government will develop a coordinated, strategic approach to identifying and accessing EU funding streams.**

133. The UK will also seek to enhance cooperation through its continued support of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) which works to counteract drugs, crime and terrorism by promoting health, justice and security; and through support of the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) which seeks to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organised crime more effectively. **We will push for our objectives internationally through UK representation at the UN's annual conferences on drugs and crime.**

134. We will seek to make better use of Interpol, which facilitates cross-border police cooperation, and supports and assists all organisations working to prevent or combat international crime. For example, it provides UKBA with access to its Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database, helping to stop criminals using stolen passports to enter the UK.

135. We will also work to improve cooperation in other settings, such as the 'Quintet Group' on organised crime, which supports the Attorneys General of five countries<sup>ii</sup> in implementing an agreement to cooperate in combating organised crime. It provides a forum through which the member countries, all of whom share similar legal traditions, can strengthen cooperation on addressing organised crime, including common

threats; as well as to share information, practices and ideas on domestic policy and legislative approaches to organised crime.

136. The UK will seek to enhance bilateral relationships with our key partners in the fight against organised crime by developing more cooperation agreements between us. Our operational partnership with allies like the US is strong, but needs to be more effective at a strategic level. **The UK will continue to work with our US partners through the new senior level UK/US organised crime contact group** which met for the first time in January 2011. This group was established to support enhanced strategic and tactical cooperation against the most significant geographic and thematic organised crime threats to the UK and the US.

### 3.4 Research

#### **We will improve our knowledge of organised crime**

137. Tackling organised crime effectively requires a strong evidence base on the scale and nature of the problem and how it can best be tackled. This will in turn improve our operational response on the ground. Although our understanding of organised crime is improving there are still challenges in building a comprehensive evidence base, including testing fully the planning assumptions set out in Part I of this strategy. These include the range of definitions of what constitutes organised crime, the lack of robust data and difficulties in assessing the impact of law enforcement interventions. The international nature of organised crime activity and the range of agencies which have a role to play in tackling it are also factors which affect the building of a strong evidence base.

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i. Interpol and Europol aid law enforcement agencies internationally and in the EU respectively. Eurojust supports judicial cooperation between EU Member States  
ii. The United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand

138. One of the key areas where we know we need to improve our understanding is around the socio-economic costs of organised crime. Our best estimate at present is that the total cost is between £20 billion and £40 billion each year. **We will therefore undertake a review of the social and economic costs of organised crime in the UK**, underpinned by a consistent and robust methodology across the crime types.

139. To date, there has been a lack of a joined up approach between government and partners in establishing research priorities on organised crime and taking them forward in a coordinated way. Developing a coordinated research agenda on organised crime will involve operational and research partners who bring subject knowledge and methodological expertise. Our ambition is to **develop a cross-government multi-disciplinary organised crime research strategy, which will be published in October 2011.**

140. The research strategy will aim to improve the value from research and analysis on organised crime by: helping prioritise key questions; encouraging data sharing; promoting the dissemination and sharing of research findings; encouraging collaboration; and reducing duplication of effort. It will cover a range of disciplines, including social research, economics and statistics and will include:

- an overview of current and planned government and academic research on organised crime;
- clarification of the role of key partners;
- an indication of the research needed to fill key gaps in the organised crime evidence base and support delivery of the activities outlined in this strategy;
- options for delivery, including coordination within government and between government and other partners; and

- plans for improving communication and collaboration between researchers, policy makers and practitioners.

141. The research strategy will not only rely on newly commissioned research, but will also draw on existing research from elsewhere, including academia, the private and voluntary and social enterprise sectors. The research strategy and improved engagement with the research community will help external partners and stakeholders to better understand these needs.

142. Improved engagement with the external research community will be achieved through workshops and seminars. **We will set up a ‘virtual’ network of researchers with an interest in organised crime** to ensure regular and focussed engagement between researchers and policy makers across government.

143. As a first step a stocktake of recent, current and planned research on organised crime was undertaken, targeting NSC agencies and UK-based researchers with a known interest in organised crime. The results from this exercise have been used to develop a ‘map’ of organised crime research across UK universities and other institutions. This has provided an important starting point for engagement across the research community. The forthcoming strategy will build on this, to develop and communicate a list of prioritised organised crime research needs and how these could be met.

### 3.5 Communication

#### **We will communicate our strategy effectively**

144. Communications are a vital tool in helping delivery partners, businesses and the public to understand the threat from organised crime, recognise it and motivate them to combat it.

145. Individual communications activities outlined within this strategy will play their part in achieving this aim. This includes: challenging criminal markets by encouraging people not to use products and services offered by organised

criminals (for example counterfeit DVDs and drugs); making people more aware of the harm they cause; facilitating the sharing of best practice; raising awareness of the threat and methods used by organised criminals; and providing the public and businesses with practical ways to protect themselves.

**146. The Home Office will lead the development and delivery of a cross-government communications strategy by Autumn 2011.**

This will set out details for these individual communications activities and place them in the wider context of the activity of other government, delivery partner and industry communications.

## Part 4 – Accountability

### Summary

The approach set out in this strategy requires work across a range of areas, and by a number of partners. Some elements are in train already. Government will provide stronger national leadership and oversight and put in place greater strategic coordination of the UK’s international work on organised crime. We will develop a clear set of indicators so that the public can judge the success of our approach to reducing the threat from organised crime.

### 4.1 Stronger national leadership

147. The National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the Prime Minister, is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the NSS and the SDSR, which highlight that a significant increase in the level of organised crime affecting the UK is a Tier Two risk to our national security.

148. As the lead Minister responsible for coordinating this work across government, and reporting to the NSC on it, the Home Secretary will – until the NCA is fully established – publish an annual assessment of the threat to the UK from organised crime and set out a transparent set of indicators (see below) so that the public can judge the effectiveness of the response to the threat.

149. Overall implementation of the organised crime strategy will be overseen by an organised crime officials group, with senior representation from key departments, agencies and devolved administrations. It will be chaired by the Director General of the Crime and Policing Group within the Home Office, as senior responsible owner (SRO). Progress on implementing this strategy will be outlined as part of the annual report which the Government will make to Parliament on the NSS. We will also require a new organised crime strategy every five years.

150. In implementing this strategy we also want to build on the strong operational links that exist within policing and wider law enforcement partners across all the UK territories, including the work of the Organised Crime Task Force<sup>i</sup> (OCTF) in Northern Ireland, which recently published its annual report,<sup>26</sup> and the implementation of the organised crime strategy, 'Letting Our Communities Flourish', in Scotland.<sup>27</sup>

151. The Strategic Centre for Organised Crime (SCOC) in the Home Office will coordinate the implementation of the strategy. The Home Secretary's Monthly Organised Crime Meeting, which involves key Ministers and law enforcement heads, for which SCOC is the secretariat, will scrutinise progress against the strategy, assess the latest intelligence and operational picture, and consider emerging strategic themes and issues.

152. The strategic operational response to organised crime will be improved by overhauling current arrangements. SCOC will establish a small number of threat reduction boards to provide focus for law enforcement partners including HMRC, SOCA and UKBA. Each board will be chaired by a senior operational partner, responsible for assessing operational and intelligence activity against the three themes set out in this strategy (**stem, strengthen, safeguard**). The Government's expectation is that all law enforcement partners should contribute to this endeavour. The activities of the boards will be subject to scrutiny by the senior officials group, and Ministerial structure, set out above.

153. The Government recognises that whilst national security is a reserved matter, crime and policing issues are devolved matters which are the responsibility of the Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly. Both Scotland and Northern Ireland have existing approaches to tackling organised crime, designed to work for the particular circumstances in those jurisdictions. The UK Government will work cooperatively with the devolved administrations to ensure close alignment of the strategic approach set out in

this document with the existing approaches in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

## 4.2 Funding arrangements

154. This strategy is set against the need to reduce the UK's budget deficit, which is why, through better coordination of effort, it should be delivered at a reduced cost. We will achieve this by making full use of the resources provided to SOCA (and from 2013 the NCA) and other organisations, the police service and other initiatives that are relevant to organised crime. We will also expect to see value for money as a key part of our shared approach.

155. SOCA is the only agency solely dedicated to combating organised crime, although a number of other agencies include organised crime as part of their core activities. Our broad estimate is that in 2010/11 SOCA, UKBA and HMRC will spend between £779 million and £829 million on organised crime, on top of what is spent by the police service. This will fall in subsequent years as set out in the Spending Review.

156. The total cost of the NCA, when established, will not exceed the aggregate of the Spending Review settlement for its precursor elements and the costs of the fully funded functions that it has been agreed should migrate to the NCA. Through its tasking and coordination function, the NCA will set the agenda for tackling serious and organised crime, drawing on significant resources deployable across the whole law enforcement landscape.

157. The police service, like other parts of the public sector, is not exempt from the need to make savings. The Spending Review reduced central government funding to police forces in England and Wales by 20 per cent. However, the reality is that no force will actually have a 20 per cent reduction in their overall funding. If forces freeze their precept this year, but increase it in line with official forecasts over the next three, they will on average face a 14 per cent real terms reduction in their funding. The police funding settlement is therefore challenging but manageable.

i. <http://www.octf.gov.uk/>

158. Our response to organised crime will also continue to be strengthened by investment in communications interception capability, cyber security and the use of technology to secure our borders. The Government will provide approximately £3 million in 2011/12 for the national coordination of organised crime policing. We will provide £19 million in 2011/12 and £18 million in 2012/13 to provide specific support for regional organised crime policing capabilities, including RARTs, and their enhanced national coordination. This funding is in addition to the main police grant.

159. Taken together, we expect that value for money savings can be made without affecting the quality of the response to organised crime. There are already a number of identified areas of potential savings, starting with HMIC's report, 'Valuing the Police', published in July 2010, which sets out how forces can save just over £1 billion.<sup>28</sup> Police forces can do more than this, for example by adopting a national approach to the procurement of equipment and to IT.

### 4.3 Transparent accountability

160. Measuring the success of the response to organised crime has been a difficult challenge for law enforcement, governments and academics in the UK and abroad.

161. We propose a new approach which will involve:

- assurance on coverage and the threats – i.e. an agreed percentage of the most serious organised crime groups under appropriate operational cover;
- assessment of impact on criminal markets using key market indicators on drugs and cutting agents (including price, purity, volume seized); criminal finances (preventing criminals from accessing criminal assets); and organised immigration crime (measuring the enablers i.e. the cost of facilitation and illegal labour and fraudulent documentation);
- assessment of impact on organised crime using a basket of output indicators including groups disrupted or dismantled and fraud prevented; and

- a richer and forward looking intelligence picture to indicate changes in threat levels; and consistent reporting from law enforcement partners on criminals' perceptions.

162. The **Home Office will continue to develop this approach and publish, in Autumn 2011, a transparent set of measures of the impact of the response to organised crime**, in line with the relevant commitment in the Home Office Business Plan 2011/12. To comply with the Public Sector Transparency Framework, the data to be used will be data which is already collected by delivery partners and others, so measuring the impact will not increase bureaucracy (or costs).

163. Police forces will be held to account on behalf of the public by their respective local policing bodies, such as PCCs, who will be directly responsible for the totality of policing within their force area. In addition to delivering against local priorities they will also support chief constables to deliver on national responsibilities such as organised crime and to challenge them on their effectiveness.

164. The NCA will be held to account by the Home Secretary. As part of UK law enforcement, the NCA will also have a clear relationship with the police and other law enforcement agencies and with PCCs. The NCA's operational activities, including its performance in carrying out its national direct tasking and coordination role, and its support to the police and other agencies, will be subject to robust scrutiny. It will also report publicly on its overall performance.

165. Taken together, the proposals set out in this strategy will effect a step change in how we combat organised crime impacting on the UK. By working at all levels – from the local, national through to international – with key partners across government, law enforcement, the intelligence agencies, and the voluntary and private sectors, as well as the public in a coordinated manner, we can achieve more action against organised criminals at a reduced cost.

## Annex A: Actions

Number	Paragraph	Action
<b>Improving our knowledge of organised crime</b>		
1	32	The Home Office will publish a new public facing UKTA in Autumn 2011
<b>Stopping individuals becoming involved in organised crime</b>		
2	52	The Home Office, working with law enforcement and CJS partners, will conduct an analysis of the criminal 'career pathways' of identified organised criminals
3	54	The Home Office will establish a working group of relevant partners and agencies to develop proposals to stop young people being drawn into organised criminality
<b>Tackling the causes of organised crime through development and stabilisation work abroad</b>		
4	57	DFID, working with others, will help address organised crime by working to build stability and reduce corruption in priority countries
<b>Improving how law enforcement combats organised criminals</b>		
5	62	The Ministry of Justice will review the rules and processes to ensure the civil justice system can process orders in a fair, effective and efficient way
6	63	The Home Office will work with the FCO to ensure that organised crime is appropriately reflected in Country Business Plans and to inform their decisions on drugs and crime projects
7	64	The Government will develop a common organised crime priority countries list where we will prioritise our collective efforts by providing strategic direction and coordination for the political and law enforcement resources that can be used to address it
8	66	The Home Office and Ministry of Defence will work together to make new arrangements to ensure that organised crime is considered within Ministry of Defence tasking decisions for deployment of maritime assets overseas

Number	Paragraph	Action
9	68	UKBA, together with partner law enforcement agencies, will deliver improvements in border security against national security threats including the threat from organised crime
10	69	UKBA, together with partner law enforcement agencies, will prioritise, alongside other national security threats, the identification of organised criminals entering or leaving the UK
11	73	The Home Office will introduce legislation to meet the challenges of new and emerging technologies whilst ensuring it is subject to robust and effective safeguards in line with the Government's commitment on civil liberties
<b>Targeting criminal finances</b>		
12	79	The Government will explore the potential for greater private sector involvement to deliver both value for money and an increase in our capacity to hit criminal finances
<b>Tackling the associates and enablers of organised crime</b>		
13	81	The Government will develop a range of measures to target and disrupt 'front' businesses (for example through revocation of licences) and HMRC will use its tax powers to disrupt 'front' businesses identified to have a significant amount of unpaid tax
14	81	The Government will explore how the powers of the Insolvency Service can be used to a greater extent to investigate and disrupt disreputable companies
15	82	The Government will develop an action plan on combating identity crime
16	83	SOCA will carry out an assessment of the extent of corruption by organised criminals in the public and private sectors and recommend ways for addressing it
17	84	The Government will continue to increase collaboration between law enforcement officers and regulatory and professional bodies to thwart businesses that facilitate organised crime
<b>Enhancing the criminal justice approach</b>		
18	87	The Ministry of Justice will develop proposals to modernise and reform the criminal justice system
19	88	The Ministry of Justice will develop and mainstream the principle of lifetime management of organised criminals
<b>Developing a more effective multi-agency approach to organised criminals in prison</b>		
20	93	The Home Office, Ministry of Justice and NOMS will propose a refreshed package of measures on dealing with organised criminals in prison

Number	Paragraph	Action
<b>Raising awareness of organised crime</b>		
21	95	The National Fraud Authority, through Action Fraud, will help coordinate the awareness raising activities of the counter fraud agencies for the public and businesses
22	96	The Government will use the planned cross-government communications strategy to make clear the link between certain criminal offences and organised crime
<b>Helping the public and business protect themselves</b>		
23	99	The National Fraud Authority will develop and issue a best practice guide on fraud prevention to counter fraud agencies
24	101	The National Fraud Authority and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau will ensure that fraud alerts to the public, businesses and the public sector are coordinated and effective, reaching the right audience at the right time
<b>Working closely with private sector and civil society partners</b>		
25	102	The National Fraud Authority will lead the development of a new strategic approach to tackling fraud across the public, private and non-profit sectors, to be published in Autumn 2011
26	103	The Government will establish a new Forum for Innovation in Crime Prevention
27	106	The National Fraud Authority and the Charity Commission will develop a strategic response to reducing the threat and impact of fraud against the charitable sector
<b>Developing a better framework for intelligence collection</b>		
28	109	The Government will review the National Intelligence Requirement to maximise its effectiveness as a framework for intelligence collection
29	110	The Government will introduce a more comprehensive method of setting out intelligence collection priorities
30	111	The Home Office will encourage existing members of community safety partnerships to join up their approach to specific operations wherever possible
<b>Keeping ahead of organised crime through horizon scanning</b>		
31	112	SOCA (and from 2013, the NCA) will coordinate and prepare regular horizon scanning reports for organised crime for Ministers, policy and law enforcement partners
<b>Using intelligence to aid enforcement and develop policy</b>		
32	113	The Home Office will ensure that an interim organised crime coordination centre with full multi-agency buy in, is in place by November 2011
33	114	The Home Office will oversee the development of a new approach to improve the synthesis, analysis and dissemination of all types of intelligence gathered from different agencies and sources

Number	Paragraph	Action
<b>Disseminating intelligence more effectively</b>		
34	115	The Government will enhance intelligence sharing by law enforcement by establishing common formats and embedding good practice
35	118	The Home Office will ensure RIUs continue to develop as an important resource, enabling intelligence collection and dissemination between forces and agencies and will work with all regions to adopt the GAIN approach in their areas
36	119	The Home Office will identify best practice in the dissemination of neighbourhood and local intelligence that can be used to brief local authorities, police authorities (now) and PCCs (from 2012), on organised crime
<b>Improving the operational response in the short term</b>		
37	130	The Government will look to a reformed Organised Crime Partnership Board to drive the implementation of the key national and regional elements of the operational response
38	131	The Organised Crime Partnership Board will develop specific proposals for enhancing the role of neighbourhood policing teams and CSPs in combating organised crime
<b>International cooperation</b>		
39	132	The UK will develop a coordinated, strategic approach to identifying and accessing EU funding streams
40	133	The UK will push for its objectives internationally through strong representation at the UN's annual conferences on drugs and crime
41	136	The UK will continue to work with our US partners through the new senior level organised crime contact group
<b>Improving our knowledge of organised crime</b>		
42	138	The Home Office will undertake a review of the social and economic costs of organised crime in the UK
43	139	The Home Office will develop a cross-government multi-disciplinary organised crime research strategy published in October 2011
44	142	The Home Office will set up a 'virtual network' of researchers with an interest in organised crime
<b>Communicating our strategy effectively</b>		
45	146	The Home Office will lead the development and delivery of a cross-government communications strategy by Autumn 2011
<b>Measuring the impact</b>		
46	162	The Home Office will continue to develop and publish, in Autumn 2011, a transparent set of measures of the impact of the response to organised crime

## Annex B: References

These references provide the detail of the sources quoted in this strategy. We do not necessarily endorse all the views expressed in those documents that have not been published by HM Government.

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