

**Evaluation of the
Indonesia National
Police Management
Training Project,
1983-96**

by

Phil Evans, Keith Biddle, John Morris

In May 1997 the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) was replaced by the Department for International Development (DFID). References in this report to the ODA apply to events, actions, etc prior to the changes of title and functions.

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for International Development

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	i
Abbreviations & Acronyms	ii
Map	iii
SUMMARY	1
The Project	1
The Evaluation	1
Overall Success	1
Main Findings	2
Lessons Learned	5
Evaluation Success Rating	6
1 BACKGROUND	9
Country Background	9
Indonesian National Police	10
The Project	11
Objectives of the Evaluation	12
Methodology	12
2 THE PROJECT CYCLE	15
Identification	15
Implementation	17
Monitoring and Supervision	19
3 ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES	21
4 EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING CARRIED OUT UNDER THE PROJECT	25
Training Institutions	26
Interview Questionnaires	26
Management and Performance of IMCU	28
5 FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS	29
6 IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY	31
Impact	31
Sustainability	31
Cross-cutting Concerns	32
Lessons Learned	34

ANNEXES

A: Terms of Reference	35
B: Policing in Indonesia	39
C: Evaluation Mission Field Notes	55
D: Semarang Case Study	65
E: Training Database	69
E1 Indonesian Police Officers trained in the UK	69
E2 Police Officers Trained as trainers of tutors in Indonesia	73
E3 Staff members of the IMCU	74
F: Logical Framework	75
F1 Project Framework for Phase II	75
F2 Project Framework for Phase II extension	77
F3 Achievement of log frame	79
G: Expenditure Cash Flow On Project Components	81
H: Organogram Of Police Training Institution	83
J: Results Of Management Training Of Officers In Training Centres	85
K: Analysis Of Results Of Interview Questionnaire	87

TABLES

Table 1 Evaluation success ratings	7
Table 2 The project Cycle - Key Events	16
Table 3 Achievement of Objectives	21
Table 4 Summary of achievements against objectives, phases 1 & 2	22
Table 5 Summary numbers of individual police officers trained in the UK and in Indonesia	25
Table 6 Tutors trained by ToTs since 1987	26
Table 7 Police officers trained as consultants and trainers of trainers interviewed during the evaluation	27
Table 8 Summary of findings from questionnaire survey	27
Table 9 Overall expenditures by components	29
Table 10 Unit costs of UK training	29

PREFACE

Each year the Department for International Development (DFID) commissions a number of ex post evaluation studies. The purpose of the DFID's evaluation programme is to examine rigorously the implementation and impact of selected past projects and to generate the lessons learned from them so that these can be applied to current and future projects. It should be borne in mind that the projects concerned were inevitably the product of their time, and that the policies they reflected and the procedures they followed may, in many cases, have since changed in the light of changing DFID knowledge.

The DFID's Evaluation Department is independent of DFID's spending divisions and reports directly to the DFID's Director General (Resources).

Evaluation teams consist of an appropriate blend of specialist skills and are normally made up of a mixture of in-house staff, who are fully conversant with ODA's procedures, and independent external consultants, who bring a fresh perspective to the subject-matter.

For this evaluation the team consisted of the following: *Phil Evans (Team leader), Social Development Adviser, Evaluation Department; John Morris (Evaluation consultant); Keith Biddle (Police Consultant).*

The evaluation involved the following stages:-

- initial desk study of all relevant papers;
- consultations with individuals and organisations concerned with the project, including a field mission to collect data and interview those involved;
- preparation of a draft report which was circulated for comment to the individuals and organisations most closely concerned;
- submission of the draft report to the DFID's Director General (Resources), to note the main conclusions and lessons to be learned from the study on the basis of the draft report.

This process is designed to ensure the production of a high quality report and Summary sheet (EVSUM) which draw out all the lessons.


This study is one of a series of evaluations of projects in the police sector. A synthesis study which draws out the conclusions and lessons from all these evaluations will also be available from Evaluation Department later this year.

Head, Evaluation Department

ABBREVIATIONS LIST

ABRI	GoI's armed forces command
AKPOL	Police Academy
ATG	Advanced Training Group
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoI	Government of Indonesia
IMCU	Internal Management Consultancy Unit
INP	Indonesia's National Police
KAPOLRI	Chief of INP
MIS	ODA/DFID's Management information system
NAO	National Audit Office
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
OD	Organisation Development
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
POLDA	INP regional command
POLRES	INP divisional command
POLSEC	INP sub-divisional command
POLLINGA	INP's community policing model
PTIK	College of Police Science
SEADD	South-East Asia Development Division
SESPIMPOL	Police Staff College
SELAPA	Police Officer Advanced Training Establishment
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TETOC	Technical Education and Training Operations and Consultancies (within the British Council)
TORs	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of Trainers

MAP



SUMMARY

The project

1. The UK-funded Indonesia National Police Management Training Project provided management training and other support to the Indonesian National Police (INP) between 1983 and 1996. The evaluation covers both phases of the project (phase 1, 1983/84 to 1989/90; and phase 2, 1990/91 to 1995/96).

2. The project aimed to improve the INP's management efficiency and help it move away from a militaristic style of policing towards a more community-based approach. The first phase provided UK and in-country training to a cadre of management trainers to introduce and establish new management training courses in all the INP's key training institutions. The second phase sought to build on the first by providing continuing support to the ToTs and training institutions, and establishing an Internal Management Consultancy Unit (IMCU) within the INP to act as internal agents of change and to ensure that new approaches to management and problem-solving were introduced at strategic levels in police operations.

The Evaluation¹

3. The study was undertaken by an Evaluation Department staff member and two independent consultants. Preparation work for the evaluation projects began in 1996 and a field mission to Indonesia was undertaken in December 1997².

Overall Success

4. Overall, the evaluation judges the Indonesia Police Management Training Project to have been "partially successful", gaining a "B" rating with some objectives achieved and some significant overall benefits achieved in relation to costs³. In view of the size of Indonesia and its police force⁴, the impact of the project has been significant in relation to the size of the UK investment, which averaged £130,000 per year over a 14 year period. Overall, the project represents good value for money. Remaining doubts about the long-term future of the Internal Management Consultancy Unit (IMCU) within the institutional framework of the INP mean that a "successful" rating cannot be given at this stage.

¹ The evaluation mission was undertaken by Dr Phil Evans (Team leader, DFID Evaluation Department), Mr John Morris (Evaluation Consultant), and Deputy Chief Constable (ret'd) Keith Biddle (Police Consultant). The Terms of Reference for the evaluation are attached at Annex A.

² Since the field mission was completed, Indonesia has experienced a period of turmoil in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis. President Suharto has stepped down, and the country has entered a period of uncertainty. At the time of writing (end of 1998) it is impossible to judge what further changes are likely to occur. The evaluation study reflects judgements valid at the time of the mission.

³ DFID requires evaluators to use the following scale for rating projects: A+ - Highly Successful (objectives completely achieved or exceeded, very significant overall benefits in relation to costs); A - Successful (objectives largely achieved, significant overall benefits in relation to costs); B - Partially Successful (some objectives achieved, some significant overall benefits in relation to costs); C - Largely Unsuccessful (very limited achievement of objectives, few significant benefits in relation to costs); D - Unsuccessful (objectives unrealised, no significant benefits in relation to costs, project abandoned).

⁴ Indonesia's population is close to 200 million and there is a police force of 170,000.

Main Findings

5. Taken separately, Phase 1 of the project, which introduced new management training modules and training methods into INP training institutions which are still being actively used 10 years later, would probably merit an “A” rating. The management training, and the values of openness and democratic decision-making which it carries with it, has reached an entire generation of Indonesian police officers of all ranks, and becomes an increasingly dominant part of in-service training as officers rise to the highest levels of command. The management training package is the largest single module in the 11 month training given to senior command candidates at the Police Staff College. While some doubts remain about the long-term capacity of the INP to sustain its cadre of trainers, and to revise and update the training modules without external assistance, the general evaluation judgement about this part of the project remains positive (paragraph 3.3-8).

6. The quality of technical assistance provided in both phases of the project has been high, with excellent working relationships being established between the INP and the long-term consultants provided by the UK. The same two-person team of core consultants remained engaged with the project for virtually all its life, with major benefits in terms of the quality of working relationships developed, influence brokered, and continuities established between the first and second phases. Many of the young officers trained through the project in the 1980s have now reached very senior rank in the INP. The project was further helped by regular monitoring by ODA advisers, and by efficient local management support from the British Council (paragraphs 2.3-12).

7. The establishment of the IMCU during the second phase was an ambitious undertaking and reflects a significant raising of the project’s aspirations in promoting change within the INP. Progress during the 1990s has been promising, and IMCU members have made, in the regions in which they have worked, valuable contributions to improvements in efficiency and moves towards an improved image for the INP in the eyes of the public (paragraphs 4.9-11). The team gained the impression, however, that although the IMCU had obtained some assurances of a future role within the INP by being given budgetary support as part of the expert staff of the national Chief of Police, there had been some loss of momentum in the year or so since the end of the project. The IMCU was in a holding pattern, awaiting a decision on its long-term future and suffering from the outposting of the majority of its members to other duties. A bid was in the draft budget, requiring the agreement of the Chief of the Armed Forces, for the establishment of a permanent unit of eight internal consultants, headed by a Lieutenant-General⁵. Until this decision is taken, the future of the unit remains uncertain. Continued support for the unit at the highest levels within the INP itself also remains a vital precondition for its long-term effectiveness. The IMCU has benefited from the active support of the current coordinator of the expert staff (a Major-General, who was himself the first head of the unit). He is due to retire in 1998, however, and it remains to be seen whether his successor will maintain the same level of commitment (paragraphs 6.5 & 6).

⁵ at present the unit is headed by a Colonel.

8. In judging the project's overall impact it is important to maintain a sense of perspective and recognise what would constitute a reasonable expectation of, in comparative terms, an extremely modest investment. It would be wrong to expect that a project of this scale on its own would be able to bring about a fundamental reform of policing in Indonesia. Judged in this light, the project has had a very widespread impact and reached a significant number of police officers, both through the training cascade and through work undertaken by INP consultants in the IMCU (paragraphs 6.1 & 2).

9. A notable feature of the project as it evolved was the shift from UK-based training to a much greater emphasis on in-country work. Regular visits by the UK consultants over a long period helped build a significant capacity within the INP to sustain the benefits of earlier parts of the project and to transfer skills to a large number of new tutors in police training institutions, for example, as routine staff rotations moved officers on to new postings. On-the-spot mentoring support from the UK consultants also helped INP consultants from the IMCU to develop their diagnostic and advisory skills in their support to police regions. Although there have been some losses over the years, the project does not appear to have suffered from the same levels of skills evaporation which are too often a feature of training-based projects (paragraphs 2.3-8; 4.9-11).

10. Although it was well managed and supported, both in-country and from ODA Headquarters in London and, from 1992, from the South East Asia Development Division (SEADD) at Bangkok (paragraph 2.11), a key project weakness was that monitoring and evaluation work paid insufficient attention to the project's overall impact in bringing about change within the INP and improving police performance. No baseline was established on which clear judgements on outcomes can now be based. The absence of this imposes limitations on ex-post evaluation work, which has had to rely on the experience and judgement of the evaluation team to fill gaps in the analysis of the project's effectiveness (paragraph 1.15). Judging, however, by similar comments in many other ODA and DFID evaluation reports this is by no means a feature unique to this particular project. It is only in recent years that ODA and now DFID have improved their approach to performance and impact assessment.

11. The project has succeeded in helping to lay down a number of important building blocks for the future de-militarisation of policing in Indonesia. The management style promoted by the training modules places the emphasis on participatory problem-solving and open lines of communication, acting as an important counter-weight to the vertical lines of command characteristic of military systems, and encourages managers to improve their awareness of the needs of the public and to recognise the importance of consent and public support in effective policing. A number of attempts have been made to improve police-public relations in Indonesia and to improve the quality of service provided at police stations and in the community. The team gained the impression from many sources that the general image of the police has improved somewhat in recent years, albeit from a low base (paragraphs 3.11 & 12; 6.11 & 12).

12. Important steps have been taken in some regions towards a more community-based approach to policing and a more overt recognition of the need to take the views of the public into account in the development of policing policy at the local level. The INP, however, is still far from attaining UK community policing standards, not least in respect of accountability mechanisms. There is no equivalent in Indonesia of civilian police authorities: public accountability relies almost exclusively on the media and the campaign work of Indonesia's numerous civil and human rights groups. Although the police are far from being seen as blameless, the army is more often the target in internal and external criticisms of Indonesia's human rights record (paragraphs 3.11 & 12; 6.11 & 12).

13. The project aimed to bring benefits to policing as a whole in Indonesia and did not have a specific focus on the needs of poor or disadvantaged people, including women. Human rights were a concern, but one which was addressed indirectly. With the benefit of hindsight, and in the light of the UK's current policy on international development, the project could be said to be deficient in these respects. During the 1980s, however, these were less overt aid policy concerns. From a tactical point of view it is also probable that a more assertive stance on human rights would have diminished the project's influence and created resistance to change within the force. Improvements in Indonesia's human rights record depend only in part on internal changes within the police force. At the same time, human rights issues have not been altogether avoided. The proper observance of citizens' rights is a standard feature of police training at The Police Staff College Bramshill (where most of the UK training was provided during the first phase) and remains a feature in the management training modules. In almost all cases, police officers trained through the project reported being impressed by the quality of the relationship between the police and public in Britain and hoped that similar standards could be achieved in Indonesia (paragraphs 6.7-12).

14. The long-term prospects of the establishment of democratic, community policing in Indonesia depend upon major developments in the wider national context, the most crucial of which would be the separation of the police force from the military command structure and a general improvement in Indonesia's human rights record. Although a new Police Act was passed in September 1997, giving the Chief of Police stronger powers in relation to other sections of the military in maintaining internal law and order, it remains to be seen how easy this will be to uphold (paragraph 1.8). It does represent, however, a step in the right direction. While the police force remains attached to the military hierarchy it will be very difficult for it to undertake the major organisational and operational changes (including the elimination of a military rank structure) necessary for the establishment of a civilian force. In a modest way, however, the project has introduced changes in style and practice which would help to facilitate such changes in the future. It certainly appears to have helped to develop a number of key individuals in the INP with the potential, given the opportunity, to act as agents of change.

15. The same 2 visiting consultants were involved throughout the project, initially as Bramshill College staff and then independently. This had considerable advantages in providing continuity and forming good relationships with INP staff. The counter-arguments for resort to competitive bidding to ensure

value-for-money have weight, however, in view of the considerable fee-rate increases over the 6 years period (paragraphs 5.5 & 6)".

Lessons Learned

16. A number of important lessons can be learned from this evaluation. The most striking of these are that:

- (a) it is possible, and can indeed be desirable, to work with police forces in politically sensitive and difficult circumstances, provided that the constraints faced by police forces themselves in bringing about change are clearly understood and realistic goals are set; (Paragraphs 5 & 11)
- (b) in politically sensitive contexts, more progress can sometimes be made by dealing with the most difficult issues in an oblique manner rather than head-on. In Indonesia, the project was not centrally driven by human rights concerns, but introduced policing concepts and working methods which promoted more openness and respect for, and consideration of, the needs of the Indonesian public; (Paragraph 13)
- (c) processes of change which go to the heart of an organisational culture require high levels of trust between the organisation concerned and external change agents, and in the end must be driven from within the organisation itself. In the case of the INP project, clear benefits derived from the provision of long term support, provided at a distance and supported by regular visits, and the long term investment in key individuals. The quality of the relationship established in this case was more significant than the level of resources invested; (Paragraphs 6, 8 & 12)
- (d) sustainable skills transfer is likely to be best achieved by a strong emphasis on in-country training, complemented by overseas training to provide a wider perspective; (Paragraphs 7 & 9)
- (e) in all cases, and particularly in difficult and controversial cases, the establishment of clear, agreed indicators of change and performance standards, and well structured monitoring systems, are essential if real lessons are to be learned; (Paragraph 10)
- (f) where a project or programme depends for its success on long term inputs from a core group of consultants or advisers close attention needs to be paid to contract negotiation issues to ensure value for money and to reduce the risk of excessive leveraging up of fees and other costs. (Paragraphs 5.5 & 6)

Evaluation Success Rating

The Indonesia National Police Management Training Project set ambitious goals, which it sought to achieve at very modest overall cost in a very challenging context. The evaluation has judged that it succeeded in achieving an important number of its objectives and that significant benefits have been achieved in relation to costs. The table below summarises the ratings given to the project by the evaluation team, using the standard chart provided by Evaluation Department.

EVALUATION SUCCESS RATINGS

The Overall Success Rating for a project is allocated on a scale from **A+** to **D** according to the following rating system:-

A+ Highly Successful:	<i>objectives completely achieved or exceeded</i> , very significant overall benefits in relation to costs
A Successful:	<i>objectives largely achieved</i> , significant overall benefits in relation to costs
B Partially Successful:	<i>some objectives achieved</i> , some significant overall benefits in relation to costs
C Largely Unsuccessful:	<i>very limited achievement of objectives</i> , few significant benefits in relation to costs
D Unsuccessful:	<i>objectives unrealised</i> , no significant benefits in relation to costs, project abandoned

The judgement on the Overall Success Rating is informed by a tabulated series of judgements on individual aspects of performance, including the project's contribution to achievement of ODA's **priority objectives** (listed in the upper section of the table). First an assessment is made of the relative importance in the project of each criterion or objective, which may be **Principal** or **significant**; or, if not applicable, it is marked “-”. Where no specific objective was established at appraisal, the importance assessment is given in **brackets**. Each performance criterion is then awarded a rating, based only on the underlined sections of the five-point scale above.

Table 1: Evaluation success ratings

Project Performance Criteria	Relative importance	Success Rating
Economic Liberalisation	-	-
Enhancing Productive Capacity	-	-
Good Governance	Principal	B
Poverty Impact	-	-
Human Resources: Education	-	-
Human Resources: Health	-	-
Human Resources: Children by Choice	-	-
Environmental Impact	-	-
Impact upon Women	-	-
Social Impact	Significant	B
Institutional Impact	Principal	B
Technical Success	Significant	A
Time Management within Schedule	Significant	B
Cost Management within Budget	Significant	A
Adherence to Project Conditions	Significant	B
Cost-Effectiveness	Significant	B
Financial Rate of Return	-	-
Economic Rate of Return	-	-
Financial Sustainability	Significant	B
Institutional Sustainability	Principal	A
Overall Sustainability	Principal	B
OVERALL SUCCESS RATING		B

1 BACKGROUND

Country background

1.1 The Republic of Indonesia was established in 1950 after a long period of Dutch colonial administration and a period of Japanese occupation during the Second World War. It consists of a vast archipelago of nearly 14,000 islands, 3,000 of which are inhabited, spreading across a 3,200 mile span bridging the gap between the Indian and Pacific Oceans from Sumatra in the north-west to Irian Jaya in the south-east. A population of nearly 200 million is spread over a land area of 780,000 square miles and is made up of more than 160 different ethnic groups speaking more than 250 languages and dialects between them. The official language is Bahasa Indonesia. Java is the dominant island, covering seven per cent of the land area but containing 60% of the population. The estimated population of Jakarta, the capital, is close to 10 million.

1.2 Indonesia has been dubbed one of the “Asian tiger” nations and, until the recent Asian financial crisis, sustained annual rates of GDP growth of between 6-8% throughout the 1990s. Until the end of 1997, the proportion of people living below the poverty line had been reduced over a 30 year period from more than 65% to less than 15%. The process of modernisation, with its combination of rapid economic growth and accompanying social change in a diverse and complex society, has not been without its problems.

1.3 The government of President Suharto, who came to power in a military coup which deposed the independence leader Dr Sukarno in 1965, has insisted on tight central controls and strict national discipline. Indonesia’s human rights record has been the subject of considerable international criticism and has led to the development of a vociferous human rights movement within Indonesia itself. In a recent report⁶ Amnesty International describes Indonesia’s record as “chilling” and claims that human rights violations are “widespread” and “are part of a pattern of systematic human rights violations which has unfolded over more than a quarter of a century”. Most blame is attributed to “Army personnel and members of elite military units...”. Although the police are accused of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners, “Fewer abuses are attributed to members of regular police units, mainly because they play a minor role in counter-insurgency operations and in the arrest of political suspects”.

1.4 Indonesia joined the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1991, and has set up a National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) which most critics of Indonesia’s human rights record acknowledge has proven to be far more independent than might have been expected. Indonesia’s disputed claim to the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, in defiance of a UN resolution, and the presence of a number of militant separatist movements in parts of the archipelago, have added to the pressures on the government.

⁶ *Power and Impunity: Human Rights Under the New Order*, Amnesty International, September 1994.

1.5 British government aid to Indonesia has been criticised in Parliament and elsewhere and has been the subject of a National Audit Office report⁷ and subsequent hearings at the Select Committees of Public Accounts and Foreign Affairs. Among other things, the NAO report and parliamentary hearings explored allegations of direct links between aid to Indonesia and British commercial interests, including arms sales. No evidence of such links, however, has been established.

1.6 The pressures of globalisation are being acutely felt in Indonesia and are frequently acknowledged in government and in the media. While, on the one hand, the government attitude reflects concern about the increasing difficulties of maintaining central control as global information becomes more widely available and aspirations grow there appears, on the other, to be a recognition that the pressure for greater democratisation and the upholding of human rights will continue to be features of this process. Many of the senior police officers interviewed by the evaluation team acknowledged this and appeared to recognise the increasingly urgent need for a more sympathetic, consensual approach to policing.

Indonesian National Police

1.7 The Indonesian National Police (INP) is a large, complex and highly centralised organisation. There are some 180,000 police officers controlled, operationally and administratively through a regional command structure, from headquarters in Jakarta.

1.8 The INP is constituted as one of the armed forces of Indonesia and its systems and command arrangements are identical to those found in the Indonesian army, navy and airforce. The rank structure, managerial arrangements, pay, conditions and uniform of police officers mirror the military arrangements. All police officers are trained as soldiers before they receive professional police education.

1.9 The chief of the INP is a full general and is legally responsible for all operational policing issues, but is accountable to the Commander of the Armed Forces (Chief of the General Staff) for non-operational issues. The INP's military background is reflected in its policing style, often inflexible and not always taking account of the views of the communities being policed. Its tendency towards heavy-handed approaches in dealing with public demonstrations and political gatherings has received critical coverage internationally.

1.10 The police role in Indonesia and the style of policing delivered are the subject of debate within the country. A recent statute has attempted to clarify the INP's accountability and its relationship to the armed forces. The statute also gives governmental effect to the concept of community policing.

1.11 Senior officers of the INP have long recognised the need for a change in policing operational practice to a more acceptable community-based police style with a relaxing of the ties to the military. This was said by the INP to be one of the primary reasons why the Government of Indonesia turned to the United Kingdom for assistance.

⁷ National Audit Office. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. *Aid to Indonesia*. HC 101 Session 1996-97. 29 November 1996.

1.12 The policing of Indonesia and initiatives taken to introduce community policing are discussed in more detail in Annex B.

The project

1.13 The Indonesian National Police Management Training Project began in 1983 and ended in 1996. It was implemented in two phases (1983/84 to 1989/90; and 1990/91 to 1995/96) at a total cost of about £1.8 m.

1.14 The objectives of the project's first phase were to improve the overall standard of INP's management and help create a less militaristic and more community-oriented style of policing, based on the UK approach. This change of style was to be achieved through a capacity-building and management-training programme covering all the main INP training institutions. Training was to be based on interactive, "experiential learning" methods which promote team approaches to problem solving and more open and democratic decision-making processes.

1.15 The second phase sought to build on the first through the creation of an Internal Management Consultancy Unit (IMCU) within the police force to ensure that the new management skills were actively applied at a strategic level. The project framework for the second phase defined the wider objective (long-term developmental goal) as the:

"development of an effective and professional national police force in Indonesia with the following characteristics:

- sound internal organisation alignment and functioning
- coherent and flexible strategic response
- efficient use of resources
- community-based approach to policing".

1.16 Project activities in the first phase consisted of training of trainers (ToT) courses at Bramshill Police Training College in the UK (until 1986) and in Indonesia (after 1986) to develop the capacity to deliver a new management training package in INP police training institutions, and study visits by senior INP officers to the UK to familiarise themselves with British police management methods and approaches to training. In the second phase, the core team making up the IMCU received a programme of training and skills development which combined a series of short visits to the UK with in-country training and project work in the field; a number of post-graduate training awards to develop skills in specific technical areas (human resource development, financial management, etc); and continued in-country support to the ToT programme in the training institutions.

1.17 For the purposes of the evaluation, a list of eight key objectives were identified from the project documents, covering both phases:

1. Trainers of trainers placed in all training centres
2. Skill modules introduced and in use in all training centres
3. New management training materials being used in all training centres
4. New learning methods being used in all training centres
5. In-house consultancy capacity established in the INP and 15 consultants trained
6. Consultancy assignments carried out in the regions and counterparts trained
7. Managerial and organisational improvements in the INP
8. Community policing concept known and in use.

The evaluation focused on assessing achievements against each of these objectives and placed these in the framework of the wider social, economic, and political context in which it was implemented.

Objectives of the evaluation

1.18 The Terms of Reference (TORs) set out in full at Annex A, identified three main purposes for the evaluation:

1. to assess the project's overall impact and the extent to which it met its objectives;
2. to make a judgement as to whether the benefits of the project outweigh its costs; and
3. to learn lessons from the project of value to both the Indonesian and British governments.

The evaluation was to assess both the direct and indirect impact of the project, on both the Indonesian police force and the public; the extent to which project objectives were met; and the extent to which the immediate benefits have been sustained and long-term benefits are likely to be obtained. As with all DFID evaluations, the team was also asked to investigate the benefits of the project for poor people and in relation to gender concerns. The team also took account of the human rights situation in Indonesia, this having been the subject of significant local and international attention in recent years and of central importance to an informed judgement of the merits or otherwise of the project.

Methodology

1.19 Preparations for the evaluation began in 1996 with a comprehensive review of the project files and the drafting of a project history⁸. This document, together with other key papers, were reviewed by the evaluation team prior to the undertaking of a two weeks field mission to Indonesia in December, 1997. In addition to meetings with police and other interested parties in Jakarta, the team visited police regions in West, Central, and East Java and South Sulawesi, and visited the main national police training institutions. Field visits included tours of police stations and regional headquarters and formal and

⁸ prepared in May 1996 by Deborah King

informal meetings with members of the community. Short questionnaire forms were prepared and used to interview individuals trained in the UK in the first and/or second phases of the project. A large proportion of those trained in the UK during the first phase, and all 16 of the core team members trained to form the Internal Management Consultancy Unit (IMCU) in the second phase were interviewed. A matrix was also prepared to analyse the main objectives of both phases and the extent to which these had been achieved.

1.20 The field visit yielded a great deal of useful material and the thorough documentation available for this project was of great assistance to the team, and helped place the mission findings in context. It is important to note, however, that the methodology used, though supported by some structured investigation tools, relied heavily on the experience and judgement of the team and the weighing of a large number of impressions gained during a relatively brief tour of a vast and complex nation. While far from being scientific or comprehensive, the team hopes that the judgements presented in this report will be seen to be based on a determined effort to present an assessment which is both balanced and fair.

2 THE PROJECT CYCLE

The project lasted over twelve years and went through several changes over this period. Some of the key events are illustrated in Table 2. Expenditure on the various components is shown in Annex G.

Identification

2.2 The initial suggestion that support should be provided to the INP came from the British Embassy in Jakarta and was taken further forward following a visit to the UK by the then Chief of Police in 1983. The Embassy's interest was expressly linked to the view of its Commercial Section that support to the police could help obtain valuable equipment orders from the Government of Indonesia (GoI). Although there was a clear recognition by the Foreign Office that the benefits of such a project would not be exclusively on the Indonesian side, there is no evidence in ODA files that this had an influence on the decision to finance the project. This issue was addressed by the NAO report, along with a similar concern about the Radio Studios Rehabilitation Project, in the following terms:

“..In May 1985 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office noted that the benefits of the aid project were not entirely on the Indonesian side when referring to the UK Government's hope for further defence equipment purchases by Indonesia. The close association between the Indonesian police force and the military establishment was felt by the Foreign Office to play a crucial role on future decisions by Indonesia on military procurement...

None of the contracts examined, however, nor the memoranda of understanding between the UK and Indonesian Governments, was conditional on the Indonesian purchase of British goods or services beyond those necessary for the projects and the primary reasons for supporting these activities were developmental. There is no evidence that representations from the Ambassador in Jakarta or from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Diplomatic Wing had any influence on the Administration's decision to undertake these projects and no reference was made in the papers seeking Ministerial approval to them.” (*NAO report on Aid to Indonesia, November 1996, p.13*)

The decision to provide management training support was in line with the request made by the then Chief of Police. A three to five year project was envisaged, following a training needs assessment undertaken by consultants from Bramshill

Table 2: The project Cycle - Key Events

Phase/Date	Event
Identification	
March 1983	Initial survey. Visit of two-man team from Bramshill Police Staff College to Indonesia.
Phase I. 1983/4-1985/6.	
	Administrative arrangements for visits by British Council in Indonesia and London with technical advice provided by TETOC. Overall management by ODA London
November 1983	Pilot course in Indonesia by Bramshill College.
April 1984	First course at Bramshill College.
October 1986	Last course at Bramshill College. No further training provided at Bramshill.
Phase I, Part II 1987-89/90	
January 1987	Visit by five man team from Bramshill to Indonesia to contribute to a programme of police management training in Indonesia.
August 1987	Visit to Indonesia by four man team from Bramshill to establish training of tutors (ToT) Group. Thereafter further training and support undertaken by a UK based firm of consultants.
March 1988	Course for ToTs run by UK consultants in Indonesia.
August 1988	Course for ToTs run by UK consultants in Indonesia.
November 1988	Project review by Professor Briston.
January 1989	Visit by UK consultants to undertake training of ToTs.
Phase II, 1990/91- 95/96	
July 1990	British Council appointed as Field Managers to Phase II. Technical advice provided by ODA Advisers. Overall management provided by ODA London.
January 1991	First visit to Indonesia by UK consultants to provide workshop for INP Internal Management Consultancy Unit, select candidates for UK training awards and arrange study tours.
October 1992	Overall management transferred to SEADD from London.
February 1993	Extension to Phase II agreed by SEADD.
January 1995	Last visit to Indonesia by UK consultants.
February 1995	Final review by SEADD using ODA London based Advisers.

Implementation

2.3 From 1983 until the end of 1986 the project's activities followed an annual pattern:

- a training of trainers course of 6-8 weeks at Bramshill for INP officers.
- follow up work in Indonesia each year, in which a Bramshill team worked with the returned trainers and INP course directors in developing and running a management module and related practical exercises.
- study visits by senior INP officers to the UK to familiarise themselves with British police management methods and with UK training approaches and facilities so as to build top level support for the project within the INP.

Overall management was provided by the ODA geographical department based in London. The British Council both in Indonesia and in London made the administrative arrangements for the visits. British Council (TETOC) provided technical advice on the project. Bramshill provided the training until 1986.

2.4 According to the NAO report, direct involvement by Bramshill came to an end in 1986 because: "...In 1984 the Home Office expressed concern at the prospect of the involvement of Bramshill College because of reports of civilian killings in Indonesia and uncertainty as to the possible complicity of the Indonesian police; they perceived a risk that British trained Indonesian policemen might later commit atrocities. The Home Office were also concerned that the College's continuing commitment for special training for any one country would put its overseas training programme out of balance. They insisted on the gradual withdrawal of Bramshill's involvement by 1986." (NAO report on Aid to Indonesia, November 1996, p.37)

2.5 For the remainder of the project's first phase the emphasis shifted to the provision of training in Indonesia. More account was now taken of accelerating the build up of a training and development resource in the INP itself. The training activities were switched from Bramshill to Indonesia. The key features of the programme were now:

- a differentiation of the level and content of skills and management training at the different INP training institutions and a further integration of the new learning methods into the curriculum;
- taking the Advanced Training Group (ATG) to a higher level for senior management training ability;
- accelerating the ToT programme to create sufficient tutors for the different training institutions;
- developing INP's selection and assessment capability for college students and tutor potential;
- developing an in-house consultancy capability within the INP to stimulate the transfer of learning to operational working teams.

2.6 From 1987-1988 a private consulting firm made up of a former Bramshill staff member and a management training consultant were used to provide the support in Indonesia. They were experienced in police training and consultancy work and familiar with the Bramshill model and methodology. Their brief was to:

- train the “core” group of trainers to undertake management training at the Police Academy, the Institute of Police Sciences (PTIK) and the officer training college (SELAPA). Initial work commenced in July-August 1987 and was followed up in 1988;
- introduce new management materials into the senior course at the Police Staff College (SESPIMPOL). This was started in July-August 1987 and continued during 1988 and subsequently.

2.7 A second phase of the project, initially to run for three years from 1990, was approved following a positive independent review by Prof. R J Briston and J Christian, based on a field visit at the end of 1988. As a result Phase II, over 1990/91-1992/93, was designed to:

- train at least 70 INP managers in the basic skills of internal organisation development (OD) consultancy;
- establish a central team of specialist in-house consultants within INP HQ which took an active role in OD;
- create a limited in-house consultancy resource within each regional command;
- model, support and supervise a series of pilot consultancy assignments in the field as an applied training exercise;
- integrate the above with a programme of UK training in specialist subject areas for selected INP officers on Masters degrees, short courses, and study visits in the UK;
- maintain and improve the ToT strategy, and build it, with the internal consultancy unit, into the organisation’s working infrastructure.

2.8 The British Council was appointed to provide not only administrative support but to act as Field Managers. The training consultants who had provided the bulk of the input on the first phase were re-engaged. ODA London continued to provide overall management until 1992 when responsibility for the project was transferred to SEADD.

2.9 In the second phase, UK training was largely provided by the Surrey Police and post-graduate studies were undertaken at a number of British universities and colleges. Work programmes and assignments were undertaken by the IMCU, based on plans drawn up with assistance from the UK consultant trainers, and progress was reviewed at each training visit.

2.10 Because of slippage in activities and training awards an eighteen-month extension to Phase II was agreed in February 1993 by SEADD. A further extension was agreed in August 1994, leading to the project's completion in 1996.

Monitoring and supervision

2.11 ODA monitoring of the project was regular and thorough, particularly in the second phase. In the first phase, progress reports were submitted by Bramshill after each training course, and by the British Council. In the second phase, the British Council submitted six-monthly progress reports, the consultants reported on visits once or twice per year, and an annual visit to the project was made by an ODA Senior Institutional Development Adviser. The project was also visited by police and social development advisers.

2.12 A Project Completion Report was prepared by the British Council and approved by the Head of the South East Asia Development Division (SEADD) in October 1996. It judged that the project had "largely realised" its outputs and that the goal of helping to develop an effective and professional national police force was likely to be partially achieved.

3 ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

The key objectives of both phases of the project are summarised in Table 3.

Table 3: Summary of key objectives

<p>Phase I: Management Training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trainer of Tutors experts established, used in training centres and still in operation. • Skill modules for management training established, used in training centres and still in operation. • New management materials used in skill modules in training centres. • New learning methods used and still in operation. <p>Phase II: Internal Organizational Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In-house consultancy capacity established and 15 (30) members trained up. • Consultancy assignments carried out in management function areas and regional centres. • Managerial and organisational improvements stimulated. <p>The wider objective for both Phases was as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The “community based approach to policing” known and experienced (in operation in the UK) and used by INP to “draw away” from the then existing military approach.

3.2 The analysis of achievements against objectives was undertaken by combining the analysis of a questionnaire survey of individuals trained through the project with interviews and observations carried out by the evaluation team during the field mission. Summaries of the team’s observations at the field sites visited are contained in Annex C. A more detailed case study of project activities at Semarang is contained in Annex D. A summary of the evaluators’ view of overall achievements against objectives is shown in Table 4. Although there was a significant degree of continuity between the first and second phases, the first four objectives refer largely to the first phase, the fifth and sixth refer to the second phase, and the seventh and eighth refer to both. An organogram of the national police training institutions is at Annex H.

3.3 The first four objectives refer to the ToT programme run in the first phase, leading to the training of tutors in INP training institutions and the introduction of a new three-part management training programme. The achievements against these four objectives have been substantial. A strong cadre of ToTs was established during the 1980s, and more ToTs were trained in Indonesia during the second phase.

Hundreds of tutors have been trained to deliver the course modules in the training institutions, and tutor training has been sustained to cope with rapid staff turnover. The course becomes more extensive as officers move towards higher levels of command. The basic course, covering interpersonal skills, is given to all officer trainees at the police academy and officer candidate school. A longer second level course, taught at PTIK and SELAPA (for officer candidates for the ranks of Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel) focuses on operational management, problem solving, and teamwork. The third level course, taught at the police staff college for senior commanders, concentrates on strategic management and planning. As officers move up the ranks, they are given refresher courses on the previous levels. The management training module is the largest single part of the senior command course.

Table 4: Summary of achievements against objectives, phases 1 & 2

Objective	Achievements	Shortcomings
1. ToT trainers in training centres	Achieved, but not sustained in all training centres. New batch of ToTs trained in Indonesia.	No ToT currently posted at AKPOL, SELAPA or SESIMPOL ToT capacity to undertake quality control of tutors constrained by other responsibilities
2. Skill modules in training centres	Achieved. At Staff College, management course is the largest single module.	Doubts about INP capacity to update and revise modules. Doubts about extent of genuine Indonesian ownership of the content of the modules.
3. New management materials in training centres	Achieved. Some courses updated by tutors with new case studies Achieved	Doubts about INP capacity to update and revise.
4. New learning methods in training centres	Achieved. Positive response from students to new methods.	Some inconsistency between new methods used for management training, and old-style methods used in other parts of training.
5. In-house consultancy capacity established and 15 consultants trained	Achieved. Core of committed change agents established, and significant levels of high level support obtained; IMCU services valued by police clients Budget established as part of Chief of Police's expert staff and bid for further resources made.	Level of activity limited since end of project. Outposted consultants have limited time available for consultancy assignments. No structured monitoring and evaluation system to assess progress.
6. Consultancy assignments carried out in management function areas, and at regional level	Assignments carried out in four regions, involving 18 divisions and over 30 sectors.	Activity levels have tailed off, and monitoring and evaluation of effectiveness is weak.
7. Managerial and organisational improvements	Some evidence of improvements in some regions.	Evidence largely anecdotal, and not reflected in crime figures and other statistics. No monitoring and evaluation system in place to check progress.
8. Community policing concept known and in use	Some progress, especially in IMCU supported regions. Improved front-line services in some police stations, including the establishment of service quality standards. Better communications and information dissemination to the public.	Improved accountability not seen as a priority. Impact largely confined to urban areas, and little evidence of benefits for the poor or disadvantaged (including women). Development of community policing constrained by limited resources. Low levels of public response to attempts to make police stations more user friendly. "Neighbourhood watch" schemes of limited merit, and do not appear to improve accountability.

3.4 New learning methods have been successfully introduced into the training institutions, and have been adopted in courses other than the management training, though a great deal of training still follows older-style didactic methods. Course materials have been updated to include new case material, but no fundamental changes to the basic package have been made since it was introduced 10 years ago.

3.5 Key shortcomings include constraints on the ToTs, because of other duties, on carrying out adequately a quality control function in respect of tutors and doubts about the INP's capacity to undertake major revisions of the training package as these become necessary.

3.6 The fifth and sixth objectives, pursued during the second phase, have also been largely achieved, though important doubts remain about the long-term sustainability of this work. The establishment of the IMCU signalled a significant raising of the project's aspirations and required a much more fundamental change of approach within the INP than the work of the first phase.

3.7 The aims of training a cadre of internal management consultants and establishing the unit were achieved. The placing of the unit within the organisational structure of the INP changed a number of times during the second phase, and it is now placed within the Chief of Police's expert staff, with its own budget. Consultancy assignments have been carried out in four regions and IMCU consultants have acted as important agents of change in the regions and operational districts in which they have worked. An important commitment to the work of the unit was obtained at a high-level workshop of Regional Commanders in 1993. This led to the issue by the Chief of Police of a decree calling for improvements in service quality which has served as a mandate for the unit's activities. Examples of attempts to act on this directive were seen by the evaluation team during the mission.

3.8 Important doubts remain, however, about the unit's long-term future. Most members have been assigned to other duties and the central budget only supports four staff. Activity levels have tailed off since the project's end, though a series of seminars for district commanders was still under way at the time of the evaluation.

3.9 Monitoring and evaluation of the unit's work is unstructured and inadequate, and the lack of a systematic approach in this area is a major weakness. During the mission, the Chief of Police's Assistant Chief for Budget and Planning was in the process of developing a performance assessment system for the INP as a whole but an effective IMCU will require a system of its own.

3.10 In relation to the remaining two objectives, the team saw some evidence of managerial and organisational improvements but this was largely anecdotal. The senior commanders met on the mission, however, all strongly acknowledged the importance of the continuing development of management systems and efficiency improvements.

3.11 As far as community policing is concerned, some progress appears to have been made in the IMCU-supported regions. The evaluation team saw improved front-line services in operation in a number of police stations, and evidence of structured attempts to provide the public with better information about INP services on offer. Service quality standards have been established in many places, setting goals both for the delivery of services and for the conduct of officers in their dealings with the public. Waiting times for the issue of licences and good conduct reports (which take up a great deal of police time) are said to have been considerably reduced. Crime reporting, however, continues to remain very low, which may indicate a general lack of public confidence in the force's effectiveness.

3.12 Weaknesses in the move towards community policing were identified in several areas. The most significant is that community policing in Indonesia does not appear to be associated with greater direct accountability to the public. Although closer relationships are being developed through "neighbourhood watch" schemes, the kind of accountability which might be associated with the establishment of a civilian police authority, for example, has not been a part of this. The police continue to rely on a relatively free press as the main source of feedback on its performance. Furthermore, the impact of work so far appears to be confined largely to urban areas, with little evidence of any particular concern being shown for poor and disadvantaged groups. Although attempts have been made to improve the appearance of police stations and make them less intimidating, the public response has remained low. By developing country standards, the INP is relatively well resourced, but still has a limited capacity to put sufficient officers into the community to fully develop an effective approach.

4 EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING CARRIED OUT UNDER THE PROJECT

4.1 Training was the key input provided by the project, beginning with UK-based training at Bramshill and developing into a combination of further UK training and an increasing emphasis on in-country training in Indonesia.

4.2 The evaluation has assembled a database (in alphabetical order) of all the individual police officers trained in the UK (Annex E). This was used as a basic reference during the study. The table gives the different types of training received, its duration, cost and course provider. Altogether 65 officers were trained in the UK over the period 1984-1997, covering 104 courses. The total cost of this UK training element was approximately £560,000. The database shows those officers who were selected to work as Trainers of Tutors and who were trained as Consultants.

4.3 In 1989 the ToT training programme switched to Indonesia. At that time 12 police officers were given ToT training. Three of these subsequently received training in the UK and are included in the figure for the 65 UK-trained officers. In 1994 the best ToTs trained a further 10 ToTs in Jakarta. In total 84 police officers received direct project-funded training.

4.4 Of the 84 police officers who received direct training, 33 were appointed as Trainers of Tutors in the project's first phase and 17 as Consultants in the second phase, together with a further 10 ToTs. Of the 17 Consultants, four had been previously trained as ToTs. The figures are summarised in Table 5.

Table 5: Summary numbers of individual police officers trained in the UK and in Indonesia

	Total	Trainer of Tutors	Consultants	Consultants and TOTs	General
Police officers trained in UK	65	24	17	(4)	28*
Police officers trained in Indonesia	38	22	17	(1)	-
Police officers trained in UK and Indonesia	(19)	(3)	(17)	1	-
Total number of police officers trained	84	43	17	(4)	28*

* Of these 28, 11 were on the first course in the UK. Thereafter there was a higher specialist output from the training.

4.5 The police officers who had been trained as ToTs embarked on a substantial programme of training of tutors at the various police training institutions in Indonesia. Table 6 shows the number of tutors trained at the different levels.

Table 6: Tutors trained by ToTs since 1987

Time Frame	Objective	Officers in charge	Tutors trained
1987-95	Tutors, Level I (1 st line supervisors)	ToT	1,123
1988-95	Tutors, Level II (Middle managers)	ToT	584
1991-96	Tutors, Level III (Senior managers)	ToT	88

Training institutions

There are three levels of training institutions for police officers and management training is provided at each level. These are shown in the organogram in Annex H. Under the project, tutors were trained at each level and skill modules were provided for the various courses in these institutions. These modules contained new management materials and were taught using new learning methods.

4.7 During the evaluation, visits were made to four of the five Level I to Level III training institutions. These were:

- the Police Academy (AKPOL)
- the College of Police Science (PTIK)
- the Police Officer Advanced Training Establishment (SELAPA)
- the Police Staff College (SESPIMPOL)

4.8 The purpose was to assess the achievement of the project objectives. According to the four immediate objectives of the programme these are as follows:

- the ToTs were established in all of the training centres. They were used to train the tutors and a substantial number were so trained. The ToTs have since, however, in many instances been posted or promoted and so are no longer in the training centres;
- the skill modules for management training were established in all the training centres and are still in operation;
- the new management materials are used in the skill modules in the training centres;
- the new learning methods have only been partially established, with limited spread beyond the management modules themselves.

A summary table showing these results is presented in Annex J.

Interview questionnaires

An interview questionnaire to explore project effectiveness was prepared by the evaluation team and used with 26 police officers. The aim was to cover all the consultants and as many of the ToTs as could be

contacted in the training centres. Altogether 31% of the police officers who had been trained directly under the project were interviewed, 30% of the ToTs and 94% of the consultants. This was a significant proportion of the officers who had been trained and is considered sufficient coverage on which to base the findings. Table 7 below refers:

Table 7: Police officers trained as consultants and trainers of trainers interviewed during the evaluation

	Total	Trainer of Trainers	Consultants	Consultants and TOTs	Others
Police trained	84	43	17	(4)	28
Police interviewed	26	13	16	(3)	-
% interviewed	31%	30%	94%	75%	-

The analysis of the results of the questionnaires is set out in the table in Annex K. The key findings are summarised in Table 8.

Table 8: Summary of findings from questionnaire survey

Question	Summary of responses
Skills learned through training	There has been substantial learning of the skills necessary for bringing about institutional change. More than half (15/26) of the police officers interviewed mentioned either learning about British police methods or about community policing.
Present postings	Less than half the police officers were in a job which made direct use of their specific training. Only 4 of the 17 consultants ⁹ were in a full time position in the IMCU. All the rest had other positions and did not regard themselves as a direct part of the IMCU team. At best they only had occasional work as a consultant. Similarly, only 8 of the 13 ToTs interviewed were based in a training institution. These 8 were not currently being used in a specified programme of training of tutors.
General usefulness of training	The police officers reported a relatively high use of the training in their jobs. Noticeable, however, for the officers trained up to 1990 was a decline in usefulness from 83% in the first job and 70% in the current job. This is consistent with the officers being posted, over a period of time, away from the speciality for which they were trained.
Particular use of skills acquired Relevance of British policing methods	A high proportion of those interviewed (65%) stated that they had used their training in the analysis of the police organisation in connection with their work. Altogether 17 out of 26 of the officers who had had training in the UK emphasised the relevance of British policing to the Indonesian situation: 13 of those officers said that it enabled them to see requirements in Indonesia and 11 said that it indicated the need for change in the Indonesian managerial system.
Ability to bring about institutional change and improvement	A significant number of the officers commented that at present it was extremely difficult to bring about institutional change and improvement. Nevertheless the evaluation team assessed that about three-quarters of those interviewed had obtained the necessary management skills and insights as to be able to manage change should they be required so to do.

⁹ This was also the case for the 17th consultant who was not able to be interviewed.

Management and performance of the IMCU

4.10 The IMCU was established so as to function as an internal consultancy unit which would provide change agents and facilitators within the INP. The emphasis was on improving service to the public by establishing consultants with three or four years training in this area. They were also to be given specific skills through training in such key areas as resource management. The strategy was to establish a client relationship with the regions and to work with counterparts in order to facilitate change. This approach was a highly innovative one at that time.

4.11 The project framework was discussed and agreed with the INP prior to the start of this phase. During the evaluation a detailed assessment was carried out of each component of the project framework. The original framework is in Annex F, accompanied by an assessment of each component.

4.12 The main areas where the project has fallen short of the framework specifications are the following:

- continuity of personnel. This particularly concerned those with whom the consultants worked and proved a major problem in working in the regions with both clients and counterparts;
- failure to make all the consultants full time members of the IMCU. Outposting has meant that their consultancy work has taken second place. This is associated with the need for individuals to pursue promotion;
- failure to provide sufficient budget resources for the IMCU to establish full time posts for all the consultants;
- failure to establish a set of specific and measurable performance indicators for the INP;
- monitoring and evaluating the work of the consultants. This is an important requirement for achieving change in the organization and also for stimulating improved performance by the consultants.

5 FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

5.1 The expenditure each year on the various project components is set out in Table 9. The numbers of short courses, scholarships for Masters' degrees etc, and study tours are shown in Table 10.

5.2 The costs of the individual items of Phase I from 1984 to 1988 are not available for detailed analysis for two reasons. First, this period preceded the establishment of the ODA's Management Information System (MIS), making systematic cost data impossible to obtain. Second, at that time the actual costs of training and of travel and subsistence were not broken down by discrete project components. Detailed figures are, however, available for the latter part of Phase I (Part 2 - Consultancy and Training Visits to Indonesia) and for Phase II. The overall totals of expenditure on the various components for Phase I (Part 2) and Phase II (1989/90-1997/98) are shown in Table 9. It can be seen that more than twice as much was spent on overall consultancy costs as on training and courses in the UK. The unit costs of the various types of training are summarised in Table 10.

Table 9: Overall expenditures by component

Project component	Expenditure (£'000s)	% share
Consultancy fees	327	30%
Consultancy: subsistence and travel	323	30%
Consultancy: unspecified	60	5%
Sub-total	710	65%
Scholarships, including short courses	210	19%
Study tours	108	10%
Sub-total	318	29%
British Council management	60	5%
TOTAL	1,088	100%

Table 10: Unit costs of UK training

Type of course	Duration	Cost	Cost per month
Police Staff College, Bramshill (1986)	4 months	£8,100	£2,030
Royal Institute of Public Affairs (1990)	4 months	£8,300	£2,080
Study tour (1991)	1 month	£3,000	£3,000
Master's Degree (1992)	12 months	£13,500	£1,130

As far as the costs are concerned, the shorter the course the higher the monthly costs, as would be expected. All the different types of courses were, however, providing different types of training.

5.3 There were one-month study tours every year for three years for the officers who were being trained to be IMCU consultants. These also provided them with direct experience of British police forces. They were complemented by substantial in-service training in Indonesia through the visits of the UK consultants. At the same time, the trainee IMCU consultants were carrying out items of consultancy work for the Indonesian police.

5.4 It is not possible to allocate the expenditure on UK consultancy work between training the Indonesian consultants and the items of consultancy work the trainees carried out. For illustrative purposes we have assumed that the expenditure on training was 25% of expenditure on the UK consultancy over the period 1989/90-1995/96. On this basis, the cost for each of the 16 consultants would have been some £9,000 for the training in Indonesia and £9,000 for three visits on study tours to the UK: ie a total of £18,000. Insofar as only four of the trained consultants are working full time in the Consultancy Unit at present, this would appear to be of low cost-effectiveness.

5.5 The fee rates of the UK consultants were £400 per day over the period 1989/90-1990/91. For the period 1990/91-1995/96 they averaged £558 per day. For the latter part of that period they were £600 per day. There was no competition with other possible providers. It is, however, the case that these consultants were providing the training for the course at Bramshill and there were good arguments for the use of personnel familiar with the programme and with conditions in Indonesia. These arguments gained increased strength as the project proceeded.

5.6 The fee rates increased by 50% over a period of six years. In the previous phase of the project both consultants were being charged to ODA at just under £200 per day. Allowance for inflation of 30.6% over the relevant dates would increase the fee rate to £260 per day. The fee rate of £400 per day over 1989/90-1990/91 would appear to be an exceptional increase for which there would seem to be no apparent justification, particularly for an ongoing medium-term commitment. Similarly, the increase for inflation of the fee rate of £400 per day over the period 1989/90-1990/91 would have been 28.5% to £514 and again the increase to £600 per day seems excessive.

5.7 The project strategy of providing periodic short term visits by the UK consultants to Indonesia, the travel and subsistence costs form a high proportion of the overall consultancy costs.

5.8 The analysis of cost-effectiveness has been particularly difficult because of the lack of specificity of the sub-codes in the MIS. Several different sub-codes have been routinely allocated to "police training" without indicating the particular component, such as study tours, which were being financed under the project.

6 IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

6.1 For the purposes of the evaluation, eight key objectives, covering both phases, were identified. The eight key objectives of the project provided a useful framework for the evaluation team's assessment (summarised in Table 4), and helped inform wider judgements about the project's overall impact and its sustainability. Cross-cutting concerns about poverty and gender, routinely considered in DFID evaluations, were also addressed, and attention was paid to the human rights issue, which is of particular relevance to this project.

Impact

6.2 The overall impact of the project can only be judged by proxy but is likely to have been significant in a number of important areas. Small, but well-placed cadres of trainers and internal consultants have been placed within the INP, and between them have influenced literally thousands of police officers. Virtually an entire generation of candidates for senior command have been exposed to the management training programme, which not only develops general management skills but also carries with it important values associated with teamworking and customer responsiveness. The IMCU has established an important mandate for its operations (through the Chief of Police's 1993 decree on service quality), and has staked a claim to a permanent place in the police establishment in the Chief of Police's expert staff. A final decision on its long-term future is awaited. Consultancy assignments have been carried out in Indonesia's largest police regions, and regular work is continuing to influence all Indonesia's district commanders.

6.3 Although it is too early to say whether the combined effects of the project will bring about lasting and fundamental change to the INP, the progress made by the project has been significant in relation to the size of investment and has laid important building blocks for the democratisation of the INP in a national and international context which is creating pressures for such change which will be increasingly difficult to resist.

Sustainability

6.4 In certain respects, a high degree of sustainability has already been achieved, particularly in relation to the capacity-building work and management training package. A cadre of tutors capable of delivering the course modules has been established; a rolling programme of training for new tutors is being sustained; and the package itself is still being delivered 10 years after its introduction. The evaluation team saw nothing to suggest that this programme would not continue in more or less its current form for the foreseeable future. Some doubts remain, however, about the INP's long term capacity to make major revisions to the programme, and to sustain a sufficiently high degree of quality control.

6.5 The sustainability of the IMCU is less certain, and was hanging in the balance during the course of the evaluation. Important precedents have been set, however, with the placing of the unit very close to the centre of power in the INP, and the establishment of a budget for it, albeit one which only allows it to operate at a modest level. If the bid for more substantial resources and a permanent place within the police establishment is successful, the future prospects for the unit look good. Rapid steps will be needed, however, to strengthen the unit's own management systems, including its monitoring and evaluation capability. The upgrading of the unit's leadership to Lieutenant-General status would be a significant step forward.

6.6 The INP indicated during the evaluation that further external assistance to the unit would be most helpful. DFID has already indicated, however, that further support is not envisaged. In the view of the evaluation team, while further assistance would no doubt help to maintain the momentum for change, the INP has the resources and potential capacity to sustain the momentum of the project on its own account: whether it chooses to do so very much depends on the extent to which there is genuine commitment to a process of change at the highest levels of command.

Cross-cutting concerns

6.7 An assessment of the extent to which a project has explicitly addressed poverty and gender concerns is a standard requirement for all DFID evaluations. In respect of **poverty**, the ODA files make no mention of any specific focus on this issue, or any attempt to target benefits on poor people or assess the effects of the project on this section of the community. It should be noted, however, that although work was focused on poorer countries, poverty reduction was not necessarily the dominant priority for the UK aid programme during the 1980s and early 1990s which it has now become for DFID. It was not a requirement, as it is now, that all projects should demonstrate a direct link to a poverty-reducing aim.

6.8 Although the project aimed to bring about improvements to policing in Indonesia which would benefit all sections of the community, the evident urban bias of the project is likely to limit the direct benefits to the poorest people. The INP does have a flexible policing strategy which includes specifically adapted approaches for use in more remote and "backward" areas, where policing work seeks to take account of traditional dispute settlement procedures and to operate with the consent of local leaders. The expressed aim of this strategy, however, is to draw marginal peoples into the mainstream of the national system of law and order, rather than to recognise the integrity of minority cultures as such. In this respect, it cannot be said to be a pro-poor strategy. The absence of a poverty focus should be seen, however, within the context of the enormous gains made by Indonesia in sharply reducing the proportion of its population living below the poverty line. Although the poor number several millions in Indonesia, the proportion of the population living in poverty is low compared to many other parts of the developing world. Nonetheless, a more explicit recognition of the particular needs of the poor, who find it more difficult than anyone else to represent their interests effectively, would have been desirable. The use of stakeholder analysis as a management tool in the training package should enable INP commanders to

recognise the specific needs of poor people but the evaluation came across no evidence that this was a priority concern.

6.9 Concerns about **gender** issues were expressed in a report from an ODA Assistant Social Development Adviser, who visited the project in 1991. Her report recommended that the consultants investigate the reasons why there were no women officers within the IMCU. Although no further mention is made of gender issues in the files, three women officers had been trained as members of the unit by the end of the project. The only evidence gathered during the evaluation of a specific interest being shown in gender issues by the INP was an initiative under way at Malang, in East Java Region, to set up a rape counselling service, with support from the local university.

6.10 Because of the controversy surrounding the project, the evaluation team took note of human rights concerns during the mission, and met a small cross-section of Indonesian **human rights** activists. Although only a small number of organisations were met, these covered a spectrum from the official human rights organisation (Komnas HAM) to a very outspoken, militant civil and human rights organisation. All of those met, including the official human rights commission, expressed concerns about Indonesia's record, across a very broad range of rights (including land and labour rights, as well as political rights). Komnas HAM noted that more than 400 cases of rights violations had been recorded in the past year, and that an ongoing debate was being conducted over the appropriateness of the government's interpretation of human rights and attempts to establish unequivocal support for the concept of inalienable rights contained within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There was agreement that the most serious violations of people's rights were more often attributable to the military, though there remained considerable scope for improvement in the conduct of the police. Although some progress has been made, civil unrest (including the burning down of police stations) remains an endemic feature. The UN Human Rights Day was observed during the course of the evaluation mission and was marked by demonstrations and civil unrest in several towns and cities.

6.11 Although the project did not explicitly set out to address the human rights issue, a concern for this is implied in its aim of developing a policing style which would be less militaristic and more in line with UK practice. References to human rights concerns are to be found in the project files from as early as 1984, and the final project file (covering the period 1995-97) is dominated by answers to Parliamentary Questions which are centred on human rights concerns¹⁰.

6.12 Given the project's size, it would be unreasonable to expect that it could have brought about a significant change in the Indonesian human rights situation, although greater respect for people's rights is central to the community policing concept which it promoted. The question raised in much of the UK criticism of ODA involvement centred on whether it was appropriate for the British government to give support to an organisation which may subsequently violate people's rights. This question was put during the evaluation to the Indonesian rights groups met by the team. In reply, all groups said they believed that continuing involvement of outside agencies was desirable and was likely to have a moderating effect

¹⁰ Nearly 200 Parliamentary Questions were tabled during this period about British government aid to Indonesia, including 100 questions in a three month period.

on the behaviour of the police. Although an organisation like DFID could not expect to directly bring about major changes, a presence was seen by critics of the Indonesian government's record to be of value. None of those met on the mission expressed the view that British government involvement with the police implied support for, or complicity with, violations of human and civil rights.

Lessons Learned

The Indonesia National Police Management Training Project set ambitious goals, which it sought to achieve at very modest overall cost in a very challenging context. The evaluation has judged that it succeeded in achieving an important number of its objectives and that significant benefits have been achieved in relation to costs.

A number of important lessons can be learned from this evaluation. The most striking of these are set out in the Summary (paragraph 16). Perhaps the key lesson is that it is possible, possibly even desirable, to work with police forces in politically sensitive and difficult circumstances, provided that the constraints faced by police forces themselves in bringing about change are clearly understood and realistic goals are set.

ANNEX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

I. OVERALL PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

1. To assess in terms of fulfilment of objectives and overall impact, the degree of success of ODA's programme of management training to the Indonesian Police Force (INP) which was aimed at improving the overall standard of management and also, if possible, enabling the military style force to create a more "civil" image with the emphasis on a "community policing" approach modelled on United Kingdom practice;
2. to arrive at a judgement as to whether the costs of the assistance programme can be justified by its perceived benefits;
3. to enable the Government of Indonesia, the local police force and the British Government to learn from the experience of the programme and draw appropriate conclusions which can be applied to similar programmes elsewhere.

II. MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

4. To assess in general how far the objectives of the assistance programme have been, or are being, realised in terms both of its effects on the police force itself and on the wider community;
5. to assess whether the original objectives were correctly identified in relation to the overall programme goal, and if not, what steps were taken to refocus the assistance during the course of the programme.
6. to assess all aspects of the direct and indirect impact of the assistance, whether institutional, social or economic, including a focus on benefits according to (i) gender and (ii) the poorest members of the community (although bearing in mind that gender and poverty were not mandatory foci at the time the project was formulated); and to identify any negative impacts;
7. to establish how far the views of the various local stakeholders were sought and taken into account during the planning and implementation of the programme (again bearing in mind that this was not compulsory at the time);
8. through appropriate consultation to assess whether or not there is a public perception that the behaviour of the police force as a whole has changed as a result of the assistance programme;
9. to assess whether, overall, the assistance was the most cost-effective means of helping to achieve the objectives of the programme.

III. APPROACH

10. The evaluation will be carried out in accordance with the standard Guidance Notes provided by Evaluation Department and making full use of the Project History.
11. The evaluators will take full account of the conclusions of the recent NAO report covering this subject.
12. The evaluation will focus primarily on the immediate and wider impact of the assistance and on judgements of overall success, cost-effectiveness and value for money. Issues relating to identification, design, appraisal and implementation of the assistance programme are important but should be considered primarily in the light of the impact findings (as detailed in “6” above); in these respects the evaluators should consider the following aspects where relevant:

Identification, Design and Appraisal

- a. how the programme was identified as a priority area for financing;
- b. how far and how well the Logical Framework technique was used in managing the programme and monitoring the achievement of objectives;
- c. how far the programme confirmed with the Indonesian Government’s broader policy priorities;
- d. the criteria used to select programme personnel;
- e. whether adequate conditionality was attached to the ODA assistance;
- f. how far, if at all, the ODA assistance complemented any contributions made by other donors;
- g. how effective were the channels and methods used for this type of aid, how far they might be improved, or which alternatives might be considered in future;
- h. the extent and effectiveness of the strategies adopted by the assistance programme to bring about effective institutional strengthening wherever this was needed.

Implementation

- i. whether the assistance programme met its targets for physical implementation and how accurately those targets reflected the potential for achievement; and if targets were not met, the main reasons for under-achievement;
- j. whether monitoring and review procedures were adequate and appropriate, including whether the reporting systems were effective in systematically feeding back advice and recommendations (i) to the programme’s management, and (ii) to the Indonesian authorities;
- k. the ability of UK personnel working in Indonesia to develop a rapport with the recipients;
- l. the level of cooperation provided by the recipients and how far any conditions attached to the assistance programme were fulfilled;
- m. the quality and appropriateness of advice provided by the programme personnel

- n. whether programme design was sufficiently flexible to take into account changing circumstances and assumptions;
- o. whether the risks at each stage were properly assessed and acted upon.

IV. ORAL REPORT BACK AND WRITTEN REPORTING

- 13. The evaluators will call on SEADD at the conclusion of the field study to give a presentation of their provisional, preliminary findings. Subsequently they will submit to Evaluation Department, within four weeks of their return from the field, a draft report on their findings; and they may be required thereafter to make amendments to the draft in the light of comments received from within and outside the ODA. They may also be required to attend a meeting of the ODA Projects and Evaluation Committee if the latter chooses to consider the evaluation in detail.

Evaluation Department
October 1996

ANNEX B

POLICING IN INDONESIA

1. Introduction

B1 This annex discusses the organisation, accountability and style of the INP. It draws upon the evaluation process and provides a snapshot, at the time the evaluation team visited Indonesia, of the benefits that had accrued from the ODA/DFID assistance to the development of the INP.

2. Background

B2 Constitutionally, policing in Indonesia is the responsibility of the INP. This is a national organisation and, unlike police forces in most other modern democratic countries, is accountable to the Minister of Defence and the Commander of the armed forces. For administrative purposes, the INP has command and organisational structures similar to those of the navy, army and air force but is largely independent in respect of operational issues. The chief of police is a four star general and is a full member of the military council.

B3 Prior to the Second World War, the formal policing of Indonesia was the responsibility of the Netherlands' colonial administration and was based upon the policing of the Netherlands. Immediately following independence in 1950 the INP was formed. Almost all of the policing traditions inherited from the previous colonial dispensation were scrapped because the Indonesians had formed a strong dislike of all things colonial.

B4 Indonesian police officers, being the only organised armed body in the country, had been in the van of the fight for independence from the Netherlands and for this reason formed the nucleus of the emerging nation's armed forces. In consequence, the ties between the INP and the military became very close and the INP developed an overtly military style.

3. United Kingdom Assistance to the Indonesian National Police Force

B5 In 1983 the then Chief of the INP requested developmental help from the United Kingdom. This request for help was made because the Indonesians had formed the view that the INP needed to become more orientated towards policing by consent, to be accountable to the people for its actions and to develop a community policing style¹¹. In short, it had been recognised that there was a need to transform the INP from a mainly paramilitary force to a police service that would be acceptable to and supported by the majority of Indonesians.

¹¹ Interview with Mr W Pullinger QPM, formerly the Director of Overseas Police Studies at the Police Staff College, Bramshill, 1985 - 1988.

B6 Although, philosophically, the need for change is easy to define and articulate, finding solutions to the problems identified is infinitely more difficult. The degree of difficulty is increased when solutions have to be found in a problematic operational environment, where political and military senior figures are unconvinced of the need and at a time when the economy of the country was fluctuating uncertainly, following a long period of phenomenal growth.

B7 Between 1983 and 1995 British aid to the INP was provided in two phases with the wider aim of contributing to:¹²

“The development of an effective and professional national police force in Indonesia with the following characteristics:

- Sound internal organisational alignment and functioning
- Coherent/flexible strategies responses
- Efficient use of resources
- Community based approach to policing.”

B8 To achieve the necessary critical shifts in the political approach to policing, operational practice and police accountability would have required infinitely more technical assistance and United Kingdom resources than was applied to this project over its thirteen years life cycle: £1.8 million or circa £140,000 for each project year. In consequence, the assistance given was targeted so as to have the best effect upon the development of the INP for the money invested. The project activities concentrated upon providing education and expertise to selected officers, who had the potential to rise to the most influential positions within the INP. The schedule at Annex E shows the training officers received through the project.

B9 In the first phase of the project activity centred upon bespoke courses provided by the Bramshill Police Staff College for Indonesian police officers either at Bramshill or in Indonesia. In addition, Indonesians attended the Overseas Command Course, the Intermediate Command Course and the Senior Command Course at Bramshill and this provided the selected officers with opportunities to study comparative policing in collaboration with colleagues from democratic countries with a tradition of policing by consent.

B10 From an early stage the need for sustainability was recognised and considerable effort was devoted towards training tutors so that the education could continue to be delivered in Indonesia by trained INP personnel.

B11 The second phase aimed to build upon the lessons learned in the first phase. The strategy was:

- to continue support to the trained tutors,
- to help develop the management training in the INP training institutions,

¹² Project Memorandum dated 4 October 1990.

- to facilitate the establishment of an internal team of change agents under the umbrella title of the Internal Management Consultancy Unit (IMCU),
- to continue educating selected officers with good potential in the United Kingdom at Universities and with various police forces.

4. Organisational Structure of the Indonesian National Police Force

B12 The INP's organisational structure is centrally driven and headquarters maintains strict control over subordinate units. It is very much a traditional military style administrative structure and almost mirrors the arrangements of the Indonesian Army.

B13 The Headquarters units are responsible to the Chief of the INP (KAPOLRI) for the formulation of policy and strategy. Specialist units such as personnel and training, organised crime combating, finance and logistics are based at headquarters.

B14 The next tier consists of the regional commands (POLDA). There are twenty seven regions which, depending upon size, are commanded by either a major general or a brigadier general. Their function is to co-ordinate the policing activity in the regions. The regions are geographically coterminous with the military district commands and the police regional commander is a full member of the local military management committee.

B15 Although the police regional commanders insist that they have primacy for police matters and that the military only came onto the streets when requested to do so by the police commander, the reality may be somewhat different. People met during the evaluation frequently said that the armed forces regularly appeared on the streets of Indonesian towns apparently carrying out what was described as a policing role.

B16 The next tier is that of the police division (POLRES) of which there are 298. These are based in major centres of population and control and co-ordinate the activities of several police stations.

B17 The most important tier is that of the police sub-division (POLSEK) which is responsible for the delivery of policing services to the people of Indonesia. There are 3400 POLSEK.

B18 Each tier of command maintains its own support and administrative structures and all are reminiscent of army units. Military style discipline is the norm and the saluting of senior ranks is mandatory. Meetings and presentations are conducted in a formal militaristic manner.

B19 The following table gives an indication of the police alignment with a traditional military command structure.

Indonesian National Police	Military
Headquarters (POLRI)	Army
Region (POLDA)	Division/Brigade
Division (POLRES)	Battalion
Sub-division (POLSEK)	Company
Police station or specialist team such as CID Military	Platoon

5. The Indonesian State Police Statute 1997

B20 In November 1997 a statute was passed into law by the Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia to make arrangements for the accountability, operations and management of the INP and to clarify its role in relation to the armed forces command (ABRI). The main purposes of this statute are:

- to give legal effect to the principle of the INP having primacy in respect of all internal policing issues
- to articulate the need for all INP officers to operate ethically and to uphold the basic human rights and freedoms of all citizens
- to lay the foundations for effective community policing
- to clarify the role of the military in internal policing issues.

B21 This important legislation was guided through the drafting and committee negotiations by the major general responsible for the specialist staff and policy formulation. The major general had benefited from the ODA/DFID project and was one of the INP officers who had studied in the United Kingdom. The major general told the evaluators that his studies of policing methods in the United Kingdom had greatly influenced the statute's underpinning philosophy.

B22 The evaluators formed the view that many senior officers of the INP welcomed the new statute, the limited civilianisation of policing, and the clarification the statute provides. A subliminal message seemed to come across that many would have liked the INP to have been placed under a separate civilian ministry. All the senior officers met during the evaluation expressed the view that community policing was the way forward.

B23 It is also the evaluators' view that the complete eradication of the armed forces from the police accountability chain would be a welcome catalyst in the development of community and police partnerships.

B24 The following analysis is taken from translations of the final draft bill and explanatory paper prepared for the Parliament of Indonesia.¹³

a. The role of the police

The purpose of the INP is defined in Articles 2 and 3 as follows:

Article 2

“The INP is established to police order, uphold the law and maintain public peace of life in order to bring into reality public safety and order in the frame of safeguarding domestic security, enforcing state security and achieving these aims by respecting human rights.”

Article 3

“The INP conducts the state functions in the field of law enforcement; providing protection, service and guidance to the public in maintaining order, and developing public peaceful life in order to bring into reality public security and order.”

The primacy in policing matters of the INP is affirmed in Article 5:

Article 5

“(1) The INP is one of the elements of the Indonesian Armed Forces and especially has the role of maintaining domestic security;
(2) The INP shall become an integral unit in performing police functions.”

The effect of these three statutory provisions is to make the INP totally responsible for domestic policing issues and the essence of the provisions is effectively similar to those found in other democratic countries. The provisions are further strengthened by Article 27:

Article 27

“ In emergency and for the sake of the public interest the INP shall be allowed to ask assistance of, and use, other elements of the Indonesian Armed Forces.”

The explanatory notes prepared for members of the Indonesian Parliament to enable them to come to an informed decision clarified this article as follows:

“An emergency is defined as a certain situation marked with any disturbance and/or appropriately expected there will occur immediately any disturbance to the public order and security, which according to the estimation, the power or ability of the police is inadequate to handle and/or prevent the disturbance, also including any activity of the community or government requiring the mobilisation of the INP so that the activity can take place in an orderly manner and safely.

¹³ Translations provided by Chancery Section of the British Embassy, Jakarta.

In the realisation of the application of another element of the Armed Forces of Indonesia, **the operational responsibility and authority is vested in the police of the Republic of Indonesia.**”

INP senior officers envisage that the military forces will only be called upon to help to police riot situations and will not be routinely used to supplement police street strengths - in Indonesia riots can be very ferocious and frequently result in fatalities. The military will, however, continue to be routinely utilised where they have unique technical expertise - such as bomb disposal – and for providing resources to help at disasters.

The above provisions should limit the role of military forces to coming to the aid of the civil power in times of real operational emergencies and to providing services to the community at appropriate times. The Statute, most importantly, appears to place military personnel deployed on policing tasks under the operational control of the INP.

The enacted provisions are consistent with those of other democratic countries and only time will tell whether or not they will bring about a change in the policing of Indonesia.

b. Accountability

The chain of accountability of the INP leads directly to the President of the Republic of Indonesia and no provision is made for the INP to be formally accountable for its actions to the community.

Article 8

“(1) The President shall hold the highest power on the INP

(2) In implementing the power as referred to in paragraph (1) above, the President shall be assisted by the Minister and the Commander.”

The “Minister” is the Minister for Defence and the “Commander” is the Commander of the Armed Forces (ABRI). This Article of the Statute effectively gives the armed forces the ‘golden share’ in that they have the power to influence the President in policing issues. However, the General of the INP is given lead responsibility for the formulation and implementation of policing policy and the development of the capability of the INP but in both regards he is responsible to the Minister and the Commander for his actions.

A consequence may therefore be that the General INP will always ensure that his decisions are in accord with the thinking of the military leaders and the fine words of intent in the Statute regarding police primacy and independence of action will prove to be hollow. This is particularly so as the General INP is appointed by the President on the advice of the Minister and Commander and officers of senior rank in the INP are appointed by the Commander upon recommendation from the General INP.

The subliminal message received by the DFID evaluators, revolves around concerns as to how military leaders will interpret their powers: there are ambiguities that could lead to operational and managerial confusion.

The Statute is, however, on a firmer footing when it deals with individual accountability of police officers. Articles 23 and 24 set out a framework for ethical policing and this is very much in keeping with developments which will have been witnessed in United Kingdom police forces by those Indonesian police officers who benefited from study sponsored through the ODA/DFID project.

Article 23 requires the attitude and behaviour to reflect the provisions of a code of professional ethics, which will be determined by the General of the INP. Article 24 provides for a Committee of Code of Ethics one of whose roles will be to deal with infractions against that Code.

c. Community Policing

The Statute gives effect to the concept of community policing:

Article 26 (1) & (2)

“Relationship and co-operation of the INP with both domestic and foreign bodies, agencies and institutions shall be built on the basis of functional relationship principles, mutual understanding, mutual assistance (thereby) giving priority to the public interest.

The domestic relationship and co-operation shall be built especially with local government elements and institutions and with the local community by developing participation and partnership.”

The Statute has articulated for the first time a commitment from the Government of Indonesia towards community-based policing and gives support to the community policing initiatives being taken and the developments which have occurred.

These provisions seem to have gone some way towards meeting the final aim of the ODA/DFID project’s wider objective, i.e -

“The development of an effective and professional national police force in Indonesia with the following characteristics:

- sound internal organisational alignment and functioning
- coherent/flexible strategies responses
- efficient use of resources
- a community-based approach to policing.”

It is not unreasonable to deduce that the work done by the ODA consultants to develop key individuals in the INP has assisted in bringing about this signal statement of policy.

6. Policing Style

B25 The INP is a civilian police force with distinct military characteristics. All police officers receive basic military training before professional police education. Continuation training continues to mirror the in-service training regime of the army, navy and air force. Uniforms have a similar appearance, although police officers do not wear camouflaged clothing for day to day duties. The ranks and badges of rank mirror those of the other three forces and the unit shoulder flashes worn by all police officers are distinctly military. Conditions of service and promotions are also based on military systems.

B26 Although, however, the INP is administratively indistinguishable from the three military forces, police officers in Indonesia are aware that their role in society differs vastly from that of the other forces. Police officers are proud of their military discipline but maintain an equal pride in their professional policing role.

B27 The military influences on the INP clearly affect its operations and the policing style is reactive and rigid. There is a tendency, widely reported by the international media, for them to suppress street disorder, illegal marches and protests in an unacceptable heavy handed manner and it is frequently alleged that the human rights of suspects and arrested persons are ignored.

B28 Street disturbances and riots are not uncommon in Indonesia and such events all too often result in fatalities. The INP often find themselves confronted by rioters intent upon causing death to their opponents and mayhem within minority communities. Consequently, police responses have to be harder than the INP would prefer: no police officer enjoys having to quell bloodthirsty rioters.

B29 An example of the problem of lethal rioting was explained to the DFID Evaluation Team in South Sulawesi where indigenous people had randomly attacked Chinese people and set about destroying property owned by people of Chinese origins. Deaths occurred and the only way to stop the disorder, which lasted for days, was by the use of highly trained riot squads supplemented by troops.

B30 In the general day to day routine, police responses to problems have taken little account of the views of the ordinary people or the communities affected by police actions. This is not untypical of policing elsewhere in the world or in developed countries in the not too distant past. Traditional law enforcement-based policing is usually characterised by government or police imposed solutions that do not necessarily take account of community desires or requirements. In consequence, there is a lack of confidence in the police, an unwillingness to report matters to police officers and a fear of being seen to help police by giving evidence against criminals. Corruption becomes endemic and often open hostility and conflict between the community and the police will be evident.¹⁴

¹⁴ See *The Report of an Enquiry into Disorders in Brixton, London* by the Rt.. Hon The Lord Scarman OBE, (HMSO 1981).

7. Towards Community Policing

B31 The senior officers of the INP, many of whom have studied policing methods in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, The Netherlands and the United States of America, are conscious of the need for the INP to move away from its traditional paramilitary law enforcement-based policing methods towards a more proactive problem solving operational style, which will be linked to a public service culture. In other words: **community policing**.

B32 This development is the product not only of the thinking of educated professionals but is also supported by Indonesian society.¹⁵ The effect of globalisation cannot be underestimated. Citizens of countries throughout the developing world are more cognisant than ever of issues that affect their living standards and of international norms in respect of human rights. Free access to radio and, via satellite, to television programmes from throughout the world has heightened the awareness of ordinary people towards their rights and the policing of their societies. Globalisation was cited as one of the main drivers of change in Indonesia and, in particular, the impetus that helped drive through the Police Statute.

B33 What is community policing and how can it help to improve the INP style of policing? The term community policing does not have a standard definition. It is a term used to describe a policing style which:

- takes account of local problems
- meets the needs and desires of local people
- solves problems within communities
- treats the community as partner in policing, thereby preventing crime and disorder, improving the environment and ensuring the safety and security of individuals
- enables police to act proactively against patterns of crime and persistent criminals
- enables police commanders to make better use of their limited human resources
- enables the police to enforce the law effectively and efficiently and with the support of the law-abiding community
- provides avenues of communication between the police and community groups
- energises all agencies working within the community.

B34 Community policing is not a discrete programme or collection of initiatives added on to existing police practices but is an holistic operational style for delivery of all police services. It follows, therefore, that all police officers have to become community police officers and that everyone affected by policing understands the philosophy. This is not an easy change process to undertake and it takes a great deal of determination and effort from governmental policy makers, community leaders and police officers.

¹⁵ Interviews with NGO representatives and community members in Indonesia during the evaluation

B35 The initiatives that have been taken in Indonesia are police led and the IMCU has been an influential facilitator of community policing initiatives. The training provided during the project enabled a number of influential senior INP officers to study formally community responses to problems and to witness at first hand community policing in action in the United Kingdom. When these formal studies were combined with the consultancy skills acquired from the United Kingdom consultants, it enabled members of the IMCU to adapt British community policing initiatives to Indonesian circumstances. Some examples of community policing initiatives being piloted and witnessed by the DFID Evaluation Team are given below (some of the notes in Annex C cover the same ground).

B36 In Malang in Eastern Java, as part of the community policing and quality of service initiatives, “user friendly” receptionists have been introduced to the public enquiry counter at the Malang police station. The lady receptionists are dressed in attractive receptionists/ airline style uniform clothing and they are intended to make the public feel more relaxed about visiting a police station to make reports. This initiative was facilitated by members of the IMCU and is clearly based on similar models they will have observed whilst on study visits to United Kingdom police forces.

B37 As part of the evaluation study the system was tested by a member of the team, role-playing the victim of a street robbery which had just happened in the street adjacent to the police station. The first step was actually to get to the public enquiry counter. This was clearly signed in Bahasa Indonesian but the victim has first to present himself or herself to the Provoost post. The Provoost is an internal policing unit, akin to a military police detachment and, in addition to its function of ensuring internal discipline within the INP, is responsible for guarding police stations. Its members, heavily armed and austere, are the antithesis of the softer image presented by the public enquiry receptionists.

B38 Once admitted to the public enquiry counter the receptionists were polite and sympathetic. Basic details of the incident were taken and written into a desk journal. (This was only the fifth incident of the day and the others referred to people visiting to obtain or renew driving documents.)

B39 Once details had been obtained, the receptionist handed the matter to a police sergeant in an adjacent office. She took no action to either report the incident or initiate police action to look for the suspects. In the United Kingdom the public enquiry receptionists would have contacted the operational unit with basic details so that immediate action could be taken. The police sergeant then asked a number of questions about the incident and commenced to make a computer record of the crime. The questions were basically the same as those asked at the public enquiry counter and the process was mainly duplication.

B40 The police sergeant, having completed the report, passed the matter to the duty officer, a lieutenant, who again asked a number of duplicate questions but did arrange for an investigation to be commenced. The duty officer also handed over a copy of the computer report. Insurance companies in Indonesia require this so that a victim can prove that a report of the crime was made to the police – it is frequently alleged that, at this stage, a corrupt payment is more often than not demanded. The matter

was then passed to the CID for investigation. A formal signed statement was made, photographs of suspects shown and a routine CID investigation launched. Follow up was promised but only if there was an arrest. Enquiries which do not result in court proceedings are closed without the victim receiving any explanation of the outcome of the investigation. The whole process took some forty minutes to complete.

8. Conclusions and observations

B41 The main part of the initiative is the introduction of the “user friendly” receptionists and they are certainly polite and smart. However, they are little more than cosmetic because they have no executive power and the type of person who is reluctant to enter police stations still has to negotiate the Provoost before being able to make a report. There is still work to be done to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the receptionists, who should be able to initiate actions through the duty officer and have the authority to complete the initial computerised reports. The layout of police stations needs to be thought through so that the first point of contact for members of the public is the receptionist rather than the Provoost. The system being used is along the right lines and merely needs some rethinking, e.g. to widen the receptionists’ role, and to bring about a more customer-friendly image in the police station.

B42 Work has been done in conjunction with IMCU to develop community based policing. In Eastern Java, at the South Surabaya station, the public enquiry counter is staffed by police officers in receptionist style clothing. Because of the number of international tourists visiting the district, all have a reasonable command of the English language in addition to ability in local languages. There are also complaint and suggestion letterboxes for the use of members of the public but, as at other locations where this initiative has been taken, no useful suggestions have been made. The senior officers we met were very vague when attempting to explain how complaints made against police officers by members of the public were investigated. Other initiatives developed concern alarm systems, which are linked to the police station. The computerised telecommunications-driven system centres on major business premises and the residences of some of the more influential members of the community.

B43 The police station also covers a vast rural area and there is a system of traditional policing undertaken by police sergeants who have twenty-four hours responsibility for the policing of a village community. Their work is a very traditional role in the community and they are constantly in touch with the people they serve through traditional and religious leaders and the neighbourhood watch network. (Neighbourhood Watch in Indonesia should not be confused with the system common in the United Kingdom. In Indonesia it is a local political government-sponsored organisation, rather than a community-driven crime prevention initiative to ensure safety and security in the locality.)

B44 The area sergeants are lightly armed and work alone. They can only successfully perform their duties by working closely with the people whom they police and live amongst. The area sergeants scheme has been in use for many years and owes a great deal to the former Dutch colonial policing systems but the IMCU consultants have assisted in strengthening the informal links to community leaders.

B45 It is INP policy to finance pilgrimages by area sergeants to Mecca for the Haj. It is felt that this gives the area sergeants credibility and respect in the predominantly Islamic villages in the coastal regions of East Java, whilst simultaneously helping the police officers to understand more fully the culture of the people they police.

B46 Gowa, in South Suluwesi, is a rural area on the outskirts of Unjang Panjang. The police sub-division (POLSEC) is responsible for a population of 471,000 spread across an area of 1888 square kilometres. The population is mainly rural and the main industry is market gardening. 473 police officers are employed in the POLSEC.

B47 The average number of crimes reported to police in any one month is 30 and this figure seems to be remarkably low, when compared to reported crime rates in the United Kingdom. A police area there with a similar population and industrial profile would expect to record in the region of 2000 crimes every month.¹⁶ The reason given for the low crime rate is that the people either settle the matter themselves or seek mediation through the traditional leadership, which still commands respect and fear. The area is a former kingdom and was not formally administered by the Dutch who had signed a treaty with the local potentate.

B48 The initiatives taken at Gowa are in the areas of police community relationships. Quality of service issues have been piloted, with the aim of streamlining service and making the police station more user friendly. The station itself was originally too small and poorly equipped. Former police housing units were converted into operational office accommodation. The gardens, formerly waterlogged and overgrown, have been drained, tidied, and planted to make the precincts of the police station presentable and user friendly.

B49 The public reception area is the Provoost post in an open-air area which is clean and welcoming. In contrast to other areas, the Provoost here had been brought into the customer service equation and this arrangement seemed to work well in Gowa.

B50 A major initiative undertaken is the improvement of the service to members of the public who visit the police station. Three coloured lines had been drawn on the footpath so as to direct people to the correct department. The idea is to negate the requirement for members of the public to be escorted and to reduce the amount of duplication. One line leads to the office responsible for issuing driving licences to members of the public. This line was followed by a member of the Evaluation Team and he was issued a driving licence in some fifteen minutes. The system is computerised and photographs are made by video. It is an efficient and simple system. If the system in place at Gowa is utilised without there being any corrupt interference then there ought to have been a great improvement in the speed and quality of service given to ordinary members of the public.

¹⁶ Ashford, Kent

B51 In Indonesia obtaining a driving licence is a major issue. It can take some two days of queuing at various offices and it is widely alleged that inefficiency and corruption are responsible for the delays. It is claimed that officials and police officers expect to receive a corrupt payment at each stage of the proceedings: those who either do not pay or make a sufficiently large donation are ignored. Obtaining a driving licence is frequently the first, and often the only, contact a person will have with the INP. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance for the development of community policing that the issue of driving licences is efficient, speedy and unaccompanied by any corruption. It is for this reason that the INP has placed a high priority on modernising the issue of such licences.

B52 In day to day policing there is close liaison with traditional leaders, local government and neighbourhood watch. Informal meetings are regularly held and these provide police with an opportunity to listen to the community views and to communicate police policy to the people. The Area Sergeants are the key operatives and they are encouraged by the POLSEC commander to engage in community activities.

B53 The style of management at Gowa appears to be less militaristic and the commander holds meetings with all ranks to explain his policy and to seek ideas from operational officers. It is claimed that many of the initiatives introduced were formulated from suggestions from lower ranks and their ideas are shaped by community views.

B54 Gowa is one of 23 sites in Indonesia where local government reform is being piloted. The central government has devolved a number of functions to local government and this initiative has drawn the police more into local problem solving and has added a wider dimension to community liaison. Senior police officers believe that changes in local government will eventually affect the control of the INP in that it will become more accountable for its actions to local people.

B55 A major general, who has benefited from attendance at the Police Staff College, Bramshill, commands the **Western Java Police region**. Community policing is central to the regional operational policy and the major general said that he had applied knowledge he had gained, whilst studying in the United Kingdom, to developing a community policing model known as POLLINGA. (This is an acronym for Polisi – Lingkungan – Warga, which translates as Police – Environment – Community). The IMCU has helped with conceptual work and in facilitating the change process. POLLINGA is an attempt to produce a comprehensive community policing strategy to pervade all police activity. The aim is to improve communication between the police and the communities it serves and to deliver an improved quality of service.

B56 The system was observed at Bandung central police station, which is a divisional headquarters (POLRES). The POLLINGA system of policing is used at all sub divisions (POLSEK) of Bandung.

B57 POLLINGA in Bandung is built around three priorities:

- improving the way in which members of the public are received at police stations
- developing the quality of service to the public
- improving the response to public complaints.

As at other locations throughout Indonesia, police station receptionists dressed in non police type uniform have been introduced as the first public contact point but, as elsewhere, any person wishing to make a report has first to negotiate the Provoost post. Also at Bandung the large police station forecourt is used for police drills including riot squad training and this somewhat militates against the user-friendly image presented by the receptionists.

B58 There are also improved streamlined procedures for the issue of driving licences.

B59 The POLLINGA system is attempting to provide a better and more community-responsive policing system by dedicating individual police officers to patrols covering distinct communities. The police officer is encouraged to make contacts with community interest groups, address local problems and to make contacts amongst members of the public. They also work closely with local government officials and neighbourhood watch officials. In this way policing is targeted to those issues which more accurately reflect the needs of individual communities. This method of working draws upon the experiences gained in the United Kingdom by Indonesian police officers who have observed community policing through “Home Beat”¹⁷ officers and capitalises upon the Indonesian system of assigning area sergeants to rural communities.

B60 In some of the more sensitive areas of Bandung community leaders and members of the public are being encouraged to engage in joint patrols with police officers. It is claimed that there is now greater confidence in the police and that communications between community and police have been greatly improved.

B61 To tackle complaints about policing and the individual actions of police officers confidential post boxes have been established at police stations and in prominent places within communities so that members of the public can make suggestions or complaints in confidence. This is a novel idea but no evidence of public use was able to be shown to the DFID evaluators.

B62 The INP is undergoing reform and is attempting to reconstitute itself as a modern community based police service. It is proving to be a long haul and a difficult process. The recent police statute, if honoured, provides a basis for the full civilianisation of policing in Indonesia and for the INP to become more accountable for its actions. A start has also been made in addressing the role of the military in routine police matters.

¹⁷ In the United Kingdom “Home Beat” officers are assigned to a particular area and have twenty four hour responsibility for routine police issues. They are supported by mobile police resources who also cover the beat when the “Home Beat” officer is either unavailable or is off duty.

B64 The moves made towards community policing through initiatives being taken throughout the country are encouraging. More work, however, is required to educate the whole of the INP in the ethics and principles of consensus policing.

B65 The assistance provided by the United Kingdom has helped in the process by providing for selected INP officers an insight into methods of delivering police services, where human rights are respected, communities are consulted and the highest importance is attached to quality of service.

ANNEX C**EVALUATION MISSION FIELD NOTES****Visit to PTIK Police Sciences College (for middle-ranking officer training),
Jakarta. 9.12.97.**

C1 PTIK trains officer candidates who qualify from the Police Academy, and also runs diploma courses for women officers from the Women's Police Academy. The management training package makes up three weeks of course time and focuses on levels 1 and 2. The purpose is to prepare students for operational management responsibility, using interactive small group/individual tutorial methods.

C2 Under the ToT programme a total of around 200 tutors have been trained to deliver the management courses (9 for level 1; 10 for levels 1 and 2; 21 for levels 1, 2 and 3). Many have moved on to other postings. PTIK currently has a cadre of 40 trained tutors. Two ToTs at PTIK provide quality control.

C3 In addition to training its own students, PTIK has also trained 300 people from the National Police Organisation (Bhayangkari) responsible for welfare of police families (described as the police wives' organisation).

C4 PTIK has trained 120 tutors per year to do level 1 (= 1320); 30 regional tutors per year (= 360); + 200 PTIK tutors noted above (C2).

C5 The project has introduced new methods - placing emphasis on small groups, tutorials and counselling in study skills rather than set-piece lectures.

C6 A number of challenges were identified by PTIK: bringing in new methods is not an easy process as system change is required. Main needs are:

- training of more ToTs
- training for design and updating of management training modules (PTIK does not have in-house capacity for future programme updating and development - the same course has been in use since 1985)
- an English course (good one in the past)
- Masters level training to develop skills.

C7 PTIK monitors performance standards through a questionnaire-based system, sent out through Regional Commanders every year. The focus is on core aspects of the management course (customer service, behavioural change, daily planning, setting service quality standards, etc).

C8 The training levels for the management course are:

Level 1: focus on interpersonal skills (listening, observing, etc), taught at police academy (direct officer entrants) and officer candidate school (sergeants who are officer candidates).

Level 2: taught at PTIK and SELAPA. Focus on operational management: problem solving, teamwork, activity analysis, etc.

Level 3: taught at Police Staff College (SESPIMPOL), with focus on strategic planning and management.

C9 Women officers are given a three year diploma course, from which they graduate as sergeants (they do not go to the academy yet - though it is intended that they should in future). INP has only 4 women generals. Once they graduate with diploma they have the opportunity to “catch up” at officer candidate school.

Visit to West Java Regional HQ, Bandung. 10.12.97.

C10 West Java is divided into sub-regions and districts. It is one of the largest police regions, serving a population of more than 33 million. The INP's relationship with the public is generally good, but there have been problems, including the recent burning down of a police station. The region says it has gained many benefits from the management training programme.

C11 Policy has two main streams: crime and traffic management; maintenance of public order and expansion of capacity to deal with new problems of commercial crime.

C12 West Java launched a preventative approach to “community policing” called POLLINGGA in 1996 (similar ideas elsewhere but POLLINGGA itself is unique to this region). Seen as part of a public services scheme. Also tied in to existing “neighbourhood watch” schemes. Coordination through weekly meetings at district level and monthly meetings at sub-region level. Regional commander also attends coordination meetings with Chief of INP every two months. UK management training has contributed to the growth of generalisable skills which support improved management.

C13 There is no Indonesian equivalent of a UK police authority but the force still sees itself as accountable to the public, mainly through the press.

C14 Police/public ratio in West Java is 1:1,194, compared with 1:1,145 for Indonesia as a whole, and approx. 1:450 in UK.

Visit to Bandung Sub-Region. 10.12.97

C15 Bandung is a university town, with a large student population: problems of public order, and a hot-spot during 1997 election.

C16 Work in the sub-region based on follow-up to the service quality decree issued in 1993 after the regional commanders seminar and the development of the POLLINGGA scheme. All officers are responsible for implementing the scheme. POLLINGGA has helped to develop informant networks and to improve the speed of police response to crime on the ground. Seen as a good scheme but one which needs further development - partly a response to resource constraints. The scheme also helps to close information and communication gaps between police and public.

C17 Public feedback obtained as a result of the scheme suggests that people would like a more rapid response from the police; more attention paid to robbery; more street patrols; and a more polite and less hostile attitude from police officers. Some things are said to be easier to respond to than others. There have been some improvements in the general style of policing - these may seem small, but they are important signs of the general direction in which the Indonesian police would like to head.

Visit to Central Bandung Division. 11.12.97

C18 The main link to the project is through POLLINGGA and attempts to improve service quality and communications between the police and project. The Division's strategy is built around three priorities: developing the quality of service to the public; improving the response to public complaints; and improving the way the public are received and served at police stations.

C19 Suggestion boxes have been placed in stations for use by the public.

C20 POLLINGGA is seen as a very helpful scheme. Much easier to monitor the situation on the ground. Scarcity of resources still a problem, however. Weekly meetings are used as a training opportunity for POLLINGGA - weekly reports reviewed and problems discussed. In the past, the Division was reliant on area sergeants for knowledge of the community, now many more lines of communication have been opened up by a more routine presence of police officers on the street - this helps build networks and lines of access and reporting. The Division is trying to develop citizen counterparts to POLLINGGA officers, with roles in providing information and providing public service. Commander attended IMCU district commanders workshop in Jakarta in August - learned SWOT analysis (among other things) which has helped him in his job. Says since POLLINGGA was introduced there had been a 5-7% improvement in clear-up rates (but in the context of low reporting rates in general).

C21 Service quality guidelines are issued to front-line staff and hung up in stations. The instructions pre-date POLLINGGA, but are now taken more seriously, with a more structured approach. Weekly meetings help to identify trouble spots. The deployment decisions taken on the basis of this improved knowledge lead to greater efficiency. Information is now obtained from the public in a more voluntary fashion and the speed of police response is much greater as a consequence.

C22 Impact of IMCU contacts and new approach: officers see a broader role for themselves, tap in to wider public service issues (and sometimes act as intermediaries to help solve non-crime problems), and believe that they now behave in a better manner towards the public.

Visit to Police Staff College (SESPIMPOL) at Lembang. 11.12.97.

C23 There are 100 students per course. The present course is made up of 89 INP, 2 Army, 2 Navy and 2 Airforce. (2 police officers attend the equivalent military institutions). There are students also from the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and two from Madagascar. A question on funding of Malagasy students was sidestepped but they are probably funded by Indonesia. The course is for qualified majors and newly appointed lieutenant colonels. It has a similar syllabus to the military staff colleges (would equate with Camberley or ICC at Bramshill.) and is another example of the militarisation of the police. (There is also a joint staff college attended by police and all other armed forces.)

C24 The management training programme is part of the course. 20 days of classroom tuition, 9 days field experience are devoted to the management training, which is said to be admired by the other services although not adopted by them. This input equates to 6 student weeks out of a total of 44 such weeks. It is a significant input to the training of key officers who will go on to command at POLRES level or be staff officers at regional or HQ levels. The syllabus and method explained are identical to those taught at Bramshill in the late 1980s. Little seemed to have been changed or localised, beyond that provided by the UK consultants. No examples could be given of College follow up of students successfully using the change management skills taught. An audit function from HQ was mentioned but nobody seemed aware of the results of the audit team. Answers were of a nebulous kind and it became apparent that there has been little development of the training since the UK consultants were last involved.

Visit to East Java Region HQ, Surabaya. 11.12.97.

C25 Police policy in this region focuses on social, political and cultural factors, with different approaches being taken in different parts of the region, depending on the circumstances on the ground. Divided into three basic policing areas: seashore area, where a “cultural” approach is taken, with officers working with traditional leaders in less developed areas; central area, where an assertive style is adopted to counter high rates of crime; region border area, where a “normal” policing style is used. A “community policing” approach is said to be used in all three areas. Officers posted to the seashore area, which has a

strong Muslim tradition, are sometimes sent to Mecca before their posting to give them more status and influence in the community. In the central area a “flying squad” approach is used, combined with patrols and linked to neighbourhood watch schemes. In normal policing areas an area sergeant approach is used, working out of local police posts. A regular cycle of weekly, monthly and quarterly review meetings is maintained to monitor progress and develop strategy. An annual meeting is held with the press to address issues of accountability.

Visit to South Surabaya Police Station. 11.12.97.

C26 This was a very military-like establishment. All units had been paraded for our inspection. However, work has been done in conjunction with IMCU to develop community based policing. Further details are given in Annex B (paras B42-45).

C27 Unfortunately we were unable to meet with any members of the community to test their views of policing in Surabaya.

Visit to Malang District, East Java. 12.12.97.

C28 Malang is a client district of the IMCU. The aims of the district are “to seek customer satisfaction and respect and to win public confidence and support”. It works with a concept of both external and internal customers, in the community and within the force itself. The District has developed an ongoing evaluation system, based on 10 key areas: customer relations, quality of service, influencing factors, supervision, actions of officers, training, support systems, reward and punishment, priorities, and building relationships with the public.

C29 The District serves a population of 750,000, including 100,000 students. Potential for conflict within the community is high, for social and religious reasons. Service quality standards have been set, including target response times for services in police stations and in the community. The District runs more than 700 “neighbourhood watch” schemes, in various stages of development.

C30 The support from the IMCU has been much appreciated, with progress being made in service quality and a broadening of vision for many individual officers. The IMCU approach was seen as strange at first, but gradually its value has been learned and the message that different clients have different needs has been recognised.

C31 As part of the community policing and quality of service initiatives “user friendly” receptionists have been introduced to the public enquiry counter at Malang police station. The lady receptionists are dressed in attractive receptionists/ airline style uniform clothing and they are intended to make the public feel more relaxed about visiting a police station to make reports. This initiative was facilitated by

members of the IMCU and is clearly based on similar models they will have observed whilst on study visits to United Kingdom police forces. The evaluation team's study of the arrangements in place at this police station for the reporting of crime is recorded in Annex B (paras B37-41).

Visit to Police Academy at Semarang (AKPOL), 11.12.98

Trainers of Tutors

C32 One police officer, trained under the programme as a trainer of tutors (TOT), held an established post at AKPOL from 1987 to 1993. During this period 55 tutors on the staff of the Police Academy were trained under the programme. These tutors were successfully used in establishing the Level 1 management training. Because of the movement of staff due to promotion and posting, only six of these trained tutors remained at the Police Academy at the time of the visit. For the same reason there were no longer any Trainers of tutors.

Skill Modules for Management Training

C33 These had been successfully established under the project. They concerned Level 1 of the three levels and took the following form:

- Phase 1: Interpersonal skills (for first year cadets)
- Phase 2: Leadership skills (for second year cadets)
- Phase 3: Managerial skills (for third year cadets)
(each Phase lasted for one week).

These Phases were still being used. A random visit was made to one of the police stations where the police cadets were undertaking field training. These cadets were examined on the management training which they had received. They were fully conversant with the content of the courses. It was notable that these young trainee police officers stated that they "used interpersonal skills to listen to, and learn about, public requests". This is confirmation that an element of community policing has entered into the training of all new police officers.

New Management Materials

C34 These had also been established and were being used in the course work. However, we were informed by the staff at the Academy that these had never been evaluated or developed further since being established in 1991.

New Learning Methods

C35 Although these had been established under the project, they were no longer used at AKPOL. This was because of the lack of tutors and in particular the lack of tutors trained in the new methods. Most of the tutors are therefore following traditional teaching methods rather than the tutorial approach as taught under the project.

Conclusions

C36 It is a substantial achievement that the training modules and materials are still being used some six years after the project was completed. However, further sustainability is at risk due to the lack of new tutors being trained in the use of both the materials and the new approach. The staff at the Academy said that there was a need for continued training of new tutors. There was also a need for refresher training of the existing tutors. Neither of these were occurring.

Visit to Central Java Regional Headquarters. 12.12.98

Consultancy Assignments

C37 Consultancy work had been carried out by the ICMU in Central Java. Police officers in the Headquarters were interviewed, including one of the counterparts to this work. It was reported that the work had not come to fruition because it had ceased while still in progress. The problem was that the tour of duty of those in charge when the work commenced had come to an end before the work was completed. In addition, some of the clients felt that the consultancy imposed a burden rather than met a need. The overall result was that existing systems and approaches were perpetuated. It was also reported that people might have been changed through training, but if the environment in which they were working was not changed then progress could not be made.

C38 The action pack approach to data collection and analysis of public service achievements had been started but was no longer in use as the District Police Officers felt that they did not have sufficient time for this work. This meant that this “service to the community” approach was discontinued.

C39 It was evident that staff movement posed considerable problems for the consultancy/client concept. For example, one of the staff at Central Java Police Headquarters had previously been a counterpart to consultancy work carried out in Sulawesi. His departure meant that this work had come to an end in Central Java. It was also interesting that before that he had been trained in the UK in training needs analysis as a Trainer of Tutors. As he was now working in finance the benefit of that training had also not been realised.

Visit to Semarang City Police. 12.12.98

Community based Approach to Policing

C40 It was evident that attempts had been made to make the public areas more community friendly. For instance, there were television sets at places where the public would be waiting for service. Structural work was under way to make a reception area for the public at the entrance. Also observable in the same area were the rifles which are standard issue to police officers. The effect was therefore, rather conflicting. We were informed that the policy for the control of riots had changed some time ago. The policy now was to use less force, in particular to negotiate where possible and to use shields and batons if necessary, rather than more extreme force.

C41 The overall impression was of the consultancy work leading to some modest improvements.

Visit to South Sulawesi Region Headquarters, Ujung Pandang. 15.12.97.

C42 The region is made up of 23 police districts, with most resources directed to Ujung Pandang city district, where 65% of the policing problems are found. The Ujung Pandang city police district and Gowa district have both been IMCU clients. The region is guided by the INP Chief of Police's service quality decree. The region has two key aims: to improve speed of response and to improve quality of response. The population of Sulawesi is said by officers to be very temperamental and tough in comparison with that in Java. There is a high potential for public disorder, with the ethnic Chinese minority particularly vulnerable. A swift response is necessary to prevent escalation.

C43 The region's policy is to seek to mobilise community resources alongside the police to maintain order, and to develop close relations with the media as a key channel of public information. The latter is seen as important because of the volatility of the population. Regular meetings are held at police stations with community leaders.

C44 Because of endemic civil unrest in Sulawesi, the INP Chief of Police has ordered the establishment of an armed section of the police. We were told that this was intended to eliminate the need for army involvement in civil matters. Officers said that the volatility of the community in Sulawesi was attributable to the culture of "siri", which is concerned with "face" and pride. Individuals will often act violently to restore their pride. This is associated with a culture of togetherness, which means that if one member of a community is shamed, all members feel shamed, and this can lead to a rapid escalation of disorder.

C45 The IMCU is said to have helped in introducing new approaches to addressing policy problems, improving in-service training down to the police station level, and introducing helpful problem solving techniques. The main constraint is the high turnover of officers in the region - most only remain in post

for one to two years. Regional officers said there was a strong case for a permanent internal consultancy unit at national headquarters, supporting regional internal consultancy teams.

Community Forum Meeting, Panakukang Police Station, Ujung Pandang. 15.12.97.

C46 The station serves a population of 202,000, with 70 officers. The police:public ratio is 1:3,000, making community support essential. The station works with a community forum made up of local religious leaders, business people and traders, teachers, and leaders of community organisations. The evaluation team met a group of more than 50 community representatives and police officers, only two of whom were women.

C47 Members of the forum said that in the past the police had been inclined to strike first and ask questions later, but now it was more likely to be the other way around. Day to day contact was maintained through area sergeants, but there was a suggestion that more intensive contact was needed and that there were not enough area sergeants.

C48 The forum has played a role in solving conflicts, and gave an example of a fight between youth groups which was settled by the forum bringing together both formal and informal leaders from both sides. Youth problems were getting more worrying than in the past, a trend members of the forum attributed to wider developments in the world and the greater influence of the outside on local culture.

C49 Public support was provided to the police through three different groups: “Singa” (lion) which worked with CID on criminal intelligence; “Nuri” (parrot) which worked with police community relations officers; and the zebra group which worked with the traffic police. In future the forum would like to see the police better resourced, with a more open presence in public areas. Improvements in the example of good conduct by the police should continue, and more big meetings should be held of the community forum.

Visit to Gowa Police Station in South Sulawesi. 15.12.97.

C50 Commanded by a Lt Colonel who had just left for another posting. The very bright major in temporary command was committed to community based policing.

C51 Immediately prior to our visit a military inspection team had inspected the POLSEC. From questioning we deduced that the inspection was something akin to one in the UK by one of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary. The inspection concentrates on administrative and financial issues and has no mandate to look into operational matters. Also police officers are seconded to such inspection teams from time to time and help to conduct similar inspections of other government departments.

C52 The Polsec covers an area of 1888 square kilometres and has a population of 471,000. The population has mainly a traditional rural background. The main industry is market gardening although industrialisation is occurring. Local government reform is also being undertaken in Gowa, which is one of 23 experimentation sites nationally. More autonomy is being given to local government by central government. There is a belief that police should have more local autonomy and this could result in a change in the balance of accountability to local people. (The Colonel and Regional Commander believe this will be the case.).

C53 There are 9 sub Polsecs, commanded mostly by a senior sergeant or warrant officer, and 473 police personnel – this includes a 47 member riot squad.

C54 IMCU has been active in Gowa and has piloted quality of service issues, with the intention of streamlining service and making the police station more user friendly. Further comments on the team's visit are contained in Annex B (paras B48-54).

ANNEX D

SEMARANG CASE STUDY

The IMCU consultancy work with particular reference to Semarang

D1 Since the beginning of the consultancy project several members of the IMCU have been sent to Semarang to do consultancy work as part of the exercises given to the consultant trainees by the UK consultants. The aim of this consultancy field exercise was to reinforce the previous consultancy experience that the trainees had acquired in Jakarta. The earliest assignment to Semarang was in 1991 and involved three senior members of the IMCU. The consultancy assignment was undertaken in the Semarang City Police jurisdiction which covered the south, north and east Semarang Police Sub-Divisions and the Ungaran sub-division. The consultant trainees were asked to identify the profile of a sub-division which was able to provide a 24 hour service to the public efficiently and effectively and to ascertain the problem with the existing policing method.

D2 This assignment was carried out by collecting data regarding the public perception of the police, the officers' perception of their own role, what kind of service was needed by the public, how efficiently and effectively the existing sub-divisions had served the public, and what problems were encountered by them. Data were collected by means of direct observation, interviewing the police officers, visiting and interviewing the public, and studying the existing documents with regard to policing.

D3 As the number of the consultant trainees was small the involvement of other officers was needed. For this reason, when diagnosing the sub-divisions the consultant trainees were accompanied by local officers who were then called the counterparts. This was the beginning of the development of the role of consultants' counterpart.

D4 A similar assignment was carried out in sub-divisions in the Bandung City Police by two other IMCU members. The findings of the studies carried out in Semarang and in Bandung, together with the findings of the previous study in Jakarta, were discussed, compared and contrasted regularly at the IMCU office in Jakarta and reported to the UK consultants when they came to Indonesia. Finally, in an intensive discussion led by the UK consultants, the IMCU concluded that the problems encountered by the sub-divisions were: communication, data collecting, setting daily action plans, setting quality standards, ensuring efficient supervision and team building. These were later recognised and known as the six managerial problems at the sub-division level.

D5 From the studies other problems were identified which belonged to the next, upper, level of organisation, that of the Division. These were problems of directing, developing, controlling, supporting, problem solving and coordinating. To eliminate or reduce these problems it was decided that training in

interpersonal skills and team building should be undertaken at sub-division level, while a programme called “Action Pact” was introduced to the Chiefs of Divisions by means of training. The latter programme was emphasised as generating the awareness of the Division Chiefs’ role as facilitators because it was felt that they should be able to direct, develop, control, support, help the sub-divisions solve problems and coordinate them in providing the service to the public. Such programmes of developing, directing, controlling, supporting and coordinating should be developed and reviewed in a national meeting of the Division Chiefs held annually. This was done from 1992 to 1994. In 1995 the emphasis of the Division Chiefs’ meeting was slightly different. From the previous national meetings it was concluded that the programmes would not be sustained unless they were included in Divisions’ annual plans. For this reason, how to include these programmes in the Divisions’ annual plan was highlighted at the 1995 national meeting of the Divisions’ Chiefs.

D6 The Action Pact programme which was held in Semarang or Central Java was perceived not to have been successful. The short tours of duty due to postings, promotion to higher positions, tours of area of Chiefs of Divisions are considered to be the reasons. The Division Chiefs trained in Action Pacts have mostly been transferred or promoted.

D7 The other reason perceived for the lack of success was that the Division Chiefs’ attitude towards the consultancy work was not always supportive. Instead of looking at it as a means of helping them solve their problems they considered it a burden. They claimed that they were too preoccupied by the daily routines. The other consultancy was undertaken in Semarang in 1994, following a seminar on the improvement of the police service held at the national headquarters in October 1993. This work was the realisation of the INP Chief’s instruction No 595/1994 which instructed that all the INP’s regional and functional units, as well as operational units, should improve their quality of service to the public. In doing so they were requested to employ the IMCU members. Central Java (Semarang) was one of the regional police units in which members of the IMCU were involved. Central Java and East Java were consulted by six IMCU members. This consultancy work was undertaken on a peripatetic basis, meaning that sometimes the consultants had to work in Central Java, sometimes in East Java and sometimes they were split into smaller groups doing the same work in different provinces.

D8 The work in Central Java (Semarang) was sensitive, as prior to this activity the presence of the IMCU members had been rejected. However, the IMCU members managed to make an entry by incorporating the local programme called “the succession programme” which consisted of training and improving the working environment, into the IMCU’s mission of improving the quality of service programmes. The consultancy work continued to prepare a number of counterparts through training. After this short training in understanding the organisation’s health, and following visits to private companies, the counterparts began to practise the diagnosis of problems in the sub-divisions and in the Semarang City Police.

D9 The counterparts were enthusiastic in doing this exercise and wanted to undertake more of them. Unfortunately the consultancy work had to be stopped because of the lack of an operational budget in the IMCU. One of the counterparts interviewed during the evaluation questioned why such a programme was not continued and, instead, was stopped mid way.

D10 Since the end of 1994 the pure consultancy work had stopped but other activities involving the IMCU members in Semarang still continued, such as helping the regional headquarters and five divisions in Central Java (Pati, Purwodadi, Sragen, Temanggung and Yogyakarta) in their annual planning process (1995), conducting a team-building exercise for the management team of the headquarters (1996) and, in the Police Academy (1996) doing some partial work such as writing job descriptions in Kudus division.

D11 The consultancy work stopped not only in Central Java (Semarang) but in East Java, West Java and Jakarta. The consultancy work as part of the consultant training was stopped as well. Partial consultancy programmes continued only in Jakarta, in the form of training of different kinds.

D12 To summarise, the IMCU members had done consultancy work in Semarang from 1990 to 1994 and the impact had begun to be felt. But this could not be sustained because of staff movement due to the tours of duty or promotions of the Chiefs involved in the consultancy work. In addition, the attitude towards the consultancy work among the Division Chiefs varied from acceptance that it was needed, understanding that it would be of benefit, and rejection of it. Lack of resources in the IMCU budget finally brought the consultancy work in Semarang to an end.

ANNEX E

TRAINING DATABASE

ANNEX E.1: INDONESIAN POLICE OFFICERS TRAINED IN THE UK

Name	Specialist TOT-CON CON TOT	FY	Scholarship/ Study Tour/ Study Course	Cost	Date	Provider	Course
Mr Syaiful Aryat	-	1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Yusnar Arsyad	T	1990-91	Sch.	8,300	16 Aug-15 Dec 1990	RIPA	Pers.Mgt
Mr Zainal Asni	-	1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr A Ketut Astawa	-	1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Astika	-	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Baruno	-	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985		
Mr Basjir A Barmawai	T	1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986		ATC
Mr Chaerudin	-	1985-86	SC		Not known	-	-
Mr Meedhy Chumadi	-	1990-91	Sch.	8,300	16 Aug-15 Dec 1990	RIPA	Pers.Mgt
Mr LLuthfi Dahlan	-	1984	SC		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Dr M Dangkjua (P)	T	1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Dasuki	T	1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Bramshill	ATC
Mr Deddy S K	T	1990-91	Sch	8,300	16 Aug-15 Dec 1990	RIPA	Pers.Mgt
“		1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Bramshill	ATC
Ms G Djumjatni	T	1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	“”	“
Mr N Eko	C	1990-91	ST	3,100	July 1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1991-92	ST	3,000	July 1991	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1994-95	Sch	13,500	1 Aug 1994-30 Sep 1995	Sheffield Hallam Univ	MSc
Mr Yadi Ermiyadi	C	1991-92	Sch	9,000	1 Oct 1991-30 Sep 1992	Kent University	MScField
“	C	1991-92	ST	3,000	July 1991	Surrey Police	Exp
“		1992-93	Sch	13,500	1 Oct 1992-30 Sep 1993	Sheffield University	MSc

Name	Specialist TOT-CON CON TOT	FY	Scholarship/ Study Tour/ Study Course	Cost	Date	Provider	Course
Mr Dadang Gamida	T	1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Bramshill	ATC
Ms Pengasih Gaut	C	1992-93	Sch	8,500	1 Aug 1992-30 Nov 1992	Thames Valley Univ	Diploma
“		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
Mr Heru Tjipto Harsono	T	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	SPMT
Ms Hemawati	C	1990	ST		1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
Mr Riswadi Herry S	T	1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Bramshill	ATC
Mr M Hindarto	T	1986-87	Sch		Apr-Sept 1986	Police Staff Coll.	Senior Comm.
Mr Herman Hidayat	T	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr M B Hutagalung		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
Mr Iksan	-	1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Bramshill	ATC
Mr Adnl Isa	T	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	“	SPMT
Mr Isnawan	T	1985-86	SC		July-Dec 1985	“	SPMT
“		1988-89	Sch		Oct 1988-Sept 1989	Bath	M Phil
Mr Yasa Toh Jiwa	-	1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Karyoso		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
Mr Sebastian Koto	T	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Kumiadin (P)	-	1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Y Y Laoli	C	1990-91	ST	3,100	July 1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1991-92	ST	3,000	July 1991	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
Mr Ledwijk	-	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Rony Lihawa	T/C	1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
“		1988-89	Sch		Oct 1988-Sept 1989	Bath	M.Phil
“		1990-91	ST	3,100	July 1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
Mr Ahwil Lutan	-	1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Asikin Nadikusumah		1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Bramshill	SPMT

Name	Specialist TOT-CON CON TOT	FY	Scholarship/ Study Tour/ Study Course	Cost	Date	Provider	Course
Mr Hamami Nata	T	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	“	ATC
Mr Rachmat	-	1986-87	Sch		Not known	Police Staff Coll	SPMT
Mr Adjie Rustam Ramdja	T	1990-91	Sch	8,300	16 Aug-15 Dec 1990	RIPA	Pers Mgt
“		1992-93	Sch	8,500	8 Dec 1992-7 April 1993	Manchester Univ	Diploma
Mr H Rasyid	C	1990-91	ST	3,100	July 1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1991-92	ST	3,000	July 1991	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1993-94	Sch	3,000	21 May-20 June 1993	Surrey Police	Field Exp
Drs Amir Ralna		1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr D Rustadi	C	1990-91	ST	3,100	July 1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1991-92	ST	3,000	July 1991	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
		1995-96	SC	6,000	9 Apr-12 May 1995	Herts & Glos Police	Field Exp
Mr dooh Saudi		1986-87	Sch		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Police Staff Coll	SPMT
Ms Minton Mariaty Simanjuntak	C	1991-92	Sch	8,000	3 Sep-12 Dec 1991	Surrey Police	SPMT
“		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
Mr A D Sitorus	T/C	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr James Silorus	T	1994-95	Sch	13,500	1 Aug 1994-30 Sep 1995	Sheffield Hallam Univ	MSc
“		1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr M Nian Sjadudin	T	1986-87	ST		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Police Staff Coll	Senior Comand
Mr Soebarilyono	C	1990-91	ST	3,100	July 1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1991-92	ST	3,000	July 1991	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1995-96	SC	7,000	25 March-26 Apr 1996	Herts & Glos Police	Field Exp
Mr Soekamid	T/C	1991-92	ST	3,000	July 1991	Surrey Police	Field Exp
“		1991-92	Sch	9,000	1 Oct 1991-30 Sept 1992	Salford University	MSc
Mr Soemitro	-	1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Bramshill	ATC

Name	Specialist TOT-CON CON TOT	FY	Scholarship/ Study Tour/ Study Course	Cost	Date	Provider	Course
Mr Tjoek Sugiamo	-	1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Bramshill	ATC
Mr Kresno Sukamso	-	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr F X Sumamo		1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr F Sumampow	TC	1990-91	ST	3,100	July 1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
"	TC	1991-92	ST	3,000	July 1991	Surrey Police	Field Exp
"		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
"		1994-95	Sch	5,000	13 April-12 June 1995	Herts & Glos Police	Field Exp
"		1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr S A Supardi	T	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Suryaningprang	C	1990-91	ST	3,100	July 1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
"		1991-92	ST	3,000	July 1991	Surrey Police	Field Exp
"		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
"		1995-96	SC	7,000	25 March-25 Apr 1996	Herts & Glos Police	Field Exp
Mr S Tarigan	-	1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr M Thoyib	C	1990-91	ST	3,100	July 1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
"		1991-92	ST	3,000	July 1991	Surrey Police	Field Exp
"		1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
"		1996-97	Sch		1996/97	Hull University	Inst. Psychol
Mr Pepe Tjahjana	T	1992-93	Sch	8,500	8 Dec 1992-7 April 1993	Manchester Univ	Diploma
"		1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Bramshill	ATC
Ms Mumi Tukiman		1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	"	ATC
Mr Achmad Turan (P)	-	1984	ST		10 April-18 May	Bramshill	SPMT
Mr Wakin	C	1994-95	ST	5,000	July-Oct 1994	Surrey Police	Field Exp
Mr C H M Waskito	C	1990-91	ST	3,100	July 1990	Surrey Police	Field Exp
"	C	1992-93	ST	2,865	July 1992	Surrey Police	Field Exp
Mr L N Yudana	-	1986-87	SC		6 Oct-6 Dec 1986	Bramshill	ATC
Mr H Yusar	-	1985-86	SC		30 July-18 Dec 1985	Bramshill	ATC

TABLE E.2

LIST OF POLICE OFFICERS TRAINED AS TRAINERS OF TRAINERS IN INDONESIA

No	Name	Date of Courses	Subsequently trained in UK
1	Mr Yuswar Arsyad	10.1.89-17.6.90	Yes
2	Mr Sukamid	“	Yes (also consultant)
3	Mr Partiw E Yadi	“	No
4	Ms Nurhayati	“	No
5	Mr Adji Ramja	“	Yes
6	Mr Pudjianto	“	No
7	Mr P H Hutadjulu, SH	“	No
8	Mr Herutjahyono	“	No
9	Mr Eko Yustono	“	No
10	Mr Bambang Suprianto	“	No
11	Mr Subianto	“	No
12	Mr M C Nubu (P)	“	No

TABLE E.3 STAFF MEMBERS OF THE IMCU

STAFF MEMBERS OF THE INTERNAL MANAGEMENT CONSULTANCY UNIT (IMCU) 1997

No	Name	Rank	Date joined Unit	Posted with Unit
1	Mr Ch.Mulyadi Washkito	Col.	1990	IMCU
2	Mr Herman Rasyid	Col.	1990	PTIK*
3	Mr Fred Sumampow	Col.	1990	IKP Sumut
4	Mr Sitorus MsC	Col.	1996	SRENA
5	Mr Mamoh Sur Yaningprang PhD	Col.	1990	PTIK*
6	Mr Soebarliono	Lt.Col	1990	SRENA
7	Mr Yan Laoly	Lt.Col	1990	Lembaba Rahasa
8	Mr Didi Rostady	Lt.Col	1990	IMCU
9	Mr Sukumid, MSc	Lt.Col	1992	Selapa*
10	Ms Pengasih Gaut	Lt.Col	1992	Lemdktat*
11	Ms Minton Simanjuntak, BA	Lt.Col	1990	Hankam
12	Ms Hermawaty	Lt.Col	1991	Koprasi
13	Mr Moesthofa Thoyid	Lt.Col	1992	Denita
14	Mr Wakin	Major	1992	Sespim*
15	Mr Nicocous Eko, Msc	Major	1992	Sespim*
16	Mr Ermaidy. MSc	Major	1990	NCB Interpol
17	Mr Mangas Sitorus	Col.	1990	Resigned 1992+

* Institutions concerned with training

+ Before starting any training in the UK

ANNEX F

LOGICAL FRAMEWORKS

TABLE F.1 PROJECT FRAMEWORK FOR PHASE II 1990/91-1992/93

PROJECT TITLE:	Management and Organization Development within the Indonesian National Police (INP)
PROJECT DESCRIPTION:	Development of Internal Organizational Development Consultancy Unit within INP
PROJECT DURATION:	3 years 1990/91-1992/93
PROJECT COST:	£713,190

Project Description	Indicators of Achievement and Value	How Indicators can be Assessed	Assumptions, Risks and Conditions
<p>WIDER OBJECTIVES</p> <p>1. Development of an effective and professional national police force in Indonesia with the following characteristics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - sound internal organization alignment and functioning; - coherent/flexible strategic responses; - efficient use of resources; - community based approach to policing <p>IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES</p> <p>1. To train at least 70 INP managers in the basic skills of internal organisation development (OD) consultancy.</p> <p>2. To establish a central team of specialist consultants within INP HQ which takes an active role in OD.</p> <p>3. To create a limited consultancy resource within each regional command.</p> <p>4. To model, support and supervise a series of pilot consultancy assignments in the field as a laboratory training exercise.</p>	<p>1. At the outset of the project, establishment with the INP senior management an agreed set of indicators (specific and measurable as to the current deficiencies of INP in the areas of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - professionalism - organisation alignment - use of resources - strategic responsiveness <p>1. The number of consultants trained and practising within the organisation.</p> <p>2. The number of functional areas within INP supported by expertise developed by the project, and the range of organisational issues diagnosed and improved as a result of consultancy intervention.</p> <p>3. The type and number of consultancy assignments developed in the field in response to the project.</p> <p>4. The number of officers graduating from UK universities directly using skills acquired in the consultancy process on their return.</p>	<p>1. Consultant's reports.</p> <p>2. Implementing agency reports.</p> <p>3. Internal audits to be introduced under the project and carried out by the OD consultancy unit;</p> <p>1. Interim (after 3 years) and final evaluation reports from consultants.</p> <p>2. Under the project the consultancy unit will develop the capacity to conduct strategic appraisals, management and OD audits.</p> <p>3. In addition consultancy project dairies and reports will be maintained to assess performance against objectives set under the project.</p>	<p>1. Continuity of key personnel at a senior level in INP to ensure consistency of policy.</p> <p>2. Sustained commitment to the current policy direction of developing a more community based policing service.</p> <p>1. A sufficient number of candidates with high standards of English can be identified and released for UK training.</p> <p>2. Core consultant team considered as "permanent" appointments; ie guaranteed commitment to consultancy unit for a number of years.</p> <p>3. Support from regional commanders for "laboratory" training approach and willingness to "offer" their territories as training ground.</p> <p>4. Strategic senior management support, liaison and response to the consultancy process.</p>

Project Description	Indicators of Achievement and Value	How Indicators can be Assessed	Assumptions, Risks and Conditions
<p>5. To integrate the above with a programme of UK training in specialist subject areas for selected officers in INP on Masters degrees, short courses and study visits in the UK.</p> <p>6. To maintain and improve the training of tutors (TOT) strategy, and build it with the consultancy unit into the working infrastructure of the organisation.</p> <p>OUTPUTS</p> <p>1. At least 30 INP officers trained in internal OD consultancy and specialist consultancy team established and active within INP HQ.</p> <p>2. Up to six major consultancy assignments commissioned from policy level.</p> <p>3. Three foundation training modules interspersed with supervised project assignments and case conference debriefs.</p> <p>4. Five specialist training modules interspersed with advisory assignments within functional areas of INP.</p> <p>5. Specialist seminar for INP senior managers in "Designing an OD policy and strategy".</p>	<p>5. The resource saving/ reallocation effected by consultancy intervention and the improved targeting of results.</p> <p>6. TOT, tutor and management skills development maintained at right standard of quality at the training colleges involved.</p>	<p>1. Implementing agency records</p> <p>2. Consultant's reports.</p> <p>3. Internal assessments generated by consultancy unit in INP.</p>	<p>1. Adequate resources provided from within INP for the unit to function.</p> <p>2. A management structure/department is created at the centre of INP to "house" the consultancy unit and give it credibility and authority within INP.</p>

ODA Funded Inputs by Project Year: 90/91 91/92 92/93 Total	How Inputs can be Assessed	Assumptions, Risks and conditions
<p><u>UK TRAINING FOR INP OFFICERS</u></p> <p>- TCT awards (short courses - 3 months and</p> <p>- Masters' programmes 8 8 8 24</p> <p>- Study tours (4 weeks) per person; 10 10 10 30</p> <p><u>CONSULTANCY DAYS IN UK TO SUPPORT</u></p> <p>- UK TRAINING COMPONENT 35 35 35 105</p> <p>- CONSULTANCY DAYS/NUMBERS AIR-FARES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT TRAINING IN INDONESIA 97/6 102/7 96/7 295/20</p> <p>- <u>BOOKS AND JOURNALS: VALUE</u> £3,000 P/Y FOR THREE YEARS</p>	<p>1. Implementing agency records.</p> <p>2. Academic reports on trainees from UK training institution.</p> <p>3. UK consultants' progress reports.</p> <p>4. Evaluation report (year 3)</p>	<p>1. Sufficient number of high calibre candidates with adequate English can be identified and release for training.</p>

TABLE F.2 PROJECT FRAMEWORK FOR EXTENSION TO PHASE II

PROJECT TITLE:	Management and Organization Development Within the Indonesian National Police (INP) - Extension to Phase II
BRIEF DESCRIPTION	Strengthening of Internal Organization Development Consultancy
	MIS Code No: 150-542-001
FILE REFERENCE:	INO 917005
TOTAL ODA FUNDING	£1,014,190
PERIOD OF FUNDING:	April 1993-March 1996
DATE FRAMEWORK PREPARED:	August 1994

Project/Structure	Indicators of Achievement	How Indicators can be Quantified or Assessed	Assumptions, Risks and Conditions
<p>WIDER OBJECTIVES;</p> <p>1. Development of an effective and professional national police force in Indonesia with the following characteristics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - sound internal organisation alignment and functioning - coherent/flexible strategic responses - efficient use of resources - community based approach to policing <p>IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES:</p> <p>1. To build up knowledge and experience of consultancy unit to work at strategic levels of organisation</p> <p>2. To increase range of specialist consulting techniques available to consultancy unit.</p> <p>3. To improve the internal management of the consultancy unit.</p> <p>4. To develop network of local partner consultants in 10 of the Police Regions</p> <p>5. To establish consultancy unit as a permanent unit within INP.</p>	<p>1. At the outset of the project extension, and agreed set of indicators (specific and measureable) will be established with the INP senior management concerning the current deficiencies of INP in the areas of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - professionalism - organisation alignment - use of resources - strategic responsiveness <p>1. Members able to tackle problems at strategic level without assistance by end of project.</p> <p>2. Members of develop expertise in personnel, management information, planning, budgeting and finance by end of project.</p> <p>3. Effective processes of work planning, recording, client contracting, information processing, marketing and supervision in place by end of project.</p> <p>4. Regional units set up within Planning and Budgeting section of 10 regions and equipped with basic consultancy skills.</p> <p>5. Consultancy unit continues to function effectively after end of project.</p>	<p>Consultants' reports. British council reports. Internal audits to be introduced under the project and carried out by the OD consultancy unit</p> <p>UK consultants will measure and report on these standards of achievement during their monitoring visits.</p> <p>Under the project the consultancy unit will develop the capacity to conduct strategic appraisals, management and OD audits.</p> <p>Consultancy project dairies and reports will also be maintained to assess performance against objectives set under the project</p>	<p>Continuity of key personnel at a senior level in INP ensure consistency of policy.</p> <p>Sustained commitment to the current policy direction of developing a more community based policing service.</p> <p>Core consultancy team members remain full time appointees.</p> <p>Consultancy team continues to be led by a qualified team leader. Central consultancy unit is given a formal place in organisational structure, whicl continuing to be under the immediate control of Chief of the INP.</p> <p>Regional consultancy units have direct access to Regional Commanders.</p>

Project/Structure	Indicators of Achievement	How Indicators can be Quantified or Assessed	Assumptions, Risks and Conditions																								
<p>6. To maintain and improve the training of tutors (TOT) strategy and built it with the consultancy unit into the working infrastructure of the organisation.</p> <p>OUTPUTS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Training of expanded core consultancy team. 2. Further training of counterpart in regions. 3. Interventions in overall strategic processes. 4. Interventions in the development of functions. 5. Intervention in regions. <p>INPUTS</p> <p>From ODA</p> <p>Nos of training awards (short courses and Masters' programmes) (Nos in individual years are indicative)</p> <p>Days of consultancy inputs</p> <p>Total cost (including inflation) £'000</p>	<p>6. TOT Group's tutor and management development skills maintained at agreed standards for consultancy support and at police training colleges.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 15 core consultants trained during project extension. 2. 50 counterparts in regions trained during project extension. 3. Consultancy assignments completed in planning, communication, management information and corporate working by September 1994. 4. 4. Consultancy assignments completed in personnel, finance, logistics, education/training by September 1994. 5. Consultancy assignments completed in 6 regions by end of 1993 and in a further 4 regions by September 1994. <table border="1" data-bbox="485 1173 790 1451"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>93/94</th> <th>94/95</th> <th>95/96</th> <th>96/97</th> <th>TOTAL</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Nos of training awards (short courses and Masters' programmes) (Nos in individual years are indicative)</td> <td>4</td> <td>3</td> <td>3</td> <td>2</td> <td>12</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Days of consultancy inputs</td> <td>156</td> <td>60</td> <td>30</td> <td>0</td> <td>246</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total cost (including inflation) £'000</td> <td>208</td> <td>105</td> <td>81</td> <td>28</td> <td>422</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		93/94	94/95	95/96	96/97	TOTAL	Nos of training awards (short courses and Masters' programmes) (Nos in individual years are indicative)	4	3	3	2	12	Days of consultancy inputs	156	60	30	0	246	Total cost (including inflation) £'000	208	105	81	28	422	<p>Implementing agency records.</p> <p>Consultants' reports.</p> <p>Internal assessments generated by consultancy unit.</p> <p>Implementing agency records.</p> <p>Academic reports on trainees from UK training institutions.</p> <p>UK consultants' progress reports.</p>	<p>Continued strategic senior management support, liaison and response to the consultancy process.</p> <p>INP senior management provide support to consultancy unit after the project ends.,</p> <p>A sufficient number of candidates with high standards of English can be identified and released for UK training.</p> <p>Regional Commanders in new regions provide strong support during project extension.</p> <p>Adequate resources provided by INP for consultancy unit and regional teams to function effectively.</p>
	93/94	94/95	95/96	96/97	TOTAL																						
Nos of training awards (short courses and Masters' programmes) (Nos in individual years are indicative)	4	3	3	2	12																						
Days of consultancy inputs	156	60	30	0	246																						
Total cost (including inflation) £'000	208	105	81	28	422																						

TABLE F.3 ACHIEVEMENT OF LOGFRAME FOR EXTENSION (AS IN TABLE F.2)

Project Structure	Indicators of Achievement	How Indicators can be Quantified or Assessed	Assumptions, Risks and Conditions
<p>WIDER OBJECTIVES</p> <p>1. This would take many years to achieve and a much larger programme. It was noted by the IMCU that this was not within their own power to achieve.</p> <p>IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES</p> <p>1. Achieved. Consultancy unit worked at strategic levels. 2. This has declined since the end of the project. 3. With out-posted staff this has proved extremely difficult to achieve. 4. Partner consultants have not been developed. 5. IMCU is established but its permanency is uncertain. 6. The ToT strategy is not built into the working infra-structure. The ToTs are not organised as a group.</p> <p>OUTPUTS</p> <p>1. Training achieved. 2. Not fully achieved. 3. Achieved to a limited extent. 4. Achieved to a limited extent. No interventions in the regions now being achieved.</p>	<p>1. No specific and measurable indicators were established.</p> <p>1. Individual consultants are able to tackle consultancy problems but are not full time members. 2. Expertise of consultants developed. 3. Effective processes of work planning, etc not sustained. 4. Regional units not set up. 5. Effectiveness uncertain and requires approval of increased budget (being sought). 6. ToT groups' skills not maintained at training colleges.</p> <p>1. Sixteen (16) consultants trained. 2. A limited number of counterparts were trained but not now functioning. 3. By and large consultancy assignments completed. 4 and 5 as above.</p>	<p>1. Consultants reports were issued. 2. British Council produced detailed reports. 3. Internal audit reports were not produced.</p> <p>1. Reasonable reporting, although deficient in indicator No 3. 2. Capacity achieved. 3. Consultancy project dairies were not formally kept by the IMCU and there was uncertainty regarding whether this should have been carried out by DFID (ODA).</p> <p>1. British council records well kept. 2. Consultants' reports available. 3. Monitoring and evaluation of their own programme has not been done. This is a significant weakness.</p>	<p>1. Continuity of personnel was not assured. The normal system of movements and promotions was inconsistent with ensuring continuity. 2. Commitment was variable.</p> <p>1. Assumption not met and is the main constraint on sustainability. 2. The team leader is a qualified consultant. 3. The Consultancy Unit has a formal place. It reports to the Major General in charge of the Expert Staff, a former UK trained consultant. 4. There are no regional consultancy units. 5. Satisfied through Item 3 above. 6. The IMCU is still surviving, albeit at a low level, and is recognized.</p> <p>1. By and large achieved. Suitable English language training was provided. 2. Movement of regional commanders through posting meant lack of continuity in support during the project. 3. Although significant resources provided for IMCU they were considerably less than needed</p>

ANNEX G

EXPENDITURE CASH FLOW ON PROJECT COMPONENTS


	85/86	86/87	87/88	88/89	89/90	90/91 act	91/92 act	92/93 act	
A: FIGURES FROM HANSARD IN REPLIES TO PQs									
Short course	Number	15	15	0	0	0	4	1	1
Schol MSc etc	Number	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	3
Study tour 4 weeks	Number	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	15
Cost £									
Short courses		(120836)	(120,992)				33,200	8,000	8,000
Scholarships MSc etc							0	18,000	39,000
Study tour 4 weeks							31,000	30,000	43,000
TOTAL (A)							64,200	56,000	81,500
B: FIGURES ON EXPENDITURE FROM THE MIS									
	CODE								
Consultancy 89/91 (fees £43,600) then Short Courses	AA					35,924	14,367		
Consultancy 89/91 (fees £43,600) then Short Courses	AW						60,675		
Short courses and scholarships	AS			2,700	546	32,521	26,157	53,014	
British Council Management	BA				3,909	12,578	16,374	16,733	
Study Tours	BM					31,655	29,564	43,453	
Consultancy (fees £283600)	BW					94,575	105,281	155,187	
Miscellaneous	BL								
TOTAL (B)				2,700	40,379	246,371	177,376	268,387	

Phase I, 1983/90 cost £800,000. No break down by year and component available.

		93/94 act	94/95 act	95/96 act	96/97 act	97/98 act	TOTAL act	
A: FIGURES FROM HANSARD IN REPLIES TO PQs								
Short course	Number	1	2	3			12	
Schol MSc etc	Number	0	2	0			17	
Study tour 4 weeks	Number	0	0	0			35	
Cost £								
Short courses		3,000	10,000	20,000			82200	
Scholarships MSc etc		0	27,000				84000	
Study tour 4 weeks		0	0				104000	
TOTAL (A)		3,000	37,000				261700	
B: FIGURES ON EXPENDITURE FROM THE MIS							Total 89-98	%
	CODE							
Consultancy 89/91 (fees £43,600) then Short Courses	AA	15,465	11,530				77286	7%
Consultancy 89/91 (fees £43,600) then Short Courses	AW						60675	6%
Short courses and scholarships	AS	2,733	32,417	43,591	11,331	5,001	210011	19%
British Council Management	BA	5,155		5,000			59749	5%
Study Tours	BM	3,500					108172	10%
Consultancy (fees £283600)	BW	98,768	69,255	49,147			572213	53%
Miscellaneous	BL	129					129	
TOTAL (B)		125,750	113,202	97,738	11,331	5,001	1,088,235	100%

ANNEX H

ORGANOGRAM OF POLICE TRAINING INSTITUTION



ANNEX J

RESULTS OF MANAGEMENT TRAINING OF OFFICERS IN TRAINING CENTRES

Management Training	Police Academy AKPOL	Officer Candidate School SECAPU	Police Science College PTIK	Advanced Training College SELAPA	Staff College SESPIN
Level of Management Training	Level I	Level I	Level II	Level II	Level III
1. Trainer of tutors					
. TOTs established	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
. Tutors trained	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
. Trained tutors in post	0	0	1	6	0
2. Skill modules					
. established	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
. still used	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
3. New management materials					
. still used	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4. New learning methods					
. Still used	No	?	Partial	Partial	Partial

ANNEX K

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Direct project trained in UK and in Jakarta

	Total	%
Male	21	87%
Female	5	13%
No of UK visits	58	Av 2.5
Trained as TOT	13	43%
Trained as consultant	16	70%
Three most important things learned		
Managerial skills	14	54%
organisational systems	12	46%
British Police Methods	10	38%
Community policing	10	38%
Organisational culture	9	35%
Tutorial/training system	10	38%
Improve English	2	8%
Present job		
Consultant (full time)	4	15%
TOT (part time) and at training institute	8	31%
Others at training institute	3	12%
Other	11	42%
Training used		
in present job	19	73%
In previous job	19	73%
How		
Analysis of police organisation	15	58%
Improved communication skills	16	62%
Trainer of tutors	10	38%
Assess training needs	5	19%

Relevance of British policing

See requirements in Indonesia	14	54%
Managerial system	12	46%
Police independence	5	19%
Human rights	3	12%

Comments

Limited ability of police to change	11	42%
Poor management of IMCU	4	15%
insufficient accountability	3	12%

The Department for International Development (DFID)

is the British government department responsible for promoting development and the reduction of poverty. The government elected in May 1997 increased its commitment to development by strengthening the department and increasing its budget.

The policy of the government was set out in the White Paper on International Development, published in November 1997. The central focus of the policy is a commitment to the internationally agreed target to halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015, together with the associated targets including basic health care provision and universal access to primary education by the same date.

DFID seeks to work in partnership with governments which are committed to the international targets, and seeks to work with business, civil society and the research community to encourage progress which will help reduce poverty. We also work with multilateral institutions including the World Bank, United Nations agencies and the European Commission. The bulk of our assistance is concentrated on the poorest countries in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

We are also contributing to poverty elimination and sustainable development in middle income countries, and helping the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe to try to ensure that the widest number of people benefit from the process of change.

As well as its headquarters in London and East Kilbride, DFID has offices in New Delhi, Bangkok, Nairobi, Harare, Pretoria, Dhaka, Kathmandu, Suva and Bridgetown. In other parts of the world, DFID works through staff based in British embassies and high commissions.

DFID
94 Victoria Street
London
SW1E 5JL
UK

DFID
Abercrombie House
Eaglesham Road
East Kilbride
Glasgow G75 8EA
UK

Switchboard: 0171-917 7000 Fax: 0171-917 0019

Website: www.dfid.gov.uk

email: enquiry@dfid.gov.uk

Public Enquiry Point: 0845 3004100

From overseas +44 1355 84 3132

ISBN 1 86192 112 8