Foreword to the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review

“The water started to rise, and it did not stop... the water was already so high and strong that I could not hold on to one of my children and the water swept her away.

Luckily someone was there to grab her.”

Gonaïves, Ogé Léandre, Haiti 2008

The people of the United Kingdom know why we respond, individually and as a society, to humanitarian emergencies around the world. They understand that when we are confronted by the image of a child trapped in the rubble of an earthquake, or of a family clinging to the roof of a flooded home, we don’t so much commit to help, as feel committed to do so; committed by our shared humanity.

It is because the impulse to relieve suffering is rooted in morality that our interventions to relieve suffering at times of disaster must always be driven by need and need alone. Nevertheless, the fact that Britain is prepared to play a full part (and often a leading part) as a member of the international community in order to relieve suffering at times of crisis makes for, not only a more compassionate world, but a safer one too – and that benefits all of us.

What is crucial is that when we decide to act, we do so effectively. The fact that, across the country, household budgets are under particular strain at the moment, only underlines the point. People want to know that every pound they give will be a pound spent saving lives and livelihoods.

In looking at the way the UK government responds to humanitarian emergencies, this Review has identified much in which the British people can take pride. The Department for International Development, as a policy maker, a funder and a deliverer of aid, has been widely praised for its leading role within the international humanitarian community.

But being good is not going to be good enough given the challenges ahead. The scale, frequency and severity of rapid onset humanitarian disasters will continue to grow in the coming years, and at an accelerating pace. Experts predict that climate related disasters could affect 375 million people every year by 2015, up from 263 million in 2010.

The reasons for this are many. Rapid population growth, especially in disaster prone areas, is a key factor, especially when combined with continued mass urbanisation, much of it unplanned and unsafe. So too are the changes already underway in sea levels, and in global rainfall and storm patterns – changes that will contribute to significant additional pressure for food and water in the years ahead.

We are caught in a race between the growing size of the humanitarian challenge, and our ability to cope; between humanity and catastrophe. And, at present, this is not a race we are winning.

Some recently affected countries, like China and Chile have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of natural disasters. Even Japan, where the triple catastrophe has led to tremendous suffering, things might have been far worse without preparation. But others, like Haiti or Pakistan, have needed large scale outside help and will continue to do so.

The ability of the international humanitarian community to provide this help is threatened by a number of problems, some new, some familiar.
The first is the global economic crisis, which could make the already slower growing countries of the West less able or willing to provide resources for disaster relief. This gap could be filled by the faster growing ‘emerging’ world economies, but this is far from guaranteed. These countries currently contribute far less to disaster relief, and in any case are likely to remain preoccupied with the relatively high levels of poverty within their own borders.

The second is the rising security threat faced by humanitarian workers on the ground, and the increasing difficulties they face in accessing affected populations. The task of providing humanitarian assistance impartially and on the basis of need is hugely complicated by conflict. The need, on occasion, to work alongside or with hostile – even proscribed – groups already presents humanitarian workers with a number of moral and practical problems. These too are likely to grow in number and complexity.

Regrettably, the leadership, management and coordination of the international community’s efforts have not risen even to the challenges we currently face. Unless we radically improve the quality of the leadership of the international effort in humanitarian crises, we will not succeed in dealing with what is ahead.

For all these reasons, we have concluded that merely improving upon what we have done in the past – enhancing the status quo – will not be sufficient. We must devise new ways to meet the new challenges.

There are seven threads to this new approach. These form the structure of this document.

First, we need to develop a more *anticipatory* approach, using science to help us both predict, and prepare for future disasters and conflict.

Second, we need to place the creation of *resilience* at the heart of our approach both to longer-term development and to emergency response. This will require DFID to make humanitarian response a part of its core development work, engaging more closely with local people and institutions so as to strengthen local capacity.

Third, we need substantially to improve the strategic, political and operational *leadership* of the international humanitarian system.

Fourth, we need to *innovate* to become more efficient and effective.

Fifth, we need to increase transparency and *accountability* towards both donor and host country populations. Far from being burdensome, this is in fact a precondition for the improvements we want to see in terms of value for money and impact.

Sixth, we need to create new humanitarian *partnerships* to allow DFID better to influence and work within an increasingly complex humanitarian system. In future, the effectiveness of DFID will depend more on what it can do with others, than on what it can do alone. DFID will need to work more closely with the emerging world powers and with the private sector, as well as with the military. In addition, it will need to nurture its existing partnerships with the EU, the US, other donors, the Red Cross and the international NGOs.

Finally, as emergencies become bigger and more complex, so we need to defend and strengthen the *humanitarian space*. This refers to the need for humanitarian workers to be granted access and protection as they seek to provide humanitarian assistance in conflict affected areas. This in turn will require us to reassert the core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality; the promise to assist people on the basis of need, regardless of their gender, religion, ethnicity or political allegiance.

As DFID seeks to meet these challenges, it will need, in everything it does, to become even more innovative, even more of a learning organisation that is always open and welcoming to new ideas.
I have been privileged to chair this independent review and am grateful to Secretary of State Andrew Mitchell, not only for asking me to do this, but for enabling me to work with a Senior Advisory Board whose talent, experience and wisdom has contributed so much to this work; with a gifted and committed team of DFID officials who have supported us outstandingly; and with my friend of forty years, Ross Mountain, who, as the Review’s Director, has driven and steered us throughout the seven months of the review process.

DFID enjoys a position of respect and leadership in the international community for the work that it has done in the past and still does today. It is our hope that this report will assist DFID to maintain that position of international leadership in the face of the challenges that lie ahead.

Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, Chair
Humanitarian Emergency Response Review

Director: Ross Mountain
Senior Advisory Board Members: Andy Bearpark; Barney Mayhew; Carolyn Miller; David Bryer; Elisabeth Rasmusson; Gilbert Greenall; Gordon Conway; Jo da Silva; Mark Bowden; Nici Dahrendorf; Randolph Kent; Simon Maxwell; Steffen Stenberg; Sue Wardell; Yasemin Aysan.
Executive Summary

The review comes at a time when the humanitarian community faces a number of daunting challenges. Disasters are increasing, as are the numbers of people affected by them. These are set out starkly in the Chair’s foreword and in the report itself.

The UK is a major contributor in humanitarian crises, and is highly respected for its role. Some of the best known humanitarian organisations are UK based, and the British public gives generously in appeals. The UK government has been the second largest bilateral donor for humanitarian relief in recent years, after the US.

This review has found that the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the main conduit through which the government responds, is also well respected and well regarded. It has excellent humanitarian staff, and has played a positive role in improving international response. Nevertheless, the review has also concluded that in light of the potential need in years to come, there will have to be a step change in the way DFID responds. The review makes a series of high level policy, and some down to earth practical, recommendations intended to bring this change about.

Anticipation

If we are to meet the challenges ahead, we have to be “ahead of the curve” rather than always behind; preparing for disasters, as well as reacting to them.

It is in the nature of disasters and conflict that they cannot be precisely predicted. But we can be more anticipatory in our approach. Hurricane seasons are well known, as are earthquake fault lines. Droughts can be quickly identified. Climate science is improving all the time. Political instability and the conflict it can lead to are reported early. But these early warnings and predictable events are often not acted on in advance, or quickly enough when they are happening. Part of the answer is better presentation of the science for better decision making. Part of the answer is for decision makers to act on this information. Devolving decision making to those closest to events is another part, including equipping at risk governments and civil society with the means to act.

Resilience

The more resilient a nation, the less lasting damage disasters cause and the quicker they can recover. Resilience is about being prepared for disasters, and having good systems for responding to them. It is about investing in infrastructure, like building houses and hospitals that can withstand earthquakes, or schools that double up as cyclone shelters. But it is also about investing in human capacity; strengthening a government’s capacity to respond; creating disaster management structures and plans; giving people support before drought forces them to sell all their possessions. It is about economic planning that recognises disasters can happen and makes provision for them.

Where governments are capable of building resilience, then the UK, through DFID should help them to do so. This should be a core part of DFID development work in countries that are at risk, which is the majority of the 27 in which DFID now works bilaterally. Investing in resilience will save lives and money in the future. Mozambique asked the international community for £2 million in 2006 to help prepare for the floods, an amount it could not secure. After the floods the international system spent £60 million responding.
Leadership

Where governments are not able to respond to disasters or in conflict situations they need a strong international system to help out. But too often the international system fails them. Case studies for this review in Haiti and Pakistan make this depressingly clear. The UN is the only legitimate authority that can lead but is often too weak and slow to do so.

Change is needed at the strategic and the operational levels. The UN needs to invest in a leadership cadre and ensure its best people are deployed quickly to the biggest and most complex disasters. These leaders need the support of their headquarters and the agencies that do the majority of the work. The same is true of technical leadership – the ‘clusters’. These need dedicated leadership in the biggest emergencies and they need to be strategic, decision-making bodies with national and local groups fully integrated. Lines of authority need to be clearer, and where necessary, institutional changes should be made to make them so. Overall the level of professionalism in the humanitarian sector needs to be raised through better investment in skills and training.

The UK has been a strong proponent of change in the international system to date, and can help push this new agenda. Already the heads of the major UN agencies, led by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), are pushing these ideas. DFID should encourage and support further reform, and work with others to deliver the change needed to face future challenges.

Innovation

When it comes to saving lives in an emergency we need to be as efficient and effective as we can. One of the ways this can be achieved is through greater use of new technologies and new practices, harnessing the best of new science, new processes and the new ideas from those affected.

The humanitarian sector has been slow to change. New approaches such as giving people cash (instead of buying them blankets they may not need) have taken years to go to scale. In Pakistan, satellite imagery was available to strategic planners, but not to those responding on the ground. Intractable problems such as the timely provision of shelter remain a challenge. Whilst there have been a few successes, such as in nutrition where new food products have proven revolutionary, these have been driven by committed individuals usually without support.

DFID has a good track record in supporting innovation. It has provided start up funding for many new initiatives, and continues to seek solutions to problems like shelter. It helped set up a new innovations fund, with other donors and NGOs. This work needs to be accelerated, and new innovations need to be taken to scale faster. Crucially, there is a need for more investment in research and evidence, as well as new ways of working.

Accountability

Humanitarian aid helps millions of people around the world each year. The Niger case study for this review alone makes clear that tens of thousands of children were saved from starvation through prompt action, with DFID funding playing a meaningful part. But there is an accountability deficit. The people who are on the receiving end of our assistance are rarely if ever consulted on what they need, or able to choose who helps them or how. This means that gender based issues and the needs of the vulnerable are too often overlooked. Whilst this has long been recognised as an issue, too little has been done about it.
Understanding the impact of humanitarian assistance is another area where much work is needed. This is connected to the accountability issue; those who deliver humanitarian aid can only understand their impact if they understand what people need. DFID can help with measuring impact and making those who deliver humanitarian aid more accountable. Linking impact measurement and accountability better to the funds agencies receive is a key recommendation of this review.

Humanitarian agencies should also be more accountable to donors, be they governments or the public. Donors have a right to know how – and how well – their money is spent.

**Partnership**

The UK is not a large direct provider of humanitarian assistance, preferring instead to work with and through partners. The review endorses this approach; partnership will become even more important as the world becomes more interconnected, as power shifts towards the newly emerging economies, and as greater challenges require more capacity.

The UK should remain a committed multilateralist in its approach. Working with partners in other nations, with the United Nations and with civil society organisations makes sense. It combines scarce resources for the best effect.

Many of the partners DFID works with in humanitarian response are world-class organisations. Nevertheless, the humanitarian sector in recent years has been seen by many as a ‘closed shop’ with a handful of agencies and donors dominating. Whilst this can be explained (partly by the need for organisations to be seen as neutral and impartial) the system does need to change. This review concludes that DFID needs to become more of a ‘network enabler’, working with existing partners but also developing new and dynamic partnerships with emerging nations, NGOs, the private sector, faith groups and the diasporas.

**Humanitarian space**

In conflict zones or failed states, DFID often cannot work directly through the authorities. In such cases there is a fragile ‘space’ into which humanitarian agencies are admitted to help those most in need. They are only ‘allowed’ in, however, when they are viewed as genuinely impartial. Where aid is linked to political or military goals, access can be denied and the security of staff compromised, making it difficult to reach those most in need. Hence the importance of the key humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

The review concludes that DFID humanitarian policy should be to support, defend and where possible enlarge this fragile space; to work with agencies that can access and help those in dire need, and not to politicise humanitarian aid. The review also recognises that in complex conflicts, and in situations where the authority of the state has broken down there will be times when military force, mandated by the UN, will be needed to protect civilians and humanitarian workers. In such cases, creating a secure environment both for the civilians and for the conduct of humanitarian work can often be a first priority.

**Delivering transformational change in DFID**

To deliver a step change in the way humanitarian assistance is conceived and delivered, DFID will have to make significant changes. The most radical change will involve seeing humanitarian concerns as a core part of DFID programming, rather than something that
needs to be responded to when it happens. **There should be a closer, more integrated relationship between DFID’s core development work and the way DFID responds to meet rapid onset emergencies.** Such work should also be of central concern to DFID’s development partners, such as the World Bank and the UN.

DFID should actively support the UN in its efforts to reform its humanitarian leadership. Funding for multilateral and NGO partners needs to become more predictable, so that they can invest in the skills and structures they need to be better prepared. There is a need for fast and flexible funding for the ‘critical period’ immediately after a humanitarian emergency has happened. Funding should also be available directly to governments for resilience and response work, where they are capable, willing and transparent.

**To introduce a new dynamism into the humanitarian sector DFID needs to reach out to new partners. It needs to work better with new donors and the private sector. It needs to promote innovation and bring new innovations and processes to scale faster. It needs to put the measurement of impact at the heart of its work, and demand accountability and transparency of itself and its partners. It needs to seek value for money, not crudely through comparing costs but through focusing on achieving the best outcomes for affected people and improving the quality of future decision making. It needs to drive radical change, for instance in the supply chain. It needs to improve the way it provides leadership and coordination across the UK government when responding to humanitarian emergencies. Finally, it must become better at communicating what it does, both to those who provide the money, and to those who are the beneficiaries of it.**
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1. Introduction

This independent review into how the UK responds to humanitarian emergencies was commissioned by the Secretary of State for International Development and led by Lord Paddy Ashdown. It was asked to consider how the UK should best respond to humanitarian emergencies overseas, and the role the UK should play in the international humanitarian system.

The UK is considered one of the leading nations in humanitarian response. In recent years it has been the second largest bilateral humanitarian donor globally, and is widely regarded internationally. The UK is a strong supporter of the multilateral system, provides significant funding and consistently provides experienced staff and relief items to support the response in major emergencies.

The British public expects the UK to be a major humanitarian responder. The British public itself gives generously to emergency appeals. In January 2010, the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) Appeal for Haiti raised £101 million from the public. The response was especially notable at a time of global economic crisis.

This review of how the UK carries out its humanitarian response work comes at a moment of reflection for the international system. As the horrendous events unfold in Japan and over a year after the Haiti earthquake and six months after devastating floods in Pakistan, many of those in charge of major aid agencies are wondering how to meet the challenges of the future. It also comes at a time of change for DFID, which has recently published the findings of its Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Reviews.

The review is forward looking. It is not an evaluation of DFID’s work in emergencies to date. Rather, the review notes where past response has been most effective and looks for ways to enhance what has been done well. It aims to build on the UK’s strengths. The scope of the review does not cover long-term chronic humanitarian crises. It focuses on sudden onset disasters or ‘spikes’ in conflict situations, but many of the recommendations will also apply to chronic situations.

Creating the best UK response will only go part of the way towards improving the whole system. The review looks at the way the UK can work with other international bodies and UN agencies in emergency situations to ensure that the global response to disasters improves. The UK must work to influence the global system if real improvements are to happen.

The UK works through and with partners. Working in partnership is a big part of the review and the proposed future approach. The review sets out where DFID can deepen these partnerships and how. It also looks to new partnerships and how DFID can work best within the UK government.

How the report is organised

The report is laid out in six sections. This introduction is followed by section two, which briefly describes the international humanitarian system and DFID’s role in it. The third section looks at potential future humanitarian challenges and the capacities there are to cope with these. Section four sets out the findings of the review. The review’s conclusions on how DFID should position itself in order to meet the future challenges are outlined in section five. Section six lists the recommendations.
How the review was conducted

The review was chaired by Lord Paddy Ashdown and was entirely independent in nature. A Senior Advisory Board (SAB) of 15 met on a monthly basis throughout the review period to steer the direction of the review, examine material and set out the main themes and recommendations. The advisory board served in a personal capacity, but represented through their experience the major institutions and traditions involved in humanitarian response.

A small review team carried out consultations, literature review and prepared material for the board. An independent director was appointed to head the team.
2. The international humanitarian system

The international humanitarian system is made up of providers (donor governments, foundations and individual givers) and the implementers (Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, UN Agencies and IOM and national and regional NGOs and civil society). A number of key actors also of importance are still seen to be outside the formal system, namely affected governments, the military, and businesses. Remittance flows are also not captured by the formal system. The chart above shows the main components of the system.

The international humanitarian system responds to humanitarian emergencies where there is an appeal for international assistance, or in extreme cases where directed by the UN. The legal framework for an international humanitarian emergency response is set out in International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, Refugee Law and UN Resolutions.

Figure 1: The international humanitarian system. Data included from the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2010. (*Amounts unknown)
These legal norms establish that humanitarian aid should be guided by the principles of:

i. **Humanity** – the centrality of saving lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found.

ii. **Impartiality** – humanitarian aid should be implemented solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations.

iii. **Neutrality** – humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute.

iv. **Independence** – humanitarian objectives are autonomous from political, economic, military objectives or other interests related to the location where assistance is provided.

The international humanitarian system has grown rapidly over recent years and there is often a lack of clarity as to what the term actually refers to and where its boundaries lie. The main delivery actors fall into three ‘pillars’: the UN and its specialised agencies; the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). Governments, national and local institutions in affected nations typically lead the response and provide much of the assistance, with the international system in support. In recent years, international military forces and large private corporations have increasingly become aid providers, as this report explores.

The international system is financed by government donors (of which the UK is a significant one) and private contributions. Figures for total international humanitarian resources vary depending on the source. Although funding to the international humanitarian system has increased faster than the rate of official development assistance (ODA) in recent years, the latest Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) report claims that humanitarian aid fell by 11% from 2008 ($16.9 billion) to 2009 ($15.1 billion).

The range of activities undertaken by the international humanitarian system has also expanded. The core humanitarian activities remain: health services; water and sanitation; food security; nutrition and food aid and shelter. However, many humanitarian operations now include a wide range of other activities, including: protection; education; agriculture; mental health support; income generation; infrastructure rehabilitation; human rights advocacy and support to the re-establishment of the rule of law.

The total number of staff working for the international humanitarian system is estimated at 210,800 (mostly nationals in their own country). It is made up of UN agencies and the IOM (49,500), the Red Cross/Crescent Movement (48,400) and NGOs (112,900). Aid worker population has increased by 6% year on year over the last 10 years.

In conflict situations there is typically a peace and security dimension to humanitarian emergencies. In such cases other multilateral mechanisms and institutions are also involved such as the UN Security Council, which determines when and where a UN Peacekeeping (DPKO) operation should be deployed.

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1 Stoddard (2008).
DFID: A leading actor in humanitarian response

The UK, through its Department for International Development is the second largest bilateral global humanitarian donor. The 2002 International Development Act provides the legal basis for DFID’s response to humanitarian emergencies. It gives the Secretary of State for International Development powers to provide humanitarian assistance, with the sole purpose to “alleviate the effects of a natural or man-made disaster or other emergency” outside the UK. Latterly, the UK has also signed the EU consensus on humanitarian aid that enshrines the principles outlined above. As a donor, the UK has also signed up to the Principles and Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship. DFID delivers humanitarian assistance in four distinct ways:

1. DFID shapes the humanitarian system

As a significant UN member state and a large donor to the international system, the UK (through DFID) works with UN agencies to deliver effectively and improve performance. DFID contributes core funding to the UN, as well as additional funding in big emergencies. Institutional strategic partnerships have been formed around this core funding, allowing DFID and the UN to set long-term goals.

In 2009/10 total DFID humanitarian spend was split as shown in the figure below. In several sudden onset emergencies researched as part of this review, the UN component was significantly smaller, closer to 40% with larger percentages going directly to NGOs and the Red Cross/Crescent Movement. Exceptionally, in the case of the Haiti earthquake, more than 50% went on direct expenditure.

Figure 2: Percentage of DFID’s humanitarian spend by agency type 2009/10.

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3 Adapted from DFID, “DFID’s Expenditure on Humanitarian Assistance 2009/10”. According to the GHA Report 2010 14 donors spent over 60% of their humanitarian aid through multilateral agencies.
In 2005 DFID supported a ‘humanitarian reform’ process that sought more predictable response. The reforms called for major changes in funding, leadership and coordination of humanitarian emergencies. As a result, DFID has worked to enlarge the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and create country pooled funds, which help UN agencies respond rapidly to emergencies. The UK has been the largest donor to the CERF – more than $420 million to date – and to country pooled funding mechanisms. As well as leading by example, DFID works to influence other member states to increase contributions to the CERF. In 2006 there were 52 country donors to the CERF. By 2010 that figure had risen to 82 countries.

DFID also supported the establishment of the ‘cluster’ approach, a new coordination mechanism that made agencies responsible for particular areas like shelter or health. DFID funded global cluster appeals to set the system up and has continued to push agencies to deploy people to lead these. Through its funding, DFID continues to play an influencing role encouraging cluster lead agencies to view humanitarian leadership and co-ordination activities as part of their core work.

2. DFID funds humanitarian aid agencies and is the second largest bilateral donor after the US Government

In 2009/10 DFID spent about £528 million on humanitarian assistance. About £100 million of this went through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the EU’s fund for emergencies. ECHO then spent this money through UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs. A large proportion of the funds spent through the UN were channelled to implementing NGOs.

11% went on rapid onset funding for humanitarian emergencies. The remainder on protracted crises such as DR Congo or Sudan. The one off amounts that DFID spends on rapid onset emergencies, however, change significantly depending on the context. In 2010/11 DFID spent £134 million on responding to the floods in Pakistan alone.

Several million pounds each of core funding went to all of the big UN agencies involved in emergencies and the Red Cross/Red Crescent. The annual contribution to the CERF constituted about 10% of DFID’s non-ECHO humanitarian spend.

ECHO was the biggest recipient of UK aid at about £100 million in 2009/10, followed by the ICRC at £66 million, and then OCHA (including CERF), WFP, UNDP and UNICEF (see figure 3 on page 7).

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5 Adapted from DFID: “DFID’s expenditure on humanitarian assistance 2009/10”. 
In absolute terms, the UK has been the second largest bilateral humanitarian donor after the US. As a percentage of national income (GNI) however, the UK comes after Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Luxembourg and some others.

3. **DFID is also on a small scale a direct deliverer of aid, providing goods in kind, Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities, and supporting secondments where appropriate**

Having a direct response capability allows DFID to strengthen and influence the international humanitarian system. In 2009/10 DFID’s in-kind goods or personnel support amounted to £7 million. DFID has a standby arrangement with the UK fire service to deploy search and rescue teams after major earthquakes. It also has its own standing ‘operations team’ (CHASE OT) that can deploy rapidly to emergencies and runs all direct delivery from London. The operations team is on standby 24/7 and is a contracted out facility, currently managed by Crown Agents. It has standby arrangements with airfreight contractors and can deploy rapidly niche capabilities like airport handling. It provides expert personnel to the United Nations on request and assembles teams speedily for DFID.

In the case of the Haiti earthquake response over 50% of the expenditure was spent directly, as outlined by figure 4 on page 8.
4. DFID leads the HMG response to humanitarian emergencies

DFID works with other Whitehall departments, principally the FCO, MOD and Cabinet Office to coordinate the UK response to a humanitarian emergency. DFID leads on making the humanitarian case. Decisions on whether to deploy UK military capabilities are taken on a case-by-case basis.
3. Challenges

Increasing disaster risk: the major trends, threats, and probabilities

All current trends suggest that more people – particularly in developing countries – will be affected by humanitarian emergencies in the coming decades. Not only will they become more frequent, they will also be increasingly unpredictable and complex.

Last year, 263 million people were affected by disasters – 110 million more than in 2004, the year of the Tsunami. By 2015, climate-related disasters, such as floods, famines and droughts, are predicted to affect an average of over 375 million people every year. Other disasters (such as earthquakes), and man-made conflicts, will affect many more.

In 2009 UNHCR reported its ‘total population of concern’ at 36.5 million, including refugees, stateless persons and those displaced within their own country. By definition these are people fleeing conflict or persecution. An estimated 27.1 million of these were displaced within their own countries as a result of armed conflict, generalised violence or human rights violations. This figure represented an increase of over a million in the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) compared with the 26 million internally displaced in 2008 and also in 2007. Whilst the trend for refugees (fleeing their country) has gone down in recent years, those internally displaced has consistently risen. The 27.1 million reported in 2009 were displaced in 54 countries.

The rising world population and growth in urban areas (demographic stress) will almost certainly increase the humanitarian caseload, particularly in less developed countries. Already an average of 1,052 people die in any given disaster in less developed countries, compared to 23 in developed countries. The world’s population is predicted to reach 9.1 billion by 2050, with virtually all population growth occurring in low-income countries, including Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

By 2030, over 61% of the world’s population (5 billion people) will live in urban areas, mostly in low and middle income nations. The concentration of populations in urban areas will change the nature of many humanitarian disasters. More people will be living on marginal land, in overcrowded and poorly planned housing, lacking access to adequate water and sanitation, health care and education. Whilst availability of services and infrastructure should mean fewer fatalities, damage may have far reaching consequences making rebuilding costlier. The impact of disasters on urban centres will have economic consequences potentially greater than in the past, at local, national and regional level.

7 Internal Displacement (2010). Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2009. IDMC/ NRC.
9 UNHABITAT.
Figure 5: Areas likely to be at risk of instability as a result of multiple environmental stress. Data from the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) Strategic Trends review 2006-2036 and International Charter ‘Space and Major Disasters’.
Growing food insecurity is likely to create new humanitarian emergencies, within countries and regions and also globally. The existence of nearly a billion chronically hungry people, primarily in Asia and Africa, already exacerbates the consequences of emergencies. There is potential for repeated food price spikes similar to those of recent years, which have especially damaging effects on developing countries. Underlying these challenges, the world as a whole faces the task of increasing food production by 70 to 100% by 2050 in order to cope with a growing population with a greater livestock based diet. There is a growing demand for bio-fuels and increasing constraints are posed by the price of fertilisers and fuels, the shortage of land and water and their increased degradation. Climate change will reduce yields, sometimes catastrophically, necessitating the production of stored surpluses in some regions to compensate for losses elsewhere.

Globalisation and the increasingly interconnected world in which we live, means that disasters often have a global impact. Pandemics spread rapidly through air travel. Economic shocks in one region spread through commodity price increase and loss of remittance flows. Conflict does not respect borders, and spill over from conflict-affected areas contribute to regional destabilisation and refugee flows. Migration and changing employment patterns will contribute to vulnerability in unexpected ways, with the potential to create new security threats.

Future crises could differ fundamentally from past experience and the prospect of ‘synchronous failures’ is a growing concern, as with the nuclear threat in Japan caused by tsunami. New sources of displacement or conflict are also possible, for instance as water resources become scarce.

The Diaspora community is playing an increasingly significant role in humanitarian responses. Remittance flows are already the second largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) for developing countries and increase significantly after an emergency. The Diaspora community can also influence the size and type of donor response, depending on its size and vociferousness.

As economies in China, India, Brazil and the Gulf States continue to grow, they are playing an increasingly important role globally. They are becoming more involved in humanitarian emergency responses, particularly in their neighbouring regions. China was an important actor in the response to the Pakistan floods at the end of 2010. The international humanitarian system needs to work more with these partners, particularly as it is possible that traditional DAC donors will be able to provide fewer resources for disaster relief in the coming years. The US Congress is considering whether to cut America’s humanitarian assistance budget in 2011, reducing U.S. food aid programmes by 41% ($687 million) and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance funding by 67% ($875 million).

Timely and unimpeded access to affected populations is becoming more difficult due to the increasingly complex nature of emergencies. There has been an unprecedented growth in violent attacks on humanitarian workers (177% increase from 1997 to 2008) and there is a growing need for increased protection and security as part of the humanitarian response. Governments and non-state actors in conflict have become increasingly sophisticated in their attempts to manage international humanitarianism, making traditional ways of intervening more difficult.

Media reporting of humanitarian responses has grown over the last years and will continue to have an impact on the political and public reaction to disasters. Donors will

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have to make difficult decisions on how to respond to a disaster in the full glare of 24/7 media attention.

Increased media coverage and new ways of communicating through social media tools, such as Twitter and Facebook, will allow closer contact between recipients of aid and those donating the money. Together they will demand greater accountability of the deliverers and the official donor agencies.

**Responding to increased need**

The increase in the international humanitarian caseload and challenges, have the potential to break an already stretched international humanitarian system, which is struggling to cope with current levels of need. There were two major humanitarian disasters in 2010, which required international humanitarian assistance – the earthquake in Haiti and floods in Pakistan. In both cases, the international humanitarian system showed itself to be less than the sum of its parts and the responses were characterised by weak leadership, poor coordination and a slow response.

The international humanitarian system evolved over 150 years, it was not planned or designed. As a result, there are gaps, overlaps and numerous inefficiencies in the way it works. The future challenges outlined above will need a more sophisticated operation. New and innovative ways of working need to be widely introduced to improve the efficiency and speed of disaster response. Stronger links between humanitarian and development work; better leadership and coordination; access to new resources through improved partnerships, and engagement with new actors; better use of technology and innovations; and increased accountability, will all be vital parts of a high performing international humanitarian system, which is greater than the sum of its parts.

For too long, the performance of the international humanitarian system has been inconsistent, failing those most in need. Numerous reports have been written by the UN, NGOs and other international actors, in response to such concerns. Serious issues have been identified, but not addressed. Now is the time for a step change in the approach to humanitarian reform. Merely improving upon what has been done in the past will not be enough to meet the challenges of the future.
4. Findings

The first people to respond to disasters and conflict are the ones affected by them. Friends and neighbours search through the rubble for loved ones after earthquakes; local hospitals work through the night to care for the injured.

In many countries governments routinely affected by disasters have become adept at response and prevention. Case studies for this review show dramatic gains in places such as Bangladesh and Indonesia\textsuperscript{12}. But all too often the international response arrives as though this were not the case, sweeping aside local responders and adding to the chaos rather than alleviating it.

In conflict situations the international system often becomes the last hope for people living in the worst circumstances. Where it is slow, or gets things wrong, it is these people who suffer.

If the world is going to get better at the challenges set out in the preceding chapter, then this has to change. Donor agencies like DFID have to work with governments, and with affected people, as well as with aid agencies. They have to support local institutions rather than weaken them, especially where there is conflict.

Where national governments are capable, they invariably lead the response to disaster even when it is on an international scale. When governments are overwhelmed they either struggle to assert themselves, or find they are completely unable to coordinate. In some instances governments are actively belligerent, or hostile to international response (or to a particular group in their population being helped). This suggests four broad categories:

• Strong and capable governments who take the lead (e.g. India).
• Capable but under resourced governments who need help to lead (e.g. Mozambique).
• Governments who are unable to lead, and need the international community to do this on their behalf for a time (e.g. Haiti).
• Governments who are unable or unwilling to lead and are obstructive (e.g. Niger in 2009).

In these four broad categories the international community has to respond differently, but the approach has not always reflected this reality.

DFID too has tended to respond as if all disasters, and all governments, were the same. This review suggests a different approach is needed. Such an approach would require much more work on the analysis of risks and capacities in advance, incorporating disaster resilience into development processes. It also requires more work on bringing a disparate international response together so that it performs more reliably. Most of all, it requires being a partner, a builder of coalitions and a willing participant in them. This review has called this being a ‘network enabler’.

4.1 Anticipation

Disasters are often viewed in the public imagination as ‘acts of God’. In reality many are predictable. A 2005 World Bank report ‘global hotspots’\textsuperscript{13} identifies countries exposed to multiple natural hazards (earthquakes, droughts and storms), and there are plenty of credible data available identifying countries most affected by disasters.

\textsuperscript{12} Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006). ALNAP.
The UK Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) goes further in its ‘horizon scanning’ report of 2007\(^{14}\). It identifies areas of ‘multiple stress’, factoring in demography, economy and conflict. Climate change is another obvious element of stress, or vulnerability, with a recent report\(^{15}\) identifying sub-Saharan Africa as one of the most at risk areas.

What is clear is that prediction, although far from perfect, is possible for some high-risk nations. Hurricane seasons in the Caribbean and the Bay of Bengal are well known and monitored. El Nino and La Nina ocean effects last for some years and change weather patterns in ways that are partly understood. Rainfall data for regions and countries in arid zones suggests drought cycles can be identified early.

What is also clear is that as climate related disasters increase, the better we will need to become at prediction if we are to have any hope of coping with these. But disaster managers do not make enough use of such science, and scientists do not routinely produce information for this audience\(^{16}\). The rainfall that produced Pakistan’s terrible floods of 2010 happened a month before the flood water caused its greatest devastation. The effects were predicted but not acted on.

This can also be the case with ‘food security’ crises (famines). There are proven early warning systems that monitor potential crises, notably the USAID supported FEWSNET. Despite this, and proof that prior intervention not only saves lives but is cheaper, these ‘slow onset’ disasters are regularly missed. The Niger case study for this review shows how clear evidence does not always trigger a response (the blockage in Niger was domestic politics), and how timely intervention can save tens of thousands of lives.

Many agencies were able to act in Niger, despite the intransigence of government and the tardiness of the United Nations. Partly this was due to prompt action by the European Union humanitarian organisation ECHO; it was also because DFID has an innovative regional fund in West Africa for crisis response. This regional fund allows agencies to get money quickly for unexpected and unnoticed disasters – it allows for early action. Thousands of children were saved as a result of these early actions.

Early action is at least as important as early warning, and is a matter of political will. The expansion of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was in part a way of making such decisions more technical and less political. Supporting resilience in at risk nations will further increase the likelihood that early action will be taken. But there will always be an element of risk, however good the science. Being able to tolerate failure – getting it wrong occasionally – is important. The cost benefit of nine timely interventions easily outweighs one wrong judgement call.

One area where prediction is improving, but still has a way to go, is with earthquakes and volcanoes. These geo-physical hazards are different to the hydro-meteorological ones touched on above (floods, droughts and storms). They tend to happen less frequently but cause severe damage.

Although earthquakes cannot be predicted with any certainty in short time frames, the location of major fault lines is well known. The question of earthquakes in Kathmandu or Tehran is when rather than whether. There have been significant advances in understanding earthquake risk and when they might occur through monitoring ground motion. Likewise, understanding the reasons for building damage and collapse so that codes and standards can be developed to ensure safe construction in the future. Science

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\(^{14}\) The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007 – 2036. See: www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/Organisation/Agencies/Organisations/DCDC/

\(^{15}\) DARA (2010). Climate vulnerability monitor 2010: the state of climate crisis.

\(^{16}\) See for instance the 1 March Select Committee on Science and Technology findings that there is inadequate use of science for anticipating emergencies.
in this area has proven to have very significantly reduced fatalities and damage in many countries and is critical, but research and investment is needed elsewhere to promote safe construction.

Anticipating and predicting conflict is another area that has improved in recent years. Regular crises indices from the International Crisis Group or the Fund for Peace are being used by governments to inform decisions on early action. These are important, as in contrast to early warning for natural disasters, there has never been a shortage of warning about pending conflicts in a host of places.

Whilst predicting single hazards is possible but often neglected, anticipating unexpected hazards, or combinations of hazards is a factor of magnitude more difficult. The possibility of a large-scale flood causing a nuclear spill for instance (as Japan has proved), or droughts in Russia and floods in Australia leading to food price riots in West Africa is difficult to see in advance. Nevertheless, in an inter-connected world these events are ever more likely and policy makers need new tools to help them anticipate.

<table>
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<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DFID should:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Assemble and regularly update a global risk register for DFID using information gained from its country teams and international organisations.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Make better use of the DFID Chief Scientist to support UK science in anticipating crises.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Make this available as a contribution to pre-crisis arrangements across the system.</strong></td>
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4.2 Resilience

The impact of a disaster depends on how well prepared a country is to cope with it. Some are better able to bounce back than others. The Haiti earthquake at the beginning of 2010 killed 230,000 people. A much larger earthquake in Chile later in the year killed 3,000 people, almost one hundred times fewer.

But this is not only about rich nations; a 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) killed nearly half a million people whereas a similar strength cyclone in 2008 killed 3,000. The difference was that in the intervening thirty years Bangladesh had become better prepared.

The earthquake in Haiti has set back the development of that nation many years. Banda Aceh in Indonesia was devastated by the 2005 tsunami, but managed to rebuild 100,000 houses in three years. Bringing the resources of the rest of Indonesia to bear enabled this rapid recovery. Being able to channel international resources effectively was another key aspect. This was similarly true for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan which was better prepared as a result of its response to the 2005 earthquake.

Being prepared, and being able to recover is what makes nations resilient. Conversely, where nations are fragile they are much less able to cope. Being able to anticipate disasters, having shock resistant infrastructure, social protection mechanisms, financial and human resources are all part of being resilient, as is the ability to adapt.
Embedding resilience within development programmes

Disasters can have significant impact on countries’ development. Between 2000 and 2009 Munich Re estimates economic losses from disasters were $670 billion. Some small countries have sustained losses through disaster of several times their GDP, setting them back years. Vietnam loses over 1% of its GDP annually dealing with disasters. Floods and droughts can have knock on effects in terms of food production and international trade.

A seminal World Bank study in 2004 found that disasters slow economic growth in the long term as well as short term. This is especially true in countries that depend on agriculture. This means poorer countries are doubly affected, as they have less ability to cope financially with the cost of disasters, and their economies are worse affected overall. Disasters also affect the economies of middle-income countries however, as they tend to have manufacturing sectors (for example) connected to agriculture. Droughts in southern Africa in the 1990s led to big swings in GDP growth across the region.

These risks look set to increase with population growth, climate change and resource scarcity. In the fragile countries where DFID is increasingly working, achieving poverty reduction will get harder. Reducing maternal mortality and other millennium development goals will depend on nations being resilient.

Ultimately development is the answer to being able to cope with disasters – the example at the beginning of this chapter illustrates that – but getting to development can depend on being able to bounce back from disasters. Bangladesh is more resilient to disasters economically because of structural changes in its agricultural sector (the deregulation of agricultural investment led to more disaster resistant irrigation). The early warning and action systems in Bangladesh have also prevented high death rates.

This analysis has implications for development, and especially for the overall goal within DFID of reducing poverty. Disasters often hit the poorest hardest. Even when a country copes quite well overall with a disaster, the poorest and most vulnerable can be disproportionately affected.

The World Bank recognises this in its guidelines for poverty reduction strategies (PRS). One of the four dimensions of poverty is, “exposure to risk and income shock”, at a household level, a community level and a national level. Despite this, little is routinely done about disasters in development strategies, nor are they mentioned in the Millennium Development Goals. Conventional thinking has been that scarce resources should be used to promote growth, and that this is ultimately the answer anyway.

This approach is no longer defensible. The body of academic evidence that disasters and shocks must be taken seriously is growing, as is the evidence that investment in reducing disaster risk shows good returns. Flood defence and retrofitting buildings for earthquakes in the US found an average cost benefit of one to four. The same is true in developing countries. Incorporating disaster costs into longer term economic planning is necessary if valuable development resources are not to be diverted to recovery.

A new resilience approach will include working at regional, national, community and household level. At national level there needs to be more work on disaster management. Work on legal frameworks, work on planning, and work on bolstering the departments that respond after disasters, such as national disaster management agencies. Civil society organisations that respond to disasters should be supported to play their role too.

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At community and household level there needs to be work on mechanisms and institutions to respond (such as civil contingency committees), and on infrastructure that can withstand disasters, or play a dual role like schools that are used as cyclone shelters.

Governments and civil society organisations also need help to provide social protection mechanisms. The Niger case study for this review demonstrates that targeted cash distributions at the right time can stop households slipping into starvation, selling assets and incurring debt along the way. Relatively small inputs at the right time can save years of misery and disease. Crucially, the combination of such measures can provide the basis for economic development. People living on the perilous edge of extreme poverty cannot afford to take the risks needed to escape this situation otherwise.

This kind of work is taking place in different sectors. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) work seeks to build local response systems and small mitigation infrastructure. The Hyogo Framework for Action sets out five building blocks for effective disaster risk reduction; governance, risk assessment, knowledge and education, risk management and vulnerability reduction, and disaster preparedness and response. But as the money is usually humanitarian it is only available after a disaster has struck. DFID had a standing pledge to spend 10% of its response budget on DRR, but these measures are needed before, not after the event. Climate change adaptation work is often about mitigation work too— from planting more mangroves to new seed varieties for warmer summers. Development in places like Ethiopia is focusing more on social safety nets and is exploring exciting new ideas such as micro insurance. All of this needs to be brought together for maximum effectiveness.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 atrocities in the US, the UK put in place a ‘national resilience plan’, recognising that it did not have the wherewithal to deal with such a disaster. This plan sets out protocols for incident control, establishes the capacities needed for response and ensures training, equipping and regular practising. Many countries have national disaster protocols, but they are not resourced or planned in detail.

This report was not mandated to look at protracted conflicts. It is clear though, that in fragile states, or states in conflict, the international humanitarian system is often the provider of last resort to the very poorest. The case study in DR Congo for this report highlighted the vulnerability of states and societies to even the smallest shocks when they are very fragile. A lack of institutions and capacities means that accidents lead to much higher loss of life, small conflicts cannot be resolved and grow to big ones and communities are not able to protect themselves. In DR Congo there are emergencies almost constantly; boat accidents that kill hundreds, petrol tanker explosions that do the same. A fishing conflict in 2009 that led to the exodus of thousands of people across the border when it turned violent. Mass rapes and robbery are committed in the east by roving groups of bandits.

All of this is avoidable with working institutions. A licensing authority that does not allow ferries to run without checking them for safety; a fire service that can attend accidents before tankers explode; a judicial process that allows disputes to be resolved before they become violent; a police or security service that arrests bandits.

In this vacuum, much of what is today called ‘humanitarian’ in DR Congo is simply substitution service delivery. Health care is not provided by the state and people are too poor to pay for it. So humanitarian agencies provide basic health care and respond when major killers like cholera or measles break out. Resilience is an important way to understand this work, and will be important as DFID works to build institutions, making states less fragile. Ensuring humanitarian and development work closely together will be vitally important.
Regional, national and local capacities
DFID has not traditionally funded governments directly in humanitarian crises (less than 1% in the last two years), although it has funded multi-donor reconstruction funds through the UN and the World Bank. Similarly, whilst DFID has built up considerable expertise in rapid procurement, it usually donates its in kind assistance through aid agencies, rather than government. There has been funding for national disaster preparedness, typically through the UN, in countries like Bangladesh. This is not routinely linked with subsequent response however. In Mozambique the government asked for £2 million to help them prepare ahead of anticipated flooding in 2006. This was not forthcoming; when there was flooding later that year the international response cost over £60 million.

Neither does DFID routinely fund local NGOs or local organisations in rapid onset emergencies, although it funds them indirectly, as many grants to international partners are passed on to national and local organisations. In Bangladesh UNDP has a list of more than 30 pre-approved local NGOs that it gave DFID money to after the 2008 cyclone. Many of the international NGOs (and especially faith based organisations like Christian Aid and CAFOD), routinely work through local partners. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement always work through its national societies. Despite this, the funding of national and local NGOs by DFID remains hit and miss. It is not a conscious strategy, but more of a by-product.

An approach tailored to government capacity would offer several advantages. Governments like the Philippines and Indonesia can already respond to quite large disasters without international help. Preserving international capacity for those disasters that are truly overwhelming makes much more sense than having to deploy expensive international workers to floods simply because the local system was so under resourced. National Disaster Management Agencies exist in most countries that suffer regular disasters, but often lack equipment and training. With an established relationship, it would also be possible to give money and goods directly to the government after a disaster knowing how such resources would be used. Special funding channels could be set up in advance, making transparency and reporting easier.

The same is true of civil society organisations; organisations such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies often have formal responsibilities in the national disaster plan. With proper resources they can prepare jointly with government and other private or voluntary agencies, leading to prompt response in the event of disaster.

An increased focus on national and local capacities could also include regional bodies. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) played a pivotal role in facilitating the response to cyclone Nargis in Burma in May, 2008. This regional cooperation around disaster response has continued, with joint protocols on deployment of military assets one of the latest developments. Increasingly governments at risk from disasters are sharing expertise through such regional forums, spreading good practice and developing joint early warning systems.

Innovative funding models for risk transfer
As the cost of damage caused by extreme weather conditions is soaring, more sustainable ways to tackle weather risk are needed. Public-private partnerships in risk financing have become more popular, in particular parametric insurance. Catastrophe bonds are also issued more commonly now, e.g. by Mexico to provide resources in the event of severe earthquake or hurricane damage.

Insurance can play a role in guaranteeing predictable and reliable payouts, allowing for long-term planning, increasing governments’ self-determination and ownership, protecting livelihoods and diminishing negative effects of relief interventions on local
markets. The limitations are that premiums can be too high with high opportunity costs, and that it is not easy to tell if the insurance gives value for money. There is also the danger of moral hazard – governments not focussing enough on risk reduction and prevention because they feel insured.

The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) is the most prominent example of a public private insurance mechanism that DFID has funded. The review welcomes this groundbreaking work. DFID is now also investing in the design of the Africa Risk Capacity, leading to the establishment of an African-owned risk pooling entity for weather risk.

### Recommendations

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<tr>
<th>DFID should:</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong> Ensure that building resilience is part of the core DFID programme in at risk countries, integrating the threat from climate change and other potential hazards into disaster risk reduction. Country offices should undertake contingency planning.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5</strong> Promote national response capacities of governments and civil society in at risk countries including:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The development of national resilience strategies.</td>
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<td>• The establishment of direct funding mechanisms.</td>
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<td>• Regional response mechanisms where they add value.</td>
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<td>• Through civil society organisations such as Red Cross and Crescent Societies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• National and local private sector companies, which are able at the country level to support entrepreneurial, and market solutions, which will increase in resilience and improve disaster response.</td>
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### 4.3 Leadership

In situations where the government of an affected country is unable to lead humanitarian response, the UN remains the only legitimate authority that can do so. Over the years a complex system has been put in place to do this, with a dedicated global Emergency Relief Coordinator supported by the big specialised UN agencies.

Although the UN has the mandate to lead, its performance has been very disappointing overall. In all but one of the case studies for this review UN leadership was poor. This was especially true in the larger disasters. It is true at a strategic level and at an operational level. It is true across the international system, and in individual crises. There is rarely a vision beyond fund raising, and rarely an organising narrative that draws together the disparate capacities.

What is needed is a complete overhaul of strategic and operational leadership in the UN. This review finds that there is appetite for this within the system, and that it is in the interest of the UK to champion it. The issue is at the heart of ensuring affected people receive what they need and achieving value for money. On the strength of these findings the review concludes that there is a need for further humanitarian reforms.

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20 Christian Aid, "Does Disaster Insurance Have a Role in Climate Change Adaptation", Time for Climate Justice, June 2010.
Strategic leadership
First and foremost, there is a need for vision. There is a need for the UN at the highest level to set out the challenges ahead and how it plans to deal with them. There is a need for this vision to be backed politically, and for this political backing to extend into responses when they occur. Leaders on the ground must be confident they have the backing of their seniors, and of the member states of the UN.

Secondly there is a need for the right people. During the reviews consultations in New York the idea of a ‘stand aside’ mechanism whereby the best humanitarian leaders could be deployed into mega crises was developed. This idea has subsequently been taken up in the IASC and the review strongly supports this process.

The UN needs to develop a cadre of capable humanitarian response leaders. It needs the right approach to talent management and the right terms and conditions to underpin this. It needs to look outside its own narrow base to secure the best talent.

Finally, there is a need for the right support systems and structure to enable leaders. Some of these structures are in place and work well; for instance financing which has improved as a result of the last round of reform. But planning and prioritisation remain weak and politicised. Leaders of the various UN humanitarian coordination mechanisms have no formal authority and reporting lines between clusters and coordinators are unclear. There are few standing support staff and deployment of the right team can take weeks. These have been seen as intractable issues, but will have to change if performance is to improve.

For the UK as a strong UN supporter, and a large donor to the system it is important to work on these issues, as outlined above. The UK is also one of the best placed. It drove the last round of reforms and will receive much support for initiating a new round. To do so it will need to build coalitions of support and work cleverly with its partners. This is expanded in further sections of this report.

Operational leadership
One of the fundamental drawbacks to achieving a more reliable response from the UN is that it is more a loose collection of strong and separate agencies than a well functioning system. WFP is the world’s premier food agency, with logistics that rival many multi-national companies. UNICEF is the world’s largest children’s agency providing everything from clean water to temporary education. The refugee agency UNHCR can set up camps for hundreds of thousands of displaced people fleeing war or persecution. Each has separate mandates, boards, missions and histories and all are suspicious of too much central direction. All three need to fundraise in big emergencies, as do the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) who are also involved in humanitarian emergencies. This creates competition, making prioritisation especially difficult as it can have funding implications.

The cluster approach was developed as the latest attempt to solve the coordination problem. It sought to fill gaps in humanitarian service delivery. Improved coordination of all players by a named lead agency was expected to eliminate gap areas and avoid overlaps. Key agencies were given responsibility for leadership and coordination for each sector; for example WFP leads the logistics cluster, WHO leads the health cluster. The cluster lead is usually a UN agency although IFRC leads the shelter cluster and Save the Children co-leads the education cluster with UNICEF.

But performance of clusters has been disappointing. Cluster coordinators often lack experience and the training required to provide strong leadership. Too often cluster meetings are information sharing gatherings instead of the strategic decision making forums they should be. And the system has merely replicated agency divisions meaning prioritisation remains just as difficult.
The cluster system needs to be revised to address these failings. The role of the international system is to support national government in times of disaster, not to take over. A greater emphasis therefore should be put on cluster leadership by national government where appropriate. NGOs should play a greater role in co-chairing clusters. Where this happens, the cluster often has a better understanding of the situation on the ground.

In mega crises, there is a need for dedicated and experienced cluster leadership. Where this is not the case experienced coordinators should be deployed, secured by predictable donor funding. In larger emergencies clusters should become two-tier, consisting of a ‘strategic body’ group and an ‘information sharing’ group. This allows all partners to be included but also allows for a core group to set strategic direction.

Some disasters have seen an over proliferation of clusters and sub-clusters. This can lead to less, rather than more effective coordination. In fact, not all clusters are needed in every emergency. The type of disaster and the effectiveness of existing coordination mechanisms should dictate how many and which clusters need to be activated. In natural disasters this should be a national government led decision in consultation with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).

To be fully effective clusters need national NGOs and local groups. But these are the very partners that get excluded first due to security reasons, language barriers or size of cluster. This could be rectified if donors made local participation a prerequisite for cluster funding in each emergency. Clusters also need ‘non traditional actors’ such as the private sector if they are to be effective in coordinating the full response.

UN agency autonomy means that cluster leads often report through their agency rather than through the HC and OCHA can be excluded altogether. Clear reporting lines should be established between HC, cluster lead, agency and OCHA.

**Human resource capacities**

The uneven quality of personnel is a major limiting factor in humanitarian response. This is particularly true at the leadership level, but also with cluster leadership, technical experts and mid-level managers. One major issue is that there is no straightforward professional route into humanitarian work. Aid agencies want to hire experienced people but how do people get experience unless they are offered a job? Getting started in humanitarian work becomes a chicken and egg conundrum.

There is a need to grow the pool of competent professionals involved in humanitarian work. This requires investment, and a commitment from humanitarian agencies to create career paths for humanitarian professionals. Many aid agencies grew up without a culture of training, instead valuing rapid action and on-the-job learning. This approach has strengths: aid agencies remain nimble and keep their costs low. But it also means that, too often, managers and staff do not have all the skills they need.

There has been progress on staff skills in the past decade, and a number of worthwhile initiatives. But in every major emergency there are still significant numbers of aid personnel who lack some of the skills essential to their jobs. The consequences are hard to measure but are bound to include lost lives and wasted funds.

The gulf is starkest when one considers the investment the UK military make in their preparedness. Typically professional military forces spend 95% of their time training and 5% of their time in action. For humanitarians this figure is reversed; 95% of their time is spent in action and 5% of the time training would be a high figure.

Training is not the only method of learning and should complement, not replace, learning on the job. It need not be expensive or lengthy. It should be based on an assessment of the skills needed for the job, taking account of skills that are already there. Ideally it should be combined with a range of career development measures, which, over time, result in strong individuals within well-managed teams.
In the private sector this lesson is well known even if not always followed. The most successful companies take care to invest in their staff, and fast track them when they prove capable. And indeed, some of the best aid agencies have been doing so for years.

Some aid agencies may be reluctant to invest in training for fear of increasing the percentage of their funds spent on administration. They know the public are rightly sensitive about this. If they increased their administration budgets from, say, an average of 10p in the pound, to 12p in order to pay for training, they might worry that it would appear wasteful. But if the 2p spent on training increases the impact of the remaining 88p, everyone should be pleased. Aid agencies should explain to donors and the public that their beneficiaries will be better served if there is a modest investment in staff development. Skilled staff will make better use of the funds they have been entrusted with.

Professionalisation of the aid industry will come through better preparation and training of staff. DFID’s commitment to this could be demonstrated by investing in agency skills development and by better training of its own staff working in humanitarian situations. DFID should investigate and support the development of professional standards that it can use itself and will be of use to others.

**Recommendations**

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<tr>
<td><strong>6</strong> Build coalitions to drive forward humanitarian reform based on improving leadership, including:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Rapid deployment of experienced leadership teams in big crises. This should include a ‘step aside’ system to ensure the best leadership is in place at both the strategic and operational level.</td>
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<td>• Encourage the convening of a UN High Level Panel to look at ways of improving the international humanitarian system to face future challenges.</td>
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<td>• Work closely with UK missions to build coalitions for reform of the international system, including more coherent use of UN executive board positions.</td>
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<td>• Work with the UN to create a new cadre of humanitarian leaders and the talent management systems and terms and conditions to sustain this.</td>
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<td>• Work with other donors and the UN to resolve some of the deficiencies in management, recruitment, prioritisation and planning. This must include the right support staff available for rapid deployment.</td>
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<td>• Work with other donors and the UN to strengthen and provide better leadership of the cluster system.</td>
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<td><strong>7</strong> DFID should make a sustained effort to improve skills in the humanitarian sector. This should include:</td>
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<td>• Work to create a set of standards for humanitarian leadership.</td>
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<td>• Training within DFID, aid agencies and governments and civil society in disaster prone countries.</td>
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<td>• Ensuring pre-qualified partners demonstrate adequate investment in skills development (see section 5.2).</td>
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4.4 Innovation

The international humanitarian system is facing greater and more complex challenges. New social, demographic, environmental and political problems increasingly demand innovative products, organisational processes and ways of thinking. Synchronous failures such as those seen in Japan; simultaneous disasters taxing global capacity will need new approaches. It is now widely acknowledged that humanitarian actors cannot simply do more of what they have always done.

But humanitarian practitioners and analysts bemoan the slow pace of change. Relatively straightforward ideas like cash transfers have taken a long time to become accepted. The barriers to innovation are often more to do with politics and institutional interests.

Recent research\(^\text{21}\) has identified a number of successful humanitarian innovations. And major organisations are beginning to understand its importance. USAID has made innovation a central pillar of its ongoing strategic renewal in both policy and operations\(^\text{22}\). The World Food Programme is innovating the way it delivers food aid\(^\text{23}\).

This context of growing interest and commitment presents clear opportunities. DFID has a reputation for being ‘out ahead of the donor pack’ in terms of flexibility and responsiveness. It has supported specific innovations processes both at policy level such as the Good Humanitarian Donor-ship initiative; and in operational contexts such as community-based feeding therapy. This experience and reputation are assets that could be leveraged, establishing the UK as an innovative leader in global humanitarian efforts.

Evidence shows\(^\text{24}\) that successful innovations have a number of common enabling factors, including effective support from donors, head offices, senior managers and like-minded peers in other implementing organisations. Also important are good partnerships with actors outside the traditional humanitarian sector. Any donor seeking to improve the system must work on the basis that it is not possible to single-handedly reform a complex system with multiple actors and factors. Coalition building is vital.

Given the limited resources that will be available relative to other sectors (e.g. the private sector), it is essential for donors to take an ‘open innovation’ approach from the outset. Collectively, DFID and its partners need to invest in robust innovation processes focusing on both longstanding unresolved problems and new emerging challenges. DFID needs to become more consistent in using evidence and systematic analysis to decide where to invest and how. Resources for strengthening the innovations capacities of high value partners which will also be essential to create the time and space needed for reflection and generation of new ideas.

A more innovative international response to disasters needs to be firmly grounded in humanitarian principles and values. They need to build on the principle of better learning from and with, and greater accountability to, affected communities. Many of the most important innovations of the past 30 years – from cash to community feeding therapy – have come from rethinking this central relationship.

There is an urgent need to leverage appropriate forms of science, research, technology and private sector knowledge to support humanitarian innovation. While DFID has placed considerable importance on research for development, with significant investment in research capacity North and South, there has been relatively less attention paid to research for humanitarian action, and none of it has focused on

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23 www.wfp.org/content/revolution-food-aid-food-assistance-innovations-overcoming-hunger
Southern capacities. As noted previously in relation to insurance and national resilience, there is scope for transformative developments in this last area.

Innovation also presents a number of internal opportunities and challenges for DFID. One of the key findings of this review is that there are opportunities to benefit from fresh ideas throughout DFID’s humanitarian policy and operational work. More work is needed to systematically identify where the need for innovation is most pressing. DFID staff members are a vital asset for the organisation, with a wealth of experience and knowledge from a range of disaster settings. But staff are not encouraged to innovate, nor are they consistently rewarded for it. There is no time to devote to developing ideas, and there is often a hard battle to get new ways of working accepted.

Any effort to enhance humanitarian innovations needs to build on and enhance the entrepreneurial and creative capabilities within the organisation. There is a need to provide appropriate training, secondments and reflection space for DFID staff. Effective innovators and innovation facilitators should be rewarded, and this should be built into appraisal systems and ultimately career development. Leaders need to foster an atmosphere of enquiry, feedback and challenge, where there is tolerance of risk.

DFID also needs to work to join the dots between the successful innovations it funds and the proposals it subsequently approves. For instance, DFID provided some of the first funds to trial the ‘plumpynut’ idea in nutrition, since hailed as one of the most exciting innovations of the last decade. But it did not push this new way of working through its funding decisions. This urgently needs to change so that DFID’s research funds can support the development of successful innovation that are taken to scale through operational funding.

Two approaches are highlighted here for their importance for an effective humanitarian response, and also for highlighting the range of ways DFID can support innovations.

**Cash based approaches**

One of the exciting advances in recent years has been the use of cash for relief and recovery. Traditionally, humanitarian agencies would supply goods, but a wealth of academic work has proven cash to be more flexible, more efficient and more effective in certain situations.

Whilst the benefit of using cash is widely acknowledged, its adoption at scale has been frustratingly slow. The majority of relief operations still supply stricken populations with blankets, pots and pans, soap and so on. DFID, despite being a funder of research into cash, and a supporter of it as an approach at a policy level, does not routinely require its partners to work with cash. This has to change.

In the Niger case study for this review, two aspects of the response stood out. ECHO insisted that its partners used cash, requiring them to argue against its use rather than for it. Concern Worldwide, an NGO, demonstrated that cash distributions could prevent malnutrition. Concern did half of their cash distributions using mobile phones – they distributed the phones and then used a transfer system called ‘zap’ to allow recipients to buy goods in local shops. With an established infrastructure for transfer, costs can be marginal. It is possible to envisage a system whereby in lean years targeted cash distributions for several months would prevent malnutrition, and far costlier medical interventions.

This review has concluded that DFID should follow the lead of ECHO and make cash based responses the usual relief and recovery position for its partners. Partners should be required to explain why they are not using cash, rather than the converse.

Inevitably there will be times when cash is not appropriate. Where markets do not function efficiently, large volumes of cash might push prices up. Where there are
extreme security concerns this might also be an issue. Two of the case studies from this review suggest that these circumstances may be less frequent than imagined however. In Niger the cash distributions by Concern, Save the Children and others took place in remote areas at a time of absolute food shortages. Despite this prices did not rise in the markets, as traders efficiently drew in surplus from neighbouring Nigeria. Similarly in DR Congo, ‘voucher fairs’ demonstrated that local traders could bring goods to needy populations far faster and more efficiently than aid agencies.

One fear that has consistently dogged the scaling of cash is that of corruption. The extensive literature on cash has found no increased risk of this compared to other relief goods however, and with systems such as mobile phone transfer and micro bank accounts it may in fact be less.

Shelter
Providing adequate shelter is one of the most intractable problems in international humanitarian response. Tents are too costly and do not last long enough. Plastic sheeting can be good but most often is low quality and falls apart immediately. Rebuilding houses takes years, even when land issues are not major obstacles.

To solve this issue, agencies have increasingly used ‘transitional shelter’, a wide range of alternative solutions including cash, communal buildings and temporary shelters. Typically a compromise between a tent and a full house, transitional shelter can last for three years until proper reconstruction is achieved. At best it uses low cost local materials and is based on a simple design. Materials can be used afterwards too, when people move to their new home.

Whilst this approach shows promise, there are also challenges. Transitional shelters cost more than a few bits of plastic sheeting, and in emergencies that are not well funded ‘transitional’ can quickly become ‘permanent’. Arguments between experts over design, quality and cost can slow the process, and weak coordination in the sector often leads to a wide variance in what is provided. That can mean affected communities getting different levels of provision depending on the agency allocated to build their shelter.

The issue of weak coordination was at the heart of the establishment of the cluster system. As section 4.3 of this review sets out, in some areas this has worked well. Logistics, food and water have all improved. Other areas have improved in parts. In shelter, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) was nominated as the cluster lead agency, and this has not worked well. Partly this is because shelter is difficult. Partly it is because there is an artificial split whereby IFRC is responsible in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, but not beyond the emergency phase of displacement.

DFID has been heavily engaged in shelter since the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. It has funded research and pushed quality standards and coordination. This review concludes that DFID must continue and intensify its efforts to find better solutions to providing shelter after disaster. Shelter is critical to health, employment, family and safety. Without adequate shelter, in all but the most benign climates people are terribly vulnerable. Partly this may involve resolving the cluster issues touched on above. Partly it will involve more research. Partly it may involve bringing in new actors, such as the private sector consortium recently founded through the World Economic Forum. Continuing to fund and resource shelter during response will also be important.

Technology
Technology, although not a silver bullet to the problems of humanitarian aid, also needs more concerted support.

Some existing technologies offer considerable potential. The Niger case study for this review highlighted the use of mobile phones for cash transfers (also successfully used in
Kenya). This rapidly developing technology could become the standard in a few years, revolutionising the banking and remittance sector along the way. Satellites are already widely used in tracking storms and in providing imagery for humanitarian operations. “Crowd sourcing”, such as that used in Kenya and Haiti may prove to be an important new way of doing needs assessment. Social media is driving new accountability touched on in the section below. Google has piloted several software applications for humanitarian operations including through its Google Earth map and its people finder software now being used in Japan.

There are emerging technologies that also have considerable potential (and risks). Foremost among these is nanotechnology, which is widely seen as having the potential to transform medicine, water safety and foodstuffs within the next 5-10 years. Another is agent based modelling, increasingly used in economics, which may have applications in understanding the spread of epidemics or even population movement.

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4.5 Accountability

Accountability in sudden onset humanitarian emergencies has particular characteristics: the presence of acute needs, lack of choice, lack of voice and access to formal procedures, disconnect between donors and survivors, and the prevalence of life and death decisions. All of these make accountability more challenging but also more important.

The paradigm is still viewing the affected population too much as what economist Julian Le Grand has called “pawns” (passive individuals) and the international community as “knights” (extreme altruists). This approach costs. Local capacities are not utilised, the beneficiary is not involved enough and the quality of delivery is lower than it should be.

Since the late 1990s the humanitarian community has initiated a number of inter-agency initiatives to improve accountability, quality and performance. DFID has been funding the most widely known ones: the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), People In Aid and the Sphere Project.
These initiatives and others have improved standards, quality, learning and transparency in the sector but not enough progress has been made. It is time now to put these approaches at the heart of how the system works.

The case studies for this review show that involvement of affected communities and provision of information about programmes to recipients of aid was patchy everywhere. In general, performance was worst during the relief phase, and improving during recovery and reconstruction. The very fact that the most innovative practices highlighted earlier are those which focus on recipient capacities and needs highlights how far the system has to go.

The international humanitarian system needs to put accountability, learning and transparency into the centre of its response. With the technology and methods now available, there is no excuse not to. Assistance has to be in accordance with what affected people have made clear they need, rather than what the system is prepared to offer. And the international system has to be held to account for that, and for learning how to deliver improved services. This can be done through better feedback loops with the affected population, through a range of mechanisms such as Listening Project-style assessments, HAP complaints mechanisms and perception surveys.

DFID is being asked to be more accountable than ever before to UK taxpayers in a period of heightened government budgetary constraints. DFID has taken important steps on transparency as a step towards greater accountability and is at the forefront amongst donors on this. Under the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee DFID has started publishing detailed information about all new projects and programmes on the web since 1 January 2011. DFID recognises that transparency creates better feedback from beneficiaries to donors and taxpayers. It helps to better understand what works and what does not. It also helps reduce waste and the opportunities for fraud and corruption.

DFID is also committed to push for full transparency across the international aid system by asking partners and other donors to adhere to similar standards of transparency.

And to square the circle from transparency to accountability, DFID has committed to providing opportunities for those directly affected by DFID projects to provide feedback on their performance. This commitment needs to apply to all humanitarian emergency work as well. Even if putting them into practice will be more challenging than in other areas.

Improving accountability is intimately tied up to the work on impact assessments – for credible impact assessments there is a need to put disaster-affected people at the centre of the analysis.

This can be supported through innovative use of appropriate technology that improves communications to and from affected populations. Hi-tech was seen in Haiti with the Ushahidi “crowd sourcing” platform, low-tech – men on bicycles with megaphones in Bangladesh and Burma for early warning. Mobile phones and radio are both important to reach people.

**Impact**

The emergency response sector does not routinely assess impact. What this means is that for some operations it is almost impossible to say how the assistance helped people, or even whether it helped them.

There are good reasons for this sometimes. In emergencies, there is little time to measure in the early hours and days of a response, in what the review sees as “the Critical Period”. In conflict it can be dangerous. And saving lives is the priority. It is also more difficult to measure averting negative change (e.g. to prevent famine) than bringing about a positive change (as in development) because of the lack of decent
counterfactuals. Delivering in some of the most important sectors of humanitarian aid, such as protection and dignity, is difficult to assess. Aid is only one of a number of inputs into the lives of disaster-affected people. Any attempt to assess even at a system-wide level is plagued with attribution issues, never mind down to the level of individual donors’ contributions to a particular project.

Other reasons for not doing impact assessments cannot be so easily justified: it is convenient not to have to do it; the need for high visibility action, shaped by donors and the media; the competition between agencies and the lack of serious consultation with the people in need; the failures in leadership. Perhaps most important, impact assessments require time and resources that are not trivial, and to date few donors have been willing to support these efforts on the humanitarian side of the system.

This is no longer acceptable. The sector must increase its efforts to demonstrate impact, and it must use evidence on what works and what does not and why to improve its performance. Lessons need to be learned and applied. Donors like DFID need to change the incentives in the financing system to ensure that impact is routinely measured, rather than fitfully if at all. Perfection is not possible for the valid reasons outlined above but a lot more can be done.

This review found that tools exist or are being developed to overcome the methodological challenges. Case studies have been collated by ALNAP and others. A framework for monitoring and evaluating results and impact is being designed for DR Congo’s Humanitarian Action Plan. This will provide further insight into what can and cannot be done. What is necessary is to move away from a system where many agencies still continue to measure success in volume of food, goods or vaccines delivered rather than the impact on the affected population. A particularly important and necessary area for impact assessments will be in innovation, testing the relative impact of one approach compared to another.

To measure and demonstrate impact, action needs to be taken at various stages of an emergency response as well as in resilience building programmes. It cannot be done as an add-on alone. And throughout all stages, participatory approaches should be taken where possible.

In theory, needs assessments should provide baselines against which impact can later be measured. Needs assessments should also be designed and carried out having the views of affected people centre stage. However, the reality looks different. Needs assessments routinely lack baseline data. They are more about gathering information for planning and fundraising by specific agencies than building a comprehensive picture of need and prioritisation. There is competition between organisations and sectors, the process is not transparent and sharing information is sometimes discouraged as it might pose a risk to an institution’s role in the response. Needs assessments are quite often too late to inform funding decisions.

The lack of baselines is not the only problem. Without a common strategy and agreed definitions of humanitarian outcomes, impact assessments are difficult to carry out. For that, leadership and strong partnerships are essential (see sections 4.3 and 4.6).

Monitoring has also been found to be weak and suffers from patchy, inconsistent efforts. In complex emergencies where security and access are major constraints, monitoring is an even greater challenge. Remote programming is increasingly used, especially in countries like Somalia.

Ex-post evaluations tend to evaluate activities rather than impact and do not often enough include a participatory element so that disaster survivors can hold agencies to account. Because of a lack of resources and narrow agendas, most evaluations focus on a particular project or programme; system-wide assessments are still rare. The quality of
evaluations, as assessed by ALNAP from 2000 to 2008 has been consistently disappointing. Impact assessments, whether agency-specific, sector-wide or system-wide, are not usually carried out.

Technological advances such as satellite imagery are still not used enough to collect data across the programming cycle, including for needs assessments, monitoring and impact assessments. Neither are national capacities used enough in monitoring and evaluative efforts – whether operational agencies or think tanks and academics.

Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable
The humanitarian system is poorly equipped to ensure an equitable response for the most vulnerable. Whilst issues specific to children, age, old people, women and those with disability are widely written about, there are few mechanisms to deal with them.

There is no formal platform for collective engagement on specific issues, and there is little if any disaggregated data on needs and impact on vulnerable groups. A lot of the evidence base is anecdotal, picked up by someone who was aware of the needs of vulnerable groups while doing something else. Culturally insensitive practices such as delivering relief items in single lanes are still routinely practised. During the Pakistan earthquake this prevented widows without male company from accessing aid. A study by HelpAge25 shows that a disproportionately low amount of humanitarian assistance was dedicated to ensuring that the needs of a particular vulnerable group in disaster-affected populations – older people – are met.

Children, defined by those under the age of 18, make up at least 50% of affected populations in most of the emergencies around the world. Humanitarian assistance that does not assess and address the needs of children may be ignoring the majority – and would therefore potentially be failing to have the greatest impact.

Amnesty International reported that women and girls living in the makeshift camps in Haiti one year after the devastating 12 January 2010 earthquake faced an increasing risk of rape and sexual violence. The camps provided shelter and access to basic services in the immediate aftermath but no adequate protection for women and girls.

Gender
Accountability cannot improve without the humanitarian system becoming more gender aware. Poverty experienced by women and men is shaped by inequalities that discriminate against and marginalise certain social groups. The most pervasive one is gender inequality and this is magnified by the impacts of climate change and disasters.26 A study by the London School of Economics shows that natural disasters and their subsequent impact on average kill more women than men or kill women at an earlier age.27

An approach that does not recognise that women, men, girls and boys in an emergency situation have different needs and are exposed to different types of risk will in the best case be bad quality programming, in the worst case it can cause harm. Projects that are gender blind risk missing out on the most vulnerable individuals and may also provide an inappropriate response due to lack of analysis and limited understanding of what the gender specific needs are.

At the same time, the role of women in prevention, relief and recovery is not recognised enough. Previous evaluations show that women drive the move from immediate concerns – reuniting families, finding shelter and food – to identifying ways to generate

26 Gender, Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation: A Learning Companion, Oxfam Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation Resources, 2010.
income. And women have repeatedly led initiatives to adapt to the impacts of climate change, and their knowledge and responsibilities related to natural resource management have proven critical to community survival. Women and girls need to be consulted on their needs immediately, appropriately and comprehensively throughout all stages of assistance.

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### 4.6 Partnership

The UK is not a large direct giver of humanitarian assistance, preferring instead to work with and through partners. This review endorses this approach; partnership will become even more important as our interconnected world gets more so and as power shifts towards the new emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India and the Gulf States. The UK can achieve more through and with partners, using its resources to bring together organisations with different skills to respond to acute need. In the modern world the most important part of what an organisation can do is what it can do with others.

Many of the partners DFID works with in humanitarian response are world-class organisations. A multilateral aid review, commissioned at the same time as this review, found that 80% of humanitarian agencies were either good or very good.

Nevertheless, the humanitarian sector in recent years has been seen by many as a closed shop with a handful of agencies and donors dominating. Whilst some of this has been for good reason – the need to be seen as neutral and impartial in conflict and being able to access populations mostly– some of this is simply not working. This review concludes that a sea change in thinking is required, so that DFID recognises that it is the quality of its partnerships that matters, as much if not more than its own stand alone capacity. Its role should be more ‘network enabler’ than individual doer.

### Working with the United Nations and its agencies

The United Nations as a whole is the largest partner of the UK in humanitarian emergency response. As a permanent member of the Security Council, and a founder member of the UN, the UK has historically been active in supporting multilateralism. This review has concluded that this position should be maintained, with multilateral response the default position of the UK and DFID.

UN agencies are amongst the largest deliverers of humanitarian aid. The World Food Programme (WFP) delivered 44 billion meals in 2010, most of it in response to emergencies or ongoing crises. UN agencies have the reach and the presence to deliver

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28 A. Araujo et al (2008), Gender Equality and Adaptation, IUCN.
aid at scale, and their international status often means they have a better relationship with government. The review documented some excellent examples of UN agency-led response; from WFP rapidly delivering food to 7 million people in flood hit Pakistan, to UNICEF supplying infant food nationally for starving children in Niger. There have also been failures, notably the inability to treat and contain cholera in Haiti.

The sections on leadership, finance, accountability and impact in this review make the point that there is still much work to be done to improve the performance of the international system. Cluster leadership needs to be improved, the UN agencies need to better support OCHA and the ERC, and need to work more collegially. Agencies need to get better at reporting results rather than what they have purchased.

DFID needs to support these efforts. As one of the major donors, it needs to provide greater predictability of funding so that the main UN agencies can invest in their humanitarian response capacities. It is difficult to keep staff, chart careers and invest in people if you do not know whether you will have money next year. Agencies need multi-year funding to make these investments. But DFID can also link this more clearly to results and performance. The multilateral aid review can be a good basis to start this rebalancing of funding.

This review concludes that alongside more predictable core funding the CERF is a valuable mechanism and should continue to be supported and expanded. It also concludes that NGOs need similar support. Pooled funds like the one in DR Congo have generally worked well. As they apply mostly to protracted crises the review has not studied these in depth, except to generally endorse this approach.

UN agencies are the backbone of many responses, and the UK is consistently one of the largest contributors. The default position of multilateralism means these agencies need supporting, as does the overall institution. But support cannot, and should not be uncritical. Agencies must collaborate with each other, with governments, with NGOs and with UN appointed leadership. The cluster approach is the correct vision – strategic networks bringing together the main actors involved in response. But its implementation has been too inflexible. Clusters need to be grouped around need rather than mandate, including all key actors, not just UN agencies and international NGOs. They need to be strategic, and often they need to work on several levels. They need to be creative, decision making bodies, not uninspiring talk shops. Resources from DFID should follow success on these criteria, and not be routinely allocated.

**Working with the European Union**

The European Union collectively provides half of all official humanitarian aid. It also has its own humanitarian aid agency, ECHO, which is the second largest global donor in its own right. And although the UK provides a sixth of its funding, it does not engage with ECHO strategically. This needs to change.

DFID’s policy level relationship with ECHO is weak. DFID and ECHO too often work in parallel, failing to communicate effectively. This results in duplication of work and costly overlaps. In disaster situations ECHO is routinely unaware of what DFID’s response will be. At policy level, DFID focuses priority attention on the major UN humanitarian partners rather than other donors. The lack of effective partnership with ECHO is a wasted opportunity. The UK holds a unique position amongst EU member states, with capacity to provide effective humanitarian aid when acting alone. This experience if better shared, could be beneficial to both agencies.

At present DFID’s relationship with ECHO appears to be delegated to junior staff. What is needed is better engagement at policy level, and better alignment at delivery level. DFID needs to have a more consistent strategic dialogue with ECHO. It needs to be aware of ECHO’s strategic planning processes and engage with these.
Most importantly, DFID needs to get smarter at sharing resources with ECHO. Niger is a good example of how this can work. ECHO has strong technical advisory presence through its specialised offices and permanent representation through the EU delegation. DFID relied on ECHO to lead the response. But DFID also periodically sent humanitarian advisors to reinforce and complement ECHO leadership. In other situations ECHO might follow a DFID lead.

Working with bilateral donors
The US government is the world’s largest individual humanitarian donor. It is very influential, with the heads of WFP, UNICEF and the World Bank traditionally coming from the US. The US government is also the largest donor to UNHCR and the ICRC.

This means the US has an opportunity to influence UN agencies at a high level. This is often not used coherently because of the fragmented nature of the US aid bureaucracy. But even so, DFID does not have a sustained policy dialogue with the humanitarian agencies of the US government, and is often perceived by the US as a loner.

The US was considering a significant reduction in the amount of humanitarian aid it gives as this review went to press (40% of food aid and disaster response by 70%). Were this to happen, for DFID it would mean that conversations about burden share – similar to those with ECHO – would be even more vital. It will be important to understand where the US will focus its efforts, and to ensure that scarce humanitarian resources are spread most effectively. Where the US will obviously lead – Haiti was a good example – then DFID should be able to fit around this.

The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group has played a role in achieving change in the humanitarian system. Donors such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Canada have been close allies for DFID. GHD has created a space for collective action that did not previously exist, and provided DFID with its most consistent allies. Lately, it has lost momentum. DFID should work to reinvigorate this group, both globally and in countries like DR Congo where it plays a pivotal role.

DFID shares the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality as a starting point for partnership with other traditional humanitarian donors. The principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) bind like-minded donors together around a further set of core donor principles. The GHD group is a starting ground for more effective donor action. But more needs to be done by DFID to demonstrate a collegial approach.

Widening the group who adhere to GHD principles would be a positive way forward. DFID is one of the stronger group members with capacity to influence how to bring others in. The annual Montreux meeting might be the forum for this and could potentially be widened in scope and ambition.

Working with new donor partners
The world is changing. China is now the second largest global economy. Nations such as India, South Africa, Russia, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia are important regional powers. The global picture of who responds to humanitarian need is changing too. Increasing contributions to disaster response are being seen from donors outside the ‘traditional’ OECD DAC group.

All of the nations cited above significantly respond to disasters in their regions. China’s contribution to WFP doubled in 2005 and was one of the largest donors in Burma after Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (and in Pakistan during the floods in 2010). Brazil was a major responder in Haiti. Saudi Arabia was the single largest donor to Bangladesh following cyclone Sidr (and was one of the top five global donors in 2009). India gave through multilateral channels to Pakistan flood relief.
The emerging group of non-traditional partners is an opportunity for DFID to establish new relationships. To do so, DFID must look for areas of common ground that already exist. Similar viewpoints can be used as starting points. For example, Brazil’s view on humanitarian response is, like DFID to build ownership by working with local authorities. DFID can combine its expertise with that of nations that regularly experience large scale natural disasters, and work with them to share learning with other at risk nations. Russia’s Emergency Control Ministry, EMERCOM has vast capacity and experience. India has a cadre of experienced disaster managers in government, following disasters in Orissa, Gujurat and Tamil Nadu. China’s handling of the Sichuan earthquake response was exemplary. China’s current 5 year plan (2006 – 2011) includes disaster relief, highlighting the importance of multilateral coordination.

China has enormous capacity to respond and deep experience of humanitarian emergencies within its own borders. Any disasters in the region of the Hindu Kush will likely see China responding in a significant way. To remain a humanitarian leader into the 21st century, DFID should reach out to seek to build new relationships with China along the lines of their recent White Paper.

The Gulf States, such as Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are significant donors in the humanitarian assistance and are increasingly becoming involved in other ways. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has a new humanitarian mechanism. DFID is already working with the GCC and humanitarian assistance is a good area of common interest.

In forging new humanitarian relationships, DFID should not risk ‘going it alone’. Alliances must be built with other traditional humanitarian donors to welcome new partners on board. Support must be corralled from within the DAC group to create a receptive forum for new donors to join. DFID will have to look wider across Whitehall to influence in this action. Close collaboration between DFID, FCO and other Whitehall departments will be vital to develop opportunities. The FCO’s capacity to build rapid consensus through cables in support of ASEAN’s role in response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 has already been demonstrated. DFID should make more use of the diplomatic networks and other government departments in order to build wider coalitions it needs to drive through the international reform agenda.

DFID’s commitment to humanitarian principles will become increasingly important as partnerships are developed. Demonstrating the value of these will be an important part of new rules for international humanitarian collaboration.

**Working with NGOs**

The UK has some of the most respected and important international non-government organisations in the world. Organisations like Oxfam and Save the Children are known worldwide. Their work has helped millions in disaster from Ethiopia, to Bangladesh to Haiti. Their pioneering technical work has often set the standard for other humanitarian agencies. They are highly regarded by the UK public and receive generous support when massive disasters strike.

Non-government organisations (NGOs) also provide much of the implementation capacity in humanitarian emergency response. Indigenous and faith based NGOs are often the first to respond, and understand both culture and context. International NGOs are adept at deploying quickly, often setting up big relief operations weeks before the UN cranks into gear. In 2008 NGOs spent $5.7 billion on humanitarian assistance29. NGOs often have large programmes in affected countries before disaster strikes, have experience in resilience building especially in community based disaster risk reduction and many work with national and local organisations.

The term NGO covers a diversity of organisations. World Vision had a turnover of $2.1 billion in 2006, rivalling UNICEF at $2.7 billion in the same year. In 2006 Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) spent $575 million on humanitarian aid. Only two governments – the UK and the US – spent more on official bilateral humanitarian assistance that year. The Catholic Church network Caritas’s voluntary spend was equivalent to the bilateral humanitarian assistance of Sweden, the sixth largest donor in 2006. In some cases, a single member of an NGO family makes a more significant contribution than its host government. For example, MSF France spent an estimated $81 million of the French public’s money on responding to crises in 2006, compared with bilateral spending of only $48 million by the French government.

NGOs are also rapidly growing in scale and geographic spread. India has a million indigenous organisations that describe themselves as NGOs. BRAC in Bangladesh claims to be the world’s largest NGO if number of employees is considered rather than financial turnover. Mercy Malaysia has become a well-known international NGO running programmes as far afield as Africa; Africa Humanitarian Action in Ethiopia runs programmes across the Horn.

What NGOs represent at their best is citizens’ action. Organisations like MSF have very generous public support across Europe and the US, receiving 86% of their funds from private donations. Their global spread is testimony to their enduring appeal.

For official donors and the international system this creates both an opportunity and a challenge. The increased capacity, especially of national and local NGOs provides untapped potential. The Haiti earthquake provides an example though of the headache that trying to coordinate the NGO sector can be, with more than 1,000 international NGOs flying in to Port au Prince ready to help. Some NGOs are an integral part of the system. Save the Children co-leads the education cluster with UNICEF; Oxfam provides people ready to go for the water and sanitation cluster. But other NGOs either do not know, or do not accept this system. Many turn up looking for guidance. Others try to push a political agenda.

Faith groups are another example of a growing NGO sector with potential to improve responses through their strong links with and access to local communities. They raise considerable donations from faith and Diaspora communities outside the DEC appeals.

The international NGO sector has gone a long way in trying to self-regulate. There is an industry wide Code of Conduct, technical standards for each sector of activity and lots of work on accountability. Unfortunately this has not been enough to stem the tide of first time “well wishers”, many of whom do not know about standards, codes and the idea that their help might do more harm than good. Neither has it made an impact on the competition between international NGOs. As with UN agencies this competition means that assessment information is often treated as commercially sensitive, leading to multiple surveys and organisations jostling for funding for particular geographic areas or technical sectors.

As a result of the humanitarian reform efforts with the UN, DFID has rather neglected the NGO sector in the last five years. Latterly this has been changing with the establishment of innovative consortia, both for improving rapid response and in-country for local NGOs. The Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA) and the West Africa Regional Humanitarian Fund (WARHF) offer two proven models at a global and regional level. These are effective and should be expanded.

DFID should also consider, either through consortia or individually, investing in NGOs with specialist response capabilities to ensure these can be deployed robustly. This could

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30 DI report for 2009 Montreux donors conference.
be linked to cluster needs and responsibilities (for instance with CARE who support the shelter cluster, or Merlin who have co-chaired country health clusters).

In countries where DFID has a presence this type of approach can be extended to national and local NGOs and apply to international NGOs with substantial presence and experience. The civil society fund in DR Congo could serve as a model, whereby one NGO acts as the grant holder on behalf of the collective. USAID uses these types of ‘umbrella grants’ routinely. Another model is UNDP in Bangladesh; another is the recently formed CBHA.

Whilst these types of approaches have the potential to improve the effectiveness of many of the bigger international NGOs, it will not solve the issue of ever increasing proliferation. One potential measure that has been debated within the NGO community for many years is for ‘accreditation’ of some sort, allowing accredited NGOs easier access to coordination meetings and so on. This idea has been resisted on the grounds that it would be almost impossible to achieve and that it might unfairly exclude NGOs with real capacity or insight to offer – especially national NGOs. However, the review finds that a system is needed to help short cut some of the chaos of coordination of NGOs, perhaps linked to pre-crisis arrangements and planning. This work can only be conducted by the NGO sector itself. But DFID should encourage, help and support this process. Whatever it looks like, it has to help affected governments and those charged with coordination to understand where a reputable organisation has proven capability and how it could best be deployed.

Working with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

The International Red Cross/Crescent Movement is the world’s largest humanitarian network. There are 186 National Societies with a Secretariat in Geneva as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a private Swiss organisation dedicated to helping victims of conflict. The ICRC receives the largest amount of DFID humanitarian funding of any single agency, at £66 million in financial year 2009/2010.

The relationship between DFID and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement has traditionally been mediated by the British Red Cross Society (BRCS). The BRCS is one of the stronger National Societies (NS) in the Movement, a large contributor to other NS in its own right, and a strategic voice in the IFRC Secretariat. For the past decade, DFID funds for both the IFRC and ICRC passed through the BRCS in what was called a ‘tripartite’ relationship. This recently changed for the ICRC – DFID funds now go direct to Geneva – but remains the same for the IFRC.

The different arrangements reflect the strengths and character of the different organisations. The ICRC is widely admired for its professionalism and its adherence to mandate. It scores highly in internal DFID analysis, including the recent multilateral aid review, and with country offices. This makes the ICRC a partner of choice in conflict situations and this review endorses that view. DFID should continue to work with the ICRC as it is, a trusted and principled partner in conflict situations.

The National Societies and the IFRC Secretariat are different. The network has tremendous potential, rooted as it is in its national base. National Societies are required to have auxiliary status to government to be a member, and in many countries this is a significant role. The Chinese Red Cross has around 20 million volunteers and often responds alongside the People’s Liberation Army in disasters. The Iranian Red Crescent Society is the official response arm of government, with huge relief stocks and logistics assets including helicopters. The American Red Cross is responsible for mass care in domestic disasters.

But the network does not routinely achieve its potential. It is less than the sum of its parts, with many National Societies that are under-resourced and under-performing.
Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, many of the National Societies are marginal to their national life and incapable of large-scale mobilisation. Partly this is a question of resources – when a high achieving officer from the IFRC Secretariat became Secretary General of a weak performing National Society, and was remunerated at an international level, there was a step change in performance. It is also a question of management and governance.

In the new direction recommended for DFID in this review, focusing on national resilience, there is a major role for Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies. Working through and with National Societies can be a good way to engage with National Disaster Management Agencies, and with national disaster legislation. National Societies are often close to communities, through their volunteer networks and the Federation has pioneered work on community based disaster preparedness.

The IFRC also remains a massive network for disaster response, often the very first to help through local volunteers and mobilising the network of National Societies at a regional or global level. Their performance in response has been mixed however. This critical role could be improved with greater clarity of focus on improving the global Red Cross/Red Crescent response system from the Federation, and strengthened better capacity at the NS level.

But this can only work if some of the fundamental problems can be resolved. Working with and through the British Red Cross is a sensible half way house for the time being. The BRCS has auxiliary status to government in the UK, although in practice this has not often been invoked in recent years. DFID should work closely with BRCS and the IFRC Secretariat to involve the Federation in its resilience work. It should also continue to support the global readiness of the Federation. The BRCS can act as an interlocutor, given the otherwise time consuming nature of a potential engagement.

The role of the BRCS as an auxiliary could be re-invigorated in other ways. The BRCS already provides a degree of legal advice on the laws of war to the MOD; this could be extended to DFID. BRCS also keeps a number of high quality emergency teams on permanent standby for the Federation. The national society has offered to extend this type of surge arrangement to DFID, something that should be explored.

**Working with the private sector**

The private sector represents a huge source of untapped capacity and expertise to reduce suffering and help rebuild communities in the aftermath of a disaster. It can also help to mitigate disaster risk through prevention and preparedness. This potential must be unlocked if future challenges are going to be met.

The emphasis needs to shift from seeing the private sector as a donor to being a ‘doer’, and as a valued partner not a contracted entity. New modalities of engagement are required in order to enable the humanitarian sector to have access to skills and products as and when required. Examples of this include public-private partnerships that enable the sharing of risks, credit and investment (e.g. the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, the British Earthquake Consortium for Turkey).

But there is still distrust from the humanitarian sector that characterises itself as ‘non-profit’ towards private sector organisations whose prime motivation is perceived as ‘profit’. This barrier to collaboration needs to be overcome, and DFID should be active in helping to achieve this. The private sector’s motivation for engagement is based on a wider business interest, including brand, new markets, corporate social responsibility, and staff motivation. And in view of this firms are often willing to engage on a reduced rate or ‘at cost’ basis, as for example with Digicell in Haiti. Humanitarian organisations such as MapAction and RedR rely on trained personnel from the private sector being available when needed for critical short-term assignments in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, often on a volunteer or partial cost basis.
Companies and governments have outsourced services for years, concentrating on their core advantage. The humanitarian sector also has a set of quasi-commercial relationships in its grant/recipient/sub-contracting model. Protectionist rhetoric needs to be replaced with a focus on who can do what, most effectively. Again, DFID should encourage and stimulate this process.

The current models of private sector engagement in humanitarian action generally focus on large multinational companies and involve pro-bono contributions of their products, skills and expertise to response operations. This is mostly in the sectors of logistics, IT and communication, mapping, engineering and medical supplies. The best known example in the sector is the collaboration of Agility, TNT and UPS in providing logistics and transportation services to WFP. There have also been proactive efforts by the private sector to better understand humanitarian action, and various initiatives, such as the World Economic Forum Disaster Risk Partnership to facilitate access to private sector expertise in engineering and construction.

The private sector can bring professionalism, leadership and management best practice, tools for driving efficiency and managing risk, and the use of cutting edge technology and information. Such skills need to be contextualized to the challenges of post-disaster situations through working in partnership with humanitarian organisations and building long-term collaborative relationships that enable knowledge transfer.

Recognition of the value of the international private sector needs to be matched with understanding of the importance of local businesses and companies in immediate response and in catalysing economic recovery. This importance is likely to change significantly when cash transfers become more prominent.

The local private sector is usually the first that can respond with relief items and food. It can provide employment and contribute to normalisation. Hindustan Construction Company in India has been able to respond to floods in Orissa and floods/landslides in Laddakh where they had construction sites. Notably it is national companies like these who have the capacity to respond as well as the relationships with the local government and community.

In Haiti, the rural hinterland was not much affected by the earthquake and markets resumed quickly. Large-scale food aid was nevertheless imported, with a potentially detrimental effect on the agricultural economy.

The local private sector can also profiteer from disasters. There is evidence that Niger’s cereal market is strictly controlled by a restricted group of traders. These traders keep cereals out of circulation until the maximum price is reached.

All these examples show that positive relationships with the private sector need to be established pre-disaster so that they can be best used when disaster strikes. In DFID’s resilience and preparedness work, the local and national private sector needs to be a key partner.

Disasters are increasingly taking place in urban environments. Urban environments are characterised by a high concentration of private sector interests (markets, labour, the supply chain). Urban areas are also dependent on infrastructure for the delivery of essential services (water, solid waste management, sanitation, drainage, energy) Damaged infrastructure needs to be rapidly reinstated and issues like rubble removal are critical to making land available for camps, and integrated urban planning is needed in order to provide a basis for recovery and reconstruction. Reinstating these is outside the skills set of NGOs or UN agencies, and funding and procurement barriers often prevent such skills being accessed in a timely fashion from the private sector.

Local, national and international companies hold the knowledge and expertise to respond to urban disasters. They could be of great value to humanitarian organisations.
operating out of their traditional areas of expertise. There are examples of municipal
governments turning directly to the private sector, for instance the Dujiangyan
Municipal Government after the Chinese earthquake, and a public-private partnership
(PRES) between Arauco, the ministry of housing and local municipality in Santiago, Chile.

DFID has set up a new Private Sector Department in January 2011 to help raise the level,
extent and effectiveness of DFID’s engagement with the private sector. This is an
excellent initiative. Existing and new programmes could address many of the issues
raised above. Facilities such as the Private Infrastructure Development Group or the
Business Innovation Facility could have humanitarian windows. Knowledge generation
and dissemination activities could include relevant humanitarian cases. And where
appropriate, CHASE and the Private Sector Department could work together on
galvanising private sector expertise around specific opportunities that need unblocking.
An example would be fast infrastructure rehabilitation in urban areas. Another might be
encouraging the private sector to help strengthen the human capacity of local
governments and structures to manage emergencies.

**Working with the military**
The military has long been involved in disaster relief operations. Domestic military are
often the first response of government. International military involvement in disaster
relief has been more contentious, especially where there are obvious political or military
objectives. But humanitarian workers need to be able to acknowledge areas of military
comparative advantage and recognise where they can work together. It is vital to uphold
humanitarian principles. It is equally vital to use the most effective resources at our
disposal to meet the needs of those affected, especially if predictions of increased need
materialise. The review takes the view that the British military does have a role to play
in support of the UK response led by DFID.

It is the national government’s responsibility to decide whether to call in military
resources in support of a humanitarian response. This may be a decision to use the
country’s own military or to accept the use of foreign military. In many countries, calling
in their own military to respond to a large-scale domestic disaster is the most obvious
thing to do. After the earthquake of 2005, the Pakistan army was the first responder,
saving the most lives by pulling people out of the rubble and by providing the first relief
items. When big disasters hit, often a country’s military is the only actor with adequate
resources to respond at speed and scale. DFID should recognise a country’s right to use
its own military in disaster response and be supportive.

A national government may request assistance from foreign military. Following the
tsunami that hit Banda Aceh, Indonesia in 2004 military helicopters from international
forces were needed to reach cut off populations and many nations provided military
assets toward this operation. A subsequent review found it one of the most effective
parts of the initial international response. China provided military helicopters and
medical teams after the Pakistan floods in 2010. These examples demonstrate the
benefit of extra military support when disasters are so large that the combined
resources of domestic military and those of the international humanitarian community
are insufficient to meet the needs of the affected population.

In armed conflict, or sensitive political situations, using military assets associated with
parties to the conflict can compromise the perceived neutrality – and therefore safety –
of humanitarian workers. There is an obvious need to be able to distinguish between
these situations and make sensible policy decisions based on context. In disasters caused
by natural hazard, at the request of government and with clear comparative advantage,

31 TEC coordination study: [www.alnap.org/initiatives/tec/thematic/coordinatio.aspx](http://www.alnap.org/initiatives/tec/thematic/coordination.aspx)
military planning and assets can be hugely beneficial. In conflict, this is not usually the case, although UN mandated forces can help in securing humanitarian access.

Two instruments currently exist to guide the appropriate use of military resources in humanitarian situations, the ‘Oslo’ guidelines for disasters, and the UN guidelines\(^{22}\) for conflict. The Oslo guidelines establish the principle of ‘last resort’. This is useful as it makes governments and policy makers think twice before deploying military forces. This review has concluded that the Oslo guidelines are still relevant. DFID should interpret and where possible define the principle of last resort as, ‘only using military assets when nothing else will do’. This will open the door to the use of niche capabilities, without opening the ‘floodgates’ to unwelcome deployment of military assets for every big emergency.

Niche capabilities of the British military may include strategic planning and surge deployment. It may also include a greater use of military assets. There is an assumption that this kit is too expensive. The real issue is whether there are essential assets for saving lives that cannot be secured in time any other way.

In conflict situations deployment of military assets should be in line with the UN guidelines. But there is a wider point about how humanitarians engage with military forces, and the difference between them. When military forces control areas there is a need for a humanitarian dialogue to ensure populations in need can be accessed. Many UN forces are routinely given mandates to protect civilians, and in such situations humanitarian organisations need to work with them.

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<td><strong>DFID should:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Reach out to create new partnerships with new donor partners (including China, India, Brazil and the Gulf States).</td>
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<td>19 Maintain its default position that humanitarian response is multilateral(^{32}). In particular it should:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Engage more effectively with ECHO on a policy level, and explore the possibility of co-financing.</td>
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<td>• Work with others to support the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator in the reform of OCHA and the system more widely.</td>
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<td>20 Work with partners to promote donor coordination and revitalise the Good Humanitarian Donor-ship group.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 Ensure that the new Private Sector Department gives full consideration to those areas where private sector expertise can improve humanitarian response effectiveness, including at the country level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Use military assets in situations where are consistent with Oslo guidelines and offer capacity others cannot, or provide better value for money than commercial alternatives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Work with NGOs to promote the concept of accreditation or certification.</td>
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\(^{22}\) Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA): http://www.coe-dmha.org/media/guidance/3mcdraguidelines.pdf

\(^{32}\) See section 5.2 for recommendation on funding.
4.7 Humanitarian space

When there is conflict, where states have failed, when governments are belligerent or venal DFID cannot work directly through the authorities. In such cases there is a fragile ‘space’ in which humanitarian agencies are accepted and work to help those most in need. DFID needs to do what it can to nurture and expand this space; by observing the key principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, and by leading where it has influence to ensure others do.

Humanitarian principles have evolved over time to help agencies access and protect populations most at risk. Where those agencies are seen as neutral, impartial and independent they can build trust with combatants, allowing them to deliver aid. Where aid is linked to political or military goals the security of staff can be compromised, making it difficult to reach those most in need.

This review concludes that DFID humanitarian policy should be to protect and where possible enlarge this fragile space; to work with agencies that can access and help those in dire need and to continue to resist the politicisation of humanitarian aid. The review also recognises that in complex conflicts, and the break down of state authority that there will be times when military force, mandated by the UN, will be needed to protect civilians and humanitarian workers.

Protection of civilians

In conflict situations and after some disasters, particularly in urban areas civilians need protection from violence. Often the need for security comes before anything else.

This review was not mandated to consider the full range of conflict situations, focusing only on natural disasters and spikes in conflict. In situations of conflict, it is clear that protection of civilians and humanitarian access is paramount.

The UK can play a meaningful role in such situations, even where it is a party to the conflict. It must observe international humanitarian law. It can use its influence to remind others of their obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law. It can work with legitimate humanitarian agencies to assist them in their role. And it can support the work of the United Nations in peacekeeping, by ensuring that peacekeeping mandates include the protection of civilians, and that peacekeeping forces are resourced for this.

In the case study for DR Congo, it was clear that UN peacekeeping has made progress in its protection work. Whilst there continue to be horrific attacks against civilians (mass rapes by government affiliated forces to name one), the peacekeeping force understands it has a duty to try and prevent these and works with humanitarians to this end. This should be reinforced. It is hard for soldiers, trained in the tactics of fighting battles, to find ways of preventing attacks on civilians, especially when resources are scarce. Mobile operational bases of the type trialled in DR Congo have merit, especially when coupled with ways for communities to trigger them.

DFID can work with agencies like the ICRC, the UNHCR and OHCHR to enable them to carry out their protection work (visiting prisoners, registering refugees and promoting rights). In particular DFID must ensure that in conflict humanitarian budgets fund neutral and impartial agencies, and substitution of basic services where appropriate.

DFID can work with the UN, including in peacekeeping as set out above. This is technical work, and has merit. The bigger picture is that conflict is political. Humanitarian work cannot be the sticking plaster for a lack of political action.

Case studies in DR Congo, Gaza and Burma demonstrate the limited influence the UK working on its own has in situations of conflict. The same case studies show, however, that there are things that can be achieved, especially working with others. In Burma
following cyclone Nargis, working with the ASEAN group of nations it was possible to gain access for humanitarians. In DR Congo, the patient, patchy build-up of international humanitarian, military and legal action tries to contain conflict and help those affected by it. In Gaza, DFID supported the UN in coordinating access advocacy through a Humanitarian Assistance Framework, praised by Ban Ki-Moon.

A particular issue relating to counter-terrorism legislation has arisen in several complex emergencies recently (Somalia, Colombia, Sri Lanka and Gaza) and is likely to come up more often in the future. DFID, on occasion, had to stop funding the humanitarian work of international NGOs and other implementing partners because they could not 100% ensure that a terrorist organisation would not indirectly or directly benefit. European legally binding instruments on counter-terrorism and UK legislation stipulate that anybody directly or indirectly funding terrorist organisations will be prosecuted under criminal law. However, exemptions can be made by the European Council on humanitarian grounds.

This review finds that in these circumstances, and in all cases of conflict, an essential priority is to negotiate humanitarian access on an unimpeded basis. All parties are required to grant such access under International Humanitarian Law. This should be negotiated at the highest necessary level, and not left to field workers to manage on their own. In the cases above, the legal problem should be overcome by applying for exemptions on humanitarian grounds. The humanitarian imperative should be a primary consideration.

**Security of humanitarian workers**

Humanitarian work is becoming more dangerous. Statistics quoted in the challenges section of this review outline how more and more humanitarian workers are being killed and wounded in the course of their work. Having UN in your title and flying a UN flag on your vehicle no longer provides the automatic protection it used to. Partly this is the result of a more complex and less certain world; in some places it is also a perception that humanitarian worker and even the UN is partisan.

The issues affecting the safety of humanitarian workers are beyond the scope of this review. What is clear is that they are in more danger, and that protecting them is necessary if the work is going to get done.

Traditionally humanitarian agencies have worked on the basis of being accepted by the local population. This has meant more investment in explaining what they are doing, and relying on their good works to speak for themselves. This largely remains the case. Deterrence, as employed by partisan military forces and foreign governments in conflicts, is largely counter-productive.

DFID needs to ensure that those agencies with which it works take security seriously. With the UN, this means continuing to have a close relationship with its security department (UNDSS), funding when necessary. With NGOs, this means putting security into any auditing process connected to pre-qualification, and investing in inter-agency security initiatives when these have proven worth.

### Recommendations

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<td>24</td>
<td>Re-assert the premise that humanitarian action should be based on need, reaffirming the key principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the new DFID humanitarian policy.</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Ensure funding is made available for security and risk management for humanitarian workers.</td>
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5. Delivering transformational change in DFID

To deliver the step change in the way humanitarian assistance is conceived and delivered outlined above, DFID will have to make significant changes. The most radical change will involve seeing humanitarian concerns as a core part of DFID programming, rather than something that needs to be responded to when it happens. Work on anticipation and resilience should be part of DFID’s everyday work in countries where it has a permanent presence (see sections 4.1 and 4.2). Such work should also be of central concern to DFID’s development partners, such as the World Bank and the UN.

The step change sought by this review will also have consequences for the way that DFID provides funding before and during humanitarian emergencies. Funding for multilateral and NGO partners needs to become more predictable, so that they can invest in the skills and structures they need. Funding should also be available directly to governments for resilience and response work, where they are capable, willing and transparent.

As outlined in the introduction, DFID is a shaper, a funder and a ‘doer’. This section sets out how it should engage in these roles, and looks at the resourcing, structure and accountability mechanisms it needs in place, as well as some critical areas for investment such as research and innovation.

5.1 Changing the policy

The International Development Act 2002 is the key piece of UK legislation that frames overseas assistance. In the act, humanitarian assistance is defined as, “assistance for the purpose of alleviating the effects of a natural or man-made disaster or other emergency on the population of one or more countries outside the United Kingdom”.

In addition to its domestic legal obligations, the UK is signatory to EU and international law. The EU consensus on humanitarian aid in particular commits the UK to, ‘provide a needs-based emergency response aimed at preserving life, preventing and alleviating human suffering and maintaining human dignity wherever the need arises if governments and local actors are overwhelmed, unable or unwilling to act.’

The consensus also subscribes to a number of other principles and codes. Notably it ‘firmly’ commits to the ‘fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence’. DFID has also committed to these principles in its 2006 humanitarian policy.

If the international development act and the key pieces of European and International law determine the overall framework for DFID humanitarian action, then the 2006 humanitarian policy is the key internal document. It had three policy goals:

- Improve the effectiveness of humanitarian responses.
- Be a better donor.
- Reduce risk and extreme vulnerability.

This policy needs updating, not least because of this review. A new policy should be grouped around the major themes identified in this review of anticipation, resilience, leadership, accountability, innovation, partnership and humanitarian space.

The policy should also set out why, where, when and how DFID responds. The consensus of this review is that the default position for this response should be multilateral, in that DFID will work with and through its partners. Where the scale of the need exceeds regular resources, then DFID should stand ready to make additional funds available into the multilateral system. Occasionally DFID will also respond directly, based on comparative advantage including presence. This suggests the formula should be:
• Why: because of international development act, EU consensus and British public support.
• Where: on the basis of need.
• When: through multilateral partners in the first instance. In mega disasters UK to routinely respond with additional funding and direct delivery.
• How: through regular funds to multilateral and NGO partners. Where need exceeds this level of resources, additional funding to be considered (based on advice), DFID to respond directly only where there is comparative advantage or overwhelming UK public interest.

But the implications of this review go further. There needs to be a policy change in DFID on the development side too. This needs to place the creation of resilience in at risk countries in the heart of development processes, seen not as a ‘humanitarian’ activity, but as a development necessity.

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### 5.2 Delivering differently

**Shaping the International System**

The UK is a major contributor to the international system, with the majority of its humanitarian resources channelled through partners, as outlined in previous sections. This means that DFID has a direct interest in making the international system work. An international system that works provides the best value for money, and helps the most people.

This review highlights in several sections the influence the UK, through DFID, exerts within the international humanitarian system. But this has waned. DFID has become too shrill, and too inconsistent. International agencies have come to realise that while humanitarian staff might be highly critical of an operation, political and senior organisational leaders will not expend political capital to fix it. The same is true across government. In the UN, on budgetary grounds the UK has driven terms of service changes that have made it harder to recruit humanitarians. At the same time, DFID berates the UN for not doing more to recruit humanitarians. DFID’s influence in bringing about much needed change and reforms will be increased if it spends more time building alliances, and less time acting alone.

Since the humanitarian reforms of 2005, DFID has been one of the leading voices in pressing for reforms in financing, leadership and coordination. The review has concluded that this effort has been beneficial and should continue, giving special emphasis to the changes in leadership structures and capacity the review recommends, and which the IASC has recently endorsed.

A new approach is needed if DFID wants to continue to shape the international system. DFID will have to learn to be more strategic. Humanitarian advisors need to be sure of top management and political support before engaging in negotiations with the UN system on reform.
The UK missions in New York and Geneva are valuable assets, and when used well can deliver impact. But DFID does not use either mission systematically for its humanitarian lobbying and alliance building. This needs to change. The New York mission has a sizeable DFID presence, which should be better used to plan advocacy. Geneva does not have a DFID presence. But UKMIS in Geneva can nevertheless also be used more effectively to help build diplomatic alliances in the pursuit of DFID’s reform agenda.

DFID also needs to work better with its donor partners, as outlined in previous sections of this report. Where policy messages are common between the UK, ECHO and the US, they are far more powerful. The GHD group has been an engine for change – the UK needs to work with this group to see this happen again.

Above all DFID need to be more strategic in its lobbying work. Many in the UN see DFID as the single most influential donor. The ability to leverage its position as the third largest donor to achieve real change gives the UK unique opportunities. These need to be carefully managed, not squandered in frustration. Maintaining a position as a top donor will be essential if this influence is to be retained. But better use of positions on UN agency boards, within the various UN committees, and sharper advocacy by leaders within DFID is needed. Better alliances with established donor partners and the new emerging economies will be essential, as will new relationships with regional bodies.

**Changing the funding model**

The majority of what the UK government does in humanitarian assistance is funding others. DFID has long been seen as a fast and flexible humanitarian donor. This position should be maintained. But DFID also needs to use its funds to promote change – to ensure that agencies are equipped to respond fast and deliver what people really need.

Donors shape the international response system by the way they fund. Some of this is intended, but most is not. DFID, as one of the most influential donors, has a powerful effect on the system – as laid out above. But the system is not serving the needs of affected people as well as it might. Funding is not proportionate to needs, it is not equitable, it is not coordinated or harmonised, it does not focus enough on prevention and it does not demand demonstrable performance of funded agencies.

DFID can change the incentives in the way it funds, better shaping the international system. In development aid, DFID has been a strong advocate of greater aid effectiveness, through several international initiatives. For DFID to achieve better results and greater value for money, the same principles of aid effectiveness need to apply to the funding of humanitarian partners. A step change is needed on greater predictability (including multi-year commitments), coherence, transparency, accountability, focus on results and value for money. The main priority should be to equip DFID’s partners to build their capacity and manage humanitarian response.

DFID currently funds the multilateral humanitarian system through a combination of core funding and additional non-core funding at the country level for emergencies. The split over the last few years has been strongly in favour of additional non-core funding in response to UN Flash Appeals for sudden onset disasters. The Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Reviews are changing this split. Through the MAR, the best performing agencies should receive significantly more core funding linked to results. The HERR welcomes this and recommends that DFID takes a further step towards multi-year core funding linked to performance so that the major agencies and the Red Cross Movement get predictability for financial planning and capacity building.

34 Careful consideration will need to be given not to breach the rule on funding in advance of need.
For greater global equity in allocations and coherence, the HERR also recommends a higher contribution to the CERF linked to results, in line with the MAR finding on good performance. The CERF should be enabled to fund preparedness. Keeping with the same principles applied above to the multilaterals, the best performing NGOs should get more predictable long-term funding linked to performance through strengthened Programme Partnership Arrangements. And for greater equity in allocations and coherence, the CBHA and other regional, national and local consortia, as the CERF, should get increased funding on a multi-year basis.

As a result of more core funding for major agencies, the Flash Appeals and Consolidated Appeals should become proportionately smaller over time apart from in exceptional circumstances. DFID’s contribution to them will also go down. However, DFID needs to retain its commitment to funding humanitarian needs at the country level. Often, this is where DFID’s seat at the table provides great value by improving overall aid effectiveness, as demonstrated for example by its involvement in the DR Congo pooled fund.

What is required is a step change in linking country level funding to performance. This review recommends DFID links demonstrating results and impact closely to future country/emergency funding. In return for an agreed envelope of funding for an emergency, implementing partners have to be able to demonstrate results and report accordingly.

As DFID’s contribution to ECHO is fixed, DFID should look for ways of co-financing ECHO responses where this would add value.

**Fast mobilisation funding and pre-crisis arrangements**

A particular challenge in funding sudden onset disasters is the first week after disaster strikes, in what we refer to in this report as the ‘critical period’. DFID’s ability and willingness to provide fast funding to get the wheels rolling and enabling the wider system to start providing relief is widely praised. It is one of DFID’s most important and valuable contributions to emergency responses. It does come at a cost however. Having to decide quickly what to fund and what not and dealing with many different funding streams carries high transaction costs for DFID. But more importantly the current approach does not provide the right incentives for agencies to deliver high quality work for the best value.

Once funding is approved, partners have few pressures to provide information on how their project will achieve the desired impact, how it will be accountable to beneficiaries or how specific issues such as gender are addressed. Important areas of performance just get box-ticking. Programme audits are rarely carried out.

Generally, the way humanitarian funding is allocated acts as a ‘complex incentive system’, promoting both positive and negative behaviours. One of the perverse incentives it creates is for implementing agencies to propose the highest beneficiary numbers possible from their programmes. Hence a box of water purification tablets ‘serves thousands of families’, when in fact this is only true if each family receives a handful – something impractical in most distribution models. In many emergencies in fact these boxes usually rot in warehouses.

Nevertheless, agencies do need substantial funding to mobilise – to hire people, transport, purchase goods, use equipment and so on. These mobilisation funds are connected to the ‘programmes’ and so highly speculative ‘proposals’ are made simply to allow agencies to mobilise. Once approved however, this locks agencies into a course of action that may on reflection (i.e. when they actually have time to make a proper assessment), not be the most judicious one.
Similarly, while DFID asks for greater coordination, it often funds implementing organisations individually, thereby creating a competitive dynamic which can erode collective action and compromises the outcomes for the affected populated.

The number of project grants in emergencies has also become overwhelming. 52 in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis or 27 after Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. Because in such complex emergencies objectives and contexts change frequently, DFID does need varied funding mechanisms and a flexible approach. But these numbers of funding streams result in high transaction costs of staff time and provide a strain on human resources to adequately monitor and follow up projects funded.

To increase its flexibility, whilst solving some of the issues outlined above, DFID needs a funding modality that can provide fast mobilisation funding in the first week. This should be based on pre-qualification rather than speculative proposals.

**Funding recovery from day one**

International funding for emergencies is usually split into three levels. The immediate relief phase, recovery and reconstruction. The ‘critical period’ is when international actors and money pour into countries in the aftermath of an emergency trying to save lives. After the first month, recovery needs assessments are carried out and longer-term humanitarian programming begins, targeted at saving livelihoods. A donor pledging conference is held, typically with less money pledged than required. And then, the reconstruction phase starts some time during recovery with different funding coming on stream from the World Bank and IMF often to repair pre-existing infrastructure.

What this split funding model has caused is a false dichotomy in separating relief from recovery and reconstruction. This review has found that what affected populations want and need most is an immediate start to livelihoods recovery. The neat donor split does not work for them. Evaluations show that women, for example, drive the move from immediate concerns – reuniting families, finding shelter and food – to identifying ways to generate income very quickly. Or the example from Cyclone Nargis in Burma of the private sector selling the pots and pans that enabled the preparation of cooked food and a return to normal long before the international pots and pans arrived. By then, beneficiaries had incurred debt undermining the recovery of their livelihoods. The value for money of the relief items delivered has become questionable.

Cash-based approaches to accelerate recovery are one way out of this false dichotomy and ease the way into development programming, for example into cash based social protection schemes that can reduce vulnerability and build resilience for the next crisis. Evidence is building up on the effectiveness of cash responses. It is important that their impact is assessed in relation to these goals.

Infrastructure rehabilitation is another example the review found does not get enough attention in the immediate aftermath of an emergency. The un-cleared rubble in Haiti highlights this. The resulting higher costs of recovering lost livelihoods will have to be picked up by development programmes. DFID needs to recognise livelihoods funding is legitimate from day one.

**Delivering smarter direct aid**

In the biggest emergencies, DFID can deliver aid rapidly through its standing emergency team. It can also deliver high quality people into the international system. Both of these capacities are highly appreciated and have been proven to make a real difference.

In addition to the internal capacity, DFID has a call down arrangement with the UK fire service for Search and Rescue. This provides for one UN classified ‘heavy’ team (64 people, dogs and equipment) to be deployed within hours of being called. On occasion,
the UK also provides military assets such as ships, aircraft and helicopters. In Haiti, DFID helped deploy a team of highly qualified surgeons to work on complicated trauma wounds.

All of the interventions cited above have value. The Search and Rescue teams are highly visible and demonstrate much valued solidarity. These are especially useful in the ‘critical period’, less so afterwards. From a UK perspective such deployments offer unique opportunities for teams to experience a real disaster – invaluable should there be something similar in the UK. But Search and Rescue under this model is costly with over £250,000 per life saved in Haiti. And as there are no major earthquake fault lines close to the UK, they can arrive too late. The surgical teams cost about one hundredth of the search and rescue teams (little over £2,500) per life saved in Haiti. In Niger agencies spent little over £100 per child saved in feeding programmes.

What this means is that the UK needs to be smart about where and when it deploys these assets. It also needs to think about the future, as this review makes clear. The UK has other assets that could be harnessed for disaster response as ‘niche capabilities’. The same ‘resilience’ teams in the UK fire service have nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities – these could be rapidly deployed in circumstances where they could make a real difference, as could other science based assets.

Where UK direct assistance consistently makes a difference is with the deployment of personnel. This is one of the most cost effective and influential actions DFID undertakes. DFID deployments are typically ‘enablers’ – aircraft handlers to make sure aid flows swiftly, information managers to set up systems quickly. This could easily be extended – on occasions where the UK has deployed cluster leads quickly this too has made a huge difference. DFID should work with the UN to ensure it has the most needed enabling staff on standby (and not simply take requests for cheap people through traditional agency standby schemes). It should work with others to better align this surge capacity (for instance NRC and the British Red Cross).

DFID has also built a niche expertise in ‘enabling equipment’. This might be machines for unloading aircraft, or high quality shelter materials. This too is valuable, and in the work recommended around supply chain by this report, the direct delivery of DFID should be retained.

**Working strategically across the UK government**

The UK’s response to international disasters needs to be coordinated across government departments. The response is usually led by DFID, and DFID usually provides the majority of resources. Other government departments provide support in ways where they have distinct advantage. For example the FCO and Cabinet Office through their information networks can provide rapid situation updates to complement those of DFID’s own staff and agency contacts. The NHS provides surgeons for response in the ‘critical period’. However, evidence from the review suggests we can do better at integrating these separate inputs.

There is for example, no formal mechanism for convening all government departments in response to an international emergency. Arrangements by DFID are ad hoc and departments are called in as and when DFID considers there is a need for wider support. The informality of this arrangement means that the right people are not always available at short notice to attend meetings. More junior staff may represent their department than is ideal. These people may not be of sufficient seniority to take decisions, and continuity of staff who attend meetings is not maintained. This can lead to a lack of effective communication between different departments and a failure to achieve results. For example the MOD chain of command requires someone of the right rank to approve the use of an aircraft for relief supplies. If the right person is not at the meeting when it is requested, the decision cannot be taken and time is lost. DFID may look elsewhere for transport.
The review understands that other government departments are keen to provide support in emergencies and consider they have more to contribute than DFID is aware of. This is particularly the case if other departments are given enough time to plan and prepare their response. In cases where more formal coordination arrangements have been made, cross government action has been more effective. For example the response to Cyclone Nargis in Burma, 2008 included the creation of a cross-Whitehall team for planning joint response options. The result was an effective body made up of people of the right seniority who were able to make decisions and act rapidly.

The National Security Council is the new mechanism under which cross-government departments are convened under the authority of the Prime Minister. A similar body that could draw together government departments under the authority of the Prime Minister, chaired by DFID and constituted under strict humanitarian principles would provide the necessary coordination. A way should be found through the existing National Security Council mechanism to convene a standing committee on humanitarian emergency response to do this.

### Recommendations

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5.3 Changing the structure, shifting resources

Humanitarian emergency response has historically been under supported within DFID. The humanitarian cadre was only recently formed and is the smallest of DFID’s technical networks by a margin. It currently stands at 12 people globally, despite humanitarian spending constituting 8% of overseas development aid (ODA) annually. The Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Team (CHASE) manages all humanitarian issues, including response. As the conflict portfolio of work increases, the managerial load has become increasingly untenable. Despite a large research budget, DFID does not support significant humanitarian research.

The emergency (rapid) response capability has been outsourced on a three year rolling contractual basis. The contract currently provides for 27 staff shared with the Stabilisation Unit. There are six dedicated humanitarian staff on the contract. It also pays for a significant logistical standing capacity – cars, communications, specialist deployment equipment and so on. This capability is called the Operations Team (OT) and is co-located with CHASE, with OT staff integrated into the DFID main office. Whilst the international reputation of the OT is extremely high (and much envied), in recent years corporate work has been increasingly undertaken by the team as a result of lack of capacity within DFID.

The lack of capacity within both CHASE and OT has meant clear, strategic direction has been missing, as the work has been almost constant ‘fire-fighting’. The impact of successive large-scale emergencies has been to stretch resources still further. This lack of strategy is not confined to CHASE. Humanitarian action is spread across DFID in a largely unconnected and ad hoc fashion, and there is no senior champion. Until recently there was a separate Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU) within Africa division. ACHU oversaw an Africa emergency reserve fund and had no formal connection with CHASE. Country offices can choose whether to have humanitarian advisors, even in high-risk situations (Pakistan had a conflict advisor with responsibility for humanitarian but no experience in this area).

The disparate and neglected structure does not only have an effect on overall strategy, it has led to a schism between the policy function and the response mechanisms. The small team of humanitarian policy advisors centrally hold long term funding relationships with big agencies like UNICEF and UNHCR, but it is the OT staff that see how these agencies perform in successive emergencies. This has led to mixed messages and lost opportunities.

Partners remain highly positive about DFID and value both the quality of the personnel and its ability to react quickly and flexibly. There is demand for DFID to be present in large-scale emergencies as its ability to influence the overall strategy is much valued. There is also demand for a continued capacity to deploy both people and goods into the international system at short notice.

In parallel to this review, DFID also undertook a bilateral aid review (BAR) that asked country offices to predict their expenditure for the next few years. In this exercise humanitarian spend was forecast to fall, or rather country offices did not make a bid for humanitarian resources to rise. This might reflect a natural optimism – that things will get better or that development gains will mean the impact of humanitarian emergencies will be diminished. However, it is out of step with most forecasts of need and may also reflect a desire ‘not to be involved’; an idea that DFID’s core business is development and that humanitarian emergencies are an unwelcome distraction. It may also reflect an assumption by country offices that CHASE will respond if there is an emergency and the resources will be made available centrally.

To some extent this assumption is correct. This review concludes that for overwhelmingly large emergencies, ‘mega emergencies’, response should be led from
London. The intense interest from across government and from the public means that it is necessary for London to lead on strategy. Where there is a country office they should lead on delivery, although DFID should also operate a ‘step aside’ policy similar to that being advocated with the UN, whereby it ensures that delivery is led with the requisite level of experience. For medium and small-scale disasters the country offices are well placed to lead, perhaps with some technical or logistical support from CHASE.

It also means that DFID needs to make better sense of its internal structure and strategy – reflecting the importance of its humanitarian work in structure, capacity and resources as well as in rhetoric. If building resilience is to become a core part of DFID’s work as this review suggests, then both senior management and the country offices will need to reflect this in the way they work and plan. If the performance of the international system is truly to be improved then DFID will need to make better use of (and increase) its humanitarian staff and its operations team, and will need to expand this capability. If DFID is going to promote innovation, build new partnerships and enable new networks of humanitarian policy and practice, then it will need to be better integrated itself, using its policy division to promote research and evidence, its country offices to work with governments and UK missions to work with other nations.

Managing the response
Humanitarian emergencies are chaotic and fast moving. They need experienced managers with clear authority to be in charge.

DFID has a system of ‘response management’ but it is diluted. This is due to the separation of the contracted out Operations Team from the management of CHASE. Partly also it is because this skill has not been prioritised. The new system must have experienced response managers with delegated authority.

An effective response requires clear lines of authority and responsibility, and a clear strategy. The production of a wide ranging strategy including funding, lobbying, cross-Whitehall work and any direct assistance, should be a priority for the response management. The ownership of the response strategy should be at a sufficiently senior level. In a mega emergency this would be at Director or Director General level.

A comparative advantage that DFID has long enjoyed is the quality of its advisory cadre. There is a need for DFID humanitarian advisors to be deployed to emergencies. They can help shape the response, and safeguard UK taxpayer investments. They can also provide valuable analysis and insight to London. This is not true just in mega-emergencies but also in emerging crises and conflict.

Managing risk
Humanitarian emergencies are high-risk environments. They are chaotic and uncertain and decision-making has to be rapid. There is more chance of getting things wrong. There must be a greater tolerance for risk in such situation.

But there are often greater risks with doing nothing, or responding too slowly. Humanitarian emergencies are high risk because they involve life or death situations. Slow decision-making, or not reacting, can lead to loss of both lives and opportunities. Politically there is less risk in a messy response, or an accusation of waste, than being accused of letting people die.

The consequences of this are that procedures need to be streamlined for humanitarian emergencies, and decision-making needs to be delegated. Empowering those with the information to make a decision, and to implement it fast is essential. Historically this has been acknowledged within DFID and procedures have been modified. This tradition needs to continue.
This review sets out several measures for improving accountability in the international humanitarian system. Connected to this is the requirement for agencies to demonstrate results, and prove they are good value for money. But this cannot come at the expense of rapid response or if DFID humanitarian staff feel afraid to make decisions.

## Recommendations

**DFID should:**

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| 34  | **Ensure that the structure, funding and human resources for humanitarian work reflects its move to being a central part of DFID work, not least by having a Director General champion this work. Amongst others, this will require:**  
  - Rebalance resources within DFID to meet the challenges of rising humanitarian need.  
  - Expand the humanitarian cadre, both in London and in the field.  
  - Ensuring every response to rapid onset humanitarian need is led by an experienced response manager, with sufficient delegated authority to ensure swift action.  
  - Lead large-scale responses from London, managed by CHASE. |
| 35  | **Redefine the objectives for the contracted response team so that it is solely dedicated to supporting rapid response and pre-crisis arrangements.** |

### 5.4 Driving results and value for money

The humanitarian sector has traditionally been reluctant to collect, systematise and share evidence on what works, what does not and why. There has been a lack of demand for this kind of information, and sometimes an inability to find answers. The reasons are laid out in the Impact section above.

Funding decisions are not routinely based on evidence. And when funding decisions are based on evidence of results, it is outputs rather than impact that are being considered.

Without greater clarity on results (both on what is the evidence and what is the humanitarian objective), it is not easy to determine the value for money of humanitarian actions. And it has rarely been tried.

Value for money is about the optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcomes. It is about the optimum combination of costs and quality of the goods and services to meet the needs of beneficiaries. As in all other areas of HMG spending, it is not just about the lowest cost.

In a humanitarian response, to get value for money, speed is of the essence. There is no value in a response that comes too late. Lives will be lost. The risks of late or non-intervention need to be considered. Therefore, timeliness or speed needs to be added into the equation on value for money.

The figure below from the National Audit Office shows the results chain through its dark blue arrows. And the costs attached to the results through its light blue squares. Value for money analysis has to include this whole chain.
During a response, the relative importance of the three key components, cost, quality and speed, has to change if the humanitarian imperative of saving lives is the principle. In the Critical Period, it is speed that should count the most, because, in this phase speed saves lives. Cost and quality then increase in importance with time.

Since January 2011, all proposals for DFID funding must be accompanied by a Business Case, which sets out the need, justification and affordability of an intervention.\(^{35}\) It has not been devised though for completing within hours of a disaster hitting when information is scarce and people are dying. As DFID’s comparative advantage is fast response, partners look to DFID immediately for funding.

While the review recommends more work on evidence of what works and what does not and cost-effectiveness in humanitarian action, this work is less relevant in the Critical Period. However, post-action reviews and evaluations can help greatly to inform future decision making about delivery partners and mechanisms even in the critical period, through prequalification of partners (see Changing the funding model in section 5.2).

Value for money in a response can best be achieved through a focus on achieving results with all resources. Be it from other donors, domestic resources or the private sector. DFID’s resources in an effective system can achieve much greater value for money than in an ineffective system. DFID’s important role in making the system more effective, as laid out throughout this report, is therefore likely to have the greatest impact on value for money.

Innovation is another area where DFID investment could reap substantial gains in value for money in the future. DFID’s investment in Community-Based Therapeutic care (CTC) is a good example which has made the treatment of malnourished people in major emergencies more cost-effective than traditional therapies. With a relatively high fixed initial cost, CTC can treat several thousand malnourished people with little more than the extra costs of food and medicine. Other substantial costs to the community (such as travel costs and opportunity costs of being in full-time care) have also reduced significantly.

It should not be forgotten that building resilience is often the best means of providing value for money. It is estimated that £1 in prevention saves £4 in response (see section 4.2). As the IFRC Annual report 2008 says: ‘there is no economic sense in spending money on emergency response alone. Years of investment can disappear in minutes if

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35 This Business Case model is based on HM Treasury guidance and ensures consistency across UK government departments.
risk reduction and prevention are ignored.\textsuperscript{36} This is why DFID’s approach to humanitarian work needs to have prevention at its core.

**Outcomes and effectiveness**
The section on impact sets out the importance of being clearer about desired outcomes and impact and measuring them. But assessing the outcomes of DFID’s funding and influencing is far more complex than measuring outputs. And quantitative assessments are a step more difficult than qualitative ones.

Judging from the qualitative assessments made in evaluations of DFID’s response efforts, DFID often gets it right. Funding is fast, flexible, goes to the sectors where the need is greatest and enables other parts of the system to become more effective. This should lead to better outcomes for the affected population. How exactly it does that, at what cost and what would happen without DFID’s support however is often not clear. Cost and benefits are rarely quantified.

DFID is making efforts on various fronts to rectify this. Internally, DFID Pakistan, for example, has started piloting an approach to better outcome assessment and unit cost analysis. DFID Kenya and Somalia are building up a database of humanitarian indicators and costs. Externally, DFID has set up the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, a body that will evaluate DFID’s work, including in disaster response, with a focus in impact. The review welcomes this initiative.

**Outputs and efficiency**
Outputs are the first results in the chain. Any project or programme has to be able to show what the intended outputs are and later what the real outputs were. There are however, two problems with reporting output results. First, outputs can only be proxies for impact and can get it wrong. Second, outputs, as currently reported in project documents, cannot easily be compared or aggregated. Hence it is difficult to judge the efficiency of implementing partners and DFID’s funding.

The following are examples of outputs from the Pakistan floods response:

- Wheat and vegetable seeds, fertiliser, animal stock feed, and veterinary services to more than 115,000 rural families to avoid further loss of animals and dependency on food aid for the next year or more.
- Toilets and sanitation for almost 500,000 people.

The numbers sound impressive, but they do not say if the seeds and fertilisers came in time for the planting season. If the timing was wrong, the impact would not have been the desired one of recovery. They also do not show if the toilets were placed and lit in such a way as to be gender sensitive. Quality and speed – two key parameters of humanitarian effectiveness – cannot be assessed by output measurement. There is a danger by focusing on one area of the results chain of hitting the target but missing the point.

Comparisons between costs of outputs and hence the cost efficiency of implementing partners, are currently close to impossible.

- Outputs are not standardised (even within sectors) with the result that comparing is often like apples with pears.
- Some benefits are difficult to measure, e.g. in protection and different interventions have different benefits – they do not all address the same need, e.g. cash-for-work versus psychosocial support.

\textsuperscript{36} IFRC annual report 2008, p 14; Howard Kunreuther, November 2010; other studies estimate even higher cost benefit ratios.
• The information currently received from implementing partners can give a rough indication of what things cost. It cannot give much more though.
• Any comparisons of costs would be misleading without knowing the exact circumstances of the actions, including targeting of different population groups, level of security risk, or timing.

Only when outputs are the same, is it possible to carry out an analysis to see which intervention is the most cost-efficient.

**Inputs and economy**

Inputs are easy to identify and quantify. All budgets of implementing partners show what inputs are used at what cost. Inputs range from materials and logistics, personnel and personnel support (including security for personnel) to indirect support costs (the overheads).

Comparing unit costs of inputs between implementing partners or across emergencies is relatively easy. But the comparisons do not make sense if the context is not taken into account as explained in the output section. A project in a complex emergency with security implications will have greater security costs to personnel attached than another one in a natural disaster zone. A project targeting difficult to reach populations will have very justifiably greater logistics costs than a project in an urban easy-to-reach environment.

Looking through budgets of DFID implementing partners, it is obvious that costs can differ significantly, not always for justifiable reasons. An agency in the Pakistan flood response for example wanted to charge DFID £1 million more for the same non-food items delivered to the same place but with a one month time delay than if DFID had procured the items itself. With this £1 million, shelter for an additional 10,000 families could have been purchased and delivered a month earlier.

**The global supply chain**

As logistics can account for as much as 80%[37] of the effort of humanitarian organisations during a relief operation, the global supply chain warrants special consideration.

If DFID wants to improve its ability to respond at the right time for the right price and with the appropriate quality, supply chain management needs to be recognised as an integral part of preparedness and response.

End-to-end supply chain management in a humanitarian response includes procurement, stock pile management, quality and cost control, managing production capacity, international movement, coordination with other agencies and delivery to the beneficiaries.

Many INGOs have lost their supply chain management capabilities through the change in their focus from direct delivery to advocacy over the last decade. This capability loss on the development side of operations has translated directly into a loss on the humanitarian response side. Evaluations of NGO responses have shown that mistakes are routinely made along the supply chain.

UN agencies on the other hand have significant procurement and logistics departments but they are constrained by antiquated procurement rules, different donor requirements and UN bureaucracy.

Key concerns that impact negatively on the affected population are:

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37 Trunick (2005).
5.5 Getting the message across

There is strong public support for the UK response to disasters and emergencies in developing countries38. But historically DFID has not used these opportunities to talk about its work. With an aid budget under attack from some quarters and questions about failure in Haiti, DFID needs to get better at communicating the generally excellent work it does.

The communications environment is changing. Communities in the UK are often independently linked to affected populations, through diasporas, faith based groups and partnerships. It is no longer possible, or desirable to adopt a broadcast approach to communications work. Domestic media coverage is increasingly hostile to the

38 93% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement ‘Wherever possible the UK government should respond directly to disasters and emergencies in developing countries’. HERR on-line public survey: Feb 2011.

- Quality of non-food items being substandard. It is estimated that 70% of the million plus sheets provided to Haiti after the earthquake needed replacing after 9 months. At a cost (without freight) of around £10 a sheet that means £7 million was spent on commodities, which have at best lasted 9 months.
- Relief items are not always what the beneficiaries most need or arrive too late. After Cyclone Nargis in Burma, women got into debt because they purchased relief items long before the international response reached them. Blankets provided in the aftermath of the Samangan earthquake in Afghanistan were too thin for the climate.
- Lack of preparedness can lead to multiples of transport costs necessary (especially air versus sea transport).
- Because of limited supply side capacity in an emergency, prices go up and quality decreases. This can be overcome by building up the supplier base in advance and collaborating on quality standards and specifications,

Whilst decreasing these inefficiencies should be seen as a priority now, DFID has to recognise that the global supply chain is likely to change sooner or later. If for example cash responses become a game-changer in humanitarian response, this will have important implications. International procurement and transport will decrease. A focus on more local procurement, as increasingly done by WFP, will also change the nature of the traditional supply chain.

### Recommendations

| DFID should: |  
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| 36 | Build up a library of results, costs of inputs, outputs and outcomes from different countries and regions and different types of disasters in order to be able to carry out effective unit cost analysis and enable fast evidence based decision-making. Share this where appropriate with other donors. |
| 37 | Encourage the Independent Commission for Aid Impact to examine a range of humanitarian cases and resilience building work. |
| 38 | Carry out an in-depth study on how DFID’s funding impacts on the humanitarian supply chain recognising that the supply chain is a major cost driver in sudden-onset responses. Based on the findings, work with other donors, the private sector and implementing partners to align supply chain practices. |

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government’s ring fenced aid budget, and there are greater expectations around the speed and availability of accurate information about DFID’s work.

Humanitarian disasters naturally attract high levels of media attention in the UK, and the public are ready to be engaged. The relationship between the media and NGOs is a complex one. The media often relies on NGOs for access and information at the same time as seeing its role to hold them to account. If an NGO helps a journalist reach a community that is receiving support during a response, the journalist is likely to go further to find a community that has been overlooked to present the story of aid not getting to those who need it.

Using its relative independence from this relationship DFID can make general comments on the context and nature of the disaster and the planned response. It is able to refer neutrally to the work of others, to secure a unique position in communicating to the UK public. But this position can only be exploited if it can offer an authoritative voice on the ground from the outset of a response.

There is also a need to employ a longer term strategic approach to help share a better understanding about how an emergency response works – and why it is important.

This needs a strong and consistent narrative to enable the public to understand that different disasters and emergencies need a different response from the UK – including explanation of humanitarian policy, how the international community is responding and the range of responses to meet needs. In time this will help challenge the perception that aid, development and humanitarian response is one and the same.

The UK Aid Transparency Guarantee will put all new spending on-line. This will make detailed information of each emergency response available. A proactive and strategic approach to public communications work (media and non-media) will be needed to put this information in context.

For an emergency response, strategy, plans and expected results need to be readily available. Early statements on UK’s plans and objectives to response should be posted on-line as soon as possible. These can be developed as the response progresses and should complement media announcements on funding allocations.

But where concerns about effectiveness and corruption are generally high the review public survey showed support for DFID’s response didn’t carry the same levels of concern about waste and corruption that have been reflected in other surveys. It also showed that the public feel pleased when they hear about the UK government’s response along with a desire to know more. And more recent research commissioned by Plan UK reported that 90% of respondents recalled recent disasters in Haiti or Pakistan, and 36% were prompted to donate. This presents DFID with a clear opportunity to bring its work to the attention of an already engaged public – one of its best chances to reach a broad UK public is through communications around its response to rapid onset disasters.

40 60% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement ‘Emergency aid is wasted through inefficiency and corruption, and the money and support doesn’t get to the people who really need it.’ HERR on-line public survey: Feb 2011
41 98% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement ‘I feel pleased when I hear that the UK government is helping play a part in an international response to a disaster of emergency’. HERR on-line public survey: Feb 2011
42 94% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement ‘The UK government should do more to explain to the public how its work is helping to meet the needs of people affected by international disasters and emergencies’. HERR on-line public survey: Feb 2011
Government restrictions on spending means that alongside traditional broadcast and print media activity, communications through DFID’s own website and online presence is vital to the success of its communication strategy. This work has been developing well: e-bulletins, blogs, tweets, YouTube, Facebook and Flickr pages present DFID’s work to an engaged public. Communications activity around the UK’s response to meet humanitarian needs in Gaza following Operation Cast Lead, and the on-line Flood Monitor showing clearly where and how UK Aid is helping people affected by the floods in Pakistan (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Asia-South/Pakistan/Pakistan-Floods-Monitor/), has shown DFID’s communications work around an emergency response at its best.

Those affected by disaster are increasingly able to provide information and contribute to assessment of need as well as calling donors and the international community directly to account via online channels means even greater need for continued building of its online process.

### Recommendations

**DFID should:**

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<td>Request the International Development Select Committee to scrutinise progress on the implementation of these findings one year on from the launch of this report.</td>
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### 6. Recommendations

#### Anticipation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Assemble and regularly update a global risk register for DFID using information gained from its country teams and international organisations.</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Make better use of the DFID Chief Scientist to support UK science in anticipating crises.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Make this available as a contribution to pre-crisis arrangements across the system.</td>
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#### Resilience

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<tr>
<th>4</th>
<th>Ensure that building resilience is part of the core DFID programme in at risk countries, integrating the threat from climate change and other potential hazards into disaster risk reduction. Country offices should undertake contingency planning.</th>
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<td>Promote national response capacities of both governments and civil society in at risk countries including:</td>
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<tr>
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<td>• The development of national resilience strategies.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The establishment of direct funding mechanisms.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Regional response mechanisms where they add value.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Through civil society organisations such as Red Cross and Crescent Societies.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• National and local private sector companies, which are able at the country level to support entrepreneurial, and market solutions, which will increase in resilience and improve disaster response.</td>
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#### Leadership

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<th>Build coalitions to drive forward humanitarian reform based on improving leadership, including:</th>
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<td>• Rapid deployment of experienced leadership teams in big crises. This should include a ‘step aside’ system to ensure the best leadership is in place at both the strategic and operational level.</td>
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<td>• Encourage the convening of a UN High Level Panel to look at ways of improving the international humanitarian system to face future challenges.</td>
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<td>• Work closely with UK missions to build coalitions for reform of the international system, including more coherent use of UN executive board positions.</td>
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<td>• Work with the UN to create a new cadre of humanitarian leaders and the talent management systems and terms and conditions to sustain this.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Work with other donors and the UN to resolve some of the deficiencies in management, prioritisation and planning. This must include the right support staff available for rapid deployment.</td>
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<td>• Work with other donors and the UN to strengthen and provide better leadership of the cluster system.</td>
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<th>DFID should make a sustained effort to improve skills in the humanitarian sector. This should include:</th>
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<td>• Work to create a set of standards for humanitarian leadership.</td>
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<td>• Training within DFID, aid agencies and governments and civil society in disaster prone countries.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Ensuring pre-qualified partners demonstrate adequate investment in skills development.</td>
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</table>
### Recommendations

#### Innovation

8. Nurture innovation and its application in dealing with and preparing for humanitarian emergencies, including through partnership with operational agencies, private sector, technological innovators and science and research communities.

9. Appoint a Humanitarian Senior Research Fellow, reporting to the Chief Scientific Officer with a dedicated budget tasked with developing evidence and innovation.

10. Invest in three key technologies; mobile technologies, satellites and data management and display.

11. Support exploration of emerging and cutting-edge technologies such as nanotechnology, and new computer modelling approaches.

12. Work with partners to ensure cash based responses are given full consideration and where appropriate become much more widely adopted.

#### Accountability

13. Promote and support mechanisms to give recipients of aid a greater voice.

14. Promote the development of robust impact assessments.

15. Work with others to create an over-arching set of standards to assess beneficiary accountability.

16. Encourage the spread of best practice in this area.

17. Give greater emphasis to beneficiary accountability factors when making funding decisions.

#### Partnership

18. Reach out to create new partnerships with new donor partners (in particular China, India, Brazil and the Gulf States).

19. Maintain its default position that humanitarian response is multilateral. In particular it should:
   - Engage more effectively with ECHO on a policy level, and explore the possibility of co-financing.
   - Work with others to support the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator in the reform of OCHA and the system more widely.

20. Work with partners to promote donor coordination and revitalise the Good Humanitarian Donor-ship group.

21. Ensure that the new Private Sector Department gives full consideration to those areas where private sector expertise can improve humanitarian response effectiveness, including at the country level.

22. Use military assets in situations where they are consistent with Oslo guidelines and offer capacity others cannot, or provide better value for money than commercial alternatives.

23. Work with NGOs to promote the concept of accreditation or certification.
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<th><strong>Humanitarian space</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Re-assert the premise that humanitarian action should be based on need, reaffirming the key principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the new DFID humanitarian policy.</strong></td>
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</table>

| 25 | Ensure funding is made available for security and risk management for humanitarian workers. |

| **Changing the policy** |
|----|------------------------|
| **Incorporate resilience into its development policy and programmes.** |

| 27 | **Develop a new humanitarian policy setting out why the UK responds, where, when and how.** The policy should build on the review themes of anticipation, resilience, leadership, innovation, accountability, partnership and humanitarian space. |

| **Delivering differently** |
|----|------------------------|
| **Change the funding model to achieve greater preparedness, pre-crisis arrangements, capacity, performance and coherence by:** |
| - Increasing predictable multi-year funding linked to performance to major UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs. |
| - Increasing long-term support to international (the CERF) and country level pooled funds and to global, regional and country level NGO consortia, such as the CBHA and WAHRF. |

| 29 | **Design fast and flexible funding models for emergency responses:** |
| - Provide fast mobilisation funding in the Critical Period based on pre-qualification rather than speculative proposals. Use the process to reduce bureaucracy in this Critical Period. |
| - Ensure recovery and livelihoods funding is considered during and immediately after the Critical Period, rather than later as has traditionally been the case. |
| - Ensure there is flexibility of funding as fast moving situations change, perhaps by providing it in stages. |

| 30 | Use all new funding models to enforce standards and link funding to performance through clear impact assessments and reporting. Carry out independent periodic programme audits and after action reviews to inform future funding decisions. |

| 31 | **Develop and deploy niche capabilities in a more focused way concentrating on those areas where DFID or the UK are able to add value:** |
| - Only use search and rescue in situations where the UK can genuinely add value. |
| - Incorporate surgical teams into first phase deployments especially after earthquakes. |
| - Investigate new forms of niche capabilities that can respond to new types of threats such as nuclear, biological and chemical. |

| 32 | **Continue and expand the surge of UK contracted personnel into the international system.** |

| 33 | **Convene and lead a standing cross-government emergency mechanism for mega emergencies, using the authority of the National Security Council.** |
### Changing the structure, shifting resources

**34** Ensure that the structure, funding and human resources for humanitarian work reflects its importance as a central part of DFID work, not least by having a Director General champion this work. Amongst others, this will require  
- Rebalance resources within DFID to meet the challenges of rising humanitarian need.  
- Expand the humanitarian cadre, both in London and in the field.  
- Ensuring every response to rapid onset humanitarian need is led by an experienced response manager, with sufficient delegated authority to ensure swift action.  
- Lead large-scale responses from London, managed by CHASE.  

**35** Redefine the objectives for the contracted response team so that it is solely dedicated to supporting rapid response and pre-crisis arrangements.

### Driving results and value for money

**36** Build up a library of results, costs of inputs, outputs and outcomes from different countries and regions and different types of disasters in order to be able to carry out effective unit cost analysis and enable fast evidence based decision-making. Share this where appropriate with other donors.

**37** Encourage the Independent Commission for Aid Impact to examine a range of humanitarian cases and resilience building work.

**38** Carry out an in-depth study on how DFID’s funding impacts on the humanitarian supply chain recognising that the supply chain is a major cost driver in sudden-onset responses. Work with other donors, the private sector and implementing partners to align supply chain practices.

### Getting the message out

**39** Prioritise communications as a key factor in the UK’s emergency response, and resource it accordingly.  
- Embed communications at the policy and operations level from the beginning of a response.  
- Make DFID’s humanitarian and emergency response work permanently more visible through DFID’s website – in addition to features on specific responses. Communications staff, and/or the team leader trained in communications should be supported to speak publicly on DFID’s behalf.  
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