How well are further education and skills providers implementing the ‘Prevent’ duty?

The government published the ‘Prevent’ strategy in 2011 as part of its overall counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. ‘Prevent’ duty guidance, first published in February 2015, was put into place in the further education and skills sector on 18 September 2015. As a result, all further education and skills providers in England must have ‘due regard’ to the need to ‘Prevent’ people from being drawn into terrorism. Therefore, 2015/16 is the first academic year of the duty being put into practice formally.

The purpose of this survey was to evaluate how well further education and skills providers are implementing the ‘Prevent’ duty in its first year, and to assess the impact of the work being done to protect learners from those who wish to promote extremism. Her Majesty’s Inspectors carried out the fieldwork for this survey between November 2015 and May 2016.

Age group: Post-16

Published: July 2016

Reference no: 160041

Contents

[Executive summary 3](#_Toc454282635)

[Key findings 6](#_Toc454282636)

[Recommendations 7](#_Toc454282637)

[Introduction 8](#_Toc454282638)

[Main findings 8](#_Toc454282639)

[Oversight 10](#_Toc454282640)

[Partnership working 10](#_Toc454282641)

[Risk assessments and action plans 13](#_Toc454282642)

[The monitoring of external speakers 14](#_Toc454282643)

[The quality and impact of staff training 15](#_Toc454282644)

[Pastoral welfare and support in keeping learners safe from radicalisation and extremism 17](#_Toc454282645)

[IT policies and their impact on learner safety 19](#_Toc454282646)

[Notes 22](#_Toc454282647)

[Annex A: List of providers visited 23](#_Toc454282648)

[Annex B: List of providers from which additional evidence from routine inspection was captured for the survey 25](#_Toc454282649)

# Executive summary

According to the government and security services, the UK is ‘highly likely’ to suffer a terrorist attack. The current threat level is ‘severe’. Media reports of young people leaving their studies to become involved in terrorism, either here in Britain or overseas, have led to increased concerns about radicalisation and extremism in the further education sector.

Since 18 September 2015, further education and skills providers have been placed under a legal duty to have ‘due regard’ to the risk of learners being drawn into terrorism. The government issued specific guidance that clarifies what it expects further education providers to deliver to comply with this duty.[[1]](#footnote-1) The ‘Prevent’ duty guidance makes clear the important role of further education leaders in stopping extremists seeking to radicalise learners on campuses and in supporting learners at risk of extremist influences.

Ofsted has responsibility for monitoring the ‘Prevent’ duty in publicly funded further education and skills providers. The Chief Inspector commissioned Her Majesty’s Inspectors (HMI) to undertake this survey to establish how well providers are implementing the duty.

The survey focused on key matters outlined in the ‘Prevent’ duty guidance.

* Are providers ensuring that external speakers and events are appropriately risk assessed to safeguard learners?
* Are the partnerships between different agencies effective in identifying and reducing the spread of extremist influences?
* Are providers assessing the risks that their learners may face, and taking effective action to reduce these risks?
* Are learners being protected from inappropriate use of the internet and social media?

To what extent are staff training and pastoral welfare support contributing to learners’ safety?

The evidence in this report is based on survey visits to 37 further education and skills providers, combined with findings from 46 full inspections or monitoring visits between November 2015 and May 2016.

HMI found considerable variation in how effectively providers have implemented the ‘Prevent’ duty. General further education and sixth form colleges, where the majority of learners were enrolled, had made more progress than the other types of providers visited. The majority of providers had implemented the ‘Prevent’ duty guidance well. However, some providers viewed the duty as a list of conditions just to comply with and have adopted a ‘tick-box’ approach. This goes against the spirit of the government’s guidance, which seeks to promote meaningful ways to reduce the specific risks of radicalisation and extremism for learners and the local community.

In 13 of the providers visited, inspectors judged that the implementation of at least one aspect of the duty was slow when compared to other providers, or was well behind schedule. In two of the eight independent learning providers visited, not a single aspect of the ‘Prevent’ duty had been implemented. In these providers, learners’ safety was potentially at risk as leaders and managers lacked the understanding to develop risk assessments that identified accurately the possible threats to learners and the local community.

Six of the providers visited had no arrangements in place to check the suitability of external speakers. Even in some of the 31 providers that had appropriate policies and procedures to check external speakers and events, these did not always work well in practice. Nine providers allowed external speakers onto the premises without following their own monitoring procedures. Too often, learners were potentially at risk because leaders had not ensured that suitable checks had been completed.

Partnership working was ineffective in several of the providers visited. In these weaker providers, leaders and managers did not work well enough with partners to ensure the safety of learners. Several local authorities did not fulfil their responsibilities in developing multi-agency arrangements. They failed to work with further education and skills providers to share information and promote partnership working. Local authorities sometimes worked in isolation and focused solely on schools. This potentially put learners at risk of radicalisation and extremism because information about known risks was not shared.

In some cases, providers were too dependent on the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) ‘Prevent’ coordinators, or the local authority and police ‘Prevent’ teams. Where this was the case, the support available was often fragmented. The agencies involved also gave inconsistent or conflicting messages about precisely what providers should be doing in response to the duty. Many providers were unaware of the support, advice and guidance available through the Education Training Foundation (ETF). The more effective providers benefited from their long-standing relationships with a range of partners through community cohesion strategies and as part of the government’s CONTEST strategy.[[2]](#footnote-2)

In around a third of the providers visited, risk assessments lacked sufficient detail. These providers did not adequately identify potential threats to learners, the provider or the community. Action plans in these providers were generic and focused too much on procedures or systems rather than on the steps that could be taken to reduce the threats posed by extremists. As a result, practical actions designed to reduce the risks to learners were often not taken.

In nearly half the providers, not enough had been done to ensure that learners were protected from the risk of radicalisation and extremism when using information technology (IT). Too often, policies and procedures for the appropriate use of IT were poor or did not work in practice. Over a third of providers visited were not working with the Joint Information Systems Committee (Jisc) to develop IT policies and restrict learners’ access to harmful content on websites.[[3]](#footnote-3) In the weakest providers, learners said they could bypass security settings and access inappropriate websites, unchallenged by staff or their peers. This included websites that promote terrorist ideology and that sell firearms. In one such provider, a learner had accessed a terrorist propaganda video showing a beheading.

Staff training was ineffective in a third of the providers visited. In these providers, while senior managers were trained, staff with direct day-to-day contact with learners had not received enough training to identify and mitigate risks or to identify learners potentially at risk of radicalisation or extremism. Too many providers adopted a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. These providers typically relied on online training, such as basic ‘Prevent’ and Channel awareness for teachers and support staff. [[4]](#footnote-4) Such training was often too superficial to help staff understand the nature of specific risks in the communities that they serve.

Where training was effective, the providers worked closely with external partners to prepare staff to identify the risks and threats of radicalisation and extremism. This was particularly the case for general further education and sixth form colleges. College managers took full responsibility for training their own staff and provided follow-up training specific to the needs of the organisation.

Where staff training on radicalisation and extremism was weak, poor practices had the potential to become embedded in provision. In one such provider, inspectors found a multi-faith room that was located in a remote part of the provider’s premises. The use of the room was not monitored enough by staff. As a result, it was dominated by a single-faith group, where inappropriate gender segregation was permitted. Non-Muslim students said they did not use the room as they saw it as ‘the mosque’.

While most providers have made progress in implementing the ‘Prevent’ duty guidance, the sector needs to do more to ensure that all learners are protected from the risks of radicalisation and extremism.

# Key findings

* **Twenty-two of the 37 providers visited had implemented the ‘Prevent’ duty well.** General further education and sixth form colleges were the most successful. They were working closely with partners to ensure that good progress had been made on all aspects of the ‘Prevent’ duty.
* **Thirteen providers had been slow in putting the duty into practice.** Too many providers focused on compliance rather than evaluating the impact of the steps taken to meet the ‘Prevent’ duty and thereby reduce the risks posed by radicalisation and extremism.
* **Two of the eight independent learning providers visited had not implemented any aspect of the ‘Prevent’ duty.** Theindependent learning providers tended to operate in isolation and few had adequate systems in place to ensure the safety of learners.
* **Leaders at the general further education and sixth form colleges visited were the most successful at implementing all aspects of the ‘Prevent’ duty.** They had generally formed strong partnerships with external agencies and stakeholders. Risk assessments and action plans in these providers were of good quality.
* **Partnership working was often not effective**. Approximately half the providers visited were unaware of the support, information or intelligence available to them from a range of external partners, including the ETF.
* **Local authorities had often not worked with providers to build partnerships or share information effectively.** Several local authorities were not fulfilling their responsibilities in developing multi-agency arrangements and did not work closely enough with further education and skills providers to share information.
* **Independent learning providers’ arrangements for sharing information were ineffective.** These providers typically did not have the staff, skills or expertise to develop robust information-sharing protocols with partners or external agencies.
* **The quality of staff training was ineffective in a third of the providers visited.** These providers tended to be over-reliant on staff completing online training packages for ‘Prevent’. Little thought was given to adapting training to meet the needs of all staff or take account of the specific context of the provider.
* **Some senior leaders did not pass on information about strategic developments with external partners to their middle managers.** Communications within some providers were not effective. Managers with responsibility for implementation were often too distant from decision-making processes.
* **Vetting and monitoring of external speakers were inadequate in around a quarter of the providers.** As a result, in these providers, speakers wereallowed onto the premises to talk to learners without appropriate suitability checks.
* **The quality of risk assessments and action plans to reduce the risk of radicalisation and extremism was poor in 11 of the providers.** Two independent learning providers had no risk assessments in place at all. Of the other nine providers, most adopted a ‘tick-box’ approach to risk assessment rather than conducting a comprehensive evaluation of risks.

**Leaders in nearly half the providers visited did not adequately protect learners from the risk of radicalisation and extremism when using IT systems.** Learners in the weakest providers were able to bypass firewalls to access inappropriate websites, including those promoting terrorist ideology, right-wing extremism and the purchase of firearms.

# Recommendations

The government should:

* ensure the consistency of advice and guidance provided by BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators, police ‘Prevent’ teams and local authorities
* through Jisc, publicise further the support available to providers to develop IT policies that counter inappropriate internet access

promote the support, advice and guidance available through ETF to enable providers to do more to protect learners.

 Providers should:

* ensure that appropriate policies and procedures are in place, and implemented effectively, to protect learners from the risks posed by external speakers and events
* develop stronger and more supportive links with partners, including local authorities, to develop stringent information-sharing protocols and share intelligence
* ensure that risk assessments and associated action plans are of high quality and cover all aspects of the ‘Prevent’ duty
* provide staff training that is aligned to job roles and evaluate this to measure its impact across the organisation
* ensure that learners have a good understanding of British values and the risks and threats of radicalisation and extremism
* refer to the ‘Prevent’ duty explicitly in IT policies and procedures, closely monitor learners’ use of IT facilities to identify inappropriate usage, and work with partners and external agencies for additional support, information and intelligence.

Ofsted should:

* from September 2016, raise further its expectations of providers to implement all aspects of the ‘Prevent’ duty, and evaluate the impact this has on keeping learners safe.

# Introduction

1. From September 2015, further education and skills providers were required to comply with the updated statutory ‘Prevent’ duty guidance.
2. The ‘Prevent’ duty requires providers to have:
* appropriate policies and procedures in place for the management of external speakers and events
* active engagement with partners, including the police and BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators
* a risk assessment that assesses where and how learners are at risk of being drawn into terrorism, and an action plan designed to reduce such risks
* appropriate training and development for principals, governors, leaders and staff
* welfare and pastoral/chaplaincy support, including widely available policies for the use of prayer rooms and other faith-related facilities
* IT policies that make specific reference to the ‘Prevent’ duty and relate to the use of IT equipment.

# Main findings

1. Although 35 of the further education and skills providers visited by HMI were complying with the requirements of the ‘Prevent’ duty, 13 of the 37 providers visited had been slow in implementing the duty. Two of the eight independent learning providers visited had not implemented any aspect of the ‘Prevent’ duty and did not have adequate systems in place to ensure the safety of their learners. Inspectors found that providers often used the ‘Prevent’ duty guidance as a checklist, rather than focusing on the impact of the steps taken to meet the duty. This has resulted in these providers not protecting learners from radicalisation and extremism as effectively as they could.
2. Leaders at the general further education and sixth form colleges visited have been most successful at implementing all aspects of the ‘Prevent’ duty. Most of the colleges visited worked closely with key partners and external agencies to ensure that relevant documents were of a good standard. They worked together to ensure that practical actions were taken to reduce the risks of radicalisation and extremism. Some providers had worked with partners before, either as part of community cohesion strategies or the CONTEST strategy. These providers had a greater understanding of the ‘Prevent’ duty and made more rapid progress in its application. Independent learning providers, particularly small providers and those working in isolation, tended to have the most difficulty in implementing all aspects of the ‘Prevent’ duty.
3. Senior leaders reported that as they became more confident in understanding the requirements of the ‘Prevent’ duty, putting it into practice had also improved. This view is mirrored by staff at many of the providers visited. They said they were becoming better at accessing support from key partners and other educational institutions. This has helped them in implementing all aspects of the ‘Prevent’ duty.

**Case study: effective practice across Lancashire providers**

Following the introduction of the ‘Prevent’ duty, leaders at Burnley College wanted colleagues in the education sector to share experience and practice. Further education and skills providers had been working in partnership on community cohesion strategies and also in preparation for putting the ‘Prevent’ duty into practice as part of the Pan-Pennine College Group. College leaders wanted to extend this partnership working across Lancashire.

College leaders hosted a conference aimed at education settings that work with children and young people aged from birth to 19 across Lancashire. Seventy-five providers, including general further education colleges, sixth form colleges and independent learning providers, attended the event.

The conference had a wide range of guest speakers, including from the local authority, BIS and police ‘Prevent’ coordinators and expert guest speakers from the education sector. To provide an agenda that would be valuable to all colleagues and that linked ‘Prevent’ to safeguarding, the college included the latest changes in safeguarding legislation and current practice within children’s social care in Lancashire.

The conference presented excellent networking opportunities and encouraged education providers to consider the benefits of effective multi-agency working across Lancashire. Due to the success of the conference, Burnley College is considering an annual ‘Prevent’/safeguarding event as well as training and continuing professional development activities with providers who attended the conference.

The college has worked closely with providers across Lancashire to deliver Workshops Raising Awareness of ‘Prevent’ (WRAP). It has made closer links with settings working with children and young people. It has developed information-sharing protocols to share intelligence about children and young people with designated ‘Prevent’ leads, the police, the BIS coordinator and the local authorities across Lancashire.

## Oversight

1. There is a lack of coordination between key stakeholders, including BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators, police ‘Prevent’ teams and local authorities. This has resulted in considerable variance in the support and guidance for providers in the further education and skills sector. Providers reported that the different agencies involved often gave conflicting or inconsistent advice on what providers should be doing to put the ‘Prevent’ duty into practice.

## Partnership working

1. Senior leaders reported that they often had difficulty in accessing information and support from local authorities, where greater priority is placed on young people in schools rather than in further education. Only nine of the providers visited had good partnerships with local authorities. This caused problems with sharing information across boroughs – for example, where a learner lives in one local authority but attends a provider in a different local authority. The information gaps created could potentially result in learners being at risk of being radicalised or drawn into extremism without the knowledge of the provider or local authority. Those that had good working relationships were able to share a range of information about learners and their families with local authority ‘Prevent’ coordinators. They were also involved in further and higher education steering groups focused on the ‘Prevent’ duty.
2. HMI discussions with senior leaders and local authority staff showed that too many local authorities had not worked with further education and skills providers to give guidance and support for putting the ‘Prevent’ duty into practice. Their priority was schools. They relied on BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators to work with further education and skills providers. For example, leaders at a large general further education college in the West Midlands that works very effectively with partners told inspectors that they had tried to engage with the local authority in partnership working. However, the local authority saw ‘Prevent’ as low priority. Further education and skills providers were exceptionally low priority. Ofsted judged this local safeguarding children’s board as inadequate at its last inspection.
3. Where relationships were good, providers valued the work of their local authority in developing and coordinating effective partnerships. For example, a large general further education college in the North West has close links with partners, including higher education institutions. Coordinated by the local authority, the further education/higher education forum meets monthly with key partners to share intelligence. This includes background information on external speakers. They also share good practice among providers.

**Case study: partnership arrangements with the local authority**

Peterborough Regional College helps to shape the partnership arrangements and contributes fully to the Cambridgeshire and Greater Peterborough Challenge Panel. Local intelligence is good. Partners view the college as the major institution working with young people aged 16 and above.

The chairperson of the Challenge Panel reported an increased confidence in providers, including the college, in making referrals for consideration by the Channel programme. Partners work closely together to understand the threshold for Channel referrals.

Highly effective college tracking systems enable leaders and managers to provide good information about individual learners to the Challenge Panel.

1. Inspectors found that support for providers from the BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinator team was too area-dependent. Around half the providers visited, and especially independent learning providers, had difficulty engaging with BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators due to the coordinators’ workloads and unfilled vacancies in the BIS team.
2. Eighteen providers were unaware of the support, information or intelligence available to them from the range of external partners including Jisc and the ETF. Another five providers became over-reliant on partners when developing resources or considering referrals to the Channel programme. Staff in these providers were unsure of the threshold for referring learners to Channel. As a consequence, they were unable to distinguish between trivial risks and significant risks.
3. During the survey visits and routine inspections, inspectors found that the quality of partnership working between providers and external partners varied considerably. General further education and sixth form colleges had developed the best partnerships. They managed and maintained relationships with a range of partners including BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators, police ‘Prevent’ teams, safer community partnerships, local authorities, learners, subcontractors and local communities. Examples of highly effective partnership working included providers inviting partners to joint provider events, forums and ‘Prevent’-specific training.
4. Just over half the providers shared intelligence, information and good practice with partners and other further education and skills providers. For example, local independent learning providers in the Greater Merseyside Learning Provider Federation join together for meetings and training with police ‘Prevent’ teams and BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators. This reduces the need for partners to visit individual organisations.

**Case study: effective partnership working**

Senior managers at Luton Sixth Form College have developed an influential local approach to partnership working.

College staff regularly present at local conferences for headteachers, principals, chairs of governors and designated safeguarding officers. Presentation topics include managing risk assessments and using the curriculum and college ethos to strengthen young people’s confidence to challenge extremism. College staff also help to shape events by ensuring a representative role and voice for young people and community groups.

College staff look well beyond the four walls of the institution. They have links with the borough council, schools, police and the BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinator. Such links are purposeful and communication is frequent. College membership of the ‘Prevent’ and safeguarding boards enables all partners to discuss possible referrals and take collective action. The common agreement among all partners is that no one institution can ‘go it alone’. The college plays a key role in what the local authority describes as ‘early intervention activities’.

1. A lack of rigorous information-sharing protocols was one barrier to developing strong working relationships with external partners. Although most providers had informal processes in place for sharing information, 11 did not have written agreements for doing so.
2. Independent learning providers’ arrangements for sharing information were ineffective. In particular, small independent learning providers did not have the staff, skills or expertise to develop robust information-sharing protocols for effective work with external partners. They were more likely to work in isolation. Conversely, inspectors found information-sharing protocols in the majority of general further education and sixth form colleges to be good.
3. The majority of support for the implementation of ‘Prevent’ has been provided to general further education and sixth form colleges and not to independent learning providers. This could be why more than half of independent learning and other non-college providers visited had not yet developed partnership arrangements with police ‘Prevent’ teams, BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators or local authorities. For example, an independent specialist college in the East Midlands had requested support from the BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinator but the first available appointment was many months away.
4. In the providers visited, a few middle managers with responsibility for ‘Prevent’ said they were too distant from decision-making processes. They reported that senior managers have responsibility for key ‘Prevent’ strategic developments with partners, such as BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators, police ‘Prevent’ teams and the local authority. However, they did not communicate actions effectively to middle managers. This had resulted in some staff not knowing which actions to take against threats of radicalisation or extremism.

## Risk assessments and action plans

1. Inspectors found that almost all the providers visited had a risk assessment in place to reduce the risks of radicalisation and extremism. However, the quality of these risk assessments varied considerably. The best providers worked with partners and learners to review rigorously the internal and external threats to the organisation and put effective actions in place to reduce the risks of radicalisation and extremism.
2. Two independent learning providers did not have any risk assessment in place. Three other independent learning providers did not identify accurately the risks to staff, learners or the organisation. Independent learning providers were also less likely to work with partners in developing risk assessments and action plans. For example, an independent learning provider located over multiple sites worked mainly with vulnerable young people. However, the provider had not worked with any partners to identify risks. They had no risk assessment in place.
3. The quality of risk assessments and action plans to reduce the risk of radicalisation and extremism was poor in 11 of the providers visited. These providers often adopted a checklist approach to compliance and did not assess potential risks in enough depth. In these cases, the risk assessment was no more than a generic form containing tick boxes and very little context relating to the provider.

**Case study: the slow development of risk assessments**

A risk assessment and action plan was in place at this college but was clearly ‘a work in progress’. It was very much a compliance document and was not used effectively to identify risks of radicalisation and extremism. The risk assessment barely met the statutory requirements of the ‘Prevent’ duty.

The assessment set out, for example, which staff had not had ‘Prevent’ training but did not identify the risks associated with staff not being trained or identify what training was required.

There are known racial and cultural tensions in the area but the risk assessment did not acknowledge or identify any risks associated with this. The safeguarding policy that was referenced in the risk assessment paid minimal attention to radicalisation.

1. The best providers had thorough assessments of internal and external risks. These risk assessments were reviewed regularly and updated when new risks were identified. However, the quality of action plans linked to risk assessment was good in less than two thirds of the providers visited. Where plans were robust, they included key actions to reduce risks and identified key staff responsibilities and impact measures. However, a third of action plans were not detailed enough and focused too much on systems rather than evaluating the impact of measures taken to implement the ‘Prevent’ duty.
2. Five providers, mainly general further education and sixth form colleges, had become over-reliant on partners and external agencies for advice, guidance and support. These providers relied on support to develop and complete risk assessments and action plans. As a result, the providers did not take full responsibility for their own compliance with the ‘Prevent’ duty. For example, senior managers of a college in the north of England lacked confidence in sharing their risk assessment with inspectors because staff were waiting for the BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinator who had helped draft the document to approve it.
3. The involvement of learners in developing risk assessments was generally weak. Twenty-two of the providers visited did not consult with learners to identify further risks from radicalisation and extremism to include in risk assessments and action plans.

## The monitoring of external speakers

1. Learners reported that by engaging with external speakers, they gained a balanced view of life in modern Britain. Learners felt that these were generally good opportunities to debate and discuss a range of topics and themes including tolerance, respect and democracy. Nearly three quarters of the learners spoken to in general further education and sixth form colleges said that they had a better understanding of British values following external speaker activities. However, this dropped to a quarter of learners from independent learning providers and community learning and skills providers visited. Still, these appear to be useful activities for learners.
2. The vetting and monitoring of external speakers were inadequate in 15 of the providers visited. These providers had allowed external speakers onto the premises to talk to learners without completing appropriate suitability checks. Nine providers had allowed external speakers onto their premises without following their own monitoring procedures. Six independent learning providers and both community learning and skills providers either did not have policies and procedures in place to monitor external speakers and events, or did not apply these procedures in practice. In these providers, leaders and managers did not have clear oversight of external speakers and events. They were unable to identify the range of external speakers, the dates visited, the topics discussed or the benefits to learners.
3. Conversely, all general further education, independent specialist colleges and sixth form colleges visited had appropriate policies and procedures in place to monitor external speakers and events. Twenty-two providers checked and recorded external speakers and events effectively. The best providers shared this information about external speakers with partners.
4. The best providers liaised with BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators and police ‘Prevent’ teams to gather background information on speakers before organising an event. BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators and police ‘Prevent’ teams were able to provide background information to providers about external speakers. This enabled them to make an informed decision on whether an external speaker should be allowed to speak to learners.
5. However, this practice was inconsistent across the providers visited. For example, a general further education college in the north of England did not monitor or have a central record of external speakers and events. Individual departments and teachers organised external speaker activities, but did not inform senior managers of the details. As such, senior managers were frequently unaware of the external speakers or events going on at the premises, the content of the external speakers’ presentations, or the benefits these activities had on learners.

**Case study: the rigorous monitoring of external speakers**

An independent learning provider conducts ‘soft’ background checks on all external speakers, including checks with the Police and BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators and an internet search. They tell potential speakers about this and request all presentation materials in advance of the speaking engagement.

One speaker requested an engagement at the provider but objected to background checks, citing infringement of civil liberties. The provider refused the external speaker’s request, as they could not guarantee the safety of learners.

## The quality and impact of staff training

1. The quality and impact of staff training on the ‘Prevent’ duty varied considerably across the providers visited. Leaders and managers in all the providers visited had received training in ‘Prevent’. Most had received externally accredited training, such as the Workshop for Raising Awareness of ‘Prevent’ (WRAP) accredited by the Home Office.
2. In the best providers, middle managers and teachers had also received WRAP training. Key staff in a few providers, mainly general further education colleges, had received training to become accredited WRAP trainers. This reduced the burden on BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators and police ‘Prevent’ teams. For example, one general further education college had excellent relations with the police ‘Prevent’ team. The college has had strong community cohesion partnership arrangements in place since 2001, initially working with police to ease high levels of racial tension in the area. Five members of the college’s staff are accredited to deliver WRAP training and all staff at the college have received WRAP training. The trainer team is now delivering WRAP training to other further education and skills providers in the locality.
3. Features of the best staff training seen included:
* personalised training that had been developed to meet the needs of all staff
* evaluation of training to consider if any additional training activities would be beneficial
* regular updates to training
* ‘Prevent’ training linked to safeguarding training

whole-provider and individual staff/departmental training.

**Case study: effective staff training in identifying signs of radicalisation**

A learner posted an inappropriate comment on this college’s secure social media site. A member of the college safeguarding team found the comment during the daily review of the site. The post was removed and the safeguarding officer made an appointment to meet with the learner. After a meeting with the learner, the safeguarding officer spoke to his teachers and pastoral tutors. The teachers and pastoral staff had noticed subtle changes in the learner and were keeping a ‘watchful eye’ on him and kept a record of any concerns they had. The safeguarding officer also contacted the learner’s parents.

The learner’s parents were concerned about their son as he had recently shunned his Christian faith and a copy of the Qur’an had been found hidden in his bedroom. The learner also had a new group of friends who his parents felt were having a negative influence on him.

Effective staff training at this provider had enabled the early identification of signs of radicalisation. Close partnership working and an early referral resulted in the learner and his family receiving support through the Channel programme.

1. The quality and impact of staff training, however, was ineffective in 12 providers visited. While almost all staff across these providers had received some training in ‘Prevent’, there was a tendency to be over-reliant on online training packages. These packages provided only a basic awareness and understanding of ‘Prevent’. Little thought was given to extra or bespoke training for staff.
2. In weaker provision, leaders and managers typically paid little attention to differentiating training according to staff roles and responsibilities in the organisation. More than a third of providers visited adopted a one-size-fits-all approach to ‘Prevent’ training. All staff, regardless of their role, including teachers, support staff and estates staff, completed the same training package. As a result, staff were unaware of their own roles and responsibilities in the ‘Prevent’ duty, potentially affecting the safety of learners.
3. Around a quarter of leaders did not sufficiently evaluate the impact their training programme had on teaching, learning and assessment, particularly on promoting British values, pastoral support and safeguarding. Commonly, staff did not have enough knowledge of ‘Prevent’ to identify issues relating to radicalisation and extremism accurately. Inspectors found staff confidence to be lowest in independent learning providers. Staff in the best providers had a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities. They were confident in reporting issues and concerns to the designated ‘Prevent’ officer. All 37 providers had a designated ‘Prevent’ officer, usually the designated safeguarding officer, who dealt with reported incidents.
4. In the weakest providers, staff were unsure to whom they should refer issues. There were no clear guidelines or processes for staff who had concerns about radicalisation and extremism. They had not been fully trained on how to refer a concern.

## Pastoral welfare and support in keeping learners safe from radicalisation and extremism

1. Providers usually covered basic awareness of ‘Prevent’ and the promotion of British values during learners’ induction. Most of the general further education colleges and sixth form colleges visited reinforced ‘Prevent’ and British values through pastoral tutorials and learner reviews. However, too few of the independent learning providers and community learning and skills providers did enough to reinforce ‘Prevent’ or British values through either induction or pastoral activities.
2. The promotion of British values was an integral part of the curriculum in all the providers visited. However, the quality of teaching and learning of British values varied considerably.
3. Where teaching and learning were good, learners were routinely involved in a wide range of activities to promote and develop tolerance, democracy, individual liberty, mutual respect and the rule of law. Activities included:
* external projects involving the local community
* cross-college/provider debates and discussions
* learners developing a learner handbook
* media competitions – including filming short video clips promoting British values
* visiting theatre group activities – discussions following dramatisations of radicalisation and extremism
* workshops with BIS ‘Prevent’ and police ‘Prevent’ teams
* ‘justice’ workshops – for example, reviewing the radicalisation of Andrew Ibrahim.

**Case study: the role of pastoral support in keeping learners safe**

North Lancs Training Group is an independent learning provider. During tutorials and pastoral support, it gives considerable attention to ensuring that all learners are made aware of the dangers and risks associated with terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation, including through the internet.

Learners have been introduced to, and have had basic training in, the ‘Prevent’ agenda. All learners have access to an excellent 24-hour helpline if their safety or security are jeopardised. Learners know that their concerns will be taken seriously and followed up immediately.

Staff have considerable experience and expertise in supporting learners. They were proactive in implementing the ‘Prevent’ duty before it became mandatory. Senior managers sit on the Home Office steering group for ‘Prevent’.

1. Many providers recognised that pastoral welfare and support, including promoting British values and developing learners’ awareness of the risks associated with radicalisation and extremism, needed improving. The main barriers that these providers faced were improving staff knowledge and understanding of the promotion of British values, and how to integrate these into lessons.
2. Providers that had faith rooms generally monitored them well. Providers usually had comprehensive policies and procedures in place for checking the use of multi-faith rooms. They referred to these in risk assessment and action planning. Providers managed faith groups, including Islamic and Christian groups, very effectively. As a result, learners could observe their faith safely and, as for any enrichment activity, under the supervision of provider staff.
3. In one provider visited, where a multi-faith room was not monitored adequately, inspectors observed some poor practice that potentially placed learners at risk.

**Case study: the poor monitoring of faith rooms**

In one college, learners had unmonitored access to a multi-faith room that was located away from the main areas. The multi-faith room was used only by learners and staff of the Islamic faith and was segregated by gender. The multi-faith room had facilities similar to a mosque. The room was used every day, but staff did not know who was using the room. Learners frequently used the multi-faith room outside of Muslim prayer times. Managers had not conducted a risk assessment. Previous learners from the college have had links with Islamic extremists after leaving the college.

1. Five independent learning providers and five of the colleges visited did not have faith rooms. Providers had consulted with learners as to whether there was a demand for a faith room and, in many cases, learners made the decision that they would prefer not to have one.

## IT policies and their impact on learner safety

1. Leaders in 16 of the providers visited did not adequately protect learners from the risk of radicalisation and extremism when using IT systems. Learners in the weakest providers were able to bypass firewalls to access inappropriate websites including those promoting extreme Islamic ideology, right-wing extremism and the purchase of firearms.
2. Almost all the providers had an IT policy in place. However, 11 of these policies did not make explicit reference to ‘Prevent’ and did not work effectively in practice. As a result, learners could access inappropriate internet content. In one instance identified by inspectors, learners could access a website promoting ISIS ideology.
3. Monitoring of learners’ use of IT varies considerably across providers, with 10 of the providers visited not monitoring IT usage adequately. Some providers did not monitor IT usage at all, while others’ reports were so generic that they were of little use in identifying inappropriate IT use.

**Case study: putting learners at risk through inadequate monitoring of IT**

One general further education college visited had an IT policy in place that included specific reference to ‘Prevent’. It highlighted the stringent firewalls in place to block inappropriate websites, including those that promote ISIS ideology.

A Channel referral log reported how a learner in the learning resource centre (LRC) was able to circumvent computer firewalls and access an ISIS video showing a person being beheaded. The LRC staff did not notice or intervene, nor did any learner in the LRC.

The learner had been watching the video for some time before being challenged by a teacher walking through the LRC. The teacher made the learner close the webpage. The learner showed no remorse about what she had done. The learner received no support or counselling from the college and was not reprimanded in any way.

The college reported the incident as a ‘Prevent’ incident through the Channel process without an internal investigation.[[5]](#footnote-5) The college felt that the issue was the responsibility of the Channel team and did not take any responsibility as to how the learner managed to access the site.

1. The best providers visited had a range of strategies in place to ensure that learners were safe while using IT. These strategies included:
* closely monitoring IT usage in real time, in order to identify and address inappropriate use of IT, at which computer and by whom
* tracking IT use on guest log-ins
* risk-rating learners and sampling IT access
* daily reports to senior leaders of attempts to access inappropriate websites
* developing stringent firewalls with external providers

sharing data regarding ‘popular’ contentious and blocked websites that learners had attempted to access with police ‘Prevent’ teams as part of local intelligence gathering.

1. More than a third of providers did not liaise with external agencies such as Jisc to develop IT policies and firewalls. Jisc provides guidance and support to further education and skills providers in writing IT policies and in developing firewalls for computer systems. It is named specifically in the ‘Prevent’ duty guidance.
2. The best providers have liaised closely with external agencies such as Jisc and have stringent firewalls in place. In these providers, learners reported that internet safety was strong but sometimes felt frustrated that firewalls were too restrictive. However, learners understood that it was to keep them safe while using IT. Learners could access blocked websites if they provided the IT team with reasons for accessing the sites: for example, research for history, politics, theology or public services.

**Conclusion**

1. The focused visits and routine inspections were conducted at a very early point following the ‘Prevent’ duty becoming mandatory. It is still early days and providers still see the implementation of the ‘Prevent’ duty as a work in progress. Providers now must work more quickly to ensure that learners are protected against the threats of radicalisation and extremism. We have seen through the good practice identified in this survey that proactive providers were fully prepared for the implementation of the ‘Prevent’ duty. The whole of the further education and skills sector must embrace the ‘Prevent’ duty and ensure robust application to keep learners safe.

**Research publications feedback**

We are interested in finding out how useful you have found this publication.

Are you thinking of putting these ideas into practice; or already doing something similar that could help other providers; or are you just interested? We would welcome your views and ideas. Let us know in our survey: [www.surveymonkey.com/r/researchpublications](http://www.surveymonkey.com/r/researchpublications).

# Notes

The aim of this survey was to establish how well further education and skills providers were implementing the ‘Prevent’ duty. As the ‘Prevent’ duty was introduced in September 2015, there are no previous inspection findings to support the survey.

Key research questions were generated for the fieldwork stage of the survey. These were:

* how does the provider monitor external speakers, visitors and events to ensure that learners have a balance of views?
* how effective are partnerships in ensuring that learners are not radicalised or involved in extremism?
* how are risk assessments and action plans put into practice, and what impact do they have on keeping learners safe from radicalisation and extremism?
* how does staff training enable staff to keep learners safe from radicalisation and extremism?
* how do pastoral welfare and support staff keep learners safe from radicalisation and extremism?
* how effectively are IT policies implemented and how well do they contribute to learner safety?

To answer these questions, HMI collected evidence from fieldwork visits to 37 further education and skills providers, geographically dispersed across the country. The sample featured providers with a range of inspection judgements for ‘overall effectiveness’, from outstanding to requires improvement. Visits were made to: 25 general further education and sixth form colleges, eight independent learning providers, two community learning and skills providers, one independent specialist college and one employer.

During the visits, inspectors interviewed approximately 230 managers, 220 teachers and support staff, 79 provider-designated ‘Prevent’ officers, 425 learners, 63 partners and 52 governors. Inspectors also interviewed BIS ‘Prevent’ coordinators, police ‘Prevent’ coordinators, local authority ‘Prevent’ coordinators and staff from community partnerships. HMI reviewed a range of documentation, including policies and procedures for external speakers and visits, IT, staff training, partnership working and the use of faith rooms. Risk assessments, action plans, staff training logs, IT logs, internal ‘Prevent’ and external Channel referrals and tutorial planning documents were also reviewed.

Inspectors corroborated the findings alongside evidence from 46 routine further education and skills inspections or monitoring visits that took place between November 2015 and May 2016.

# Annex A: List of providers visited

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Provider | Local authority |
| Boston College | Lincolnshire |
| Burnley College | Lancashire |
| Cadbury Sixth Form College | Birmingham |
| Carshalton College  | Sutton |
| Cheadle and Marple Sixth Form College | Stockport |
| Choices 4 All | Harrow |
| Coulsdon Sixth Form College | Croydon |
| Crackerjack Training Limited | Birmingham |
| Dudley College of Technology | Dudley |
| Economic Solutions Limited (Manchester Solutions) | Manchester |
| Gateway Sixth Form College | Leicester |
| Haringey London Borough Council | Haringey |
| Homefield College | Leicestershire |
| Huntingdonshire Regional College  | Cambridgeshire |
| Itchen College | Southampton |
| Jaguar Land Rover Holdings Limited | Warwickshire |
| Kirklees Council Adult and Community Learning | Kirklees |
| Lancaster and Morecambe College | Lancashire |
| Leeds College of Building | Leeds |
| Luton Sixth Form College | Luton |
| Newcastle-under-Lyme College | Staffordshire |
| Peterborough Regional College | Peterborough |
| Prospect Training Services (Gloucester) Limited | Gloucestershire |
| QA Limited | Slough |
| Rocket Training Limited | Liverpool |
| S&B Automotive Academy Limited | City of Bristol |
| Sandwell College | Sandwell |
| Shipley College | Bradford |
| St Brendan’s Sixth Form College | City of Bristol |
| Sir George Monoux Sixth Form College | Walthamstow |
| The College of Haringey, Enfield and North East London | Haringey |
| The Manchester College | Manchester |
| The College of West Anglia | Norfolk |
| Walsall College | Walsall |
| Weston College | North Somerset |
| Wyke Sixth Form College | City of Kingston-upon-Hull |
| YMCA Derbyshire | Derby |

# Annex B: List of providers from which additional evidence from routine inspection was captured for the survey

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Provider | Local authority |
| Acacia Training Limited  | Stoke-on-Trent |
| Academies Enterprise Trust | Essex |
| Academy Transformation Trust | Nottinghamshire |
| Acorn Training Consultants | Derbyshire |
| Activate Learning | Knowsley |
| Ambitious College | Barnet |
| B2B Engage Limited | Greenwich |
| Barnardo’s Employment, Training and Skills | Redbridge |
| Catch 22 | Islington |
| Chelmsford College | Essex |
| City of Bristol College | City of Bristol |
| City of Liverpool College | Liverpool |
| College of North West London | Brent |
| Cornwall College | Cornwall |
| Derby City Council | Derby |
| Exemplas Holdings Limited | Redbridge |
| GK Training Services Limited | Wigan |
| Grantham College | Lincolnshire |
| Greenwich Community College | Greenwich |
| Havant Sixth Form College | Hampshire |
| Herefordshire Council | Herefordshire |
| Hull College Group | City of Kingston-upon-Hull |
| JGA Group Limited | Hillingdon |
| King George V College | Sefton |
| Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council | Knowsley |
| Mid Cheshire College | Cheshire West and Chester |
| N&B Training Company Ltd | Surrey |
| New College Nottingham | Nottingham |
| Newham Sixth Form College | Newham |
| North Lancs Training Group | Lancashire |
| Oakmere Community College | Liverpool |
| Paston Sixth Form College | Norfolk |
| Pearson PLC | Essex |
| Pilot IMS Limited | Birmingham |
| Progress to Excellence | Wirral |
| Redbridge College | Redbridge |
| Richmond-upon-Thames College | Richmond-upon-Thames |
| Skegness College of Vocational Training | Lincolnshire |
| South Cheshire College | Cheshire East |
| St Elizabeth’s College | Hertfordshire |
| TDR Training Limited | North Tyneside |
| The Derbyshire Network | Derbyshire |
| The Sheffield College | Sheffield |
| Unique Training (North East) Limited | South Tyneside |
| West Sussex County Council | West Sussex |
| Weymouth College | Dorset |

The Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) regulates and inspects to achieve excellence in the care of children and young people, and in education and skills for learners of all ages. It regulates and inspects childcare and children's social care, and inspects the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass), schools, colleges, initial teacher training, further education and skills, adult and community learning, and education and training in prisons and other secure establishments. It assesses council children’s services, and inspects services for looked after children, safeguarding and child protection.

If you would like a copy of this document in a different format, such as large print or Braille, please telephone 0300 123 1231, or email enquiries@ofsted.gov.uk.

You may reuse this information (not including logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit [www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence](http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence), write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk.

This publication is available at [www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ofsted](http://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ofsted).

Interested in our work? You can subscribe to our monthly newsletter for more information and updates: <http://eepurl.com/iTrDn>.

Piccadilly Gate

Store Street

Manchester

M1 2WD

T: 0300 123 1231

Textphone: 0161 618 8524

E: enquiries@ofsted.gov.uk

W: [www.gov.uk/ofsted](http://www.gov.uk/ofsted)

No. 160041

© Crown copyright 2016

1. ‘“Prevent” duty guidance or further education institutions in England and Wales’, Home Office; [www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. CONTEST is the overall counter terrorism strategy as identified in the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015. CONTEST has four strands, of which ‘Prevent’ is one:

	* **Pursue** – aims to disrupt and stop terrorist attacks wherever possible by prosecuting those that have engaged in terrorist related activity
	* **Protect** – aims to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack in the UK and reduce our vulnerability
	* **Prepare** – aims to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where the attack cannot be stopped
	* **‘Prevent’** – aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Delivered in partnership with a range of organisations including further education and skills providers. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The ‘Prevent’ duty specifically mentions Jisc as a source of specialist support and advice to help providers ensure learners are safe online and appropriate safeguards are in place. Jisc also has a Computer Security Incident Response Team who can provide assistance in the event of an online incident occurring. [www.jisc.ac.uk](http://www.jisc.ac.uk/). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Channel is a programme which focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn in terrorism. The Channel General Awareness Training Module provides information on Channel. <http://course.ncalt.com/Channel_General_Awareness/01/index.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. ‘Prevent’ incidents are reported to police through the Channel programme. It is then determined if the incident meets the threshold for Channel. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)