



## **Unite response to the Shaw Report Consultation - The Future Shape and Financing of Network Rail**

### **1 Introduction**

- 1.1 This response is submitted by Unite the Union, the UK's largest trade union with 1.4 million members across the private and public sectors. The union's members work in a range of industries including manufacturing, transport, financial services, print, media, construction, local government, education, health and not for profit sectors. Unite represents a quarter of a million members in the various forms of transport making it the largest union in the transport sector. Unite is the fourth largest rail union with membership primarily in rail manufacture, engineering and rail freight.
- 1.2 In this response Unite stresses the importance of growth and the urgent need for a comprehensive transport policy encompassing all transport modes to cope with future demand. Unite does not feel that this growth potential could be fully realised without a 'guiding mind' to direct investment, resolve timetabling disputes, provide a uniform cost effective solution to the design of the network and thereby producing cost savings by way of uniformity and volume purchases. Most importantly Unite stresses the need for the safety of the workforce and traveling public and the urgent need to find replacements for the skilled workforce as they near retirement.
- 1.3 Unite does not feel that devolution of rail transport to the regions of England would work whilst devolution of control to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly and to the Northern Irish Assembly might. The issue would always be the interfaces between one area and the next.

### **2 Report Questions**

#### ***Question 1: What are your views on the scope of Network Rail's functions?***

- 2.1 Unite feels that devolution of the services provided by Network Rail has the potential to fragment and complicate the coordination of services by creating new and additional interfaces. This could lead to a loss of economies of scale for certain functions. Unite agrees that the functions of Network Rail could benefit from an enhanced review following rationalisation but this need not mean a division and replication of work in order to more closely align with the operation of passenger services.

- 2.2 The current review appears to work under the premise that favours future devolved structure, which would provide the foundations for privatisation and not one which focusses on how the network could work better under public ownership.

**Question 2: Have we failed to mention any specific and important factors?**

- 2.3 Whilst the review has mentioned the Fourth Rail Package, but Unite believes that it is irrelevant to the discussions surrounding the future structure of the rail infrastructure. The Fourth Rail Package will in its current form require the franchising of all passenger services in a manner similar to that currently employed in the UK. The obligation does not therefore give rise to the obligation to franchise out track network services that maintain and develop the capacity of services to serve communities.
- 2.4 Unite and other unions have been following the developments in Europe on the question of the Fourth Rail Package and note that it refers to the need to franchise out passenger rail services but currently provides the regions with the ability to make direct awards. Further, the scope of the package is such that makes it open to legal challenge with respect to the rights of each nation to choose. This legislation removes that right forcing the nation to franchise out passenger rail services. The Fourth Rail Package is currently going through the trilogue negotiations process where amendments can be considered and consequently we do not know the outcome of these negotiations. Either way the scope of the duty to franchise passenger rail services would not include any provision or duty to privatise the track and infrastructure.
- 2.5 Unite always believed that the black hole in the financial arrangements of the rail industry was with the operational costs of the train operating companies (TOC's) and, in turn, the flow to the Rolling Stock Operating Companies (RoSCOs) as highlighted in the Transport for Quality of Life Rebuilding Rail Report of 2009<sup>1</sup>. Figure 8 on Page 33 of the scoping document brings that into a clear focus. Unite believes that if there was an effective accounting structure, that the full cost of the damage to the network by passenger and freight traffic would be passed on rather than relying on governmental financial support.
- 2.6 As the margins on rail freight are very tight, Unite believe, it is unlikely that the market could stand any sizable increase in costs, however, without a detrimental swing away from the tracks and on to the road. The benefits of removing long distance freight from the road, include not only environmental and traffic flow improvements but also improvements to the work life balance of lorry drivers. If it was not for rail freight capacity enhancements there would possibly not be room to allow traffic to flow. Even now long distance road freight hauliers have not enough secure overnight parking facilities so they have to find a spot on the side of the road. Such roadside stops leave drivers isolated and vulnerable to attack. Unite therefore welcomes any move to increase secure parking facilities and increases

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<sup>1</sup> Taylor I and Sloman L, (2012), *Rebuilding Rail, Final Report*, June 2012, Transport for Quality of Life. See [http://www.togetherfortransport.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/120630\\_Rebuilding\\_Rail\\_Final\\_Report\\_print\\_version.pdf](http://www.togetherfortransport.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/120630_Rebuilding_Rail_Final_Report_print_version.pdf)

in long distance freight volumes by rail in order to reduce the need for drivers to be placed in harm's way. Reducing the need for long distance road haulage has the added advantage of improving lorry driver work life balance.

- 2.7 TOC's claim that they are responsible for successfully increasing the volume of passenger numbers and that they are contributing to the growth of the network. In reality however growth has been as a result of Government investment and borrowing by Network Rail. Unite believes that the costs associated with the maintenance and repair of track and signals are not being recovered from the TOC's or freight operators. Consequently, Unite believes, almost all improvements, to date, have been as a result of Government funding directly or indirectly via the Network Rail debt. As passenger numbers increase, there must be economies of scale, which should permit the TOC's to contribute more than they do currently toward the damaging impact they have on the infrastructure rather than continuously pushing up passenger ticket prices.
- 2.8 With the introduction of the European Train Control System (ETCS) Passenger and freight services will be utilising the tracks more frequently than ever before. As such Unite believes there will need to be a more frequent scrutiny of the network and a subsequent reduction in expected life spans of assets. If current levels of inspection are used after ETCS is brought in, then Unite believes there will be an accident and potential loss of life.
- 2.9 Unite has concerns over the way in which the organisation tries to accommodate too many changes too quickly without allowing for the network to reach a state of equilibrium. Continuing on this path toward balance would allow people working within the network to adapt to the new regime. Changes should then be structured in such a way that they improve the status quo and allow for a period of adjustment and assessment before bringing in yet another rapid change. Doing this would allow a more rounded picture to develop, as opposed to trying to assess something that has already altered beyond the realms of enquiry.
- 2.10 Unite believes that the necessary innovative infrastructure improvements that have been put into place were needed to make up for decades of underinvestment that date from a time shortly after the end of the second world war. The money for these improvements has to come from somewhere as this improvement work is still necessary.

***Question 3: What are your views on these accountability arrangements and their effectiveness?***

- 2.11 The governance structure as envisaged provides the Secretary of State with virtually unlimited power to tinker with the day to day operation of the network and make changes that suit a particular political agenda. Such a close connection between politics and the operation of what in reality is a public service is a recipe for disaster and spiralling costs. Unite does not therefore feel that such a structure would be fit for purpose. That said, Unite has confidence in the current management direction of the Network under its current chair and team.

- 2.12 Unite feels that the structure of the Network should more mirror that of a trust which is tasked to maintain and improve the rail network for the benefit of the nation. Such a body would be subject to aspirational goals of government and its customers but not subject to day to day interference from outside organisations and parliamentary lobby groups.
- 2.13 One party to the operation of Network Rail is noticeable by its absence within the structure. Unite feels that the involvement of the workforce and their representatives, would enable the structure to gauge its effectiveness of decisions made and provide real insight into the operation of the network. This could be accomplished by providing for a more inclusive rather than exclusive management structure.

**Question 4: Have we correctly identified and defined Network Rail's customers?**

- 2.14 Unite feels that the customers of Network Rail are not the travelling public or the freight carried on trains that run on the tracks, but the Train Operating Companies (TOCs) and freight operators. Whilst moves to improve the safety and service level provided by the tracks and equipment may disadvantage both passenger and freight travel, the work is essential to ensure that the customers of the TOCs and freight operations are safe, and become able to arrive at their destination.
- 2.15 Unite feel that the media coverage of rail distorts the public perception of rail in order to suggest that all the good work by Network Rail in opening new routes, connecting or reconnecting communities and improving safety is down to the TOC and all the delays are down to Network Rail. As Unite stressed in the London roundtable, Network Rail does not take enough credit where credit is due, in so many areas.

**Question 5: How effectively are customer needs and expectations met by Network Rail at present?**

- 2.16 Unite believes that the customers of Network Rail wish to see a network that will allow them to run trains at a frequency sufficient to meet the demands of the traveling public and freight. TOCs need to meet the demands placed upon them by increases in population and the modal shift away from road to rail.
- 2.17 As highlighted by Unite in the London round table discussions please see below evidence that aims to break the myth that growth in passenger numbers is due to privatisation.
- 2.18 In a recent review of car ownership and journeys by road<sup>2</sup> the authors highlighted several eminent peer-reviewed studies that tried to explain changes in car journey


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<sup>2</sup> RAND Europe Evidence review of car traffic levels in Britain Charlene Rohr, James Fox  
[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/395118/evidence-review-car-traffic-levels-britain.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/395118/evidence-review-car-traffic-levels-britain.pdf)

mileage, not just in the UK but across Europe. These reviews looked at everything from the size of impact of traditional economic factors, such as changes in fuel prices, travel service levels including congestion, income and GDP changes in explaining changes in car to quantify the impact of known trends on aggregate changes in car mileage.

2.19 One of the key arguments postulated by the TOCs is that private investment into the passenger train services in the UK has been the root cause for increases in passenger numbers. If you compare and contrast the factors outlined in the RAND Europe report with the timeline of declining proportional investment into the roads, then it is clear that the change has more to do with a lack of capacity on the roads than any money invested by the TOCs.

Car Use Density, Rail Usage and Additional Motorway Mileage by Year<sup>3</sup>.



2.20 As shown by the above graph, rail passenger number growth commenced a long time prior to the privatisation of the network. The greatest percentage increase was in 1983 at 10.2% by this followed a 12.4% decline the year prior. Every time there has been a return to the rails, there has been a rate of increase in passenger mileage that is as steep as before. Whilst there are times when passenger numbers grow in both road and rail, as has been the case since 1996, the trend shows that whenever new road infrastructure opens, rail passenger mileage begins to diminish. Between 1982-87 and between 2010-12, the country was facing a widespread financial downturn with increases in the level of unemployment<sup>4</sup>. As a consequence students joining the world of work were unable to obtain cars and increasing relied on public transport.


2.21 In the late 1980s and early 1990s the price of rail fares grew above the rate of inflation as the government prepared the network for privatisation. Given the amount in direct and indirect subsidies and the volume of borrowing that has been

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix 1

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/datasets-and-tables/data-selector.html?cdid=LF2Q&dataset=lms&table-id=01>

ploughed into rail transport in order to bring it to its current standard, it is unsurprising to see an increase in ridership.

Rail Freight Volumes 1982 - 2015



Source ORR Rail Freight usage<sup>5</sup>

- 2.22 If the growth was due to privatisation and innovations as claimed, why wasn't the same growth seen in the Rail Freight industry following privatisation? This sector of Network Rail customers has not experienced any climb in volume of the same order as that of passenger. Unite believes that the volume of freight traffic carried has been affected by market trends and, more recently, the declining internal market for coal and steel. Office of Rail and Road (ORR) figures released on 25 November showed that 21.1m tonnes were lifted in the three-month period<sup>6</sup>. This is the second lowest Q2 and third lowest quarter overall since the start of records in 1996-1997.
- 2.23 The sector faces a restraint on growth as a result of the lack of gauge clearance together with the provision of new rail freight terminals. The need for these additional facilities has been clearly illustrated by the work carried out on the Southampton to London route, which induced a growth in rail freight capacity demand, so large that additional tractor units were needed from preservation societies.
- 2.24 The Rebuilding Rail report, highlighted earlier, stresses that the majority, if not all of, the investment into rail has been as a result of public subsidies augmented by

<sup>5</sup> <http://dataportal.orr.gov.uk/displayreport/report/html/8db1c1b2-1a53-4db1-8347-ce248a12abb5>

<sup>6</sup> See [http://orr.gov.uk/\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0007/19888/freight-rail-usage-2015-16-quarter-2.pdf](http://orr.gov.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0007/19888/freight-rail-usage-2015-16-quarter-2.pdf)

Network Rail's borrowing. Unite therefore concludes that growth in passenger rail is more down to the growing population together with the ability to pay for services.

- 2.25 Unite believes that the success of the East Coast line illustrated that with proper management a franchise that had been dropped twice by the Private sector could turn a profit, which could not be said for the vast majority of rival privately operated lines, despite being encumbered by dated, unreliable rolling stock and a series of track improvement works. Despite this obstacle, East Coast won several customer service awards.
- 2.26 In the days of Railtrack, the privatisation of the rail maintenance company charged the operators a track access fee far higher than today. Railtrack suffered from years of poor management, neglect of safety standards, weak cost control and industry neglect and left the country's infrastructure in a substantially worse state than it was at the time of RT's floatation.
- 2.27 As appears to be the case with any company privatisations, their initial approach was to outsource work in order to reduce internal costs. This led to a loss of focus on safety and, as shown by the subsequent enquiry into the Hatfield crash, a total loss of control over maintenance. As a consequence of Railtrack bankruptcy the UK emerged with a railway system that was totally state run, but at arm's length and paid for with a combination of direct subsidies, less than a realistic track access charge and a state guaranteed loan which grew every year. Operating Network Rail in this way prevented the Treasury removing money earmarked for the railways as they had previously done under British Rail. Until Network Rail was created, the rail network had dwindled on the vine and was in a sorry state.
- 2.28 The underinvestment was the reason why so much additional money has been needed to bring the network into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The railway is an expensive game. Network Rail has been trying to put innovative infrastructure improvements in to make up for long periods of underinvestment since the end of WWII. Because of all the necessary infrastructure improvement and modernisation expenditure, the money had to come from somewhere, the previous Labour governments allowed Network Rail to borrow from the market. £38 billion of debt later and Network Rail has been forced into the public sector by EU national accountancy rules. Now that this burden has been the money then appeared on the UK government's balance sheet and the present Conservative government's reaction is to dispose of that debt away as quickly as possible.
- 2.29 Unite believes that there has to be a more sensible method of providing money to modernise and improve the railway and securing it away from the clutches of the Treasury
- 2.30 The privatisation of British Rail in 1994 by the Conservative Government led by Sir John Major, who thought at the time the railway system was going to die. As a consequence of the huge level of government support since the sale, the railway system has gone from strength to strength. Passenger numbers and railway system use in general has increased.

- 2.31 Some lines have been re-converted from single track back to dual track and indeed lines have been reintroduced and new lines constructed where they were removed under Dr Beeching's 1963 review.
- 2.32 The Railway needs money because steel corrodes, power and signalling cables breakdown or are stolen and need renewal, plant and buildings need repair and modernisation, signalling systems need updating and renewal. In addition modern new train control systems (ERTMS) require installation on the train fleet and the Infrastructure to increase the capacity of a network already operating above capacity under the old track circuit block signalling system.
- 2.33 Unite is led to believe that there is currently a programme to review the projected lifespan of assets on Network Rail to determine the frequency of precautionary checks. Given the network is being utilised more frequently than ever before, such projections are needed more frequently. We have been informed, however, that the reverse is true with focus drawn to areas that fail more frequently. Unite believes that such a radical approach if applied in this way in an effort to cut costs would be reckless putting lives at risk.

***Question 6: Should direct customer pressure on Network Rail be strengthened? If so, how might this be achieved?***

- 2.34 Unite believes that there is sufficient pressure on Network Rail already in dealing with enquiries for delay compensation. Unite does not believe it is a just culture, when TOCs receive compensation when a train is delayed by a matter of minutes and their customers can only claim if their journey has been significantly impacted by a delay of over half an hour.

***Question 7: Are there more positive incentives for delivery which would be useful? Are any of these incentives more effective than others?***

- 2.35 Previously Unite has highlighted failings in health and safety practices within Network Rail which went unreported due to managerial pressure to drive down reported incidents. The reason for this lack of reporting was down to the link between safety and bonuses given to senior management. Given the targets set in the COP21 climate change targets to restrict emissions from all sources to a level that would prevent a 1.5°C global average temperature rise above preindustrial levels, Unite believes that as highlighted previously, more long distance freight needs to be shipped by rail. Consequently there needs to be a move to incentivise rail freight and a more connected rail freight industry.
- 2.36 Rail freight volumes are currently on the decline due to the declining fortunes of both the coal and steel industries. Given the loss of £1 billion in funding for a Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) facility in Yorkshire, it is also likely that there will be other industries in the area that will see a decline and possible relocation. As such rail freight is facing a crisis situation and needs a similar influx of support to that provided to the private sector in order to keep the network operational.

**Question 8: Is there a case for changing the route structure and what are the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to disaggregating the network, for example on the basis of:**

- **physical, political or economic geographies?**
- **service type, e.g. commuter services, inter-city services and regional services?**

2.37 Unite believes that disaggregation is not the correct path for the network. Doing so introduces physical boundaries which inhibit intercity and freight movements. Additionally not everybody wishes to interchange between services in London. Cross country services from Felixstowe to Nuneaton and on to Liverpool would cross many border areas.

2.38 Unite is concerned by Devolution given the potential to fragment and complicate the coordination of services by creating new and additional interfaces and could lead to a loss of economies of scale for certain functions. Unite believes that there is a team of workers employed by Network Rail and the TOCs who argue all the time about who is to blame for a delay.

**Question 9: Does the current balance of responsibilities between the routes and the centre seem at the right level? Are there any further responsibilities that should be devolved or centralised?**

2.39 Unite does not agree with the premise that any part of the service provided by Network Rail should be decentralised. Rail travel should be treated like a utility as it is in Central London with the control residing in the centre allowing for centralised decision making that will connect towns and cities to the regions.

**Question 10: Can you point to any specific economies of scale that should be protected at national rather than route level?**

2.40 If the networks were decentralised, the emergency response teams that are needed at major incidents would need to be replicated as would the teams of individuals dealing with complaints and delays. There is, however, a limit to the extent to which Network Rail's limited budget can stretch. Consequently as it makes it almost impossible to employ the necessary number of staff required to properly operate one unified Network Rail, without the added complexity of devolution, Unite would suggest that some functionality would need to remain centralised.

2.41 One of the greatest failings of the industry is the lack of investment into the future workforce. Unite realises that many of the current workforce have only a few more years until retirement and when they do retire they will take decades of knowledge and skills with them. Moves to replace this disappearing generation with a new younger similarly skilled intake are the only ways to progress in an industry which is does not normally appear on the list of potential career paths.

- 2.42 Unite therefore believes in the need for pan industry training facilities. Decentralisation would make such facilities prohibitively expensive if replicated in different regions across the network.

***Question 11: What processes and capabilities need to be in place (at both the centre and route level) to support Network Rail's current devolved structure?***

- 2.43 Unite believes functions like Human Resources, education, legal, financial and timetabling emergency response teams and standard approval of equipment that is need to be centralised with regions provided with a range of slot gaps within which they have the potential to add locally oriented services to assist the communities they serve. Decentralising the timetabling would create chaos at the boundary between local networks which would delay intercity, open access and freight paths. Any such delay creates disruption across the network timetabling which will be exacerbated by the increased demands made on the service.

***Question 12: Drawing on your previous experiences where relevant, what would be the potential impact on your organisation of further structural change within Network Rail?***

- 2.44 The impact on Unite will hopefully be minimal with members adapting as they have done several times in the past to new operational measures. As stated earlier the problem in the past has been too many changes, far too often. To ensure experienced staff and all their skills are retained, Unite would wish to see them TUPE transferred to any outsourced third party. Failure to maintain these individuals skill set could result in a substantial loss and a prohibitively high level of investment in the future.

***Question 13: What are the strengths and weaknesses of Network Rail's current approach to planning enhancements?***

- 2.45 One of Network Rail's greatest weaknesses is its ability to provide accurate reasonable costings, for work that is needed and its inability to work within a budget and to timescales. In the past, if the work cost more than Network Rail management simply dipped deeper into the debt mountain.
- 2.46 The greatest strength of Network Rail is that of its unified structure which is able to coordinate the demands of service providers for access to the tracks and coordinate the provision of improvement work.

***Question 14: What are the strengths and weaknesses of Network Rail's current approach to delivering enhancements?***

- 2.47 Unite believes that the strengths of the current system of planning and delivering enhancements is one of control and direct feedback on issues that arise. Having a centralised 'guiding mind' who can oversee the growth and improvement of the network, set timetables that can cope with passenger and freight demand flows together with interfacing with other transport modes to provide a truly intermodal experience.

- 2.48 Network Rail's Route, Asset Management (RAM) departments and managers that look after all the assets installed on the infrastructure within the eight routes. Since 2004 when this way of working was installed, the system is working and is not broken so why try and fix it. Devolution of functions of Network Rail will pose a host of problems. It will increase interface complexities and higher fragmentation costs and may have serious national planning and project implications.
- 2.49 Moreover it is inappropriate having eight separate divisions perhaps with varying degrees or forms of investment, different methods and levels of funding or even legal and structural forms of ownership. Such an array of factors will hamper, restrict and lead to considerable practical problems with obtaining, servicing controlling and monitoring the debt levels.
- 2.50 The weakness is that the management is subject to the whims of politicians who are more interested in the impact on their corner of the UK. Their other weakness is the inability to pass on the true cost of maintenance and development to the networks customers.

***Question 15: How well do the current delivery and planning processes work for projects of different sizes?***

- 2.51 In general the current system works on all projects but they face the task of modernising a network where issues can and will arise. The reason for the problem with the increase in cost of the electrification of the Great Western and Thames Valley lines, for example, was down to the way in which the cables in the old British Rail days were placed in trenches, and, not as it should have been placed in ducting on the surface. Records of where cables were placed were not kept or indeed cable marking was not employed. Hence, when the new Electrification Installation machine, that drills piling holes and erects pilings into the ground, cut a significant amount of buried cables, adding to the problem and cost of installation of overhead structure stanchions. As a consequence, preparatory scanning and test holes had to be dug before using the specialist equipment, designed to cut costs. This issue possibly doubled or trebled overhead structure installation time and obviously cost.

***Question 16: Are there any useful models or precedents from other sectors or countries for long term infrastructure planning and delivery processes that we should consider, including in relation to management of and engagement with suppliers during the planning process?***

- 2.52 Unite believes that the rail network is more akin to a universal utility company like the National Grid, the telephony network or the supply of water.
- 2.53 The National Grid is a network which funds expansions by asking the customer to pay for the major upgrade work to connect generation capacity to it. This additional cost is then added to the cost of installation. Due to climate change legislation a large proportion of the UK's energy has been either mothballed or closed. Additionally, the Grid is reaching near capacity where any additional load will require a major programme of expansion.

- 2.54 The water industry is more regional given the absence of a national grid structure. As a result, work in one area has to be replicated in another in order to meet standards. This is often the reason why water in different areas tastes so different. The short coming of such an approach is that should there be an issue with supply in one region, water has to be taken by road from one region that has a surplus to those that do not.

**Question 17: What would be the most important structural features of any future infrastructure provider?**

- 2.55 Unite believes that the most important structural feature is a publically owned centralised control system.
- 2.56 Partial privatisation will introduce yet more industry interfaces and structural complexity into the industry. In particular, privatising some or all of the current devolved route sectors opens the door to privatisation for external investors and funders to take greater control of the industry and threatens a return to the problems and issues of former years of that arose with Railtrack.
- 2.57 Even using various methods and forms of injecting private equity capital and debt into a small number of divisions promises to push the privatisation door wide open at a later date. The use of various funding methods such as the use of Public Private Partnerships, the use of joint ventures or establishing SPVs for project development will increase costs, threaten safety levels and lead to a more complex and even dysfunctional railway infrastructure ownership and control. In an attempt to respond to their own pressures to increase earnings, the train operating companies will be able to exert their increased influence over the infrastructure company (or companies), leading to increasing pressure for the infrastructure company to reduce costs threatening safety standards in return.
- 2.58 A key strength of the current form of Network Rail is the integrated nature of its ownership and control. As a minimum, this single organisational form should be preserved in any industry structural reforms.
- 2.59 There should certainly not be more fragmentation of the network that will arise from devolution of the infrastructure. Railway fragmentation is already a major cause of high industry operating costs and further impacts on the need for increasing subsidy levels. As with the vast majority of railway industries in the world, the industry requires state subsidies. But privatisation has seen industry subsidies soar. As Taylor and Sloman<sup>7</sup> point out, the amount of subsidy 'has increased from around £2.4 billion per year before privatisation (in the period 1990/91 to 1994/95) to approximately £5.4 billion per year in the period 2005/06 to 2009/10 (all at 2009/10 prices). However, with government subsidy going direct to the train operating companies by 2019, the train operating companies will be the infrastructure company's (or companies') sole source of revenue. This change will

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<sup>7</sup>Taylor I and Sloman L, (2012), *Rebuilding Rail, Final Report*, June 2012, Transport for Quality of Life. See [http://www.togetherfortransport.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/120630\\_Rebuilding\\_Rail\\_Final\\_Report\\_print\\_version.pdf](http://www.togetherfortransport.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/120630_Rebuilding_Rail_Final_Report_print_version.pdf)

place the TOCs is a strong negotiating position to influence the operational and investment policies of Network Rail.

- 2.60 Unite is not happy with this idea that the TOCs will ultimately take control of the Network Rail's financial lifeline. In such a situation funding for urgent repairs may be delayed increasing the risk to passenger and worker safety. Unite fears that this may end up becoming IMC and Railtrack but in reverse. Such political tinkering with funding by the Government is ripening up Network Rail for the table whilst forgetting the needs of rail freight and intercity services.

***Question 18: Are there any other processes which we have not highlighted, either within Network Rail or the wider industry, which could be improved?***

- 2.61 Unite does not wish to comment on this issue

***Question 19: Do you have any views on how the relationship between the periodic review process and other processes with which you are involved could be improved?***

- 2.62 Unite does not wish to comment on this issue

***Question 20: What criteria should be used to assess structural options under consideration? How, if at all, should these criteria be prioritised?***

- 2.63 Unite believe substantially more detail is required to discover how devolution will impact upon interface costs, safety standards, cost control and organisational and financial management to the benefit of the network cost and safety structure.

- 2.64 The rail industry is expected to save between £2.5bn and £3.5bn per annum by 2018-19, and 70 per cent of these savings are expected to come from Network Rail. According to the ORR (2013) if NR delivers on its CP5 efficiencies, then the organisation's efficiency will have improved by 50 per cent between 2004 and 2019. Funding cuts to NR in CP4 and CP5 raise several concerns.

- 2.65 There should be improved workforce planning across the industry, with particular reference to Network Rail in order to deliver decent, secure jobs and, in the longer term, help retain a skilled workforce. However, due to the proposed efficiency savings set out in the Rail Command Paper, the TUC estimates that around 6,300 jobs are at risk in maintenance, signalling and operations, and a further 5,500 in station staff across the network. In 2014, the TUC and rail unions commissioned research into the impact of efficiency savings on Network Rail staff, performance and safety which involved frontline staff at Network Rail and its contractors<sup>8</sup>. Findings from this research included:

- Safety has become secondary to meeting targets and budgetary demands.
- In the context of headcount reductions and restructuring, staff are having to take on multiple roles, affecting their ability to deliver a safe and efficient service.

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/NetworkRailEfficiency.pdf>

- Staff shortages have led to the promotion of a culture of putting jobs off until 'tomorrow' because adequate resources are not available.

**Question 21: Do you have any views on whether the RAB remains a relevant concept for the railway, and, if not, what should replace it?**

2.66 Unite believes that the RAB provided an enabling functionality that made it possible to develop the network and provide funds for growth. Such a function will be needed in the future but if it is it needs to be managed far better than previously.

**Question 22: How should financial risk be managed in Britain's rail infrastructure in the future?**

2.67 The financial risks associated with running the network should be held centrally, with the TOCs and Rail Freight operators sharing in that risk. Current arrangements result in a system where the TOC's can take all the glory of enhancements but Network Rail is publically criticised if passengers are delayed whilst the enhancement is being installed.

2.68 The decision on funding has, however, already been made. The government has already started to change the direction from where the subsidies into Network Rail arrive. Subsidies will go from government to the train operators and the infrastructure operator (Network Rail) will charge track access charges to the train operators, hoping to improve the services for the benefit of passengers.

2.69 The problem Unite has with this change is the company trying to make too many changes too quickly and change is never at a sustainable pace which would allow people to get used to the change. Change must improve things and allow for adjustment before bringing in another rapid change.

2.70 Unite does not wish to see this issue repeated with contractors taking advantage of inexperience. The problem of having contractors working for Railtrack was one where the relationship generated the need for quantity surveyors (QS) to cost every job and give a price to Railtrack so that the job, whatever it was, could be costed and a contract let to the maintainer to get work or upgrades progressed. The contractors were very experienced at this process and Railtrack were not good, Railtrack had a total lack of contracting experience in this area and, in general, the contractors for railway maintenance took advantage and the system worked against the owner of the infrastructure as regards cost.

**Question 23: Do you have any views on how Britain's railway infrastructure should be funded in the future, regardless of corporate structure?**

2.71 Unite is convinced that the use and deployment of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) as mooted in the scoping document to permit the creation of external infrastructure companies or joint ventures on their own or in conjunction with Network Rail poses substantial risks. Unite would not wish to see any repeat of the uncertainties, disruptions and additional costs for passengers witnessed by the failure of a number of rail franchisee operators such as GNER on the East Coast.

Unite feels that one should be highly cautious about allowing devolved sectors to participate in forms of SPVs, Public Private Partnerships or various schemes of joint ventures.

- 2.72 Unite believes that the funding of the network could be held in trust in the same way as trust ports work for the communities they reside in. The BBC was until recently another key example of an independent trust style structure which would remove the network from the whims of the Treasury and form a body that can work with its customers to deliver improvements where they are needed, whilst maintaining a watching brief over the entire network to ensure that the additional strain placed upon it does not cause a fatal flaw to develop creating a potential hazard to the travelling public.

***Question 24: What positive case studies are there (e.g. international examples in the railway sector, other sectors internationally/in the UK), where more affordable and sustainable funding and financing structures have been implemented, with or without private sector capital input? And how do you think the lessons learnt could be applicable to Britain's railway infrastructure?***

- 2.73 The fundamental challenge faced by the industry is that it is too fragmented with competing interests pursuing short term commercial gains. More successful railways such as in France and Germany are funded and operated in the public sector and are far more integrated. Instead of full or partial privatisation and further fragmentation as a way of dealing with mounting costs Shaw should give more priority to the potential benefits of having a single unified and vertically integrated railway industry under an over-arching single organisation that is in the public sector and is publicly owned and publicly accountable. The railway should be regarded as a 'public good' providing substantial social, economic and environmental benefits with investment financed directly by government.

***Question 25: What are your views on the enabling factors facilitating a sustainable and affordable capital structure for Britain's railway? What factors would be required specifically for private sector capital introduction?***

- 2.74 Unite feels that the only way to attract private capital is to offer a return that makes the investment interesting to the private sector. Consequently such capital comes at a high price.

***Question 26: What are the types of investors that may be interested in investing in Network Rail, any of its functions, or in select parts of it? And for these types of investors, can you indicate:***

- ***key attractions;***
- ***risk appetite;***
- ***required enabling factors.***

- 2.75 The government has recently established the National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) as a means of enabling 'strategic decision making to build effective and efficient infrastructure' for the country. Further investment in the railway industry is welcome, however, it is important that any funds invested through the NIC are not

used as a means to support further privatisation of the industry. Likewise, there should also be an opportunity for a state investment bank to invest in NR's railway infrastructure. The role and remit of the National Investment Bank could be extended to invest directly in key infrastructure projects – especially if this was awarded more extensive borrowing facilities and was granted access to substantially more capital for investment in railway projects.

- 2.76 Unite has called for the government to make it clear that the 40 main infrastructure projects currently in the pipeline, such as HS2 and rail and road building improvements across England, will use UK steel, and to move to ensure that contracts are placed with the industry as a matter of urgency<sup>9</sup>. Business leaders, unions, MPs and the public all want robust action in the UK to save our steel. It is only the government that is determined to sit apart from this consensus revealing itself again to be totally out of step with public opinion.
- 2.77 Unite believes that the vast majority of potential investors would be concerned with their bottom line return, not an air of philanthropic enterprise where they invest for the greater good of all. Rail Travel in general is good for the environment as it is the only way to travel sustainably over long distances. As the COP21 talks in Paris have set some very demanding goals for the nations to cut greenhouse gas emissions, one of the key areas is transport emissions reductions. Without this the task of avoiding a greater than 2°C increase in global average temperature, becomes almost impossible.
- 2.78 Current proposals will see all additional electrification projects receiving their supply from the next generation of Nuclear Power stations that will make rail that much greener and energy efficient. It will then be up to the TOCs and freight operators to invest in the latest in electrical rollingstock.

***Question 27: What characteristics do you think enhancement projects would need to have to attract private sector investment and to what extent and in what form would public sector support would be needed? What types of financing structure could be brought to bear?***

- 2.79 Unite believes that projects that bring new routes into areas and the creation of new stations should be partially funded by housing development companies who stand to make fortunes out of the increase in property value a train service can provide. The ever growing nature of towns and cities without a subsequent increase in the transport capacity can only lead to one result, overcrowding.
- 2.80 The other principle beneficiary of new infrastructure will be the businesses in the locality who benefit from easier commuting for staff and easier access to large conurbations, and onward transport facilities like airports and passenger ferry services in order to trade. Businesses also benefit from the provision of rail freight terminals in or surrounded by industrial parks. Consequently a levy or enhanced business rates could be utilised to contribute to the cost.

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<sup>9</sup> - <http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/new-poll-public-criticise-government-handling-of-steel-crisis-and-back-intervention-to-save-the-industry/#sthash.TFZJAjOi.dpuf>

- 2.81 Unite believes that a private investor will not provide funding for infrastructure enhancements unless there is an incentive. This incentive may be purely financial, functional or a combination of the two. To attract a financial investment into Network Rail, the return would need substantially more attractive than other investment options on the market and if so, Unite believes, the short term gain will not be worth the cost of repayments.

***Question 28: What incentive mechanics or control structures on Network Rail would facilitate third party involvement in the financing of enhancement projects?***

- 2.82 One incentive and potential investor funding opportunity may arise if agreements with local authorities over planning permission include a requirement to invest in enhancements and develop areas for housing and commercial property. A trust style operation would lend itself readily to this style of operation.

***Question 29: Do these feel like the right risks? Has anything been missed that it is vital to consider at this stage?***

- 2.83 Unite believes it has highlighted earlier the risks of believing the myths spread about the successes of a privatised system.

### **3 Conclusion**

- 3.1 Unite does not believe in the concept of devolution for devolutions sake as it increases the level of interfaces which have already been identified as the principle cost of running the current network. The addition of ever more interfaces will seriously hinder the development of more sustainably secure transport options which are able to interlink with other transport modes, the public and investors in UK plc. Any new structure for the rail industry will need to provide for the demands of a growing nation long into the future and ensure the safety of everyone and everything being carried from A to B.
- 3.2 Unite is concerned that lessons of the past are being ignored in order to follow a seriously flawed political doctrine. “The market will provide” attitude and a reliance on the collective wisdom of business has led to a series of disasters. Now we have a safe network that is making a difference which isn’t broken, why try and fix it.

**Hugh Roberts**  
**Acting National Officer**  
**Rail Sector**  
**Unite the Union, Transport House**  
**128 Theobalds Road, Holborn**  
**London WC1X 8TN**

23<sup>rd</sup> December 2015

For further information please contact Colin Potter, Research Officer in the Unite the Union, Research Department on 0207 611 2591, [colin.potter@unitetheunion.org](mailto:colin.potter@unitetheunion.org)

## **Appendix 1 – UK Motorway mileage schemes**

Unite response to the Shaw Report Consultation - The Future Shape and Financing of Network Rail

Order	Scheme	Date	Miles	Spur Miles
1	M6. Preston By-pass (J29 to J32)	Dec 58	8.3	
2	M4. Chiswick flyover (J1)	Sep 59	0.4	
3	M1, M10 & M45. Berrygrove to Crick (J5 to J18), St Albans By-pass & Dunchurch Link	Nov 59 [Dec 59 (M45)]	61.5	10.5
4	M6 & A601(M) Lancaster by-pass & Carnforth Link (J33 to J35a)	Apr 60	10.4	0.9
5	M63. Stretford Eccles By-pass (M60 J7 to J13)	Oct 60	5.9	
6	M50. Brokeridge Common to Ross on Wye (J1 to J4)	Nov 60	19.8	
7	M20. Maidstone By-pass west (J5 to J7) (opened as A20(M))	Dec 60	3.1	
8	M4. Maidenhead By-pass (J7 to J9)	May 61	2.8	
9	A1(M). Doncaster By-pass	Jul 61	15.0	
10	M20. Maidstone By-pass east (J7 to J8) (opened as A20(M))	Sep 61	3.4	
11	A1(M). Stevenage By-pass (J6 to J8)	May 62	7.8	
12	M1(NI). Belfast to Lisburn (to J6)	Jul 62	6.5	
13	M5. Lydiate Ash to Strensham (J4 to J8)	Jul 62	25.4	
14	M50. Strensham to Brokeridge Common (M5(J8) to J1)	Jul 62	1.6	
15	M6. Stafford By-pass (J13 to J14)	Aug 62	5.4	
16	M6. Hanchurch to Cheshire Boundary (J15 to J16)	Nov 62	9.2	
17	M6. Stafford By-pass to Hanchurch (J14 to J15)	Dec 62	11.1	
18	M4. Slough to Maidenhead By-pass (J5 to J7)	Mar 63	5.9	
19	M6. Warrington to Preston (J20 to J29)	Jul 63	29.2	
20	M6. Cheshire (J16 to J20)	Nov 63	22.6	
21	M1(NI). Lisburn to Sprucefield (J6 to J7)	Dec 63	1.7	
22	M2. Medway bridge to Stockbury (J5)	? 63	11.0	
23	M90. Forth Road Bridge & North Approach Roads (J1 to J2)	Aug 64	1.0	
24	M1(NI). The Birches to Verners (J12 to J13)	Dec 64	3.3	
25	M6. Preston-Lancaster (J32 to J33)	Jan 65	13.2	
26	M4. Chiswick to Slough (J1 to J5)	Mar 65	12.0	0.9
27	A1(M) & A66(M). The Darlington By-Pass motorway	May 65	9.6	2.2
28	M1. Crick to Kegworth (J18 to J24)	Nov 65	36.7	
29	M5. Quinton to Lydiate Ash (J3 to J4)	Nov 65	5.7	
30	M8. Harthill Bypass (J4 to J5)	Nov 65	6.3	
31	M1(NI). Sprucefield to Moira (J7 to J9)	Dec 65	6.8	
32	M2. Stockbury to Faversham (J5 to J7)	? 65	12.3	
33	M2. Three Crutches (J1) to Medway Bridge	? 65	1.5	

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34	<b>M4. Tormarton to Almonsbury (J18 to J20)</b>	Jan 66	10.8
35	<b>M1(NI). Moira to Lurgan (J9 to J10)</b>	Feb 66	6.0
36	<b>M6. Shareshill to Dunston (J11 to J13)</b>	Mar 66	8.0
37	<b>M1. Kegworth to Sandiacre (J24 to J25)</b>	May 66	5.1
38	<b>M4. Port Talbot by-pass (J39 to N of J41)</b>	Jul 66	3.4
39	<b>M32. Hambrook Spur (M4 to J1)</b>	Sep 66	0.4
40	<b>M4. Almondsbury to Aust (J21 to J20)</b>	Sep 66	2.0
40a	<b>M5. Almondsbury to Filton By pass (J15 to J16)</b>	Sep 66	1.1
41	<b>M48. First Severn crossing and Wye bridge</b>	Sep 66	5.4
42	<b>M6. Darlaston to Shareshill (J10 to J11)</b>	Sep 66	5.7
43	<b>A8(M)(NI). Corr's corner to Sandyknowes</b>	Oct 66	1.0
44	<b>M2(NI). Greencastle to Sandyknowes</b>	Oct 66	3.5
45	<b>M1. Brockley to Berrygrove (J4 to J5)</b>	Nov 66	4.1
46	<b>M1. Sandiacre to Nuthall (J25 to J26)</b>	Nov 66	6.0
47	<b>M74. Uddingston Bypass to Hamilton (J4 to J5)</b>	Dec 66	3.4
48	<b>A57(M) Mancunian Way</b>	Mar 67	1.5
49	<b>M1. Wakefield to East Ardsley (J41 to J42)</b>	Apr 67	1.3
50	<b>M1. Nuthall to Pinxton (J26 to J28)</b>	May 67	9.1
51	<b>M1. Page Street to Brockley (J2 to J4)</b>	May 67	4.2
52	<b>M4. Newport by-pass (J24 to J28)</b>	May 67	6.9
53	<b>M40. Handycross to Stokenchurch (J4 to J5)</b>	Jun 67	7.6
54	<b>A1(M). Baldock By-pass (J8 to J10)</b>	Jul 67	6.4
55	<b>M1. Thurcroft to Tinsley (J32 to J34)</b>	Jul 67	6.5
56	<b>M4. Newhouse-Coldra (J2(M48) to J24)</b>	Aug 67	12.0
57	<b>M8. West of Harthill - Newhouse (J5 to J6)</b>	Aug 67	5.6
58	<b>M1. East Ardsley to Stourton (J42 to J44)</b>	Oct 67	3.1
59	<b>M1(NI). Lurgan to Ballynacor (J10 to J11)</b>	Nov 67	2.4
60	<b>M1. Pinxton to Thurcroft (J28 to J32)</b>	Nov 67	27.7
61	<b>M18. Thurcroft to Wadworth (J32(M1) to J2)</b>	Nov 67	8.5
62	<b>M1(NI). Verners to Dungannon (J13 to J15)</b>	Dec 67	5.7
63	<b>M1(NI). Ballynacor to The Birches (J11 to J12)</b>	Jan 68	5.5
64	<b>M8. Renfrew Bypass (J26 - J29)</b>	Mar 68	3.3
65	<b>M74. Hamilton - Larkhall (J5 to J8)</b>	May 68	8.1
66	<b>M1. Meadowhall to Tankersley (J34 to J36)</b>	Jun 68	6.7
67	<b>M9. Polmont and Falkirk Bypass (J4 to J9)</b>	Aug 68	11.6

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68	<b>M1. Tankersley to Darton (J36 to J38)</b>	Sep 68	8.5	
69	<b>M1. Darton to Wakefield (J38 to J41)</b>	Oct 68	8.7	
70	<b>M6. Penrith By-pass (J40 to J41)</b>	Nov 68	3.2	
71	<b>M6. Bescott to Darlaston (J9 to J10)</b>	Dec 68	1.3	
72	<b>M8. Glasgow IRR West and North Flanks - Townhead (J15 - J16)</b>	? 68	0.7	
73	<b>M40. Wycombe End to Handycross (West of J2 to J4)</b>	Mar 69	5.5	
74	<b>M5. Filton By Pass to Avonmouth (J15 to J18)</b>	Mar 69	5.1	
75	<b>M2(NI). Ballymena By-pass</b>	Apr 69	4.5	
76	<b>A102(M). Blackwall Tunnel Southern Approach road</b>	July 69	2.0	
77	<b>A1(M). Durham motorway (J59 to J63)</b>	Sep 69	21.4	
78	<b>M8. Dechmont - Whitburn (J3 to J4)</b>	Sep 69	5.9	
79	<b>M61. Horwich to Preston</b>	Nov 69	12.4	
80	<b>M90. Crossgates - Kelty and Cowdenbeath Bypass Stage I (J2 to J3)</b>	Dec 69	6.4	
81	<b>M5. Twynning to Tewkesbury (J8 to J9)</b>	Feb 70	3.8	
82	<b>A194(M). White Mare Pool to Black Fell</b>	Mar 70	3.7	
83	<b>A1(M). Birtley By-Pass</b>	Apr 70	3.0	
84	<b>M5. Gordano Valley (J19 to J20)</b>	Apr 70	6.4	
85	<b>M5. M6 to Quinton (J8(M6) to J3)</b>	May 70	9.0	
86	<b>M6. Rayhall to Bescott (J8 to J9)</b>	May 70	2.6	
87	<b>M12(NI). Portadown Urban Motorway</b>	Jun 70	1.0	
88	<b>A40(M)/M41. Westway and West Cross Route</b>	Jul 70	2.5	0.6
89	<b>M32. Hambrook to Eastville (J1 to J2)</b>	Jul 70	2.7	
90	<b>M6. Great Barr to Rayhall (J7 to J8)</b>	Jul 70	0.8	
91	<b>M90. Crossgates - Kelty and Cowdenbeath Bypass Stage II (J3 to J5)</b>	Jul 70	3.0	
92	<b>M6. Westmorland (J35 to J40)</b>	Oct 70	40.7	
93	<b>M62. Pole Moor to Outlane (West of J23 to J23)</b>	Nov 70	2.2	
94	<b>M9. Newbridge - Kirkliston and Forth Bridge Connecting Roads</b>	Nov 70	1.1	
95	<b>M6. Carlisle By-pass (J42 to J44)</b>	Dec 70	6.8	
96	<b>M61. Worsley Braided Interchange to Horwich</b>	Dec 70	9.2	
97	<b>M8. Bishopton Bypass Stage I (J29 - J30)</b>	Dec 70	3.3	
98	<b>M8. Glasgow IRR West and North Flanks - Kingston Bridge (J19 - J20)</b>	? 70	0.6	
99	<b>M2(NI). Templepatrick to Dunsilly</b>	Feb 71	6.5	
100	<b>M6. Maxstoke to Bromford (J4 to J5)</b>	Feb 71	5.4	
101	<b>M62. Gildersome to Lofthouse (J27 to J29)</b>	Feb 71	5.7	
102	<b>M5. Gloucester - Moreton Valence (J9 to J13)</b>	Mar 71	19.9	

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103	<b>M9. Stirling Bypass Stage I (J10 to J11)</b>	Apr 71	2.5	
104	<b>M8. Newbridge - Dechmont (J2 to J3)</b>	May 71	5.3	
105	<b>M3. Lightwater to Popham (J3 to J8)</b>	Jun 71	24.5	
106	<b>M6. Ansty to Maxstoke(J2 to J4)</b>	Jul 71	12.6	
107	<b>M6. Penrith to Carlisle (J41 to J42)</b>	Jul 71	12.4	
108	<b>M22(NI). Dunsilly to Ballygrooby (J1 to J2)</b>	Aug 71	2.3	
109	<b>M56. Preston Brook to Hapsford (J11 to J14)</b>	Sep 71	8.1	
110	<b>M6. Bromford to Gravelly Hill (J5 to J6)</b>	Nov 71	3.1	
111	<b>M6. M1 at Catthorpe to Ansty to (J1 to J2)</b>	Nov 71	10.9	
112	<b>M602. Eccles By-pass</b>	Nov 71	2.1	
113	<b>M62. Boundary to Pole Moor (J22 to West of J23)</b>	Nov 71	5.1	
114	<b>M62. Eccles to County Boundary (J12 to J22)</b>	Nov 71	19.4	
115	<b>M20. Ditton By-pass (J4 to J5)</b>	Dec 71	2.7	
116	<b>M4. Wickham to Tormarton (J14 to J18)</b>	Dec 71	40.4	
117	<b>M4. Winnersh to Wickham (J10 to J14)</b>	Dec 71	29.3	
118	<b>M5. Michael Wood and Alveston Sections (J13 to J15)</b>	Dec 71	17.7	
119	<b>M4. Holyport to Winnersh (J9 to J10)</b>	? 71	7.2	
120	<b>M8. Glasgow IRR West and North Flanks - Woodside (J16 - J17)</b>	? 71	0.7	
121	<b>A627(M) Rochdale to Oldham Motorway</b>	Jan 72	3.6	0.6
122	<b>M56. Wythenshawe to Bowdon (J1 to J7)</b>	Jan 72	7.3	0.8
123	<b>M53. Mersey tunnel to Hooton (J1 to J5)</b>	Feb 72	11.0	
124	<b>M57. Liverpool Outer Ring Road. Phase 1 (A59 to A580)</b>	Apr 72	3.6	
125	<b>M73. Maryville - West of Mollinsburn</b>	Apr 72	5.7	
126	<b>A38(M). Aston Expressway</b>	May 72	2.3	
127	<b>M6. Gravelly Hill to Great Bar (J6 to J7)</b>	May 72	4.2	
128	<b>M90. Kinross and Milnathort Bypass (J5 to J8)</b>	May 72	6.5	
129	<b>M18. Hatfield to Thorne (Thorne By-pass) (J5 to J6)</b>	Jun 72	2.1	
130	<b>M606. A6177 to Cleckheaton Road</b>	Sep 72	2.0	
131	<b>M621. Leeds South Eastern Urban Motorway (J3 to J7)</b>	Dec 72	2.0	
132	<b>M9. Newbridge-Lathallan (M8(J2) to J4)</b>	Dec 72	12.6	
133	<b>M4. Morrision by-pass (J44 to J46)</b>	? 72	3.8	
134	<b>M62. Ainley Top to Chain Bar (J24 to J26)</b>	? 72	7.0	
135	<b>M62. Outlane to Ainley Top (J23 to J24)</b>	? 72	1.0	
136	<b>M8. Glasgow IRR West and North Flanks - Charing Cross (J18 - J19)</b>	? 72	0.6	
137	<b>M8. Glasgow IRR Woodside - Charing Cross (J17 - J18)</b>	? 72	0.2	

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138	<b>M22(NI). Ballygrooby to Artresnahan (J2 to end)</b>	Jan 73	2.3
139	<b>M5. Clevedon and Mendip Hills Sections (J20 to J22)</b>	Jan 73	15.2
140	<b>A329(M). Reading - Wokingham link</b>	Feb 73	4.3
141	<b>A1(M). Stanborough to Welwyn (J4 to J6)</b>	May 73	3.2
142	<b>M2(NI). Belfast to Greencastle</b>	May 73	2.5
143	<b>M606. Cleckheaton Road to Chain Bar (J26)</b>	May 73	0.3
144	<b>M62. Chain Bar to Gildersome (J26 to J27)</b>	May 73	4.2
145	<b>M40. Denham to Wycombe End (J1 to West of J2)</b>	Aug 73	8.0
146	<b>M5. Highbridge By-Pass (J22 to J23)</b>	Aug 73	5.0
147	<b>M62. Tarbock to Croft (J6 to J10)</b>	Nov 73	10.3
148	<b>M621. Gildersome Street to Beeston (J27(M62)) to J1</b>	Nov 73	3.4
149	<b>M5. Bridgwater By-pass (J23 to J24)</b>	Dec 73	4.9
150	<b>A102(M). Hackney Link</b>	? 73	1.6
151	<b>M40. Stokenchurch to Waterstock (J5 to J8a)</b>	Mar 74	10.2
152	<b>M57. Liverpool Outer Ring Road. Phase 2 (A580 to M62)</b>	Mar 74	5.7
153	<b>M62. Hopetown to Ferrybridge (J31 to J33)</b>	Mar 74	5.7
154	<b>M5. Taunton By-Pass (J25 to J26)</b>	Apr 74	6.9
155	<b>M62. Risley to Worsley (J10 to J12)</b>	Apr 74	9.5
156	<b>M5. Avonmouth Bridge (J18 to J19)</b>	May 74	4.0
157	<b>M80. Haggs-Pirnhall</b>	May 74	6.4
158	<b>M9. Stirling Bypass Stage II (J9 to J10)</b>	May 74	4.8
159	<b>M3. Sunbury to Lightwater (J1 to J3)</b>	Jul 74	12.8
160	<b>M62. Lofthouse to Hopetown (J29 to J31)</b>	Aug 74	5.7
161	<b>M63. Sale Eastern and Northenden By-pass (M60 J4 to J7)</b>	Sep 74	4.5
162	<b>M62. Ferrybridge to Pollington (J33 to East of J34)</b>	Oct 74	8.4
163	<b>M23. Hooley to Mertsam (J7 to J8)</b>	Dec 74	1.0
164	<b>M56. Bowdon to M6 (J7 to J9)</b>	Dec 74	5.3
165	<b>M62. Rawcliffe to Goole (J35 to J36)</b>	Mar 75	3.3
166	<b>M32. Eastville to Ashley Street (J2 to J3)</b>	May 75	0.8
167	<b>M63. Sharston By-pass (M60 J2 to J4)</b>	May 75	1.3
168	<b>M8. Monkland Motorway Stage 1 (J12 - J15)</b>	May 75	2.0
169	<b>M11. S Harlow to A120 (J7 to J8)</b>	Jun 75	9.5
170	<b>M18. Thorne to East Cowick (J6 to J7)</b>	Jun 75	4.5
171	<b>M53. (M531) Hooton to A5117 (J5 to J10)</b>	Jun 75	5.2
172	<b>M62. Pollington to Rawcliffe (East of J34 to J35)</b>	Jun 75	3.8

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173	<b>M55 The Preston Northern By-pass</b>	Jul 75	11.9
174	<b>M56. M6 to Preston Brook (J9 to J11)</b>	Jul 75	6.3
175	<b>M27. Cadnam to Ower (J1 to J2)</b>	Aug 75	2.7
176	<b>M66. Bury Easterly By-pass - Southern section (J3 to J19(M60))</b>	Aug 75	3.1
177	<b>M2(NI). Sandyknowes to Templepatrick</b>	Sep 75	5.9
178	<b>M25. South Mimms to Potters Bar (J23 to J24)</b>	Sep 75	2.7
179	<b>M5. Killerton and Sowton Sections (J27 to J30)</b>	Oct 75	15.6
180	<b>M23. Bletchingley to Pease Pottage (J8 to J11)</b>	Nov 75	14.9
181	<b>M23. Gatwick Link (J9 to J9A)</b>	Nov 75	0.8
182	<b>M5. North Petherton By-Pass (J24 to J25)</b>	Nov 75	6.6
183	<b>M8. Bishopton Bypass Stage II (J30 to J31)</b>	Nov 75	3.5
184	<b>M27. Ower to Chilworth (J2 to 4)</b>	Dec 75	5.2
185	<b>M271. Nursling Link</b>	Dec 75	2.3
186	<b>M54. Forge to Cluddley (J5 to J7)</b>	Dec 75	3.8
187	<b>A167(M). Newcastle Central Motorway East</b>	? 75	1.1
188	<b>A58(M)/A64(M). Leeds Inner Ring Motorway</b>	? 75	2.0
189	<b>M621. Leeds South Western Urban Motorway (J1 to J3)</b>	? 75	1.8
190	<b>M25. Godstone to Reigate (J6 to J8)</b>	Feb 76	4.8
191	<b>M25. Maple Cross to Hunton Bridge (J17 to J19)</b>	Feb 76	4.2
192	<b>M27. Windover to Portbridge (J8 to J12)</b>	Mar 76	9.2
193	<b>M275. Portsmouth Link</b>	Mar 76	2.1
194	<b>M62.Goole to North Cave (inc Ouse Bridge) (J36 to J38)</b>	May 76	10.9
195	<b>M5. Chelston to Willand (J26 to J27)</b>	Oct 76	8.2
196	<b>M42. Solihull Section (J4 to J8)</b>	Nov 76	10.8
197	<b>M62. Queens Drive to Tarbock (J4 to J6)</b>	Nov 76	3.5
198	<b>M69. Leicester section (J2 to M1)</b>	Nov 76	6.5
199	<b>M25. Thorpe to Egham (J12 to J13)</b>	Dec 76	3.2
200	<b>M90. Arlary (J8) to Arngask</b>	Mar 77	3.7
201	<b>M11. Redbridge to S Harlow (J4 to J7)</b>	Apr 77	11.5
202	<b>M25. Dartford to Swanley (J2 to J3)</b>	Apr 77	3.2
203	<b>M4. Pontardulais by-pass (J46 to J49)</b>	Apr 77	8.5
204	<b>M20. Swanley to West Kingsdown (J1 to J2)</b>	May 77	7.4
205	<b>M5. Exminster Section (J30 to J31)</b>	May 77	3.6
206	<b>M1. N Circular Road to Page Street (J1 to J2)</b>	Jul 77	2.4
207	<b>M18. Armthorpe to Hatfield (J4 to J5)</b>	Jul 77	3.9

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208	<b>M69. Coventry section (M6 to J2)</b>	Jul 77	9.8	
209	<b>M180. Brigg By-pass (J4 to J5)</b>	Sep 77	6.6	
210	<b>M4. Tredegar Park-St Mellons (J28 to J29A(A48(M))</b>	Oct 77	2.1	
211	<b>M77. M8 to Dumbreck Road (M8 to J1)</b>	Oct 77	0.8	
212	<b>M8. Renfrew Motorway (J20 - J26)</b>	Oct 77	4.2	
213	<b>M4. Pyle by-pass (E of J37(A48) to J39)</b>	Nov 77	5.5	
214	<b>M4. Coryton-Pencoed (J32 to J35)</b>	Dec 77	12.1	
215	<b>M90. Muirmont to Craigend (J9 to J10)</b>	Dec 77	2.2	
216	<b>M58. Regional Road upgraded to Motorway (J4 to M6)</b>	? 77	4.0	
217	<b>M27. Hedge End to Windover (J7 to J8)</b>	Feb 78	4.7	
218	<b>M67. Hyde By-pass (J2 to J4)</b>	Mar 78	3.1	
219	<b>M180. Thorne to Sandtoft (J1 to J2)</b>	May 78	7.1	
220	<b>M66. Bury Easterly By-pass - Northern section (A676 to J3)</b>	May 78	6.4	
221	<b>M90. Craigend to A90 (J10 to J11)</b>	May 78	1.9	
222	<b>M90. Craigend to Broxden (J10 to A9)</b>	May 78	3.1	
223	<b>M180. Sandtoft (J2) to Trent</b>	Oct 78	3.5	
224	<b>M180. The Scunthorpe Southern By-pass (J3 to J4)</b>	Nov 78	6.8	
225	<b>M180. Trent to Scunthorpe (J3) including M181</b>	Dec 78	1.0	2.6
226	<b>M18. Wadworth to Armthorpe (J2 to J4)</b>	Feb 79	7.4	
227	<b>A(1)M. South Mimms to Roestock (J1 to J2)</b>	May 79	3.4	
228	<b>M8. Monkland Motorway Stage 2A (J11 - J12)</b>	Jun 79	1.2	
229	<b>A3(M). Horndean to Bedhampton</b>	Nov 79	5.6	
230	<b>M11. A120 to Stump Cross (J8 to J9)</b>	Nov 79	15.2	
231	<b>M25. Sundridge Road to Godstone (J5 to J6)</b>	Nov 79	9.0	
232	<b>M11. Cambridge Western By-pass (J9 to J14)</b>	Feb 80	14.2	
233	<b>M20. West Kingsdown to Wrotham (J2 to J4)</b>	Feb 80	6.0	
234	<b>M876. Dennyloanhead to Bowtrees</b>	Feb 80	7.2	
235	<b>M9. Longdyke - Pirnhall</b>	Feb 80	7.8	
236	<b>M8. Baillieston Interchange - Glasgow City Boundary (J8)</b>	Apr 80	0.2	
237	<b>M8. Monkland Motorway Stage 2B (J8 - J11)</b>	Apr 80	3.3	
238	<b>M25. Dunton Green to Sundridge Road (J5)</b>	Jul 80	0.9	
239	<b>M4. Castleton-Coryton (J29 to J32)</b>	Jul 80	7.5	
240	<b>M26. Sevenoaks to Wrotham</b>	Sep 80	8.9	
241	<b>M5(NI). Greencastle to Rush Park</b>	Sep 80	1.6	
242	<b>M58. Aintree to Skelmersdale (to J4)</b>	Sep 80	7.4	

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243	<b>M25. Chertsey to Thorpe (J11 to J12)</b>	Oct 80	2.0	
244	<b>M90. Arngask to Muirmont (J9)</b>	Oct 80	4.7	
245	<b>M53. A5117 to Stoak (J10 to J11)</b>	Mar 81	0.9	
246	<b>M56. Hapsford to A5117 (J14 to J16)</b>	Mar 81	6.2	
247	<b>M25. Potters Bar to Waltham Cross (J24 to J25)</b>	Jun 81	5.3	
248	<b>M4. Bridgend Northern by-pass (J35 to E of J37(A48))</b>	Sep 81	8.9	
249	<b>M67. Denton Relief Road (J1 to J2)</b>	Sep 81	1.7	
250	<b>M20. Sellindge to Folkestone (J11 to J13)</b>	Oct 81	5.2	
251	<b>M25. Egham to Yeoveney (J13)</b>	Oct 81	0.5	
252	<b>M65. Burnley to Brierfield (J10 to J12)</b>	Oct 81	3.6	
253	<b>M20. Ashford to Sellindge (J9 to J11)</b>	Dec 81	9.4	
254	<b>M53. Stoak to Chester (J11 to J12)</b>	Jul 82	3.4	
255	<b>M63. Stockport East-West By-pass (M60 J27 to J2)</b>	Jul 82	2.8	
256	<b>M25. Yeoveney to Airport spur (A3113) (J13 to J14)</b>	Aug 82	2.0	
257	<b>M25. North Ockendon to Mar Dyke (J29 to J31)</b>	Dec 82	4.8	
258	<b>M602. Extension to Salford (J2 to J3)</b>	Dec 82	1.7	
259	<b>M25. Theydon Garnon to North Ockendon (J27 to J29)</b>	Apr 83	10.6	
260	<b>M54. Hilton Park to Forge (M6 to J5)</b>	Nov 83	17.7	
261	<b>M25. Wisley to Chertsey (J10 to J11)</b>	Dec 83	4.9	
262	<b>M65. Brierfield to Nelson (J12 to J13)</b>	Dec 83	1.1	
263	<b>M65. Hyndburn to Burnley (J7 to J10)</b>	Dec 83	5.3	
264	<b>M27. Chilworth to Hedge End (J4 to J7)</b>	? 83	2.2	
265	<b>M25. Waltham Cross to Theydon Garnon (J25 to J27)</b>	Jan 84	7.8	
266	<b>M65. Whitebirk to Hyndburn (J6 to J7)</b>	Dec 84	2.2	
267	<b>M25. M40 to Maple Cross (J16 to J17)</b>	Jan 85	5.7	
268	<b>M3. Popham to Bar End (J8 to J10)</b>	Aug 85	12.8	
269	<b>M25. M4 to Iver Heath (J15 to J16)</b>	Sep 85	5.2	
270	<b>M42. Umberslade Section (J3 to J4)</b>	Sep 85	5.7	
271	<b>M25. Reigate to Wisley (J8 to J10)</b>	Oct 85	14.3	
272	<b>M25. Airport spur to M4 (J14 to J15)</b>	Dec 85	1.9	
273	<b>M42. Tamworth (Water Orton &amp; Kingsbury) Sections (J8 to J10)</b>	Dec 85	7.6	
274	<b>M25. Swanley to Dunton Green (J3 to J5)</b>	Feb 86	7.7	0.8
275	<b>M42. Lickey End to Alvechurch (J1 to J3)</b>	Jun 86	7.1	
276	<b>M42. Tamworth (Polesworth) Section (J10 to J11)</b>	Aug 86	7.3	
277	<b>M25. Dartford Tunnel Southern Approach</b>	Sep 86	1.5	

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278	<b>M25. Micklefield to South Mimms (J19 to J23)</b>	Oct 86	12.3
279	<b>M74. Larkhall - Poniel (J8 to J11)</b>	Oct 86	10.0
280	<b>A1(M). Roestock to Stanborough (J2 to J4)</b>	Dec 86	3.2
281	<b>M42. Southern Links (M5 to J1)</b>	Mar 87	0.9
282	<b>A6144(M). Carrington Spur</b>	Oct 87	1.2
283	<b>M74. Poneil - Millbank (J11 to J12)</b>	Nov 87	1.3
284	<b>A601(M). Carnforth quarry link road (J35 to B6254)</b>	? 87	0.9
285	<b>M65. Nelson to Colne (J13 to J14)</b>	Sep 88	1.7
286	<b>M66. Portwood to Denton (M60 J24 to J27)</b>	Apr 89	3.2
287	<b>M40. Longbridge to Umberslade (J15 to M42)</b>	Dec 89	10.5
288	<b>M42. Northern Turn (M5 to J1)</b>	Dec 89	1.6
289	<b>M40. Waterstock - Longbridge (J8A to J15)</b>	Jan 91	45.8
290	<b>M20. Maidstone to Ashford (J8 to J9)</b>	May 91	13.5
291	<b>M74. Millbank - Nether Abington (J12 to J13)</b>	Nov 91	7.4
292	<b>M3. Pitmore to Chilworth (J12 to M27(J4))</b>	Dec 91	4.0
293	<b>M12(NI). NW Link to Craigavon</b>	? 91	0.9
294	<b>M80. Stepps By-pass</b>	Jun 92	3.0
295	<b>A74(M). Elvanfoot (J14) - Paddy's Rickle</b>	Aug 92	2.4
296	<b>A635(M) Extension to Mancunian Way</b>	Sep 92	0.2
297	<b>A74(M). Kirkpatrick Fleming - Gretna (J21 to J22)</b>	Dec 92	4.5
298	<b>M2(NI). Crosskennan junction</b>	Oct 93	0.9
299	<b>M74. Nether Abington - Elvanfoot (J13 to J14)</b>	Nov 93	5.0
300	<b>M74. West of Fullarton Road - Maryville (J1 to J4)</b>	Apr 94	2.5
301	<b>A74(M). Dinwoodie Green to Ecclefechan (J16 to J19)</b>	Sep 94	10.1
302	<b>M4. Baglan-Lon Las (N of J41 to J44)</b>	Dec 94	5.6
303	<b>A74(M). St Ann's (J16) to Dinwoodie Green</b>	Jan 95	2.8
304	<b>M3(NI). Dock Street to Middlepath Street</b>	Jan 95	0.4
305	<b>M3. Bar End to Compton (J10 to J11) &amp; Compton to Pitmore upgrade (J11 to J12)</b>	Jun 95	4.9
306	<b>A1(M). Walshford to Dishforth</b>	Nov 95	13.1
307	<b>A74(M). Ecclefechan to Kirkpatrick Fleming (J19 to J21)</b>	Nov 95	6.3
308	<b>M8. Newbridge (J2) to Edinburgh City Bypass</b>	Dec 95	3.2
309	<b>M77. Dumbreck - City of Glasgow Boundary (J1 to J3)</b>	Apr 96	3.1
310	<b>M4. Second Severn crossing</b>	Jun 96	10.7
311	<b>M49. Severn crossing Link road</b>	Jun 96	5.5

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312	<b>M77. City of Glasgow Boundary - Malletsheugh (J3 to J5)</b>	Dec 96	3.4	
313	<b>M65. M6 to Whitebirk. (J1a to J6)</b>	Dec 97	11.8	
314	<b>A823(M). Halbeath Interchange (J2)</b>	Mar 98	1.1	
315	<b>M3(NI). Middlepath Street to Sydenham By-pass</b>	May 98	0.5	
316	<b>A1(M). Alconbury to Peterborough (J13 to J17)</b>	Oct 98	12.8	0.8
317	<b>M1. Extension to A1(M) (J43 to J48)</b>	Feb 99	11.3	
318	<b>A74(M). Paddy's Rickle - to St Ann's (J16)</b>	Apr 99	19.8	
319	<b>M60. Denton to Middleton (J19 to J24)</b>	Oct 00	9.4	
320	<b>M6 Toll. Birmingham Northern Relief Road</b>	Dec 03	27.0	
321	<b>A1(M). Wetherby to Walshford</b>	Apr 05	4.6	
322	<b>M77. Malletsheugh to Fenwick</b>	Apr 05	15.2	
323	<b>A1(M). Hook Moor to Ferrybridge</b>	Jan 06	7.6	
324	<b>M6. Carlisle to Guards Mill</b>	Dec 08	6.0	
325	<b>A1(M). Bramham to Wetherby</b>	Dec 09	6.0	
326	<b>M74. Completion from Fullarton Road junction to M8 Motorway</b>	Jun 11	5.0	
327	<b>A1(M) Dishforth to Leeming</b>	u/c	13.0	
328	<b>M80. Stepps to Mollinsburn</b>	u/c	5.0	
329	<b>M80. Mollinsburn to Auchenkilns</b>	u/c	1.7	
330	<b>M80. Auchenkilns to Haggs</b>	u/c	4.6	