


**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**



## Joint Personnel Recovery

Joint Warfare Publication 3-66


**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

**JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3-66  
JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY**

Joint Warfare Publication 3-66 (JWP 3-66) dated April 2003  
is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff



Director General  
Joint Doctrine and Concepts

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

1. This information is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments, except as authorised by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate.
2. This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to a recipient Government for defence purposes only. It may be disclosed only within the Defence Department of a recipient Government, except as otherwise authorised by the MOD.
3. This information may be subject to privately owned rights.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **AUTHORISATION**

The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre (JDCC) is responsible for publishing Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs) and maintaining a hierarchy of such publications. Users wishing to quote JWPs as reference material in other work should confirm with the JDCC Doctrine Editor whether the particular publication and amendment state remains extant. Comments on factual accuracy or proposals for amendment should also be directed to the Doctrine Editor at:

The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre  
Ministry of Defence  
Shrivenham  
SWINDON  
Wilts, SN6 8RF

Telephone number: 01793 314216/7  
Facsimile number: 01793 314232  
E-mail: doctrine@jdcc.mod.uk

## **DISTRIBUTION**

Distribution of JWPs is managed by DSDC(L) Llangennech, Mwrwg Road, Llangennech, Llanelli, Carmarthenshire, SA14 8YP. Requests for use of this publication, or amendments to its distribution, should be referred to DSDC(L).

Telephone number: 01554 822368  
Facsimile number: 01554 822350

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## PREFACE

### SCOPE

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-66 '*Joint Personnel Recovery*' is to provide guidance to the deployed staff within a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and the HQs of individual force components on the planning and conduct of Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR). It is intended primarily for staff officers who are, or are likely to be, employed in the J3 Operations Division and the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre of a JTFHQ and also those working in the Rescue Co-ordination Cells of individual components. It aims to give planning and operations staff a framework for conducting JPR missions where full Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) assets are either unavailable or inappropriate and where personnel (and equipment), neither trained nor equipped for CSAR, become isolated. It is also designed to provide guidance on Deployed Search and Rescue (DSAR) procedures as well as a useful insight to other staff within a JTFHQ and subordinate components. JWP 3-66 will be of value to other organisations, such as the Joint Helicopter Command.

2. **Context.** JWP 3-66 relates to the broad subject of JPR, while the specialised area of CSAR is dealt with in detail in Allied Tactical Publication 62 (ATP-62) '*Combat Search and Rescue*'. Similarly, '*Search and Rescue*' is covered in detail within ATP-10. All three publications will effectively complement each other and cover the full spectrum of JPR operations. For ease of reference, the JDCC CD-ROM contains the current versions of both ATP-10 and ATP-62 as well as JWP 3-66 and all three are available for viewing at the JDCC website via the MODWeb. JWP 3-66 has been developed by the Joint CR Working Group and reflects the diverse nature of JPR between force components. JWP 3-66.1 '*Combat Recovery*' has been subsumed by JWP 3-66.

3. **Structure.** JWP 3-66 is primarily aimed at ensuring that appropriate structures and procedures are in place in a joint force to allow for effective JPR, while providing a guide to risk analysis and planning for JPR missions.

### LINKAGES

4. JWP 3-66 should be read in conjunction with ATP-10, ATP-62 and Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) CONOPS<sup>1</sup> for the conduct of JPR.

---

<sup>1</sup> Still under development by JHC HQ.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

ARCHIVED

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY**

### **CONTENTS**

Title Page	i
Authorisation and Distribution	ii
Preface	iii
Contents	v
Joint Warfare Publications	vii
Record of Amendments	viii
<b>Chapter 1</b>	<b>The Joint Personnel Recovery Spectrum</b>
	<b>Annex A – Joint Personnel Recovery Spectrum</b>
	<b>Diagram</b>
<b>Chapter 2</b>	<b>Principle Factors and Considerations in the Conduct</b>
	<b>of Joint Personnel Recovery</b>
<b>Chapter 3</b>	<b>Command and Control</b>
<b>Chapter 4</b>	<b>Risk Analysis</b>
	<b>Annex A – Generic Decision Matrix</b>
<b>Chapter 5</b>	<b>Planning for Joint Personnel Recovery Operations</b>
	<b>Annex A – Outline Format for Combat</b>
	<b>Recovery Concept of Operations</b>
	<b>Annex B – Joint Personnel Recovery Special</b>
	<b>Instructions/Co-ordinating Instructions</b>
	<b>Annex C – Force Components</b>
<b>Chapter 6</b>	<b>Care After Recovery</b>
	<b>Annex A – The Joint Personnel Recovery Process</b>
<b>Glossary of Terms and Definitions</b>	
<b>Glossary of Abbreviations</b>	

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

ARCHIVED

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS**

The successful prosecution of joint operations requires clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or at all, by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

Interim Joint Warfare Publications (IJWPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a foreshortened time scale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur when a more comprehensive 'parent' publication is under development, but normally well in advance of its planned publication.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is explained in DCI JS 16/02.



**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **CHAPTER 1 – THE JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY SPECTRUM**

### **Background**

101. The UK Government has a duty to reduce, wherever possible, the risk to the lives and welfare of its citizens, including servicemen and women. The provision of a capability to recover personnel who may be placed at risk is a moral obligation recognisable to all. As an important tenet in the maintenance of morale, Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) also provides a positive response to the expectations of media, public and next-of-kin alike.

102. At the operational level it is desirable to retain freedom of action through avoidance of a hostage situation. This prevents involuntary release of intelligence and enemy exploitation of a propaganda opportunity. The success of JPR should be gauged by how quickly recovered personnel are returned to duty. Skilled individuals represent a considerable training investment that cannot be replaced quickly.

103. Experience has shown the value of being able to recover service personnel from hostile territory, particularly when opponents ignore the Geneva Convention. With continuing emphasis on the decisive nature of Deep Operations the need for timely recovery of personnel isolated in enemy territory or waters can only increase.

104. Also of concern is the loss of key items of equipment. Certain equipment is rare and/or sensitive and its loss may potentially greatly reduce operational effectiveness. Should the tactical situation allow, there will be occasions when, as well as personnel needing recovery, there will be a requirement to recover high value or sensitive equipment. It should be noted that JPR engenders varying degrees of risk to both personnel requiring and those executing the recovery. Hence, a decision to recover key or sensitive equipment will normally rest with the Joint Task Force Commander, following a comprehensive risk analysis (see Chapter 4).

### **Scope of Joint Personnel Recovery**


105. **Joint Personnel Recovery.** JPR involves a balance of activity in two areas. First, a recovery force that has the equipment, manpower resources and expertise to plan, exercise and execute JPR missions. Second, individuals who are likely to be at risk should be identified, trained and equipped for the type of recovery method. Support to missing, detained or captured personnel extends to care after recovery. The nature of the recovery force required varies in line with the demands of the task. However, whilst the broad types of capabilities are closely linked, they are separated by distinct changes in situation.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

106. **Joint Personnel Recovery.** Joint Personnel Recovery is the aggregation of military, civil and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing or isolated. JPR includes Search and Rescue (SAR), Deployed Search & Rescue (DSAR), Combat Recovery (CR), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Special Forces operations such as Unconventional Assisted Recovery (i.e. hostage rescue) and associated Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) training, and Care After Recovery (CAR). This represents a broad span of different types of operation covering a disparate group of missions, roles and tasks but consolidated into a single and coherent spectrum covering a number of parameters, the principal ones being location and threat. This recovery spectrum is outlined at Figure 1.1 and replicated in more detail in a pullout version at Annex 1A.



**Figure 1.1 – Spectrum of Joint Personnel Recovery**

107. **The Recovery Spectrum.** To place JPR activity in context, a number of definitions are required:

- a. **Search and Rescue Operations.** Search and Rescue Operations (SAR Ops) is a generic term which comprises the following elements:
  - (1) **National Search and Rescue.** National SAR is the recovery of isolated personnel in distress where **no** threat is posed by hostile interference. *This term relates primarily to non-military situations in the UK and overseas territories including home and territorial waters.*
  - (2) **Deployed Search and Rescue.** DSAR is the recovery of isolated personnel in distress and/or equipment, in support of deployed operations and exercises, where **no** threat is posed by hostile interference. *This term relates primarily to non-hostile situations when deployed overseas but could include deployment within the UK to cover a catastrophe or disaster.*

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

b. **Combat Recovery Operations.** CR Operations is a generic term for recovery operations comprising the following elements:

(1) **Combat Recovery.** CR is the recovery of isolated personnel in distress and/or equipment, from an environment in which a threat is posed by hostile interference, who are **not** trained and/or equipped to receive CSAR.

(2) **Combat Search and Rescue.** The recovery of isolated personnel in distress, from an environment in which a threat is posed by hostile interference, who **are** trained and equipped for CSAR.

(3) **Special Forces Operations.** Special Forces (SF) operations will not be covered within this JWP. However it should be noted that, following a strategic decision to commit UK SF personnel to a task, SF would conduct unconventional assisted recovery tasks within their own planning and execution criteria.

c. **Care After Recovery.** Care After Recovery (CAR) is the term used to describe a range of support measures for recovered personnel including, debrief, repatriation, rehabilitation, counselling and medical assessment. It incorporates where possible the successful return to duty of the recovered individual and extends into long term monitoring and support where necessary.

108. **Joint Personnel Recovery Functions.** JPR is a defence task that goes far beyond the boundaries of simply recovering isolated military personnel. Implicit within JPR are the core functions of preparation of personnel for potential isolation, intelligence gathering, equipment provisioning for both the individual and the recovery force, developing the recovery force and the care after recovery of those recovered.

109. **Search and Rescue Operations.** The primary function of SAR is to save lives. Military SAR effort (including Mountain Rescue) is directed principally towards but is not restricted to, the rescue of military personnel of the Allied Nations as detailed in ATP-10. Subject to military requirements and operational practicability, SAR assistance is also provided to civil authorities. Additionally, some nations have parallel civil SAR assets, which can respond to military SAR incidents.

110. **Conventions.** The UK is a signatory of the Chicago Convention of 1947 on International Civil Aviation, and the International Convention on Maritime SAR of 1979. Under these conventions the UK has agreed to adhere to overall policies, procedures and minimum standards in SAR, for the needs of maritime and aviation safety. The operational aspects of this responsibility are discharged by delegation to nations where each nation is responsible for SAR within an area or number of areas

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

called Search and Rescue Regions. In aeronautical SAR, SAR Regional boundaries usually coincide with those of Flight Information Regions (FIRs) but Maritime SAR Regions (SRRs) shall be established by agreement among parties concerned.

111. **NATO.** There is no requirement for NATO to maintain a parallel SAR organisation and in time of peace NATO SAR services remain a national responsibility operated to meet International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) and NATO requirements. In many cases NATO requirements for SAR exceed those of ICAO and International Maritime Organisation which represent only the minimum acceptable civil standard; thus the facilities provided within SRRs are often well in excess of those shown in the ICAO documents for the region - the Air Navigation Plans. SAR facilities provided by nations, though usually military and military-operated, may also be civil and civil-operated.

112. **Deployed Search and Rescue.** Whilst ATP-10 does make some allowance for the equivalent SAR roles and tasks within a warfighting context, it contains insufficient detail. Hence this JWP will expand the roles and tasks foreseen with DSAR when deployed on operations or large formation exercises.

113. **Combat Recovery Operations.** CR is the recovery of isolated personnel from an environment where hostile interference is expected.<sup>1</sup> The threat environment ranges across a wide spectrum. At best, the situation could present a low risk environment but in the worst case, CR could be conducted in a situation where an opposing force is attempting to prevent the recovery. Because of the varied threat scenarios, the scope and scale of CR operations vary widely. The type of operation conducted and the size of the task force will be dependent upon the risk assessment made at the time, by the appropriate authority. At the most extreme end of the spectrum, where risk is greatest but recovery is still an operational imperative, a wide ranging force would be required involving all or a combination of the following capabilities: C4I, Close Air Support, Suppression of Enemy Air Defences, Naval Fires, Electronic Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Airborne Warning and Control System, Reconnaissance, Refuelling (Air to Air, maritime platform or Forward Air Refuelling Point), Medical Evacuation, Deception Operations and Special Forces. Normally, the primary rescue vehicle will be a helicopter, although any air, surface or sub-surface vehicle may be used subject to the risk assessment and the need for expediency.

114. Due to the risk to the rescue forces, detailed intelligence, careful planning, co-ordination, risk analysis and rapid, reliable and secure communication are essential to success. CR operations may be required throughout a Joint Operations Area (JOA), by day or night, in all weather conditions, on or from the land, water or air environments. Therefore, all component commanders should be prepared to contribute to a CR operation. CR task forces, principally the recovery vehicle and its ground protection

---

<sup>1</sup> In UK doctrine, CR also embraces recovery of equipment.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

party, may be allocated for specific missions, held at high readiness or diverted from extant tasks.

115. **Combat Search and Rescue.** To increase the chances of success of such a mission, by minimising time in the risk environment or by reducing the opportunity for spoofing, it is advantageous to ensure that isolated personnel are equipped and trained for CSAR recovery. Where the isolated personnel meets these criteria and the recovery force is equally trained, the recovery is deemed a CSAR mission. CSAR is well covered in ATP-62 but it contains insufficient detail on CR. Hence this JWP will expand the roles and tasks foreseen with CR of personnel (and equipment) who are not trained and/or equipped but who are isolated in a threat environment.

116. **Extant Doctrine.** This JWP will therefore focus on the DSAR and CR aspects of JPR. It is not intended to reiterate any doctrine covered in separate manuals. If needed, detailed information can be found as follows:

- a. SAR and national SAR – ATP 10 ‘*Search and Rescue*’.
- b. CSAR – ATP-62 ‘*Combat Search and Rescue*’.
- c. Escape and Recovery – AP 3456, Vol 6 ‘*Aviation Medicine and Survival*’, Part 2, Sect 3, Ch 1,2,3.

117. **Medical Tasks.** Within the context of JPR the medical reaction task sits in the area covered by DSAR and CR, and hence this JWP. The activity has a wide variety of descriptors and terminology, which has been principally drawn from NATO, and all seek to outline minor but key differences. Most are recognised terms with agreed definitions:

- a. **Aeromedical Evacuation.** Aeromedical Evacuation (AEROMED, sometimes referred to as MEDEVAC) is the movement of patients to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation.
- b. **Forward Aeromedical Evacuation.** Forward Aeromedical Evacuation (Fwd AE) is that phase of evacuation, which provides airlift for patients under medical supervision between points within the battlefield, from the battlefield to the initial point of treatment, and to subsequent points of treatment within the combat zone. Normally conducted by rotary wing aircraft.
- c. **Tactical Aeromedical Evacuation.** Tactical Aeromedical Evacuation (Tac AE) is that phase of evacuation that provides airlift for patients under medical supervision from the combat zone to points outside the combat zone. Normally conducted by fixed wing aircraft.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

d. **Casualty Evacuation.** Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) is the movement of casualties to and between medical facilities by land or air transportation.

e. **Rescue.** Transfer of person(s), from a hostile environment to a benign environment, without further medical treatment.

118. **Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction.** SERE is an inclusive term (of US origin) that has recently superseded phrases previously used such as Escape and Evasion and Conduct After Capture.<sup>2</sup> It encompasses all practical and theoretical measures required to prepare personnel for isolation, captivity and recovery.

119. **Care After Recovery.** In the past CAR has often been neglected but it is an important aspect of JPR. It seeks to return personnel to duty and includes debriefing, repatriation, rehabilitation, and counselling. This is covered in some detail at Chapter 6.<sup>3</sup>

---


<sup>2</sup> The original US term refers to Survival, Evasion, Resistance and **Escape** – however the UK believes that whilst ‘escape’ from captivity is unlikely, an individual should normally be able to assist in his/her ‘extraction’, and hence the change in emphasis in the UK definition.

<sup>3</sup> Chapter 6 also covers different aspects of working with the Media, which may need to be considered in the early stages of a JPR operation.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66



1. **Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR):** 'The aggregation of military, civil and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing or isolated'.
2. **Search and Rescue (SAR):** 'SAR is the recovery of isolated personnel in distress, where no threat is posed by hostile interference'.
3. **Deployed SAR (DSAR):** 'The recovery of isolated personnel in distress and/or equipment, in support of deployed operations and exercises, where no threat is posed by hostile interference'.
4. **Combat Recovery (CR):** 'The recovery of isolated personnel in distress and/or equipment, from an environment in which a threat is posed by hostile interference, who are not trained and/or equipped to receive CSAR'.
5. **Combat SAR (CSAR):** 'The recovery of isolated personnel in distress, from an environment in which a threat is posed by hostile interference, who are trained and equipped for CSAR'.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

ARCHIVED

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **CHAPTER 2 – PRINCIPLE FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONDUCT OF JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY**

### **General Principles of Joint Personnel Recovery**

201. **Early Deployment.** From the outset of a mission, the Joint Force may be susceptible and vulnerable to the risk of personnel becoming isolated. Therefore, based on the estimate, the early deployment of a Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) capability may be an important element to the Joint Task Force Commander's initial force protection requirement.

202. **Time.** A timely response can often be critical to the success of a JPR mission. This principle applies equally to the need to meet a medical liability or remain on the inside of an adversary's decision cycle. Similarly, there may be preferred periods to execute a recovery (i.e. at night) or specific times when the isolated person(s) will be contactable or available for recovery. Therefore, JPR assets must remain flexible and able to react rapidly when required.

203. **Operational Security.** To reduce the risk to a given mission, all possible measures must be taken to deny critical information to the adversary, and any neutral parties, to prevent jeopardising the participating forces and the personnel and equipment to be recovered.

204. **Flexibility.** JPR plans should be flexible in order to allow all JPR capable resources to be employed in the most efficient and effective manner.

### **Factors**

205. In addition to the principles outlined above, the following factors should also be considered when planning and conducting JPR missions:

- a. Commander's JPR policy and priority.
- b. Political direction.
- c. Population attitude in target area.
- d. Intelligence assessment.
- e. Risk assessment, including the level of threat and recovery training undertaken by isolated personnel.
- f. Environment (including weather).

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

- g. Number of personnel and amount of equipment to be recovered.
- h. Distance/range over which the Mission must be accomplished.
- i. Rules of Engagement.
- j. Assets and capabilities available.
- k. Liaise with National Search and Rescue Regions within the Joint Operations Area.

**Additional Specific Considerations for Combat Recovery**

206. **Mission Timescales.** Depending on the force posture, forces may be designated for specific Combat Recovery (CR) missions and maintained at a high degree of readiness or they may be double earmarked while conducting other missions. Once a force element has become isolated, and hence it or its unit is unable to effect self-recovery, the task will be passed to the next level until a recovery is possible. Should the task be beyond the Component Commander's (CC's) recovery capability it will be passed to the theatre CR force (usually under the Joint Force Air Component but could be under any one of the CCs). Once the task is received, the response will be either:

- a. **Immediate.** Immediate CR is either the use of assets on alert to recover the isolated personnel as soon as their predicament is notified or a high readiness reaction as soon as a rescue mission becomes viable. Either designated forces on alert posture or other forces within immediate reaction range and capable of undertaking the task, may be used. Opportune forces should only attempt such operations if they have the capability and sufficient situational awareness to preclude more losses. Location and threat assessment are minimum requirements prior to conducting an immediate CR mission.
- b. **Deliberate.** An initial assessment of a situation may dictate a mission delay to allow for more detailed planning. Launch authority for a deliberate CR mission should only be granted after a detailed risk analysis has been conducted.

The decision to mount immediate or deliberate CR ultimately rests with the Joint Task Force Commander. Providing a clear policy is promulgated, this decision may be delegated to component commanders.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **CHAPTER 3 – COMMAND AND CONTROL**

### **General Principles of Command and Control for Joint Personnel Recovery**

301. **Initial Command and Control.** Any aspect of Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) may be required as a stand-alone operation if a deployed HQ has not been established; this scenario is most likely in support of Other Government Departments (OGDs), Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) or small military deployments, such as United Nations (UN) observer missions. When such a situation arises, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) J3 will have the command responsibility until a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) has been deployed. Command and Control (C2) arrangements should be deconflicted with the appropriate National Search and Rescue Regions (SAR Regions) at the earliest opportunity.

302. **The Joint Task Force Commander's Responsibilities.** The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) will have overall responsibility for JPR operations within his Joint Operations Area (JOA) and must:

- a. Conduct a JPR risk estimate.
- b. Establish an appropriate JPR organisation within the JOA.
- c. Establish and maintain a reserve (probably double earmarked) to provide the Ground Protection Party for a JPR mission.<sup>1</sup>
- d. Establish and maintain command procedures for JPR.
- e. Ensure that JPR is an integral part of planning and training and given the appropriate priority as required.
- f. Identify requirements and allocate forces for JPR, and identify shortfalls in JPR capabilities, if necessary, requesting additional JPR assets from national forces not assigned.
- g. Establish clear and direct lines of communication between all force elements required to liaise in co-ordinating a JPR mission.
- h. When personnel become isolated, conduct a preliminary assessment of the circumstances surrounding the incident and make a recommendation concerning the status of the isolated personnel.

303. **Command Relationships.** The command elements and their relationships are:

---

<sup>1</sup> Current policy states that the Ground Protection Party should be made up from in-place teeth arm personnel when available but a reserve is required for when they are not.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

- a. **Joint Task Force Commander.** The JTFC exercises Operational Control (OPCON) over deployed forces. The establishment of a Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre (JRCC) in a designated operations centre or Component Commander's (CC's) HQ will attain integration of forces, to achieve the JPR objective. The appropriate specialists should staff the JRCC.
- b. **Component Commander.** Each CC has the responsibility to plan, co-ordinate and control Deployed Search and Rescue (DSAR) and Combat Recovery (CR) operations for his own component from within his available component resources. The authority to launch such component missions rests with CCs and will normally be delegated to the Operations Centre Director/Chief of Staff (COS). A CC designated by JTFC, normally the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), will plan, co-ordinate and control joint DSAR and CR for the theatre and will have the responsibility to launch those missions. The nominated CC may be delegated OPCON over assigned forces and the supported/supporting relationships may be used with TACON delegated over the assigned forces tasked for the specific mission. The nominated CC will establish a JRCC in his HQ with representation from all components.

#### **Additional Principles of Command and Control**

304. **Deployed Search and Rescue.** All CCs are responsible for the development and execution of a DSAR plan within their sphere of operations. Should a DSAR situation develop that demands resources greater than those held under a component commander's authority the JTFC will exercise command authority for re-assignment of assets, if this is deemed appropriate. In order to discharge this function all CCs will man a JRCC through which resources and planning will be channelled during a DSAR mission. For the higher intensity CR missions a more detailed and established structure is required. This structure needs to be established in advance of any potential mission and deconflicted with the appropriate National SAR Regions.

305. **Combat Recovery.** CR missions are likely to demand far more of the joint forces than a DSAR mission. The increased number of assets, preparatory planning and additional co-ordination required demand a more robust C2 mechanism with identified roles throughout the force.


306. **Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre.** For the majority of high intensity CR missions the JTFC will routinely delegate CR planning and execution to the JFACC. However, depending on the scenario, he may designate a member of his own staff or the Land, Maritime or Special Forces CC as the JRCC director. Wherever this responsibility falls, the designated CC will establish a JRCC within his HQ. If the operation is sufficiently complex other CCs involved in the operation may also

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

establish Rescue Co-ordination Centres (RCCs)<sup>2</sup> within their HQs. The JRCC has primacy over RCCs and the latter must keep the JRCC informed of any CR operations or planning. CCs retain the authority to task their own forces to conduct CR operations through their component RCC.



1. As an alternative to the JRCC being established within the JFACC HQ, it could sit within the JTFHQ or another component HQ.
2. JFLogCC is unlikely to possess appropriate assets to conduct CR. However, his HQ must have the ability to track other component personnel and equipment, casualty handling, recovery of personnel to the UK and to liaise with other components over the recovery of JFLogC personnel and equipment.

**Figure 3.1 – Generic Functional Diagram**

307. **Co-ordination.** Co-ordination should be both vertical and horizontal and should be conducted continuously during all phases of a CR operation. The principal nodes where co-ordination takes place are within the JRCC, between the JRCC and RCCs, between the JTFC and external agencies, and through liaison officers.

308. **Command Relationships.** In addition to the JTFC and CC relationships detailed at paragraph 303, for complex CR missions there are additional command elements required:

- a. **Mission Co-ordinator.** The Mission Co-ordinator (MC) serves as an extension of the JRCC/RCC co-ordination function after the CR Task Force<sup>3</sup> (CRTF) launches. He may, as directed by the JRCC/RCC, exercise TACOM

<sup>2</sup> Depending on the level and intensity of operations, this may be 'double hatted' with another suitable cell, i.e. in a Land HQ, the Air Manoeuvre Planning Team.

<sup>3</sup> The Joint and combined arms grouping of assets and personnel tasked with the CR task.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

over assets tasked to conduct the mission. The MC will normally be located within the JRCC. The MC co-ordinates all efforts between the task force and the JRCC, monitors the status of all elements and, if holding TACON, may appoint or relieve the On-Scene Commander (OSC). He may request additional assets as required to ensure recovery and supporting forces arrive at designated locations to accomplish the mission. However, in a small-scale operation in a low threat environment, the conduct of a CR mission may well be the main focus of a CC's effort; consequently he will probably not need to establish a 'MC' per se because the MC's duties (described below) will be conducted as part of the existing operational duties of standing staff members. These duties may include:

- (1) Co-ordination of communications.
- (2) Management of aircraft, ship and vehicle flow to and from the objective area.
- (3) Co-ordination of air-to-air refuelling.
- (4) Co-ordination of ground refuelling at Forward Arming and Refuel Points or other locations if required.
- (5) Advising the JRCC/RCC of mission support requirements.
- (6) Co-ordination of appropriate no fire zones in the objective area.
- (7) Advising CRTF participants and the JRCC of mission progress, threats and weather conditions affecting the mission.

b. **On-Scene Commander.** An OSC should be appointed on most occasions for CR operations and is designated by the JRCC, executing RCC, or MC when the tactical situation warrants. Initially, the OSC can be any individual capable of providing on scene co-ordination; his proximity to the scene is vital in the early stages. The OSC controls operations in the objective area and ensures a co-ordinated recovery effort. All assets participating in such an operation should contact the OSC before entering the objective area. The initial OSC should hand over to the Rescue Mission Commander, who will have the required specialist knowledge to co-ordinate CR missions, at the earliest opportunity.

c. **Rescue Mission Commander.** The Rescue Mission Commander (RMC) will be appointed by the CC and will have responsibility for the planning and execution of the CR mission. The RMC will have TACON of assets tasked for the recovery mission. He could, if time permits, exercise

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

TACON from an AWACS<sup>4</sup> and also be the commander of the detached Rescue Escort (RESCORT) (see Chapter 5C) and is responsible for effecting the safe achievement of the mission objective. He may relieve the OSC. During the execution phase he co-ordinates his elements' activities through the MC. The RMC should select routes in and out of the objective area and tactics based on hostile activity, terrain and the number of personnel and amount of equipment being recovered.

309. **Mission Abort.** All levels of command can recommend mission abort. The authority to abort, before the mission is launched, rests with the JTFC or, if authority is delegated, with the CC. Once the mission is launched, 'mission abort' should be delegated to the OSC and clear direction must be given as to what stage in the mission that authority is extant.

310. **Liaison Authority.** All participating units may be granted direct liaison authority with the JRCC/RCC as appropriate. Liaison policy and authority should be clearly promulgated in Land Component orders and CR Special Instructions (SPINS), and should be confirmed in the CR Concept of Operations.

311. **Role of the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre.** The role of the JRCC is to plan and co-ordinate all combined joint CR. It is the primary facility, suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and manned by trained personnel drawn from each joint task force component, to deliver this capability. Responsibilities of the JRCC include the following:

- a. Develop a CR plan to support Operation Plans, Supplementary Plans and Standard Operating Procedures.
- b. Co-ordinate training and exercises to provide a trained joint staff element for combat operations.
- c. Provide inputs to Land Component orders, the Air Tasking Order and the Communications Plan.
- d. Develop and disseminate SPINS and ensure that the required information is promulgated to all force components that require it.
- e. Co-ordinate and deconflict concurrent support operations by different force components and recommend priorities.
- f. Establish reporting requirements and monitor all incidents prosecuted by component RCCs.

---

<sup>4</sup> Or other airborne platform; under these circumstances, he/she may be referred to as an 'Airborne Mission Commander'.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

- g. Alert CCs to the location of isolated personnel (and equipment).
- h. Develop a Joint Task Force threat decision matrix tailored to the threat analysis.
- i. Maintain a database and file on each isolated person and piece of equipment until recovery is complete.
- j. Establish dedicated intelligence support requirements and co-ordinate with theatre resources.
- k. Co-ordinate with all the other cells within a CC.
- l. Co-ordinate deception plans to support operations.
- m. Where appropriate, initiate and maintain Isolated Personnel Reports and Evasion Plans of Action.

312. **Training.** Training is fundamental to the success of CR operations. Personnel assigned to the JRCC and component RCCs should deploy trained in the planning and co-ordination of such missions at the appropriate command level. Well-trained CR operatives, JRCC and RCC staffs may be the difference between success and failure in the time-sensitive and highly charged environment of a CR incident.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **CHAPTER 4 – RISK ANALYSIS**

401. A Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) operation may be driven by the need to satisfy a number of strategic tenets in addition to the more conventional operational and tactical factors upon which most planning is based. The strategic factors are likely to include some or all of the following:

- a. A moral obligation to UK service personnel.
- b. Political and military freedom from hostage situations.
- c. Denial of propaganda opportunities to the adversary (Media – see Chapter 6).
- d. Morale of servicemen and women at risk.
- e. Recovery of tactical intelligence that may fall into adversary hands.
- f. A positive response to next of kin, public and media expectation.
- g. Protection of some high value capital assets.

402. **Tactical Factors.** Not all of the above strategic factors would necessarily apply across the full spectrum of JPR; consequently the risk analysis necessary prior to the execution of a JPR mission is predominantly based upon the tactical factors. These will be wide ranging but may include the:

- a. Need to reach isolated personnel to avoid deterioration of their condition.
- b. Available assets at appropriate readiness and their location.
- c. Ability of these assets to operate within the prevailing environmental conditions.
- d. Ability of the recovery asset to stabilise the isolated personnel whilst in transit.
- e. Degree of immediate aftercare available following extraction from isolation.
- f. Diversion of critically needed forces from ongoing operations.

### **Specific Principles Related to Combat Recovery**

403. **Principles.** Combat Recovery (CR) operations are subject to a far greater cost/gain consideration and threat analysis than DSAR. Particularly when measured

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

against the strategic tenets, the benefit gained from such an operation should equal or outweigh the potential cost associated with executing the operation. Critically, CR operations must not:

- a. Unduly risk isolating additional personnel.
- b. Preclude execution of higher priority missions.
- c. Routinely expose certain high value assets to unacceptable risk.
- d. Divert critically needed forces from ongoing operations – depending on priorities.
- e. Allow the overall military situation to deteriorate.

404. **Decision Matrix.** Commanders must balance the value of retrieving isolated personnel and equipment against potential costs. The positive psychological impact of a successful mission should be weighed against the risk to overall force resources and the effect of diverting resources from the ongoing combat effort. Commanders at all levels should evaluate these factors before ordering or authorising a CR mission. Development of a threat decision matrix tailored to the current threat analysis will assist in the decision effort. An example of a Generic Decision Matrix is shown at Annex A. It should be noted that in some cases, particularly recovery of personnel from Other Government Departments or Non-Government Organisations, these considerations might be over-ruled by political considerations.

405. **Decision.** The decision to launch a CR mission, other than one where an instant reaction by co-located forces is possible can only be taken after careful analysis of the risks. The aim is to evaluate the probability of success, based on a number of factors, including:

- a. Intelligence.
- b. Threat assessment, which will help determine:
  - (1) The make-up of the combat recovery package.
  - (2) Method of recovery.
- c. Availability and capability of combat recovery forces.
- d. Environment (including weather).
- e. Timings.
- f. Compromise to, or cover from, another mission.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

406. **Threat Levels.** There is no precise delineation of what constitutes a particular threat level since what may be a low-level threat for one type of aircraft/rescue vehicle is often a high threat for another. Additionally, threat levels are often contingent upon parameters such as the state of adversary training and morale, his intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Signals Intelligence capabilities, maintenance of weapons systems and availability of spare parts, or other intangibles. However, the following general guidelines can be used to help determine the level of threat to a particular CR mission:

a. **Low Threat**

- (1) Friendly forces have control of the air.
- (2) Ground threat confined to isolated, small hostile elements equipped with Small Arms.
- (3) Negligible or no maritime threat exists.

b. **Medium Threat**

- (1) Friendly forces have the required control of the air.
- (2) Ground threat consists of well-organised, well-armed hostile elements plus dispersed hostile elements of the indigenous population.
- (3) Maritime threat consists of radar guided SAMs, AAA and surface-to-surface weapons.

c. **High Threat**

- (1) Enemy forces have control of the air.
- (2) Ground threat consists of major military concentrations capable of rapid deployment. Indigenous population is well organised with communications to hostile military elements.
- (3) Maritime threat consists of a highly Integrated Air Defence, Underwater and Surface Warfare capability.

407. **Planning Guidelines.** The following planning guidelines should be followed on completion of the threat assessment:

- a. **Low Threat.** Significant planning is required for operations in a low threat environment; the composition and concentration of adversary forces may allow operations to utilise purely passive countermeasures.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

b. **Medium Threat.** Medium threat operations necessitate detailed planning and require consideration of the use of both active and passive countermeasures, an external means of suppression and support aircraft such as Rescue Combat Air Patrol (CAP), Rescue Escort (RESCORT) and Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. Survivability may be achieved through the use of covert helicopter operations without RESCORT/CAP that could compromise the mission.

c. **High Threat.** Operations in a high threat environment will require extensive mission planning and will probably require associated raids to negate, reduce or deceive the threat. Normal procedures are unlikely to be successful and recovery in a high threat environment is likely to involve an Unconventional Assisted Recovery, i.e. a deliberate operation planned and coordinated at Joint Task Force Headquarters level with extensive use of joint and Special Forces assets.


408. **Equipment Recovery.** Commanders should ensure that, while the recovery of key equipment is highly desirable, its recovery does not compromise the wider operational/tactical mission or place personnel at undue levels of risk. It is unlikely that recovery of equipment such as a helicopter external load would be carried out in any threat state other than Low. Where it is vital to recover a piece of equipment, consideration should be given to the establishment of a low threat environment around the equipment (a sanitised area) or the selective extraction of equipment from a capital platform. Recovery of large pieces of equipment must be subject to a comprehensive risk analysis. The JTFC must promulgate a clear policy on the recovery of equipment at the outset of an operational deployment.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

**ANNEX 4A – GENERIC DECISION MATRIX**



**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

ARCHIVED

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **CHAPTER 5 – PLANNING FOR JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS**

501. As covered in Chapter 3, the Joint Task Force Commander's (JTFC's) overall theatre plan should state the requirement for, and include guidance on, Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) operations.

502. **Additional Deployed Search and Rescue Planning Principles.** Deployed Search and Rescue (DSAR) planning should be complete prior to the deployment for an operation. DSAR forces will be allocated against a specific task when the mission analysis is complete. The analysis may show that the task required is relatively simple or needs theatre-specific clarification due to the extended nature of the task. Should this arise the JTFC may wish to specify and allot forces to a specific task-organised team.

### **Additional Combat Recovery Planning Principles**

503. **Concept of Operations Development.** Combat Recovery (CR) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) should be developed by the Component Commander (CC) responsible for the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre (JRCC). In order to achieve this it will be essential that the JRCC is manned by suitably qualified staff members to ensure effective employment of assets and execution of the CONOPS. The key factors to be considered in the development of these CONOPS include:

- a. Asset availability and capability, with particular focus on the recovery vehicle and its ground protection party.
- b. Limitations:
  - (1) Threat.
  - (2) Rules of Engagement.
  - (3) Considerations for international responsibilities. (Host nation, international waters etc.).
- c. Information and Intelligence.
- d. Risk Management.

504. **Execution.** CR operations are normally conducted in 6 phases although each phase should not be considered as an isolated activity and phases may overlap. Planning guidance for the organisation and function of the JRCC, and the procedures used by it, are contained in this 6-phase format.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

505. **Phase 1 – Proactive Mission Planning.** Proactive mission planning is preparatory work, conducted before an incident occurs, which facilitates the recovery of the isolated personnel or equipment. The main elements of proactive mission planning are:

- a. Develop a list of all theatre assets that are useable for CR missions with reference to availability, capability, and interoperability.
- b. Develop a list of medical facilities, including their capabilities and specialisation, which are available in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
- c. Conduct route planning<sup>1</sup> (critical for airborne assets), taking into consideration:
  - (1) Threat analysis.
  - (2) Environmental factors.
  - (3) Location of friendly forces.
  - (4) Fuel/time plan.
- d. The communications plan.
- e. The production of a JPR CONOPS for theatre. A suggested format for this is at Annex 5A.
- f. The production of JPR-specific Special Instructions (SPINS) for the theatre. A suggested format for JPR SPINS is at Annex 5B.

506. **Phase 2 – Notification (Initial Notification to Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre).** Initial notification of a mission requirement is likely to come from either the operating authority (i.e, the component chain of command), the initial On-Scene Commander (OSC), or a C3 platform. This information must then be passed to the JRCC by the quickest and, if possible, secure means.

507. **Phase 3 – Detection and Location.** The requirement to know the location of isolated personnel and equipment to an acceptable degree of certainty<sup>2</sup> is a pre-requisite to launch a recovery mission. Initial detection, location and authentication is normally achieved using electronic means. Isolated personnel must make every effort to aid the location and authentication process without compromising themselves or

---

<sup>1</sup> The incorporation of new capabilities such as Quickdraw2 and PRC112B1 by ISTAR aircraft and other platforms will significantly influence route planning.

<sup>2</sup> The acceptable degree of certainty of location of isolated personnel and/or equipment to launch a recovery mission will be a function of the threat assessment and the composition and capability of location equipment available to the recovery force.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

elements of the recovery Task Force. Depending on the threat-level, it may be necessary to give direction on emission control and the use of visual signals, such as light, which should be given in component orders and CR SPINS. If the initial electronic search fails to determine the position of the isolated personnel/equipment, a more extensive search may be required with the tasking of ISTAR assets. In a hostile area, stand-off search techniques may have to be employed. A risk assessment needs to be conducted before any search of hostile areas.

508. **Phase 4 – Mission Planning.** The decision to launch a deliberate CR mission can only be taken after careful risk analysis. This analysis is implicit in the mission planning cycle and the results will determine both the composition of the package and the conduct of the mission. The mission planning process involves the following steps:

- a. Selection of recovery method.
- b. Assignment of assets and supporting forces, including the designation of commanders.
- c. Co-ordination with other forces and operations.
- d. GO/NO GO decision based on the risk analysis assessment.
- e. Mission briefing.
- f. JRCC launch approval process.

509. **Phase 5 – Execution.** The execution of a deliberate CR mission would normally begin with launch authority from JTFC, or a delegated CC. The mission would then be conducted in accordance with theatre Standard Operating Procedures.

510. **Phase 6 – Mission Completion.** On completion of the 'Execution' phase of a CR operation, recovered personnel should be taken to a pre-assigned medical facility and subsequently handled through the Care After Recovery process (see Chapter 6). Contingency plans should be in place to cater for changing medical and operational requirements. However, recovered personnel and rescue forces should be debriefed at the earliest opportunity. Lessons learned should be collated by JRCC and disseminated to all appropriate force components, including back to the Permanent Joint Headquarters.

511. Annex 5C is a description of the Force Components involved with JPR to assist in the planning process.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

ARCHIVED

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **ANNEX 5A – OUTLINE FORMAT FOR COMBAT RECOVERY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

1. **Situation.**
  - a. Personnel and equipment to be recovered (including location if known).
  - b. Enemy.
  - c. Armed Factions.
  - d. Neutral countries/states and attitude of civilian population.
  - e. Friendly (including other missions in or near the CR AO).
  - f. Environment (including weather).
2. **Mission.**
3. **Execution.**
  - a. Commander's Intent.
  - b. Outline concept/plan.
  - c. ORBAT:
    - (1) CR forces.
    - (2) CR support forces.
    - (3) C2 relationships.
    - (4) Individual authority. Nomination or confirmation of:
      - (a) JRCC.
      - (b) MC.
      - (c) OSC.
      - (d) RMC.
  - d. Delineation of areas of responsibility for JRCC and RCC.
  - e. ROE.
  - f. Constraints.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

- g. Authority to abort mission. Who and under what circumstances.
- h. Co-ordinating Instructions:
  - (1) Authority for direct liaison.
  - (2) Nomination of HQ and unit co-ordinators and liaison officers.
  - (3) JRCC point of contact.
  - (4) Confirmation of CR SPINS
  - (5) Specific Command and Battlespace Management Information.
  - (6) Timings.
  - (7) Media (see Chapter 6)
- 4. **COMPLAN** (may include).
  - a. Callsigns.
  - b. Frequencies.
  - c. EMCON.
  - d. Locations of JRCC and RCCs.
  - e. If applicable: use of lights, visual signals and authentication codes
- 5. **Combat Service Support Plan** (may include).
  - a. FARP & FRP locations and timings.
  - b. Medical facilities (during and after mission).
  - c. Re-supply and re-equipping of recovered personnel (if necessary).
  - d. Aeromedical Evacuation/CASEVAC procedures.
  - e. Requirement for specialised equipment recovery assets.<sup>1</sup>
- 6. **De-briefing** (see Chapter 6).
  - a. Policy.
  - b. Procedures.

---

<sup>1</sup> E.g. CH47 to recover another unserviceable BH, or maintenance crews to prepare heavy equipment for recovery.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

- c. Location.
- d. Personnel to be de-briefed.

ARCHIVED

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

ARCHIVED

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **ANNEX 5B – JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/CO-ORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS**

1. Combat Recovery (CR) Special Instructions (SPINS) are issued in order to provide forces that are prone to capture or isolation with instructions on actions to take to evade the adversary and the mandatory procedures to be followed for subsequent recovery. Although SPINS are normally associated with wider air operations they are equally applicable to all participants in an operation who have the potential to become isolated. Consequently, there should be a CR-specific section within SPINS. The Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre (JRCC) will publish the SPINS at the beginning of an operation and they will remain applicable for its duration, being updated as necessary to support changing operational requirements. (Some sections of the SPINS will remain current for the duration of the operation while others may change weekly or daily.) Changes to SPINS are contained in the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO). The JRCC must give consideration to the means of disseminating the SPINS to units, which do not or would not normally receive the ATO. It is the responsibility of the CCs to designate these units/individuals and advise the JRCC of their information requirements.

2. The CR section of SPINS should include the following information:

- a. Pre-mission procedures.
- b. General CR procedures.
- c. Initial actions for the On-Scene Commander.
- d. Isolated personnel radio communication procedures.
- e. SARDOT.<sup>1</sup>
- f. Authentication procedures.
- g. Instructions to survivors for initial actions.
- h. What/how/when to use signalling devices.
- i. Lost communication procedures.
- j. Identification of Survival and Contact Areas.
- k. Identification of potential methods of recovery.

---

<sup>1</sup> SARDOT – SAR Bullseye. One or more classified map reference points will be given in SPINS. Isolated personnel can subsequently give their position (if known) in relation to the SARDOT.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

ARCHIVED

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## ANNEX 5C – FORCE COMPONENTS

### Deployed Search and Rescue

5C1. The force package for Deployed Search and Rescue is entirely dependent upon the mission analysis set against the perceived tasks that would be conducted prior to deployment and refreshed thereafter. Most frequently the requirement will be for a helicopter to be at certain readiness able to react to and reach incidents within the Joint Operations Area. Should the analysis identify specific additional requirements the necessary force elements will have to be drawn together trained and then declared as capable. Continuous evaluation of the requirement by MOD, Permanent Joint Headquarters and Joint Task Force Headquarters is necessary to ensure that the most appropriate force is deployed and held at the appropriate readiness.

### Combat Recovery

5C2. **Force Package.** Combat Recovery (CR) operations may comprise forces ranging from a single unit or sub-unit to a complex task force. The composition of the force will be dependent upon several factors as identified in Chapter 2. The organisation and operations must, where possible, be centred on forces either dedicated or designated for the mission. In addition, all other maritime, land or air assets may be required to assist in detection, co-ordination, location, authentication, protection and recovery of personnel and equipment. These assets may be constituted into a comprehensive force package.

5C3. **Recovery Assets.** Recovery assets are those assets specifically involved in the rescue of isolated personnel and equipment.

a. **Recovery Vehicle.** The primary recovery vehicle will normally be a helicopter, although other naval,<sup>1</sup> land or air vehicles may execute or assist in the execution of a recovery. When a helicopter is used, it will carry a ground protection party that must be capable of recovery site security, final authentication, immediate medical aid and assist movement of the isolated personnel or equipment into the helicopter. Designated recovery helicopters must be able to operate in a threat environment and should be capable of:

- (1) Winching/underslung loads.
- (2) Carrying rescue personnel and related equipment.
- (3) Low-level night operations.
- (4) Accurate independent navigation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Including ships, submarines and landing craft.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

- (5) Self-protection.
  - (6) Operations at extended range.
  - b. **Rescue Escort Assets.** A Rescue Escort (RESCORT) is an armed fixed or rotary wing aircraft, armoured vehicle or naval vessel, depending on the scenario. The RESCORT platform should, where possible, be capable of isolated personnel authentication and location.
  - c. **Rescue Combat Air Patrol Assets.** A Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP) is an aircraft patrol provided over a CR mission for the purpose of protecting the isolated personnel/equipment and task force from airborne threats. RESCAP forces should be available before committing rescue forces if the threat-state has potential to rise above Low (see Chapter 4) or adversary air activity is anticipated along the intended flight route or in the objective area.
- 5C4. **Supporting Assets.** Maritime, Land, Air and Special Forces (SF) components may provide supporting assets, which may include:
- a. C4ISR (including imagery intelligence).
  - b. SEAD (including Attack Helicopters, Artillery and Naval Fire Support), ELINT/SIGINT.
  - c. AEW/AWACS (for situational awareness, aircraft control and connectivity).
  - d. Ground and air recce.
  - e. Refuel/Resupply (AAR, Maritime resupply platforms, FARP etc.).
  - f. Aeromedical Evacuation/CASEVAC.
  - g. Deception forces.
  - h. SF patrols.
  - i. Specialist debriefing teams and facilities.
  - j. Ground or Naval Fire Support.
  - k. Ground Manoeuvre units/sub-units.
  - l. ASTOR (ground radar and MTI picture).

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **CHAPTER 6 – CARE AFTER RECOVERY**

### **General**

601. Taking effective action to care for the well being of Service Personnel who have been isolated, detained or captured is an essential task that must be accorded an appropriately high priority within the overall Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) process. Knowledge of such support is likely to encourage personnel at risk to give of their best under testing operational conditions. The responsibilities of the three Services are significant as there is a strong moral obligation to ensure that recovered personnel are provided with suitable levels of Care after Recovery (CAR). This includes debriefing, repatriation, rehabilitation, and counselling.

602. The purpose of CAR is to provide an effective mechanism to support the physical, psychological, emotional and spiritual recovery of individuals, who have been isolated, detained or captured. Ultimately the success of any recovery operation can be measured by the retention in service and return to duty of recovered personnel.

### **Factors**

603. **Health.** The physical and psychological condition of recovered personnel will be the key factor in their CAR. It may not be possible to determine the condition of personnel until they can be given a medical examination as part of the recovery activity. The primary aim of medical care is to preserve life, assess the physiological and psychological condition of the individuals, treat any ailments, (as well as taking all practical steps to prevent those likely to emerge in the future) and to ensure a return to normal living. Recovery plans will, therefore, need to err on the side of caution and assume worst-case scenarios for the scale of the needs of recovered personnel. Individuals who require evacuation to the UK and hospital admission must be tracked through the Health Service and close contact must be maintained, if necessary through dedicated liaison officers. The Services will need to ensure that individuals who are unable to be looked after in Service aftercare facilities are provided with the full range of psychological, emotional and spiritual support.

604. **Debriefing.** Recovered personnel may have access to critical information such as adversary ORBATs, dispositions and intentions and information about other prisoners or detainees. There are two stages of debrief:

- a. **Immediate.** High priority debriefing of personnel at point of recovery (subject to medical approval), carried out by the J2 staff in theatre in order to provide time sensitive intelligence.
- b. **Long Term.** Follow up debriefing carried out by 4(CAC) Company Joint Services Intelligence Organisation (JSIO) in order to provide information

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

to update and improve the Conduct After Capture Tri-Service Training Directive.

605. **Media.** Effective relations with the media at all levels of Defence will be critical to maintaining public support and Operations Security (OPSEC). The associated JPR Information Plan (covering all phases up to repatriation) will be a significant factor in planning the recovery operation. The aim of the Information Plan will be to minimise the possibility of any media reporting affecting the safe recovery of personnel. The factors to be considered include:

a. **Access of Captors to Media.** An adversary who has taken prisoners or hostages may seek to exploit the situation by giving the media (either local or international) access to them or releasing video material of 'confessions' from individuals. The International Community will need to take this into account and work on the expectation that prior to release, the prisoners/hostages' situation will have been publicised and high levels of media interest generated.

b. **Progress of Negotiations for Release.** The utility of informing the media needs to be assessed at the operational level and directed at the policy level. Past experience suggests that the best solution is to maintain a holding line confirming that named individuals are being held (confirmation of names only after KINFORMED) and that the govt will make every effort to ensure their safe return. For security reasons it will normally be policy not to be drawn into further detailed discussion of what these efforts entail nor should there be any discussion as to the progress of negotiations.

c. **Progress of Joint Personnel Recovery planning.** The utility of informing the media of progress needs to be assessed at the operational level and directed at the policy level.

d. **Family Liaison.** Families are to be kept as fully informed as possible, at the same time Liaison Officers must make strong recommendations that they do not discuss details with the media. Families should be protected from the media by careful briefing and, if necessary, be offered secure accommodation. Gaining and maintaining the support of the wider family is critical in order to dissuade them from talking to the media and divulging information that may, in turn, jeopardise efforts to secure the release or recovery of personnel. In normal circumstances the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) will nominate a media staff officer who is to be available at all times in order to brief the family through the J1 Duty Officer. The media staff officer will be in a position to dispel media speculation and offer 'ground truth'. He will also co-ordinate presentational activity between the J1 Welfare staff and the media staffs in Theatre and UK.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

606. **Next of Kin and Families.** The Next of Kin (NOK) and Families of recovered personnel have a vital role in the whole recovery and CAR process and a number of factors need to be considered:

a. **Maintaining communication.** It is extremely important that the NOK and Families of isolated personnel are kept as fully informed as possible, although the release of information will always be driven by the need to maintain Operational Security. In order to help keep them informed and to provide advice and guidance, it will be necessary to appoint a Families Liaison Officer (FLO), under the direction of the respective Service Principal Personnel Officers (PPO).

b. **Access to Repatriated Personnel.** The timing of, and location at which NOK and families are given access to repatriated personnel is important and should be judged on a case-by-case basis depending on:

- (1) The medical condition of the repatriated person.
- (2) The location of the family, given that they could be widely dispersed throughout the UK.
- (3) The facilities, if any, at the Reception Centre.

c. **Support for Next of Kin and Families.** The requirement to support NOK and families throughout a recovery operation should also be considered, particularly during a long-term rehabilitation programme. This would include linking with existing national medical and welfare services and Service welfare/support organisations and agencies, in order to provide counselling, medical and welfare support.

#### **The Care after Recovery Process**

607. Every recovery operation will be different and the circumstances and subsequent needs of recovered personnel will be unique to each situation. CAR procedures must be sufficiently flexible to take this into account and the Services should be prepared to tailor the aftercare processes to meet individual needs. Annex A to this chapter shows a schematic diagram of the CAR process and how this fits in to the overall JPR process. Also included in the diagram (for completion) is a suggested outline training profile for both the rescue assets and those to be rescued.

608. There are four phases to the CAR process: Pre Recovery, Recovery and Repatriation, Post Recovery and Follow Up. The CAR process is as follows:

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

SER	PHASE	ACTIVITY	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Pre-Recovery.	NOTICAS action and inform NOK	Casualty & Compassionate activities are currently a single Service responsibility and are carried out under single Service procedures, for example; the RN will use BR 8886, AC 12974 (Army Casualty Procedure 2000) for the Army, and AP 1922 for the RAF. With the introduction of JPA from 2006 Casualty & Compassionate cells will merge to form one tri-Service organisation.  The NHS may provide medical care for dependants, while local authority social services department may provide social care. Full care for dependants may need the involvement of these agencies. Defence Medical Services may need to provide medical help to families not normally entitled to treatment.
		Appoint Family LOs and Families Media LOs (if required) through Regional Welfare Areas (RN), Districts (Army) and Station HQ (RAF)	
		Maintain contact with families and dependents.	
		Notify Service medical and welfare organisations.	
		Recovery Planning.	
2.	Recovery and Repatriation.	Medical.	To be carried out at an in-theatre reception centre.
		Initial Intelligence Debrief.	Recovered personnel may possess significant information that requires immediate attention with regard to the status of other prisoners of war or hostages. They may also have important information about adversary capabilities that require immediate exploitation.
		Holding Facility.	Facility to hold recovered personnel whilst medicals and debriefs are carried out, prior to repatriation.
		Repatriation.	Usually by RAF Aeromedical Evacuation. Notification of families carried out by PPOs.
3.	Post Recovery.	Reception.	Reception and Recovery Centre (RRC) to be established. Reception will be through Reception Arrangements for Military Personnel for personnel requiring transfer for admission to a NHS hospital.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

SER	PHASE	ACTIVITY	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		Medical.	Provide appropriate medical treatment (Primary Health Care) at the RRC.  Close monitoring of and support to personnel treated in NHS/private facilities.
		Extended Debrief.	Conducted by 4(CAC) Coy JSIO under medical supervision if required.
		Recuperation.	Supervised by appropriately trained psychiatric staff. Access to Chaplains and Service Welfare Agencies required.
		Reintegration	Depending on the circumstances a gradual reintroduction to the military and civilian environment may be required. Including briefings on significant changes that have occurred since individuals were captured.
		Administration.	Individual pay and administration issues are to be resolved at the RRC.
		Leave.	Individuals should be granted any entitled leave. Arrangements may be required to provide support to the individual in the leave environment. Family LOs may need to continue to provide support, information and access to welfare organisations.
		Return to duty.	Subject to medical risk assessment. Individuals who are considered unsuited to return to duty will need to be assessed by a Medical Board.
4.	Follow Up.	Health monitoring and access to counselling services.	In line with Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy 'Remember' Theme. Individuals are to be routinely monitored for illness arising from their ordeal. If required, this is to include post discharge follow up as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder can develop a long time after exposure to stressors.

**Table 6.1 – The Care after Recovery Process**

### Responsibilities

609. **Joint Task Force Commander.** The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), supported by PJHQ, has primary responsibility for the recovery and repatriation phase of CAR. In carrying out these tasks he is to be supported by in theatre assets and advice and assistance from:

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

- a. RAF Medical Services who are responsible for repatriation when medical supervision is required.
  - b. The Deputy Director of Aviation Medicine who can provide specialist medical advice and support.
  - c. The Services who provide the link to NOK and dependents and will advise the JTFC of any non-medical grounds for repatriation.
610. The JTFC's responsibilities are to ensure the provision of:
- a. Immediate medical care.
  - b. In-theatre reception and holding facilities for recovered personnel.
  - c. Medical inspections/treatment.
  - d. Immediate debrief of recovered personnel using in-theatre J2 assets.
  - e. Decision on whether repatriation is required on non-medical grounds.
  - e. An escorting officer or officers to look after recovered personnel until they are returned to duty or repatriated.
  - f. Controlled access to recovered personnel.<sup>1</sup>
  - g. Repatriation when suitable.
611. **Services.** Once the repatriation of recovered personnel has taken place CAR becomes a single Service responsibility and will normally be controlled and co-ordinated by the PPOs. Where recovered personnel are from different Services MOD may nominate a lead Service to co-ordinate CAR activities. This will usually be to enable personnel who have been held as a group to stay together through the recovery process.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Where individuals do not require immediate repatriation on medical grounds it may be beneficial to their psychological health to keep them in theatre and return them to duty rather than repatriate.


<sup>2</sup> There are demonstrable psychological benefits in keeping a group who have shared a traumatic experience together through the recovery process.

This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.

This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.

JWP 3-66

ANNEX 6A – THE JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY PROCESS



**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ARCHIVED

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

### **Aeromedical Evacuation**

The movement of patients to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. (JWP 0-01.1/AAP-6)

### **Airborne Mission Commander**

A Rescue Mission Commander who commands from an airborne platform (such as an AWACS). (JWP 3-66)

### **Care After Recovery**

Care After Recovery is the term used to describe a range of support measures for recovered personnel including, debrief, repatriation, rehabilitation, counselling and medical assessment. It incorporates where possible the successful return to duty of the recovered individual and extends into long term monitoring and support where necessary. (JWP 3-66)

### **Casualty Evacuation**

The movement of casualties to and between medical facilities by land or air transportation. (JWP 3-66)

### **Combat Recovery Operations (CR Ops)**

A generic term for operations to recover isolated personnel in distress and/or equipment, from an environment in which a threat is posed by hostile interference, including: Combat Recovery, Combat Search and Rescue and certain Special Forces recovery operations. (JWP3-66)

### **Combat Recovery**

The recovery of isolated personnel in distress and/or equipment, from an environment in which a threat is posed by hostile interference, who are **not** trained and/or equipped to receive Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). (JWP 3-66)

### **Combat Search and Rescue**

The recovery of isolated personnel in distress, from an environment in which a threat is posed by hostile interference, who **are** trained and equipped for CSAR. (JWP 3-66)

### **Deployed Search and Rescue**

The recovery of isolated personnel in distress and/or equipment, in support of deployed operations and exercises, where **no** threat is posed by hostile interference. (JWP 3-66)

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

**Forward Aeromedical Evacuation**

That phase of evacuation, which provides airlift for patients under medical supervision between points within the battlefield, from the battlefield to the initial point of treatment, and to subsequent points of treatment within the combat zone. Normally conducted by rotary wing aircraft. (JWP 3-66)

**Joint Personnel Recovery**

The aggregation of military, civil and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing or isolated. JPR includes SAR, DSAR, CR, CSAR, Unconventional Assisted Recovery (i.e. hostage rescue) and associated Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) training, and Care After Recovery (CAR). (JWP3-66)

**Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre**

The Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre is the primary co-ordinating centre for all Joint Personnel Recovery operations. (JWP 3-66)

**Mission Co-ordinator**

The Mission Co-ordinator serves as an extension of the JRCC/RCC co-ordination function after the recovery force has launched. (JWP 3-66)

**On-Scene Commander**

The On-Scene Commander controls operations in the objective area and ensures a co-ordinated recovery effort. (JWP 3-66)

**Rescue**

Transfer of person(s), from a hostile environment to a benign environment, without further medical treatment. (JWP 3-66)

**Rescue Co-ordination Centre**

The Rescue Co-ordination Centre plans and co-ordinates Component Commander's Joint Personnel Recovery operations including co-ordination with the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre. (JWP 3-66)

**Rescue Mission Commander**

A Rescue Mission Commander is appointed by a Component Commander and has responsibility for the planning and execution of the JPR mission. (JWP 3-66)

**Search and Rescue Operations (SAR Ops)**

A generic term for operations to recover isolated personnel in distress where **no** threat is posed by hostile interference, including: Search and Rescue and Deployed Search and Rescue. (JWP3-66)

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

**Search and Rescue (SAR)**

SAR is the recovery of isolated personnel in distress, where **no** threat is posed by hostile interference. (JWP 3-66)

**Tactical Aeromedical Evacuation (TAE)**

That phase of evacuation that provides airlift for patients under medical supervision from the combat zone to points outside the combat zone. Normally conducted by fixed wing aircraft. (JWP 3-66)

ARCHIVED

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

ARCHIVED

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

## **GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAR	Air-to-Air Refuelling
ACO	Airspace Control Order
ACP	Airspace Control Plan
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AH	Attack Helicopter(s)
AMPT	Air Manoeuvre Planning Team
ANP	Air Navigation Plans
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
ASaC	Airborne Surveillance and Control
ATO	Air Tasking Order
ATP	Allied Tactical Publication
AO	Area of Operations
C2W	Command and Control Warfare
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
CAC	Conduct After Capture
CAR	Care After Recovery
CAS	Close Air Support
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CBM	Command and Battlespace Management
CC	Component Commander
COMPLAN	Communications Plan
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COS	Chief of Staff
CR	Combat Recovery
CRTF	Combat Recovery Task Force
CSAR	Combat Search and Rescue
CSS	Combat Service Support
DSAR	Deployed Search & Rescue
ER	Evasion and Recovery
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EMCON	Emission Control
EPA	Evasion Plan of Action
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FARP	Forward Arming and Refuelling Point
FIR	Flight Information Region
FLO	Families Liaison Officer

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

FRP	Forward Refuelling Point
Fwd AE	Forward Aeromedical Evacuation
IADS	Integrated Air Defence System
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
ISOPREP	Isolated Personnel Report
IR	Infra-Red
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFSFCC	Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander
JHC	Joint Helicopter Command
JOA	Joint Operating Area
JPR	Joint Personnel Recovery
JRCC	Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre
JSIO	Joint Services Intelligence Organisation
JTFC	Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
MC	Mission Co-ordinator
NF	Naval Fires
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHS	National Health Service
NOK	Next of Kin
OGD	Other Government Departments
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OSC	On-Scene Commander
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
PPO	Principle Personnel Officer
PR	Personnel Recovery
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RAMP	Reception Arrangements for Military Personnel
RCC	Rescue Co-ordination Centre
RESCAP	Rescue Combat Air Patrol
RESCORT	Rescue Escort

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

RMC	Rescue Mission Commander
ROE	Rules of Engagement
R to I	Resistance to Interrogation
RRC	Reception and Recovery Centre
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SAR	Search and Rescue
SARDOT	SAR Bullseye Point
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
SERE	Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction <sup>1</sup>
SF	Special Forces
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPINS	Special Instructions
SRR	SAR Regions
SUPPLAN	Supplementary Plan
Tac AE	Tactical Aeromedical Evacuation
TACON	Tactical Control
UAR	Unconventional Assisted Recovery

---

<sup>1</sup> In the US, 'SERE' stands for Survival, Evasion, Rescue and Escape.

**This publication was replaced by  
Allied Joint Doctrine for the  
Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7)  
published by NATO in February 2016.**

**This publication is no longer authoritative and has been archived.**

JWP 3-66

ARCHIVED

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)