



Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Record of roundtable discussion on EU Enlargement in Paris, 17 June 2014

On 17 June 2014 HMA Peter Ricketts chaired a breakfast with EU enlargement policy specialists based in France. Participants included:

- Jacques Rupnik, Director at CERI-Sciences Po, Paris;
- Ambassador Michel Foucher, Chair in geopolitics, Collège d'études mondiales;
- Dorothee Schmid, Head of the Turkey programme at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI);
- Florent Parmentier, Programme director, Master of Public Administration" Sciences Po, Paris;
- Gaëlle Pério Valero, Balkans specialist at the Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS)

The discussion took place under the Chatham House Rule. The participants and a discussion summary are recorded but the information received and points made are not attributed to individuals or their affiliation.

Question 1: How effectively have the Member States and the EU institutions run the enlargement process? Have lessons drawn from previous enlargement rounds been applied?

The enlargement process has been effective:

- The 2004/2007 enlargements to include twelve Central and Eastern European countries helped to consolidate democracy in the region. But the EU's Member States (MS) do not always recognise this, as it is too politically sensitive to describe the enlargements as success stories. The press also has a tendency to paint a negative picture. As a result the enlargement process has been questioned. It is a necessary but fragile policy;
- The EU's MS learned from the 2004/2007 "big bang" enlargements. They realised that adoption of the *acquis* was a complicated process, and altered their enlargement policy to enable new MS to get it right. The process is currently more differentiated

than previously, and based on implementation of key reforms. This is why an emphasis has been placed on chapters 23 and 24.

But there is still room for improvement:

- There is a large discrepancy between the amount of money spent on the EU's enlargement policy and the ENP. Poland, for example, receives 78 billion Euros in EU funding, whereas Ukraine currently receives less than 1 billion;
- There is a need to disassociate the enlargement offer from a NATO membership perspective;
- There is an absence of transparency, fluidity and effective communication in/about the enlargement process;
- The enlargement process needs to be tailored with regards to a country's individual circumstances – a one-size fits all process is not the most effective, although a tailored approach brings its own challenges;
- The Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) funds are not used effectively and the framework is not well adapted to its purpose.

Question 2: How do you assess the EU's use of conditionality (e.g. the Copenhagen Criteria, the 'New Approach' on rule-of-law issues)? Has conditionality been effective in ensuring candidate countries implement reforms necessary for EU membership? Please give examples.

One of the EU's greatest Foreign Policy success resulted from EU enlargement conditionality:

- The Serbia/Kosovo dialogue, linked to the two countries' accession process, was a huge success.

But the EU's use of conditionality merits more attention:

- Conditionality could vary depending on the candidate country: regional cooperation should be an additional criteria for the Balkans countries, to help solve regional problems;
- BiH has made little progress of late and is a clear example of why the EU needs to rethink its enlargement conditions – BiH's political leaders did not seem to care, for example, when the Commission withdrew its IPA funding in December 2013;
- For conditionality to be successful there is a need for: transparency; a motivated (pre) candidate country, a clear balance of power, and a reasonable timeframe (the

current process takes too long). Turkey is currently attracted by the Middle East, and therefore losing interest in its EU perspective. This hinders the efficacy of conditionality;

- There needs to be more of a focus on specific tasks, rather than changing Commission priorities;
- We need to better understand the political effects conditionality has on member states.

Question 3: What challenges / opportunities might EU enlargement face in future? Is there room to improve the process?

Future Challenges/opportunities EU enlargement faces :

- Enlargement to include the Western Balkans countries is currently blocked – the EU's MS need to become more implicated in the process. If the EU doesn't manage to, for example, resolve the Greece/Macedonia name dispute, or encourage change in Bosnia, it will have failed on its own doorstep and lose credibility;
- But enlargement to the Western Balkans is the only enlargement that is not questioned by EU's MS;
- In the Western Balkans case, the accession process supports state-building and has therefore taken on a new dimension;
- Croatia has a huge role to play and we should be collectively passing this message in Zagreb;
- Macedonia is regressing – the EU's MS need to take responsibility and pass tough messages to encourage reform in Skopje;
- The Ukrainian question will loom over the EU's enlargement policy – we need to work out a credible EU offer for the Ukrainians. In this context, we also need to think collectively about Russia's role in the Balkans region through different fora such as the OSCE.

There is room for improvement:

- Enlargement financing needs to be re-thought;
- We should invent an intermediary status between enlargement and an Association Agreement (for Ukraine especially);
- We need to develop a credible discourse for the people in Ukraine's Donbas region – there needs to be a push for a bottom-up Europeanisation of Ukraine, through instruments like the Erasmus programme;

- There is a contradiction between bilateral Association Agreements and the need for regional integration. To solve this the EU should come up with a regional economic integration policy.

Annex: Michel Foucher's additional notes on roundtable discussion on EU enlargement in Paris

Question 1: How effectively have the Member States and the EU institutions run the enlargement process? Have lessons drawn from previous enlargement rounds been applied?

The Commission's DG Enlargement remit has expanded. There is a tendency to copy-paste (c.f draft association agreement with Ukraine: 80% of *acquis* of the 1378 pages).

Apparent willingness to replicate the Polish scenario and make suitable corrections.

Financial aspects: too much money for existing Member States, not enough for pre-accession candidates or for the neighbourhood. Need to end the "all or nothing" nature of accession.

Neighbourhood:

DG DFCO: neighbourhood = cooperation (permanent tensions with DG Elar.)

Between 2014 and 2020: €15,4bn (€12 en 2007-2013) for the East and South

- Ukraine : €1,4 (+ 8 EIB, loans including the Chernobyl assistance+ 1,4 loans)
- Moldavia €0,5 ; Georgia €0,3 ; Azerbaijan €0,2 ; Armenia €0,2 ; Belarus €200.000 (civil society)

Poland: structural funds €78bn (+ CAP minus return)

Therefore Ukraine €200 million/ year, Poland €11 bn: = 1 to 55

2007-2013 : Ukraine 494m€ ; Poland

DG Enlargement 2007-2013 : Pre-accession instrument 11,5 : Western Balkans (6,7) et Turkey (4,8)

2007-2012 Amount received by Poland as net beneficiary (Cohesion policy + CAP – contribution to the European) : **€50,9 bn**

(Billion Euros)

2012	:	15,7
2011	:	11
2010	:	8,4
2009	:	6,3
2008	:	4,4
2007	:	5,1

Ukraine received €494m between 2007-2010.

Differential: 1 to 103 (the more Poland develops, the more money it receives)

Question 2: How do you assess the EU's use of conditionality (e.g., the Copenhagen Criteria, the 'New Approach' on rule-of-law issues)? Has conditionality been effective in ensuring candidate countries implement reforms necessary for EU membership? Please give examples.

1993 criteria were invented to take into account ideological tendencies (which did not exist in 1957): Montesquieu + market economy

Method to be adapted depending on historical and geographical circumstances: for the Balkans, add a cooperation aspect. Risk of self-centred attitudes (Slovenia/Croatia on Piran) and of divergence in the Western Balkans.

Question 3: What challenges / opportunities might EU enlargement face in future? Is there room to improve the process?

Take into account geopolitical realities and EU interests.

End of the « all or nothing » approach to accession: to have progressive and tailor-made offers, bottom-up europeanisation (grants ; visas) and top-down (institutions)

Associated partnership (Ukraine, Turkey) and ad hoc agreements (Azerbaijan for example)

And geostrategic realities : separate EU/NATO in Eastern Europe

No enlargement policy without a European policy towards Russia and there should be one question: retreat from or cooperate over the continent. Decide taking into account the EU's long-term interests.

Challenges around public opinion and decision making process: towards a more differentiated EU.